v6.9-rc5-scx1

.mailmap

@@ -446,7 +446,8 @@ Mythri P K <[email protected]>
 Nadav Amit <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Nadav Amit <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Nadia Yvette Chambers <[email protected]> William Lee Irwin III <[email protected]>
-Naoya Horiguchi <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
+Naoya Horiguchi <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
+Naoya Horiguchi <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Neeraj Upadhyay <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Neil Armstrong <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
@@ -524,6 +525,7 @@ Rémi Denis-Courmont <[email protected]>
 Ricardo Ribalda <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Ricardo Ribalda <[email protected]> Ricardo Ribalda Delgado <[email protected]>
 Ricardo Ribalda <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
+Richard Genoud <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Richard Leitner <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Richard Leitner <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Richard Leitner <[email protected]> <[email protected]>

CREDITS

@@ -3146,6 +3146,10 @@ S: Triftstra=DFe 55
 S: 13353 Berlin
 S: Germany
 
+N: Gustavo Pimental
+E: [email protected]
+D: PCI driver for Synopsys DesignWare
+
 N: Emanuel Pirker
 E: [email protected]
 D: AIC5800 IEEE 1394, RAW I/O on 1394

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst

@@ -138,11 +138,10 @@ associated with the source address of the indirect branch. Specifically,
 the BHB might be shared across privilege levels even in the presence of
 Enhanced IBRS.
 
-Currently the only known real-world BHB attack vector is via
-unprivileged eBPF. Therefore, it's highly recommended to not enable
-unprivileged eBPF, especially when eIBRS is used (without retpolines).
-For a full mitigation against BHB attacks, it's recommended to use
-retpolines (or eIBRS combined with retpolines).
+Previously the only known real-world BHB attack vector was via unprivileged
+eBPF. Further research has found attacks that don't require unprivileged eBPF.
+For a full mitigation against BHB attacks it is recommended to set BHI_DIS_S or
+use the BHB clearing sequence.
 
 Attack scenarios
 ----------------
@@ -430,6 +429,23 @@ The possible values in this file are:
   'PBRSB-eIBRS: Not affected'  CPU is not affected by PBRSB
   ===========================  =======================================================
 
+  - Branch History Injection (BHI) protection status:
+
+.. list-table::
+
+ * - BHI: Not affected
+   - System is not affected
+ * - BHI: Retpoline
+   - System is protected by retpoline
+ * - BHI: BHI_DIS_S
+   - System is protected by BHI_DIS_S
+ * - BHI: SW loop, KVM SW loop
+   - System is protected by software clearing sequence
+ * - BHI: Vulnerable
+   - System is vulnerable to BHI
+ * - BHI: Vulnerable, KVM: SW loop
+   - System is vulnerable; KVM is protected by software clearing sequence
+
 Full mitigation might require a microcode update from the CPU
 vendor. When the necessary microcode is not available, the kernel will
 report vulnerability.
@@ -484,7 +500,11 @@ Spectre variant 2
 
    Systems which support enhanced IBRS (eIBRS) enable IBRS protection once at
    boot, by setting the IBRS bit, and they're automatically protected against
-   Spectre v2 variant attacks.
+   some Spectre v2 variant attacks. The BHB can still influence the choice of
+   indirect branch predictor entry, and although branch predictor entries are
+   isolated between modes when eIBRS is enabled, the BHB itself is not isolated
+   between modes. Systems which support BHI_DIS_S will set it to protect against
+   BHI attacks.
 
    On Intel's enhanced IBRS systems, this includes cross-thread branch target
    injections on SMT systems (STIBP). In other words, Intel eIBRS enables
@@ -638,6 +658,18 @@ kernel command line.
 		spectre_v2=off. Spectre variant 1 mitigations
 		cannot be disabled.
 
+	spectre_bhi=
+
+		[X86] Control mitigation of Branch History Injection
+		(BHI) vulnerability.  This setting affects the deployment
+		of the HW BHI control and the SW BHB clearing sequence.
+
+		on
+			(default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation as
+			needed.
+		off
+			Disable the mitigation.
+
 For spectre_v2_user see Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
 
 Mitigation selection guide

Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt

@@ -3444,6 +3444,7 @@
 					       retbleed=off [X86]
 					       spec_rstack_overflow=off [X86]
 					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
+					       spectre_bhi=off [X86]
 					       spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
 					       srbds=off [X86,INTEL]
 					       ssbd=force-off [ARM64]
@@ -6063,6 +6064,15 @@
 	sonypi.*=	[HW] Sony Programmable I/O Control Device driver
 			See Documentation/admin-guide/laptops/sonypi.rst
 
+	spectre_bhi=	[X86] Control mitigation of Branch History Injection
+			(BHI) vulnerability.  This setting affects the
+			deployment of the HW BHI control and the SW BHB
+			clearing sequence.
+
+			on   - (default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation
+			       as needed.
+			off  - Disable the mitigation.
+
 	spectre_v2=	[X86,EARLY] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
 			(indirect branch speculation) vulnerability.
 			The default operation protects the kernel from

Documentation/devicetree/bindings/display/msm/qcom,sm8150-mdss.yaml

@@ -53,6 +53,15 @@ patternProperties:
       compatible:
         const: qcom,sm8150-dpu
 
+  "^displayport-controller@[0-9a-f]+$":
+    type: object
+    additionalProperties: true
+
+    properties:
+      compatible:
+        contains:
+          const: qcom,sm8150-dp
+
   "^dsi@[0-9a-f]+$":
     type: object
     additionalProperties: true

Documentation/devicetree/bindings/pwm/mediatek,pwm-disp.yaml

@@ -52,6 +52,9 @@ properties:
       - const: main
       - const: mm
 
+  power-domains:
+    maxItems: 1
+
 required:
   - compatible
   - reg

Documentation/devicetree/bindings/serial/atmel,at91-usart.yaml

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ $schema: http://devicetree.org/meta-schemas/core.yaml#
 title: Atmel Universal Synchronous Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter (USART)
 
 maintainers:
-  - Richard Genoud <richard.genoud@gmail.com>
+  - Richard Genoud <richard.genoud@bootlin.com>
 
 properties:
   compatible:

Documentation/driver-api/virtio/writing_virtio_drivers.rst

@@ -97,7 +97,6 @@ like this::
 
 	static struct virtio_driver virtio_dummy_driver = {
 		.driver.name =  KBUILD_MODNAME,
-		.driver.owner = THIS_MODULE,
 		.id_table =     id_table,
 		.probe =        virtio_dummy_probe,
 		.remove =       virtio_dummy_remove,

Documentation/filesystems/bcachefs/index.rst

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+======================
+bcachefs Documentation
+======================
+
+.. toctree::
+   :maxdepth: 2
+   :numbered:
+
+   errorcodes

Documentation/filesystems/index.rst

@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ Documentation for filesystem implementations.
    afs
    autofs
    autofs-mount-control
+   bcachefs/index
    befs
    bfs
    btrfs

Documentation/mm/page_owner.rst

@@ -24,10 +24,10 @@ fragmentation statistics can be obtained through gfp flag information of
 each page. It is already implemented and activated if page owner is
 enabled. Other usages are more than welcome.
 
-It can also be used to show all the stacks and their outstanding
-allocations, which gives us a quick overview of where the memory is going
-without the need to screen through all the pages and match the allocation
-and free operation.
+It can also be used to show all the stacks and their current number of
+allocated base pages, which gives us a quick overview of where the memory
+is going without the need to screen through all the pages and match the
+allocation and free operation.
 
 page owner is disabled by default. So, if you'd like to use it, you need
 to add "page_owner=on" to your boot cmdline. If the kernel is built
@@ -75,42 +75,45 @@ Usage
 
 	cat /sys/kernel/debug/page_owner_stacks/show_stacks > stacks.txt
 	cat stacks.txt
-	 prep_new_page+0xa9/0x120
-	 get_page_from_freelist+0x7e6/0x2140
-	 __alloc_pages+0x18a/0x370
-	 new_slab+0xc8/0x580
-	 ___slab_alloc+0x1f2/0xaf0
-	 __slab_alloc.isra.86+0x22/0x40
-	 kmem_cache_alloc+0x31b/0x350
-	 __khugepaged_enter+0x39/0x100
-	 dup_mmap+0x1c7/0x5ce
-	 copy_process+0x1afe/0x1c90
-	 kernel_clone+0x9a/0x3c0
-	 __do_sys_clone+0x66/0x90
-	 do_syscall_64+0x7f/0x160
-	 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6c/0x74
-	stack_count: 234
+	 post_alloc_hook+0x177/0x1a0
+	 get_page_from_freelist+0xd01/0xd80
+	 __alloc_pages+0x39e/0x7e0
+	 allocate_slab+0xbc/0x3f0
+	 ___slab_alloc+0x528/0x8a0
+	 kmem_cache_alloc+0x224/0x3b0
+	 sk_prot_alloc+0x58/0x1a0
+	 sk_alloc+0x32/0x4f0
+	 inet_create+0x427/0xb50
+	 __sock_create+0x2e4/0x650
+	 inet_ctl_sock_create+0x30/0x180
+	 igmp_net_init+0xc1/0x130
+	 ops_init+0x167/0x410
+	 setup_net+0x304/0xa60
+	 copy_net_ns+0x29b/0x4a0
+	 create_new_namespaces+0x4a1/0x820
+	nr_base_pages: 16
 	...
 	...
 	echo 7000 > /sys/kernel/debug/page_owner_stacks/count_threshold
 	cat /sys/kernel/debug/page_owner_stacks/show_stacks> stacks_7000.txt
 	cat stacks_7000.txt
-	 prep_new_page+0xa9/0x120
-	 get_page_from_freelist+0x7e6/0x2140
-	 __alloc_pages+0x18a/0x370
-	 alloc_pages_mpol+0xdf/0x1e0
-	 folio_alloc+0x14/0x50
-	 filemap_alloc_folio+0xb0/0x100
-	 page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x97/0x180
-	 filemap_fault+0x4b4/0x1200
-	 __do_fault+0x2d/0x110
-	 do_pte_missing+0x4b0/0xa30
-	 __handle_mm_fault+0x7fa/0xb70
-	 handle_mm_fault+0x125/0x300
-	 do_user_addr_fault+0x3c9/0x840
-	 exc_page_fault+0x68/0x150
-	 asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
-	stack_count: 8248
+	 post_alloc_hook+0x177/0x1a0
+	 get_page_from_freelist+0xd01/0xd80
+	 __alloc_pages+0x39e/0x7e0
+	 alloc_pages_mpol+0x22e/0x490
+	 folio_alloc+0xd5/0x110
+	 filemap_alloc_folio+0x78/0x230
+	 page_cache_ra_order+0x287/0x6f0
+	 filemap_get_pages+0x517/0x1160
+	 filemap_read+0x304/0x9f0
+	 xfs_file_buffered_read+0xe6/0x1d0 [xfs]
+	 xfs_file_read_iter+0x1f0/0x380 [xfs]
+	 __kernel_read+0x3b9/0x730
+	 kernel_read_file+0x309/0x4d0
+	 __do_sys_finit_module+0x381/0x730
+	 do_syscall_64+0x8d/0x150
+	 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x62/0x6a
+	nr_base_pages: 20824
 	...
 
 	cat /sys/kernel/debug/page_owner > page_owner_full.txt

Documentation/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.rst

@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ an involved disclosed party. The current ambassadors list:
   AMD		Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
   Ampere	Darren Hart <[email protected]>
   ARM		Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
-  IBM Power	Anton Blanchard <anton@linux.ibm.com>
+  IBM Power	Michael Ellerman <ellerman@au.ibm.com>
   IBM Z		Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]>
   Intel		Tony Luck <[email protected]>
   Qualcomm	Trilok Soni <[email protected]>