editorial nits

book/src/introduction.md

@@ -32,19 +32,19 @@ computed by RISC Zero's Bonsai service in under an hour.
 Assuming an honest majority operates the parent chain of the rollup, on-chain denial-of-service attacks can still
 happen if a wealthy party raises the on-chain gas costs beyond what honest participants in the fault proof protocol can
 afford.
-This block congestion attack can effectively censor disputes on faulty sequencing from being made on-chain, threatening
-the safety of the rollup.
+This block congestion attack can effectively censor disputes against faulty sequencing proposals from being made
+on-chain, threatening the safety of the rollup.
 
 ```admonish check
-Kailua incorporates "Adaptive Dispute Cutoffs", which delays withdrawal finality to increase the opportunity to
-dispute faulty sequencing based on the level of on-chain congestion. This guarantees that if faults cost more to
-dispute than a predetermined amount, honest parties will be granted more time until gas costs return to normal.
+Kailua's design incorporates "Adaptive Dispute Cutoffs", which delays withdrawal finality to increase the dispute 
+opportunity based on the level of on-chain congestion. This guarantees that if faults cost more to dispute than a
+predetermined amount, honest parties will be granted more time until gas costs subside.
 ```
 
 ### Sybil Identities
 
-Whale attackers can overwhelm honest parties in a dispute resolution mechanism by using multiple identities to flood the
-system with disputes.
+**Whale** attackers can overwhelm honest parties in a dispute resolution mechanism by using multiple identities to flood
+the system with disputes.
 In fault proving schemes where a defender has to issue a timely response on-chain to every dispute, the costs borne
 by the defender to continuously participate in all open disputes until they are resolved can be overwhelming, leading
 to some faults slipping through.
@@ -58,8 +58,8 @@ generate.
 
 ### Resource Exhaustion
 
-In addition to transaction fee expenditure, some protocols additionally require collateral to be staked for every move
-made in the system, while others require proofs to be generated in a timely manner.
+Some fault proof protocols require additional collateral to be staked for every move made in the system, while others
+require proofs to be generated in a timely manner.
 These two requirements cause some other systems to be vulnerable to resource exhaustion, where the resource can be
 the collateral or the proving power required for an honest party to issue a timely response, even if it can afford the
 transaction fees.

book/src/parameters.md

@@ -33,7 +33,8 @@ to ensure the liveness of your chain.
 ```admonish example
 Consider Optimism Mainnnet as an example, which has a block time of 2 seconds.
 To keep its current average sequencing frequency of ~55 minutes, it only needs to publish ~1650 commitments per proposal.
-To maximize its usage of this single blob, OP Mainnet can relax its proposal rate to once per 2 hours and 15 minutes.
+To maximize the utilization of the extra blob published when proposing, OP Mainnet can relax its proposal rate to once
+per 2 hours and 15 minutes.
 ```
 
 ## Proposal Time Gap
@@ -44,11 +45,13 @@ proposals from being made eagerly before the parent chain data supporting that s
 This mechanism comes in the form of a forced delay between the timestamp of the L2 block being proposed, and the current
 timestamp on the parent chain (ethereum).
 
-At the time of writing, Ethereum finalized a block in [approximately 15 minutes](https://ethereum.org/en/roadmap/single-slot-finality/#:~:text=It%20takes%20about%2015%20minutes%20for%20an%20Ethereum%20block%20to%20finalize).
-Consequently, we recommend you set this parameter to `15 × 60 = 900` seconds.
+At the time of writing, Ethereum finalizes each block in [approximately 15 minutes](https://ethereum.org/en/roadmap/single-slot-finality/#:~:text=It%20takes%20about%2015%20minutes%20for%20an%20Ethereum%20block%20to%20finalize).
+Consequently, we recommend you set this parameter to `15 × 60 = 900` seconds to match.
 
+```admonish note
 While the Kailua proposer agent won't publish a sequencing proposal until it is considered safe, the Kailua contracts
 allow you to enforce this requirement so that even an eager (potentially dishonest) proposer cannot have a head start!
+```
 
 ## Collateral Amount
 
@@ -68,18 +71,15 @@ days if it is undisputed.
 This means, at an average hourly rate of proposing, the proposer has `84 * 0.08 = 6.72` ETH (\~$3700 USD) on average 
 locked up as collateral in the best case where no disputes take place.
 
-Using Kailua 0.08 ETH would be sufficient as the total collateral locked up by the proposer, even under the same finality
+Using Kailua, 0.08 ETH would be sufficient as the total collateral locked up by the proposer, even under the same finality
 delay.
-This would cover the worst-case proving cost in case of dispute, and leave a $200 tip as well.
+This would cover the worst-case proving cost in case of dispute, and, discounting transaction costs, leave a $200 tip.
 ```
 
 ## Challenge Timeout
 
-```admonish note
-Kailua does not yet implement adaptive dispute periods.
-```
-
-For simplicity and ease of mind, you can keep your current sequencing proposal dispute period.
+The current implementation of Kailua does not yet have adaptive dispute periods based on congestion.
+Consequently, you should keep your existing challenge timeout period.
 
 ## Verifier Contract
 RISC Zero maintains a set of pre-deployed verifier contracts for its ZK proving system.
@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ mechanism that anyone who can produce a proof-of-exploit can trigger to halt the
 
 ```admonish note
 You must ensure that the chosen verifier contract supports your RISC Zero zkVM version.
+Once a new zkVM version is released, there can be a delay in adding it to the router.
 ```
 
 You have the choice of either using the already deployed verifier for your parent chain, or deploying and maintaining

book/src/quickstart.md

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 # Quickstart
 
-Kailua enables rollup operators to add a new fault proof system to their rollup using the `DisputeGameFactory`.
-Kailua's contracts rely on RISC-Zero zkVM proofs to finalize/dismiss output proposals, and are compatible with Optimism's Bedrock contracts `v1.4.0` and above.
+Kailua enables rollup operators to add a new fault proof system to their rollup via the Optimism `DisputeGameFactory`
+contract.
+Kailua's contracts rely on RISC-Zero zkVM proofs to finalize/dismiss output proposals, and are compatible with
+Optimism's Bedrock contracts `v1.4.0` and above.
 
-The `KailuaTournament` contract optimistically allows outputs to be accepted after a timeout if no fraud proof is published against it,
-or if the output is challenged, waits for a proof to be submitted to decide whether to dismiss the output.
 
 ## Prerequisites
 1. [rust](https://www.rust-lang.org/tools/install)

book/src/setup.md

@@ -9,9 +9,9 @@ Before you can start migrating your rollup, you'll need to build and install Kai
 commands from the root project directory:
 
 ```admonish tip
-Do not run these commands in parallel.
-Each of these commands will take time to build the FPVM program in release mode.
-If you do, GitHub may throttle you, leading to a docker build error.
+Do not run these `install` commands in parallel.
+Each binary installation will take time to reproducibly build the FPVM program in release mode.
+If you install them in parallel, GitHub may throttle you, leading to a docker build error.
 ```
 
 ### CLI Binary
@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ cargo install kailua-host --path bin/host
 
 ## Configuration
 
-Once your installation is successful, you should be able to run the following command to fetch the configuration
-parameters of your rollup instance:
+Once your installation is successful, you should be able to run the following command to fetch the Kailua configuration
+parameters for your rollup instance:
 
 ```shell
 kailua-cli config --op-node-url [YOUR_OP_NODE_URL] --op-geth-url [YOUR_OP_GETH_URL] --eth-rpc-url [YOUR_ETH_RPC_URL]
@@ -56,6 +56,11 @@ OPTIMISM_PORTAL: 0x16FC5058F25648194471939DF75CF27A2FDC48BC
 KAILUA_GAME_TYPE: 1337
 ```
 
+```admonish warning
+Make sure that your `FPVM_IMAGE_ID` matches the value above.
+This value determines the exact program used to prove faults.
+```
+
 ```admonish note
 If your `RISC_ZERO_VERIFIER` value is blank, this means that your rollup might be deployed on a base layer that does
 not have a deployed RISC Zero zkVM verifier contract.
@@ -64,9 +69,4 @@ Always revise the RISC Zero [documentation](https://dev.risczero.com/api/blockch
 to double-check verifier availability.
 ```
 
-```admonish warning
-Make sure that your `FPVM_IMAGE_ID` matches the value above.
-This value determines the exact program used to prove faults.
-```
-
-Once you have these values you'll need to save them for later use during contract deployment.
+Once you have these values you'll need to save them for later use during migration.

book/src/upgrade.md

@@ -18,6 +18,10 @@ The Kailua CLI has a `fast-track` command for automating the L1 transactions req
 If the command does not yet support your configuration, you'll need to follow the manual steps in the next sub-sections.
 ```
 
+```admonish hint
+You might find it useful to rehearse migration using a local devnet first.
+```
+
 ## Fast-track Migration
 
 ```admonish info

book/src/validator.md

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ proof to settle the dispute between them.
 
 ```admonish note
 The Kailua validator agent requires access to an archive `op-geth` rollup node to retrieve data during proof generation.
-Node software other than `geth` is not as reliable.
+Node software other than `op-geth` is not as reliable for the necessary `debug` namespace rpc calls.
 ```
 
 ## Usage