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 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Report on OONI: Open Observatory of Network Interference</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/categories/report/</link><description>Recent content in Report on OONI: Open Observatory of Network Interference</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 09 Dec 2024 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://ooni.github.io/categories/report/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Censorship Chronicles: The systematic suppression of independent media in Russia</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-russia-report/</link><pubDate>Mon, 09 Dec 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-russia-report/</guid><description>&lt;p>Nearly three years ago, when Russia launched its military operation in Ukraine, it also initiated a parallel campaign: a censorship war targeting independent news media within the country.&lt;/p>
-&lt;p>Merely a week after the conflict started, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in Russia &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2022-russia-blocks-amid-ru-ua-conflict/#blocking-of-news-media-websites">started blocking&lt;/a> access to several foreign news media websites (such as &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/search?since=2022-02-03&amp;until=2022-03-07&amp;failure=false&amp;domain=www.bbc.com&amp;probe_cc=RU&amp;only=anomalies">BBC&lt;/a> and &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/search?since=2022-02-03&amp;until=2022-03-07&amp;failure=false&amp;domain=www.dw.com&amp;probe_cc=RU&amp;only=anomalies">Deutsche Welle&lt;/a>) and independent Russian news media websites (such as &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2022-russia-blocks-amid-ru-ua-conflict/#meduza">Meduza&lt;/a> and &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2022-russia-blocks-amid-ru-ua-conflict/#new-times">New Times&lt;/a>). Within a year, independent news media censorship in Russia had become pervasive. In our previous report, we &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2023-russia-a-year-after-the-conflict/#blocked-websites">confirmed the blocking of 139 news media domains&lt;/a> in Russia.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Russia blocked OONI Explorer, a large open dataset on Internet censorship</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-russia-blocked-ooni-explorer/</link><pubDate>Wed, 25 Sep 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-russia-blocked-ooni-explorer/</guid><description>&lt;p>As of 11th September 2024, Russia has &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=RU&amp;since=2024-08-01&amp;until=2024-09-25&amp;time_grain=day&amp;axis_x=measurement_start_day&amp;test_name=web_connectivity&amp;domain=explorer.ooni.org">blocked&lt;/a> one of our platforms: &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/">OONI Explorer&lt;/a>.&lt;/p>
+&lt;p>Merely a week after the conflict started, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in Russia &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2022-russia-blocks-amid-ru-ua-conflict/#blocking-of-news-media-websites">started blocking&lt;/a> access to several foreign news media websites (such as &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/search?since=2022-02-03&amp;until=2022-03-07&amp;failure=false&amp;domain=www.bbc.com&amp;probe_cc=RU&amp;only=anomalies">BBC&lt;/a> and &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/search?since=2022-02-03&amp;until=2022-03-07&amp;failure=false&amp;domain=www.dw.com&amp;probe_cc=RU&amp;only=anomalies">Deutsche Welle&lt;/a>) and independent Russian news media websites (such as &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2022-russia-blocks-amid-ru-ua-conflict/#meduza">Meduza&lt;/a> and &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2022-russia-blocks-amid-ru-ua-conflict/#new-times">New Times&lt;/a>). Within a year, independent news media censorship in Russia had become pervasive. In our previous report, we &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2023-russia-a-year-after-the-conflict/#blocked-websites">confirmed the blocking of 139 news media domains&lt;/a> in Russia.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>iMAP 2024: State of Internet Censorship in 9 countries</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-imap-9-research-reports-southeast-asia/</link><pubDate>Wed, 23 Oct 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-imap-9-research-reports-southeast-asia/</guid><description>&lt;p>On 22st October 2024, our long-term partner, &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/partners/sinar-project/">Sinar Project&lt;/a>, published &lt;strong>&lt;a href="https://imap.sinarproject.org/reports/2024">9 new research reports&lt;/a>&lt;/strong> on
+internet censorship in Southeast Asia and Hong Kong (China) in collaboration with their
+&lt;a href="https://imap.sinarproject.org/">Internet Monitoring and Action Project (iMAP)&lt;/a> partners. These reports are based on &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/data">OONI data&lt;/a> collected between July 2023 to June 2024 from 9 countries: Cambodia, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam.&lt;/p>
+&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://imap.sinarproject.org/about">Internet Monitoring Action Project (iMAP)&lt;/a> aims to establish regional
+and in-country networks that monitor network interference and
+restrictions to the freedom of expression online in Southeast Asia and Hong Kong (China) in
+collaboration with national digital rights
+&lt;a href="https://imap.sinarproject.org/partners">partners&lt;/a> in these countries.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Russia blocked OONI Explorer, a large open dataset on Internet censorship</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-russia-blocked-ooni-explorer/</link><pubDate>Wed, 25 Sep 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-russia-blocked-ooni-explorer/</guid><description>&lt;p>As of 11th September 2024, Russia has &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=RU&amp;since=2024-08-01&amp;until=2024-09-25&amp;time_grain=day&amp;axis_x=measurement_start_day&amp;test_name=web_connectivity&amp;domain=explorer.ooni.org">blocked&lt;/a> one of our platforms: &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/">OONI Explorer&lt;/a>.&lt;/p>
 &lt;p>&lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/">OONI Explorer&lt;/a> is one of the largest open datasets on internet censorship around the world. We &lt;a href="https://blog.torproject.org/ooni-explorer-censorship-and-other-network-anomalies-around-world/">first launched&lt;/a> this web platform back in 2016 with the goal of enabling researchers, journalists, and human rights defenders to investigate internet censorship based on empirical network measurement data that is contributed by &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/install/">OONI Probe&lt;/a> users worldwide. Every day, we publish &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/">new measurements&lt;/a> from around the world in real-time.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Kazakhstan: TLS MITM attacks and blocking of news media, human rights, and circumvention tool sites</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-kazakhstan-report/</link><pubDate>Thu, 19 Sep 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-kazakhstan-report/</guid><description>&lt;p>In recent years, internet censorship in Kazakhstan has been &lt;a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/kazakhstan/freedom-net/2023">reported&lt;/a> quite extensively. As part of this study, &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/">OONI&lt;/a>, &lt;a href="https://ifkz.org/en">Internet Freedom Kazakhstan (IFKZ)&lt;/a>, and &lt;a href="https://www.digitalrights.asia">Eurasian Digital Foundation&lt;/a> collaborated to investigate internet censorship in Kazakhstan over the past year (between June 2023 to June 2024) through the analysis of empirical network measurement data.&lt;/p>
 &lt;p>In this report, we share OONI censorship measurement findings and relevant legal context. We found numerous &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/search?probe_cc=KZ&amp;test_name=web_connectivity&amp;since=2023-06-01&amp;until=2024-06-01&amp;failure=false&amp;category_code=NEWS&amp;only=anomalies">news media&lt;/a>, &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?test_name=web_connectivity&amp;axis_x=measurement_start_day&amp;since=2023-06-01&amp;until=2024-06-01&amp;time_grain=day&amp;probe_cc=KZ&amp;axis_y=domain&amp;domain=www.ipetitions.com%2Cwww.change.org%2Cegov.press%2Camnesty.org.ru">human rights&lt;/a>, and &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?test_name=web_connectivity&amp;axis_x=measurement_start_day&amp;since=2023-06-01&amp;until=2024-06-01&amp;time_grain=day&amp;probe_cc=KZ&amp;axis_y=domain&amp;category_code=ANON">circumvention tool websites blocked&lt;/a> in Kazakhstan by means of TLS interference. We also found 7 distinct intermediate certificates signed by 4 distinct root CAs being used to carry out TLS man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, targeting at least 14 distinct domain names on at least 19 different networks in Kazakhstan. We share more details below.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Tanzania: Surge in online LGBTIQ censorship and other targeted blocks</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-tanzania-lgbtiq-censorship-and-other-targeted-blocks/</link><pubDate>Thu, 11 Apr 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-tanzania-lgbtiq-censorship-and-other-targeted-blocks/</guid><description>&lt;p>This report documents the blocking of LGBTIQ websites and other targeted blocks in Tanzania based on the analysis of &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?test_name=web_connectivity&amp;axis_x=measurement_start_day&amp;since=2023-12-01&amp;until=2024-01-31&amp;time_grain=day&amp;probe_cc=TZ">OONI data&lt;/a>.&lt;/p>
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