Fixed whitespace errors

draft-ietf-lamps-cms-ml-dsa.md

@@ -80,9 +80,9 @@ informative:
     author:
       -
         ins: R. Wang
-      - 
+      -
         ins: K. Ngo
-      - 
+      -
         ins: J. Gärtner
       -
         ins: E. Dubrova
@@ -312,9 +312,8 @@ Implementers SHOULD consider implementing such protection measures if it would b
 To avoid algorithm substitution attacks, the CMSAlgorithmProtection attribute defined in {{!RFC6211}} SHOULD be included in signed attributes.
 
 # Operational Considerations
-If ML-DSA signing is implemented in a hardware device such as hardware security module (HSM) or portable cryptographic token, implementers might want to avoid sending the full content to the device for performance reasons. 
-By including signed attributes, which necessarily include the message-digest attribute and the content-type attribute as described in 
-Section 5.3 of {{RFC5652}}, the much smaller set of signed attributes are sent to the device for signing.
+If ML-DSA signing is implemented in a hardware device such as hardware security module (HSM) or portable cryptographic token, implementers might want to avoid sending the full content to the device for performance reasons.
+By including signed attributes, which necessarily include the message-digest attribute and the content-type attribute as described in Section 5.3 of {{RFC5652}}, the much smaller set of signed attributes are sent to the device for signing.
 
 This approach addresses the use case for HashML-DSA, and is one reason why HashML-DSA is not specified for use with CMS in this document.
 Additionally, the pure variant of ML-DSA does support a form of pre-hash via the *mu* "message representative" value described in Section 6.2 of {{FIPS204}}.