Support xpc_connection_set_peer_sig on macOS 12

Also support validating client code requirements using the audit token
using the same APIs.

examples/echo-server/Cargo.toml

@@ -8,9 +8,6 @@ publish = false
 # See more keys and their definitions at https://doc.rust-lang.org/cargo/reference/manifest.html
 
 [dependencies]
-core-foundation = "0.9"
 futures = { version = "0.3" }
-# Support for SecCode was added in 2.3.1
-security-framework = "^2.3.1"
 tokio = { version = "1", features = ["macros", "rt-multi-thread"] }
 xpc-connection = { path = "../../xpc-connection", features = ["audit_token"] }

examples/echo-server/src/main.rs

@@ -1,58 +1,10 @@
-use core_foundation::{base::TCFType, data::CFData};
 use futures::stream::StreamExt;
-use security_framework::os::macos::code_signing::{Flags, GuestAttributes, SecCode};
 use std::{error::Error, ffi::CString};
 use xpc_connection::{Message, MessageError, XpcClient, XpcListener};
 
-fn get_code_object_for_client(client: &XpcClient) -> SecCode {
-    let token_data = CFData::from_buffer(&client.audit_token());
-    let mut attrs = GuestAttributes::new();
-    attrs.set_audit_token(token_data.as_concrete_TypeRef());
-    SecCode::copy_guest_with_attribues(None, &attrs, Flags::NONE).unwrap()
-}
-
-#[allow(dead_code)]
-/// This isn't used because we don't sign our builds, but it's a useful example.
-fn validate_client_by_code_signing_requirement(client: &XpcClient) -> bool {
-    let requirement = "anchor apple".parse().unwrap();
-
-    if get_code_object_for_client(client)
-        .check_validity(Flags::NONE, &requirement)
-        .is_ok()
-    {
-        println!("The client's code signature matches");
-        return true;
-    }
-
-    println!("The client's code signature doesn't match");
-    false
-}
-
-fn validate_client_by_path(client: &XpcClient) -> bool {
-    if get_code_object_for_client(client)
-        .path(Flags::NONE)
-        .unwrap()
-        // It'd be better to use to_path
-        .get_string()
-        .to_string()
-        // This is insecure, it's just so the tests can be run from anywhere
-        .contains("message_round_trip")
-    {
-        println!("The client was validated using its path");
-        return true;
-    }
-
-    println!("The client's path doesn't contain 'message_round_trip'");
-    false
-}
-
 async fn handle_client(mut client: XpcClient) {
     println!("New connection");
 
-    if !validate_client_by_path(&client) {
-        return;
-    }
-
     loop {
         match client.next().await {
             None => {
@@ -80,7 +32,16 @@ async fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn Error>> {
         mach_port_name.to_string_lossy()
     );
 
-    let mut listener = XpcListener::listen(&mach_port_name);
+    let mut listener = XpcListener::listen(
+        &mach_port_name,
+        // An example requirement. Whe matching on the common name it's
+        // important to anchor to a trusted authority that you know doesn't
+        // allow for user-defined common names, otherwise it would be trivial
+        // to bypass.
+        // Some("anchor apple and certificate leaf[subject.CN] = \"Apple Development: Steven Joruk (Z84S59N9K4)\""),
+        None,
+        None,
+    );
 
     while let Some(client) = listener.next().await {
         tokio::spawn(handle_client(client));

xpc-connection-sys/src/lib.rs

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #![allow(
     dead_code,
-    safe_packed_borrows,
+    unaligned_references,
     non_upper_case_globals,
     non_camel_case_types,
     non_snake_case,

xpc-connection/Cargo.toml

@@ -11,14 +11,20 @@ keywords = ["xpc", "mac", "macOS"]
 categories = ["os", "api-bindings", "concurrency", "encoding"]
 
 [features]
-audit_token = []
+audit_token = ["core-foundation", "security-framework"]
 default = []
 
 [dependencies]
 block = "0.1.6"
-core-foundation = { version = "0.9", optional = true }
 futures = "0.3.4"
 xpc-connection-sys = { path = "../xpc-connection-sys", version = "0.1.0" }
 
+# Remove when weak linkage is stable
+libc = "0.2.97"
+
+# For the audit_token feature
+core-foundation = { version = "0.9", optional = true }
+security-framework = { version = "^2.3.1", optional = true }
+
 [dev-dependencies]
 tokio = { version = "1", features = ["macros", "rt-multi-thread"] }

xpc-connection/src/dlsym.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+// This is copied from mio which is MIT licensed, it's to work around the
+// linkage feature not yet being stable.
+//
+// https://github.com/carllerche/mio/blob/master/src/sys/unix/dlsym.rs
+
+use std::marker;
+use std::mem;
+use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
+
+macro_rules! dlsym {
+    (fn $name:ident($($t:ty),*) -> $ret:ty) => (
+        #[allow(bad_style)]
+        static $name: crate::dlsym::DlSym<unsafe extern fn($($t),*) -> $ret> =
+            crate::dlsym::DlSym {
+                name: concat!(stringify!($name), "\0"),
+                addr: AtomicUsize::new(0),
+                _marker: ::std::marker::PhantomData,
+            };
+    )
+}
+
+pub struct DlSym<F> {
+    pub name: &'static str,
+    pub addr: AtomicUsize,
+    pub _marker: marker::PhantomData<F>,
+}
+
+impl<F> DlSym<F> {
+    pub fn get(&self) -> Option<&F> {
+        assert_eq!(mem::size_of::<F>(), mem::size_of::<usize>());
+        unsafe {
+            if self.addr.load(Ordering::SeqCst) == 0 {
+                self.addr.store(fetch(self.name), Ordering::SeqCst);
+            }
+            if self.addr.load(Ordering::SeqCst) == 1 {
+                None
+            } else {
+                mem::transmute::<&AtomicUsize, Option<&F>>(&self.addr)
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+unsafe fn fetch(name: &str) -> usize {
+    assert_eq!(name.as_bytes()[name.len() - 1], 0);
+    match libc::dlsym(libc::RTLD_DEFAULT, name.as_ptr() as *const _) as usize {
+        0 => 1,
+        n => n,
+    }
+}

xpc-connection/src/lib.rs

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #[allow(
     dead_code,
-    safe_packed_borrows,
+    unaligned_references,
     non_upper_case_globals,
     non_camel_case_types,
     non_snake_case,
@@ -11,20 +11,34 @@ extern crate xpc_connection_sys;
 mod message;
 pub use message::*;
 
+#[macro_use]
+mod dlsym;
+
 use block::ConcreteBlock;
 use futures::{
     channel::mpsc::{unbounded as unbounded_channel, UnboundedReceiver, UnboundedSender},
     Stream,
 };
-use std::ffi::CStr;
-use std::{ffi::c_void, ops::Deref};
-use std::{pin::Pin, task::Poll};
+use std::{
+    ffi::{CStr, CString},
+    ops::Deref,
+    os::raw::{c_char, c_int},
+    pin::Pin,
+    sync::atomic::AtomicUsize,
+    task::Poll,
+};
+
 use xpc_connection_sys::{
-    xpc_connection_cancel, xpc_connection_create_mach_service, xpc_connection_resume,
-    xpc_connection_send_message, xpc_connection_set_event_handler, xpc_connection_t, xpc_object_t,
-    xpc_release, XPC_CONNECTION_MACH_SERVICE_LISTENER, XPC_CONNECTION_MACH_SERVICE_PRIVILEGED,
+    dispatch_queue_t, xpc_connection_cancel, xpc_connection_create_mach_service,
+    xpc_connection_resume, xpc_connection_send_message, xpc_connection_set_event_handler,
+    xpc_connection_t, xpc_object_t, xpc_release, XPC_CONNECTION_MACH_SERVICE_LISTENER,
+    XPC_CONNECTION_MACH_SERVICE_PRIVILEGED,
 };
 
+dlsym! {
+    fn xpc_connection_set_peer_code_sig(*const c_char) -> c_int
+}
+
 // A connection's event handler could still be waiting or running when we want
 // to drop a connection. We must cancel the handler and wait for the final
 // call to a handler to occur, which is always a message containing an
@@ -87,12 +101,35 @@ impl Stream for XpcListener {
 
 impl XpcListener {
     /// The connection must be a listener.
-    fn from_raw(connection: xpc_connection_t) -> XpcListener {
+    fn from_raw(connection: xpc_connection_t, requirement: Option<&'static str>) -> XpcListener {
         let (sender, receiver) = unbounded_channel();
         let sender_clone = sender.clone();
 
+        let mut already_validated = false;
+
+        if let Some(requirement) = requirement {
+            if let Some(f) = crate::xpc_connection_set_peer_code_sig.get() {
+                let requirement = CString::new(requirement).expect("Invalid requirement string");
+                unsafe {
+                    f(requirement.as_ptr());
+                }
+
+                already_validated = true;
+            }
+        }
+
         let block = ConcreteBlock::new(move |event| match xpc_object_to_message(event) {
-            Message::Client(client) => sender_clone.unbounded_send(client).ok(),
+            Message::Client(mut client) => {
+                if already_validated
+                    || Self::validate_client_using_audit_token(&client, &requirement)
+                {
+                    sender_clone.unbounded_send(client).ok()
+                } else {
+                    unsafe { xpc_connection_cancel(client.connection) };
+                    client.event_handler_is_running = false;
+                    None
+                }
+            }
             _ => None,
         });
 
@@ -113,13 +150,68 @@ impl XpcListener {
         }
     }
 
-    pub fn listen(name: impl AsRef<CStr>) -> Self {
+    /// If `requirement` is set then clients will have their code signature
+    /// validated before being available. See Apple's documentation on the
+    /// language [here](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/CodeSigningGuide/RequirementLang/RequirementLang.html).
+    ///
+    /// On macOS 12 this uses `xpc_connection_set_peer_code_sig`, and if the
+    /// `audit_token` feature is enabled then this will use a custom
+    /// implementation on older versions of macOS.
+    ///
+    /// # Panics
+    ///
+    /// * If `audit_token` feature is used and the `requirement` isn't parsable
+    ///   as a `SecRequirement`. This will occur during client validation.
+    pub fn listen(
+        name: impl AsRef<CStr>,
+        requirement: Option<&'static str>,
+        queue: Option<dispatch_queue_t>,
+    ) -> XpcListener {
         let name = name.as_ref();
         let flags = XPC_CONNECTION_MACH_SERVICE_LISTENER as u64;
-        let connection = unsafe {
-            xpc_connection_create_mach_service(name.as_ref().as_ptr(), std::ptr::null_mut(), flags)
+        let queue = queue.unwrap_or(std::ptr::null_mut());
+
+        let connection =
+            unsafe { xpc_connection_create_mach_service(name.as_ref().as_ptr(), queue, flags) };
+
+        Self::from_raw(connection, requirement)
+    }
+
+    #[inline]
+    #[cfg(feature = "audit_token")]
+    fn validate_client_using_audit_token(client: &XpcClient, requirement: &Option<&str>) -> bool {
+        use core_foundation::{base::TCFType, data::CFData};
+        use security_framework::os::macos::code_signing::{Flags, GuestAttributes, SecCode};
+
+        let requirement = match requirement {
+            Some(r) => r,
+            None => return true,
         };
-        Self::from_raw(connection)
+
+        let requirement = requirement
+            .parse()
+            .expect("Unable to parse the requirement");
+
+        let token_data = CFData::from_buffer(&client.audit_token());
+        let mut attrs = GuestAttributes::new();
+        attrs.set_audit_token(token_data.as_concrete_TypeRef());
+
+        if let Ok(code_object) = SecCode::copy_guest_with_attribues(None, &attrs, Flags::NONE) {
+            return code_object
+                .check_validity(Flags::NONE, &requirement)
+                .is_ok();
+        }
+
+        false
+    }
+
+    #[inline]
+    #[cfg(not(feature = "audit_token"))]
+    fn validate_client_using_audit_token(_client: &XpcClient, _requirement: &Option<&str>) -> bool {
+        // TODO: log an error:
+        // Attempted to use code signature requirements on an unsupported
+        // version of macOS without the `audit_token` feature enabled
+        false
     }
 }
 
@@ -223,6 +315,8 @@ impl XpcClient {
 
     #[cfg(feature = "audit_token")]
     pub fn audit_token(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
+        use libc::c_void;
+
         // This is a private API, but it's also required in order to
         // authenticate XPC clients without requiring a handshake.
         // See https://developer.apple.com/forums/thread/72881 for more info.