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design-argument.bib
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@article{Abraham2014,
author = {Loeb,Abraham},
title = {The habitable epoch of the early Universe},
journal = {International Journal of Astrobiology},
volume = {13},
number = {4},
month = {10},
year = {2014},
issn = {1475-3006},
pages = {337--339},
numpages = {3},
doi = {10.1017/S1473550414000196},
URL = {http://journals.cambridge.org/article_S1473550414000196},
abstract = { ABSTRACT In the redshift range 100≲(1+z)≲137, the cosmic microwave background (CMB) had a temperature of 273–373 K (0–100°C), allowing early rocky planets (if any existed) to have liquid water chemistry on their surface and be habitable, irrespective of their distance from a star. In the standard ΛCDM cosmology, the first star-forming halos within our Hubble volume started collapsing at these redshifts, allowing the chemistry of life to possibly begin when the Universe was merely 10–17 million years old. The possibility of life starting when the average matter density was a million times bigger than it is today is not in agreement with the anthropic explanation for the low value of the cosmological constant. }
}
@book{Billingsley1995,
title={Probability and Measure},
author={Billingsley, P.},
isbn={9780471007104},
series={Wiley Series in Probability and Statistics},
year={1995},
publisher={Wiley}
}
@incollection{Calude2013,
year = {2012},
editor = {Zenil,Hector},
author = {Calude,Cristian S. and Meyerstein,F. Walter and Salomaa,Arto},
publisher = {World Scientific, Singapore},
title = {The Universe is lawless or 'Panton chrematon metron anthropon einai'},
booktitle = {A Computable Universe: Understanding Computation and Exploring Nature as Computation},
isbn={9789814374309},
doi={10.1142/9789814374309_0026},
}
@book {Cohen1966,
title = {Set Theory and the Continuum Hypothesis},
author = {Paul J. Cohen},
publisher = {W. A. Benjamin},
isbn = {},
year = {1966},
series = {},
edition = {},
volume = {}
}
@InCollection{sep-fine-tuning,
year = {2018},
editor = {Edward N. Zalta},
author = {Friederich, Simon},
publisher = {Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University},
title = {Fine-Tuning},
booktitle = {The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
howpublished = {\url{https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/fine-tuning/}},
edition = {Winter 2018},
}
@inbook {Feynman2009,
title = {The Meaning of It All: Thoughts of a Citizen-Scientist},
author = {Richard P. Feynman},
publisher = {Hachette Book Group},
isbn = {9780786739141},
url = {https://www.amazon.com/Meaning-All-Thoughts-Citizen-Scientist-ebook/dp/B006U6IFSC/ref=mt_kindle?_encoding=UTF8&me=},
doi = {},
chapter = {1, paragraph 60},
edition = {Kindle Keyboard},
keywords = {},
year = {2009},
}
@article{Harnik2006,
title = {A universe without weak interactions},
author = {Harnik, Roni and Kribs, Graham D. and Perez, Gilad},
journal = {Phys. Rev. D},
volume = {74},
number = {3},
pages = {035006},
numpages = {15},
year = {2006},
month = {Aug},
publisher = {American Physical Society},
doi = {10.1103/PhysRevD.74.035006},
url = {http://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/PhysRevD.74.035006}
}
@article{Kotzen2012,
author = {Kotzen, Matthew},
title = {Selection Biases in Likelihood Arguments},
year = {2012},
doi = {10.1093/bjps/axr044},
abstract ={Most philosophers accept some version of the requirement of total evidence (RTE), which tells us to always update on our complete evidence, which often includes ‘background information’ about how that evidence was collected. But different philosophers disagree about how to implement that requirement. In this article, I argue against one natural picture of how to implement the RTE in likelihood arguments, and I argue in favor of a different picture. I also apply my picture to the controversy over the so-called ‘Objection from Anthropic Bias’ to the fine-tuning argument, and argue that the Objection from Anthropic Bias fails.
1 Introduction2 The Likelihood Principle3 The FTA4 Eddington's Fish and the Requirement of Total Evidence5 LP* and the Objection from Anthropic Bias6 Problems with LP*
6.1 The line-drawing problem 6.2 Firing squad cases 6.3 Probabilistic dependence between I and the hypotheses7 My Proposal8 Other Views},
URL = {http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2012/02/24/bjps.axr044.abstract},
eprint = {http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2012/02/24/bjps.axr044.full.pdf+html},
journal = {The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}
}
@incollection{Leslie2003,
year = {2003},
editor = {Neil A. Manson},
author = {John Leslie},
publisher = {Routledge},
title = {The Meaning of Design},
booktitle = {God and Design: The Teleological Argument and Modern Science}
}
@article{Manson2003,
journal = {Pacific Philosophical Quarterly},
number = {1},
title = {Fine-Tuning, Multiple Universes, and the "This Universe" Objection},
author = {Neil A. Manson and Michael J. Thrush},
volume = {84},
pages = {67--83},
year = {2003}
}
@article{Manson2009,
journal = {Philosophy Compass},
title = {The Fine-Tuning Argument},
volume = {4},
year = {2009},
number = {1},
author = {Neil A. Manson},
pages = {271--286},
publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell}
}
@article{McGrew2001,
ISSN = {00264423, 14602113},
URL = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/3093564},
abstract = {Proponents of the Fine-Tuning Argument frequently assume that the narrowness of the life-friendly range of fundamental physical constants implies a low probability for the origin of the universe 'by chance'. We cast this argument in a more rigorous form than is customary and conclude that the narrow intervals do not yield a probability at all because the resulting measure function is non-normalizable. We then consider various attempts to circumvent this problem and argue that they fail.},
author = {Timothy McGrew and Lydia McGrew and Eric Vestrup},
journal = {Mind},
number = {440},
pages = {1027-1037},
publisher = {[Oxford University Press, Mind Association]},
title = {Probabilities and the Fine-Tuning Argument: A Sceptical View},
volume = {110},
year = {2001}
}
@article{Monton2006,
author = {Monton, Bradley},
title = {God, Fine-Tuning, and the Problem of Old Evidence},
volume = {57},
number = {2},
pages = {405-424},
year = {2006},
doi = {10.1093/bjps/axl008},
abstract ={The fundamental constants that are involved in the laws of physics which describe our universe are finely tuned for life, in the sense that if some of the constants had slightly different values life could not exist. Some people hold that this provides evidence for the existence of God. I will present a probabilistic version of this fine-tuning argument which is stronger than all other versions in the literature. Nevertheless, I will show that one can have reasonable opinions such that the fine-tuning argument doesn't lead to an increase in one's probability for the existence of God.
The fine-tuning argumentObjective versus subjective probabilityObservational selection effectsThe problem of old evidenceAgainst the fine-tuning argumentMany universes},
URL = {http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/content/57/2/405.abstract},
eprint = {http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/content/57/2/405.full.pdf+html},
journal = {The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}
}
@incollection{Narveson2003,
title = {God by Design?},
booktitle = {God and Design: The Teleological Argument and Modern Science},
publisher = {Routledge},
editor = {Neil A. Manson},
year = {2003},
author = {Jan Narveson},
pages = {80--88}
}
@inbook {Sober2003,
title = {The Design Argument},
author = {Sober, Elliott},
publisher = {Blackwell Publishing Ltd},
isbn = {9780470756638},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9780470756638.ch6},
doi = {10.1002/9780470756638.ch6},
pages = {117--147},
keywords = {design argument, cosmological argument, design theorist, cosmic design, epistemological problems},
booktitle = {The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Religion},
year = {2008},
abstract = {This chapter contains sections titled:
* What is the Design Argument
* Clarifications
* Other Formulations of the Design Argument, and Their Defects
* Three Possible Objections to the Likelihood Argument
* The Relationship of the Organismic Design Argument to Darwinism
* Anthropic Reasoning and Cosmic Design Arguments
* A Prediction
* Notes
* References
* Suggested Further Reading},
}
@Article{Sober2009,
author="Sober, Elliott",
title="Absence of evidence and evidence of absence: evidential transitivity in connection with fossils, fishing, fine-tuning, and firing squads",
journal="Philosophical Studies",
year="2009",
volume="143",
number="1",
pages="63--90",
abstract="``Absence of evidence isn't evidence of absence'' is a slogan that is popular among scientists and nonscientists alike. This article assesses its truth by using a probabilistic tool, the Law of Likelihood. Qualitative questions (``Is E evidence about H?'') and quantitative questions (``How much evidence does E provide about H?'') are both considered. The article discusses the example of fossil intermediates. If finding a fossil that is phenotypically intermediate between two extant species provides evidence that those species have a common ancestor, does failing to find such a fossil constitute evidence that there was no common ancestor? Or should the failure merely be chalked up to the imperfection of the fossil record? The transitivity of the evidence relation in simple causal chains provides a broader context, which leads to discussion of the fine-tuning argument, the anthropic principle, and observation selection effects.",
issn="1573-0883",
doi="10.1007/s11098-008-9315-0",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-9315-0"
}
@article{swinburne1968,
ISSN = {00318191, 1469817X},
URL = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/3749813},
author = {Richard G. Swinburne},
journal = {Philosophy},
number = {165},
pages = {199-212},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
title = {The Argument from Design},
volume = {43},
year = {1968}
}
@incollection{Swinburne2003,
editor = {Neil A. Manson},
year = {2005},
author = {Richard G. Swinburne},
booktitle = {God and Design: The Teleological Argument and Modern Science},
pages = {106--124},
publisher = {Routledge},
title = {The Argument to God From Fine-Tuning Reassessed}
}
@book {Swinburne2004,
title = {The Existence of God},
author = {Richard Swinburne},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
isbn = {9780199271672},
doi = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199271672.001.0001},
keywords = {hypothesis, evidence, evolution, nature, experience, probability, theism, evil},
year = {2004},
abstract = {
This book assesses the worth of arguments for and against the existence
of God. Evidence confirms (makes more probable) an explanatory
hypothesis in so far as (1) given the hypothesis the evidence is to be
expected, that is the hypothesis makes the evidence probable, (2) the
evidence is not otherwise to be expected, (3) the hypothesis is simple,
and (4) it fits with background knowledge (i.e., knowledge about how
things behave in neighbouring fields of enquiry). When we are
assessing hypotheses (such as theism, the hypothesis that there is a
God) purporting to explain everything, there will be no background
knowledge. Theism is a very simple hypothesis. If there is a God, there
is some reason to expect that he will create a universe, with laws of
nature, leading to the evolution of humans (bodies connected to souls),
who often have experiences which seem to them experiences of God. It
is most improbable that all this evidence would exist if there was no
God. Taken together therefore all this evidence makes it probable that
there is a God. The occurrence of evil, whether produced by humans or
natural processes, does not significantly diminish that probability.
}
}
@InCollection{sep-set-theory,
author = {Bagaria, Joan},
title = {{Set Theory}},
booktitle = {The {Stanford} Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
editor = {Edward N. Zalta},
howpublished = {\url{https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/set-theory/}},
year = {2020},
edition = {Spring 2020},
publisher = {Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University}
}