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quant.tex
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\chapter{Witness-based quantification}
\label{ch:quant}
\setcounter{equation}{0}
\section{Introduction}
In this chapter we are going to explore how the TTR approach to
semantics we have developed gives us a novel treatment of quantification and binding in
natural language.
In Section~\ref{sec:quantification} we are going to propose a revision of witness conditions for
quantificational ptypes which will constitute what we will call a
\textit{witness based} account of generalized quantifiers. % which will be inconsistent with some of what
% we said before in the book about their witness conditions --
% eventually we need to go back and revise the previous discussion and
% also the section on anaphora following this section.
The motivation
for this is in part to get a neater treatment of anaphora, and a more
general treatment along the lines of \cite{LueckingGinzburg2019}.
In Section~\ref{sec:long-distance} we will take a brief look at how
long distance dependencies can be treated as preparation for our
treatment of quantifier scope and binding in Chapter~\ref{ch:underspec}.
\section{Quantifiers and their witness sets}
\label{sec:quantification}
\subsection{Conservativity and dynamic generalized quantifiers}
Here we review the treatment of quantifiers that we have presented so
far and its relation to the notion of \textit{conservativity} which we
will discuss here. This property of conservativity facilitates the
witness-based account of quantifiers that we will undertake below.
In Chapter~\ref{ch:commonnouns}, example (\ref{ex:dynqconstr}), we
introduced the notion of dynamic generalized quantifier and pointed
out that one of the original motivations for them was what is known as
donkey anaphora which we will discuss in Section~\ref{sec:anaph}.
Here we will point out a connection between dynamic quantifiers and
conservativity of quantifiers, noted in \cite{Chierchia1995}. The informal way to state
conservativity for quantifiers is as in \nexteg{a} and an example is
given in \nexteg{b}.
\begin{ex}
\begin{subex}
\item Q A B is true just in case Q A A\&B is true
\item \textit{every farmer likes a donkey} is true just in case
\textit{every farmer is a farmer and likes a donkey} (or more
naturally, \textit{every farmer is a farmer who likes a donkey}) is true
\end{subex}
\end{ex}
Most, if not all, natural language quantifiers have this
property.\footnote{For discussion, see \cite{PetersWesterstahl2006},
p. 138f.}
Now consider the discussion of dynamic generalized quantification in Chapter~\ref{ch:commonnouns}, Section~\ref{sec:dgqs}. There in
example~(\ref{ex:dynqconstr}) we gave dynamic versions of generalized
quantifier interpretations of noun-phrases. % We can give a general characterization of the witness
% conditions for dynamic generalized quantifiers as in \nexteg{}, where
% $q$ is a predicate corresponding to a quantifier and $q^*$ is the
% relation between sets corresponding to $q$ in classical generalized
% quantifier theory.
% \begin{ex}
% $e:q(P,Q)$ iff $q^*$ holds between $\downP{P}$ and
% $\downP{Q|_{\mathcal{F}(P.\mathrm{fg})}\restriction e}$
% \label{ex:witness-cond-GQ}
% \end{ex}
% According to the definitions given in Chapter~\ref{ch:commonnouns},
% $\downP{Q|_{\mathcal{F}(P.\mathrm{fg})}\restriction e}$ is the set of
% individuals which have property $Q|_{\mathcal{F}(P.\mathrm{fg})}$ in
% $e$ and $Q|_{\mathcal{F}(P.\mathrm{fg})}$ is $Q$ with its
% domain restricted by $P$ (example~(\ref{ex:function-restriction}), p.~\pageref{ex:function-restriction}).
We spell out the witness condition for the quantificational ptype, \nexteg{b},
corresponding to \textit{every dog runs} in \nexteg{}. % Here, as
% before, we only represent the foregrounds of the properties which are
% arguments to the predicate `every' in order to make the presentation
% clearer.
\begin{ex}
\begin{subex}
\item dog$'$ = $\ulcorner\lambda r$:\smallrecord{\smalltfield{x}{\textit{Ind}}}
. \smallrecord{\smalltfield{e}{dog($r$.x)}}$\urcorner$
run$'$ = $\ulcorner\lambda r$:\smallrecord{\smalltfield{x}{\textit{Ind}}}
. \smallrecord{\smalltfield{e}{run($r$.x)}}$\urcorner$
\item $T$ = every(dog$'$, run$'\mid_{\mathfrak{F}(\text{dog}')}$)
\item \begin{tabbing}
$s:T$ \=iff
$\downP{\text{dog}'}\subseteq\downP{\text{run}'|_{\mathcal{F}(\text{dog}')}\restriction
s} $ \hspace*{2em}(witness condition for `every', p.~\pageref{ex:witcond-every})\\
\> iff $\downP{\text{dog}'}\subseteq\downP{\text{run}'|_{\text{\smallrecord{\smalltfield{x}{\textit{Ind}}\\\smalltfield{e}{dog(x)}}}}\restriction
s} $ \hspace*{2em}(fixed point types, p.~\pageref{ex:fixedpointtype})\\
\> iff $\downP{\text{dog}'}\subseteq$ [$\downarrow\lambda
r$:\smallrecord{\smalltfield{x}{\textit{Ind}}}\d{$\wedge$}\smallrecord{\smalltfield{x}{\textit{Ind}}\\\smalltfield{e}{dog(x)}}
. \smallrecord{\smalltfield{e}{run($r$.x)}}$\restriction s$ ]
\hspace*{2em} (function restriction, p.~\pageref{ex:function-restriction})\\
\> iff $\downP{\text{dog}'}\subseteq$ [$\downarrow\lambda r$:\smallrecord{\smalltfield{x}{\textit{Ind}}\\\smalltfield{e}{dog(x)}}
. \smallrecord{\smalltfield{e}{run($r$.x)}}$\restriction s$ ]
\hspace*{2em}\begin{minipage}{.3\textwidth}(merge, p.~\pageref{pg:merge})\end{minipage}\\
\> iff $\downP{\text{dog}'}\subseteq$ [$\downarrow\lambda r$:\smallrecord{\smalltfield{x}{\textit{Ind}}\\\smalltfield{e}{dog(x)}}
. \smallrecord{\smallrfield{e}{$s$}{run($r$.x)}}
]\hspace*{2em}\begin{minipage}{.3\textwidth}(property restriction,
p.~\pageref{pg:property-restriction})\end{minipage}\\
\> iff \=$\{a\mid\exists r$:\smallrecord{\smalltfield{x}{\textit{Ind}}}
$\wedge
r.\text{x}=a\wedge\down{\text{\smallrecord{\smalltfield{e}{dog($r$.x)}}}}\not=\emptyset\}$\\
\>\>$\subseteq\{a\mid\exists r$:\smallrecord{\smalltfield{x}{\textit{Ind}}\\\smalltfield{e}{dog(x)}}
$\wedge
r.\text{x}=a\wedge\down{\text{\smallrecord{\smallrfield{e}{$s$}{run($r$.x)}}}}\not=\emptyset\}$
\hspace*{2em}($\downarrow$, p.~\pageref{pg:property-extension-rev})
\\
\> iff
$\{a\mid\down{\text{dog}(a)}\not=\emptyset\}\subseteq\{a\mid\down{\text{dog}(a)}\not=\emptyset\wedge\exists
s'[s'\underline{\varepsilon}s\wedge
s':\text{run}(a)]\}$\\
\>\`\begin{minipage}{.3\textwidth}(Arity of `dog', `run' and set
extension of records, p.~\pageref{pg:set-reduction-gq}ff)\end{minipage}\\
\> iff $\{a\mid\exists s'[s':\text{dog}(a)]\}\subseteq\{a\mid\exists
s'[s':\text{dog}(a)]\wedge\exists
s'[s'\underline{\varepsilon}s\wedge s':\text{run}(a)]\}$ \\
\>\`\begin{minipage}{.3\textwidth}($\down{T}$, p.~\pageref{pg:type-extension})\end{minipage}
\end{tabbing}
\end{subex}
\label{ex:witnessconds-edr}
\end{ex}
\subsection{Witness sets}
The classical view of quantifiers is based on the notion that noun
phrases represent sets of sets or set of properties and the definition of a
quantifier involves characterizing which set of sets or properties it
represents. This was the view presented, for example, in
\cite{BarwiseCooper1981}. Associated with this was the notion of
\textit{witness set} defined by Barwise and Cooper as in \nexteg{}.
\begin{ex}
A \textit{witness set} for a quantifier $D(A)$ living on $A$ is any
subset $w$ of $A$ such that $w\in D(A)$.
\end{ex}
In \preveg{} $D$ was used as the function corresponding to a
determiner such as \textit{some} or \textit{most} mapping a set $A$
(corresponding, for example, to the set denoted by a common noun phrase such
as \textit{farmer} or \textit{farmer who owns a donkey}) to a set of
sets. The notion \textit{lives on} used by Barwise and Cooper
corresponds to what was later in the literature referred to as
\textit{conservativity}. Their definition of the lives-on property,
slightly simplified by removing reference to the model, is given in \nexteg{}.
\begin{ex}
A quantifier $Q$ \textit{lives on} a set $A$ if $Q$ is a set of sets
with the property that
\begin{quote}
$X\in Q \text{ iff } (X\cap A)\in Q$
\end{quote}
\end{ex}
This means that the notion of witness set given by Barwise and Cooper
is defined for conservative quantifiers. Examples of witness sets
that they give include: a witness set for the quantifier corresponding
to a proper name \textit{John} as the singleton set containing the
individual John; a witness set corresponding to \textit{a woman} as
any non-empty set of women; a witness set corresponding to
\textit{most women} as a set of women which contains most women.
The notion of witness set
was introduced by Barwise and Cooper in a section called
\textit{Processing Quantified Statements}. It was introduced
as an auxiliary notion which could be used in an account of how an
agent might evaluate the truth of a quantified statement. This
suggests that it should play an important role in a theory of
semantics like ours which is oriented towards explaining cognitive
semantic processing, especially if it is a theory which attempts to do
this in terms of judgements that objects (including situations) are
witnesses of types. It seems natural to make a link between the
notion of witnesses for types and the notion of witnesses for
quantifiers. We will go further and suggest that the characterization
of the meaning of determiners is based on witness sets, thus elevating
the witness sets from an auxiliary notion derived from the meaning
assigned to quantifiers to the central notion which characterizes the
distinctions between the various quantifier meanings available, just
as in type theory the notion of meaning is characterized in terms of
the witness conditions for types. In doing this we will be going at
least part way to meeting some of the requirements of the proposals by \cite{GinzburgPurver2008,LueckingGinzburg2019}.
In the literature on generalized quantifiers \cite{Benthem1984}
introduced the perspective that we should think of determiners as
representing relations between sets rather than as mappings from sets
to families of sets. This is reflected in our characterization of
quantifier relations as relations between properties (which can be
used to generate the set of objects which have the property) and the
use of ptypes constructed with quantifier relations and two properties
as arguments.
With each quantifier relation, $q$, and property, $P$, we will
associate a type of witness sets $q^w(P)$. For example, a set, $X$,
is of type $\text{most}^w(P)$ if $X$ is a set of objects with property
$P$ which contains most of the objects which have property $P$. We
will say that a witness for the quantificational ptype `most($P$,
$Q$)' is a pair (coded as a record and thus corresponding intuitively
to a situation) consisting of the set, $X$, where $X:q^w(P)$
(i.e. $X$ is a witness set for $q$ and $P$) and a function, $f$, whose domain
is $X$ and such that for any $a\in X$, $f(a)$ is a situation which
shows that $a$ has property $Q$. In general for distributive readings
of monotone increasing
quantifiers, $q$, we can say that a witness for $q(P, Q)$ provides a
witness set $X$ of type $q^w(P)$ and a function which shows that every
member of $X$ has the property $Q$. For distributive readings of
monotone decreasing quantifiers we need a different kind of function
together with the witness set. Here we have to check that everything
which has both property $P$ and property $Q$ is a member of the
witness set. Thus we need a function, $f$, whose domain is the set of
objects having both $P$ and $Q$, such that if $a$ is in this set then
$f(a)$ is a situation which shows that $a$ is a member of the witness
set $X$. These two kinds of functions correspond exactly to the
evaluation procedures suggested in \cite{BarwiseCooper1981} quoted in
\nexteg{}.
\begin{ex}
\textit{To evaluate $X\in D(A)$ do the following:}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Take some subset $w$ of $A$ which you know to be in $D(A)$
\item
\begin{enumerate}
\item[(i)] For mon$\uparrow$ $D(A)$, check $w\subseteq X$.
\item[(ii)] For mon$\downarrow$ $D(A)$, check $(X\cap A)\subseteq w$
\end{enumerate}
\item If there is such a $w$, the sentence is true. Otherwise it is false.
\end{enumerate}
\end{ex}
Using pairs of witness sets and functions as witnesses for
quantificational ptypes is also closely related to
the treatment of quantification in Martin-Löf type theory using
$\Sigma$-types and dependent types. (See, for example, discussion in
\citealp{Ranta1994}.) A witness for the $\Sigma$-type \nexteg{a}
would be an ordered pair as characterized in \nexteg{b}.
\begin{ex}
\begin{subex}
\item $(\Sigma x:A)B(x)$
\item $\langle a,b\rangle$ where $a:A$ and $b:B(a)$
\end{subex}
\end{ex}
In the following subsections we will develop the tools we need to make
our analysis precise in terms of the TTR machinery we have developed
so far to create a witness-based analysis of quantfiers. We will also
consider how we can move away from a set-based account of
quantification to a type-based approach where we can estimate the
probability of a quantificational ptype being witnessed on the basis
of our previous experience.
\subsection{Relating properties, types and sets}
% [????In this section we revise the definition of properties. We
% probably need to go back and revise previous definitions for
% consistency.]
% We first define a type of record types whose labels include a certain
% set of labels. Let $L$ be a set of labels, then \textit{RecType}$_L$
% is a type. $T$ : \textit{RecType}$_L$ iff $T$ : \textit{RecType} and
% $L\subseteq\text{labels}(T)$. [????Check whether `labels' defined for
% record types -- it is defined for records.]
% Now we can define \textit{Ppty} to be the type in \nexteg{}.
% \begin{ex}
% \record{\tfield{bg}{\textit{RecType}$_{\{x\}}$}\\
% \tfield{fg}{(bg$\rightarrow$\textit{RecType})}}
% \end{ex}
% A witness for this type, a property, would be something like
% \nexteg{}, ``the property of being a dog''.
% \begin{ex}
% \record{\field{bg}{\smallrecord{\smalltfield{x}{\textit{Ind}}}}\\
% \field{fg}{$\lambda
% r$:\smallrecord{\smalltfield{x}{\textit{Ind}}} . \record{\tfield{e}{dog($r$.x)}}}}
% \end{ex}
% This is a cumbersome notation for a property so we abbreviate it as
% \nexteg{}.
% \begin{ex}
% $\ulcorner\lambda
% r$:\smallrecord{\smalltfield{x}{\textit{Ind}}}
% . \record{\tfield{e}{dog($r$.x)}}$\urcorner$
% \label{ex:ppty-dog}
% \end{ex}
% If $P$ is a property we will also use the notation $P(a)$ to represent $P.\text{fg}(a)$.
% \preveg{} is a property of individuals and we will have a subtype of
% \textit{Ppty}, \textit{Ppty}(\textit{Ind}), to represent this more
% specific type of property. In general we give the definition in
% \nexteg{}.
% \begin{ex}
% \begin{subex}
% \item if $T$ is a type, then
% \textit{Ppty}($T$) is a type
% \item $P$ : \textit{Ppty}($T$) iff
% $P$ : \textit{Ppty} and $P$.bg$^{\text{x}}$ is
% \smallrecord{\smalltfield{x}{$T$}}
% \end{subex}
% \end{ex}
% Here we use $P$.bg$^{\text{x}}$
% to represent the generalization of $P$.bg to its `x'-field as
% characterized in Appendix~\ref{app:gen-rectypes}, that is the type
% whose only field is the `x'-field of $P$.bg.
A property, $P$, can be \textit{pure}, as in \nexteg{a}, that is,
$P$.bg has exactly one field, the required `x'-field; or it can be
restricted by including additional fields in the background as in
\nexteg{b}, the restricted property
of being an individual which is a dog that barks.
\begin{ex}
\begin{subex}
\item $\ulcorner\lambda r$:\smallrecord{\smalltfield{x}{\textit{Ind}}}
. \record{\tfield{e}{bark($r$.x)}}$\urcorner$
\item $\ulcorner\lambda
r$:\smallrecord{\smalltfield{x}{\textit{Ind}}\\
\smalltfield{c}{dog(x)}}
. \record{\tfield{e}{bark($r$.x)}}$\urcorner$
\end{subex}
\end{ex}
% Note that \preveg{b} is still of type \textit{Ppty}(\textit{Ind})
% according to our definition above.
The ability to restrict properties will be important for analyzing
dynamic quantification where information from the first argument of
the quantifier relation is passed to the second argument of the
quantifier relation and this is what enables the treatment of donkey
anaphora. Thus \textit{every farmer who owns a donkey likes it} will
be treated as the `every'-relation holding between the property of
being a farmer and owning a donkey and the property of being a farmer
who owns a donkey and likes it thus providing an antecedent for
\textit{it} within the second property (see
Section~\ref{sec:donkey-anaph}). However, it will also be important to
be able to ``purify'' such restricted properties, that is, relate them
systematically to a corresponding property whose background contains just
the one `x'-field. This will allow us to avoid the proportion problem
that can arise in the analysis of donkey anaphora, that is in
computing whether a
sentence like \textit{most farmers who own a donkey like it} is true, we need
to ensure that the majority of farmers who own a donkey are such that
they like it and not that the majority of pairs of farmers and donkeys
where the farmer owns the donkey are such that the farmer likes the
donkey. Thus we need a property of individuals, not of farmer-donkey
pairs. Suppose we have the restricted property \nexteg{a}. We will
define an operation on functions which will yield the pure property
\nexteg{b}.
\begin{ex}
\begin{subex}
\item $\ulcorner\lambda r$:\smallrecord{\smalltfield{x}{\textit{Ind}}\\
\smalltfield{c$_1$}{farmer(x)}\\
\smalltfield{y}{\textit{Ind}}\\
\smalltfield{c$_2$}{donkey(y)}\\
\smalltfield{e}{own(x, y)}}
. \record{\tfield{e}{like($r$.x, $r$.y)}}$\urcorner$
\item $\ulcorner\lambda r$:\smallrecord{\smalltfield{x}{\textit{Ind}}} . \record{\tfield{$\mathfrak{c}$}{\smallrecord{\smallmfield{x}{$r$.x}{\textit{Ind}}\\
\smalltfield{c$_1$}{farmer(x)}\\
\smalltfield{y}{\textit{Ind}}\\
\smalltfield{c$_2$}{donkey(y)}\\
\smalltfield{e}{own(x, y)}}}\\
\tfield{e}{\record{\tfield{e}{like($\Uparrow$$\mathfrak{c}$.x,
$\Uparrow$$\mathfrak{c}$.y)}}}}$\urcorner$
\end{subex}
\label{ex:pure-eg}
\end{ex}
This purification operation changes the property in \preveg{a}, a
property of farmers who own a donkey into the property \preveg{b}, a
property of individuals. The restriction in \preveg{a} has been
lowered into the body of the property and labelled with
`$\mathfrak{c}$', intuitively a local context in the type returned by
the function.
We first define an operation which will generalize a type to the type
containing one of its non-dependent fields. This is just one way of
many to operate on a type to make it more general. Consider \nexteg{}.
\begin{ex}
\record{\tfield{x}{\textit{Ind}}\\
\tfield{e}{dog(x)}}
\end{ex}
We can pick out the `x'-field which is not dependent, unlike the
`e'-field. The result is \nexteg{}
\begin{ex}
\record{\tfield{x}{\textit{Ind}}}
\end{ex}
In general for a record type, $T$, we will represent the generalization
of $T$ to its non-dependent $\ell$-field as $T^\ell$.
\begin{shaded}
The general
definition of this is \nexteg{}, repeated in Appendix~\ref{app:gen-rectypes}.
\begin{ex}
If $T$ : \textit{RecType}, $\ell\in\text{labels}(T)$ and
$\langle\ell,T'\rangle\in T$ where $T'$: \textit{Type} (that is,
$[\ell,T']$ is a non-dependent field in $T$), then \textit{the
generalization of $T$ to its $\ell$-field}, $T^\ell$, is
\begin{quote}
\record{\tfield{$\ell$}{$T'$}}
\end{quote}
\label{ex:gen-to-ell}
\end{ex}
\end{shaded}
We denote the purification operation on properties by $\mathfrak{P}$
and define it as in \nexteg{}.
\begin{ex}
If $P$ : \textit{Ppty}, then
\begin{quote}
if $P$.bg$^x$ = $P$.bg, then
\begin{quote}
$\mathfrak{P}(P)=P$
\end{quote}
otherwise:
\begin{quote}
$\mathfrak{P}(P)$ is $\ulcorner\lambda r$:$P$.bg$^{\text{x}}$
. \record{\tfield{$\mathfrak{c}$}{$P.\text{bg}\parallel$ \smallrecord{\field{x}{$r$.x}}}\\
\tfield{e}{$P(\mathfrak{c})$}}$\urcorner$
\end{quote}
\end{quote}
\label{ex:purification}
\end{ex}
(Recall that $T\!\!\parallel\!\! r$ is the result of specifying or anchoring
$T$ with the record $r$ as defined in Appendix~\ref{app:specrec}.)
\preveg{} represents one of two options for purifying a property. It
yields the property of being something such that the background
conditions $P$.bg are met \textit{and} the body of the property is met
under those conditions. The alternative is to say that the property
yielded is the property of being something such that \textit{if} the
background conditions $P$.bg are met, \textit{then} the body of the
property is met under those conditions. This alternative, which has
the effect of universal quantification over situations which meet the
background conditions, will we represented by the operator
`$\mathfrak{P}^\forall$' characterized in \nexteg{}.
\begin{ex}
If $P$ : \textit{Ppty}, then
\begin{quote}
if $P$.bg$^x$ = $P$.bg, then
\begin{quote}
$\mathfrak{P^\forall}(P)=P$
\end{quote}
otherwise:
\begin{quote}
$\mathfrak{P^\forall}(P)$ is $\ulcorner\lambda r$:$P$.bg$^{\text{x}}$
. ($(r'\!:\!P.\text{bg}\!\parallel\!\!\text{\smallrecord{\field{x}{$r$.x}}})\rightarrow$
\record{
\tfield{e}{$P(r')$}})$\urcorner$
\end{quote}
\end{quote}
\label{ex:purification-universal}
\end{ex}
The option presented by `$\mathfrak{P}^\forall$' will become relevant
in our discussion of donkey anaphora on
p.~\pageref{pg:donkey-purification-universal}. For now, we will
continue the discussion with the existential variant, `$\mathfrak{P}$'.
As an example let us apply $\mathfrak{P}$ to (\ref{ex:pure-eg}a). The
result will be \nexteg{}
\begin{ex}
$\ulcorner\lambda r$:\smallrecord{\smalltfield{x}{\textit{Ind}}} .
\record{\tfield{$\mathfrak{c}$}{\smallrecord{\smalltfield{x}{\textit{Ind}}\\
\smalltfield{c$_1$}{farmer(x)}\\
\smalltfield{y}{\textit{Ind}}\\
\smalltfield{c$_2$}{donkey(y)}\\
\smalltfield{e}{own(x, y)}} $\parallel$
\smallrecord{\field{x}{$r$.x}}} \\
\tfield{e}{$\ulcorner\lambda r$:\smallrecord{\smalltfield{x}{\textit{Ind}}\\
\smalltfield{c$_1$}{farmer(x)}\\
\smalltfield{y}{\textit{Ind}}\\
\smalltfield{c$_2$}{donkey(y)}\\
\smalltfield{e}{own(x, y)}}
. \record{\tfield{e}{like($r$.x, $r$.y)}}$\urcorner$($\mathfrak{c}$)}}$\urcorner$
\label{ex:pure-eg1}
\end{ex}
% Following the definition of generalization of a type to a particular
% field in Appendix~\ref{app:gen-rectypes}, \nexteg{a} represents
% \nexteg{b}.
% \begin{ex}
% \begin{subex}
% \item \smallrecord{\smalltfield{x}{\textit{Ind}}\\
% \smalltfield{c$_1$}{farmer(x)}\\
% \smalltfield{y}{\textit{Ind}}\\
% \smalltfield{c$_2$}{donkey(y)}\\
% \smalltfield{e}{own(x, y)}}$^x$
% \item \smallrecord{\smalltfield{x}{\textit{Ind}}}
% \end{subex}
% \end{ex}
According to the definition of the specification of a record type by a
record, \nexteg{a} represents
\nexteg{b}.
\begin{ex}
\begin{subex}
\item \smallrecord{\smalltfield{x}{\textit{Ind}}\\
\smalltfield{c$_1$}{farmer(x)}\\
\smalltfield{y}{\textit{Ind}}\\
\smalltfield{c$_2$}{donkey(y)}\\
\smalltfield{e}{own(x, y)}} $\parallel$
\smallrecord{\field{x}{$r$.x}}
\item \smallrecord{\smallmfield{x}{$r$.x}{\textit{Ind}}\\
\smalltfield{c$_1$}{farmer(x)}\\
\smalltfield{y}{\textit{Ind}}\\
\smalltfield{c$_2$}{donkey(y)}\\
\smalltfield{e}{own(x, y)}}
\end{subex}
\end{ex}
To understand the reduction of the type in the `e'-field in (\ref{ex:pure-eg1}) we
represent it first in the official notation for dependent fields as in
\nexteg{a}. This represents the same as \nexteg{b} (by
$\beta$-conversion) and its abbreviatory notation in the context of
(\ref{ex:pure-eg1}) is \nexteg{c}.
\begin{ex}
\begin{subex}
\item $\langle\lambda v$:\smallrecord{\smalltfield{x}{\textit{Ind}}\\
\smalltfield{c$_1$}{farmer(x)}\\
\smalltfield{y}{\textit{Ind}}\\
\smalltfield{c$_2$}{donkey(y)}\\
\smalltfield{e}{own(x,y)}}
. $\ulcorner\lambda r$:\smallrecord{\smalltfield{x}{\textit{Ind}}\\
\smalltfield{c$_1$}{farmer(x)}\\
\smalltfield{y}{\textit{Ind}}\\
\smalltfield{c$_2$}{donkey(y)}\\
\smalltfield{e}{own(x,y)}}
. \record{\tfield{e}{like($r$.x,$r$.y)}}$\urcorner$($v$), $\langle\mathfrak{c}\rangle\rangle$
\item $\langle\lambda v$:\smallrecord{\smalltfield{x}{\textit{Ind}}\\
\smalltfield{c$_1$}{farmer(x)}\\
\smalltfield{y}{\textit{Ind}}\\
\smalltfield{c$_2$}{donkey(y)}\\
\smalltfield{e}{own(x,y)}}
.
\record{\tfield{e}{like($v$.x,$v$.y)}},
$\langle\mathfrak{c}\rangle\rangle$
\item \record{\tfield{e}{like($\Uparrow\!\mathfrak{c}$.x,$\Uparrow\!\mathfrak{c}$.y)}}
\end{subex}
\end{ex}
Making these substitutions yields (\ref{ex:pure-eg}b).
If $P$ is a pure property, we will use the notation $P\{a\}$ to
represent the type $P$(\smallrecord{\field{x}{$a$}}). If $P\{a\}$ is
witnessed we say that $a$ has property $P$. We can now define the
type of objects which have $P$, which we will represent as
$\mathfrak{T}(P)$. We introduce this type as in \nexteg{}.
\begin{ex}
\begin{subex}
\item If $P$ : \textit{Ppty} and $P$ is pure, then $\mathfrak{T}(P)$ : \textit{Type}.
\item $a:\mathfrak{T}(P)$ iff $\mathfrak{P}(P)\{a\}$ is witnessed.
\end{subex}
\end{ex}
There is a different route to a type with the same witnesses as
$\mathfrak{T}(P)$. We have previously defined $\downP{P}$ as the
set of objects which have the property $P$, as in
Chapter~\ref{ch:commonnouns}, p.~\pageref{pg:property-extension-rev}. For
any set, $X$, we can define a type whose witnesses are exactly the
members of $X$. We will represent this type as $\mathfrak{T}(X)$ and
introduce it as in \nexteg{} (repeated in Appendix~\ref{app:settypes}.
\begin{ex}
\begin{subex}
\item If $T$ is a type and $X:\mathrm{set}(T)$, then $\mathfrak{T}(X)$ is a type
\item $a:\mathfrak{T}(X)$ iff $a\in X$
\end{subex}
\label{ex:mathfrakT}
\end{ex}
Given this, it is straightforward to see that \nexteg{} holds.
\begin{ex}
For any property, $P$, $a:\mathfrak{T}(P)$ iff
$a:\mathfrak{T}(\downP{P})$
\end{ex}
What distinguishes these two types is the method they suggest for
determining whether something is a witness for the type. In the case
of $\mathfrak{T}(\downP{P})$ we have to first determine the complete
set of objects which have the property and then determine whether the
object in question is a member of the set. In the case of
$\mathfrak{T}(P)$ we only have to determine whether the object in
question has the property $P$. Computing the set of all objects which
have a property may be viable when we are considering a property whose
extension is a small finite set of objects (for example, if the
property is that of being a dog in a particular small situation) but
it does not seem feasible in the case of large finite sets or infinite
sets. We will return to this issue below when we consider the
interpretation of generalized quantifiers which are classically
treated by comparing sets and we will consider an alternative in terms
of types and estimated probabilities.
\subsection{Types of witness sets for quantifiers}
\label{sec:witset-types}
In this section we will discuss the characterization of types of
witness sets for various generalized quantifiers as a step on our way
to characterizing a witnessed-based account of generalized
quantifiers. The witness sets we characterize will be very close to
those of \cite{BarwiseCooper1981}, though not exactly the same in all
cases. In general for a quantifier relation, $q$, and property,
$P$, a witness set, $X$, of type $q^w(P)$ must meet two conditions. The
first is that it must be a subset of the property extension of $P$.
We now have two ways of expressing this as shown in \nexteg{}.
\begin{ex}
\begin{subex}
\item $X\subseteq\downP{P}$
\item $X:\mathrm{set}(\mathfrak{T}(P))$
\end{subex}
\end{ex}
\preveg{a} makes explicit the connection to the original definition of
witness sets by Barwise and Cooper. \preveg{b} is an equivalent
condition on $X$ which does not involve the computation of the
complete property extension of $P$.
The second condition which must be met by witnesses, $X$, of $q^w(P)$ is a
cardinality condition on $X$. This may be an absolute condition on
the size of $X$ or it may involve a comparison of the size of $X$ with
the size of the property extension of $P$, that is, $\downP{P}$. Thus
even though we have a way of avoiding the computation of the total
property extension in the first condition on witness sets, we will not
always be able to avoid it in the second condition. It is for this
reason that we will move to probability estimations in the next
section.
The witness condition for `exist$^{\text{w}}$($P$)' is given in
\nexteg{}.
\begin{ex}
$X:\text{exist}^{\text{w}}(P)$ iff
\begin{enumerate}
\item $X:\mathrm{set}(\mathfrak{T}(P))$
\item $|X|=1$
\end{enumerate}
\end{ex}
Note that this differs from Barwise and Cooper in that it requires
that the witness set contain exactly one object having property $P$
rather than at least one such object. The quantifier relation `exist'
is used in interpreting the English determiner \textit{a} and also the
singular determiner \textit{some}. Plural \textit{some} corresponds
to the quantifier relation `exist$_{\text{pl}}$'. The witness condition for `exist$_{\text{pl}}^{\text{w}}$($P$)' is given in
\nexteg{}.
\begin{ex}
$X:\text{exist}_{\text{pl}}^{\text{w}}(P)$ iff
\begin{enumerate}
\item $X:\mathrm{set}(\mathfrak{T}(P))$
\item $|X|\geq 2$
\end{enumerate}
\end{ex}
Correspondingly we can define the witness condition for `no$^{\text{w}}$($P$)' is given in
\nexteg{}.
\begin{ex}
$X:\text{no}^{\text{w}}(P)$ iff
\begin{enumerate}
\item $X:\mathrm{set}(\mathfrak{T}(P))$
\item $|X|=0$
\end{enumerate}
\end{ex}
\preveg{} could, of course, be given more concisely as \nexteg{}.
\begin{ex}
$X:\text{no}^{\text{w}}(P)$ iff $X=\emptyset$
\end{ex}
The witness condition for `every$^{\text{w}}$($P$)' is given in
\nexteg{}.
\begin{ex}
$X:\text{every}^{\text{w}}(P)$ iff
\begin{enumerate}
\item $X:\mathrm{set}(\mathfrak{T}(P))$
\item $|X|=|\down{\mathfrak{T}(P)}|$
\end{enumerate}
\end{ex}
Note that \preveg{} requires $X$ to be identical with $\down{\mathfrak{T}(P)}$ and
we could, of course, express the witness condition more succinctly as
\nexteg{} if we are not concerned about demonstrating that the witness
conditions for the types witness sets for all quantifiers follow the
same pattern.
\begin{ex}
$X:\text{every}^{\text{w}}(P)$ iff $X=\down{\mathfrak{T}(P)}$
\end{ex}
Either way, we seem committed to computing the set $\downP{P}$ in
order to compute a witness set of `every' and $P$ and this can
therefore lead to problems if $\downP{P}$ is a large set. A standard
way of avoiding the computation of this set in the interpretation of
universal quantification is to associate universal quantification with
a function so that, using the notions we have built up, a witness for `every($P$,$Q$)' would be a function
from $\mathfrak{T}(P)$ to $\mathfrak{T}(Q)$ (see \citealp{Ranta1994},
for discussion of how this is done in a standard Martin-Löf type
theory). This avoids computing the property extension of $P$ if we
have the right view of functions as intensional objects or procedures,
rather than the von Neumann notion of function as a set of ordered
pairs as is standard in set theory. We will make use of such
functions when we come to treat the witness conditions for
quantificational ptypes. Such a treatment on its own does not yield a
characterization of a witness set, however, and thus does not
immediately yield a way of treating plural discourse anaphora with
a universal quantifier as antecedent as in \nexteg{}.
\begin{ex}
Every dog ran into the field. They had seen the rabbits.
\end{ex}
For this reason we will pursue the witness set approach and attempt to
solve the problem of large sets by introducing probability estimation.
In order to account for the witness condition for `most$^{\text{w}}$'
we assume that there is a threshold,
$\theta_{\text{most}}(P)$, which tells you what proportion of the
property extension of $P$ has to be included in the witness set. This
is possibly an oversimplification in that the threshold may depend on
more than the quantifier relation and the first argument property
to the relation. A common assumption in the generalized quantifier
literature is that `most($P$,$Q$)' is true just in case at least one more than
half of the $P$s are $Q$ (see, for example,
\citealp{PetersWesterstahl2006}). This may be true if the property
extension of $P$ is a small finite set. But it hardly seems to be the
case for an example involving a larger set as in \nexteg{}.
\begin{ex}
Most supporters in the stadium cheered when the goal was scored.
\end{ex}
\preveg{} does not appear to be true if only one more than half of the
forty thousand supporters in the stadium cheered. Rather we would expect the number
of cheering supporters to be something in excess of 75\% or 85\% of the
supporters in the stadium. The unclarity as to exactly which
proportion is involved leads us to introduce a threshold which can
vary with the context and the speaker.
The witness condition for `most$^{\text{w}}$($P$)' is given in \nexteg{}.
\begin{ex}
$X:\text{most}^{\text{w}}(P)$ iff
\begin{enumerate}
\item $X:\mathrm{set}(\mathfrak{T}(P))$
\item $\frac{|X|}{|\downP{P}|}\geq\theta_{\text{most}}(P)$
\end{enumerate}
\end{ex}
Clause~2 in \preveg{} requires us to count both the witness set, which
may be quite large, like the number of supporters in a stadium, as
well as the property extension of $P$. We will address this by using
probability estimations in the next section.
The English determiner \textit{many}, has two readings: absolute and
proportional. We will treat this in terms of two quantifier relations
`many$_a$' and `many$_p$'. For any property, $P$, we will assume that
thresholds, $\theta_{\text{many}_a}(P)$ and $\theta_{\text{many}_p}(P)$ are
provided. These will indicate, respectively, the number of objects
having property $P$ that will count as many and the proportion of the
set of objects having $P$ that will count as many. The witness
condition for `many$_a^{\text{w}}$($P$)' is given in \nexteg{}.
\begin{ex}
$X:\text{many}_a^{\text{w}}(P)$ iff
\begin{enumerate}
\item $X:\mathrm{set}(\mathfrak{T}(P))$
\item $|X|\geq\theta_{\text{many}_a}(P)$
\end{enumerate}
\end{ex}
The witness condition for `many$_p^{\text{w}}$($P$)' is given in \nexteg{}.
\begin{ex}
$X:\text{many}_p^{\text{w}}(P)$ iff
\begin{enumerate}
\item $X:\mathrm{set}(\mathfrak{T}(P))$
\item $\frac{|X|}{|\downP{P}|}\geq\theta_{\text{many}_p}(P)$
\end{enumerate}
\end{ex}
The quantifier relations corresponding to \textit{few} are treated in
an exactly similar fashion to those corresponding to \textit{many}
except that the cardinality of the witness set or the proportion of
the property extension included in the witness set is required to be
less than or equal to the relevant threshold. The witness
condition for `few$_a^{\text{w}}$($P$)' is given in \nexteg{}.
\begin{ex}
$X:\text{few}_a^{\text{w}}(P)$ iff
\begin{enumerate}
\item $X:\mathrm{set}(\mathfrak{T}(P))$
\item $|X|\leq\theta_{\text{few}_a}(P)$
\end{enumerate}
\end{ex}
The witness condition for `few$_p^{\text{w}}$($P$)' is given in \nexteg{}.
\begin{ex}
$X:\text{few}_p^{\text{w}}(P)$ iff
\begin{enumerate}
\item $X:\mathrm{set}(\mathfrak{T}(P))$
\item $\frac{|X|}{|\downP{P}|}\leq\theta_{\text{few}_p}(P)$
\end{enumerate}
\end{ex}
The quantifier relations corresponding to \textit{a few} use the same
thresholds as those corresponding to \textit{few} but in the case of
\textit{a few} the size of the witness set and the proportion of the
witness set to the property extension have to be greater than or equal
to the threshold. The witness
condition for `a\_few$_a^{\text{w}}$($P$)' is given in \nexteg{}.
\begin{ex}
$X:\text{a\_few}_a^{\text{w}}(P)$ iff
\begin{enumerate}
\item $X:\mathrm{set}(\mathfrak{T}(P))$
\item $|X|\geq\theta_{\text{few}_a}(P)$
\end{enumerate}
\end{ex}
The witness condition for `a\_few$_p^{\text{w}}$($P$)' is given in \nexteg{}.
\begin{ex}
$X:\text{a\_few}_p^{\text{w}}(P)$ iff
\begin{enumerate}
\item $X:\mathrm{set}(\mathfrak{T}(P))$
\item $\frac{|X|}{|\downP{P}|}\geq\theta_{\text{few}_p}(P)$
\end{enumerate}
\end{ex}
\section{Relating witness sets to probabilities}
In general our strategy for relating witness sets to probabilities
will involve two conditions, the first of which is the same as we had
in the previous section, that is that the witness set, $X$, is a set
of objects which have the property, $P$, i.e. $X:\mathrm{set}(\mathfrak{T}(P))$.
The second condition, however, will place a constraint on the value of
a conditional probability which we will represent as
$p(\mathfrak{T}(X)\|\mathfrak{T}(P))$, that its, the probability for
any object $a$ that it is of type $\mathfrak{T}(X)$ given that it is
of type $\mathfrak{T}(P)$.\footnote{We contrast this with
$p(\mathfrak{T}(X)|\mathfrak{T}(P)$, the probability that there is
something of type $\mathfrak{T}(X)$, given that there is something
of type $\mathfrak{T}(P)$. See \cite{CooperDobnikLappinLarsson2014a}
for discussion.} Similar probabilities associated with quantifiers
have been suggested by \cite{Emerson2020}. Here we will take a
frequentist view of this probability and define it according the
equation in \nexteg{}.
\begin{ex}
$p(T_1\|T_2)=\frac{|\down{T_1\wedge T_2}|}{|\down{T_2}|}$ if $T_2$ is
witnessed and $0$ otherwise.
\label{ex:freq-cond-prob}
\end{ex}
Clearly, this of itself will not help if we wish to avoid counting the
set of witnesses of $T_1$ or $T_2$. However, probabilities can be
estimated on the basis of previous experience. We will assume that an
agent has available in memory a finite set of Austinian propositions,
$\mathfrak{J}$, recording judgements previously made. We will define
a notion of having a type with respect to a set of Austinian
propositions, $\mathfrak{J}$, using $a:_{\mathfrak{J}}T$ to represent
``$a$ is of type $T$ with respect to $\mathfrak{J}$''. This notion
is defined in \nexteg{}.
\begin{ex}
\begin{subex}
\item $a:_{\mathfrak{J}}T$ if \record{\field{sit}{$a$}\\
\field{type}{$T$}}
$\in$ $\mathfrak{J}$
\item If $T=(T_1\wedge T_2)$, then $a:_{\mathfrak{J}}T$ if $a:_{\mathfrak{J}}T_1$ and
$a:_{\mathfrak{J}}T_2$
\item Otherwise $a\not:_{\mathfrak{J}}T$
\end{subex}
\end{ex}
We will use the notation $\down{T}_{\mathfrak{J}}$ to represent the
extension of $T$ with respect to $\mathfrak{J}$, defined in \nexteg{}.
\begin{ex}
$\down{T}_{\mathfrak{J}}=\{a\mid a:_{\mathfrak{J}}T\}$
\end{ex}
We can now define the notion of \textit{estimate of} $p(T_1\|T_2)$
\textit{based on} $\mathfrak{J}$, $p_{\mathfrak{J}}(T_1\|T_2)$, as in
\nexteg{}.
\begin{ex}
$p_{\mathfrak{J}}(T_1\|T_2)=\frac{|\down{T_1\wedge T_2}_{\mathfrak{J}}|}{|\down{T_2}_{\mathfrak{J}}|}$
\end{ex}
A measure of reliability of the estimate could be related to the
number of instances observed, that is, about which a judgement has
been made, for example as in \nexteg{}.
\begin{ex}
reliability($p_{\mathfrak{J}}(T_1\|T_2)$) = ln min($|\down{T_1}_{\mathfrak{J}}|,|\down{T_2}_{\mathfrak{J}}|$)
\end{ex}
This could still involve an agent in a serious amount of counting
which might be unintuitive from a psychological point of view. From a
computational point of view it would be straightforward enough to keep
track of how many objects of each type have already been judged and to
increment these numbers when a new object of the type is encountered.
However, we do not seem to be aware of how many objects of a given
type we have encountered when the numbers get high. For example, I
know that I have seen a lot of dogs in my life but I have no idea how
many. It would also not explain how I could estimate the probability
that any person in a stadium is wearing an IFK Göteborg scarf just by
looking around the stadium but not exactly counting the number of
people in the stadium and the number of those wearing the scarf. This
seems to point to the related proposals based on Austinian
propositions involving Bayesian reasoning about probability which are
suggested in \cite{CooperDobnikLappinLarsson2014a}. An
important difference between what we are doing here and what we did in
the earlier work is that here we assume that the Austinian
propositions in $\mathfrak{J}$ are categorical rather than
probabilistic. We could, of course, derive a set of categorical
propositions from a set of probabilistic propositions by choosing
categorical propositions for all those in the probabilistic set whose
probabilities exceed a given threshold.
Here we will look at the straight frequentist interpretation of
probabilities associated with types of witness sets of quantifiers as
this can be shown to relate directly to the characterization of these
types in Section~\ref{sec:witset-types} and assume that these
probabilities can be estimated on the basis of a (tractably small) set, $\mathfrak{J}$,
of propositions available to the agent in memory. For convenience in
the discussion below we will repeat the second clause of the
non-deterministic characterization from Section~\ref{sec:witset-types}
for comparison.
The witness condition for `exist$^{\text{w}}$($P$)' is given in
\nexteg{}.
\begin{ex}
$X:\text{exist}^{\text{w}}(P)$ iff
\begin{enumerate}
\item $X:\mathrm{set}(\mathfrak{T}(P))$
\item
$p(\mathfrak{T}(X)\|\mathfrak{T}(P))=\frac{1}{|\down{\mathfrak{T}(P)}|}$
(corresponds to $|X|=1$)