diff --git a/draft-ietf-lamps-rfc6712bis.md b/draft-ietf-lamps-rfc6712bis.md index 2ecbcdd..2bb65f0 100644 --- a/draft-ietf-lamps-rfc6712bis.md +++ b/draft-ietf-lamps-rfc6712bis.md @@ -200,25 +200,25 @@ conveying CMP messages. {: id="sect-3.1"} Implementations MUST support at least HTTP/1.0 {{RFC1945}}. This is because -the POST method and the Content-Type header field are available since +the POST method and the "Content-Type" and "Connection: keep-alive" header fields are available since version 1.0. Implementations SHOULD support HTTP/1.1 as specified in {{RFC9110}} and {{RFC9112}}. This is because the -Keep-Alive feature is used since version 1.1 by default, which helps +persistent connection was improved with HTTP/1.1 which helps transferring messages in transactions with more than one request/response -pair more efficiently. +pair more efficiently, see {{Section 9.3 of RFC9112}} for persistent connections and {{Appendix C.2.2 of RFC9112}} for interoperability with the Keep-Alive feature in HTTP/1.0. ## Persistent Connections {: id="sect-3.2"} -HTTP persistent connections {{RFC9112}} allow multiple interactions to +HTTP persistent connections {{Section 9.3 of RFC9112}} allow multiple interactions to take place on the same HTTP connection. However, neither HTTP nor the protocol specified in this document are designed to correlate messages on the same connection in any meaningful way; persistent connections are only a performance optimization. In particular, intermediaries can do things like mix connections from different -clients into one "upstream" connection, terminate persistent +clients into one upstream connection, terminate persistent connections, and forward requests as non-persistent requests, etc. As such, implementations MUST NOT infer that requests on the same connection come from the same client (e.g., for correlating PKI @@ -233,20 +233,20 @@ A DER-encoded {{ITU.X690.1994}} PKIMessage {{I-D.ietf-lamps-rfc4210bis}} MUST be content of an HTTP POST request. If this HTTP request is successful, the server returns the CMP response in the content of the HTTP response. The HTTP response status code in this case MUST be -200; other "Successful 2xx" codes MUST NOT be used for this purpose. -HTTP responses to pushed CMP Announcement messages (i.e., CA +200 (OK) status code; other Successful 2xx status codes MUST NOT be used for this purpose. +HTTP responses to pushed CMP announcement messages (i.e., CA Certificate Announcement, Certificate Announcement, Revocation Announcement, and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Announcement) utilize the status codes 201 and 202 to identify whether the received information was processed. -While "Redirection 3xx" status codes MAY be supported by +While Redirection 3xx status codes MAY be supported by implementations, clients should only be enabled to automatically follow them after careful consideration of possible security -implications. As described in {{sect-5}}, "301 Moved Permanently" +implications. As described in {{sect-5}}, 301 (Moved Permanently) status code could be misused for permanent denial of service. -All applicable "Client Error 4xx" or "Server Error 5xx" status codes +All applicable Client Error 4xx or Server Error 5xx status codes MAY be used to inform the client about errors. @@ -254,9 +254,9 @@ MAY be used to inform the client about errors. {: id="sect-3.4"} The Internet Media Type "application/pkixcmp" MUST be set in the HTTP -Content-Type header field when conveying a PKIMessage. +"Content-Type" header field when conveying a PKIMessage. -Note that the PKIMessage type is used also when sending an Announcement +Note that the PKIMessage type is used also when sending an announcement message. In line with {{Section 8.6 of RFC9110}}, the "Content-Length" header @@ -270,9 +270,9 @@ length of the ASN.1 DER-encoded PKIMessage. In CMP, most communication is initiated by the EEs where every CMP request triggers a CMP response message from the CA or RA. -The CMP Announcement messages described in {{sect-3.7}} are an +The CMP announcement messages described in {{sect-3.7}} are an exception. Their creation may be triggered by certain events or done -on a regular basis by a CA. The recipient of the Announcement only +on a regular basis by a CA. The recipient of the announcement only replies with an HTTP status code acknowledging the receipt or indicating an error, but not with a CMP response. @@ -327,9 +327,9 @@ only be pushed to the recipient. If an EE wants to poll for a potential CA Key Update Announcement or the current CRL, a PKI Information Request using a General Message as -described in Appendix D.5 of {{I-D.ietf-lamps-rfc4210bis}} can be used. +described in {{Appendix D.5 of I-D.ietf-lamps-rfc4210bis}} can be used. -When pushing Announcement messages, PKIMessage structures MUST be sent as +When pushing announcement messages, PKIMessage structures MUST be sent as the content of an HTTP POST request. Suitable recipients for CMP announcements might, for example, be @@ -348,26 +348,26 @@ element. [18] CRL Announcement ~~~~ -CMP Announcement messages do not require any CMP response. However, +CMP announcement messages do not require any CMP response. However, the recipient MUST acknowledge receipt with an HTTP response having an appropriate status code and an empty content. When not receiving such a response, it MUST be assumed that the delivery was not successful. If applicable, the sending side MAY try sending the -Announcement again after waiting for an appropriate time span. +announcement again after waiting for an appropriate time span. If the announced issue was successfully stored in a database or was -already present, the answer MUST be an HTTP response with a "201 Created" +already present, the answer MUST be an HTTP response with a 201 (Created) status code and an empty content. In case the announced information was only accepted for further processing, the status code of the returned HTTP response MAY also be -"202 Accepted". After an appropriate delay, the sender may then try -to send the Announcement again and may repeat this until it receives +202 (Accepted). After an appropriate delay, the sender may then try +to send the announcement again and may repeat this until it receives a confirmation that it has been successfully processed. The appropriate duration of the delay and the option to increase it between consecutive attempts should be carefully considered. -A receiver MUST answer with a suitable 4xx or 5xx HTTP error code +A receiver MUST answer with a suitable 4xx or 5xx error code when a problem occurs. @@ -380,10 +380,10 @@ as possible. For example, there is no benefit in using chunked Transfer-Encoding, as the length of an ASN.1 sequence is known when starting to send it. -There is no need for the clients to send an "Expect" request-header -field with the "100-continue" expectation and wait for a "100 Continue" status +There is no need for the clients to send an "Expect" request header +field with the "100-continue" expectation and wait for a 100 (Continue) status code as described in {{Section 10.1.1 of RFC9112}}. The CMP -payload sent by a client is relatively small, so having extra +content sent by a client is relatively small, so having extra messages exchanged is inefficient, as the server will only seldom reject a message without evaluating the content. @@ -407,7 +407,7 @@ users: consumption by opening many connections to an HTTP server. Therefore, idle connections should be terminated after an appropriate timeout; this may also depend on the available free - resources. After sending a CMP Error Message with PKIStatus other than "waiting", the server should + resources. After sending a CMP error message with PKIStatus other than "waiting", the server should close the connection, even if the CMP transaction is not yet fully completed. @@ -421,15 +421,15 @@ users: (e.g., TLS or HTTP digests). 1. Client users should be aware that storing the target location of - an HTTP response with the "301 Moved Permanently" status code + an HTTP response with the 301 (Moved Permanently) status code could be exploited by a man-in-the-middle attacker trying to block them permanently from contacting the correct server. 1. If no measures to authenticate and protect the HTTP responses to - pushed Announcement messages are in place, their information - regarding the Announcement's processing state may not be trusted. + pushed announcement messages are in place, their information + regarding the announcement's processing state may not be trusted. In that case, the overall design of the PKI system must not - depend on the Announcements being reliably received and processed + depend on the announcements being reliably received and processed by their destination. 1. CMP provides inbuilt integrity protection and authentication. @@ -437,10 +437,10 @@ users: contain sensitive information endangering the security of the PKI when intercepted. However, it might be possible for an eavesdropper to utilize the available information to gather - confidential technical or business critical information. + confidential personal, technical, or business critical information. The protection of the confidentiality of CMP messages together with an initial authentication of the RA/CA before the first CMP message - is transmitted ensures the privacy of the End Entities requesting + is transmitted ensures the privacy of the EE requesting certificates. Therefore, users of the HTTP transfer for CMP messages should consider using HTTP over TLS according to {{RFC9110}} and {{RFC9112}} or using virtual private networks created, for example, by utilizing Internet @@ -476,7 +476,9 @@ Note: This appendix will be deleted in the final version of the document. From version 07 -> 08: -* Addressed SECDIR, OPSDIR and ARTART review comments and also at least partly the HTTPDIR comments +* Addressed HTTPDIR, SECDIR, OPSDIR and ARTART review comments + +* Aligned the terminology with https://httpwg.org/admin/editors/style-guide * Added normative language in Sections 3.3 and 3.7 for clarity