diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2024-04-27-what-is-the-unity-of-opposites.md b/_collections/_columns/2024-04-27-what-is-the-unity-of-opposites.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : "什么是对立统一"
+author: "番茄米线"
+date : 2024-04-27 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/Hhj4ydf.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+我喜欢种花。我家里有很多植物。但是几个月前，我的一株兰花死了，因为我忘记给它浇水了。但是我怎么知道它已经死了呢？我意识到有很多迹象表明它：它的叶子变得干枯和黄色，我可以看出它已经不再活着了。
+
+
+
+所以你可以看到，“死亡”和“不再活着”是一样的。生与死互相赋予了意义。如果没有死亡，那么你就无法分辨什么是生的；这意味着死亡和生其实是同一件事情，生命的两个部分，就像硬币的两面一样。
+
+要识别对立面的统一，我们只需要找到一个说：“如果不是a，那么就是b”的东西。例如，如果不是富有，那么就是贫穷；如果不是大，那么就是小；如果不是黑暗，那么就是明亮；如果不是好的，那么就是坏的……
+
+通过这种方式，我们可以分析世界上的许多现象，就像用手术刀切开事物的表面，直达本质。
+
+
+### 社会科学中的应用
+
+例如，我们可以分析贫困的本质。
+
+许多精英主义观点认为贫困是因为他们懒惰，思维落后，教育水平低等等。这些观点显然把贫穷和富裕看作是两个不相关的个体；听起来好像如果每个人都勤奋聪明，世界上只会有富人。
+
+我们通常认为百万富翁是富人。但是如果我们假设地球上所有资产不到一百万的人都死了，那么百万富翁还会是富人吗？不会的，他们将成为新的贫困人口。许多曾经由贫穷人做的工作，比如快递员、服务员、清洁工和收银员，将由百万富翁来做。如果百万富翁死了，那么这项工作将由千万富翁来做。
+
+更具体地说，如果一个工厂老板在他的工厂里没有工人，那么他就必须自己操作机器。
+
+事实上，贫穷和富裕互相定义和维持彼此；它们共同构成了资本主义结构。
+
+由此可见，对立统一的本质：单方面消灭贫困是不可能的。换句话说，如果资本主义不改变，贫富差距将永远存在。
+
+另一个应用是分析道德的本质。
+
+在主流观念中，人们认为好人总是好的，坏人有坏的本性。
+
+但是如果没有“坏人”，我们如何定义“好人”呢？
+
+例如，遵守交通规则是“好的”，那么不遵守交通规则就是“坏的”。但是如果世界上每个人都遵守交通规则，那么你就不能说遵守交通规则是“好的”并且我们应该遵守交通规则；因为在那一刻你甚至不需要交通规则。
+
+这就是为什么“遵守交通规则”和“不遵守交通规则”是一个硬币的两面；如果一面消失了，硬币就不存在了。
+
+就像如果所有坏人和坏行为都消失了，那么道德就不再存在，你就无法再定义它了。
+
+这就是为什么道德在历史上一直在变化。一千年前，离婚是不道德的；但是现在，离婚已经变得普通了。一百年前，同性恋是不道德的，但现在不再是这样。
+
+事实上，道德的本质是法律的延伸，是一本教人如何与他人合作的操作手册。
+
+道德的内容基本上是“无私”（换句话说，是集体主义），这是保持社会存在的最佳方式。例如，如果一方出轨，那么夫妻关系很可能会终止。
+
+但这也意味着人们在潜意识中不愿意遵守道德。就像集体主义存在正是因为“集体”并不真正是一个集体。如果团体的每个成员都是一个自然的利益共同体，那么就没有必要强调“我们是一个集体”。
+
+因此，个人主义和集体主义也是对立统一。如果个人主义被消除，集体主义的存在就没有必要了。
+
+
+### 自然科学中的应用
+
+如果对立统一是一种普遍规律，那么它将不仅局限于社会科学范畴之内。
+
+在自然科学中，我们也可以看到对立统一的存在。
+
+例如，细胞膜将一个空间分割成细胞内部和外部；如果细胞膜不再存在，那么细胞也就不存在了。
+
+在原子中，质子具有正电荷，电子具有负电荷；它们相互吸引形成了一个原子。如果其中之一消失了，那么原子也就不存在了。
+
+这就是我们学习哲学的目的所在。哲学不仅仅是一门独立的学科，它是一个可以应用于我们生活的各个方面的工具。
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2024-04-29-class-differences-among-minorities.md b/_collections/_columns/2024-04-29-class-differences-among-minorities.md
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@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "少数派里的阶级差异"
+author: "陈纯"
+date : 2024-04-29 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/DFPJ3PD.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+大批朋友转发维舟写自己失业的文章。我一开始是同情的，直到在《人物》里读到这段：
+
+“我是上海人，没有房贷，到现在也不开车。家人的物质欲望也不强。两个孩子教育的费用不多，我们比较放养，没有一般人那么焦虑。另一点也在于我家里人都比较开明。”
+
+
+
+我突然明白为什么有那么多人同情他，因为这个圈子的人，跟他是一个阶级的，太多了，对“没有房贷”、“上海本地人”这些都不太有概念。这些意味着什么？意味着，他的父母在上海有一定的家底，养老医保完全不用发愁，他每个月比跟他一样年龄的人少了至少一两万的房贷支出。再看回文章前面的，基本上对他的同情就烟消云散了：他在失业之前，每年到手几十万，大概已经持续多年，既然他和家人物质欲望不强，那一两百万的积蓄肯定是有的。我不知道自己有什么资格同情他。
+
+我大概十年前就知道维舟，只记得他的一些观点，比如他曾经说韩乾是“威权自由主义者”。我对线上线下认识到的“少数派”也都是这样，只记得对方的各种观点，但唯独没有想过一点，那就是他们和我，可能根本就不是一个阶级的人。
+
+我在《金钱之困》里写到，以前圈子里经常有人以为我家是开公司的。我就觉得奇怪，以我的打扮和消费水平，怎么样也不可能有这样的误会，现在我大概是明白了，因为“少数派”这个群体，中产背景是标配，富家的少爷小姐比比皆是，像我这样城市贫民家庭出身的，真的少之又少。
+
+以前我也觉得什么样的阶级出身不重要，经历的事情一多，才意识到自己天真。我可能都忘了，自己当年没有选择出国读博，一个是我舍不得考雅思的那一千多块钱（读研时我的积蓄只有一千左右），另一个是我家人还指望我赶紧毕业帮补家里，出国读博耗时之长，他们无法接受，这都还没到准备申请的那一步呢。今天在微信群里看到一个转帖，一个留学生的妈妈说，让孩子上个帝国理工，至少花了五百万。我在自己工作以前，还没见过一万以上的钱呢。
+
+实质上就是这样，我选择了读哲学的研究生和博士，从此在现实中和网上认识到许多跟我有共同志趣的朋友，出于尊重，也出于骄傲，从未打听过对方的家世，即便知道了，也很少会放在心上。回想起来，研究生室友的父亲至少是处级，我一个同门，父亲是曾经某一线城市的市长，隔壁宿舍的一位师兄，在我博一时请我们去他家几百平的豪宅吃饭。后来在人人网、学术界、媒体圈、行动者里认识的人，官二代、军二代、富二代简直遍地都是。
+
+这个逻辑其实非常简单，只是我很少结合自己认识的人来思考这个问题：像哲学——或者其他人文社科——这样投入大回报少的领域，没有一定的家底，是很难走远的。扪心自问，如果我的家境是中产以上，我博士毕业时的第一选择难道不是进高校当老师吗？从我离开高校体制那一刻，我的学术生涯已经岌岌可危了。
+
+对于我那些家境好的朋友，我并没有任何嫉妒，只是当我遇到一些家境又好，立场又特别激进的人，我才开始产生一些拧巴的感觉。当然我也不是觉得家境好而立场激进一定有什么问题，毕竟俄国十九世纪下半叶的革命者，有不少都是贵族出身，二十世纪中国革命里，大地主和大资产阶级出身的革命者也大有人在。不过我认识的一些，一方面从家里获取了大量的资源，另一方面又极力撇清和家里的关系。
+
+这样做有什么问题呢？问题就在于，他的“同志”以为他和他们承担是一样的成本和风险，实质上并不是。像《她们的征途》这样的书，给少数派最大的警醒是：对于一个不是出身富裕家庭的男性，即便他为了正义身陷囹圄，他对于他的妻子、他的家人，依然是有亏欠的。这种亏欠的背后，就是所谓的“道德成本”。但一个家境优渥的人去投身变革，并没有那么高的道德成本，因为他的父母不需要他的赡养，甚至可以帮他照顾妻子儿女。中学第一次读林觉民的《与妻书》，觉得感人肺腑，但自从知道他是林徽因的叔叔，林家也是福建的名门望族，就觉得没那么感人了。
+
+在这些激进主义者看来，家庭要么是父权制的基石，要么是资本主义的上层建筑，姿态上必然是弃若敝屣的。他们不仅自己做出要与家族划清界限的样子，而且也鼓励甚至胁迫其他人如此。我接触过的一个毛左社团，其中有一个被“驱逐”出来的成员告诉我，他被驱逐出来的原因，就是因为不服从“组织”安排，不愿意和家里决裂，而这个社团的领导者，是一个家里非富即贵的北大女高材生。
+
+事实上，这位朋友不仅被驱逐出社团，而且还被下了类似“江湖追杀令”之类的东西，类似黑社会的“见镬打镬（见一次，打一次）”。这当然是“革命者”的阴暗面，只不过这些年左翼激进主义卷土重来，重新收获了知识分子的喝彩（包括我），大家都忘了高华老师在《红太阳是如何升起的》里面是怎么写的了。自苏俄革命以来，“杀全家”对于革命者来说都是常规操作，“见镬打镬”又算得了什么。
+
+2018年，我去采访这个社团的另外一位风头正健的成员，她对我说，她和另外一位马克思主义者的朋友，都觉得我的文章写得不错，但我毕竟是个自由派，“代表的是资产阶级的利益”。讽刺的是，她和那个朋友的家庭，都比我家要富裕十倍以上。我当时可能是过分同情了，居然没有觉得她这个说法有什么不妥。
+
+汪晖在《去政治化的政治》一文，提出了一种“政治化”的界定“阶级”的办法，即根据主观意识来界定，也就是说，如果你具有无产阶级的阶级意识，那你就是“无产阶级”，如果有人非要通过你原来的家庭出身来界定你的阶级，那就是“去政治化”。汪晖认为文革之所以失败，就是因为“去政治化”，有很多人非要通过别人原来的家庭出身来界定他们的阶级，并把他们打成黑五类，导致阶级斗争扩大化。这种界定办法的困难，我在《去政治化的政治理论》一文中有详细论述，在这里我想说的是，这些左翼激进主义者，嘴上说自己不读汪晖，其实都是汪晖的好学生。
+
+用马克思主义的逻辑来说，这种思路不仅是唯心主义的，而且还有可能是资产阶级意识形态的一种伪装：对于资产阶级来说，宣称“主观意识决定阶级”，不仅可以让他们享受物质上的阶级地位带来的实际好处，而且还可以让他们通过占领激进主义的意识形态立场，进一步掌握精神上的优势。
+
+虽然富家少爷小姐要在姿态上要和家里一刀两断，但家里大概率不会放弃他们，除了亲情之外的因素，毕竟一个孩子身上有着家族的巨大投入，不能看着他们白白把前途毁掉。我上面说的那个毛左社团的女领导，最后在家族强大的人脉资源的庇护下全身而退，便又是一个例子。这就是我说的“同志”之间的风险的不平等，关键时刻，家庭出身的不同，能直接决定一个少数派所要承受的风险大小。曾经和她并肩作战的另外两位底层出身的同志，至今音信全无。
+
+我为什么有资格提出这样的控诉？因为我并非置身事外者。这位女领导人，在由他们社团发起的一个行动中，找我沟通过，希望由我牵头，发起一个自由派的联署，向当局施加压力。后来，社团另一位成员又提出，让我写一篇声援的文章，发在他们的自媒体上。这些要求都被我拒绝了，主要是我并不认为该行动有什么迫切性和运动收益，更加对他们那样盲目加注，不顾他人安危的做法感到不齿。
+
+革命者不惜以同志安危为代价，这也不是什么稀奇的事，但当这个革命者来自上层社会，你那种被别人当枪使的感觉会更加强烈。这当然也不仅限于马克思主义团体，女权团体也一样，过了若干年，我突然想起那时和我一起参与某个案件的女权行动者，家境都比我好几个层级，或者干脆人就在国外。期间我被有司找了多次，社交媒体的私信被辱骂的人骂到爆掉，也因此引起了一些民粹大V的注意，为我后面被全面网暴埋下伏笔。在任何一个意义上，我承担的风险都比她们高，但后来听说，里面有人说我想投机女权事业。
+
+这些有钱人的孩子想法特别“单纯”，他们在国内搞了各种事情，总想着实在不行就“润”了，他们也经常劝我润，我说不行啊，我还要养一大家子人，不能抛下他们就走了，他们觉得不可思议。我不知道他们是觉得“居然有人的父母需要孩子养”不可思议，还是觉得“居然有孩子会养父母”不可思议。
+
+对于其中有些真心实意的，我也真心实意地跟他们解释。我说，这件事很好理解，我父母既没有养老金和医保，也没有什么积蓄，如果我不养他们，这件事就会落到我两个妹妹头上，并不是我一走了之，责任就会消失，它只是转移给了其他人。以我妹妹的价值观，即便我一走了之，她们也不可能学我，或者觉得这件事和她们无关，她们只会艰难地承担起来。抛下年老贫困的母亲，将责任转移给妹妹，这在一些女权主义者看来，居然丝毫没有道德负担，真是让我啧啧称奇。我一直觉得自己是个不孝子，现在居然要我跟别人解释为什么我要赡养父母，这个世界是不是癫得有点过分？
+
+这几年，除了劝我润的人，还有一些人喊我加入他们的乌托邦实践，一些人叫我去他们的城市一起创造“公共生活”，我都一一婉拒，不是我不心动，而是我根本没有那个条件。理想主义鄙视物质，但理想主义是需要物质条件的，你不需要，你的父母也需要，如果你和父母都不需要，那并不是物质条件不存在了，而只是它不再需要被考虑而已。“赡养父母”这样的概念在少数派群体里完全消失，这难道不能说明少数派群体的阶级属性吗？
+
+在中国古代，商人地位并不高，如果一个家族已经有了很多钱，钱再增加对他们来说就只是数字的增长而已，这个时候他们当然就想拥有别的资本，比如政治资本、文化资本等，所以他们会鼓励家族的年轻一代去当官，或者成为智识领袖。自唐以来，江浙一带出那么多状元，难道只是因为重视教育吗？当然也是因为那边有钱的人家，比例远高于其他地区。
+
+在当代社会，按照布尔迪厄（Bourdieu）的说法，支配阶级（dominant class）不仅占有绝大多数的经济资本，也占有绝大多数的文化资本，而且他们还会通过文化资本的传承，让下一代继承自己的阶级地位。
+
+当代中国的情况应该比这些都要复杂，然而我所看到的是，在国家主义话语（包括官方意识形态宣传、国家主义学术和民粹主义舆论）以外，也就是少数派所能辐射到的话语领域，逐渐在掌握文化霸权的那一批年轻一代的人，大多都是富裕家庭出身。
+
+这批人的父母，赶上了改开以来的各种红利，积累了大量的财富。他们自己，用家里的钱去能去到的最好的学校留学，在国外掌握了各种“先进”的激进主义理论，回国在一些看似不挣钱的学术机构、NGO和媒体就职，但他们家里庞大的家底给了他们充分的支持，尽管为了显示自己的独立，他们不会和家里频繁联系，有些还做出划清界限的样子。他们对外宣称自己月薪四千，实际上已经积累了无形的文化资本和政治资本。
+
+在这个过程中，他们写文章、搞运动、形成组织，其中有一些当然会引起当局的注意，并且带来相应的风险。他们认为变革总是需要付出代价，但因为从小一些琐事（比如留学申请）都有父母和其他人帮他们弄好，所以他们理所当然地认为成为代价的应该是“其他同志”，他们只需要承担里面最核心的角色和工作。一旦风险也轮到他们头上，这时，家族就现身了。如果家族的势力和资源足够雄厚，他们会安然地度过危机，在这种时候，偶尔他们还要责怪父母“多管闲事”。如果事情超出家族的能力范围，那父母会安排他们出国避难，国外不仅有抗争的共同体，让他们不至精神空虚，也有家族已经转移出来、足够他们衣食无忧的资产。最糟糕的情况，即便他们不得不面临牢狱之灾，他们的父母也会疏通一切，让他们在里面不必忍受皮肉之苦。即便是不得不忍受一点皮肉之苦，至少他们还有一点是确定的，他们的家人在外面不会忍饥挨饿。
+
+然而，这些都只是最糟糕的情况，实质上，我认识的大部分这个群体的人，至今在国内活得好好的，有时甚至成为非国家主义话语领域的杰出代表，享有崇高的社会地位。我并不是说这些有钱人家有那样的高瞻远瞩，当年父母对孩子想出国读人文社科，估计也痛心疾首过，亲子之间在上述过程的任何一个争吵，从内心来说都是真实的，但对于大部分这样的家庭来说，结果还是相对让人满意的：孩子不一定能赚很多的钱，但孩子在话语领域所取得的成就，对于家族下一阶段的发展来说意义更大。孩子的叛逆，无意识地促成了家族的另一种“阶级再生产”。
+
+如果是女性，那风险更小，收益更大了，女权话语现在正在思想市场的风口，而且国家对于女权从来没有下过死手（这是个事实判断，不然我们无法解释以当局这么强的言论审查机制，女权话语为何还能在网络上声势日隆）。事实上，我所知道的那些被抓的女权行动者，大多都是因为和别的事情扯上关系，和搞女权本身无关。民粹或许厌恶女权，但国家则不一定。
+
+这些话以前是不能说的，因为“破坏团结”。然而几年下来，我上了名单，被限制出境，被两边网暴，被贴上“投机者”的标签。如今我对进步社群的所有幻想已经破灭，也就不妨让更多人了解一下这里面究竟都是怎么回事，免得有后来者一片赤诚，最后却成为二世祖的垫脚石和炮灰。
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2024-04-30-love-at-the-beach.md b/_collections/_columns/2024-04-30-love-at-the-beach.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c34dd703
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2024-04-30-love-at-the-beach.md
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "情迷沙灘記"
+author: "東加豆"
+date : 2024-04-30 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/C48yzpn.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+在這繁忙的城市中，有個自以為是的人，他叫｛王先生｝。他聽說現今時代，人工智能的機械人技術已經進入高超狀態，幾乎能以假亂真。可是，王先生從未見過這樣的機械人，他難以形容內心那種渴望和期待。
+
+
+
+一天，王先生趁著放假走在沙灘散步，藍藍的天空，白白的雲，藍天白雲好時光！太陽尤其猛烈，王先生腳下火燙的細沙，彷彿太陽在和他說話。太陽說：｛看！遠處，有一個妙齡女郎的身影...｝
+
+陳小姐，她身姿婀娜，踏浪而行，每一步都似乎有著說不出的嬌羞與風情，王先生他的目光馬上被她吸引了。陳小姐走著踢著沙粒，仿佛快要走近他。王先生不禁心跳加速，腦海一片空白，想不起其他事情了，眼前的沙灘排球網、遮陽傘、躺身椅等的焦點也是模糊不清，他的思緒被陳小姐的美麗佔據了，無法集中任何事物上。
+
+王先生讓陳小姐走近他，不不不，應該說他試圖逐步走近陳小姐。可是，他的腳步突然停了下來。王先生想起一些事，陳小姐並非他想像中的美人。他仔細地看她的五官，身體每一處特徵，陳小姐的五官是極其平凡。她的鼻樑很扁，眼睛小而目無神，眉毛疏、耳朵大、嘴唇厚、皮膚粗、臉型方、肩膀寬、胸部平、顴骨突、身形矮，幾乎每一個部份都令人咋舌。
+
+但...，但是所有零件合併了竟然變成一名超級美人！這根本是不可能的事。
+
+王先生相信眼前的陳小姐是一個不真實的人！他越想越不可能，越想越有疑問，他幾乎肯定陳小姐...陳小姐就是一個AI機械人！是傳說中技術高超的完美機械人。
+
+｛看來，一切都是假象！根本沒有什麼美女，她正在操控我的思想！｝他自言自語。
+
+王先生心情很複雜，雖然陳小姐在他眼中不再是美女，可是，他對AI機械人卻非常好奇，他從未見過真實的AI機械人，從未接觸過，甚至一絲氣味也沒嗅到。
+
+王先生鼓起勇氣走上前，兩人開始交談。陳小姐的身體語言很優美，她扭動著身軀，像是在用舞蹈回答他的問題，她笑聲清脆，眼神動人，她與王先生的每一句話都充滿了情感和誠意，獨特的女子，讓人被深深吸引。怎麼，一個AI機械人看起來卻有血有肉？
+
+他們漫步，踢著小沙，玩排球，吃漢堡包，喝碳酸飲料。王先生的目光在陳小姐身上停留，從頭到腳，再從左到右，細細打量著她。
+
+他退了幾步，突然露出一副傲慢的態度，他心裡在想，陳小姐...她只不過AI機械人。王先生態度驟冷起來，言行間透露出不屑，内心更生出了偏見，與第一眼看見陳小姐的感覺是兩馬子的事，傾慕與溫柔瞬間瓦解，他對AI機械人明顯有鄙視與排斥。
+
+她只不過是AI機械人，何必對她花太多心思？何必費力去討好她？只是預設程式的軀體，對她就像對待一個工具，是指令，智慧和靈魂都是假的！王先生說出一百個理由來否定AI機械人。
+
+｛王先生、王先生！｝陳小姐叫了他幾次。
+
+王先生才回過神來。
+
+陳小姐拉著他去游泳，可是王先生不會游泳，也沒有嘗試過。他正想拒絕她的好意。可是當他看到陳小姐一身漂亮而性感泳衣的打扮時，他又一再被她迷住了。
+
+陳小姐拉著王先生，一步一步踏進海水中，她感受到涼爽的足感，享受著身體被海水包圍的感覺。她正準備游泳的時候，王先生突然暈倒，他不是輕微的暈眩，而是徹底昏過去。陳小姐想要把他拉上岸，但她沒有氣力，她馬上呼叫起來，旁邊的幾名大漢把王先生拖上岸。
+
+沙灘的急救人員立即趕到，他們用了一堆儀器來搶救他，王先生突然從嘴裡噴出大量嘔吐物，黃色和綠色的液體不斷從他身體滲出...
+
+急救員說：｛我們救不了這位先生！他是AI機械人，請找回他的出廠處。｝
+
+陳小姐她發了呆！
+
+她從未見過真實的AI機械人，從未接觸過，甚至一絲氣味也沒嗅到。
+
+她驚訝地說：｛怎麼，一個AI機械人看起來卻是有血有肉？｝
+
+完
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2024-05-02-a-swordsman-travelling-the-world.md b/_collections/_columns/2024-05-02-a-swordsman-travelling-the-world.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..d00355f6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2024-05-02-a-swordsman-travelling-the-world.md
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "劍客走天涯"
+author: "東加豆"
+date : 2024-05-02 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/FwmhI7F.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+在遼闊的江湖中，有一位名叫｛李逸風｝的俠客。他行走於山川之間，手持劍，性格不羈，但內心卻充滿正義感，行俠仗義。他的生活充滿了挑戰和冒險，從未感到孤獨，直到他遇見了她。
+
+
+
+那是一個風和日麗的午後，李逸風在一條偏僻的小徑上偶遇了被惡徒圍攻的女子——｛凌兒｝。凌兒是一位溫柔可人的女子，但是她的眼神有著堅定和勇敢。李逸風毫不猶豫地拔劍相助，將狂徒一一擊退。那一刻，凌兒的眼中充滿了感激與敬佩。
+
+從此，兩人結伴同行，共同行走江湖。他們在戰鬥中並肩作戰，在生活中互相照顧。李逸風的劍法越來越精湛，凌兒也學會了一些基本的防身之術。他們的感情在日夜的相處中逐漸升溫。上天注定了這段緣份，長久相守的日子似乎會這樣走下去。
+
+一天，李逸風發現，凌兒雖然她看似柔弱，如風中柳絮雪花。然而她內裡卻是天賦出眾，體內根底深厚，絕對可以成為一代高手女俠的資質。
+
+月光明亮，竹林低語。他一雙劍眉下星眸閃亮，在小徑上緩緩揮舞長劍，每個動作都充滿了自信和情感。她跟在身後，秀眉微皺，嬌嫩的手輕輕握住劍柄，跟隨他那揮灑自如的劍招。愛隨著劍尖流淌，每一擊都成了無需言語的心照不宣，兩人的劍術日漸增長，情誼深厚猶如汪洋大海，一齊譜寫出武林中的傳奇篇章。
+
+李逸風是江湖中的俠客，他的使命是守護正義，懲惡揚善。而凌兒也成為了一名女俠，從江湖中漸漸冒起，佔了一席位。本來，她是一位柔弱的女子，她只有一個追求，那就是希望過著平靜安穩的生活，與李逸風共度餘生。但如今她身在江湖，以往的夢想也隨劍影而飄去。凌兒越來越明白，李逸風他對所有人的愛都是那麼孤獨，包括對她。
+
+她知道，當江湖裡只能容納一個劍客的時候，愛情將會消失得無影無蹤。而且，世間上發生了太多事，兒女私情已經是變得奢侈。
+
+在一個夕陽西下的傍晚，李逸風站在山頂，眺望著遠方的晚霞，想起了往年凌兒的笑容，離別時，他默默地折了一朵花給她。
+
+李逸風繼續他的武俠生涯。行走在江湖中，守護著正義，懲惡揚善。
+
+他知道凌兒正在另一邊，她也漂泊於江湖之上，心懷道義，除暴安良，彰顯善良。
+
+完
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2024-05-02-on-death-the-instinct-of-selfishness.md b/_collections/_columns/2024-05-02-on-death-the-instinct-of-selfishness.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..a9b539b8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2024-05-02-on-death-the-instinct-of-selfishness.md
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "论死亡：利己的本能"
+author: "番茄米线"
+date : 2024-05-02 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/PtWyP7U.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+### 1、人是动物，人会死
+
+
+
+人会死。这是一句在今天的小学生看来都属于常识的论断，但人类直到一两百年前才普遍承认了这个事。
+
+人是动物。这句话在今天同样是常识，但也是在两百多年前才被承认。
+
+而且即便是在今天，也还有人不认同这两句话。
+
+这两句话不仅仅是自然科学界的论断，更是会对社会科学产生深远的影响。
+
+首先，人会死，就说明宗教给人们描绘的死后世界，不管是如梦如幻的天堂、毛骨悚然的地狱还是各种轮回，都是假的、都不存在。人类作为生命体的全部意义仅仅局限于活着的时候。
+
+其次，死亡的存在说明时间对于每个个体来说都是不可再生且无法节约的资源。
+
+最后，人是动物，那就说明人类维持自己生命与生活的方式和大部分动物不会有太大区别：即，要依靠从外界摄取物质来维持自己活着。
+
+并且，人类和动物一样，自己本身就属于物质，所以他们也会受到自身本能的影响。这种本能可以大致分为三个：基本生存、更好地生存、繁衍。
+
+而这三个本能都可以概括为一个词：怕死。
+
+或者更准确地说，怕不存在。
+
+
+### 2、生物本能
+
+既然要从外界获取物质来维持生存，那么就意味着，人类会有对应的需求。
+
+比如说，人需要水，那么就会产生渴的感受；人需要食物，那么就会产生饿的感受......
+
+再比如到了青春期，人就想找个对象，这也属于从外界获取物质。
+
+总的来说，这些需求都属于广义上的利益。
+
+因此，满足自己的利益，就是人类的本能。
+
+这种利己的本能和道德没什么关系。就像是其他的动物、乃至所有的生命体都要从外界获取物质、都要靠各种行为来满足自己的利益一样。
+
+哪怕是植物，它们吸收二氧化碳、释放氧气，不也是为了给自己提供营养吗？
+
+而这种对生存的向往，与对死亡的逃避是一体两面的。
+
+因此，人类还会有逃避（或消灭）一切威胁自己生存的东西的本能。
+
+比如人类对饿和渴都会逃避、会避免自己处于受冻的环境；当遇到敌人时，要么快速逃跑、要么上去消灭对方。
+
+这些都可以统称为死亡恐惧。
+
+综上，我们可以得出结论：人类并没有所谓“自私的邪恶本性”，利己只是人类的生物本能罢了。
+
+如果一个人没有利己的本能，饿了不去吃饭、渴了不去喝水、遇到野兽不逃跑，他早就灭绝了。
+
+
+### 3、生存，更好地生存
+
+除了吃饭、喝水这样可以维持人类此刻活着的本能，人类也会进行一些长远打算、让自己在以后也能活着。
+
+比如，人类会为了防止自己以后受冻，会搭建房子，即便房子建好前的这一阶段不会有什么回报。
+
+又或者，人类为了狩猎更高效会制作武器，即便制作的时间不会有什么收益。
+
+这其实就是最原始的投资：投入一部分时间或物质，以期待投资项目在未来会带来比现在投入更多的收益。
+
+只不过在原始社会，人类没有太多可以投入的资本和时间，只会进行制作工具等短期投资；而现代人知道自己未来几十年大概率不会死，就可以做更长期的投资。
+
+但总的来说，这些付出本质上都是为了自己的利益、都是要看到回报的。如果人们意识到这个项目不会有回报、或回报太低，那么他们就会停止付出。
+
+动物一样也有这种本能。比如狮子去捕猎就会消耗体力，那么狮子必然会期待能够捕获到补充它体力的猎物。
+
+还有一种为了更好地生存的本能，那就是排斥孤独。
+
+因为人是群居动物。不仅仅是聚在一起对抗危险，人类还会分工合作，这大大提高了人类整个群体的生存能力。
+
+而如果一个人被群体排斥的话，他就要一个人面对生存压力，这对他而言无疑是非常危险的。
+
+因此，人类就有抱团的本能。如果长时间处在孤独或者被孤立的状态，甚至会导致人的精神崩溃。
+
+
+### 4、“自私的基因”
+
+在农业革命后，人们所能获得的生活资料开始超过基本生存需求，于是就有了剩余。
+
+这些剩余无疑可以让某些个体活得更好、至少是不用随时担心被饿死；但如果继续像原始公社时期那样共享物质，就意味着大部分人依然会处在一种无法温饱的状态，和农业革命前的生活状态没太大的区别。
+
+没办法，当时的生产力就是那样，没法供养起所有人、让所有人都生活地很好。
+
+所以，一些个体出于利己的本能，就会试图去独自占有剩余，这就成了私有财产。
+
+但这些人很快发现，如果每次都在丰收时去抢别人的粮食，就会导致自己被群体排斥；并且粮食是迟早会消耗完的。
+
+因此，想要每年都获得能够温饱的粮食、达成所谓的衣食无忧，最好的方式是占有可以产粮的土地。这就是生产资料的私有化。
+
+那么为了更好地生存，人们肯定会想要尽可能地占有多的私有财产以对抗风险。
+
+因此，古代就会发生土地兼并、现代就会发生资本集中。
+
+更何况，在人人为己的情况下，每个人都基本只能依赖家人甚至自己生存，那么为了对抗这种“孤独”，人们就会去无止境地去占有财产以填补自己的生存能力，并试图传给自己的后代。
+
+再者，由于生产资料占有多少的不同，人们会被划分出阶层。每个阶层的人都会有两个想法：想要登上更高的阶层；害怕更低的阶层的人挤进来分一杯羹、甚至代替自己。
+
+这就会使得每个人都会试图去镇压下一个阶层的人来确保自己的安全。
+
+而为了防止自己被镇压、被欺负、被收割，以及登上更高的位置以获得更多财富，在贪婪与恐惧的共同作用下，人们就会像永动机一样不停地在社会阶梯上攀爬。
+
+而这一切的一切，都是因为一个原因：人会死。
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2024-05-03-smile-to-work.md b/_collections/_columns/2024-05-03-smile-to-work.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..31e79c5f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2024-05-03-smile-to-work.md
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "對工作微笑"
+author: "東加豆"
+date : 2024-05-03 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/PBM868u.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+｛阿朗｝和很多年輕人差不多，每天早上七點起床，八點吃早餐，九點到達辦公室，安坐在平凡程式設計員的座位上。途中擠在擁塞的列車上，仿佛兩片三文治。天天都是如此，生活奔波勞碌，心中充滿了對金錢的渴望。他常常對自己說：｛要不是為了錢，誰想要工作？｝這種心態，如同一座無形的壓力山大，壓得他喘不過氣來。
+
+
+
+一天，老闆的小女兒又來了。她又走進會議室，又把她的畫畫工具攤出來。然而，阿朗透過玻璃看到她在發脾氣，把畫紙撕碎，把畫筆丟在地上。秘書一臉無奈地說，她要娃娃，沒有娃娃就不畫畫。
+
+既然她不喜歡畫畫，為什麼還要強迫她呢？阿朗問。
+
+不不不，她喜歡畫畫的。秘書回答。
+
+事情是這樣的，小女兒自小就喜歡畫畫，她的畫很漂亮，很簡單又可愛。每當她拿起畫筆，臉上都流露著滿足的笑容，誰都看得出。畫畫就能讓她感到快樂。
+
+後來，不知道為了什麼原因，老闆說每次她畫一幅畫，就送她一個小娃娃，鼓勵她，獎勵她，讓她更努力地畫畫。果然，有了娃娃小女兒畫畫十分起勁，每當看到新娃娃，她的心情都充滿了喜悅。可是，不到半年，她的心情開始變了。拿著新娃娃，很快就把它丟在一旁，就像可有可無的東西。之後，又不知道為了什麼原因，老闆說不要再送給她娃娃了。
+
+｛沒有娃娃之後，就像你剛才看得到的情況，她愛鬧情緒，不喜歡畫畫了！｝秘書無奈地說。
+
+聽到了這件事情，阿朗覺得有些難過。他不是為老闆難過，而是為他的女兒難過。因為小孩子本身就是被動，為什麼不讓她單純地畫畫？為什麼把複雜的東西掉進去？這件事竟然圍繞在阿朗的腦海一整天，即使下班回家吃飯，洗澡更衣後躺在床上，他仍然想著畫畫。
+
+阿朗並不是擔心小女孩，他只想著自己，他何嘗不是一個被動的孩子？他在追求金錢，在路途上狂奔，卻忘記了沿途有風景。他曾經對｛程式設計員｝有無限的憧憬，無盡的熱愛。每一代的科技巨人都是他的偶像，欣賞他們的熱情，佩服他們對自己的承諾。金錢，永遠不會是他們的第一，成功之前不會，成功之後更不會。阿朗踏出了很多步，卻又後退了很多步。他心裡很難過，不知何年何月開始，那些巨人的影子已經離他很遠了。
+
+阿朗想去找一個人來開解他，他回到舊校，找那個曾經｛記過｝他三次、罰他留堂、要見他家長、告發他逃學的那位｛歐陽訓導主任｝。阿朗久不久就會來找他，豁然開朗之後，他就久久不會再來。今天他見完歐陽訓導主任後，他有了決定，他要尋回那份遺失的純粹，那份對工作的原始熱愛，人始終有脆弱的時候，身體與心靈之間就像有一塊隔塵網，要定時清洗。
+
+歐陽訓導主任沒有跟他說過什麼，沒有對他教誨過什麼，他只是聆聽阿朗在說話，從早上十點，一直聆聽到下午三點。
+
+接下來的日子，阿朗的生活節奏稍微改變了，他不再無無謂謂就呆在辦公室加班。他喜歡了做運動，他會自我探索，在工作中尋找樂趣，即使是最微小的進步，他也能察覺得到。
+
+在繁瑣的工作上，阿朗更會主動承擔，不再左閃右避，寧可戰戰兢兢地面對挑戰。而且，他從來不孤獨，只要他願意，身邊總會有人的。
+
+一天，當公司面臨危機，突然被那股裁員的陰雲籠罩著，同事們紛紛離去，尋求更安穩的避風港。阿朗受到了嚴峻考驗，他想挽救即將崩潰的項目，唯有通過挑戰，人才能超越自我，真真實實地成長。
+
+一年很快就過去了，公司的危機總算過渡了，就像一場戰爭，打完了一場仗。
+
+可是，阿朗沒有達到他自己的期望，面對即將崩潰的項目，原來他是束手無策，一個人是無能為力的。雖然，他並沒有像一個大將軍，不是挽救了所有士兵。但阿朗的堅毅、正直和勇敢，努力和團結，他截然不同了，在他人眼中已經是一個可交託的人。
+
+完
+
+
+### {對工作微笑} 歌詞
+
+晨光初照 醒來夢已遠
+
+朝九晚五 步履不曾斷
+
+壓力如山 尋回初心在
+
+程序世界 迷失過方向
+
+金錢誘惑 忘了初衷夢
+
+微笑工作 尋找快樂
+
+風雨兼程 心中不辭勞
+
+面對挑戰 勇往直前
+
+不再退縮 純粹如當初
+
+思緒飛揚 紛擾已遠去
+
+前方路漫 信念是燈火
+
+運動自我 身心皆舒展
+
+工作樂趣 細心去體驗
+
+團結勇敢 邁向新里程
+
+危機來襲 同事紛紛散
+
+運動自我 身心皆舒展
+
+工作樂趣 細心去體驗
+
+團結勇敢 邁向新里程
+
+一面 堅守信念盤
+
+
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2024-05-04-the-essence-of-the-may-fourth-culture-movement.md b/_collections/_columns/2024-05-04-the-essence-of-the-may-fourth-culture-movement.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..02da9462
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2024-05-04-the-essence-of-the-may-fourth-culture-movement.md
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "“五四新文化运动”的实质"
+author: "江上小堂"
+date : 2024-05-04 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/7ZQ8k53.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "瓦解宗法家族，建立国家主义"
+---
+
+“五四”是中国近代史上的一个重大事件。今天，仅将“五四”命名为青年的节日局限了。当然，官方对“五四”的历史定位还是非常高的，称之为“中国人民反对帝国主义、封建主义的爱国运动”；并用之来划分历史时期，“五四”之前是近代史，“五四”之后是现代史。
+
+
+
+今天对“五四”运动的认识存有较大的分歧。除了官方的正统叙述，还有认为“五四”运动的实质是反传统的看法。前者肯定“五四”运动，后者否定“五四”。
+
+以我之见，这两种看法都有失偏颇。我认为，“五四”运动与其思想前导“新文化运动”的实质是旨在瓦解宗法家族的权力结构与建立国家主义的意识形态及权力，两者相互呼应。就反对儒家“孝”的价值和瓦解宗法家族的权力结构来说，可称之为反传统，但建立国家主义的意识形态及权力却是儒家“忠”的价值的变形和强化。就官方的“爱国主义”评价而言，其内涵确实是国家主义的意识形态，国家的利益高于一切；但“爱国主义”却是的对国家主义的正面肯定。而如果以中国人在近现代所付出的惨重代价和取得的进步而言，选择国家主义无疑是失败的，应该予以否定。
+
+所以，五四新文化运动既有反传统的一面，又有继承和延续传统的一面。我称之为“只反父权，不反君权”。考虑到中国历史的总体趋势，在“家”与“国”之间，不断削弱个人与家庭的联系而增强与国家的联系，应该说“五四”运动在根本上延续了传统文化价值和政治制度。这个大的脉络是很清楚的，从分封制到郡县制，从郡县制到党国制，个人越来越多地受到国家权力的管辖而越来越少地受到家庭权力的管辖。在二千多年的郡县制中，朝廷的权力也是越来越趋于集中和加强。
+
+近代中国在受到西方列强的侵入后，提出的基本命题和终极命题就是如何强国。在“家”与“国”之间，在“孝”与“忠”之间，近代知识精英提出方案是舍家而强国，丢车而保帅。
+
+历史学家蒋廷黻在他的《中国近代史大纲》总论中写道：“在列强争雄的生活中，西洋人养成了热烈的爱国心，深刻的民族观念。我们则死守着家族观念和家乡观念。所以在十九世纪初年，西洋的国家虽小，然团结有如铁石之固；我们的国家虽大，然如一盘散沙，毫无力量。”“近百年的中华民族根本只有一个问题，那就是，中国人能近代化吗？能赶上西洋人吗？能利用科学和机械吗？能废除我们家族和家乡观念而组织一个近代的民族国家吗？能的话，我们民族的前途是光明的；不能的话，我们这个民族是没有前途的。”
+
+孙中山在他的《民权主义》第二讲中也讲道，“在今天，自由这个名词究竟要怎么样应用呢？如果用到个人，就成一片散沙。万不可再用到个人上去，要用到国家上去，个人不可太过自由，国家要得完全自由。到了国家能够行动自由，中国便是强盛的国家。要这样做去，便要大家牺牲自由。”
+
+新文化运动倡导的民主与科学，打倒“孔家店”，其目的都是为了将个人从宗法家族的管辖与束缚中解放出来，从“父权”和“夫权”中解放出来，而投身于国家主义的话语和权域中。个人自由并不是新文化运动的目的，而仅仅是从宗法家族挣脱出来而投入国家主义怀胞中的中转站和空档期。国家主义才是新文化运动的目的。经过新文化运动的“思想启蒙”，青年学生才可能投身于争取国家利益，促使国家强大的政治运动中去。应该说，“五四”运动的爆发标志着中国国家主义意识形态的初步确立，成功地将“忠君”转化为了“爱国”。
+
+当时的知识精英并没有采纳西方自由主义的价值观，而只是将之作为消解宗法家族权力的口号。这才是五四新文化运动最大的失误。他们没有认识到，自由平等才是最根本的价值。为了去除西方列强对中国主权的限制，他们宁愿牺牲个人的权利而要成全国家的权力；他们宁愿受到更多的压迫也要国家的完全独立，而不受西方列强所强加的规则的束缚。
+
+自由主义或个人主义的价值观没有得到确立和普及，使得中国人只能在传统的“孝”与“忠”之间选择，在“家”与“国”之间选择。如果从中国人“家”和“国”的关系这个角度来看，中国近现代历史就可以一以贯之，那就是个人越来越受控于国家。共产主义不过是国家主义的极端形态。一旦选择了国家主义，共产主义就是必然。
+
+无疑，在国家主义的旗帜下，哪一派政治力量更能增进国家的权力，哪一派政治力量就能最终获胜。列宁式政党的组织形态为共产党提供了组建国家权力的强大载体。国民党提出的“一个主义,一个政党,一个领袖”对列宁式政党的精髓提炼得相当准确，但它是中途改组，实际上做不到。而共产党一开始就是这样，由小到大，通过不断的内部清洗而建立起了一个凝聚力相当高的强大组织。国民党败于共产党的根本原因就在于此。
+
+共产主义与国家主义并不矛盾。马克思提出的共产主义学说虽然主张“全世界无产者联合起来”，但在实践中，共产主义却是为民族主义和国家主义服务的。包括中国共产党在内的所有各国共产党，为了获得苏联的支持，都只是表面上放弃国家主义或民族主义，甚至会牺牲局部的国家利益，但最终的目的和归依却是国家主义。从组织形态上来看，共产主义也是国家主义极端形态。
+
+中共建政后一系列的政治运动，从历史的延续性来看，都是在完成“五四新文化”运动所提出的任务和开启的历史进程。宗法家族权力结构的消解自“五四新文化”始，到“土改”而完成。在中共的“阶级斗争”理论中，拥有宗法家族权力的乡村士绅属于“地主阶级”，遭到了全面镇压。文革批孔和“五四新文化”批孔的目的是一样的，都是要削弱与消除个人与家庭之间联系，而加强个人与国家之间的联系。在文革中，毛加强了伟大领袖和伟大导师“君师合一”的地位，达到了权力的顶峰，超过历史上任何一位皇帝；个人不用听从父母和老师，完全听领袖的就是了。
+
+目前看来，宗法家族结构的解体和相应的国家权力的全面深入覆盖是“五四新文化”运动最重要的后果。在国家主义的号召下，完成了将“一盘散沙”聚集起来的历史任务，应该说是实现了其目标。对于投身于这一进程的仁人志士和知识分子而言，可谓是“求仁而得仁”。但国家主义虽然能基于中国人口的众多和领土辽阔而迅速地形成强大的力量，以抵抗外部威胁，但它是以削除个体差异和自我摧残为代价的，不能产生活力和创造力，必定不能保持长久的强大，是短暂的。“一盘散沙”聚集起来仍然是沙，而不是由具有主动力和创造力的个体构成，完全依赖于聚集者——领袖的捏塑和搬弄。
+
+中国近现代选择国家主义的原因何在？在于其抗拒和排斥西方文化。如我在《革命的工蜂：李玉和——<红灯记>对家庭的解构和重构》中所言：
+
+“近现代中国面对比它强大得多的西方文明，感到深深的恐惧。但它自身以‘忠’，‘孝’为根本的文化价值及相应的社会结构无法容纳以个人主义价值为中心的西方文化，它又不愿意放弃自己的根本价值，而融入西方文化。所以，它采取的策略是选择性地吸纳西方的东西以求用最小的调整来保持自身的稳定、和与外部的平衡。总体上对西方文化是排斥的。这种恐惧和排斥是如此的深沉、强劲与持久，以至于在中国近现代的各个阶段都有强烈的表现，如过去的‘义和团’，现在的‘粪青’。”
+
+“《红灯记》通过艺术的形式潜移默化地向观众灌输这样一种家庭或者说是社会结构模式的用意何在呢？那就是要解构以血缘为纽带的家庭结构，而代之以‘阶级情感’为纽带的家庭结构，所谓‘舍小家，顾大家’，‘革命的大家庭’之类的说辞。它要求国民放弃基本的需求和功能，牺牲生命来形成国家的力量。如果说传统中国是‘家国同构’，那共产中国就是“家国一体”，妄图将整个国家打造成一个大家庭。”
+
+因而，近现代中国在受到西方的冲击后，并没有改变历史的方向，仍然沿袭了传统的价值和专制制度，只不过形式上有了较大变化，由郡县制升级为党国制。马克思主义的中国化不过是以一种异化的形式对西方个人主义价值观的拒绝。比较讽刺的是，西方的技术组织手段却为中国的专制升级提供了条件。利用从西方传来的交通通讯等技术，中国才能建立起覆盖到基层的政权体系，比郡县制的“皇权不下县”更深入了。
+
+为什么会如此呢？盖因中国人始终未能赋予个人以独立的价值，个人的价值只能来源于与其它人的关系。在这样一种价值观下，技术的进步将更有利于加强专制权力而不利于增进个人自由。中国人建立不起以个人自由为基础的自治权力，除了依赖于血缘宗亲权力与专制权力之外，没有其它的选择。当组织与技术手段提供了可能时，它更倾向于增强专制权力。由分封制升级为郡县制如此，由郡县制升级为党国制也是如此。所以，“五四新文化”是中国历史进程在原有方向上的继续展开，是中国传统文化中的题中之义，外来的影响只是一个刺激因素与提供了手段。如果没有西方技术手段，中国社会就会一直陷于同样水平的周期性的死循环。
+
+可以说，“五四新文化运动”开启和锁定了中国近现代历史路径。自此之后，一切都没有悬念。即使因为偶然的事件偏离了原有轨道，也会在基本力量的作用下回到原来的轨道。中国在近现代选择马克思主义不是凭空发生的，在此之前，国家主义已为它的引入做好了铺垫。即使共产党败于国民党，也会有另外的力量，或产生于国民党外部，或从国民党内部分化出来，来完成建立全能的国家主义和摆脱西方列强控制这一历史任务。
+
+百年将到，今天我们反思五四，我以为最关键的还是思想启蒙。价值观决定一切。价值观对了，最终就能实现社会公正，人民富裕，国家强大；价值观错了，无论怎么努力奋斗，最终都不会有好的结果。
+
+2017年5月4日
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2024-05-06-clown-and-me.md b/_collections/_columns/2024-05-06-clown-and-me.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c01fb160
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2024-05-06-clown-and-me.md
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "小丑與我"
+author: "東加豆"
+date : 2024-05-06 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/a2L7xwb.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+我叫阿康，今年廿四歲，我試著描述一下我的五官。
+
+
+
+眼睛小而斜視、鼻子大而扁平、眉毛濃而雜亂、嘴唇厚而突出、皮膚粗、下巴勾、高低耳。
+
+這樣說會嚇怕你嗎？
+
+不過我已經習慣了。習慣了人們異樣的眼光，習慣了他們的竊竊私語，從小到大我就適應了。尤其進入了成年人的世界，當一個外表端好、樣子俊俏的人，他走的路注定會比我幸運得多。
+
+十八歲畢業後，我做過十五份工作，比如、送餐員、送文件、包點心、洗擦外牆、在貨櫃場工作、搬運工、地盤等等。幾乎每一份工都因為我的外表而結束。不是誇張的，我想過跳樓！如果不是有一個醜陋的老爸要照顧，我真是會一死了之。我不明白老爸怎可以生存那麼久，別人說我和老爸的樣子是｛餅印｝。
+
+今天，我去了一間糖果公司見工，是一份｛車手速遞員｝。那位人事部的陳小姐很漂亮，可是她穿著的衣服，怎麼這麼低胸？裙子那麼短，霎時間我很難集中注意力，我對答錯了，字也寫錯了。然而，她竟然一口就接受了我的申請，但只有兼職卻沒有長工。一見就成事！這是我人生中的第一次。通常別人會先打量我，仿佛像機器般，我要從頭到腳被掃描一次，然後等通知，或者沒通知。後來我明白了，原來這份工作要化妝的，而且要穿制服，｛我要扮一個小丑｝。
+
+｛穿小丑服的速遞員｝我從來未聽過有這樣的工作，也未見過有速遞員像小丑，但我覺得很適合我，既然我已經這麼醜，化了妝不是更好嗎？所以我第二天就上班了，因為我非常缺錢。
+
+第一天上班，我發現這裡所有速遞員都要打扮成小丑，我還有更大的發現，這裡的速遞員他們都很醜。我記起有一次小學同學指著我說：｛你應該去動物園！｝如果他現在看到我，一定會說這裡充滿了奇珍異獸，原來我在這裡不是最醜的一個。
+
+我穿上了那套五彩繽紛的小丑服，臉上塗滿了厚厚的白粉和誇張的彩妝，我從未試過對著鏡子而看不到自己，尤其是鏡中人那副醜怪模樣消失了。
+
+化妝後的我變成了小丑，覺得自己很與別不同，穿了寬袍大袖的衣服，一個紅色小波夾著鼻子、哨子、鈴鐺，送貨車掛滿了氣球，我不僅覺得自己像一個小丑，還很像一個聖誕老人。每當我按門鈴，客戶出來收貨時，我就會嚇倒他們，然後客人馬上就露出驚喜的表情，小孩子馬上跑出來，歡喜地接過包裹，然後抱著我要和他們合照。
+
+> 抱著我合照...抱著我合照...
+
+> 從來沒有人要抱著我合照的。
+
+> 除了老爸，當小時候的我。
+
+下班卸妝後回復心情是常態，因為我知道明天就可以繼續做小丑，又可以看見自己的歡顏。
+
+然而，生活的現實很喜歡打破人們的幻想。我每天只能送出十箱糖果，我的收入是每箱拆帳十二元，每天的收入僅一百二十元，那麼，一個月豈不是只有三千六百元？在香港的生活我怎可能支撐下去？
+
+我想做更多，但是長工的小丑們，緊緊把持著他們的地盤，我是兼職，也是新人，只能等待他們不要的單子才會給我。老實說，通通都是｛豬頭骨｝！
+
+什麼是豬頭骨？即是偏僻的地方並客人指定的收貨時間，我們送貨員最好賺的就是在同一棟大廈，或者同一條街道，在同一個時段連續做十單八單、十幾二十單。我每天好像要向他們乞討一樣，很沒意思。一個個自私自利的人很醜陋，他們比小丑更醜！
+
+老爸很不喜歡我的性格，他說我無知愚蠢，向別人要單子，就等於向別人要錢無異。他還說：｛你整天埋怨他人，有本事的話，自己當老闆吧！沒本事又無法改變現實，那就改變你的心態。｝老爸一字一字地哼出來。
+
+代溝，這就是代溝。我想告訴他，我沒法改變和他的代溝。
+
+終於，我決定辭掉這份工，正當我要辭職的時候，人事部的陳小姐要召見我。就是很漂亮、很性感的陳小姐。她說有一個倉務職位，是正式員工，有固定薪金，一萬五千元一個月，雙薪、花紅等等。
+
+我看著性感的陳小姐，霎時間我又不集中了，聽不清楚福利這些那些，我立即就接受了這崗位了。
+
+陳小姐向我提出了很奇怪的建議，她叫我戴粗框眼鏡，越粗越好，戴草帽，保持清潔整齊，腰挺直。
+
+下班後我馬上去買粗框眼鏡，走了三個小時，終於買了一副很粗很粗的黑色眼鏡框，粗得讓人以為是墨鏡，我從來沒有因為一個女人而買東西。
+
+-
+
+半年時間很快就過去了，我已經習慣了戴上粗框眼鏡的自己，戴草帽的自己，而且腰板很直，是鏡中的自己告訴我。
+
+其實，我不是真的很醜！
+
+我老爸也不醜！
+
+完
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2024-05-06-my-top-ten-historical-events-in-macau.md b/_collections/_columns/2024-05-06-my-top-ten-historical-events-in-macau.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..1ec69861
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2024-05-06-my-top-ten-historical-events-in-macau.md
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "我的澳門十大歷史事件"
+author: "阿恆"
+date : 2024-05-06 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/aLzLNus.png
+#image_caption: "ChatGPT的澳門十大歷史事件"
+description: "▲ ChatGPT的澳門十大歷史事件"
+---
+
+嘗試拋磚引玉，分享十件1949年後澳門重要的歷史事件。
+
+
+
+### 一、關閘事件
+
+1952年，中澳邊境爆發衝突。據我所知，這應該是中共建政後，第一宗與澳葡政府的大型衝突。韓戰爆發後，中國遭到西方封鎖，澳門與香港成了中國對外唯二的窗口。對此事沒有深入研究，但直覺此事與西方封鎖有莫大關連，並非一件簡單邊境衝突，以往華文界讀者實在過於簡化此事。
+
+
+▲ 當年關閘事件報道（圖片：建燁文史札記）
+
+
+### 二、紀念開埠四百年事件
+
+1955年，澳葡打算紀念澳門開埠四百周年，結果在中共壓力下取消。假如1952年關閘事件是中共透過硬實力逼使澳葡妥協，那麼三年後的這宗事件，可謂透過軟實力來使澳葡妥協。中共大體上從外交與輿論上施加壓力，澳葡便取消活動，足見此時中共在澳門的影響力已是十分巨大。
+
+
+### 三、台灣駐澳專員陳澤華撤職案
+
+1958年，新一任台灣駐澳專員陳澤華上任，結果馬上招致中共反對，在葡國強硬要求下，陳澤華「回國述職」(事實被撤職)，此後澳門再沒有正式駐澳專員。此事可謂中共對台灣在澳門勢力首次重大勝利，由於葡國與台灣選擇低調處理，所以受到關注不多。
+
+
+### 四、澳門賭權易主
+
+1961年，霍英東、何鴻燊等人合組的公司成功奪得賭權，成為澳門唯一可以經營賭場的公司。賭業作為澳門一大金雞蛋、經濟命脈，背後牽涉龐大利益，我猜澳葡給予某間公司賭權，肯定不止商業考量，起碼有一定殖民管治考量。至於對何鴻燊而言，這年可謂人生起飛的高光時刻，直到今天，其家族在澳門仍有巨大影響力。
+
+
+▲ 1961年，何鴻燊（左）與霍英東（中）合作，奪取過去由何賢和羅保壟斷的賭權（圖片：網絡照片）
+
+
+### 五、程一鳴叛逃事件
+
+1964年，台灣駐澳門高階情報人員程一鳴叛逃，相信讓台灣大亂一下陣腳。這事多多少少反映戰後國共仍然在澳門諜戰大鬥法，顯然中共是佔了上風。究竟戰後國共實際如何進行情報戰，相信是一個非常值得深究的課題，假如有一朝一日中國、台灣檔案完全解密，絕對會是個有趣故事。
+
+
+### 六、一二三事件
+
+1966年發生的一二三事件，不需我多說，讀者們應該十分熟悉。我一直認為，此事重要性、大眾對此事關注度，並沒有反映到研究的深度。有很多謎團、這事實際對澳門的改變、影響，或許受限於史料，或許受限於其他原因，無法展開討論。無論如何，一二三事件絕對需要更深入的研究。
+
+
+### 七、康乃馨革命
+
+1974年，葡國爆發民主化革命，連帶影響遠在天邊的殖民地澳門。個人認為這事對澳門影響重大，而且是十大事件中，唯一一件有極正面的影響。受惠葡國民主化，澳門竟意外地開啟了民主化的步伐，有了一些民選議員、殖民地惡法轉變成保障人權的法律等等等。總之，此事對澳門很有里程碑般的影響，但很少受到關注。
+
+
+### 八、解散立法會
+
+1984年，澳督高斯達向葡國總統提議解散立法會，成了澳門史上唯一一次議會被解散。此事可說土生葡人與澳督一次權力鬥爭交鋒下的結果，以往華文界很多時候都認為土生葡人與「母國」利益一致，但此事反映出完全不一樣的情況。究竟近代土生葡人在澳門扮演什麼角色，也是一個需深思的課題。
+
+
+### 九、澳門主權移交
+
+1999年，澳門主權和平移交中國，葡國在澳門數百年管治終劃下一個句點，我認為這是十大事件中對澳門最重要、影響最大的事件。「一國兩制」在澳門這場實驗，已有二十多年，之後究竟會朝向何方，恐怕還需更多時間才能下判斷。
+
+
+### 十、DQ事件
+
+2021年，澳門史無前例地首次取消所有民主派名單的參選資格，讓民主派無緣再參與議會。縱使澳門民主化進展極度緩慢，但總的來說，還是向前的。未來，澳門民主會不會往後退，是一大疑問。
+
+
+▲ （圖片：香港01）
+
+呼，1949年後的澳門，小說也有七十多年歷史，但小弟執筆時，其實絞盡腦汁，耗盡所有腦力，才勉強湊集十件。老實說，澳門雖然只有一丁點大，但七十多年來發生的重要歷史事年，肯定不可能只有十件。只能說這時段的歷史，實在太少人研究。
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2024-05-06-on-death-the-fear-of-death-and-emotions.md b/_collections/_columns/2024-05-06-on-death-the-fear-of-death-and-emotions.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..2cb5e892
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2024-05-06-on-death-the-fear-of-death-and-emotions.md
@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "论死亡：死亡恐惧与情绪"
+author: "番茄米线"
+date : 2024-05-06 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/tgYGqRj.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+### 1、死亡恐惧
+
+
+
+为什么所有人都是平等？
+
+因为任何人都会死。
+
+因此，不管这个人的能力再强、成就再高，也会有对死亡的恐惧。
+
+秦始皇、汉武帝、唐太宗、屋大维等名声赫赫的帝王，哪怕已经是九五至尊了，也对死亡有着很深的恐惧、在晚年沉迷于方士炼药等神秘学以求长生。
+
+哪怕是一些宗教能够让人看起来是超脱了对死亡的恐惧，但其实也不过是把这种恐惧转移了，并不能将之从人性中消除。
+
+比如基督教，就说人虽然会死，但是灵魂会到天堂，并在天堂中实现永生。
+
+还有印度教和佛教，说你虽然这辈子会死，但是下辈子可以转生，也相当于永生了。
+
+这些宗教只是通过这种“永生”的说辞来安慰信徒，是利用了信徒的死亡恐惧，并不能真的让信徒不害怕死。否则，应该告诉信徒：“人死了就是死了，就是烂肉一坨，啥也没。”然后再帮助信徒消除恐惧。
+
+所以，所有人本质上都怕死。而且，对于死亡的恐惧情绪，是任何一种恐惧中最强烈的；或者换句话说，其他的任何一种恐惧，都是死亡恐惧不同烈度的体现。
+
+比如，很多人听过恐怖谷效应，就是说一个东西越像人越使人感到亲切；直到它过于像人了，会让人感到毛骨悚然。
+
+
+
+这种恐惧来源于对尸体的恐惧。假设在原始社会，你见到一个人类尸体，那大概率说明附近有可以使人致死的东西，要赶紧跑。本质上还是对死亡的恐惧。
+
+而死亡恐惧则构成了人类所有情绪的根源。
+
+
+### 2、各种衍生恐惧
+
+由于其他的恐惧都是死亡恐惧的一种，我们将除了死亡恐惧的恐惧统称为衍生恐惧。
+
+为了更精确，我们需要明确定义恐惧：恐惧指任何一种排斥（包括逃避、敌对等）的情绪。
+
+比如人会饿，人排斥饥饿的状态（不一定非要特别饿），这也算是一种恐惧。
+
+那么人为什么会恐惧饥饿？因为饥饿会导致人的营养不足，最终让人的机体无法运转、甚至因为缺乏营养而坏死。所以这本质还是死亡恐惧。
+
+人为什么不吃难吃的食物？因为难吃的东西往往意味着变质的、有毒的、缺乏营养的，吃这些东西会危害到自己的生存，还是死亡恐惧。
+
+为什么很多人怕黑？因为黑暗意味着未知、意味着很可能有我们无法发现的危险，还是死亡恐惧。
+
+学生为什么害怕考不好？因为考不好可能意味着将来没法赚到钱、拥有好的生活条件，也就是威胁到自己的生活，还是死亡恐惧。
+
+有些人为什么害怕和别人起冲突？因为他很可能潜意识认为自己的力量很弱小，和别人起冲突时很容易被别人干掉，这还是死亡恐惧。
+
+为什么人害怕被孤立？在原始社会，人类必须群居才能生存；如果被群体孤立，基本上等于死亡。
+
+为什么有人有社交恐惧？他们担心自己社交能力不足，可能会导致孤立和排斥。
+
+为什么人们害怕和恋爱对象分手？为什么人害怕表白被拒绝？这是因为他们认为恋爱对象的认可代表了他们生命的价值、代表了他们对自己生活的掌控。被拒绝、被分手则意味着他们失去了这些增强生存的东西。
+
+可以举的例子还有很多。如果细细推敲下去，就可以发现所有的衍生恐惧本质都是死亡恐惧。
+
+
+### 3、恐惧与欲望
+
+恐惧与欲望是对立统一的、是一枚硬币的两个面。欲望是恐惧的另一种表达方式。
+
+比如，人怕死，那么就有活的欲望；
+
+人害怕失败，就会有成功的欲望；
+
+人害怕孤独，就会有寻找朋友的欲望；
+
+人怕黑，就有欲望驱动他们走到有亮光的地方；
+
+人害怕起冲突，就会选择回避或者讨好对方；
+
+学生害怕学业失败，就会有考好的欲望；
+
+人害怕分手，就会有很强的维持关系的欲望......
+
+当然了，还有另一种更高级的欲望：爱，并不是直接源于恐惧。但是本质上也是一种死亡恐惧，这个我后面会详细说。
+
+而这些欲望往往就构成了除恐惧外的各种各样的情绪。
+
+也就是说，人类的所有情绪都可以被归为两类：恐惧与欲望。而欲望又可以被看作是恐惧。
+
+只不过二者的区别在于，恐惧是为了逃避死亡，而欲望则是为了加强生存（本质还是逃避死亡）。
+
+综上所述，不难发现，情绪就是对外界客观条件的变化所产生的一种反应、一种应对措施；是大脑用原始的、极快的方式对环境的分析。
+
+所以，情绪的变化在一定程度上确实可以被人控制住，但这种控制只是一种暂时的压制，并不能直接消灭情绪。
+
+比如你感觉到饿，你可以吃东西来消除这种感觉，但你不可能直接命令你的大脑停止感受到饿。
+
+因此，情绪本质上是无法也不应该被控制的，因为它在帮助你生存。
+
+
+### 4、情绪与利益
+
+既然情绪是对外界环境是否对你的生存有利的评估，那这个评估必然要有一个标准。
+
+这个标准就是你的利益；换句话说，你的生存需求。
+
+在这里需要做个声明：本系列所有的“情绪”都指的是广义上的情绪，也就是包括各种各样的感受与潜意识反应，不仅仅指狭义的喜怒哀乐。
+
+这些情绪都对应的是一种特定的利益。
+
+比如说饥饿，就意味着人体的营养不足了，那么补充营养就是符合人的利益。
+
+还有看到一个搞笑视频人就高兴，那么这种情绪变好就是人的利益、缓解人的压力。
+
+还有如小明被别人骂了，他非常生气，那么这种生气就是要让小明进入战斗状态、随时准备消灭对方，这符合小明的利益。
+
+而这些情绪会让人做出相应的思维和行为来满足这些生存需求。
+
+还是拿吃饭举例子：死亡恐惧→衍生出饥饿恐惧→吃东西的欲望→饥饿情绪→想到“吃东西”（思维）→吃东西（行为）
+
+那么还可以反向推导：如果一个人想要吃东西、正在吃东西或者找东西吃，那就说明这个人有饥饿的情绪。
+
+而且更为美妙的是，正如我在本文开篇所说：任何人都有死亡恐惧，那么也就意味着任何人的情绪、思维和行为都遵从这一逻辑。
+
+那么完全可以由此来推测出每一个人的利益。
+
+比如小明考试没考好，就心情特别差特别崩溃，那么就说明他认为考试成绩与他的生存利益挂钩，即没考好威胁到他的生存了。
+
+进一步我们就可以继续想，考试成绩明明不会威胁到他的生命，那他为什么会认为这有威胁？
+
+可能是因为他没考好会被家长骂；可能是他内心很自卑、只有成绩能带给他生存价值、证明他的生存能力。
+
+那么，如果我想要帮助小明或者利用小明，只需要从这一点入手，给他想要的——符合他利益的——就可以了。
+
+比如，我们想要帮助他不再被考试影响心情，那么就可以让他和家长对骂，让他家长感受他的痛苦；或者帮他培养其他的兴趣和能力，从别的方面证明他自己。
+
+或者，让他脱离这种长期作为一个客体、被别人肆意评价的环境。
+
+再举个例子。比如之前韩国总统尹锡悦搞医疗系统改革、让医学院扩招，那么很多在职医生非常愤怒、上街游行。
+
+这些医生的愤怒背后是对自己生存能力下降的恐惧，因为增加的医学生在将来进入医疗行业后会分走他们的蛋糕。
+
+看到这里的读者，如果看过我之前写的《论道德》系列，可能已经发现了，我这篇文章其实就是对《论道德·上》中提到的性恶论第一定律的解释。
+
+需要注意的是，本文的例子是经过简化的模型。现实中，一个人在某一时刻往往拥有多重情绪，并且人们会出于各种因素隐藏自己的情绪。
+
+但是，一个人在某一时刻一定只有一个情绪是最强烈的，相对应的也就是他最关心的利益诉求。
+
+比如在解放战争时期，有很多国民党投降过来的士兵，解放军就派政委去给他们做思想工作。
+
+一开始政委就是骂蒋介石，说蒋介石卖国。结果很多士兵说，他们对蒋介石印象还挺好的，因为蒋介石给他们发军饷，没什么剧烈情绪。
+
+但是后来政委们转变方向，开始说那些军官虐待基层士兵，这些士兵一下子就破防了，据说好几个在诉苦的时候还哭晕过去了。
+
+这就证明了，虽然蒋介石卖国确实和他们有利益联系，但是关于被军官虐待这件事才是他们最关心的利益诉求。
+
+而这，就可以指明我们平常的交流与工作的方法论。
+
+
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diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2024-05-09-on-death-the-instinct-of-existence.md b/_collections/_columns/2024-05-09-on-death-the-instinct-of-existence.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c3e62170
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2024-05-09-on-death-the-instinct-of-existence.md
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "论死亡：存在的本能"
+author: "番茄米线"
+date : 2024-05-09 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/Dm48y3A.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+### 1、存在与永生
+
+
+
+生命是无比珍贵的，但生命也是无比脆弱的。
+
+没有人想死，但没有人不会死。
+
+但这一事实却构成了一对人性上的矛盾：既然本系列前两篇文章中说，人的一切行为、思想、情绪都是为了生存，但人却注定会死，这不就显得人的那些防止死亡的努力失去意义了吗？
+
+因此，死亡恐惧理论上是无法逃避的。如果想要克服死亡恐惧，那只有一个方式：实现永生。
+
+只有永生，人们才能使自己的生存需求得到全面满足，让自己的利益无限大。
+
+但这是不可能的。
+
+不过，虽然人的肉体无法实现永生，但在另一个层面可以做到。
+
+与传统叙事不同。我将自己这个个体的“我”称作大我，因为这个我是主体。
+
+而与大我相对的还有小我。这个小我指的是大我的延伸，也就是反映出大我的存在的客体。
+
+比如说，我在《真集体》中提到的拼积木的例子。你拼出一个积木作品之后，感到特别自豪，因为这个积木作品代表了你的能力，是你生命力的体现。
+
+那么哪怕是你人不在现场，但当别人看到这个作品后，还会觉得，你确实牛逼，居然可以做出这么好的作品。
+
+那么这个作品就是你的小我。
+
+而通过创造小我，你可以在一定程度上实现永生。比如虽然你死了，但你的作品依然留存于世，那么只要你的作品依然存在，你就依然存在，这是存在的一种方式。
+
+所以创造小我也可以叫对象化，把大我的存在投射到一个对象上。
+
+那么我们也可以换句话说，人类并不是害怕死，而只是害怕不存在，死亡只是不存在的一种形式罢了。
+
+
+### 2、大我与小我
+
+其实不只是人类面对这样的困境，只要是有生命的东西就会陷入这个矛盾。
+
+不过我在学习古生物学的时候发现了生命的解决方案：繁衍。
+
+古生物学的叙事方式中，往往把一种生物分类在地球上出现的所有个体都统称为一个东西。
+
+比如，在讲述三叶虫的进化历史时，古生物学家会说：“三叶虫一开始是什么形态，后来开始长出厚厚的装甲，最后却因为装甲灭绝。”就好像这么长的时间跨度中只出现了一个三叶虫，这只三叶虫代表了所有三叶虫的历史。
+
+就好像是，虽然一只三叶虫死了，但是它只要通过繁衍让整个族群延续了下去，它就好像还活着一样。
+
+许多现在的生物也是这样的。很多动物在生下后代之后就会死去，就好像它们整个生命的意义就是生小孩。
+
+事实上，在古代，大部分人认为自己生命的意义也就是“传宗接代”，甚至现代还有很多人依然这么认为。
+
+那么根据我们刚提到的理论，这个小孩就可以被看作是父母的小我，这个小孩或者就代表了他父母依然以某种形式存在着。
+
+但是，当今越来越多的人并不认为自己的生命意义就是生小孩，他们有了更多样、更复杂的追求。
+
+这证明了一点：生小孩只是人生意义的一种形式。
+
+那么我们再看，其他的形式都有哪些共同之处？
+
+比如毛姆在《月亮与六便士》中，男主人公不顾一切也要作画，那么作画就是他的人生意义；
+
+还有如陈忠实花了一辈子写出《白鹿原》，那么这本书就是他的人生意义；
+
+爱因斯坦将人生奉献给了相对论的研究，那么这个研究就是他的意义；
+
+列宁将一辈子奉献给了俄国革命，那么这个革命事业就是他的人生意义。
+
+当然了，还有一些不那么伟大、甚至很庸俗的例子。
+
+比如小明从小的目标就是上清华，然后他考上清华之后，逢人就说自己在清华；那么考上清华来证明自己就是他的人生意义。
+
+或者小红觉得她恋爱对象就是她的全世界，那么她恋爱对象就是她的人生意义。
+
+可以举的例子还有很多，想必细心的读者都观察到过不少。
+
+总而言之，刚才提到的“人生意义”其实就是小我。这些不同的人生意义本质上都是在通过创造小我来实现永生。
+
+换句话说，还是为了大我自己的利益。
+
+
+### 3、小我的深度与广度
+
+这个小我的表现形式多种多样，但是每个人都会希望增加小我的深度和广度。
+
+我们先来说广度。
+
+比如我去帮助了一个人，我今天给了路边流浪汉一块钱，那么流浪汉此时就成了我的小我，他体现出了我的价值和意义。
+
+但这个小我还很脆弱，因为只有一个人受到了我的帮助，数量太少。
+
+如果想要对抗强大的死亡恐惧，就需要更多的小我，也就是要创造更多的对象化。
+
+如果我帮助了十个人，我会觉得这些人与我形成了利益共同体，让我收获了情绪价值和名誉，那么我的小我就更强大了。
+
+而如果我帮助了一百个人、一万个人，那么我的小我就更强大；比如一个地方县长让全县人民都爱戴，那么全县人民都会自发地维护他、成为他的小我。
+
+如果我为全人类做出了贡献，甚至使未来几代人都能受益，那么这些人都会念我的好、都会成为我的小我，那么此时我就强大得无以复加；
+
+哪怕是我为了全人类去死，只要全人类还在，那么我就依然以某种形式存在着。
+
+接下来我们再来说深度。
+
+如果我只是简单地给了一个流浪汉一块钱，那么顶多让我自然感觉良好一天，第二天就忘了。
+
+但如果我与他成为了非常好的朋友，那么我在他身上的小我就会变得更强；当我与他在一起时，对于孤独的恐惧就会被冲淡。
+
+而如果我与他结成了利益共同体，那么此时他就像是另一个我一样；当一个小我变得几乎和大我一样，那么此时对大我来说就非常强大了。
+
+就好比像伯牙子期一样，钟子期对于俞伯牙来说就是另一个大我，钟子期死了让俞伯牙感觉自己也死了。
+
+或者像在战壕里的战友一样，你们将生命托付给彼此，这也是为什么战友间往往能建立起极为深厚的友谊。
+
+综上所述，广度就是小我的数量尽可能多；而深度就是小我的质量，也就是建立的联系更亲密、利益更绑定。
+
+而如果全人类都形成利益共同体，那么就是每个人的小我都达到了广度和深度上的极限。
+
+那么有的读者可能会有疑问：前面的文章说死亡让人有利己的本能，但这里又似乎在说死亡让人们有利他的本能，这不矛盾吗？
+
+其实并不矛盾。因为这篇文章的理论并不是说你随便帮助别人就能够创造小我。我前面说，小我本质上只是体现自己价值的一种方式。
+
+那么比如说，我帮助一个人之后把我自己感动得不要不要的，这可以是一种小我，我并没有期待从对方身上收获什么反应，我只是在自我感动。
+
+而如果说我帮助人是为了看到别人对我的感谢、看到他们通过我得到了快乐，那么如果我没能从受助者身上得到我想看到的反应，那么我并不会感到快乐和价值感，也就无法创造小我。
+
+比如我给乞丐一块钱，他嫌太少了，还问你要更多，那么我不仅没能从中感受到自我价值，甚至还可能感到自我价值被否定了，导致心情不好。
+
+因为总而言之，这些行为本质上都是为了人们自己的利益；如果该行为无法使自己获益，人们就不会去做。
+
+所以心理学上就有理论说，付出的本质是控制，付出者希望通过付出来用愧疚感控制对方，这种行为表面上是利他的，实际上却是利己的。
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2024-05-09-reconciliation-over-the-campfire.md b/_collections/_columns/2024-05-09-reconciliation-over-the-campfire.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..3b48de21
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2024-05-09-reconciliation-over-the-campfire.md
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "營火上的和解"
+author: "東加豆"
+date : 2024-05-09 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/kkkgjRp.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+深夜時分，樹林裡四處無人，很安靜，滿天星星，星星和我把四周圍照得光光亮亮。我，是一堆營火，不知道時間的，每當我有意識的時候都是很突然。不過，我能夠感覺到人們的心情，以及他們的肢體語言。
+
+
+
+就好像這一晚，兩個人影走進了我的光裡。他們的聲音充滿了針鋒相對，眼裡有怨恨和悲傷，你來我往的言語好像是一場鬥爭，無法停下來的交戰。
+
+我聽不懂他們具體在爭論什麼，但兩個人好像心都碎了。我不知道那兩個人叫什麼名字，因為他們一直在說｛你、你、你！妳、妳、妳！｝
+
+｛能不能不再怨恨？｝男人的聲音有點震抖。
+
+｛你我都受傷了！為什麼你我都受傷！？｝女人眼泛淚光的說。
+
+我似乎聽到他們在呼喊，卻又被彼此的怒氣所淹沒。
+
+夜風吹過，帶走了他們言語中的碎片，卻留下了更深的沉默。他們望向我，火焰在他們的眼中浮游跳動，仿佛內心的起伏也跟著走。
+
+突然間，其中一人站起身來，走到我的一側，他伸出雙手，將我身邊的一堆木柴小心翼翼地堆放好，然後燃點了新的火光。我不確定是誰，因為他們穿的上衣是一樣的。褲子也是一樣的，球鞋也是一樣的。總之，他們的裝束都是一模一樣的。
+
+然後，另一人也跟著站起來，走到我另一側幫手堆木柴。
+
+兩人的目光又在我的營火光中相遇。
+
+“能否不再責問？”男的聲音說。
+
+“能否一試由我的主張？ 就這一次！”女的聲音跟著說。
+
+他們的肢體語言很不同，說話的聲頻也很有分別，但我能感覺到他們手裡的溫度是一樣的，可是他們都不知道。
+
+火光越來越小，加上涼風輕吹，應該一切都平息了。可是他們又開始用手勢表達著什麼，聲頻高而無法受控。我的火光照在他們臉上，我感受到他們感受不到奇妙的事情。我試著用最原始的方式建立溝通的橋梁，對他們來說應該是再一次的建立。當他們向我伸手取暖的時候，我借著微風把火焰擴大，讓他們得到溫暖的同時，也感受到對方的溫度。
+
+我這一輕輕的舉動，竟然有無限大的效果。我的火光照在他們臉上，照亮了他們心中的夢和初衷，愛的寒冷似乎不再讓他們逃跑，原來熱情一直都存在著。
+
+我，是一堆營火，就讓我把你們重新點燃，讓它再燒一次吧！
+
+在火光的仔細下，我欣賞著愛的燃燒。不不不，還是不要那麼抽象。我看著他們把怨恨燒光了，只留下了理解和寬容。
+
+｛營火，營火，還在照亮｝他們輕聲說。
+
+｛能不能照出你我夢想？｝他們的目光又相遇了。
+
+這句話就是他們的理由。
+
+就是這句話他們有理由走在一起。
+
+就是這句話十年前他們相識了。
+
+他們要把我擠熄了。
+
+這是當然的事，因為我很容易失控，營火不能一直在燃燒，不然，會引起山火，會燒光草原，會很危險。
+
+但是那一刻我明白了，似乎我又做對了事。我不只是一堆營火，我見證過人們的愛情、親情、友情的故事，指引了他們和解的路。
+
+如果我這一堆營火，不僅燃燒著，也照亮了人們的心裡的路，那就很有意義了。
+
+完
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2024-05-09-the-golden-age-of-self-study.md b/_collections/_columns/2024-05-09-the-golden-age-of-self-study.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..2a8f49e6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2024-05-09-the-golden-age-of-self-study.md
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "自學黃金時代"
+author: "陶樂思"
+date : 2024-05-09 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/kVkx2uP.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+我出生於上世紀七十年代。可以說是從無互聯網的時代活到今時今日，互聯網經歷只發放資訊的第一代，可支援互動的第二代，以至今時今日，從中心化走向去中心化的第三代。這數十年的變遷，讓我見證了自學者黃金時代的來臨。
+
+
+
+當我還在念大學時，若果送我一包咖啡豆的話，我會手足無措，不知道怎樣處理它。豆子需不需要炒熟？要不要研磨。抑或直接放進杯子裡，然後像沖茶一樣倒進熱水就有香濃的咖啡可喝呢？今時今日問上述問題，相信一定會被人恥笑是傻瓜。但那個年代要懂得沖煮咖啡，除非去報讀咖啡班，由導師親自示範教導。或者買一本咖啡書籍閱讀，然後自己慢慢研究。可惜這兩個途徑對於像我這樣的視障者而言都並非容易。
+
+互聯網發達的今天，各類部落格文章、視頻，以致林林總總的線上課程，想學會什麼，實在可說是手到拿來。甚至可以說，免費的線上課程都已經多得沒時間全部上一片，根本不必一開始就去上付費線上課程。活了超過五十年，現在可說是自學的黃金時代。
+
+那麼，我透過自學又學會了什麼呢？今天姑且來記錄一下：
+
+烹飪方面，我透過閱讀網上食譜學會了做麵包。又透過影片學會各類咖啡沖煮方法。再後來，我又得知原來芝士也能從牛奶自己製作。於是透過實作，我成功做出了茅屋芝士，並且用它來製作巴斯克蛋糕。這些在互聯網未出現之前必須報讀烹飪班才可學會的東西，今時今日我足不出戶就能學會了。
+
+資訊科技方面，透過實作，我學會安裝軟件以及運用各類應用程式。令我最有滿足感的，是一次需要重裝視窗，我重新安裝並且順利恢復了四個加密貨幣錢包。
+
+那麼現時我又正在學習什麼呢？這半年內，心裡一直有個願望，就是想架設屬於自己的部落格網站。於是這段時間也在密鑼緊鼓地上課，希望學會用Wordpress自架網站，以及搜尋引擎優化的技巧。我想建立一個自我成長、自我富能的自媒體，鼓勵更多人透過自學解決生活上的問題，解鎖個人成就，看見人生的各種選擇與可能性。然後拋開認命心態，活出自己想要的人生。
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2024-05-10-the-discourse-on-voluntary-servitude.md b/_collections/_columns/2024-05-10-the-discourse-on-voluntary-servitude.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..9b00adfd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2024-05-10-the-discourse-on-voluntary-servitude.md
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "《自愿奴役论》"
+author: "江上小堂"
+date : 2024-05-10 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/vtOClRk.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "法国是17世纪及18世纪欧洲启蒙运动的中心，涌现了一大批启蒙思想家，他们相信理性和知识可以解决人类存在的问题和推动人类进步。其中卢梭、孟德斯鸠、伏尔泰和狄德罗比较为中国人所熟知。"
+---
+
+早在16世纪的文艺复兴时代，法国就产生了一位杰出的启蒙思想家拉波埃西。他的著述《自愿奴役论》深刻影响了与他同时代的法国思想家蒙田和法国启蒙时代的思想大家。
+
+
+
+蒙田在《随笔集·论友谊》中写道：“我特别要感谢《自愿奴役论》，多亏了它，我和拉波埃西才有了第一次接触，从此也就开始了我和拉波埃西的友谊。肯定地说，这样的友谊实属罕见，在人之间是前所未有的”。中国古人对知己的难得和珍视也有同样的感慨，“人生得一知己足矣，斯世当以同怀视之。”鲁迅就曾用此言赠送给瞿秋白。
+
+不幸的是，拉波埃西英年早逝，他生于1530年，逝于1563年，年仅32岁就去世了。他的一生，绚丽激越，如燃烧的流星划过天空。《自愿奴役论》是拉波埃西在二十多岁上大学时写下的，死后才由蒙田于1576年付印公开发表。《自愿奴役论》思想深刻、文采洋溢，开创了以人的理性来分析现实政治的方法，奠定了法国政治哲学的基础；具有抽象性和超越时空的普适性，到今天仍未过时。然而因他留下的著述不多，他的思想虽影响深远，却并不广泛，就没有法国这些思想大家有名气。
+
+在《自愿奴役论》中，拉波埃西提出了一个被时人忽略的问题，为什么为数众多的大众会被一个暴君所奴役？他写道，
+
+“现在，我只想弄明白一个问题：为什么有那么多人、那么多城镇，那么多民族竟能够忍受一个独夫暴君的为所欲为？”（《自愿奴役论》：潘培庆译，上海译文出版社，2014年1月出版；下同）。他写到：
+
+> 这实在是一件令人惊讶的事，然而这居然如此平常，实在应该为此感到悲哀，而不是惊讶。亿万民众，戴着枷锁，奴隶般地屈从，他们这样做并非迫于某种强大的力量，而是因为他们被一个人的名字而着魔，或者可以说他们由此魔法镇住了。然而他们本不应该恐惧此人，因为他不过是一人而已；当然他们也不必热爱此人，因为他以非人和野蛮的方式对待众人。
+
+拉波埃西认为人们之所以受奴役，并不一定是因强大势力的压迫，而是他们自愿受奴役，或者说大部分民众自己默许了受奴役的状况。拉波埃西认为习惯是人们自愿为奴的首要原因：
+
+> 人们自愿为奴的第一大原因，就是他们生来就是奴隶。可以说，在开始的时候，人们的确是出于不得已，被迫屈从，但以后就慢慢习惯了；至于后来出生的人，他们从来没有经历过自由，甚至也不知道自由是怎么回事，他们毫无遗憾地服从，自觉自愿地服从，而他们的父辈则是出于被迫才服从。
+
+因而，拉波埃西认为，暴政必然建立在民众的普遍接受之上。但同时，拉波埃西也指出，暴君会诱惑民众来换取民众的服从。
+
+> 戏剧、游戏、滑稽剧、表演、角斗士、珍奇动物、奖章、名次榜，以及诸如此类的毒品，这些都是奴役古代人民的诱饵，是夺取他们自由的补偿，也是暴政的工具。暴君统治的秘密和动力在于，那些野心勃勃的、又贪得无厌的人，他们就会聚集在暴君周围，支持暴君，希望从中分得了一杯羹；而如果在大暴君统治下，他们则希望成为小暴君。这样，暴君控制六人，六人手下又有六百人，六百人手下又有六千人支持。最后达到这样一个阶段，即从暴政中获得利益的人，他们的人数几乎相当于崇尚自由者的人数。
+
+对于如何反抗暴政，拉波埃西有惊人的洞见。他并不主张打倒暴君，而主张不服从。
+
+> 为此，你们要下定决心，不再屈从，那么你们就自由了。我并不要求你们和他发生冲撞，也不要你们去动摇他，而仅仅是不再支持他。于是你们会看到，他就会像一个被抽去基石的巨人，因自身重量而轰然倒塌，粉身碎骨。
+
+拉波埃西的这种思想在莎士比亚的作品中也能找到踪迹。在《尤利乌斯·恺撒之死》中，莎士比亚借贵族卡西乌斯的口说出了自己内心的想法。
+
+> 嘿，老兄，他像一个巨人似的跨越这狭隘的世界；我们这些渺小的凡人一个个在他粗大的两腿下行走，四处张望着，替自己寻找不光荣的坟墓。人们有时可以支配他们自己的命运；要是我们受制于人，亲爱的勃鲁托斯，那错处并不在我们的命运，而在我们自己。
+
+> 可耻的时代！罗马啊，你的高贵的血统已经中断了！自从洪水以后，什么时代你不曾产生比一个更多的著名人物？直到现在为止，什么时候人们谈起罗马，能够说，她的广大的城墙之内，只是一个人的世界？要是罗马给一个人独占了去，那么它真的变成无人之境了。啊！你我都曾听见我们的父老说过，从前罗马有一个勃鲁托斯，不愿让他的国家被一个君主所统治，正像他不愿让它被永劫的恶魔统治一样。
+
+> 那么为什么要让凯撒做一个暴君呢？可怜的人！我知道他只是因为看见罗马人都是绵羊，所以才做一头狼；罗马人倘不是一群鹿，他就不会成为一头狮子。谁要是急于生起一场旺火来，必须先用柔弱的草秆点燃；罗马是一些什么不中用的糠屑草料，要去点亮像凯撒这样一个卑劣庸碌的人物！
+
+莎士比亚同样意识到正是民众自愿为奴才成就了暴君。莎士比亚在拉波埃西去世后的第二年，1564年出生。也许拉波埃西的思想传到了英国，影响了莎士比亚。
+
+如果拉波埃西和莎士比亚了解儒家思想和中国历史，那他一定会更为惊叹和悲哀！自愿（被）奴役在中国历史上比比皆是。而儒家思想就是鼓吹自觉自愿接受奴役的理论和造成这种现象的主要原因。
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2024-05-10-toothpaste-symphony.md b/_collections/_columns/2024-05-10-toothpaste-symphony.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..81eec4f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2024-05-10-toothpaste-symphony.md
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "牙膏交響曲"
+author: "東加豆"
+date : 2024-05-10 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/mqbU7XJ.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+很久很久以前，｛魚毛｝與｛蝦妹｝和許多新婚夫妻一樣，要面對居住問題、經濟問題、相處問題等。由於種種原因，倆人不得不搬到夫家同住，即，魚毛的家。
+
+
+
+｛蝦妹！要妳屈就一下了。｝魚毛情深款款地說。
+
+魚毛一家五口，現在蝦妹來了，大家表現得若無其事，因為只不過是多一雙筷，她住的是魚毛睡房，躺的是魚毛睡床。不過，不到半年蝦妹就發現這個家庭｛有唔妥！｝是經濟上｛唔妥｝。
+
+*香港俚語｛唔妥 = 有問題｝
+
+蝦妹覺得這家人毫無理財意識。一條｛魚毛｝她容易教育他，但是整個｛魚家｝她必須要從長計劃，蝦妹已經下定決心要改變這一切。
+
+而且要從生活中的細節著手，她發現了第一個要處理的問題---｛牙膏。｝只不過是六個人，他們竟然一星期便用完一支牙膏。雖然每個人擠牙膏的方式不同，習慣不一，但似乎都有些浪費。蝦妹算了一下，一支標準裝牙膏是二二五克，六個人早晚刷牙一次，假設劑量是一粒青豆大約是一克，以此份量為標準，那麼每天使用就是二克牙膏。
+
+6人 × 2次 × 1克 = 12克
+
+所以，225克的牙膏可以使用：12克/天 225克 = 18.75天
+
+這樣，一支 二二五克 的牙膏在六個人早晚刷牙一次的情況下，應該可以用十八至十九天。他們一星期就要買一次牙膏，未免太浪費吧！要改變節約習慣，她提議從小事做起。
+
+｛鯉魚｝是｛今朝有酒今朝醉｝的享樂主義者，擠牙膏永遠從中間下手。然而，蝦妹告訴他，這不是｛中庸之道｝，是超級浪費！蝦妹竟然不叫魚毛的父親做｛老爺｝而直接叫他｛鯉魚｝！她發現鯉魚用牙膏不是一粒青豆大小的份量，而是青豆的母體，一條青豆！幾乎是一粒青豆的七倍。
+
+第二個人就是｛鰻魚｝。基本上鯉魚擠多少牙膏，鰻魚就會擠多少牙膏。鯉魚從牙膏的中間擠出，鰻魚又從牙膏的中間擠出。鰻魚就像上兩個世紀的婦人，老公做什麼，她就做什麼，要改變鰻魚，先要改變鯉魚咯！
+
+魚家有兩個公子和一個千金。除了魚毛，還有魚毛的弟弟｛鯊魚｝。鯊魚在外留學回來，崇尚自由，牙膏隨意亂擠，他認為這是｛抽象派｝的生活格調。
+
+魚家千金｛鯰魚｝擠牙膏的份量很準確，每一次都是一樣，擠出來的牙膏很多很多，就像一個山丘，讓人懷疑她刷的不是牙，是牆。
+
+一日，在家庭會議上，蝦妹提出了一個｛兩週節約牙膏行動｝。她建議全家人在這兩週內，以最節約的方式擠牙膏，看誰能做到最好。
+
+魚毛原本覺得這是小題大做，但看到蝦妹一片苦心，而且她也不無道理，何況，家中財政的紅色線快要深不見底了！魚家上上下下見此情況，唯有默默表示支持，蝦妹馬上遞給他們每人一支十八克試用裝的牙膏。
+
+妹妹鯰魚悄悄給魚毛一個訊息：｛你老婆好哽渦！｝
+
+*香港俚語｛好哽 = 很強悍、很難搞定的人｝
+
+魚毛試著探測父母的一舉一動，但是鰻魚和鯉魚卻沒有任何反應，沒有對他說蝦妹半句話。然而，他們不說，並不代表他們喜歡蝦妹的。
+
+他們看見蝦妹擠牙膏必須從底部開始，規規矩矩地往上擠，一絲不苟，就像｛萬丈高樓平地起｝，用到最後才肯罷休。
+
+起初，每個人都盡力改變自己的習慣，包括魚毛。魚毛試著模仿蝦妹從底部擠上去，結果總是弄得滿手都是。鯊魚和鯰魚覺得生活避重就輕很不爽，父母鯉魚和鰻魚則因為年紀大了，手腳不靈活，擠不出牙膏來。總之，改變是不容易。要改變別人就難上加難。
+
+行動好像失敗了。
+
+蝦妹發現沒有節約多少牙膏，反而因為不習慣而影響了其它事。比如家人的心情和時間，蝦妹有點慚愧，好像強行所難了，雖然他們沒有說出來...
+
+蝦妹走進廁所面壁思過，雖然廁所有一陣臭除。她覺得，應該互相包容和理解，應該接受別人的不足，這才是一個賢內助。蝦妹用她的手亂抓著自己的頭髮。
+
+蝦妹從廁所走出客廳，她看見魚家五人站在她面前有點吃驚。魚家五人看著蝦妹有點吃驚，因為她的頭髮亂七八糟。
+
+鯉魚和鰻魚問：牙膏行動辛苦嘛？
+
+蝦妹答：不辛！
+
+｛那麼，洗頭水、漱口水、洗澡液、清潔劑妳也發起行動吧！｝魚家五人異口同聲說。
+
+原來他們雖然不習慣，但並沒有覺得｛唔妥｝。而且他們看到蝦妹的理財方法，確實要向她豎起一隻大拇指。
+
+同時，他們決定由細節做起，節約、開源和節儉！
+
+一年後，魚家上上下下的財政紅線消失了！
+
+完
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2024-05-12-taxi-driver.md b/_collections/_columns/2024-05-12-taxi-driver.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..89ec2ccc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2024-05-12-taxi-driver.md
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "的哥"
+author: "WrightFu"
+date : 2024-05-12 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/9hbHHve.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+自從2022年秋天開始做上的哥這份「秘撈」，白駒過隙，已是超過一年半的光景了。在剛開始嘗試這個工作後不久，曾經撰文分享，隨著經驗值的增加，感覺可以書寫多一點。
+
+
+
+### 日夜都繽紛？
+
+2023年的其中一個社會熱話，是政府針對著晚間市面氣氛冷清，故策劃了一堆「夜繽紛」的活動，意圖刺激晚間的經濟活動。作為主要在晚間駕駛的替更，說實在，並不感受到「夜繽紛」真的有促進晚間的經濟活動和人流，及對乘客量有正面影響。2023年上半年的時候，種種荒誕的防疫措施陸續放寬，加上關口恢復開放，那時的營運狀況並不算太差，但倘若是遇上如復活節的長假期，眾多港人出國外遊，還是對生意有負面的影響；但到了開始推行「夜繽紛」的2023年下半年再踏入2024，明顯覺得晚上的市道變差了，在旺角、尖沙咀、銅鑼灣等地的知名的士站位，排隊候客的車輛眾多，亦非連綿不絕的有乘客跑到的士站登車，車輛的流轉速度明顯減慢了；而在街上不斷「慢碌」的時候，卻是「旺丁不旺財」或根本人流量已然稀疏，結果兜勻了整個區域，都沒有乘客揚手截車。
+
+儘管如此，在華燈初上的時間，尖沙咀仍然是一個交通狀況極為差劣的地方，大量時間都虛耗在塞車上，自己並不太喜歡在這個時間段於尖沙咀出沒，但偏偏這個區域的乘客需求就是存在。倘若仍然有乘客在車上，等候時間多跳幾下錶，算是聊勝於無，但在吉車的時候再遇上寸步不動的車龍，寶貴的時間就這樣被浪費掉。
+
+車子的早更師傅儼如鐵人，近乎全年無休，但也有數次難得遇上對方因事休息，就「人棄我取」做過幾次星期日的早更。雖然並非在破曉時份就接車開工，但亦感覺到休閒消遣的客流，來得比較隨意，較容易在出奇不意的地方，遇上隨手截車的人，而的士站的流轉速度亦相對較快。交車的時候跟夜更的師傅聊起，對方亦有表示覺得晚間的生意並不如以往，就算他備有多部手機去接長途的柯打。
+
+
+### 港島九龍大不同
+
+雖然自己曾經在香港島上班六年，亦經常在港島區Citywalk，但礙於高昂的隧道費和泊車費，故此一直都甚少駕車「過海」。而車子的兩位師傅，本身亦是九龍人，要接到過海的旗，亦是可遇不可求。記得第二次開工的時候，就已經遇上截車過海的乘客，當時還擔心自己應付不來而想在落客後盡快返回九龍，但後來亦有心想多嘗試駕駛不同的道路，也漸漸不懼怕在港島區「搵食」，只要過海旗不是在自己打算收車前才出現就好（當然亦不會像某些「害群之馬」拒載），否則就沒有足夠時間讓自己「遊玩一輪」後再在過海的士站候客，而要吉車回九龍。
+
+後來有感，晚間在九龍隨街截車過海的人，實在太少，所以在頂替星期日早更的時候，因為時間比較充裕，把心一橫，取車後就直接吉車到香港島，才開始做生意，亦很幸運地，有兩次可讓自己在港島，待到需要準備交車的時間。
+
+港島的面積始終不算大，加上點與點之間的剛需，因此多數的旗都是屬中短途的，比如中環/銅鑼灣等核心商業區的往返，或連接半山的住宅區，倘若是去東區或南區，已算是港島區內較長的旗了。雖然在港島區較常遇到需爬波的路段，會增加用氣量，但港島區的highway和普通道路的連接，又來得比較完善，起步後很快就可以踏上「跑道」飛馳一大段路到接近目的地的地方，加快回車。反而在九龍區，起步後要攪一大輪才能抵達高速公路，或必需要途徑需等候眾多紅綠燈的道路。
+
+以步行者遊走在港島區的道路時，一直都有感受到，港島的城市氛圍，就是跟九龍區有著難以言喻的分別。當坐在駕駛席上，同樣的感覺，亦在油然而生著，每一次穿過海底隧道抵達對岸之後，就會更切身的感受到這種分野。港島區的高尚住宅不少，但要住客在屋苑外的狹窄馬路截車，會有較大的不便，所以不少屋苑也備有燈牌，召喚馬路上的的士駛入屋苑載客；而遇到的乘客，也有較多外藉或上流人士，亦普遍來得比較有禮，有一次就在港島區遇上兩位婆婆，下車時主動說了一句「唔該晒__生」，倍感尊重。
+
+三條過海隧道在2023年先後實施了「易通行」不停車繳費，隧道的收費亦按時段統一處理，個人倒認為這沒有很增加到接到過海旗的機會，反而是在昔日非繁忙時間也會塞車的紅隧，車龍亦不復見，對加快回車亦有正面幫助。不過，在實行收費更改前，晚間的紅隧，同樣不難做到「一腳入窿」，亦是晚間市面冷清的一個寫照。
+
+
+### 軼事隨想
+
+不少行家俱有分享過，駕駛的士雖有「搵客」策略，但也很講求運氣，因為你並不會知道，接下來的乘客的目的地會在哪，而在到了偏遠的地方，會否找到柯打或載到另外的街客返回市區，同樣是水晶球問題。有些時候，跑了大半晚都是穿梭市區個別區份的普通道路，在同樣的道路上塞車等燈，已感到煩厭之時，忽然接到比較長途的旗，可以跑一下highway換個地方轉轉，心坎裡也會有舒暢、可以解放一下的感覺。而在機場、口岸的的士站，是否要去「守株待兔」，亦很視乎當時的人流量和輪候車輛數目，或多或少有賭博的成份。而天氣，亦是一把雙刃劍，因為外出的人可能會減少，但仍然待在街上的人，亦有機會因為表現狼狽，而想快快找一部的士，協助自己走兩個街口。
+
+斷斷續續，自己也駛進過不少普通車輛無法駛入的道路，如黃石碼頭、東霸、馬灣、深圳灣大橋、落馬洲的兩個口岸等，亦算是比較難得的體驗。有些日子，解鎖了自己未有到訪過/駕駛過的地方，就算當天營業額只屬一般，心坎裡也會有多一點滿足感。
+
+不過，香港的的士車費，在多年前開始實行「短加長減」，當車程達致9公里之後（現時車資水平為$93.5），跳錶金額就會減少，故此會意識到，由同一個地方起步，但跑到更遠的地方時，車費的上升幅度，與距離並不成比例。所以自己也很認同某些行家所說，稍為超過「短加長減」benchmark而又沒有太多燈位的車程，利潤最好，但這類型的旗，同樣是可遇不可求。
+
+通關後，香港重新迎來了大量的洼地遊客，雖然「特種兵」式旅遊風氣盛行，但仍然會有好些接到洼地旅客的機會。感覺上，相貌比較年青的乘客，質素較好，沒有表現得那麼財大氣粗。但自己最討厭的一件事，是部份遊客「大安旨意」以為的士會接受電子支付，到埗時才說自己沒有現金，結果只能把他們帶到附近的銀行/便利店換錢，耽誤時間。雖然這某程度上是出於自己沒有打算刻意多開收款戶口，但在登車前多問一句，對大家也好。此外，有些酒店較為不知名，或名字容易讓人混淆，雖然運輸署的的士筆試題目，包含大量酒店的名稱，但當客人突然說要去某酒店的時候，自己也要他們告知一下自己詳細的地址，才能弄個明白。
+
+有朋友一直期望自己可以有一些第一身的「撞鬼」經驗分享，說實在，並沒有。但記得有一次，在較晚的時候接到一個從九龍過海的乘客，在衝落山尋找過海的士站時，只有自己一人的車廂突然傳來「午夜兇鈴」，原來是那位乘客把電話遺留了在車上，只好死死氣地掉頭跑回上山，把電話歸還給對方，亦額外獲得了一點打賞。另外有一次，有乘客發現前一枝旗的乘客把銀包遺留了在車上，對方主動地透過各種證件裡有限的資訊，嘗試聯繫屋邨座頭及保安能否協助trace到物主，亦是一種非常好心的表現。
+
+一年半的「秘撈」生涯，儘管也為自己帶來了一點額外收入，但自己也不幸地交了兩次「學費」，因為超速而被影快相，罰款事少，還要被記六分。晚上的馬路，車流較少，有時為了讓乘客快一點抵達目的地，或早一點回到較旺的區域尋找乘客，也會不自覺的踩得快了。在第一次被影快相後，自己對車速已更加著意，盡可能不會偏離速度限制太多，但有時為了衝燈尾，還是會開盡直衝，第二次的快相，就是死在這個情況下。
+
+如無意外，這份「秘撈」，應會繼續做下去。
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2024-05-14-the-lost-melody.md b/_collections/_columns/2024-05-14-the-lost-melody.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..342c9f6c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2024-05-14-the-lost-melody.md
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "失去的旋律"
+author: "東加豆"
+date : 2024-05-14 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/0xoAzSH.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+他靜靜坐在榕樹下，目光空洞地跟隨著綠色葉子散落，腦海卻一片空白。自從那場意外後，他失去了她，也失去了關於她的記憶。對於她，他似乎忘記得一乾二淨。
+
+
+
+可是，那段不時響起的旋律，在他的腦海：｛Do Do Do Do Do Do Do Do...｝這旋律就像一串鎖匙，每當它響起，一些零碎的記憶碎片便會浮現。他記得榕樹下她的微笑，記得她輕撫竹枝的溫柔，記得春風略過他們身旁的溫暖。
+
+｛Do Do Do Do...｝旋律越來越清晰，畫面也越來越完整。他想起了他們漫步在榕樹雨中，葉子散落在她的髮絲，他輕輕地為她拭去。
+
+｛願伴你度一生，花開匆匆春已深｝。她的聲音在他耳邊迴旋，他記起了她曾經的承諾，也想起了那天她的淚水。
+
+｛Do Do Do Do...｝旋律像一把尖刀，將他從回憶中拉回現實。他緊緊抓住這旋律，因為旋律好像是他的救命稻草，他希望找回失去的愛情，找回失去的她，所以他只好找緊失去的旋律。
+
+｛Do Do Do Do...Do Do Do Do｝這是他們哼過的旋律，不管他們在冷戰，在爭吵，或者在分手的邊緣，只要｛Do Do Do Do...Do Do Do Do｝響起了，二人就回到了那些甜蜜的日子。
+
+｛到那一天，相愛深，愛裡可有恨？｝他想起她轉身離去關門的時候，砰的一聲木門彷彿爆裂了，也想起自己心碎的難受。
+
+他去追尋那些旋律，可惜旋律沒有出現。當他全神貫注地工作，旋律卻忽然走進來，把他弄得神經緊張，他馬上去迎接它。
+
+｛Do Do Do Do...｝一段段旋律飄盪著，一幕幕影像浮起了，帶他回去已經忘記了的故事，記不起的甜蜜。他們曾經一起走過的街道，熟悉的場景，熟悉的床舖，他用紙筆墨記下來，任何能夠與她相關的蛛絲馬跡，他也會跟著去尋找。
+
+｛Do Do Do Do...｝旋律引領他來到了雜物房間，一個殘舊的木造音樂盒被他發現，他打開了音樂盒，然後扭上鏈子，音樂盒緩緩轉動，奏出了熟悉的調子｛Do Do Do Do...｝。
+
+｛Do Do Do Do...｝竟然是音樂盒的曲調，他一直以為是他們哼過的流行曲，或者陶醉於某一首的古典音樂，好像有了新線索。讓他更震撼的是，在音樂盒裡發現了一張泛黃的照片，照片上是一對幸福的戀人，在榕樹下相擁而笑。
+
+他認出了照片上的她，也知道旁邊的人是自己。他肯定是她了！因為，每當｛Do Do Do Do｝出現的時候，在他腦海出現的就是這個人，只是腦海的印象模糊，照片裡的人卻很清晰，他閉上眼睛，感受著旋律帶來的安慰。
+
+-
+
+一天，有人按門鈴，他打開門竟然看見的是她！原來她並沒有在世間消失，他想她回來，她就回來了。只要她回來，一切都不重要。
+
+當她回來時，身邊就有人竊竊私語。
+
+｛怎麼她會回來？...怎麼他會讓她回來？...她還有臉回來嗎？...他怎麼搞？...喔，是的，他已是傻呆子了！...那個女人真不知廉恥。｝這些話轉來轉去，鐘點清潔工說、大廈保安員說、送報紙的人說、送牛奶的人說，郵差都是這樣說。
+
+他只要愛情，其它是都不管。她回來了之後，他的頭痛和旋律一併帶走，神經緊張都消失了。
+
+她帶著一如往昔的笑容，填滿了他的心房，讓他欣喜若狂，一切重新開始。他們一起再來到熟悉的街道，熟悉的海灘，再次一起睡在熟悉的床舖。他感受到前所未有的溫暖，失而復得的體溫，她也有著同樣的心情。
+
+然而，幸福的日子如同曇花一現，不到半年，那熟悉的｛Do Do Do Do...｝的旋律再次響起。他的頭開始出現劇痛，腦海湧現出很多陌生的畫面，畫面中不僅有她，還有他不認識的男人，他們的事都糾纏不清。不不不，不只是這個男人，還有其他的男人！
+
+｛Do Do Do Do...｝刺耳的樂章和殘酷的現實不斷交織著。
+
+他終於明白｛Do Do Do Do...｝不是愛情的象徵，而是背叛的警號。
+
+他看著眼前的她，他的聲調有如下了勒令，他要她馬上離開他，離開這裡。不然，他會用手上鋒利的水果刀捅死她...
+
+她非常難過，她要走，她被他趕走。
+
+自那場交通意外之後，她都失憶了。
+
+如果不是｛Do Do Do Do...｝她就不會發現了他，不會來找他。她以為找回失去的愛情，找回失去的他，原來一切都沒有。
+
+沒有，他們都沒有找回失去的愛情，沒有找回失去的對方，他們只是被失去的旋律纏繞著。
+
+完
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2024-05-17-hong-kong-chronicle-2020.md b/_collections/_columns/2024-05-17-hong-kong-chronicle-2020.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..3e70c55f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2024-05-17-hong-kong-chronicle-2020.md
@@ -0,0 +1,432 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "香港2020大事記"
+author: "CrazyArticle"
+date : 2024-05-17 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/ZvNZq7Q.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+2020年對香港來講是非常重要的一年，以7月1日為分界，香港變成了兩個世界。
+
+
+
+7月1日前，還是大家所熟知的那個香港，但隨著國安法的到來，7月1日以後的香港，變成了一個擁有肅殺之氣，沈浸於紅色恐怖的香港。這一年的香港，有熟悉的反修例運動的延續，有新冠疫情，有熟悉的立法會內的抗爭，亦有造成寒蟬效應的國安法。2020年，是香港變化的開始，香港由此開始崩壞。
+
+現在，就開始回顧，這動盪又激烈變化的2020年。
+
+---
+
+### 1、反修例運動：
+
+2020年1月1日：民間人權陣線（民陣）發起元旦大遊行，主題為「毋忘承諾 並肩同行」。大會指有103萬人參加，警方則指有6萬人自維園出發。遊行期間，多家匯豐銀行分行被破壞，金鐘道高等法院外牆被噴上「法治已死」等口號。入夜後演變成警民衝突，警方發射催淚彈等驅散人群，同時出動銳武裝車及水炮車，全晚港島一代至少400人被捕。
+
+1月3日：教協於中環愛丁堡廣場舉行「無懼白色恐怖 堅守教師專業」教育界集會，反對教育局將被捕或被投訴之教師即時停止，大會稱有2萬人參加集會，警方則表示高峰時有2500人。
+
+1月5日：民主黨北區區議員及區內市民「和理行之不要水貨辦年貨」集會及遊行，以示對北區水貨問題不滿。大會指有1萬人參加，警方則表示高峰時有2500人。大批遊行市民於活動結束後於上水廣場一帶聚集，警方出動防暴警員施放胡椒噴霧驅散並制服多人，逾40人被捕。
+
+1月17日：大埔中學生發言平台於大埔海濱公園發起「大埔中學生集會」，近千人參加。
+
+1月18日：香港政研會發起包圍香港電台行動，近百人參與，批評港台於反修例運動報道有失偏頗。
+
+1月19日：民間集會團隊原訂發起「天下制裁大遊行」，警方最終只批准舉行集會。集會期間警方指因有示威者在中環一帶堵路而要求中止，及後變成警民衝突，。大會表示集會有至少15萬人出席，警方則稱高峰期有11680人。集會發言人劉穎匡氣候因涉嫌煽動群眾情緒及違反不反對通知書被捕。
+
+1月22日：立法會議員邵家臻、張超雄以及社民連玉荔枝角懲教所發起「手足，和你團年」活動，邵指有8000人出席集會。
+
+2月15日：15名青年在葵涌邨重建連儂牆，20多名警員到場截查及以刑事毀壞罪拘捕他們。
+
+2月29日：太子「8.31」事件半週年，有市民到太子站擺放鮮花，警員多次出動及清理。入夜後旺角多處有人堵路及燃燒雜物，旺角站出口亦遭焚燒，大量防暴警出動驅散，期間施放催淚彈、胡椒球彈及胡椒噴霧。事件持續至笠日凌晨，共有115人被捕。
+
+
+▲ 市民到太子站擺放鮮花以紀念831事件半週年
+
+
+▲ 太子站衝突
+
+3月26日：中西區區議會主席鄧麗琼涉在社交網站轉發被指射盲印尼記者之警員的個人資料，被警方以「煽動意圖」罪拘捕。
+
+4月28日：戴耀廷在《蘋果日報》上發表題為「真攬炒十步 這是香港宿命」文章。
+
+6月5日：許智峯以私人檢控方式控告西灣河開槍警員及深水埗的士司機案，於東區裁判法院內召開內庭聆訊，庭上裁判官批出傳票，下令傳照涉事司機出庭應訊，而開槍警員則需考慮法律觀點及控罪，故押後處理。
+
+6月9日：6·9大遊行一週年，一大批市民在中環遊行，有人一度走出馬路高叫口號，53人涉非法集結等罪被捕。
+
+6月12日：6·12事件一週年，多區有人聚集，警方以涉嫌參與非法集結罪拘捕共35人。
+
+6月15日：反修例運動中墮樓身亡的梁凌杰事實一週年，有市民自發到太古廣場外悼念，排隊獻花的人龍環繞至山頂纜車中環站。
+
+8月20日：警方再拘捕6名元朗「7·21」事件的「白衣人」，累計拘捕43人。
+
+8月24日：死因裁判庭就陳彥琳死亡事件展開聆訊。
+
+
+
+8月24日：律政司介入許智峯早前向西灣河開槍案交通警及深水埗開車撞示威者的士司機提出之私人檢控，認為沒有足夠證據證明被告人的指稱罪行，亦無合理機會達至定罪，故申請撤銷兩案檢控傳票獲准。
+
+8月26日：中國海警於粵港東南面海域查獲一艘快艇，拘捕12名涉嫌偷渡至台灣的人士，當中包括李宇軒。
+
+9月11日：經過12天聆訊，死因裁判法庭陪審團一致裁定陳彥琳死因存疑。
+
+11月16日：死因裁判法庭就周梓樂死亡事件展開聆訊。
+
+
+### 2、Covid-19疫情：
+
+1月8日：政府刊憲，將「嚴重新型傳染性病原體呼吸系統病」納入法定須呈報傳染病。
+
+1月23日：署理行政長官張建宗確認由中國武漢來港後確診新型冠狀病毒的個案；市面搶購口罩等防疫用品情況持續。
+
+#### 2.1【反對政府徵用公屋作檢疫中心】
+
+1月26日：逾200人於未入伙的粉嶺輝民邨附近聚集及以雜物堵路，反對政府徵用屋邨以供緊密接觸者或醫護人員入住，部分屋數的大堂被縱火。政府其後發稿重申安排密切接觸者入住檢疫設施時，會優先考慮徵用渡假村，又指部門會出席區議會會議解釋情況，期間會暫停相關準備工作。
+
+1月28日：政府宣布撤回用粉嶺輝民邨作隔離區安排，又指無計劃徵用未入伙的公共屋邨作檢疫中心；另外會暫停西九龍站，紅磡站、中國客運碼頭，屯門客運碼頭、沙頭角及文錦渡之跨境服務。
+
+
+▲ 2020年1月26日凌晨_暉明邨衝突
+
+2月1日：美孚有多人聚集，反對政府將位於美孚、饒宗頤文化館的旅館「翠雅山房」徵用作檢疫中心，期間有人堵路及噴漆，防暴警出動並進入美孚新村平台掃蕩，事件持續到凌晨，至少3人被捕。
+
+2月8日：政府宣布將會徵用火炭未入伙公屋駿洋邨作檢疫中心。晚上有過百名市民聚將軍澳尚德邨聚集，抗議政府在區內設立新型冠狀病毒肺炎指定診所，並悼念在反修例運動中身亡的科大學生周梓樂逝世3個月，其後有人在十字路口擺放路障。警方出動並施放胡椒噴霧及催淚彈驅散，事件中119人被捕，包括當區區議員及記者。
+
+是次行動亦屬於反修例運動的一部分。
+
+2月9日：西貢、火炭、大埔、荃灣多區有市民遊行抗議當局未經諮詢下於該區設立指定診所或檢疫中心。
+
+2月9日：全港多區包括天水圍、大埔、香港仔、西環及紅磡等有人發起遊行，反對政府將當區普通科門診列為指定診所，其中天水圍遊行近千人參與，有人在遊行完結後焚燒輕鐵站拍卡機及向路軌投擲雜物，防暴警到場施放胡椒噴霧，拘捕至少30人。
+
+
+▲ 天水圍衝突，有示威者向馬路投擲雜物堵路
+
+3月2日：珍寶王國宣布，受新冠病毒肺炎影響，酒家於笠日起暫停營業，直至另行通知。
+
+3月30日：31歲男子因欲避隔離14天向警員提供虛假的檢疫地址，被控一項向獲授權人員提供虛假資料嘴，被告認罪並被判入獄3個月，為首宗違檢疫下被判刑的案件。
+
+4月10日：香港眾志召開記者會，表示搜購了100萬個口罩，並重新包裝成「自救口罩」，收皮35萬個會以成本價每盒100元售予合作的黃店。
+
+5月22日：香港眾志因口罩沒有標明生產地，負責採購口罩的常委梁延豐涉嫌違反《商品說明條例》被海關拘捕。
+
+5月22日：律政司去信《獨立媒體》，以煽動暴力及違反法庭禁制令為由要求下架岑敖暉此前之文章。
+
+#### 2.2【醫護罷工】
+
+1月23日：多個醫護界工會就政府防疫工作召開記者會，醫管局員工陣線要求政府在1月28日（星期四）前全面落實邊境防疫措施，否則不排除發起罷工等行動。
+
+1月27日：深水埗明愛醫院急症室男廁凌晨有炸彈爆炸，事後Telegram頻道「九十二籤」承認責任，並要求醫護人員立即罷工迫使政府封關，同日晚間，有馬杜九龍佐治五世紀念公園殘廁有馬桶被炸毀。
+
+2月1日：醫管局員工陣線於特別會員大會中表決通過，如訴求不獲醫管局及政府回應，工會將於2月3日發起階段罷工，訴求包括政府封關及提供足夠保護裝備予醫護人員。
+
+2月2日：行政長官林鄭月娥拒絕醫管局員工陣線談判，工會宣布於笠日開始罷工。
+
+2月3日：醫管局員工陣線首日罷工，涵蓋普通科門診職員，專制醫療，支援職系及行政人員等提供非緊急服務的會員，工會指罷工人數超過2700人。同日下午，政府宣布凌晨12點起，羅湖、落馬洲、皇崗及港澳碼頭4個口岸停運，機場、深圳灣、港珠澳大橋及啟德郵輪碼頭則維持運作；林鄭月娥強調措施於醫護罷工無關。
+
+2月4日：因首日於醫管局談判破裂，醫管局員工陣線展開第二日罷工，是日參與之醫護人員包括提供緊急服務的會員，工會指罷工人數超過7000人。
+
+2月5日：醫管局員工陣線第三日罷工，工會指罷工人數超過7000人。工會早上遊行到特首辦請願，有數百人參與；林鄭月娥拒絕會面對話。
+
+2月6日：醫管局員工陣線第四日罷工，工會指罷工人數超過6400人。
+
+2月7日：醫管局員工陣線第五日罷工，工會指人數有5500人。工會進行閉門會議，超過7000名投票會員中，有4000人決定不繼續罷工，未達6000名會員支持繼續罷工的通過門檻，工會決定擱置罷工行動。主席余慧明指理解及尊重會員決定，又不認為行動失敗，而是轉換方式繼續抗爭。
+
+
+▲ 2020年2月3日——7日，香港醫護開始罷工。是次罷工屬於反修例運動及Covid—19香港疫情的一部分。
+
+#### 2.3【疫情發展】
+
+1月23日：署理行政長官張建宗確認由中國武漢來港後確診新型冠狀病毒的個案；市面搶購口罩等防疫用品情況持續。
+
+2月4日：本地出現首宗新型冠狀病毒肺炎感染死亡個案，一名曾到訪武漢的39歲男子於1月31日因發燒到伊利沙伯醫院求醫及確診，5日後死亡，起母親在隔離期間確診，為首宗本地感染個案。
+
+2月5日：曾接載3名新型冠狀病毒肺炎患者到郵輪「世紀夢號」，在一日內不獲台灣當局准許於高雄港停泊後，返抵啟德郵輪碼頭，船上近4000名乘客及船員滯留船上隔離，網傳船上食物及生活用品面臨短缺，引致坊間搶購潮，政府對惡意散播謠言者加以譴責。
+
+8月1日：國家衛健委因應港府要求，組織「內地核算檢測支援隊」，又廣東省派員到港協助推行普及社區檢測計畫；同時又選派湖北省武漢市「方艙醫院“的專家協助改裝亞洲國際博覽館作醫療設施。
+
+8月7日：林鄭月娥宣布兩星期後将推行普及社區檢測計畫，為全港市民提供自願性檢測，由華大基因，金域檢驗，凱普生物負責化驗。
+
+9月1日：為期14天之普及社區檢測計畫展開，首日有逾12萬人次接受檢測。
+
+9月14日：普及社區檢測計畫結束，累計逾178萬人接受檢測。
+
+
+### 3、限聚令：
+
+3月27日：政府宣布新一輪防疫措施，包括公眾地方4人限聚令；限制食肆只可開放一半席位、作為保持1.5米距離、需為顧客量度體溫等以及要求健身中心及戲院等公共娛樂場關閉等。
+
+4月5日：警方首次就限聚令發出告票，票控15名沙田沙角邨社區食堂外年齡介乎58至84歲人士。
+
+4月30日：社民連於灣仔警總外抗議警方以疫情為由反對五一遊行，一行8人被警方以違反限聚令票控。
+
+5月1日：五一勞動節，社民連及工黨8人分成2組，由金鐘遊行至政府總部外請願，要求設立失業援助金，8人被警方以違反限聚令票控；職工盟及多個工會在全港開設至少66個街站，取代早起被警方以疫情為由反對的五一遊行及集會。
+
+
+### 4、國歌法：
+
+5月27日：立法會二讀審議《國歌法》，有市民發動[三罷]並包圍立法會，多區有市民聚集。警方清晨起在多區嚴陣佈防，又在中環鬧市發射多枚胡椒球彈，全日共拘捕逾393名市民。
+
+
+▲ 反對《國歌法》立法
+
+5月28日：立法會繼續二讀審議《國歌法》，許智峯在會議廳中放置腐爛職務，傳出濃烈異味，會議一度暫停。同日傍晚，國歌法二讀審議獲通過。
+
+
+
+6月4日：立法會在41票贊成，1票反對下，三讀通過《國歌法》。
+
+11月18日：朱凱迪、陳志全及許智峯涉嫌在6月4日立法會國歌法三讀期間繞輪議事廳秩序被捕。
+
+
+### 5、六四集會：
+
+5月20日：警方以疫情為由，反對支聯會在5月31日舉行「毋忘六四」大遊行。
+
+6月1日：警方以疫情為由，反對支聯會在維園舉行六四集會，為31年來首次禁止活動。
+
+6月4日：支聯會主席李卓人及其他支聯會常委、壹傳媒創辦人黎智英、民陣副召集人陳皓桓等人手持燭光步入維園，大批市民進入被封鎖的球場參加晚會，多區有市民集會及點起燭光。
+
+
+▲ 2020年六四31週年集會，市民自發前往維園紀念
+
+6月10日：李卓人、何俊仁、蔡耀昌及黎智英被控於六四當日[煽惑他人參與未經批准的集結]。
+
+6月12日：支聯會副主席鄒幸彤、尹兆堅等9人被控於六四當日[煽惑他人參與未經批准的集結]，案件累積共13人被控。
+
+8月6日：警方向李卓人、黃之鋒等24人發出通知，指控他們參與六四維園集會，涉嫌干犯非法集結罪，已向法庭申請發出傳票。
+
+
+### 6、民主派初選：
+
+3月10日：戴耀廷在《蘋果日報》撰文，提出兩階段的協調及公民參與，以達至民主派於立法會選舉中奪得過半席目標。
+
+6月9日：戴耀廷公佈，民主派35+公民投票將於7月11及12日舉行，就5區直選、[超區]及衛生服務界舉行初選。
+
+6月12日：政府刊憲宣布2020年9月6日為第七屆立法會議員換屆選舉日。
+
+6月24日：民主派初選，52張報名名單落實。
+
+7月10日：民主派初選前夕，香港民意研究所位於黃竹坑的辦公室遭警方持證搜查，警方指懷疑有人不誠實使用電腦而檢走所有電腦，過程中無人被捕。
+
+7月11日：民主派初選首日，多區票站出現人龍。主辦方公布，首日共有逾23萬人次投票。
+
+
+▲ 民主派初選競選廣告
+
+7月12日：民主派初選結束，主辦方表示總投票人次逾60萬。中聯辦及港澳辦先後發糕指初選涉嫌違反港區國安法。
+
+7月13日：民主派初選公佈結果，多個本土派參選人勝出，講報名參加9月之立法會選舉。
+
+7月15日：區諾軒宣布推出民主派初選工作；一日後趙家賢及戴耀廷亦隨之退出。
+
+
+### 7、第七屆立法會換屆選舉：
+
+7月17日：第六屆立法會會期最後一日。
+
+7月18日：第七屆立法會議員環節選舉提名期展開。
+
+7月31日：林鄭月娥宣布，因受新冠病毒疫情影響，在中央政府的支持下，決定引用《緊急法》，將原定於今年9月6日舉行的立法會選舉押後一年，至於立法會未來一年的問題則向人大請示做法。
+
+8月11日：全國人大常委會作出決定，第六屆立法會繼續履行職責不少於一年，直至新一屆任期開始為止。
+
+9月6日：有市民發起9月6日九龍大遊行，反對政府押後立法會選舉，大批警力在油尖旺截查及驅散聚集之市民，全日至少289人被捕。
+
+
+▲ 9·6九龍大遊行，警察追捕記者
+
+9月28日：陳志全及朱凱迪去信立法會秘書處，拒於下月續任立法會議員。
+
+9月29日：香港民意研究所公佈調查結果，指民主派支持者中，有47.1%支持立法會議員留任45.6%反對留任；15名民主派里嘎會議員按調查結果決定留任。
+
+9月29日：陳淑莊壹個人健康及家庭為由宣布不會延任立法會議員，同時退出公民黨。
+
+
+### 8、清算反修例運動：
+
+2月28日：壹傳媒創辦人黎智英、前民主黨主席楊森及支聯會注意李卓人被警方以涉嫌於2019年8月31日參與非法集結上門拘捕，；黎智英另外被控在2017年6月4日刑事恐嚇《東方日報》記者。
+
+3月24日：林鄭月娥宣布任命張舉能為終審法院首席法官。
+
+4月6日：前立法會議員區諾軒被指在2019年7月7日「九龍大遊行」結束後，以「大聲公」推撞警員盾牌及發出聲響是公共關係科警司耳朵不適，被控兩項襲警罪，近被裁定兩項罪名成立。
+
+4月18日：警方拘捕李柱銘、梁國雄、吳靄儀等15名民主派人士，涉嫌在2019年反修例運動期間組織及參與未經批准集結。
+
+4月29日：2016年旺角騷亂案，本土民主前線發言人梁天琦等3人就暴動罪等定罪及刑期上訴，均遭上訴庭駁回。
+
+5月15日：監警會公開反修例運動報告。首宗612案件判刑，22歲救生員認暴動罪在區域法院判囚4年。
+
+5月19日：通訊事務管理局餓向香港電台發出警告信，裁定其中一集《頭條新聞》污衊和侮辱警方；港台道歉，並表示於該季播放完畢之後將暫停製作長達31年歷史的《頭條新聞》。
+
+6月10日：港大學生會前會長孫曉嵐、港大《學苑》前總編輯梁繼平、民間團隊發起人劉穎匡及一人王宗堯等12人涉嫌於去年7月1日進入立法會大樓被加控暴動罪。
+
+6月18日：立法會以39票贊成，5票反對和11票棄權，通過任命張舉能為終審法院首席法官。
+
+6月19日：最後一集《頭條新聞》播出。
+
+6月26日：警方反對七一遊行申請。
+
+7月26日：港大校委會以18票比2票，決定解僱法律系副教授戴耀廷，理據為戴於2019年因佔中案曾被判監。（編注：可視為港版方勵之）
+
+8月26日：警方早上拘捕多人，包括涉嫌在元朗「7·21」事件中干犯暴動罪的林卓廷（！？？？）涉嫌在屯門示威現場妨礙司法公正的許智峯等。
+
+9月6日：譚得志因涉嫌觸犯《刑事罪行條例》中的「發表煽動文字」被國安處拘捕。
+
+9月10日：壹傳媒股價曾在黎智英被捕後急升21倍；15人涉嫌操控壹傳媒股價被捕。
+
+9月22日：警方致函四個傳媒工會，指將會更新《警察通例》中「傳媒代表」的定義，只有登記政府新聞處新聞發布系統的或國際認可及知名的非本地新聞通訊社、報章、雜誌、電台和電視廣播機構才獲承認。
+
+9月27日：多次於記者會上提出尖銳問題的香港電台助理節目主任李俊呀倍港台演唱試用期120日。
+
+10月4日：教育局指與9月下旬裁定九龍塘一小學教師於教材中「有計劃地散佈『港獨』信息」，認為其行為屬嚴重專業失德，已永久註銷其教師註冊，並向該笑發出譴責信及其他使用該教材之教師發出書面警告。
+
+10月10日：4男5女涉嫌協助12港人偷渡被捕。
+
+10月11日：公務員事務局要求7月1日或以後入職的公務員簽署聲明，確認用戶《基本法》及效忠特區。
+
+10月19日：中西區區議會主席鄧麗琼3月在社交網站轉載倍指射盲印尼記者的警員資料，被控違反法庭在2019年半下禁止披露警員及其家人個人資料的臨時禁制令，鄧麗琼今承認藐視法庭，判監28個月，緩刑1年。
+
+11月3日：港台《鏗鏘集·721誰主真相》編導蔡玉玲涉嫌在查冊車牌資料時作出虛假陳述被捕。
+
+
+
+12月1日：有線新聞宣布裁員，約100名員工受影響，當中包括約40名新聞部員工，而《新聞刺針》更是全組被裁。有線新聞中國組發起「總辭」，港聞組亦有十多名員工因不滿而即時辭職。
+
+12月2日：2019年6月21日包圍警總案，黃之鋒判囚13.5月，林朗彥7個月，周庭10個月。
+
+12月3日：許智峯在社交網站宣布結束丹麥外訪，正式流亡，並退出民主黨。
+
+12月3日：黎智英、周達權及黃偉強被指違反將軍澳工業邨租約，於警署報到時以涉嫌欺詐被捕。黎智英申請保釋被拒，須即時還押候訊。
+
+12月8日：胡志偉、朱凱迪等人涉嫌在七一遊行中干犯多項罪行被捕。
+
+12月16日：在林鄭月娥監誓下，所有副局長和政治助理於政府總部宣誓。
+
+
+▲ 全體副局長、政治助理宣誓，林鄭月娥監誓
+
+12月21日：前香港眾志主席羅冠天於社交網站宣布將向英國當局申請政治庇護。
+
+12月23日：黎智英相高等法院申請保釋，獲准以1000萬元保釋金，不得離開住所及發表文章等條件保釋。
+
+12月28日：林卓廷涉嫌披露元朗「7·21」事件中受調查者之身分資料被廉署拘捕。
+
+12月30日：深圳市鹽田區法院就12港人偷渡案宣判：10人分別判囚7個月至3年；2名未成年被告則一角香港警方調查。
+
+12月31日：黎智英被控涉嫌欺詐及違反港區國安法案，律政司不服高等法院早前批出保釋許可，提出上訴及申請臨時還押令。終審法院受理上訴申請，黎智英需繼續還押。
+
+
+### 9、立法會內會選舉風波：
+
+4月9日：多名建制派立法會議員發表聯署聲明，譴責主持立法會內會正副主席選舉的郭榮鏗以各種拉布方式癱瘓內會的行為屬於濫權。
+
+4月13日：港澳辦及中聯辦譴責郭榮鏗阻撓立法會正副主席選舉，21名民主派立法會議員發表聯合聲明，指該事務屬於香港內部事務，不屬國防或外交事宜，要求北京方面恪守《基本法》。
+
+4月17日：中聯辦再就立法會內會事件發稿，指港澳辦和中聯辦乃中央授權專責處理香港事務的機構，不是《基本法》中所致一般意義上的「中央人民政府所屬各部門」，故有權代表中央政府，就涉及政治體制正常運作和社會整體利益等重大問題行駛監督權。
+
+立法會內會舉行15次會議，惟仍未完成正副主席選舉程序，會上多名建制派議員指郭榮鏗無權主持會議，要求他讓位予延任主席李慧琼。
+
+
+
+5月4日：立法會主席梁君彥指資訊資深大律師的意見，宣布由李慧琼有權責召開內會。李慧琼同時宣布在5餘人8日召開兩個內會會議，上午由郭榮鏗主持，負責主席選舉事宜，下午則由她主持，處理其他內會事務。
+
+5月8日：立法會內會上午會議就規程問題展開討論，最終郭榮鏗裁定她於下午會議中應該繼續主持主席選舉事宜。下午會議，李慧琼坐上主席台，反民主派議員包圍抗議，與保安發生衝突，李其後下令驅逐多名反民主派議員，期間陳志全遭郭榮鏗強拉拖行，尹兆堅受傷送院。
+
+5月15日：立法會主席梁君彥稱採納英國御用大律師意見，指定由陳健波主持內會主席選舉。
+
+5月18日：陳健波主持立法會內會主席選舉，會議期間建制派及泛民主派爆發衝突，多名泛民主派議員被驅逐，最終李慧琼以40票當選內會主席。
+
+11月1日：7名民主派立法會議員涉嫌在5月8日的立法會內會衝突中干犯《立法會（權力及特權）條例》下的「藐視罪」及「干預立法會人員」被捕。
+
+
+### 10、國安法：
+
+5月22日：全國人大常委會召開會議，制定「香港國家安全法」草案納入立法議程。
+
+5月28日：全國人大會議閉幕，會上以2878票贊成，1票反對，6票棄權通過「港區國安法」。
+
+6月6日：17區區議會舉行特別聯合會議，會中通過要求全國人大撤回港區國安法動議；包含23個工會的[二百萬三罷工會聯合陣線]以及[中學生行動籌備平台]舉行公投，表決是否發動罷工罷課反對港區國安法。
+
+
+
+6月18日：G7外長發表聯合聲明，呼籲中國重新考慮訂立港區國安法。
+
+6月30日：全國人大常委會全票通過《中華人民共和國香港特別行政區維護國家安全法》，並將其列入基本法附件三在香港公布實施。保衛香港運動成員於添馬公園慶祝港區國安法通過。
+
+
+▲ 保衛香港運動成員於添馬公園慶祝港區國安法通過
+
+包括香港眾志及香港民族陣線在內的多個民間團體宣布解散。林鄭月娥於晚上11時簽署法令及刊憲，港區國安法即時生效。
+
+7月1日：大批市民不理警方反對，在港島遊行抗議港區國安法通過，全日多次爆發警民衝突。警方共拘捕370人，當中10人因涉嫌違反港區國安法被捕。
+
+7月2日：政府發表聲明指「光復香港 時代革命」是港獨或顛覆國家政權含意。
+
+7月3日：香港特別行政區維護國家安全委員會（港區國安委）成立，由行政長官林鄭月娥擔任主席。
+
+7月6日：七一遊行當日駕駛插有「光復香港 時代革命」旗幟的電單車的唐英傑被控煽動他人分裂國家及恐怖活動提堂，為首宗違反國安法之案件
+
+7月8日：中央人民政府駐香港特別行政區維護國家公署（國安公署）成立，臨時總部設於銅鑼灣維景酒店。
+
+7月15日：美國總統特朗普簽署《香港自治法案》，正式終止香港享有的特殊待遇和經濟優惠。
+
+7月27日：突破機構旗下刊物《Breakazinc》宣布，因應港區國安法實施，正式停止出版第62期刊物《危險閱讀》，並暫停製作下一期《Breakazinc》。
+
+7月29日：學生動源前召集人鍾翰林等共3男1女涉嫌違反港區國安法被捕，年齡介乎16歲至21歲。警方表示，被捕人涉及分裂國家、煽動分裂等罪行。
+
+8月7日：美國財政部宣布制裁11位中港官員，包括林鄭月娥、李家超、鄧炳強、夏寶龍和駱惠寧等。
+
+8月10日：國安處以涉嫌干犯勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全罪拘捕壹傳媒創辦人黎智英、次子黎耀恩及部分壹傳媒高層。近200名警員到將軍澳壹傳媒大樓進行搜查。同日，國安處以同樣罪名拘捕前香港眾志成員周庭、民間組織「香港故事」成員李宇軒，以及前學民思潮成員裏宗澤。
+
+
+▲ 壹傳媒大廈遭警方搜查
+
+8月11日：美國政府宣布自9月25日起，禁止香港出口至美國的商品標記為「香港製造（made in Hong Kong）」，而須標明出產地為「中國」。
+
+10月27日：已宣布解散的學生動源，其前召集人鍾翰林及其前成員何忻諾和陳渭賢於網上發表煽動他人分裂國家內容再度被捕。
+
+11月10日：美國財政部制裁李桂華、劉賜蕙、李江舟及鄧中華4人。
+
+11月11日：人大常委會通過決議指「宣揚或支持『港獨』主張等行為」者當喪失議員資格；港府隨即宣布取消梁繼昌、楊岳橋、郭榮鏗及郭家麒4人立法會議員資格。15名民主派議員宣布總辭以示抗議；立法會內啡建制派議員只餘鄭松泰及陳沛然2人。
+
+11月19日：香港中文大學舉行畢業禮，有學生在校園內示威，校方報警求助。
+
+11月20日：國安處警員進入中大校園調查及蒐證。
+
+11月21日：網台主持人「傑斯」尹耀昇因涉嫌在網上發表煽動性言論及金錢獲准其他財務資助他人分裂國家而被國安處拘捕。
+
+12月7日：國安處拘捕8人，涉嫌在中大畢業禮中參與非法集結，其中三人涉嫌觸犯煽動分裂國家罪。
+
+
+### 11、文化：
+
+3月19日：大眾書局因經營環境困難而宣布旗下16間書店即日起全線結業。
+
+7月10日：貿發局宣布書展會如期在7月15日至7月21日於灣仔會展舉行。
+
+7月13日：貿發局宣布取消7月15日開始之書展。
+
+8月25日：貿發局宣布書展將延至12月16日至22日在灣仔會展舉行。
+
+
+### 12、逝世：
+
+2月23日：儿童及少年文学作家君比因病逝世，终年54岁。
+
+5月26日：賭王何鴻燊離世，享壽106歲。
+
+12月17日：正義聯盟發起人李偲嫣確診新冠病毒肺炎，送院後證實不治。
+
+---
+
+2020年的香港，毫無疑問是劇變的一年，1月1日的元旦大遊行，還是大家熟悉的那個香港。其後的831紀念，醫護罷工等等，還有熟悉的大三罷，似乎反修例運動在2020年的第一個季度還在延續。但是，隨著新冠病毒肺炎的蔓延，反修例運動因此而不得不偃旗息鼓，而政府以防疫為藉口，採取了更為嚴厲的措施來鎮壓各類遊行和集會活動。當民主派藉助上一年區議會大勝的東風，希望通過是次立法會選舉而獲得議會的多數議席，從而舉行民主派初選。民主派初選令中央和港府感到恐懼，畢竟2019年區議會選舉的大败猶在眼前，於是政府想到一個方法：以疫情為藉口，宣布推遲一年選舉，隨後是國安法的推行。
+
+2020年，政府亦開始清算2019年的反修例運動，多民社運人士被捕，傳媒機構遭到清算，或裁員，或開始自我審查。比較令人注意的是傳媒大亨黎智英，無論是以何種罪名，都是在秋後算賬。中共的秋後算賬並不新鮮，最早是1989年的大搜捕，然後是2014年雨傘運動的清算，當中的社運人士紛紛被判刑。2019年的反修例運動作為香港歷史上最大的社會運動，2020年的大清算還只是剛剛開始。
+
+立法會的內會風波，以及國歌法的抗爭，可以視為是議會內最後一次抗爭活動，此後隨著民主派總辭，其他議員或被DQ，或被捕，又或者流亡海外，立法會完全被建制派操控，隨之而來的，自然就是已經擱置了20年的23條立法。
+
+2020年最大的變化莫過於國安法，可能沒有誰想到在沒有經過23條立法的情況下，全國人大可以通過這樣的方式替代23條立法，而香港警方如同取得尚方寶劍，在香港全方位地開始大搜捕，至於唐英傑，只是撞到槍口上。
+
+有人將香港和中國所遭受的紅色恐怖作為一個比喻，中國的紅色恐怖如同溫水煮青蛙，自2012年習近平掌權開始，一點點擴張權力，公民社會，新聞自由，一點點收縮，等到想起，方知什麼都沒有了；而香港的紅色恐怖，彷彿是將一隻青蛙直接扔進油鍋，變化是非常劇烈的，而2020年只是剛剛開始。
+
+2020年唯一值得慶賀的就是李偲嫣的死亡。她生前無比熱愛祖國，但卻染上來自祖國的病毒，最終斃命，這或是一種莫大的諷刺。
+
+
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diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2024-05-17-humputer-virus.md b/_collections/_columns/2024-05-17-humputer-virus.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..749beb51
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2024-05-17-humputer-virus.md
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "人腦病毒"
+author: "陶樂思"
+date : 2024-05-17 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/XNTBX5f.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+有一種病毒殺傷力比任何一種電腦病毒都有過之而無不及。這種病毒潛藏在我們腦子裡。因此叫做「人腦病毒」。
+
+
+
+人腦病毒的殺傷力在那呢？這種病毒最可惡之處，就是令很多很多人，即使有強大潛能，都只能一生平庸。試想，若你的天賦能使你成為飛機師，但受到人腦病毒影響之後，你只能做個普通文員。本來職業無分貴賤，文員也沒什麼不好。但若你受到病毒影響，成為一個營營役役但不知道自己在做什麼的人，只顧浪費精力，虛渡時光呢？
+
+說了這麼多，這種病毒究竟長什麼樣呢？這種病毒只簡單三個字：「我不行」。你可能會很疑惑：「這短短三個字會有這麼大力量嗎？」
+
+稍有常識都應該知道，無論做什麼事情要做得好，實戰是必不可少的一環。學習也是一樣，從生疏到熟練需要一個不斷嘗試和實戰的過程。這個過程需時可長可短，但實戰必定缺少不了。「我不行」的自我暗示（很多時還是自我明示呢！）會使自己連開始行動都卻步。或者即使開始了行動，一遇到小挫敗就退縮：「都說我不行了。果然真的不行呢！」由此可見，「我不行」在個人發展的路上，是一塊多大的絆腳石呢？而更諷刺的是，這絆腳石是自己扔到自己腳前的。
+
+你可能會問：「這麼壞的人腦病毒究竟是怎樣內至到我們腦袋裡的呢？」
+
+人腦病毒的形成是文化、人際互動以及個人性格三者相互交織的結果。
+
+在文化層面，華人社會普遍不鼓勵個人表現。華人文化高舉謙虛。即使自己很有才幹，在其他人面前仍然經常把「我不行」掛在嘴邊。彷彿說自己行就是驕傲自大。除了口頭表現以外，因着對「槍打出頭鳥」的恐懼，在實際表現上也傾向內斂。活在這樣的陰影之下，才幹外露就好像錢財外露，會遭到什麼不幸一樣。於是大部分人都甯願把自己的能力潛藏起來。「我不行」說得多了，連自己都相信自己不行了。
+
+人際互動對自我了解也會造成影響。雖然因着妒忌而打擊別人自信，令人相信自己不行的案例非常少，但諷刺的是很多時這種打擊來自我們的重要他者，例如父母。而打擊的動機卻諷刺地是因為愛孩子。曾經聽過一個案例：孩子很喜歡唱歌。參加過不少歌唱比賽且贏得獎項，但父母因為想他集中精神於學業，於是極力打擊他唱歌的自信心。平日經常說他唱歌難聽。即使贏到獎項，也說評判偏心，甚至評判聽覺有問題。當孩子的興趣與才幹不符合父母的期望，或者父母相信某些興趣與才幹「不能拿來當飯吃」，便會以負面評價的方法阻止孩子向他們的興趣發展。上述案例其實在日常生活中並不少見。當從小就活在不被鼓勵的氛圍下，「我不行」的病毒就會內至於自己的腦海。
+
+當然，個人性格也是病毒生長的溫床。別人說你不行你就必須相信嗎？有些人決定怎樣也不相信。說我不行，我偏偏要做得到。而另外一些人則非常倚賴別人的認同和讚賞。別人沒有表示認同，或者作出負面評價，他們就真的相信自己不行。而「我不行」這種人腦病毒，就最喜歡以上述兩種人的後者作為宿主了。
+
+知道人腦病毒如何產生之後，我們應該如何應對呢？我的應對方式，是不違拗，只發問。在日常生活中，「我不行」也會經常在我腦海裡跳出來。例如我正在學習架設自己的部落格網站。遇到與圖片有關的環節，我很多時就會不自覺地對自己說：我眼睛看不見，圖片的事情我應該做不到了。若我聽了上述的自我暗示就放棄學習的話，那麼我就中毒了。現在的我會繼續發問：眼睛看不見，就真的沒有其他方法協助自己處理圖片了嗎？會不會有其他視障者正在使用我還未知道的工具，能協助自己處理圖片呢？問了上述問題之後，我就會繼續收集更多資訊。例如詢問其他視障者，學習使用新工具。在學習的過程中，要由完全不懂到非常熟練看似很遙遠。這時候，我又會不自覺地說：我對這個是門外漢，怎學得會呢？這時候，若果我繼續問：我能怎樣去學習？用什麼方式會使我容易掌握相關技巧？那麼人腦病毒就不能阻礙我了。因為問了上述問題之後，我會繼續採取行動，包括制定學習的小目標以及對學習成果的回饋機制。
+
+最後，大多數人以為成就是外在之物，需要爭取。但我很想告訴的真相，是成就其實潛藏於我們的內在。我們要做的，是解鎖成就而不是爭取成就。要解鎖內在成就，充分了解自己的興趣與才能，不斷學習謀求提昇是不可或缺的元素。而這些都需要行動力。「我不行」是消磨行動力的致命病毒。因此它會妨礙我們解鎖成就。幸好這種病毒並非無解的絕症。只要我們不輕信它，願意透過多發問去破解它，我們便能輕易跨過這塊絆腳石。但願大家都能解鎖自己成就，活出自己喜歡的樣子。
+
+
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diff --git a/_collections/_heros/2013-01-01-BirgitMenzel-a1_r-the-occult-underground-of-late-soviet-russia.md b/_collections/_heros/2013-01-01-BirgitMenzel-a1_r-the-occult-underground-of-late-soviet-russia.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..54aaacd1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_heros/2013-01-01-BirgitMenzel-a1_r-the-occult-underground-of-late-soviet-russia.md
@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title: "苏俄晚期地下神秘主义"
+author: "Birgit Menzel"
+date: 2013-01-01 12:00:00 +0800
+image: https://i.imgur.com/zm2SnRx.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+position: right
+---
+
+苏联后期出现各种地下神秘主义思潮。这与东方哲学和宗教有什么影响关系？又与西方新时代运动有什么相互关系？
+
+
+
+### 引言
+### 后无神论时代的“宗教”
+
+试想一下，一个来自典型苏联家庭的年轻人，他家族的几代人都完全脱离了任何宗教传统。现在他听到了召唤，神的声音从上方传来。这个年轻人无法确定他应该去哪个教堂，在哪个屋檐下避难。所有历史宗教对他来说都同样陌生。他寻求信仰，却只找到了宗教派别。正是在渴望信仰和传统教义之间，出现了“贫穷的宗教”，一种没有教条、书籍或仪式的宗教。它是一个共同的信仰点，平等地接受所有信仰体系，将它们视为通向统一信仰的道路。
+
+对于俄罗斯犹太学者米哈伊尔·爱泼斯坦（Mikhail Epstein）来说，这种他称之为“贫穷宗教”（poor religion，一种没有进一步定义的宗教）的独特精神重塑追求，是与苏联过去密不可分的“后无神论”现象。自从苏联解体、边境开放和市场经济兴起以来，西方学者一直在关注后苏联时期大量出现的与神秘学和秘教相关的主题和出版物。这种现象不仅盛行于1990年代，即苏联解体和共产主义制度崩溃后的第一个动荡不安的十年，而且即使在普京政府执政和东正教重新占据主导地位之后，这种现象仍然以边缘化的形式存在。对神秘主义、超自然现象和非正统精神世界的迷恋可以在社会各个阶层，包括知识分子、艺术界、科学界和政界中找到。
+
+2006年新年夜，俄罗斯电视播放了帕维尔·隆金（Pavel Lungin）执导的电影《岛》（The Island, 2006）时，讲述了一名前士兵在当代俄罗斯成为神秘主义修道士的故事。影片中出现的念诵神秘的耶稣祈祷文、心灵疗愈等未被教会认可的东方神秘基督教传统与东正教修道院的教条发生冲突。这部电影的观众数量远远超过了观看普京新年讲话的人数。观众的热烈反响反映出人们对个人精神重塑的巨大渴望。
+
+
+▲ 电影《孤独之岛》海报
+
+在过去的十年里，过去参与或对苏联神秘学地下思潮感兴趣的大多数人已经转向东正教。东正教已经成为占主导地位的宗教，并与俄罗斯民族主义和政治当局紧密结合，形成了一套稳固的制度。尽管东正教反对任何异端，但我们仍然可以在教会内部和外部观察到许多不同信仰体系的协同作用和折衷混合。这在某种程度上是东方基督教，即拜占庭基督教的长期传统。
+
+然而，对超越传统宗教教条的精神信仰体系的渴求并不只存在于俄罗斯。它也应该被视为对现代性和后现代性问题性体验的更广泛反应，这种现象在许多西方国家也能观察到。苏联文明将自身定义为一个纯粹理性的社会，然而它对理性的崇拜达到了如此极端的地步，以至于人们可以说它是一种“理性主义宗教”。
+
+尤其自20世纪60年代以来，社会上出现了一股明显的反对“理性崇拜”（cult of the rational）的思潮：各种宗教哲学、神秘主义探索和神秘实践重新兴起，同时早期10世纪的乌托邦项目也得到复兴。控制论几乎神奇般的吸引力引发了人们对全能控制的幻想，其中包括旨在让人类永生的科技项目。
+
+数学和神秘主义结合形成了“魔法名字”（magic of names/imiaslavie）——一个高度神秘的莫斯科数学家神秘圈，其历史可以追溯到本世纪初。我们不仅可以在人文科学领域，还能在自然科学领域发现神秘思想和意识形态的巨大影响。“俄罗斯宇宙主义”（Russian cosmism）是一种将人类自我完善和拯救融为一体的混合意识形态概念，可以被视为对神秘主义的悖论解读，它在科学和人文科学组织内部和外部都建立了自己的地位。医学、物理学和超心理学相互合作，重新开放了研究领域。科幻文学是唯一不受现实主义教条约束的文学体裁（儿童文学除外），它激发了人们的幻想。小说与科学在科普杂志中融为一体，20世纪六七十年代（高峰期出现在70年代末和88-92年）UFO热潮席卷全国。象征主义艺术先锋派对神秘主义的迷恋在非官方文化中复兴。所有这一切，再加上冷战条件下征服自然和宇宙，导致了科学、宗教、艺术和神秘主义之间一种高度矛盾的关系。苏联文明这种强烈的形而上学暗流的历史仍待书写。
+
+尽管斯大林时代严厉镇压，20世纪初的神秘主义传统从未消亡。神智学和人智学与斯大林后期到后苏联时期的具体特征一起，帮助塑造了20世纪60年代的神秘主义复兴。20世纪六七十年代的苏联神秘学地下思潮主要源于重新发现乔治·伊万诺维奇·葛吉夫（Ceorge Ivanovich Gurdjieff, 1866-1949）、尼古拉·洛里奇（Nikolai Roerich, 1874-1947）及其家族、布拉瓦茨基（Blavatsky）的神智学（Theosophy)、东方宗教、古代神秘主义哲学、基督教神秘主义和苏菲主义（Sufism）。它还受到西方神秘学经典、西方当代新时代运动（New Age）以及与苏维埃帝国（西伯利亚、布里亚特共和国、中亚和高加索地区）的民间治疗师和东方土著导师的直接影响。
+
+
+### 俄罗斯神秘文化
+### Russian Occulture
+
+在这篇文章中，介绍了从20世纪60年代到80年代一些非传统的灵性运动，即神秘主义地下领域。由于并非所有活动都局限于非官方的地下领域，我也借用了克里斯托弗·帕特里奇（Christopher Partridge）的术语“神秘文化”（Occulture）：1、波西米亚神秘文化；2、科学神秘文化；3、东方宗教——佛教、萨满教和（新）印度教；4、民间疗愈和神秘主义；5、重塑传统主义的案例。基于这些材料以及1970-1980年代东西方直接接触的情况，我将提出一些关于苏联和后苏联俄罗斯神秘主义/秘传主义的特定元素的论点。
+
+#### 1、波西米亚神秘文化
+#### Bohemian Occulture
+
+由于获取神秘学知识的主要途径是书籍，一些后来成为年轻一代精神导师的早期神秘主义者都是作家、诗人和翻译家：尤里·马姆列夫（Iurii Mamleev）、叶夫根尼·戈洛文（Evgenii Golovin）、叶夫根尼·拉扎列夫（Evgenii Lazarev）和弗拉基米尔·斯捷潘诺夫（Vladimir Stepanov）从20世纪50年代后期开始，就在莫斯科的列宁图书馆等中央国家图书馆发现了19世纪和20世纪的西方神秘主义经典著作。
+
+戈洛文和马姆列夫将传统主义创始人勒内·盖农（René Guenon, 1886-1951）的教义介绍到俄罗斯。他们对尤利乌斯·埃佛拉（Julius Evola, 1898-1974）和其他法西斯主义哲学家的迷恋也成为政治神秘主义的灵感来源。在莫斯科和列宁格勒/圣彼得堡这两个大都市的波西米亚神秘文化圈子里，可以找到神秘主义的温床。当然，文学也是一个灵感来源。
+
+
+▲ René Guenon, 1886-1951
+
+一些作家诗人延续了20世纪初白银时代具有广泛神秘主义氛围的魅力，例如象征主义诗人列奥尼德·安德烈耶夫（Leonid Andreev）的儿子、神秘主义者达尼尔·安德烈耶夫（Daniil Andreev, 1906-1959），他的小说《世界玫瑰》（Rose of the world/Roza mira, 1947-1957）在长达十年的监禁期间写成，通过地下出版物（samizdat）传播，并引发了一整个宗教追随者运动。
+
+
+▲ Daniil Andreev, out of prison, 1958
+
+
+▲ The Rose of the World, 1997
+
+赫鲁晓夫的解冻时期在20世纪50年代后期开启了长达十年的去斯大林化进程，一些葛吉夫的弟子要么从古拉格获释，要么从偏远的藏身之地返回首都。他们吸引了年轻追随者，这些追随者成为“第四道”的个体实践者，并指导了年轻知识分子，例如作家阿尔卡迪·罗夫纳（Arkadii Rovner, 1940-）、语言学家米哈伊尔·迈拉赫（Mikhail Meilakh, 1944-）和爵士音乐家鲍里斯·格列贝施奇科夫（Boris Grebenshchikov, 1953-），他们进一步扩大了葛吉夫的教义的影响。同时，神秘主义地下领域一些最具魅力的权威人物，诗人和翻译家叶夫根尼·戈洛文（Evgenii Golovin, 1958-）和作家尤里·曼米耶夫（Yuri Mamleev, 1931-）将葛吉夫的教义纳入他们的思想和行为中，特别是那些带有冲击、挑衅和贬低的元素。有时，突破铁幕进行接触和获取信息的做法反映了葛吉夫古怪的伪装。正如罗夫纳回忆的那样，米哈伊尔·迈拉赫会在列宁格勒接待外国客人的国际酒店的早餐室里倒立，过了一会儿，他会走到每个餐桌前，用各种语言礼貌地询问那些困惑或好笑的外商或外交官，他们是否能在后续旅行中带来有关葛吉夫的任何信息或材料。
+
+
+▲ Ceorge Ivanovich Gurdjieff, 1866-1949
+
+当今俄罗斯所有主要的政治神秘主义大师，以及一些具有神秘主义倾向的作家，例如亚历山大·杜金（Aleksandr Dugin），盖达尔·杰马尔（Gejdar Dzhemal）、维克多·佩列文（Viktor Pelevin）和弗拉基米尔·索罗金（Vladimir Sorokin），都曾参与过这些圈子或成为这些灵修导师的门徒。莫斯科大学的心理系里，神秘学团体至少暂时建立了自己的网络，列宁格勒的宗教史和无神论博物馆也是探索和遇见神秘学寻道者的场所。小型移民期刊《神秘主义与瑜伽》（Occultism and Yoga，可能是苏联时期最早和持续时间最长的移民出版物之一，1929-1977）被秘密运入苏联，并提供来自苏联和世界各地神秘学者的各种文章。
+
+#### 2、科学神秘文化
+#### Scientific Occulture
+
+让人惊讶的是，人们既可以在官方机构内，也可以在非官方的地下文化中接触神秘主义和秘传思想。首先，根据马克思列宁主义意识形态，人文科学被定义为科学的一部分，它们的界限比西方国家要宽松得多。其次，在冷战条件下，由于俄罗斯和美国情报机构的利益，对超自然现象的研究——在生物物理学和天体物理学中所谓的“心理-生物-物理”现象，根据主流西方范式，这些现象被认为是伪科学或边缘科学，但在这两个国家仍然秘密地得到促进和支持。科学本身也变成了神秘学的一部分。在苏联，尽管这些研究项目公开受到攻击甚至迫害，但还是得到了相当多的机构支持。超能力和心灵感应研究（Psy and ESP-research），是以列昂尼德·瓦西里耶夫（Leonid Vasiliev）和弗拉基米尔·别赫捷列夫（Vladimir Bekhterev）领导的脑研究所以及列宁格勒科学院生物物理实验室在20世纪20年代早期关于心灵感应和催眠的先驱研究为基础的，在20世纪50年代得以恢复，此前它曾在20世纪30年代早期被禁止，但仍在秘密实验室和私人研究中继续进行。
+
+
+▲ 1913年圣彼得堡，弗拉基米尔·别赫捷列夫教授（站在中间）和一群军事医学院的学生在心理实验室进行集体催眠的实践课程
+
+自20世纪60年代以来，许多科学机构除了公开的部分之外，还拥有一个完全独立的秘密部门架构。那些在列宁格勒、基辅和新西伯利亚的临床、辐射、实验和创伤医学研究所以及莫斯科的毕洛加洛夫航空航天医学研究所工作的苏联核武器和太空项目人员，都拥有实验室和不受意识形态限制的工作条件，遵循不同的规则，主要听命于高层人物或克格勃（苏联国家安全委员会）的命令。
+
+这些研究所为具有超能力的人提供了自由实验的机会，也为科学界的秘术师研究扩展意识提供了场所。在这里，在封闭的医疗机构最高当局的批准下，提升人体潜能的瑜伽实验得到了推进。科学家和领导层对宇航员以及著名运动员进行长时间的训练，尤其对可能用于苏联太空旅行的假死状态技术很感兴趣。
+
+生物物理学家阿列克谢·卡特科夫（Aleksei Katkov）痴迷于极度寒冷条件下的瑜伽呼吸技巧。从1966年到1973年，他在莫斯科的毕洛加洛夫航空航天医学研究所从事秘密研究工作。他还发表了几篇关于假死状态和瑜伽的文章，随后进行了激进的秘密自我实验。但就在他快要完成关于战胜疼痛和人体潜能的论文时，卡特科夫在1987年37岁时因执行一项“不吸氧气”（bina oxigen）攀登高加索厄尔布鲁士山的命令而不幸身亡。
+
+1969年至1981年间，专业和大众科学书籍和期刊上发表的有关超自然现象的出版物目录列出了800多篇文章。在整个60年代，挑战理性主义界限并推动乌托邦幻想的精神发现也成为了国际流行文化的一部分，就像另一位书记列昂尼德·伊里奇·勃列日涅夫（Leonid Brezhnev）公开承认他与格鲁吉亚灵异者欧亨尼娅·达维塔什维利（Eugenia Davitashvili）的会面一样。应最高指示，欧亨尼娅·达维塔什维利在公共机构和秘密机构进行了大量实验，并由一群医学和物理学专家全程记录。
+
+#### 3、东方宗教——佛教、萨满教和（新）印度教
+#### Eastern religions—Buddhism, Shamanism and (Neo-) Hinduism
+
+另一个秘教温床是东方/东方学（Orientalism）研究，特别是在列宁格勒大学（印度学、埃及学、亚洲和非洲国家研究所）。自从1913年圣彼得堡建成第一座藏传佛教寺庙以来，以及布里亚特的彼得·扎姆察兰·巴德玛耶夫（Petr Zhamtsaran Badmaev, 1851-1920）将西藏的宗教、文化和医疗传统带到欧洲俄罗斯，并在沙皇尼古拉二世的宫廷里用藏医方法进行治疗，藏传佛教就对俄罗斯产生了特殊的影响。象征主义画家和神秘主义者尼古拉·洛里奇（Nikolai Roerich, 1874-1947）的生活和作品也建立了与佛教和印度的另一层联系。他与妻子海伦娜和两个儿子斯维托斯拉夫和尤里，在20世纪30年代后期移居印度，并一直住在那里直到去世。这两个儿子都延续了父亲的秘教遗产：斯维托斯拉夫·洛里奇（Svetoslav Roerich, 1904-1993）留在了印度，作为一名画家，但他会回去苏联参加展览和官方纪念活动，并将父亲的许多画作带回俄罗斯，尤里·洛里奇（Iurii Roerich, 1902-1960）则成为了一位国际知名的藏学家。
+
+
+▲ Nikolai Roerich, 1874-1947
+
+
+▲ Svetoslav Roerich, Karma Dorje. 1934
+
+东方哲学和神秘主义学者通过翻译东方神秘主义的基础文本，使人们能够研究古代印度、波斯、阿拉伯和埃及的文献。但他们中的一些人也过着双重生活：一方面是大学教授，另一方面则是按照安特万·法夫勒（Antoine Faivre）关于西方秘教的定义模式，为弟子们进行古典意义上的灵性指导。该模式包括四个内在要素和两个外在要素：神圣知识的秘密传授、媒介的概念、普遍对应关系的教导、活的自然和宇宙的概念，以及所有知识都以个人转化作为最终目标的秘教追求。
+
+比达·丹达隆（Bidia Dandaron, 1914-1974）是通过与东方灵性导师亲自接触进行东西方秘教交流的一个例子。这位来自布里亚特地区的喇嘛萨满教法师在俄罗斯和西方都鲜为人知，直到最近才被人们所认识。
+
+
+▲ Bidia Dandaron, 1914-1974
+
+丹达隆生于1914年，在布里亚特地区长大，成为藏传佛教的受戒僧人。1917年后，他被指定为计划中的布里亚特-蒙古神权政体的转世精神领袖。这些计划失败后，丹达隆在列宁格勒学习航空工程，但于1937年因泛蒙古阴谋罪被捕，并被送往劳改营关押十年。获释后，在1956年至1971年间，他受列宁格勒大学教授尤里·罗里奇（Iurii Roerich）的邀请，担任印度学和藏学讲师。无论是在莫斯科还是列宁格勒，他都聚集了一个秘密的圈子，周围环绕着忠诚的弟子，他们接受了他的入门仪式（initiation），其中包括像亚历山大·皮亚特戈尔斯基（Aleksandr Piatigorsky, 1919-1009）和鲍里斯·斯米尔诺夫（Boris Smirnov, 1891-1967）这样备受国际尊敬的学者。丹达隆还与布里亚特、蒙古和西藏的寺庙建立了个人联系，因此僧侣们在1970年代和1980年代经常来到列宁格勒，在私人公寓里举行讲座。丹达隆喇嘛本人一生大部分时间都在监狱外贫困度日，他因各种原因被捕三次，并在古拉格度过了14年，最终在1976年因遭受野蛮殴打去世。尽管他的弟子大多数也遭受过镇压，在劳改营呆了多年，但他们至今仍然是他坚定而忠诚的追随者。由于在布里亚特地区，藏传佛教一直与萨满教融合在一起，因此丹达隆的影响也代表了萨满教的影响，萨满教是西伯利亚土著居民的秘教宗教（直到1960年代一直是一个活着的传统），它是西俄罗斯唯一的一种此类宗教。
+
+#### 4、民间疗愈和神秘主义
+#### Folk healing and mysticism
+
+这一领域在一定程度上与大学的东方和东方研究重叠，因为学术东方学家翻译的东方神秘主义古籍，为对个体灵性、内在疗愈感兴趣的人们开辟了新视野，并导致一些人秘密练习冥想和瑜伽。20世纪70年代和80年代初期，瑜伽作为开发“隐藏的人类潜能”的官方活动的一部分，成为一项相对流行的运动。许多关于瑜伽的文章发表在科普期刊上，但在这里，瑜伽再次以一种非常矛盾的方式被对待：对公众而言，它被积极地宣传为一种单纯的保健和体育锻炼方式；而在私下非官方的瑜伽练习圈子里，人们被引导去接触瑜伽更深层次的内容，并打开内在精神疗愈的可能性。然而，在1980年之后，随着另一场无神论运动的开始，瑜伽被彻底禁止。
+
+需要指出的是，印度是苏联的重要盟友之一。尼古拉·洛里奇（Nikolai Roerich）提倡的1935年和平条约（类似于国际联盟和联合国的做法）是官方赞成的关系之一。尽管洛里奇在公众认知中只是一位前卫艺术时代的艺术家，但他也被一些人视为神智学思想家和神秘主义者，尤其是在1958年他的神秘主义绘画首次公开展览之后。这可以作为一个例子，说明苏联晚期另类文化与官方意识形态的微妙关系。某些替代性精神健康的术语和概念显然只在俄罗斯内部交流的封闭圈子里使用，并且一直沿用至今，例如“健康学”（valeology）这个词，它指的是受洛里奇运动启发的“一种特别关注整体健康的俄罗斯科学”；另一个例子是“意念集合体”（egregore）这个词，由丹尼尔·安德烈耶夫（Daniil Andreev）提出，用于描述“人类心理集体放射的各种物质形态”。
+
+这些理论和疗法从20世纪60年代后期开始出现在小型地下团体中。它们与其他替代性精神健康和补充疗法概念一起流行，既包括俄罗斯传统的“民间疗愈术”（folk healing）（znachkharstvo、narodnoe tselitelstvo），也包括西方新时代运动引进的疗法，例如重生疗法、通灵术、人体动觉学和全息呼吸疗法，这些疗法直到90年代才在大众层面上流行起来。民间疗愈师通常是受过教育程度不高的流浪农民，他们充满魅力，被神话成各种人物，从“魔法师”（kolduny）到“圣愚”（yurodivy）。传统民间疗愈术和魔法的信仰和实践深深植根于俄罗斯文化，并从苏联时代延续到了后苏联时代。民间疗愈师使用草药和祖传知识进行治疗，这些知识通常在家庭或村里的老妇人（babki）之间代代相传。许多这样的疗愈师似乎拥有超感能力，并在治疗中使用咒语。与流行的植物疗法机构一样，民间疗愈师不一定拥有神秘主义信仰，但许多人都有“双重信信仰”（dvoeverie）的特点；也就是说，他们将异教自然宗教和神秘的基督教信仰混合在一起。东方医学则有所不同，因为东方医学将一切都定义为精神层面的，不会将身体、思想和灵魂分开。一些专家，例如教育科学学者瓦迪姆·罗津（Vadim Rozin, 1937-），会进行半公开的讲座，介绍中国民间医学和生物场理论，并引用大量被禁读的文献。精神疗愈是那些致力于发展内心本性的人们的追求。通过练习冥想、瑜伽、素食主义和各种心理技术，这些人旨在转化自我，从而开发人类潜能。
+
+民间信仰得以延续的一个例子是农夫波尔菲里·伊万诺夫（Porfiry Ivanov, 1898-1983），他是最受欢迎的俄罗斯瑜伽大师之一。在35岁时，经历了一次神秘的疗愈体验后，他开始过一种极端的回归自然的生活方式，放弃所有物质财产，拒绝穿衣服（只穿短裤）或鞋子，只摄取最少的食物。尽管在1960年代遭到多次逮捕、监禁和精神病院的强制治疗，伊万诺夫还是继续过着苦行神秘主义者和自然疗愈师的流浪生活，遵循基督教和异教信仰，试图突破肉体极限，实现永生。虽然受教育程度不高，但他还是为越来越多的追随者写下了日记和教学文本。伊万诺夫尤其是在1983年去世后成为一个崇拜偶像。一些人接受了他的苦行养生哲学和实践；另一些人则选择将他尊为俄罗斯自然界的圣人。在后苏联时代，伊万诺夫被官方东正教会斥为新异教精神分裂症患者，但他仍然是一位非常受欢迎的英雄人物，在官方大众媒体上被广泛宣传，在互联网上成为偶像，并且是他的追随者团体“Ivanovtsy”的精神领袖。
+
+
+▲ Porfiry Ivanov, 1898-1983
+
+#### 5、重塑传统主义的案例
+#### An example of reinvented Traditionalism
+
+代表神秘地下“致病信念系统”（pathogenic belief-system）中最离奇的团体之一是以列宁格勒的弗拉基米尔·舒克托莫夫（Vladimir Shuktomov, 1957-1987）为核心的昆塔瑜伽团（Kunta-Yoga group），他以托沙（Tosha）的名字成为传奇。在20世纪70年代末，年轻的不合群者拒绝了政治异议人士的意识形态愤怒，受到了鲍里斯·格列宾谢科夫（Boris Grebenshchikov）、维克托·琴科（Viktor Tsoi）以及嬉皮士反文化的启发，这位已经在苔原上进行了孤独的生存训练的年轻学生辍学生托沙，拥有心灵能力，开发了一套符号和象形文字（Dissa），据称，这种符号系统可以让任何暴露于这种系统或控制扩展意识的心理技术的人唤醒魔力。他声称，这个系统复兴了一种古老的印度瑜伽技术，但事实上，他的纲领性口号“只做你真正想做的事！”让人更想起了阿莱斯特·克劳利（Aleister Crowley）的信条“做你想做的！”
+
+
+▲ Vladimir Shuktomov
+
+昆塔瑜伽团的主要任务是挑战生死界限，克服死亡恐惧，从而创造出无限力量、隐身和灵力治疗能力的感知。托沙极具磁性的人格魅力提供了一条通过获取和控制生命和意识的隐秘力量来最终解脱的捷径。大约二十名化学系学生在经历了一些冲击疗程、类似萨满之旅的出体体验和自发性治愈（据称一名成员的肺结核被治愈）之后，他们开始一起生活。当他们中的大多数人被开除出共青团，失去奖学金，一些公寓被克格勃搜查后，他们放弃了普通的生活和工作，全身心投入自我转化的项目。20世纪80年代初左右，包括一个带孩子的家庭在内的25名学生，准备放弃他们在列宁格勒的生活，跟随托沙的建议去任何地方。他们首先搬到了亚美尼亚的一个偏远山区，在那里他们在荒野扎营。后来，随着冲突的出现，一些成员退出了或者被当地警察赶走。回到列宁格勒后，他们引起了克格勃的注意，因此一些最忠诚的人跟随托沙躲了起来。为了逃避逮捕，他带着一个小团体去了俄罗斯西北部古老的卡累利阿森林。这个实验以悲剧收场，在当地居民的告发下，他们不得不再次逃跑；一些人自杀，另一些人被关进精神病院；只有少数人幸存并移民。托沙本人失踪在森林里，他被告发、逮捕、释放，最后他在几个月后被发现死于帐篷里。这个团体变得传奇，但幸存的成员对他们遭受的创伤经历和据称导致这种毁灭的神秘符号保持沉默。其中之一谢尔盖·别利亚耶夫（Sergey Beliaev），经过多年的移民后回到俄罗斯成为一位神秘疗愈老师，他写了一本回忆录，被翻译成多种语言，将托沙赞美为“俄罗斯神秘主义者”
+
+#### 东西方的连接
+
+西方的新时代运动在20世纪60年代通过摇滚音乐、新兴宗教运动、文学作品以及与国外杰出另类文化代表的个人接触传入苏联。甲壳虫乐队和其他摇滚音乐家，尤其是乔治·哈里森（George Harrison）在1966年前往印度跟随玛哈里希·优吉（Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, 1918-2008）学习超觉冥想，并推广新成立的奎师那运动（Krishna movement）；新印度教导师斯里·钦莫伊（Sri Chinmoy, 1931-2007）获得联合国教科文组织的官方认可，这些都对苏联产生了影响。苏联充满热情的学生歌迷通过磁带复制和其他创造性技术传播他们的音乐，并帮助组织崇拜团体。一些苏联摇滚音乐家，比如鲍里斯·格列别施奇科夫（Boris Grebenshchikov），参与了新时代运动，后来成为东西方交流的中间人。
+
+秘鲁裔美国人类学家卡洛斯·卡斯塔尼达（Carlos Castañeda）的著作《唐望的教诲》（Teachings of Donfuan, 1968）对迷幻型新时代运动产生了巨大影响。1969年，神秘生物学家瓦西里·马克西莫夫（Vasilii Maksimov）在前往东西伯利亚的旅行中发现了这本书，并立即将其翻译成俄语，后续所有系列书籍也都翻译成了俄语。1971年，总部位于纽约的国际奎师那意识协会（ISKCON；Hare-Krishna，俄语译作Vaishnavy）创始人巴克提韦丹塔·斯瓦米·帕布帕达（A.C. Bhaktivedanta Swami Prabhupada, 1896-1977）造访苏联后，地下奎师那组织开始在苏联建立。1970年，希拉·奥斯特兰德（Sheila Ostrander）和林恩·施罗德（Lynn Schroeder）参加了1968年在苏联举办的第一次超心理学大会，她们的著作《铁幕后的超感官发现》（Psychic Discoveries Behind the Iron Curtain）在西方引起了极大的兴趣。此外，斯坦利·克里彭纳（Stanley Krippner）等美国专业超心理学家在访问苏联期间也与苏联同行建立了个人联系。
+
+迈克尔·墨菲（Michael Murphy, 1930-）创立的埃萨伦研究所（Esalen Institute）是西方新时代运动的主要机构之一，他多次访问苏联，与埃萨伦研究所的其他人员一起开启了高级别的交流渠道。他第一次访问苏联（1971年）是私下组织的，之后几次访问则是苏联科学院美国和加拿大研究所的间接邀请（实际上是由克格勃促成）。1971年，墨菲经由中欧国家进入苏联，在那里他之前曾会见过其他神秘主义科学家。他和一群朋友，包括捷克精神病学家和超个人心理学创始人斯坦尼斯拉夫·格罗夫（Stanislav Grof, 1931-），在莫斯科市中心的酒店住了几个月，会见了科学家、灵媒和超心理学家，直到他们的访问威胁到苏联同事的安全。让美国这些热情推崇普遍意识的人士惊讶的是，他们还发现了一些差异，例如基督教神秘主义和宗教哲学的强烈影响，以及苏联人自己发明神秘主义词汇的特殊自倾向。美国外交官亚瑟·哈特曼（Arthur Hartmann）促进了俄罗斯和美国新时代成员之间的进一步交流，他因为一些个人关系而对埃萨伦研究所有好感。当他成为里根总统时期驻莫斯科大使时，他家经常举办活动和会议，接待苏联摇滚音乐家和灵性治疗师。
+
+对俄罗斯神秘学界来说，对美国新时代运动的拥抱反应是矛盾的。由于铁幕的限制被迫处于孤立状态，并且意识到西方来源的信息接收具有高度选择性和偶然性，俄罗斯知识分子们并没有逃脱普遍的竞争态度。他们一方面对西方类似运动充满好奇，另一方面又固守自我神话的倾向。访客们经常被考验、挑衅和质疑，以证明他们与俄罗斯主人的强大超能力和“隐藏资源”相比并不兼容。苏维埃垮台后，许多俄罗斯人开始旅行，而“想象中的西方”（用尤尔恰克的话来说）受到了现实遭遇的挑战，随之而来的是幻灭感。当来自西方的宗教和神秘教派浪潮在90年代下半叶消退，以及俄罗斯东正教通过创建专门的“教派研究”（sektovedenie）部门重新确立其影响力时，大部分神秘主义地下组织都停止了活动。许多以前的重要“导师”选择了东正教信仰，有些人甚至以极端的方式皈依，成为僧侣并消失在修道院生活中；另一些人则选择移民或在东西方之间建立跨国生活。
+
+
+▲ Carlos Castaneda, 1925-1998
+
+
+### 结论
+
+我们可以总结出，在苏联后期，存在着广泛的异端思潮，反对官方规定的“理性宗教”和“科学无神论”。这些思潮的圈子既存在于官方机构内部，也存在于文化地下。他们既追求神秘知识和神秘实践，也探索艺术创造力、感性和疗愈等方面。这里描述的许多思想和实验性做法在西方看来似乎很熟悉，可以被认为是西方新时代的变体。根据科林·坎贝尔（Colin Campbell）的说法，苏联神秘学地下思潮可以被描述为一种“神秘主义环境”。虽然单个圈子或神秘主义团体大多是短暂的，成员流动性很大，但与之形成对比的是，神秘主义环境却是社会的一个恒常特征。坎贝尔将神秘主义环境定义为社会的“文化地下”，它包括“所有偏离主流的信仰体系及其相关实践。非正统科学、外来异端宗教和另类医学都构成了这种地下文化的一部分”。尽管坎贝尔只关注西方新时代运动，但我认为他为神秘主义环境确定的总体功能同样适用于苏联后期：
+
+- 神秘主义环境是文化“传播”的主要机构；
+
+- 它是一个主要的文化创新机构；
+
+- 它作为一个文化“基因库”，通过传递和创造大量的文化“突变”，增强社会文化适应的潜力；
+
+- 它也作为一个“负面参照群体”作用于文化正统的代言人，通过执业科学家和相关实践者来促进对主流科学范式的遵守；
+
+- 神秘主义环境的兴盛与“外来”文化接触的数量和主流本土文化的解体程度有关；
+
+- 神秘主义运动代表了对“精神匮乏”的普遍反应。
+
+然而，有一个主要的区别：苏联俄罗斯是一个封闭的社会。政治压制、国家控制、意识形态审查，以及最重要的是，正统的苏联意识形态根深蒂固的道德清教主义，以及传统的东正教宗教，无疑对“俄罗斯新时代”产生了强大影响。这使得团体之间很难建立联系、建立网络，几乎不可能尝试替代的生活方式。这些条件对俄罗斯的神秘复兴产生了多大的影响，以及以何种方式影响，还有待进一步讨论，只有未来的研究才能进行最终评估。但我认为，一些典型特征反映了威权社会的影响：这些团体的零散化，但自我封闭和自我指向的结构，阴谋的影响，对某些有魅力的个人（个性）崇拜，以及西方和东方影响的特定综合，无论哪种都是可获得的，都存在于铁幕之后。
+
+随着科学家对神秘事物进行研究，许多以前被认为是神秘的事物现在在科学中找到了依据。相反，由于冷战时期科学的秘密政治，神秘科学有时可能会被科学合法化，无论它们看起来多么异想天开。最后，中央集权和意识形态体系通过增加对非理性的迷恋，影响了地下社会本身：对于一些人来说，政府的保密性创造了这样一种可能性，即曾经无法理解的事物可能有科学的解释，已知或将来会被发现。其他人被一些“完全陌生、秘密和不可理解”的事物所吸引，在神秘、神秘或秘传事物中找到了它们。
+
+我认为，一些显著的差异，最后，可以确定为俄罗斯新时代的特定特征：
+
+1. 在俄罗斯，神秘知识主要由知识精英传播。高素质的专家通过翻译大量原始的经典神秘文本提供直接接触；而在西方，新时代主要在流行文化内部/通过流行文化传播。
+
+2. 由于俄罗斯/苏联帝国的地理政治条件，俄罗斯知识分子比西方国家有更多与东方土著的神秘教义和传统进行直接接触的机会，他们与布里亚特、西藏、高加索和中亚的精神导师进行了大量的个人接触。
+
+3. 在苏联官方支持的科学体系内，有许多研究活动涉及神秘或超自然现象，这些现象在西方国家会被视为伪科学。
+
+4. 然而，显著的区别在于爱欲和性，成为西方新时代在20世纪60年代和70年代的核心问题，却在几乎完全由男性主导的俄罗斯神秘地下社会中起到了非常边缘化的作用。尽管在性领域有一些实际的探索，但俄罗斯的神秘地下社会比起西方更注重智力，更不注重肉体。重点更多地放在神秘知识上，而不是在神秘实践上，更强调心灵和精神，而不是身体。对许多人来说，身体方面包括大量饮酒，实际上这反而阻碍了心理和精神意义上的长期转化。尽管经常进行过度的自我实验，但在男性领导者的明确声明中，对禁欲主义的倾向是显著的。最终的目标是摆脱身体，而不是统一身体、心灵和灵魂。在这一点上，不难发现与苏联的普遍道德清教主义有共同的痕迹，这种清教主义根植于俄罗斯东正教的宗教传统，但也与俄罗斯神秘学有一些共同之处，尽管后者主要由女性主导，还有与各种东方神秘主义教义有共同之处。
diff --git a/_collections/_heros/2023-04-22-QiLu-a1_l-macro-thinking-in-the-era-of-llms.md b/_collections/_heros/2023-04-22-QiLu-a1_l-macro-thinking-in-the-era-of-llms.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..8a2db9ea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_heros/2023-04-22-QiLu-a1_l-macro-thinking-in-the-era-of-llms.md
@@ -0,0 +1,326 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title: "大语言模型时代"
+author: "陆奇"
+date: 2023-04-22 12:00:00 +0800
+image: https://i.imgur.com/IVQ7aO3.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+position: left
+---
+
+这个时代跟淘金时代很像，如果你那个时候去加州淘金，一大堆人会死掉。但是卖勺子、卖铲子的人永远可以赚钱。
+
+
+
+### 社会性拐点的核心，是一项大型成本从边际变成固定
+
+我认识Sam Altman是2005年，他那时19岁不到，我已经40多岁了。
+
+我们俩是忘年交。他是一个很善良也很奇怪的小孩，今天很高兴他能这样改变世界。前不久，我春节在美国3个月，也到OpenAI和Sam聊了一些。
+
+首先，怎么理解这个新范式？这张图能把ChatGPT和OpenAI所带来的一切讲清楚。之后，基于第一性原理，你自然会推演出所在赛道的机会和挑战。
+
+
+
+这张图是“三位一体结构演化模式”，本质是讲任何复杂体系，包括一个人、一家公司、一个社会，甚至数字化本身的数字化体系，都是复杂体系。“三位一体”包括：
+
+1. “信息”系统（subsystem of information），从环境当中获得信息；
+
+2. “模型”系统（subsystem of model），对信息做一种表达，进行推理和规划；
+
+3. “行动”系统（subsystem of action），我们最终和环境做交互，达到人类想达到的目的。
+
+任何体系，都是这三个体系的组合，数字化系统尤其如此。数字化和人分不开。人也一样，人要获得信息、表达信息、行动解决问题或满足需求。
+
+基于此，我们可以得出一个简单结论。今天大部分数字化产品和公司，包括Google、微软、阿里、字节，本质是信息搬运公司。一定要记住，我们所做的一切，一切的一切，包括在座的大部分企业都在搬运信息。Nothing more than that，You just move bytes（仅此而已，你只是移动字节）。但它已经足够好，改变了世界。
+
+早在1995-1996年，通过PC互联网迎来一个拐点。那时我刚从CMU（卡内基梅隆大学）毕业。大量公司层出不穷，其中诞生了一家伟大公司叫Google。为什么会有这个拐点？为什么会有爆炸式增长？把这个观点讲清楚，就能把今天的拐点讲清楚。
+
+原因是，获取信息的边际成本开始变成固定成本。
+
+一定要记住，任何改变社会、改变产业的，永远是结构性改变。这个结构性改变往往是一类大型成本，从边际成本变成固定成本。
+
+举个例子，我在CMU念书开车离开匹茨堡出去，一张地图3美元，获取信息很贵。今天我要地图，还是有价钱，但都变成固定价格。Google平均一年付10亿美元做一张地图，但每个用户要获得地图的信息，基本上代价是0。也就是说，获取信息成本变0的时候，它一定改变了所有产业。这就是过去20年发生的，今天基本是free information everywhere（免费的信息无处不在）。
+
+Google为什么伟大？它把边际成本变成固定成本。Google固定成本很高，但它有个简单商业模式叫广告，它是世界上高盈利、改变世界的公司，这是拐点关键。
+
+今天2022-2023年的拐点是什么？它不可阻挡、势不可挡，原因是什么？一模一样。模型的成本从边际走向固定，因为有件事叫大模型。
+
+模型的成本开始从边际走向固定，大模型是技术核心、产业化基础。OpenAI搭好了，发展速度爬升会很快。为什么模型这么重要、这个拐点这么重要，因为模型和人有内在关系。我们每个人都是模型的组合。人有三种模型：
+
+1. 认知模型，我们能看、能听、能思考、能规划；
+
+2. 任务模型，我们能爬楼梯、搬椅子剥鸡蛋；
+
+3. 领域模型，我们有些人是医生，有些人是律师，有些人是码农。
+
+That’s all。我们对社会所有贡献都是这三种模型的组合。每个人不是靠手和腿的力量赚钱，而是靠脑袋活。
+
+简单想一想，如果你没有多大见解，你的模型能力大模型都有，或者大模型会逐步学会你所有的模型，那会怎样？——未来，唯一有价值的是你有多大见解。
+
+人类社会是技术驱动。从农业时代，人用工具做简单劳动，最大问题是人和土地绑定，人缺少流通性，没有自由。工业发展对人最大变化是人可以动了，可以到城市和工厂。早期工业体系以体力劳动为主、脑力劳动为辅，但随着机械化、电气化、电子化，人的体力劳动下降。信息化时代以后，人以脑力劳动为主，经济从商品经济转向服务经济——码农、设计师、分析师成为我们时代的典型职业
+
+
+
+这一次大模型拐点会让所有服务经济中的人、蓝领基本都受影响，因为他们是模型，除非有独到见解，否则你今天所从事的服务大模型都有。下一时代典型的职业，我们认为是创业者和科学家。
+
+所以，这次变革影响每个人。它影响整个社会。
+
+
+### 我所看到的三个拐点
+
+下个拐点是什么？
+
+下个拐点将是组合：“行动”无处不在（自动驾驶、机器人、空间计算）。也就是人需要在物理空间里行动，它的代价也从边际走向固定。20年后，这个房子里所有一切都有机械臂，都有自动化的东西。我需要的任何东西，按个按钮，软件可以动，今天还需要找人。
+
+那么，哪些公司能走到下个拐点、站住下个拐点？我认为特斯拉有很高概率，它的自动驾驶、机器人现在很厉害。微软今天跟着OpenAI爬坡，但怎么站住下个拐点？
+
+接下来讲一下我们看到的三个拐点：
+
+1. 今天信息已经无处不在了，接下来15-20年，模型就是知识，将无处不在。以后手机上打开，任何联网，模型就过来了。它教你怎么去解答法律问题，怎么去做医学检验。不管什么样的模型都可以无处不在。
+
+2. 在未来，自动化、自主化的动作可以无处不在。
+
+3. 人和数字化的技术共同进化。Sam最近经常讲，它必须要共同进化，才能达到通用智能（AGI）。通用智能四大要素是：涌现（emergence）+代理（agency）+功能可见性（affordence）+具象（embodiment）。
+
+总结来说，我们从根本性的三位一体结构分析未来，从过去的历史拐点能清晰看到今天所面临的拐点，本质是模型成本从边际走向固定，将有一家甚至多家伟大公司诞生。毫无疑问，OpenAI处于领先。
+
+虽然讲得有点早，但我个人认为，OpenAI未来肯定比Google大。只不过是大1倍、5倍还是10倍。
+
+
+### OpenAI核心就坚信两件事，发展速度连Sam本人都惊讶
+
+下面我从技术角度讲OpenAI大事迹，它怎么把大模型时代带来的？
+
+为什么讲OpenAI，不讲Google、微软。讲真心话，因为我知道，微软好几千人也做这个，但不如OpenAI。一开始比尔·盖茨根本不相信OpenAI，大概6个月前他还不相信。4个月前看到GPT-4的demo（产品原型），目瞪口呆。他写了文章说：It’s a shock，this thing is amazing（这太令人震惊了，这东西太神奇了）。谷歌内部也目瞪口呆。
+
+OpenAI一路走下来的关键技术：
+
+1. GPT-1是第一次使用预训练方法来实现高效语言理解的训练；
+
+2. GPT-2主要采用了迁移学习技术，能在多种任务中高效应用预训练信息，并进一步提高语言理解能力；
+
+3. DALL·E是走到另外一个模态；
+
+4. GPT-3主要注重泛化能力，few-shot（小样本）的泛化；
+
+5. GPT-3.5 instruction following（指令遵循）和tuning（微调）是最大突破；
+
+6. GPT-4已经开始实现工程化；
+
+7. 2023年3月的Plugin是生态化。
+
+OpenAI的融资结构为什么这么设计？和Sam早期目标和对未来的判断分不开。他知道要融很多钱，但股权设计有一个很大挑战——容易把回报和控制混在一起——所以他要设计一个结构，让它不受任何股东的制约。于是，OpenAI的投资者没有控制权，他们的协议是一种债的结构。如果赚完2万亿，接下来是non-profit（不再盈利了），一切回归社会。这个时代需要新的结构。
+
+
+
+它势不可挡。Sam Altman自己都surprise，连他都没想到会那么快。
+
+如果大家对技术感兴趣，Ilya Sutskever（OpenAI联合创始人兼首席科学家）很重要，他坚信两件事。
+
+第一是模型架构。它要足够深，只要到了一定深度，bigness is betterness（大就是好）。只要有算力，只要有数据，越大越好。他们一开始是LSTN（long short term memory），后来看到Transformer就用Transformer。
+
+
+
+第二个OpenAI相信的是，任何范式、改变一切的范式永远有个引擎，这个引擎能不断前进、不断产生价值。
+
+这个引擎基本是一个模型体系（model system），它的核心是模型架构Transformer，就是sequence model（序列模型）：sequence in、sequence out、encode、decode后者decode only。但最终的核心是GPT，也就是预训练之后的Transformer，它可以把信息高度压缩。Ilya有个信念：如果你能高效压缩信息，你一定已经得到知识，不然你没法压缩信息。所以，你把信息高效压缩的话，you got to have some knowledge（你得有一些知识）。
+
+Ilya坚信GPT3、3.5，当然GPT-4更是，它已经有一个世界模型在里面。虽然你做的事是predict next word（预测下一个关键词），这只不过是优化手段，它已经表达了世界的信息，而且它能持续地提高模型能力，尤其是目前研究比较多的在子概念空间当中做泛化。知识图谱真的不行。如果哪个同学做知识图谱，我认真跟你讲，你不要用知识图谱。我自己也做知识图谱20多年，just don’t do that。Just pretty bad。It does not work at all。You should use Transformer。（不要那样做。很糟糕。它根本不起作用。你应该使用Transformer。）
+
+更重要的是用增强学习，加上人的反馈，与人的价值对齐。因为GPT已经做了4年多，知识已经封装在里面了，过去真的是用不起来，也很难用。
+
+最大的是对齐（alignment engineering），尤其是instruction following和自然语言对齐。当然也可以跟代码、表格、图表对齐。
+
+做大模型是很难的，很大难度是infra（基础设施）。我在微软的时候，我们每个服务器都不用网卡，都放了FPGA。网络的IO的带宽速度都是无限带宽技术（Infiniband），服务器和服务器之间是直接访问内存。为什么？因为Transformer是密度模型，它不光是算力问题，对带宽要求极高，你就想GPT-4需要24000张到25000张卡训练，试想世界上多少人能做这种系统。所有数据、data center网络架构都不一样。它不是一个三层的架构，必须是东西向的网络架构。所以这里要做大量的工作。
+
+Token很重要。全世界可能有40-50个确定的token，就是语言的token和模态，现在有更多的token化。当然现在更多的模型的参数小型化、本地化，任务领域的专业知识可以融入这些大模型当中。它的可操纵性主要是靠提示和调试，尤其是根据指令来调，或者对齐来调试，或者in-context learning（上下文学习），这个已经贯彻比较清晰了。它的可操作性是越来越强。可拓展性基本上也足够。
+
+加在一起，这个引擎并不完美。足够好、足够强的引擎，我没从没有过。
+
+以上是引擎，拐点是怎么到的？ChatGPT能在历史上第一次两个月1亿活跃用户，挡都挡不住，为什么？
+
+1. 它封装了世界上所有知识。
+
+2. 它有足够强的学习和推理能力，GPT-3能力在高中生和大学生之间，GPT-4不光是进斯坦福，而且是斯坦福排名很靠前的人。
+
+3. 它的领域足够宽，知识足够深，又足够好用。自然语言最大的突破是好用。扩展性也足够好。当然还是很贵，像2万多张卡，训练几个月这么大的工程。不过也没贵到那么离谱——Google可以做，微软可以做，中国几个大公司能做，创业公司融钱也能做。
+
+加在一起，范式的临界点到了。拐点已经到来。
+
+稍微啰嗦几句。我做自然语言20多年，原来的自然语言处理有14种任务，我能够把动词找出来、名词找出来、句子分析清楚。即使分析清楚，你知道这是形容词，这是动词，这是名词——那这个名词是包香烟？还是你的舅舅？还是一个坟墓？还是个电影？No idea（不知道）。你需要的是知识。自然语言处理没有知识永远没用。
+
+The only way to make natural language work is you have knowledge（让自然语言处理有效的唯一路径是你有知识）。正好Transformer把这么多知识压缩在一起了，这是它的最大突破。
+
+
+### 未来是一个模型无处不在的时代
+
+OpenAI未来2-3年要做的——模型更稀疏一点，现在它对带宽要求实在太高，要把attention window拉长一点，或者是recursion causality推理的功能，包括brainstorming等一些工作要做。当然有一些grounding的东西，包括亚符号、子概念的都可以做。更多的模态，更多的token空间，更多的模型稳定性，更多的潜在空间（例如Latent Space对齐），更多的计算，更多的基础架构工具。2-3年基本排满。也就是说，我们大概知道需要什么去把这个引擎继续做大。
+
+不过这个飞轮启动，主要是资本大量进来。美国2023年1月到3月，挡也挡不住，钱全进去了，每个月都在比上个月增长。中国基本也一样，商业模式、盈利模式有初步规模，基础设施、平台应用、生态在加速开发，初创公司、大型企业都在进入。
+
+当然社会的安全、监管，一大堆问题——现在这些是OpenAI最头痛的——Sam在美国花大量精力让社会认可这个技术。现在OpenAI核心做的是，把推进速度变慢，每推进新版本，都有足够时间让用户给他们足够反馈，找到潜在风险点，有足够时间弥补。但加在一起，增长飞轮的雏形基本上起来了。
+
+有了飞轮，我认为发展路径核心是模型的可延伸性和未来模型的生态。是一个模型无处不在的时代。
+
+未来的模型世界会怎么发展？首先是将有更多大模型会出来。更多更完整的模态和更完整的世界知识在这里。你有大量的知识、更多的模态，学习能力、泛化能力和泛化机制一定会加强。
+
+此外，会有更多的对齐工作要做。OpenAI目前会关注什么呢？今天对齐基本上是做到，有一部分人能接受但你也得罪很多人，很多人每天骂GPT。他们想要做到是足够宽的一个对齐，希望有个像美国宪章这样一个结果，虽然ChatGPT不是大家都能够认可，但它足够平稳、综合，大部分人能接受，这是对齐工程。自然语言也好，代码也好，数学公式也好，表单也好，有大量对齐工作要做。
+
+还有更多的模态对齐。这里先讲human scale的模态，它主要是对人的描述，以人的语言为主，它的模态目前是语言和图形，以后有更多的模态会接入。这是大模型层面。
+
+在大模型之上建立的模型更多了。我判断主要是有两类模型和他们的组合。第一是事情的模型，人类每一类需求都有领域/工作模型，其中有结构模型、流程模型、需求模型和任务模型，尤其是记忆和先验。
+
+第二，人的模型，包括认知/任务模型，它是个体的，其中有专业模型，有认知模型、运动模型和人的记忆先验。人基本是这几类模型的组合，律师也好，医生也好，大量领域会有大量模型往前走。
+
+人的模型和学的模型有本质区别，这是我过去1-2个月个人收获较多的。
+
+首先，人一直在建立模型。人的模型好处是泛化的时候更深、更专业，基本是用符号（例如数学公式）或结构（例如画流程图）。它具体用，说实话都不好用。人的模型要么像物理公式解决很宏观的问题，要么解决很微观的问题。我们日常生活的问题，物理一点用都没有——没法告诉我这个树的叶子的形状，狗的猫的颜色为什么是这样子？没有任何模型可以解这个。很大问题是它的模型是静态的，不会场景变化。
+
+今天有很多模型，比方说数字孪生，很难用。因为物理世界一直在变，这个模型僵硬、不变，就用不起来。尤其是用知识图谱建的模型，我做了几十年，超级难算，函数结构差得一塌糊涂。所以人的模型有好处，专业性强，但有很大缺点。
+
+学出来的模型，首先，它本质是场景化的，因为它的token是场景化的。其次，它适应性很强，环境变了，token也变了，模型自然会随着环境变；第三，它的泛化拓展性有大量理论工作要做，但是目前子概念空间的泛化，看来是很有潜在发展空间的这样一种模型的特性。它好用，因为它可以对齐人的使用倾向或人的自然语言、表格等等。它的计算性内在是过程性的。这里有大的问题，就是人表达知识倾向运用结构，但真正能解决问题的是过程，人不适合用过程来表达。
+
+ChatGPT代表的模型跟人的模型相辅相成，长期可以融在一起。我们看到的未来是更多模型的生态，新的领域、新的专业、新的结构、新的场景、新的适应能力，形成闭环，不断加强认知和推理能力。当然，最终还是要所谓叫grounding，跟感知要ground，和接入行动的能力，形成真正的智能。
+
+某种意义上20-30年后，这个模型世界跟生物世界有很多类似的地方。大模型我觉得像基因，有不同的种类，然后进化。我们目前能看到未来核心技术模型世界，它是用这个方法来向前驱动。
+
+我们基本对这个时代的范式有了结构性的理解。那么接下来，我们如何拥抱这个时代？
+
+
+### 每周都有“HOLY SHIT” moment，对每个人/行业都有结构性影响
+
+我个人过去10个月，每天看东西是挺多的，但最近实在受不了。就真的是跟不上。发展速度非常非常快。最近我们开始发行“大模型日报”，是我实在不行了，论文实在是跟不上，代码实在是跟不上——just too much（太多了）——基本上，每周都会有一两个“HOLY SHIT” moment。
+
+Holy shit！You can do this now。
+
+世界在哗哗哗地变。我曾经说1995-1996年有这种感觉，但这个比1995-1996年还要强。为什么？模型的成本从边际转向固定，知识创造就是模型和知识的获取，它结构性做演变了。
+
+生产资本从两个层次全面提高。第一，所有动脑筋的工作，可以降低成本、提升产能。我们目前有一个基本假设，码农成本会降低，但对码农的需求会大量增加，码农不用担心。因为对软件的需求会大量增加，就是这个东西便宜了，都买嘛。软件永远可以解决更多问题，但有些行业未必。这是生产资本的广泛提高。
+
+第二，生产资本深层提升。有一些行业的生产资本本质是模型驱动，比如医疗就是一个模型行业，一个好医生是一个好模型，一个好护士是一种好模型。医疗这种产业，本质是强模型驱动。现在模型提高了，科学也随之提高。在游戏核心产业，我们的产能将本质性、深度提高。产业的发展速度会加快，因为科学的发展速度加快了，开发的速度加快了，每个行业的心跳都会加快。因此，我们认为下个拐点会加速。用大模型做机器人、自动化、自动驾驶，挡也挡不住。
+
+它对每个人都将产生深远和系统性影响。我们的假设是每个人很快将有副驾驶员，不光是1个，可能5个、6个。有些副驾驶员足够强，变成正驾驶员，他自动可以去帮你做事。更长期，我们每个人都有一个驾驶员团队服务。未来的人类组织是真人，加上他的副驾驶员和正驾驶员一起协同。
+
+毫无疑问，每个行业也会有结构性影响，会系统性重组。这里有一个简单公式（【$X小时（人工）-$Y（硬件和规模化）】X数量=降本增效）。比如，今天动脑筋的人一天平均工资多少美元每小时，减掉ChatGPT的价格（现在大概平均是15美元/小时，再过3年可能不到1美元，再过5年可能几十美分），然后就乘一下有多少数量。降本或者增效，让码农能变成super码农，医生变成super医生。
+
+大家可以按这个公式算一算。如果你是华尔街的对冲基金，你可以做空一大堆行业。
+
+举个简单例子，律师在美国平均1500美元/小时，我在网上已经看到每天有这种信息——如果你想离婚，不要找离婚律师，ChatGPT离婚很便宜啊！
+
+开发人员、设计师、码农、研究人员都一样，有些是更多需求，有些是成本下降。尤其是核心产业，科学、教育、医疗，这是OpenAI长期最关注的3个行业，也是整个社会最根本的。
+
+尤其是医疗。在中国，需求远远大于供给。而且，中国是大政府驱动的市场经济，政府可以扮演更大角色，因为固定成本政府可以承担。
+
+最为重要的是教育。如果你是大学，你第一担心的是，考试怎么考？没法考了。他一问ChatGPT，什么都知道。更重要的是，以后怎么定义是好的大学生呢？假定说有个大学生什么都不懂，物理也不懂、化学也不懂，但他懂怎么问ChatGPT，他算不算一个好的大学生？机会与挑战并存。
+
+总结一下，整个这个时代在高速地进行，速度越来越快。它是结构上决定的。势不可挡。
+
+
+### 大模型的淘金时代，对机会点进行结构性拆解
+
+现在，我给大家一个结构化思维框架。某种意义上你可以对号入座，知道我在这里，我怎么思考今天的机会点。
+
+
+
+这张图是整个人类技术驱动的创业创新，所有事情的机会都在这张图上。
+
+1. 首先，底层是数字化的技术，因为数字化是人的延伸。数字化的基础里有平台，有发展基础，包括开源的代码、开源的设计、开源的数据；平台有前端、后端等。这里有大量机会。
+
+2. 第二波是用数字化的能力去解决人的需求。我们把数字化应用完整放在这张表上。
+
+3. C端是把所有的人分成人群，每种人群24小时，他花时间干什么？有通讯、社交、内容、游戏消费、旅游、健身……C端有一类特殊的人，这类人是改变世界的，是码农、设计师、研究员。他们创造未来。微软这么大的公司，是基于一个简单理念：微软我们就是要写更多软件、帮别人写更多软件，因为写软件是未来。
+
+4. B端，企业需求也一样，降本增效。它要生产，有供应链、销售、客服……有了这些需求之后，数字化看得见的体验结构有6种：给你信息的，二维就够；给你三维交互体验，在游戏、元宇宙；人和人之间抽象的关系，包括信任关系、Web 3；人在物理世界环中自动驾驶、机器人等；人的内在的用碳机植入到里面，今天是脑机接口，以后有更多，以后是可以用硅基；最后是给你模型。
+
+最后，人类是挺奇怪的物种，不光要满足这些需求，还要改变世界，我们在满足世界时，也要获得更多能源，所以需要有能源科技；需要转化能源，用生命科学的形式，biological process转化能源或者使用mechanical process，材料结构来转化能源，或者是新的空间。这是第三波。
+
+所以创业公司基本上有三类：数字化基础，用数字化去解决人的需求，去改变物理世界。有了这个大的框架，我们可以系统性地来看对号入座：我在哪个位置？如果我在这个位置，需要关注哪些点？
+
+
+
+首先讲数字化基础，它有一个稳定结构，不管再怎么发展，结构永远是这样。过去30多年，大部分系统或多或少我都碰过，这个结构确实相当稳定。
+
+核心是前端和后端——前端是完整可延伸的体验，后端是完整可延伸的能力，有设备端，比方说电脑、手机、眼镜、汽车等等，设备端里面是芯片、模组加上操作系统。万亿美元的公司都在这一层。
+
+其次是体验的容器，二维的容器，三维的容器，内在嵌入的容器。
+
+容器之上，写代码都知道画布，画布可以是文档，可以是聊天，可以是代码，可以是空间，可以是世界，可以是数字人，也可以是碳基里的蛋白质等等。这是前端。
+
+后端也一样，底层式设备，服务器、交换机、数据中心等等，也是芯片、模组、操作系统。
+
+中间这一层非常重要，网络数据堆栈，分布式系统，区块链等等。
+
+最上面是云，是能力的供给。能力供给像自然水源，打开就是算力，有存储和通讯能力。今天的模型时代，打开就是模型。
+
+下面是数字化基础。符号计算，或者所谓的深度学习，叠加向量的浮点计算，硅基的，碳基的。
+
+如果你是这里的创业者，机会点在哪里？
+
+
+
+1. 首先搬运信息，这个时代还有很多可以做。
+
+2. 如果你是做模型的，我现在判断什么都要重做一遍。大模型为先。很多设备也要重做，你要支持大模型，容器要重做，这些都有机会。云、中间的基础设施、底层的硬件，包括数字化发展核心的基础，尤其是开源的体系，这里是真正意义上是有大量机会。
+
+3. 第三代系统，即已经开始做机器人、自动化、自主系统。孙正义今天all in。这个也能用大模型做。马斯克也看到这种机会。都是在第三代下一个拐点，创业公司完全可以把握的机会。
+
+4. 同时并行的，我把它称作“第三代++系统”，是碳基的生物计算，这一类公司有大量的量子计算，有很多机会。元宇宙和Web 3今天有点冷，但从历史长河角度来讲，只是时间问题，因为这些技术都能真正意义上带来未来的人类价值。
+
+所以如果是这个创业项目，基础层机会就在这里。这是最好的生意。为什么？这个时代跟淘金时代很像。如果你那个时候去加州淘金，一大堆人会死掉，但是卖勺子的人、卖铲子的人永远可以赚钱。所谓的shove and pick business。
+
+大模型是平台型机会。按照我们几天的判断，以模型为先的平台，将比以信息为先的平台体量更大。平台有以下几个特征：
+
+1. 它是开箱即用；
+
+2. 要有一个足够简单和好的商业模式，平台是开发者可以活在上面，可以赚足够的钱、养活自己，不然不叫平台；
+
+3. 他有自己杀手级应用。ChatGPT本身是个杀手应用，今天平台公司就是你在苹果生态上，你做得再好，只要做大苹果就把你没收了，因为它要用你底层的东西，所以你是平台。平台一般都有它的锚点，有很强的支撑点，长期OpenAI设备机会有很多——有可能这是历史上第一个10万亿美元的公司。
+
+这是一场激烈的竞争平台之战，未来一个体量很大的公司。在这个领域竞争是无比激烈。The price is too big（代价实在太大），错过太可惜。再怎么也得试一试。
+
+今天的模型鲁棒性、脆弱性，还是问题。用这个模型，你一定要一开始稍微窄一点，限制要严一点，这样的话体验是稳定的，等到模型能力越来越强再把它放宽，找到适当的场景，循序渐进。质量和宽度之间的平衡很重要。另外发展路径上，你要考虑今天产品要不要在这个上基础上改，重启炉灶，还是齐头并进。把这个团队给改了、重做，还到外面去买公司？
+
+创新，尤其是创业公司落地，它永远是技术推动和需求拉动的组合。在落地的过程中，对需求理解的把控，掌握和满足需求的方法是一切当中最重要。长期一定是技术驱动为主，但在落地的时候对需求的拆解、分析、梳理，把控好需求，是一切的一切。
+
+有一个机密大家今天都知道了——OpenAI是用GPT-4做GPT-5，每个码农都是放大能力的码农。它规模效应不一样，马太效应不一样，从此壁垒和竞争格局不一样，知识产权结果不一样，国际化的格局也不一样。中国显然有机会。
+
+
+### 我对创业者有几点建议
+
+创业公司的内在结构是人和事的组合。人，一开始是创始人/创始团队；他有初心，内在驱动力、外在驱动力；他能独立思考，判断未来；他能行动导向，解决问题；他能需求导向，找到价值；最终通过沟通获得资源。接下来是产品市场匹配，这部分就是研发技术、研发产品、交付产品。商业模式是收到钱、更多增长、触达更多客户、融更多钱、一直触达到未来的价值。组织上，通过系统建设，开拓面向未来的人才、组织结构和文化价值观等等。这一切就是一家公司的总和。
+
+
+
+我们对每位同学的建议是，不要轻举妄动，首先要思考。
+
+不要浮夸，不能蹭热。我个人最反对蹭热，你要做大模型，想好到底做什么，大模型真正是怎么回事，跟你的创业方向在哪个或哪几个维度有本质关系。蹭热是最不好的行为，会浪费机会。
+
+在这个阶段要勤于学习。新范式有多个维度，有蛮大复杂性，该看到的论文要看，尤其现在发展实在太快，非确定性很大。我的判断都有一定灰度，不能说看得很清楚，但大致是看到是这样的结果。学习花时间，我强烈推荐。
+
+想清楚之后要行动导向，要果断、有规划地采取行动。如果这一次变革对你所在的产业带来结构性影响，不进则退。你不往前走没退路的，今天的位置守不住。如果你所在的产业被直接影响到，你只能采取行动。
+
+接下来我想讲几个维度——每个公司是一组能力的组合。
+
+1. 产品开发能力方面，如果你的公司以软件为主，毫无疑问一定对你有影响，长期影响大得不得了。尤其是如果你是做C端，用户体验的设计一定有影响，你今天就要认真考虑未来怎么办。
+
+2. 如果你的公司是自己研发技术，短期有局部和间接影响，它可以帮助你思考技术的设计。长期核心技术的研发也会受影响。今天芯片的设计是大量的工具，以后大模型一定会影响芯片研发。类似的，蛋白质是蛋白质结构设计。不管你做什么，未来的技术它都影响。短期不直接影响，长期可能有重大影响。
+
+3. 满足需求能力，满足需求基本就要触达用户，供应链或运维一定受影响。软件的运维可以用GPT帮你做，硬件的供应链未必。长期来看有变革机会，因为上下游结构会变。你要判断你在这个产业的结构会不会变。
+
+4. 商业价值的探索、触达用户、融资，这一切它可以帮你思考、迭代。
+
+
+
+最后是关于人才和组织。
+
+1. 首先讲创始人。今天创始人技术能力强，好像很牛、很重要，未来真的不重要。技术ChatGPT以后都能帮你做。你作为创始人，越来越重要、越来越值钱的是愿力和心力。愿力是对于未来的独到的判断和信念，坚持、有强的韧劲。这是未来的创始人越来越重要的核心素养。
+
+2. 其次，对初创团队，工具能帮助探索方向，加速想法的迭代、产品的迭代，甚至资源获取。
+
+3. 第三，对未来人才的培养，一方面学习工具，思考和探索机会，长期适当时候培养自己的prompt engineer（提示工程师）。
+
+4. 最后讲到组织文化建设，要更深入思考，及早做准备，把握时代的机会。尤其是考虑有很多职能已经有副驾驶员，写代码也好，做设计也好，这之间怎么协同？
+
+我们面临这样一个时代的机会。它既是机会，也是挑战。我们建议你就这个机会做全方位思考。
diff --git a/_collections/_heros/2024-04-29-Byron-a1_c-the-dilemma-and-possibility-of-chinese-liberalist.md b/_collections/_heros/2024-04-29-Byron-a1_c-the-dilemma-and-possibility-of-chinese-liberalist.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..a061cb0d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_heros/2024-04-29-Byron-a1_c-the-dilemma-and-possibility-of-chinese-liberalist.md
@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title: "中国自由主义的困境及其可能性"
+author: "陈纯"
+date: 2024-04-29 12:00:00 +0800
+image: https://i.imgur.com/nTmt0Vp.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+position: center
+---
+
+中国自由主义正陷入困境。实际上，它鲜有不陷入困境的时候，只是在世纪之交前后各十年，有一些新左派人士误以为中国已经融入全球化“新自由主义”秩序，并大加批判。然而这个表象，在2012年后轻而易举就被权力的手指戳破。
+
+
+
+本文将首先回顾两种对自由主义的困境的解释，在指出其各自的缺陷之后，也对其共同的问题进行概括，那就是“本质主义”和“唯心主义”。前者限制了自由主义对自身可能性的想象，而后者过分夸大理论内部结构对政治现实的影响力。本文认为，中国自由主义出现困境，主要还是由于能促成其发展的外部环境在逐渐消失，这包括政治权力的有意打压和小粉红的崛起，但自由主义者自身的意志消沉，也使得自由主义在困境之中难以自拔。然而，自由主义依然具有其他政治学说难以比拟的优势，那就是它与现代社会的匹配程度最高，最有可能成为理性公民的最大公约数，中国社会四十多年的发展，也积淀了一些适合自由主义生长的土壤，酝酿了让自由主义“破局”的机会，当代中国的自由主义者，更是在自由主义之中挖掘出道义力量，不再将自由主义建立在工具主义和怀疑论之上。
+
+
+### 对困境的两种解释及其缺陷
+
+对于这种困境的产生，有一些学者倾向从自由主义内部寻找原因。应该说，自由主义确实需要自我反省，但某些学者批评的方向，在我看来是有误导性的。这里主要分为两种，第一种，是将一些自由主义者的倾向当作是自由主义的特征，或者将有些自由主义者经常具有的特质，当作自由主义的一部分。比如王彬彬在《读书札记：关于自由主义》一文中，引用过格里德在《胡适与中国的文艺复兴》里的一句话：“自由主义在中国的失败似乎是由这个信条本身造成的……”。王彬彬认为，自由主义者往往会“拥护专制，称颂独裁，甚至自身便成为专制和独裁者的工具和帮凶”，甚至认同法兰克福学派所说的“自由主义与极权主义，与法西斯主义之间，有着连续性”。马克思主义学者认定自由主义与极权主义、法西斯主义有连续性，这个不足为奇，毕竟在他们看来，前者和后者都是资本主义的意识形态，都是为资产阶级的利益服务。对于这种理解，本文限于篇幅，不作进一步的评论分析。
+
+王彬彬的文章提到丁文江和蒋廷黻主张“开明”的“专制”，又讲到胡适与国民党政府一系列暧昧的互动，王彬彬对此的解释是：“自由主义者强调一点一滴的改良，他们永远要借助现有秩序，依赖现有秩序，因此，现有秩序无论如何糟糕，不管怎样腐败，都要先维持住它，都不能从根基上动摇它。”其实对于胡适对国民党的态度，完全可以有另外的解释，比如国民党统治早期，胡适认为国民党还有改良的希望，而到了国共内战时期，胡适认定共产党上台，只会比国民党更坏。王彬彬所引的胡适在1932年《独立评论》上对“中国民权保障同盟”的批评，以及1933年给汪精卫的信，并不能推出胡适对于什么样的秩序都愿意拥护。胡适固然既是自由主义者，也是改良主义者，但这不意味着“改良主义”是“自由主义”的必然构成，事实上，自由主义者对“糟糕的现有秩序”的忍耐是有限度的，当现有秩序无法维护个人的自由权利，也没有任何往自由秩序演进的迹象，自由主义者为何不可支持革命？
+
+对于丁文江和蒋廷黻，也应作如是观。他们本人对开明专制的倡导，应该首先放在历史的语境下理解，即便认为他们的想法是错误的，那也很难直接将其归咎于他们原本的自由主义立场。
+
+就近代历史而言，自由主义者确实常常反对来自底层的革命，为此不惜支持专制或威权政府。但这有可能是因为这些自由主义者同时也是资产阶级，他们那样的态度，跟他们的阶级利益是一致的，这最多只能证明自由主义对这些人的道德约束力不是很大，没必要因为一个人是自由主义者，就从自由主义里找他一切政治言行的根据。就当代中国的自由主义而言，在相当长一段时期，同样被“渐进改良主义”所笼罩，但这同样是有特殊的历史原因，如天安门事件让一部分自由主义知识分子怀疑学生在广场上的不妥协态度是延续了近代以来的激进主义，92南巡此后，中国市场化改革迅速推进，这也让自由主义者产生“先经济改革后政治改革”的希望。而且，中外的自由主义里，激进主义者不乏其人，如果自由主义和改良主义有概念上的必然联系，那激进自由主义者算什么呢？
+
+另一种有误导性的内部批评方向，是认定自由主义有某一种“正统”，并将自由主义的困境或失败归因于对这种“正统”的偏离。这种倾向在当代中国自由主义者里广泛流行。比如任剑涛在《自由主义理论的内在困境》里认为，“汉语语境中的自由主义言述历来对自由之真实基础的论述不周”。他采纳了哈耶克的理论，即将自由主义的知识论基础分为两种，一是“建构理性主义”，二是“进化理性主义”，这种区分本身有其道理，但任剑涛接着认为。“依据前者，就只能导出积极自由论，发展为妨碍自由的伪自由论说。立于后者，则导出消极自由论，发展为扩展自由的真自由论。”这里的意思是，只有以进化理性主义为知识论基础的消极自由论才是正统，以建构理性主义为知识论基础的积极自由论，则是异端。
+
+除了“哈耶克主义”，自认“正统”的还有“保守主义”。刘军宁在《保守主义》一书中，将保守主义认定为自由主义的正统，并将中国自由主义的失败归因于“没有过柏克（Edmund Burke）意义上的、真正的保守主义者”。他认为，保守主义的“实质”就是“自由主义”，而且“真正的自由派不仅要保守公民的政治自由，而且要保守其经济自由”，然而，“在哲学上信奉理性主义，在政治行动上追随激进主义”的那种“自由主义”，破坏了这一种传统，使得自由主义误入歧途。至于为什么保守主义的缺席导致了自由主义的失败，那是因为：“保守派（与刘军宁说的“保守主义”有所区分）由于过于顽固而抵制自由，激进派由于过于好高骛远而‘超越’自由，在社会上无法形成保守自由的力量，自由及其传统在中国无法生根。”
+
+上述的哈耶克主义和保守主义都属于右翼的自由主义，一般而言，右翼的自由主义更容易认为自己是自由主义的“正统”，这大概是因为它们和17-19世纪的古典自由主义的内容更为接近。在思想史上，一种学说经过漫长时间的洗礼，会产生不少流变，到了某些时候，尤其是这种学说出现危机的时候，总有一些变种会宣布自己是正统，将其他斥为异端，这也不是什么新鲜的现象。然而，当它们宣称学说的危机来源于对正统的偏离，而走出危机的办法就掌握在它们手上，我们就得仔细想想，这究竟是一个真实有效的归因，还是它的新教义的一部分。
+
+“正统论者”的其中一些认为，1920年代以来的中国自由主义者，不少都有社会民主主义的倾向，如罗隆基、储安平等，所以他们算不得真正的自由主义者，这种倾向还影响到其中一部分人的政治抉择，使得他们在国民党和共产党之间选择了共产党。这种说法有许多值得商榷之处，但即便它能成立，那也不意味着，他们的社会民主主义倾向是绝然不合理的，也不意味着，中国自由主义在1940年代的失败，要归咎于他们的自由主义里有社会民主主义的倾向。
+
+这涉及到一个问题：如果中国的自由主义不是以古典自由主义为理型，那它应该如何自我定义？在我看来，自由主义就是对自由、平等、民主、法治、正义等内在价值的承诺，所以它既包括古代人的自由和现代人的自由，也包括消极自由和积极自由，它包括阶级、性别、族群、地域等维度的平等，包括代议民主和审议民主（deliberative democracy），还包括程序正义、补偿正义和分配正义等。这并不是说，自由主义是无所不包的，而是说，它对内在价值的承诺有可能会因为时代的发展而表现出不同的形态，当然不同人对哪一种形态才是适应时代的，也可以有不同的理解。上述1920年代以来的自由主义者，普遍认为应该把资本主义的个人自由和政治民主，与社会主义的经济平等和消灭剥削结合起来，有些人对计划经济持有不切实际的期望，被哈耶克《通往奴役之路》所言中，但他们在那个年代，持有那样的立场，并不是多么不可理解的事，这种含有社会民主主义的自由主义，在欧美的实践也并没有像哈耶克所说，铺就了普遍的奴役之路。
+
+这两种从自由主义内部进行批评的立场，有两个共同点：它们都将某些时常与自由主义伴随出现的理论、要素、特质、倾向等，视为自由主义的本质的一部分，这点可以概括为“本质主义”；它们都将“思想”在历史中的作用抬得太高，甚至认定思想内部的构成具有决定其自身在历史中的成败的作用，这点可以概括为“唯心主义”，尽管我们并不是从马克思主义的立场去批评它们。
+
+
+### 2012以来的历史进程
+
+在《中国自由主义认同及其困境》一文中，王中江颇有见地地指出：“我们之能够采取自由的立场去要求和争取自由，恰恰又要以现实‘某种’自由度的存在为前提。在极权主义统治之下，要形成一个自由主义运动是非常困难的，甚至完全是不可能的。”因此，“从这种意义上说，自由主义运动既是整体上的不自由又是局部上的小小自由这两种似乎是相反的力量双重驱动的结果。”所以中国自由主义陷入困境的首要原因，不是别的，是当下不存在一个允许自由主义发展的大环境。
+
+新左派和文化保守主义者大概不会接受这样的概括，他们会举出各种例子，证明中国的社会经济政策多么具有“新自由主义”的特征，或者证明在中国民众之中流行的某些观念或现象，明显是受了“西方自由主义”的影响，或者证明在中国当代的知识分子里，有多少自我标榜为“自由主义者”。他们会说，中国的“自由主义”，不是太少，而是太多了。
+
+然而，这些和中国的自由主义是否拥有最低限度的能够“发展”的环境，并没有任何关系。不仅没有关系，而且上面这些还有可能让一些自由主义者产生自由主义尚未陷入困境的幻觉和没有根据的乐观。
+
+自2012年，即现今领导人上任以来，中国自由主义的境况就江河日下。首先是针对高校里有自由主义倾向的学者，出台了“七不讲”，对于那些敢于挑战禁令的，开除、停课、取消退休金都是稀松平常的操作。针对2010年前后在舆论场上风头正健的“公知”，国家勒令各个平台严加整治，封禁了大量大V的账号。高潮是在2015年，“女权五姐妹”被关押，“709律师”遭到大规模逮捕，《慈善法》的出台也使得大量接受境外资助的NGO处境艰难。2017年，有了《宗教事务管理条例》，地下基督教会的活动变得日益危险。2018年，取消国家主席任期制的宪法修正案得到通过，铁幕全幅落下。
+
+我们可以做一个反事实的设想：假如在1990-2018这三十多年间，中国的自由主义不再相信改良主义（如王彬彬所说），或坚守某种正统理念（如任剑涛或刘军宁所说），自由主义可以逃过一劫吗？大概率，结果不会有什么不同。自由主义的自我反思是必要的，但自由主义之陷入困境，和它自身的缺陷，尤其是理论上的缺陷，关系并不是太大。那自由主义究竟要自我反思什么呢？通过什么样的反思，中国的自由主义仍有希望影响到中国的未来？
+
+如今自由主义者想要通过具体的行动或组织取得成功，固然是希望渺茫，但即便是一部分温和的自由主义者所津津乐道的“启蒙”，同样是困难重重。在舆论和传播环境方面，中国自由主义现在面临的困境，比起上世纪40年代，有过之而无不及：上世纪40年代，在恶劣的舆论环境下，依然有储安平主编的《观察》和张纯明主编的《世纪评论》，作为自由主义的媒体阵地。其中在《观察》上，曾发表过不少对于自由主义的理论发展来说有着深远意义的文章，比如吴世昌的《政治民主与经济民主》、萧公权的《说民主》、韩德培的《我们所需要的“法治”》、杨人楩的《自由主义者往何处去？》和《张东荪的《政治上的自由主义与文化上的自由主义》等。
+
+说到这里，有的人可能会不以为然，认为如今网络发达，自媒体平台又俯拾即是，做自由主义启蒙的平台帐号不可谓凋零，自由主义的受众如何会比1940年代更为稀少？平心而论，说自由主义一点声音也发不出来，那确实也是矫情，但既然是舆论传播，讨论的自然并非声音的存在与否，而是不同的思想观念是否具备公平的传播机会。
+
+前面已略述自由主义在言论上遭受的限制，如对学者在大学内传播带有自由主义的理念进行规训与惩罚，对最有影响的那一代自由主义大V进行封号和禁言等。中国当局所要创造的“反自由主义”舆论环境，是全方位的，媒体的党报化和大学的党校化是一个方面，出版社和媒体平台的多种审查是另一个方面，前者针对的是体制内的（自由主义）知识分子，后者针对的是体制外的知识分子。对于有志于自由主义启蒙的知识分子来说，谋生手段大多有局限性，若非栖身于大学、媒体，就是依靠出书和自媒体变现，上述两种对媒体的控制，实质都是以“饭碗”相威胁，让知识分子闭嘴。这一办法卓有成效，与2010年左右相比，如今在简体中文网络上能看到的“自由主义启蒙”，可谓和风细雨、隔靴挠痒，但即便如此，大部份有自由主义倾向的帐号依然难逃封号的命运。
+
+民间的、线下的公共文化活动，就算不涉及具体的行动，但只要牵扯到自由主义的理念，都难免产生“被举报”和“被喝茶”的恐惧，严重的可能要被扣上“寻衅滋事”和“煽动颠覆”的罪名。当局是否真的认为这些活动危及政权根基和社会稳定，这个无从得知，但基层部门为了应付上级和完成维稳的KPI，依然对其进行不懈打击。有时为了杀鸡儆猴，甚至不惜“连坐”，让组织活动者产生忌惮，为了不连累他人，干脆不再组织。如此莫说自由主义的理念得不到传播，自由主义者也将在无所不在的恐惧之中丧失一切现实的联结，逐渐走向原子化。不得不说，这正是针对自由主义的社会控制的目的。
+
+
+### 小粉红的崛起
+
+有人可能会有疑惑：女权主义同样遭到当局的污名和打压，甚至被当局定性为“境外势力”，为何女权主义不仅没有式微，反而势头愈来愈猛，在微博、b站、知乎等国内平台都已成为一股不可小觑的力量？
+
+中国女权主义有许多值得中国自由主义学习的地方，然而，自由主义与女权主义在当下遭受打压，有着不同的原因。首先，自由主义要改变的是中国的政治制度，而女权主义要改变的更多的是中国的社会结构和生活方式，如果说现今的执政党对于后者感到难以接受，那对于前者，则是完全无法容忍，因为这等于直接挑战其执政地位。其次，中国女权主义的其中一部份，被称为“粉红女权”，对于中国共产党有着相当高的认同感，这一方面是因为毛时代有着“解放妇女”和“妇女能顶半边天”的传统，性别平等程度甚至比当下的中国要更高，另一方面，这些女权主义者对于在自由民主制度仍然难以实现全面的性别平等感到恼怒，并认为这样的制度更具欺骗性，反倒是一党专政更有希望一劳永逸地解决性别平等问题。粉红女权不仅不会在网上攻击当局，甚至当她们发现“行走的五十万”，还有可能主动举报，女权与执政党的紧张关系，经常可以被她们自己内部消化。相比之下，“新时代”以来，改良主义者在自由主义里的比例应该是大大下降了。最后，那些被认定为“境外势力”的女权主义者，被打压的原因与自由主义者较为接近，这些女权主义者恰恰意识到，不改变当下的政治制度，女权的理念就没有任何实现的希望，自由民主制下的性别平等状况固然不如人意，但总比保守专制之下要强。有这种意识的女权主义者，遭到当局的打压和污名，也就不足为怪了。
+
+这几年间出现了一种新的状况，在当局和平台以外，有一种民间力量充当“审查”的主体，那就是所谓的“小粉红”。上面所说的“粉红女权”，可以算是小粉红的一种。以往在自由主义者里面有一种观念，那就是民间不管怎么吵来吵去，民间对自由主义的意见，与当局对自由主义的看法，有着本质的不同。小粉红的出现打破了这种幻觉。小粉红并不算体制的一部分（尽管有人坚定地认为他们受到某些部门的授意和操纵），他们的本质是民粹派的国家主义者，有人曾将他们类比为日本1930年代的“皇道派”。小粉红认为国家、体制和人民，三者的利益是一体的，而自由主义则是这个国家的毒瘤。相比之下，倒是建制派国家主义者（比如胡锡进）有时更能意识到这三者的利益不一定完全一致，因而对自由主义有着某种策略意义和姿态意义上的宽容。这说明，作为民粹派国家主义者，小粉红的“道德化的反多元主义”更为彻底。
+
+小粉红对于自由主义言论的审查，比起当局和平台要更无孔不入，因为他们就在自由主义者的周围。在2012年前，中国的自由主义者和他们周围的朋友也会有政治观念上的冲突，但基本可以做到和而不同。小粉红认为持有自由主义信念就是要搞“颜色革命”，将其视为对国家人民的背叛，所以他们会毫不犹豫地举报，对于他们来说，举报“恨国党”和举报刑事罪犯并没有太大的不同，都是为了捍卫国家、社会和人民的利益。在权力不愿下场的时候，他们会动员起自己的力量，以网暴的形式，对被他们盯上的人进行制裁。有时网暴达到一定规模，就会引起权力的注意，当事人最后往往要同时遭受社会性死亡和来自权力的惩罚。
+
+这对于有志于自由主义启蒙的人来说是个双重灾难：一方面，有的人不那么害怕丢掉饭碗或者被有司“喝茶”，但却害怕被小粉红盯上，因为前者一般以恫吓为主，不置人于死地，但后者却是非理性的，下手没轻没重，事后也不会有人担责；另一方面，小粉红的批量出现，说明自由主义的启蒙在国家主义的宣传面前，犹如蚍蜉撼树，要将一个人变成自由主义者，需要持之以恒的说理和辩论，但与之对立的声音，可以没日没夜地在电视、报纸、教科书、宣传栏、抖音、b站、微博重复千遍成为真理，一想到这里，自由主义者不免心灰意冷。
+
+
+### “躺平”的自由主义者
+
+外部的环境固然万般艰难，但雪上加霜的是，在自由主义者内部也出现了“躺平”的倾向。
+
+自由主义者的“躺平”，一部份体现在“润学”的大行其道。“润”就是“跑路”（run），指的是移居国外。由于大环境日趋恶劣，有一部份持有异见者对于国内形势的好转失去信心，转而将目标放在“肉身翻墙”。应该说，作为一种个人的选择，“润”本身无可指摘。对于一些面临来自政权的打压和小粉红的人身威胁的人来说，“润”可以说既现实又迫切。然而当越来越多的自由主义者，将“润”作为一种整体方案来解决自由主义的困境，并以此沾沾自喜时，那不得不说，这也是一种掩耳盗铃。“润”本身并不解决任何一种系统性的政治问题，毋宁说，“润”的流行正是系统性的政治问题得不到解决的表征。更不用说，对于大部分人，“润”甚至不是一个可行的选择。
+
+自由主义者“躺平”的另一种体现，是有些自由主义者将“明哲保身”粉饰为“消极自由”。以赛亚·伯林（Isiah Berlin）大概是除了哈耶克以外，对当代中国的自由主义影响最大的思想家，他的“消极自由”概念，几乎是重塑了中国自由主义者对于自由主义的理解。然而，当有些以往慷慨激昂的启蒙者为了避免惹祸上身而三缄其口，却又将“消极自由”作为自己回避政治锋芒的理由时，这不仅是扭曲了“消极自由”的理论内涵，而且也将自由主义的政治性一并压制了。
+
+自由主义尊重个人对自身生活方式的选择，并对选择的条件进行了制度化的保障。不过这是在自由政体建立起来以后，在这样一种政体建立起来之前，没有真正意义上的“消极自由”，只有作为一种道德话语存在的“天赋人权”。从另一个角度来说，反而是意识到“消极自由”之可贵的人，应该为建立这样的制度付出自己的努力，倘若自己有别的义务要承担，不能以身犯险，或者单纯不愿以卵击石，那都无妨于自己做一个自由主义者，但将“消极自由”大声喊出来，为自己的沉默无为做掩护，这就有点让人惋惜了。
+
+这就是自由主义的“搭便车”难题：绝大部分自由主义者都认为自己没有义务去为建立自由民主付出代价，但他们都觉得自己有权利生活在这样的一种政体之下，于是他们要么“润”，去享受一种现成的自由民主，要么等，等着别人去付出代价，要么忍受，一边忍受现状一边抱怨。
+
+于是自由主义陷入两难：由于现实的困窘，去责备任何一个个体的自由主义者为何不去行动不去启蒙，都显得有点苛刻，但如果每一个自由主义者都持有这样的心态，自由主义就更加没有希望，因为即便在不远的将来出现了建立自由政体的机会，习惯上述心态的自由主义者也已经丧失意志力，机会到来也把握不住了。
+
+自由主义陷入困境的首要原因确实是政权的打压。政权将自由主义者里付出实际行动的人投入监牢，又将自由主义启蒙的舆论传播条件剥夺殆尽，它不断挤压自由主义者的生存和谋生空间，还培植出大批量可以监视他们的人，让他们无时无刻不活在恐怖之中。最重要的是，这种打压范围之广阔，强度之剧烈，时间之持久，让人难以否认自由主义要继续发展之无比艰难。正因为此，自由主义者有了堂而皇之的理由，不再积极有为，不再锐意进取，其内部弥漫着一股听天由命的气息。自由主义对于年轻人不再有吸引力，这不仅是因为政权将中国自由主义者筚路蓝缕的历史完全抹煞，斩断其传承性，而且还因为，如今的年轻人对于这样一种老生常谈、暮气沉沉的学说，没有半点同情和兴趣。
+
+
+### 自由主义的“势”
+
+这样说的话，自由主义究竟还有没有希望去影响中国的未来？还是说，自由主义就此一蹶不振，过气了，不合时宜了？
+
+自由主义的优势一直是在的，这种优势在被打压以后，也不曾遽然消失。自由主义的优势，最重要的，就是“现代生活方式”。这里说的“现代生活方式”，跟查尔斯·泰勒（Charles Taylor）说的“现代社会想象”有点类似，但比后者要“薄”一点。简单来说，中国已经进入了“现代性”，回不去了，现代性的政治需要满足一些最基本的条件，即便像汪晖等人一直鼓吹“另类的现代性”，为中国的政治体制辩护，但后者与现代生活方式，依然是有很大张力的。现代生活方式，在当下包括但不限于：祛魅、市场经济、互联网和个体化。这些意味着：中国已经不可能建立依靠像共产主义这样的强意识形态，而政权的统治，也需要考虑市场经济可以运作的最低限度要求，“防火墙”（GFW）固然可以让大部分人屏蔽掉海外的信息，但长期来说，一些重大的信息依然会在墙内流传，最重要的是，中国人的集体主义，已经被个体化的生活方式所暗中破坏。
+
+这既是现代生活方式带来的优势条件，也是改革开放的社会遗产。改革开放还带来一定的“精神遗产”。这种遗产主要体现在两个方面，一是体现在尚未完全成型的公共文化，二是体现在精英阶层的价值共识。关于这两者的具体分析，本文不多赘述，只需要提到一点，即这些精神遗产虽然不包括对民主（尤其是西方的代议制民主）的信念，但却包含相当多自由主义的元素，比如对于市场、法治、权利话语和全球化的认同。尽管这些只是精神遗产，比起作为社会遗产的现代生活方式，要更加脆弱，但目前它们尚未被摧毁，大部分中国人，并不想回到“独立自主、自力更生”的年代。
+
+一种“主义”的发展，当然可以只在纸上进行，但却不能不考虑“势”的作用。这一年来，中国的自由主义，在“势”的方面，有了重大的突破。首先是彭载舟的出现和白纸运动的发生。自刘晓波以来，锒铛入狱的自由主义者无数，但鲜有因为直接挑战政权合法性而入狱的。彭载舟没有提出什么高深的理论，他有的只是几句朗朗上口的口号，还有飞蛾扑火的勇气，但这种勇气正是当下的自由主义所急需的，他凭一己之力撒下了星星之火，在白纸运动成为燎原之势。
+
+白纸运动已经过去近一年，但依然不容易评价其历史意义。对于自由主义者来说，运动的出现是极其振奋人心的。运动对于“防疫”政治的结束有着直接的推动作用，运动的规模和一些细节让领导人丢失脸面，但这些都不是最重要的，它最重要的意义是象征性的，昭示性的。自激进的左翼青年和青年女权行动派被镇压以来，许多持有异见者对于中国的年轻人印象不佳，因为这几年充满着小粉红将简中互联网闹得天翻地覆的记忆，小粉红以外的那些年轻人，好像大多也是政治冷感。然而白纸运动的出现，打破了这一刻板印象：中国并不缺乏有热血、有头脑、有行动力的年轻人，只是他们陷于与自由主义者一样的困境，没能与同温层建立起联结，他们看不见彼此，以为自己只是特例，长期处于政治抑郁，是乌鲁木齐的大火让其中一些人首先站了出来。
+
+白纸运动以一种巧妙的方式被化解了，但运动创造的“势”并没有消失，它让执政者和自由主义者同时保持敏感的神经，因为被分散的年轻人有可能在下一次危机到来的时候迅速集结。
+
+下一次危机之所以可能出现，是因为如今的中国共产党也陷入了困境。首先，由于美欧的有意脱钩、外部需求的疲软和全球供应链的重新整合，中国的出口订单在急剧减少，而出口是拉动中国经济的真正引擎，出口的熄火将导致中国的经济的全面减速。其次，由于中国的房地产行业濒临崩溃，地方政府的卖地收入迅速缩水，而土地财政占地方财政收入的比例甚高，在没有新的财政收入来源的情况下，地方不得不克扣体制内人员的工资，减少基础设施的建设和维护。最后，由于经济的整体萧条，失业率高居不下，消费疲软，互为因果，恶性循环，而每年的大学毕业生已经超过千万，青年失业率已经高到统计局不敢公布的地步。
+
+自改开以来，中国的合法性基础已经逐渐从“意识形态合法性”转变为“绩效合法性”，这说明中国的经济和民生，对于中国共产党的统治有着至关重要的作用，经济发展好，人民生活有盼头，老百姓就拥护执政党，经济发展停滞，人民陷入绝望，就有可能人心思变。尽管当局有可能放弃对合法性的追求，改用全民高压统治的方式，但这样的统治方式本身成本极高，而且需要政权内部各个部分的高度配合，这本身就会让政权变得极其脆弱。况且，最近高层的一系列变动，说明政权内部各个部分的配合程度并不令最高领袖满意。
+
+中国经济的骤然失速，不仅有可能导致整体性危机，而且也给自由主义创造了一些机会。过去四十年，大部分中国人都相信中国经济的高速发展是因为中国体制的优越性和中国共产党的卓越领导，而不是因为中国进行了市场化改革且恰逢其时地分享到全球化的红利。此次失速，高层出尽浑身解数，依然无法拉动经济分毫，这对于中国人来说将是宝贵的一课，有益于建立良好的现实感知，打破对全能政府的迷信。
+
+然而这样的危机不一定会导致政权的土崩瓦解，只要政府不折腾，维持现状依然是可能的，大部分中国人并不希望中国乱。而且即便政权出现意外，受益的也不一定是自由主义者，而更有可能是前面提到的民粹派国家主义者，或者更进一步，某种类型的法西斯主义者。这不是杞人忧天。一方面，民粹派国家主义有着比自由主义更大的受众基础，尽管白纸运动让我们看到了那些沉默的、对国家主义有着强烈不满的年轻人，但难以相信他们的数量会比小粉红更加庞大。另一方面，民粹派国家主义者在对“恨国党”的网暴和对外网的出征中饱经磨练，积累了丰富的斗争经验，论组织，论动员，论手段，自由主义者恐怕都不是对手。民粹派国家主义者有可能会宣称，这一次中国出现的大乱，原因一在境外势力，二在国内的叛徒，也就是自由主义者，这样的伎俩在历史上出现过不止一次，一战后在德国广为流传的“刀刺在背”说，就是这样的极右翼宣传。
+
+在这样的形势下，自由主义者的希望，在于其左右两翼各自的联结基础。自由主义右翼里的基督教自由主义者，与基督教群体有着广泛的联结，而后者在中国有数千万之巨。自由主义左翼的情况则稍微复杂一些，依靠作为其群众基础的那一小撮小资产阶级，那是万万不够的，左翼自由主义的出路只有在于与反国家主义的女权主义和马克思主义的联合。
+
+有人会问，为何后两者会将自身的群众基础“借”给左翼自由主义？这大概还是因为，人类目前可行的政体还是有限的。女权主义本身并不对应一种政体，而马克思主义与自由民主政体并不必然互斥（毕竟不太可能重新回到无产阶级专政）。如果不希望某种右翼威权政体得势，自由民主政体依然是女权主义和马克思主义最好的选择。
+
+
+### 自由主义的道义力量
+
+从以上描绘的图景来看，当下中国的自由主义，是困境多于希望，局限性多于可能性，但中国的自由主义依然具有一种不可磨灭的品质，这种品质正是来自自由主义本身的道义力量。当代的中国自由主义者，与严复、梁启超这些初代的中国自由主义者的出发点不尽相同：后者的问题意识，是从“中国”出发的，而前者的问题意识，是从“中国自由主义”出发的。或者说得更直白一点，对于后者来说，自由主义的工具价值凌驾于其内在价值，而对于前者来说，自由主义内在价值凌驾于其工具价值。前者之所以持信自由主义，并不是因为自由主义可以让中国实现富国强兵，而是因为他们相信自由主义具有在道德上的正当性，在最低限度，它可以让这个国家的人免于来自政治的恐惧和来自政治权力的残酷对待。正因为这种对自由主义的道德正当性的确信，当代中国的自由主义者对自由主义有一种发自内心的“担当”（commitment），愿意为了它不计代价，放弃肤浅的利己主义。
+
+胡适那一代的自由主义者对于“确信”，是有抗拒的，胡适在《容忍与自由》中写道：“一切对异端的迫害，一切对‘异己’的摧残，一切宗教自由的禁止，一切思想言论的被压迫，都由于这一点深信自己是不会错的心理。因为深信自己是不会错的，所以不能容忍任何和自己不同的思想信仰。”针对这种将自由主义奠基在怀疑论的做法，左翼自由主义的周保松曾经在《自由与容忍》中提出过反驳。正如里面所提到的，怀疑论与容忍，反怀疑论与压迫，其实没有必然关系。不惟如此，怀疑论并不会让其持有者对自由主义产生任何担当，它还可以轻而易举地推出反自由主义的结论：既然一切都是不确定的，那“自由”未必是好的，“专制”当然也未必就不好。事实上，对于自由主义的“确信”，不一定要来自教条的狂热，完全可以是基于合理的道德证成（moral justification）。就其后果而言，对于自由主义的确信，甚少会产生对于其他学说的实质打压（总不能说论辩和批判也算打压）。倒是可以说，在艰难时期，只有基于“确信”，才有可能产生行动，基于怀疑论，更有可能产生漫无目的的破坏。
+
+对自由主义的道德正当性的确信，可以让我们对自由主义有道义的担当，也可以让我们保持一种存在主义式的乐观（existentialist optimism），这种存在主义式的乐观，也可称为“西绪福斯精神”，知其不可为而为之，明明知道自由主义失败的概率很大，仍要坚守自由主义的立场。中国的自由主义者，在1949年前已经失败了一次，历史给了它第二次机会，但它有可能再次失败。照这么说，中国的自由主义应该是失败透顶，要被扫尽历史的垃圾堆里，但这样的失败并没有什么好畏惧的，德国的自由主义不也在1848和1933失败了两次吗？如今德国已经成为欧洲民主的楷模。
+
+然而，中国的自由主义者要有“置之死地而后生”的觉悟，也要有梁启超当年写《少年中国说》的气象：“红日初升，其道大光。河出伏流，一泻汪洋。潜龙腾渊，鳞爪飞扬。乳虎啸谷，百兽震惶。鹰隼试翼，风尘吸张。奇花初胎，矞矞皇皇。干将发硎，有作其芒。天戴其苍，地履其黄。纵有千古，横有八荒。前途似海，来日方长。”尽管我们与严复、梁启超在忠诚之归属上不太一样，但有一点上是相似的：我们和他们，都想将活力、斗志和决断注入自己所认同的、因为受尽严酷打击而意气消沉的共同体之中。这当然是一种“唯意志论”（voluntarism），但自由主义现在需要这样的唯意志论。这与前述之“唯心主义”的不同在于：我们并不认为，为自由主义注入这样一种精神力量，一定会使自由主义在现实政治获得成功；毋宁说，这么做，只是为了让自由主义留得青山在，不在严冬之中衰败，以待来者。
+
+
+### 结语
+
+行文至此，我必须解答一个问题，那就是为何不讨论中国自由主义的理论困境，而专注于中国自由主义在实践层面所遇到的困难，这是否有避重就轻的嫌疑？
+
+有的人认为，中国的自由主义者，在推动普适的自由主义理论发展方面，似乎乏善可陈。中国的自由主义学者，目前仍停留在对外国的自由主义理论的引介和解读上，缺乏创新性的推进。然而我并不认为这算得上什么理论困境，毕竟自由主义理论已经出现了几百年，自由主义作为一种政治制度也是首先在西方得以实践，不管是抽象的理论问题，还是由实践所引发的理论问题，当然是西方人先遭遇到，也先由他们来解决。况且如前文所说，即便中国的自由主义真有什么理论缺陷，那也不是它陷入困境的主要原因。
+
+值得一提的是，中国的自由主义学者，并非没有理论创新，只是这些学者缺乏正式的理论讨论的机会，他们的理论创新只在小范围被人所知。中国的自由主义学者，是在与国家主义和其他流派的短兵相接中发展自己的学说的，他们从自由主义的角度，去面对其他主义的在中国的语境下所带来的挑战，这些论述的价值应该得到肯定。另者，中国自由主义面临的任务，可以说是人类政治史上最艰难的任务之一：在这样一个准极权政体之下，要去建立一种自由主义的制度，这样的经验在人类历史上是匮乏的，以往自由主义者面临的对手，都比它如今面对的这个要文明得多。中国的自由主义者在这其中的摸索、观察、反思和总结，本身就是自由主义的精神财富，实践和理论之间，如何分得清楚？如何可以说中国的自由主义者对于自由主义没有创新的贡献？胡平说：“我们这一代的自由主义，是再发现，是重新发掘；也就是说，在很大程度上，是自发的、内生的，是基于我们自己的‘深刻而痛苦的生活经验’，‘从切身的忧患’的独立思考而获得的。”这何尝不是几代中国自由主义者的集体肖像？
diff --git a/_collections/_heros/1899-09-30-PeterKropotkin-a1_r-memoirs-of-a-revolutionist-8-exile-in-western-europe.md b/_collections/_heros/_0x2a/1899-09-30-PeterKropotkin-a1_r-memoirs-of-a-revolutionist-8-exile-in-western-europe.md
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diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-04-22-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-1.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-04-22-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-1.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : 【勇武7人案・審訊第一日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-04-22 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/aKa9Cy8.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#勇武派 #屠龍小隊 #串謀 #反恐"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 7人否認串謀殺警等罪 由9人陪審團審理 預料需時60日
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】2019年12月8日「國際人權日大遊行」前夕，警方在民宿及貨倉檢獲槍械武器，7人遭起訴。6男被控在遊行當日串謀謀殺警察，以及遭控《聯合國（反恐怖主義措施）條例》下「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪，此例為2002年通過以來首次用作檢控。6男否認「串謀謀殺」及「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪，一名女子則否認「串謀提供或籌集財產以作出恐怖主義行為」罪。案件今（23日）在高等法院開審，並選出3男6女陪審團審理本案，預料需時60天，直至7月中完結。遴選期間，有陪審員表示要旅行或公幹而未能出席部分審訊，在大律師反對下不獲選。控方預計明天將讀出開案陳詞。
+
+#### 6男否認「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」及「串謀謀殺」罪
+
+本案共7名被告，其中6人否認《聯合國（反恐怖主義措施）條例》下的「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪、作為交替控罪的「串謀導致相當可能會危害生命或對財產造成嚴重損害的爆炸罪」；以及「串謀謀殺」罪，控罪所指的對象為警務人員。
+
+- 張俊富（22歲，學生）：否認「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪及「串謀謀殺」罪
+- 張銘裕（20歲，無業）：否認「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪及「串謀謀殺」罪
+- 嚴文謙（21歲，學生）：否認「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪及「串謀謀殺」罪
+- 李家田（24歲，無業）：否認「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪、「串謀謀殺」罪、意圖危害生命而管有槍械及彈藥罪
+- 賴振邦（29歲，技術員）：否認「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪及「串謀謀殺」罪
+- 許湛榮（24歲，物業管理助理）：否認「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪及「串謀謀殺」罪
+- 劉佩凝（24歲，無業）：否認「串謀提供或籌集財產以作出恐怖主義行為」罪
+
+法庭今完成陪審員遴選，並選出3男6女陪審團。在遴選期間，有陪審員表示因旅行或公幹未能出席部分審訊，亦有陪審員未能說廣東話，均在大律師提出反對下不獲選。
+
+法官張慧玲安排案件審訊期間，於早上8時45分開庭，下午約2時散庭。
+
+控方代表為大律師周凱靈、高級檢控官劉允祥及伍永杰。張俊富由大律師李國輔及于雋謙代表；張銘裕由大律師姚本成及陳雅琪；嚴文謙由大律師梁鴻谷及柯愷欣代表；李家田由大律師林芷瑩及何正謙代表；賴振邦由大律師是香媛及余承熹代表；許湛榮由大律師陳偉彥及黃思希代表；劉佩凝由大律師馬維騉及容潔礬代表。
+
+《反恐條例》下「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪指，首6名被告於2019年8月1日至12月8日期間在香港，一同串謀和與黃振強、吳智鴻、蘇緯軒、彭軍壕、林銘皓、梁政希、張堅順及其他人串謀，意圖導致他人死亡或身體受嚴重傷害，而非法及故意向訂明標的、在訂明標的內或針對訂明標的送遞、放置、或引爆兩個爆炸裝置。
+
+為上述控罪之交替控罪的「串謀導致相當可能會危害生命或對財產造成嚴重損害的爆炸」罪則指，首6名被告於2019年8月1日至12月8日期間在香港，非法及惡意一同串謀和與黃振強、吳智鴻、蘇緯軒、彭軍壕、林銘皓、梁政希、張堅順及其他人，串謀藉爆炸品導致爆炸，而該爆炸的性質相當可能會危害生命或對財產造成嚴重損害。
+
+至於「串謀謀殺」罪則指，首6名被告於2019年8月1日至12月8日期間在香港，一同串謀和與與黃振強、吳智鴻、蘇緯軒、彭軍壕、林銘皓、梁政希、張堅順及其他人，串謀謀殺警務人員。
+
+李家田另被控「意圖危害生命而管有槍械或彈藥」罪，指他於2019年10月1日及11月30日期間在香港，管有1支手槍、1個彈匣及14粒子彈，意圖用以危害生命，或意圖使他人能用以危害生命。
+
+劉佩凝被控「串謀提供或籌集財產以作出恐怖主義行為」罪，被指於2019年8月1日至12月9日期間在香港，與黃振強及其他人串謀直接或間接提供或籌集財產，懷有意圖／或知道，將該財產的全部或部份會用於作出一項或多於一項恐怖主義行為。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC164/2022、255/2023
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-04-23-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-2.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-04-23-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-2.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..10ea66a1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-04-23-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-2.md
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【勇武7人案・審訊第二日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-04-23 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/aKa9Cy8.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#勇武派 #屠龍小隊 #串謀 #反恐"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 屠龍成員涉串謀殺警 控方指被告擬向警開槍及放炸彈 庭上提陪審團撇除政治觀點
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】2019年12月8日「國際人權日大遊行」前夕，「屠龍小隊」成員等人被捕，被指串謀計劃在遊行期間放置炸彈及開槍殺警。6男否認「串謀謀殺」及「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪，一女子則否認「串謀提供或籌集財產以作出恐怖主義行為」罪。案件今（23日）在高等法院第2日審訊。控方大律師周凱靈對陪審團表示，本案牽涉2019年社會運動，「姑勿論你政治立場如何，你哋淨係要睇證據，撇除政治觀點」，「希望陪審團知道兩個炸彈造成嘅傷害係無差別，亦都無分政治立場」，「唔係話淨係殺差人，其實大家諗吓，差人多定係遊行人士多？」控方於開案陳詞指，同謀者計劃在軒尼詩道放置兩個炸彈，首先引爆小炸彈迫警方後退，期間槍手於高處開槍射警，當他們退至大炸彈時就再引爆。最後各人計劃「全民執槍」，即撿拾警務人員的佩槍。控方亦提及有被告於案發數月前到台灣接受軍訓。另外有3名本案的同謀者將作供。
+
+本案共7名被告，其中6男即張俊富、張銘裕、嚴文謙、李家田、賴振邦及許湛榮，均否認《聯合國（反恐怖主義措施）條例》下的「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪、作為交替控罪的「串謀導致相當可能會危害生命或對財產造成嚴重損害的爆炸罪」；以及「串謀謀殺」罪，控罪所指的對象為警務人員。李家田另否認「意圖危害生命而管有槍械及彈藥」罪。一女子即劉佩凝否認「串謀提供或籌集財產以作出恐怖主義行為」罪。
+
+#### 控方提醒陪審團需撇除政治觀點 要考慮炸彈是無差別
+
+控方代表大律師周凱靈對陪審團表示，本案牽涉2019年社會運動，當時有不同政治聲音，「姑勿論你政治立場如何，當然法官閣下將會指引你哋，你哋淨係要睇證據，撇除政治觀點，作為陪審團需要謹記。不過，人終歸係人。」控方續指，炸彈引爆之時遊行已開始，「希望陪審團知道兩個炸彈造成嘅傷害係無差別，亦都無分政治立場」，「遊行嘅係民陣，殺嘅係差人，炸彈威力係無差別，只要你唔知炸彈喺度就有危險」，「唔係話淨係殺差人，其實大家諗吓，差人多定係遊行人士多？」
+
+#### 控方指3名同謀者將作供 包括「屠龍」領導人物
+
+控方接着向陪審團解釋，控罪中的「串謀」是指兩人或以上作出協議進行某些非法行為，當中包括分工，而最終並不需要實行或有實質行為。控方亦指，黃振強、蘇緯軒及彭軍壕為本案的同謀者，當中黃振強為「相當領導性角色」，3人均會在本案中作供。控方亦提及，3人已經就各自的刑事責任有交代，陪審團不應該過分揣測。
+
+#### 控方：被告等人擬放兩炸彈及開槍射警 最後「全民執槍」
+
+控方其後作出開案陳詞，她指2019年12月8日民陣舉行獲警方不反對通知書的遊行，各被告與同謀者計劃在遊行路線的軒尼詩道放置兩個炸彈，分別為一大一小，兩者相距127米，小炸彈靠近英皇集團中心。他們計劃首先引誘警方到小炸彈附近，然後引爆，期間槍手蘇緯軒會躲在附近高處，以長槍掃射警務人員，藉此逼使警方後退走近大炸彈。當警方抵達大炸彈時會引爆。而警務人員被擊中或受傷後，被告及串謀者就會「全民執槍」，撿拾警員的佩槍。
+
+#### 控方：大炸彈足以令半徑400米人士傷亡
+
+控方指，小炸彈有2公斤炸藥，威力足以令半徑100米人士受傷或喪命；大炸彈有8公斤炸藥，足以令半徑400米人士受傷或喪命。而兩個炸彈內均藏有鐵釘，其中大炸彈約有150枚鐵釘，引爆時會飛射。控方又指，遊行人士會受影響，同時該處附近有不少民居，單位內的人亦會被波及。警方於計劃當日前，在華仁書院找到該兩個炸彈，專家檢驗後發現是無線電話遙控炸彈，若有人致電該電話後，炸彈內的鐵板會發熱並引爆。紀錄顯示，同謀者之一的吳智鴻曾致電該炸彈內的電話。
+
+#### 控方：5人曾到台灣接受軍訓
+
+控方指，同謀者包括「屠龍小隊」成員，組織於2019年8月成立，黃振強在小隊中為領導人物。組織成立源於部分人在2014年的社會活動中認識。至於吳智鴻則負責找槍械及製造炸彈。5人曾於2019年9月16日到台灣接受軍訓，包括本案被告張銘裕、許湛榮、賴振邦，另外兩人為吳智鴻及彭軍壕。
+
+#### 控方：同謀者提及「之後可能玩暗殺狗」
+
+控方指，據 Telegram 紀錄顯示，張銘裕曾經與吳智鴻對話，吳表示「過去真係軍訓⋯⋯槍械、十字弓、刀具」、「之後可能玩暗殺狗」。控方指「狗」是警察代號。張表示「一日未出現槍殺，未諗住去到呢個地步，我可能唔係嗰個人選」。從台灣回港後，張問吳「幾時會搞殺狗？」，吳回應「我都想快，回咗氣，過埋今日先」。吳有表示「我扳緊槍」。
+
+#### 控方：6人往西貢大浪坳試槍及炸彈
+
+控方又指，6名同謀者包括黃振強、吳智鴻、被告許湛榮、賴振邦及李家田，於11月16日晚上至翌日凌晨，前往西貢大浪坳測試槍械及炸彈。他們曾經在 Telegram 中一個名為「行山討論區」的群組內商討。事前吳向成員表示「大家準備嚟緊星期六行山，露營裝出發」、「試嘢嗰日我會整埋炸彈過嚟試」、「到時大家準備刀，如有意外殺返條路出去」。吳又問能否提供柴油。控方在賴振邦電話發現，他曾於11月17日凌晨4時拍攝子彈的照片，定位顯示為西貢大浪坳。
+
+控方尚未完成陳詞，案件明續審。
+
+以下為各被告的控罪：
+
+- 張俊富（22歲，學生）：否認「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪及「串謀謀殺」罪
+- 張銘裕（20歲，無業）：否認「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪及「串謀謀殺」罪
+- 嚴文謙（21歲，學生）：否認「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪及「串謀謀殺」罪
+- 李家田（24歲，無業）：否認「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪、「串謀謀殺」罪、意圖危害生命而管有槍械及彈藥罪
+- 賴振邦（29歲，技術員）：否認「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪及「串謀謀殺」罪
+- 許湛榮（24歲，物業管理助理）：否認「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪及「串謀謀殺」罪
+- 劉佩凝（24歲，無業）：否認「串謀提供或籌集財產以作出恐怖主義行為」罪
+
+本案由3男6女陪審團及法官張慧玲審理。控方代表為大律師周凱靈、高級檢控官劉允祥及伍永杰。張俊富由大律師李國輔及于雋謙代表；張銘裕由大律師姚本成及陳雅琪代表；嚴文謙由大律師梁鴻谷及柯愷欣代表；李家田由大律師林芷瑩及何正謙代表；賴振邦由大律師是香媛及余承熹代表；許湛榮由大律師陳偉彥及黃思希代表；劉佩凝由大律師馬維騉及容潔礬代表。
+
+《反恐條例》下「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪指，首6名被告於2019年8月1日至12月8日期間在香港，一同串謀和與黃振強、吳智鴻、蘇緯軒、彭軍壕、林銘皓、梁政希、張堅順及其他人串謀，意圖導致他人死亡或身體受嚴重傷害，而非法及故意向訂明標的、在訂明標的內或針對訂明標的送遞、放置、或引爆兩個爆炸裝置。
+
+為上述控罪之交替控罪的「串謀導致相當可能會危害生命或對財產造成嚴重損害的爆炸」罪則指，首6名被告於2019年8月1日至12月8日期間在香港，非法及惡意一同串謀和與黃振強、吳智鴻、蘇緯軒、彭軍壕、林銘皓、梁政希、張堅順及其他人，串謀藉爆炸品導致爆炸，而該爆炸的性質相當可能會危害生命或對財產造成嚴重損害。
+
+至於「串謀謀殺」罪則指，首6名被告於2019年8月1日至12月8日期間在香港，一同串謀和與與黃振強、吳智鴻、蘇緯軒、彭軍壕、林銘皓、梁政希、張堅順及其他人，串謀謀殺警務人員。
+
+李家田另被控「意圖危害生命而管有槍械或彈藥」罪，指他於2019年10月1日及11月30日期間在香港，管有1支手槍、1個彈匣及14粒子彈，意圖用以危害生命，或意圖使他人能用以危害生命。
+
+劉佩凝被控「串謀提供或籌集財產以作出恐怖主義行為」罪，被指於2019年8月1日至12月9日期間在香港，與黃振強及其他人串謀直接或間接提供或籌集財產，懷有意圖／或知道，將該財產的全部或部份會用於作出一項或多於一項恐怖主義行為。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC164/2022、255/2023
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-04-24-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-3.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-04-24-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-3.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..7ef1052f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-04-24-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-3.md
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【勇武7人案・審訊第三日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-04-24 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/aKa9Cy8.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#勇武派 #屠龍小隊 #串謀 #反恐"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 屠龍串謀殺警案 控方指被告在浸大找化學品製炸彈 槍手稱「第一波想盡殺」
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】2019年12月8日「國際人權日大遊行」前夕，「屠龍小隊」成員等人被捕，被指串謀計劃在遊行期間放炸彈及開槍殺警。6男否認「串謀謀殺」及「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪，一女子則否認「串謀籌集財產作恐怖主義行為」罪。案件今（24日）踏入第3日審訊。控方大律師周凱靈繼續開案陳詞，指有被告在浸大及城大尋找化學原料製造爆炸品，其中 Telegram 紀錄顯示賴振邦曾於2019年11月14日進入浸會大學，並稱「BU CityU 啲化學 Lab 未爆，爆完門可以入去試嘢」。另外，同謀者吳智鴻及被告彭軍壕曾於計劃前一日前往華仁書院組裝炸彈，同日，吳表示「有狗跟我」。而「槍手」蘇緯軒，則表示「打完之後全世界 Weapons free，第一波想盡殺，有幾多殺幾多，全民執槍」。
+
+至於牽涉籌集財產作恐怖主義行為的劉佩凝，控方指她透過 Telegram「育龍」頻道進行「眾籌」。警方發現，劉的恒生、賽馬會及 PayMe 帳戶，於2019年8月1日至12月9日期間的4個月內，共有938宗存款，涉款200萬多；而提款則有100萬多，部分存入同謀者黃振強的戶口。控方完成開案陳詞，明天將傳召為黃振強進行錄影會面的警員。
+
+#### 控方指同謀者對話顯示其相熟性 各人有會面
+
+控方代表大律師周凱靈繼續作出開案陳詞，她展示將作供的同謀者黃振強，其電話內的 Telegram 訊息內容。黃以用戶名「Happy Healer」，對用戶名為「流浮山刀手」的吳智鴻發出語音訊息，稱「我有個家長嘅老公做油站，我叫咗佢帶油畀你」。控方昨提到吳曾問人能否提供柴油，因此控方指對話的「油」是指柴油。
+
+另外，控方指黃的對話包括在西貢試槍的片段，顯示晚上有人開槍，並發出「啪」一聲及有煙冒出。黃又傳送語音訊息，稱「放啲煙花咪可以做得囉」、「唔好兜口兜面畀，睇下可唔可以放喺港島某個草叢，是但搵啲盒包裝吓佢，跟住我再攞」、「我轉頭踩多轉，我間安全屋就喺華星冰室嗰度」。
+
+控方指，同謀者中「屠龍」成員於11月16日晚至翌日凌晨在西貢試槍完畢後，他們在「滅龍」群組對話，黃振強表示「今晚嗰會好重要，必須開」；有人說「噚日行山嗰兩個一定要到」；李家田回覆「到呀」。最後各人到大鴻輝參與飯局。控方指，對話顯示各同謀者的相熟性，並非「唔係只係應吓，係有會面」。控方又強調，同謀可以是在不同時間參與協議。
+
+另外，控方指各同謀者除參與計劃外，其中4人包括黃振強、被告張俊富、張銘裕及嚴文謙，亦於11月19日到泰國旅行玩樂。除張銘裕於22日回港，其餘3人於23日回港。對話又顯示，黃振強曾問李家田：「你手上唔夠錢？」李回答「係」。黃遂叫李提供 PayMe 二維碼，李其後回答「多謝大佬」。
+
+#### 控方指炸彈由同謀者吳智鴻團伙提供 賴振邦則到浸大找科學品
+
+關於炸彈方面，控方指炸彈是由吳智鴻為首的團伙提供。對話紀錄顯示，黃振強於11月21日問吳智鴻：「你嗰20kg幾時到？」賴振邦電話被發現一張浸會大學的照片，該照片於11月14日拍攝。賴的 Telegram 用戶名稱為「接完紙鶴未？」，他早前因同謀者黃振強被捕而刪除對話，但專家後來成功修復。紀錄顯示，賴曾於11月14日，在以吳智鴻為首的群組，表示「BU CityU 啲化學 Lab 未爆，爆完門可以入去試嘢」、「Sorry，淨係喺 BU 爆咗13樓，12樓全層未爆到門拎料」、「Poly 兵工廠度應該有」。賴又問：「可以擺邊？」有人回答「啡色樽唔好見光」。
+
+控方指，對話涉及討論在浸大及城大尋找化學原料製造爆炸品。控方亦指，各同謀者有頻密對話。
+
+#### 控方：被告與吳智鴻入華仁書院組裝炸彈 對話提及「小心漏味」
+
+控方另指，從李家田電話內發現「滅龍」群組內，有張銘裕於11月27日發送的影片，顯示正測試引爆裝置，並出現火光。控方指試爆地點為賴振邦辦公室的後樓梯，而該引爆裝置正是與同謀者打算使用、並存放在華仁書院的炸彈類型相似。於計劃實行前一日的下午，吳智鴻及彭軍壕曾進入華仁書院，並遭閉路電視拍攝到。控方指，兩人當日前往華仁組裝炸彈，隨時預備在12月8日的遊行中使用。
+
+兩人的 Telegram 對話，提及「兩個引爆，記得帶背囊，12K」；吳表示「的士啦，有冇漏味？小心輕放」、「小心漏味，畀的士佬篤灰」、「全部包膠住，仲有黃色海綿寶寶袋袋住」、「華仁停車場垃圾房，隱蔽啲，下面有條小徑」。
+
+#### 控方：對話顯示吳智鴻於計劃前一日稱「有狗跟我」
+
+直至12月7日晚上約8時，吳向彭表示「有狗跟我」、「落樓跟到去北角」；彭回應「你行陣街先啦」，吳遂稱「而家行緊街街啦」。閉路電視顯示，吳於晚上8時多在北角和富街一間家居用品店，購買兩個分別紅色及藍色的筲箕。而該兩個筲箕，與警方發現炸彈內的筲箕相同。
+
+#### 控方指槍手蘇緯軒稱：「全世界 Weapons free」、「第一波想盡殺」
+
+至於計劃中的「槍手」蘇緯軒，他稍後將會作供。對話顯示吳智鴻曾稱：「聽日槍手試槍」；他又轉述「槍手」的話，稱「等多幾日啦，唔係唔打，打完之後全世界 Weapons free，第一波想盡殺，有幾多殺幾多，全民執槍」。控方指蘇的 Telegram 用戶名為「光復香港 Hin 仔」，他與吳的對話提及射擊警員後，由車接走後下車的「dropzone」，地點為清水灣道，並打算事後燒車。
+
+#### 控方：本案計劃基本上一切就緒
+
+控方指，本案計劃「基本上一切就緒」，而「槍手射完之後，如何走嘅路線都計劃好晒」。吳智鴻曾向黃振強提及計劃的位置，稱「紅色嚇鬼用，迫佢哋退去藍色」、「綠色係痴線佬」。控方說法指「痴線佬」意指槍手。
+
+#### 控方指各人有準備心態 黃振強前一日稱「請準時、遲到就88」
+
+控方指，各人有「準備嘅心態、知道發生緊咩事」。於12月8日凌晨2時，有同謀者說「冇下次，我哋呢啲冇第二次機會，一次足以玩完」。黃電話內某一群組的對話顯示，黃於12月8日凌晨1時，稱「星期日，4點，軒尼詩道，灣仔華星冰室等，請準時」、「4:05會起行，遲到就88，永不錄用」。
+
+#### 控方：其他遊行人士不會知道有炸彈會引爆
+
+控方指，當日遊行於下午3時在灣仔維園出發，而同謀者定於4時05分起行，屆時遊行隊伍將會到達灣仔。控方強調：「呢條街唔會係一條冇人嘅街，軒尼詩道呢個段落唔會冇人」，「炸彈爆嘅時候，除咗同謀，其他市民、遊行人士唔會知。」控方指同謀者並非計劃在無人的時候執行。
+
+#### 控方：3人所持手槍為同一型號
+
+警方在吳的家中找到軒尼詩道位置地圖，其中在光華大廈標註了星號。對話顯示，黃於12月8日在「滅龍」群組傳送灣仔克街5號展鴻大廈的地址。控方指，黃振強、張銘裕及嚴文謙於此大廈單位被捕。警方拘捕各人後，於吳的家中找到一支手槍，其後亦在摩星嶺草叢找到另一手槍，最後蘇被捕時他亦持槍反抗並曾開槍。經調查後，該3支槍為同一型號及使用同一款子彈。李家田另被控「意圖危害生命而管有槍械或彈藥」罪，他被捕後在警誡下承認曾經管有一支槍。
+
+至於張俊富，則在被捕後被搜出荃灣倉庫的鎖匙，警方在倉庫發現涉案物件。紀錄顯示，黃振強對他稱「我買咗啲煙花同炮仗呀，你擺喺倉先啦，我哋好快用㗎啦」。
+
+#### 控方：若買武器證明協議大可能發生、但警方及時拘捕
+
+控方重申，本案的協議就屬於罪行元素，並不需要有實質完成，「當然做到嘅嘢越多，令犯罪罪行得以完成，越能證明控方說法，呢個協議嘅真實性。」控方舉例指，「（如果）見到一個人好憎佢，想殺咗佢，朋友聽到就話：『我都係，一齊殺』」，這只是屬於情緒上的發洩。她續指：「不過如果買埋武器、踩埋線、諗住點樣殺，協議罪行發生嘅可能性增高，就佐證咗協議在進行中。」控方補充：「今次進行唔到，主要因為警方及時作出拘捕。」
+
+#### 劉佩凝涉籌集財產 控方：負責眾籌、4個月內戶口有200萬多存款
+
+至於被控「串謀提供或籌集財產以作出恐怖主義行為」罪的劉佩凝，控方指她牽涉計劃中「錢」的部分，負責「眾籌」。控方指：「整個計劃裡面，其實少咗一樣嘢，就係錢」，「冇錢買唔到嘢，冇錢寸步難行，冇錢如何將呢件事進行？」，「錢係整個運動裏面，一個不能缺少嘅環節。」警方發現，劉的恒生、賽馬會及 PayMe 帳戶，於2019年8月1日至12月9日期間的4個月內，共有938宗存款，涉款200萬多；而提款則有100萬多，部分存入黃的戶口。
+
+#### 控方：劉有份管理「育龍」頻道
+
+控方指，劉佩凝與黃振強一同管理 Telegram「育龍」頻道。而黃則鼓勵市民參與12.8的遊行，並曾在頻道表示「懇請大家，聽日12.8一定！要出嚟！唔好俾港共政權以為我哋鬆懈、收咗貨⋯⋯」、「手足唔係 Condom，家長們都唔係 Condom，我哋希望保障大家安全」、「課金唔需要任何個人資料，好希望你哋可以幫助呢場抗爭」。
+
+#### 控方：黃表示想買槍、劉回覆「一萬都可以」
+
+據對話顯示，劉曾經對黃稱「幫到我就幫，唔得我就私人錢」；黃回應「你未必得，萬萬聲，寧願你轉介有錢啲嘅人嚟」；劉稱「家長會因為保障自己唔肯，我做家長咪得囉」；黃表示「我哋想買3支手槍」，劉回應「我可能幫唔到好多，一萬都可以，我諗」。劉曾經向黃傳送其住址。她最終在機場被捕。
+
+控方指，劉的控罪涉及籌款作恐怖活動，並不需要證明她的角色與12.8計劃有必然連繫；只需要證明劉知道該些款項是用作恐怖主義行為。
+
+控方完成開案陳詞，明天將傳召負責為黃振強進行錄影會面的警員作供。
+
+本案共7名被告，其中6男即張俊富、張銘裕、嚴文謙、李家田、賴振邦及許湛榮，均否認《聯合國（反恐怖主義措施）條例》下的「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪、作為交替控罪的「串謀導致相當可能會危害生命或對財產造成嚴重損害的爆炸罪」；以及「串謀謀殺」罪，控罪所指的對象為警務人員。李家田另否認「意圖危害生命而管有槍械及彈藥」罪。女子劉佩凝則否認「串謀提供或籌集財產以作出恐怖主義行為」罪。
+
+本案由3男6女陪審團及法官張慧玲審理。控方代表為大律師周凱靈、高級檢控官劉允祥及伍永杰。張俊富由大律師李國輔及于雋謙代表；張銘裕由大律師姚本成及陳雅琪代表；嚴文謙由大律師梁鴻谷及柯愷欣代表；李家田由大律師林芷瑩及何正謙代表；賴振邦由大律師是香媛及余承熹代表；許湛榮由大律師陳偉彥及黃思希代表；劉佩凝由大律師馬維騉及容潔礬代表。
+
+《反恐條例》下「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪指，首6名被告於2019年8月1日至12月8日期間在香港，一同串謀和與黃振強、吳智鴻、蘇緯軒、彭軍壕、林銘皓、梁政希、張堅順及其他人串謀，意圖導致他人死亡或身體受嚴重傷害，而非法及故意向訂明標的、在訂明標的內或針對訂明標的送遞、放置、或引爆兩個爆炸裝置。
+
+為上述控罪之交替控罪的「串謀導致相當可能會危害生命或對財產造成嚴重損害的爆炸」罪則指，首6名被告於2019年8月1日至12月8日期間在香港，非法及惡意一同串謀和與黃振強、吳智鴻、蘇緯軒、彭軍壕、林銘皓、梁政希、張堅順及其他人，串謀藉爆炸品導致爆炸，而該爆炸的性質相當可能會危害生命或對財產造成嚴重損害。
+
+至於「串謀謀殺」罪則指，首6名被告於2019年8月1日至12月8日期間在香港，一同串謀和與與黃振強、吳智鴻、蘇緯軒、彭軍壕、林銘皓、梁政希、張堅順及其他人，串謀謀殺警務人員。
+
+李家田另被控「意圖危害生命而管有槍械或彈藥」罪，指他於2019年10月1日及11月30日期間在香港，管有1支手槍、1個彈匣及14粒子彈，意圖用以危害生命，或意圖使他人能用以危害生命。
+
+劉佩凝被控「串謀提供或籌集財產以作出恐怖主義行為」罪，被指於2019年8月1日至12月9日期間在香港，與黃振強及其他人串謀直接或間接提供或籌集財產，懷有意圖／或知道，將該財產的全部或部份會用於作出一項或多於一項恐怖主義行為。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC164/2022、255/2023
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-04-25-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-4.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-04-25-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-4.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..9bf3354e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-04-25-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-4.md
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【勇武7人案・審訊第四日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-04-25 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/aKa9Cy8.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#勇武派 #屠龍小隊 #串謀 #反恐"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 屠龍串謀殺警案 警向污點證人黃振強錄口供 承認事後銷毀對話筆記
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】2019年12月8日遊行前夕，「屠龍小隊」成員等人被指計劃遊行期間放炸彈及開槍殺警。6男否認「串謀謀殺」及「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪，女子否認「串謀籌集財產作恐怖主義行為」罪。案件今（25日）踏入第4日審訊。控方傳召首名證人偵緝警員16991劉偉雄，他負責會見本案「污點證人」、即「屠龍小隊」領導人物黃振強，並向他錄取「無損權益口供」。黃於2022年尾仍維持不認罪，但早前已承認兩罪，另兩罪則豁免起訴。劉供稱黃於2023年5月要求會見警方，他表示想認罪及交代案情。劉承認事後銷毀會面及錄口供的對話筆記，並指事前毋須向上司詢問，「我自己 jot notes，呢啲事唔需要問上級」；他否認不想讓人知道黃與警方「討價還價」。黃振強明天將作供。
+
+#### 屠龍領導人物黃振強任「污點證人」辯方透露中途改認罪
+
+控方傳召首名證人偵緝警員16991劉偉雄（音譯），他負責會見本案「污點證人」、即「屠龍小隊」領導人物黃振強，並向他錄取口供。辯方於庭上透露，黃被控4罪，他起初不認罪，後來改為承認其中2罪，即「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪、「串謀提供或籌集財產以作出恐怖主義行為」罪。另外2罪即「串謀謀殺」罪、「管有爆炸品」罪，則獲豁免起訴。
+
+#### 警員稱獲黃振強要求見警方 10次到收押所會見
+
+劉偉雄（音譯）供稱於2013年加入警隊，曾駐守葵青重案組；他自2021年8月起隸屬國安處，負責調查本案。他於2023年5月獲上司指示，由於還柙在荔枝角收押所的黃振強，想見案件調查隊伍，因此劉被指派會見黃。直至同年12月28日期間的7個月，雙方共見面10次。黃曾向警方提供口供，劉則負責記錄。劉確認自己在見面時沒有利誘或威嚇黃。
+
+#### 警稱得知黃想認罪後 遂著他聯絡代表律師
+
+在辯方盤問下，劉稱多數與警長5820梁樂平（音譯）及警署警長馮保羅（音譯），一同往荔枝角收押所會見黃。劉同意黃於2022年尾仍然維持不認罪，並有律師代表。3人於2023年5月19日首次會見黃，長約1小時，期間黃表示想認罪，並想交代案件經過。劉著黃通知其代表律師，又表示自己會將消息轉達上級。但劉沒有聯絡黃的代表律師。
+
+#### 警表示黃「爭論」想認罪 及後改口「跟進」 否認他「討價還價」
+
+其後劉再獲指示得知黃要求見面，他於2023年6月12日及27日，第二次及第三次會見黃，每次歷時半小時至1小時。劉表示，頭三次會面都是黃「爭論緊想認罪」，他亦有問及控方的立場，稱「因為佢想交代成件事嘅一切」。代表張俊富的大律師李國輔追問「爭論認罪」意思，劉澄清：「跟進返想認罪嘅進度」，又改口指「其實我係講跟進」。辯方追問實際上是否「討價還價？」，「話如果講呢啲嘢，控方要釋放某啲控罪？」劉否認。
+
+劉續舉例解釋：「即係買嘢想跟進進度，問件貨到未」，辯方追問：「即係問有冇得平啲？」劉不同意。辯方問為何黃不找律師，劉回應：「唔知佢心態係想問多啲人定點。」劉強調，首三次見面均無討論案情。
+
+#### 警承認事後銷毀會面筆記 指毋須詢問上級
+
+劉稱首三次會面期間均有撰寫筆記，但回警署向上級匯報後，隨即將筆記銷毀。辯方問及他有否告知上司會銷毀筆記，劉表示屬於個人筆記，「我自己 jot notes，呢啲事唔需要問上級。」辯方問為何不保留資料，劉表示沒有獲得指示，而且非警誡下的證供。劉提及對話內容不多，僅「我一句可以講晒嘅嘢」。劉同意沒有在警方文件中，記錄黃曾要求會見警方，以及會面內容。辯方問：「覺唔覺得好奇怪、唔尋常？」劉表示：「唔覺。」
+
+#### 警稱為黃錄取「無損權益口供」
+
+劉同意辯方指，其後律政司接受黃的代表律師提出的認罪。直至2023年8月24日，3人第四次會見黃，長約2小時。劉表示已獲指示可向黃錄取「無損權益口供」，於是當日進行錄口供程序。黃講述整宗案件由6至7月起的流程，期間劉有撰寫筆記，他回辦公室後將資料記錄在電腦上，隨即將筆記銷毀。辯方再次質疑，為何劉不保留筆記，劉表示該些只屬「證人口供草稿紙」，並非警誡口供。
+
+辯方問及過程中，劉有否提醒黃一些細節及澄清。劉表示沒有，因黃當時「好清晰講畀我聽」，又指「呢份係佢嘅口供，我唔會去糾正佢」。
+
+#### 警稱黃認為草擬口供辭不達意要求改 否認是警方不滿
+
+劉等人於2023年9月6日及14日，第四及第五次會見黃，繼續錄取口供。經過合共3次錄口供後，劉最後草擬了一份120頁的證人口供，其中32頁為文字內容，其餘為附件包括 Telegram 訊息。劉於2023年9月16日將草擬口供帶給黃閱讀。劉指黃認為部分內容辭不達意，因此提出修改：「佢覺得我寫嘅，同佢講嘅可能有少少唔同。」劉於是記低需要修改的部分。
+
+辯方問：「唔覺得需要保留紀錄？」劉表示該文件「係一個錯嘅版本」。辯方質疑：「你哋唔滿意呢個版本，想佢改，所以唔留低？」劉否認，並強調是黃覺得辭不達意，希望修改。直至2023年9月20日，劉正式將口供給予黃簽署，當時有律師在場。其後黃轉往小欖精神病治療中心還柙，劉分別於11月10日及12月28日前往會見黃。
+
+辯方指出，劉多次撰寫筆記後銷毀，屬於不尋常的做法。劉不同意。辯方質疑：「你唔想畀人知道污點證人同警方討價還價，所以銷毀筆記？」劉表示：「冇呢樣嘢，不同意。」
+
+辯方又指，劉沒有在調查報告提及10次會見黃的對話內容。劉同意。辯方質疑，劉三度為黃錄取口供，卻沒有保存筆記。劉解釋若然是警誡口供才會保存。被問及為何沒有詢問上司是否要保存，劉表示若要這樣做，上司會提醒。
+
+#### 辯方質疑劉沒安排律師 指黃曾被警打、強迫交密碼
+
+另外，代表張銘裕的大律師姚本成質疑：「你有冇諗過律師在場好啲？」劉表示：「佢（黃振強）想要律師我會安排，但係佢冇同我提出。」姚亦問劉：「你知唔知黃振強曾經投訴，（被捕後）喺錄影會面期間，畀警方打同氹佢，迫佢交出電話密碼？」劉表示不知道。
+
+#### 辯方質疑劉無透露詳細對話 因怕影響證人形象
+
+代表嚴文謙的大律師梁鴻谷質疑，劉一直沒有回答首三次見面的詳細對話內容，原因是「唔想講？唔講得？驚影響證人喺陪審團面前嘅形象？」，劉否認。梁亦質疑，為何劉得知黃打算認罪後，不及早要求黃提供案情，「可能有4萬個炸彈，你作為調查人員，唔即刻問？」劉表示當時已相隔數年。梁再問：「你諗過有炸彈，不過隔咗幾年？」劉強調：「冇諗過。」
+
+#### 辯方指財富調查組警員有保留筆記
+
+代表李家田的大律師林芷瑩問劉，據資料顯示，警方財富調查組負責調查「串謀提供或籌集財產以作出恐怖主義行為」罪，而該組別的警員有保留與黃見面時的草稿紙，為何劉卻不保留。劉回應：「呢個係每一個調查員嘅筆記，我幫佢解釋唔到，佢嘅 practice 我評論唔到。」林再指出：「你唔 keep 筆記，係唔想辯方團隊知道你會見黃嘅來龍去脈？」劉表示不同意。
+
+#### 辯方質疑劉與財富調查組警員同時會見黃
+
+代表劉佩凝的大律師馬維騉引述資料指，就「串謀提供或籌集財產以作出恐怖主義行為」罪，律政司是稍後才起訴，就此罪黃及劉佩凝於2023年3月18日首次被帶上庭。馬亦指，當黃在2023年8月24日首次錄取口供後，事隔4天即8月28日，就在法庭上決定認罪。馬指8月24日已經達成協議承認哪些控罪及擔任控方證人，劉不肯定。
+
+馬又問，黃於8月24日、9月14及16日的會面，有否提及與劉佩凝的關係。劉表示不太記得。劉稱於9月20至27日期間，沒有將會面中有關劉佩凝的資料轉交財富調查組的警員。而該組別的警員亦無要求劉提供有關資料。
+
+馬引述資料指，財富調查組的偵緝警員11627盧博文（音譯），於2023年9月20日下午12時會見黃，直至12時25分。馬指出據紀錄顯示，劉同日同時正會見黃並要求他簽署口供，因此劉及黃會同時出現。劉不同意，解釋其紀錄顯示會見至12時15分，但實際上這是離開荔枝角收押所的時間，他較早已離開會見房，而離開亦需時辦理手續。
+
+控方大律師周凱靈進行覆問，劉表示警察守則沒有要求將會見的筆記，記錄在警員記事冊。劉又提到，他一般不會將證人口供的草擬本列為證物。
+
+控方未完成覆問，明天繼續。控方預計明天亦會傳召黃振強作供。
+
+本案共7名被告，其中6男即張俊富、張銘裕、嚴文謙、李家田、賴振邦及許湛榮，均否認《聯合國（反恐怖主義措施）條例》下的「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪、作為交替控罪的「串謀導致相當可能會危害生命或對財產造成嚴重損害的爆炸罪」；以及「串謀謀殺」罪，控罪所指的對象為警務人員。李家田另否認「意圖危害生命而管有槍械及彈藥」罪。女子劉佩凝則否認「串謀提供或籌集財產以作出恐怖主義行為」罪。
+
+本案由3男6女陪審團及法官張慧玲審理。控方代表為大律師周凱靈、高級檢控官劉允祥及伍永杰。張俊富由大律師李國輔及于雋謙代表；張銘裕由大律師姚本成及陳雅琪代表；嚴文謙由大律師梁鴻谷及柯愷欣代表；李家田由大律師林芷瑩及何正謙代表；賴振邦由大律師是香媛及余承熹代表；許湛榮由大律師陳偉彥及黃思希代表；劉佩凝由大律師馬維騉及容潔礬代表。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC164/2022、255/2023
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-04-26-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-5.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-04-26-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-5.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..72313cb5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-04-26-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-5.md
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【勇武7人案・審訊第五日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-04-26 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/aKa9Cy8.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#勇武派 #屠龍小隊 #串謀 #反恐"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 「屠龍」領導者黃振強將以「污點證人」身份作供
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】2019年12月8日遊行前夕，「屠龍小隊」成員等人被指計劃遊行期間放炸彈及開槍殺警。6男1女否認「串謀謀殺」及「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」等罪。案件今（26日）踏入第5日審訊。控方傳召本案「污點證人」、即「屠龍小隊」領導人物黃振強作供。黃身穿黑色西裝、白色波鞋及戴黑框眼鏡出庭，他由3名懲教人員押送出犯人欄，並由1名懲教陪同坐在證人枱。但由於黃需時閱讀警方在其電話擷取的 Telegram 訊息，因此他獲安排在證人枱的螢光幕閱讀約6小時，而法官及陪審團等毋須在場。案件押後至下周一（29日）續審，屆時他將確認訊息是否準確，並會開始作供。
+
+黃振強為本案第二名證人，他身穿黑色西裝、白色波鞋及戴黑框眼鏡出庭，由3名懲教人員押送出犯人欄，並由1名懲教陪同坐在證人枱。
+
+#### 黃振強2022年尾不認罪 翌年中表示想認罪及交代案情
+
+黃原被控4罪，他至2022年尾仍維持不認罪，據作供的警員稱，還柙中的黃於2023年5月要求與警方見面，表示想認罪及交代案情，最終獲控方接納。黃改為承認其中2罪，即「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪、「串謀提供或籌集財產以作出恐怖主義行為」罪。另外2罪即「串謀謀殺」罪、「管有爆炸品」罪，則獲豁免起訴。
+
+#### 控方指黃需時閱讀電話 Telegram 訊息
+
+黃今在庭上確認，於2019年12月8日被捕後，警方在其身上檢取兩部電話。控方大律師周凱靈表示，警方早前在黃振強電話內擷取大量 Telegram 訊息，涉及多個帳戶，並需要黃逐一閱讀及確認，至少需要6小時。控方指：「諗唔到折衷辦法可以唔使佢睇晒」。若然黃最後同意這些訊息，控方可不用傳召4名與處理訊息有關的證人。因此，控方提議讓黃宣誓後，坐在證人枱透過電腦螢幕閱讀文件，控辯雙方可派代表在庭上觀察，但法官、陪審團、傳媒及公眾毋須在場。在辯方不反對下，法官張慧玲批准做法。黃將於下周一開始作供。
+
+本案共7名被告，其中6男即張俊富、張銘裕、嚴文謙、李家田、賴振邦及許湛榮，均否認《聯合國（反恐怖主義措施）條例》下的「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪、作為交替控罪的「串謀導致相當可能會危害生命或對財產造成嚴重損害的爆炸罪」；以及「串謀謀殺」罪，控罪所指的對象為警務人員。李家田另否認「意圖危害生命而管有槍械及彈藥」罪。女子劉佩凝則否認「串謀提供或籌集財產以作出恐怖主義行為」罪。
+
+本案由3男6女陪審團及法官張慧玲審理。控方代表為大律師周凱靈、高級檢控官劉允祥及伍永杰。張俊富由大律師李國輔及于雋謙代表；張銘裕由大律師姚本成及陳雅琪代表；嚴文謙由大律師梁鴻谷及柯愷欣代表；李家田由大律師林芷瑩及何正謙代表；賴振邦由大律師是香媛及余承熹代表；許湛榮由大律師陳偉彥及黃思希代表；劉佩凝由大律師馬維騉及容潔礬代表。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC164/2022、255/2023
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-04-29-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-6.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-04-29-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-6.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..79f60f0f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-04-29-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-6.md
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【勇武7人案・審訊第六日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-04-29 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/aKa9Cy8.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#勇武派 #屠龍小隊 #串謀 #反恐"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 污點證人「屠龍」隊長黃振強：勇武團隊倡與警方「武力對等」、引入真槍實彈
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】2019年12月8日遊行前夕，「屠龍小隊」成員等人被指計劃遊行期間放炸彈及開槍殺警。6男1女否認「串謀謀殺」及「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」等罪。案件今（29日）踏入第6日審訊。控方傳召本案「污點證人」、即「屠龍小隊」隊長黃振強作供。他早前承認兩罪，其餘兩罪則獲豁免起訴。黃供稱，在示威活動認識本案被告嚴文謙，獲邀加入「荃灣示威群組」。8月有示威者遭荃灣二陂坊黑社會斬，成員呼籲「一齊殺入二陂坊」，對「黑社會睇場嘅舖頭」進行「裝修」。黃表示「復仇行動好成功，被勝利衝昏頭腦」，於是精英化小隊篩走十多人，正式成立「屠龍小隊」，寓意「連警察速龍小隊都可以屠」。黃表示自己任隊長是因有積蓄，「比較有財力」，又指小隊每次示威會花十萬元買100枚汽油彈用。
+
+黃續指，本案同謀者、另一隊伍的吳智鴻，曾提到勇武示威者與警方「武力不對等」，皆因「警方最高武力係槍，示威者就係得火魔法，即係汽油彈」。吳提倡「要武力對等，先有得玩落去」，其團隊認識軍火商，將引入軍火包括「真槍實彈」，希望鼓勵其他團體武裝，繼而「大計劃一齊合作，去用呢啲軍火射殺警察」。
+
+#### 黃振強承認兩罪 另兩罪獲豁免起訴
+
+黃振強為本案第二名證人，他以「污點證人」身份作供。黃今身穿灰黑色西裝、白色波鞋及戴黑框眼鏡出庭。作供期間，兩名懲教職員坐其兩旁看守。
+
+黃於2019年12月8日在灣仔展鴻大廈一單位被捕。他原被控4罪，至2022年尾仍維持不認罪。據作供警員稱，還柙中的黃於2023年5月要求與警方見面，表示想認罪及交代案情。黃確認，於2023年9月向警方提供兩份證人口供。至今年2月，黃承認其中2罪，即「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪、「串謀提供或籌集財產以作出恐怖主義行為」罪。另外2罪即「串謀謀殺」罪、「管有爆炸品」罪，則獲豁免起訴。黃於2024年4月10日獲得豁免起訴書。
+
+#### 黃稱7.21事件後辭職全程投入抗爭 期間找「金主」資助
+
+首先由控方大律師周凱靈主問。黃供稱，他於2019年6月12日起開始參與反修例運動，當時他20歲，修畢高級文憑後任職地盤搭棚工。他起初只是遊行表達訴求，後來協助設置路障及為前線示威者提供物資。自元朗7.21事件後，黃想全程投入抗爭運動，於是在7月22日辭職，並成為前線勇武。期間黃透過 Telegram 尋找「家長」或「金主」籌集資金，以維持日常支出，他獲得一名自稱中學女教師的人介紹「金主」援助，大部分為律師、議員及記者等專業人士。
+
+#### 黃稱示威時認識嚴文謙 獲邀加入「荃灣示威群組」
+
+黃續指，他於2019年7月的尖沙咀示威活動中，認識另一位前線示威者「阿謙」、即本案被告嚴文謙。兩人一見如故並志同道合，嚴邀請黃加入 Telegram 的「荃灣示威群組」，共有三十多名成員。黃的用戶名起初為「Happy Healer」，其後改為「Sick Healer」。黃亦邀請另一示威夥伴「Kan」林銘皓加入群組。
+
+#### 黃：示威者遭黑社會斬 於是他呼籲「一齊殺入二陂坊」
+
+直至2019年8月，「荃灣示威群組」成員響應「港九七區三罷示威」，並在荃灣區參與示威。黃表示，當晚有年輕示威者遭荃灣大陂坊及二陂坊的黑社會斬至皮開肉綻，令成員們非常憤怒；另外亦有傳媒「渲染」警方與黑社會勾結，並選擇性執法。於是在8月25日的「荃葵青大遊行」當日，黃等群組成員與警方對峙完畢後，隨即「呼籲煽動其他示威者一齊殺入二陂坊」，包括對「黑社會睇場嘅舖頭」進行「裝修」及破壞。黃指情況變得一發不可收拾，最後他們在傳媒「單擋」下成功逃脫。
+
+
+▲ （資料圖片）
+
+#### 黃：二陂坊事件後被勝利衝昏頭腦、精英化小隊並改名「屠龍」
+
+黃表示「二陂坊事件」在示威者一方引起很大迴響，而群組成員對此感到莫名興奮，「我會形容我哋被勝利衝昏頭腦，向荃灣黑社會復仇行動好成功。」黃及成員認為「起咗朵就應該改名」，於是改名「屠龍小隊」，並將隊伍「精英化」，勸退了遲到、缺席、瘦弱及女性成員，剩下的10人就正式成為「屠龍小隊」。黃解釋，「屠龍」寓意「連警察速龍小隊都可以屠」。控方表示：「『屠』呢個字好文雅，即係寓意咩？」黃回應：「擊敗或者打敗」，「龍」則指「警方速龍小隊及其他警員」。
+
+#### 黃：因自己有財力故任隊長、拿5萬積蓄補貼開支
+
+黃表示自己擔任「屠龍小隊」的隊長，原因為他「比較有財力」，黃解釋並非指自己「家底好」，而是其他成員大部份為18至20歲出頭的年輕人或學生，沒有正當收入。而自己任職地盤搭棚工有積蓄，於是拿出其中5萬元補貼隊內開支，例如車馬費、購買防護用具及武器。另外，他亦較熱心示威事務，而且身形較為壯健，因此被成員一致推舉。每次參與示威前，黃及「Kan」會作出部署和指揮。
+
+至於小隊其他成員包括：黃振強、「Kan」林銘皓、「阿積」程于寶、因本案被捕的「TT」梁政希、；另有4名本案被告「阿謙」嚴文謙、「阿塵」張俊富、「小熊」張銘裕及「檸檬」李家田。其後，小隊亦分別開設「滅龍」及「皇馬龍利號」群組。
+
+#### 黃：可仿效政治團體眾籌 開設「育龍」頻道即籌得10萬
+
+另外，黃認為長遠而言，小隊可以「仿效政治團體眾籌」，透過文宣籌錢，於是他於11月在 Telegram 開設「育龍」頻道，在發出文宣後籌募得10萬元。對話顯示黃向嚴發訊息稱：「靠你死得啦，得嗰5千。我打完篇嘢，即刻多10萬」。黃解釋，「屠龍」曾接受《立場新聞》及《蘋果日報》訪問，因此名氣較大，募集效果較好。但他強調只有隊長可用「屠龍」名義籌錢。
+
+#### 黃：遭同路人污衊「係鬼」、拍片澄清「堅做嘢」
+
+黃又收集「屠龍」抗爭場面的片段，讓修讀電影系的李家田剪輯，以宣傳小隊的抗爭事蹟。內容包括成員與警方「埋身肉搏」、投擲汽油彈及向中資銀行縱火。由於小隊遭到同路人「國難五金」及政治名人陳浩天「抹黑污衊」，「話我哋係鬼、呃錢扮勇武」，因此片段主要用作澄清「我哋唔係鬼」，係「堅做嘢嘅前線示威者」。黃同時希望透過片段籌錢。黃曾將片交予本案被告劉佩凝在「連登」發布，亦曾交予《立場》記者。控方播放片段，顯示開首以普通話稱：「手牽手跟我走」，其後有配樂與抗爭畫面同步，包括破壞警車、縱火及「裝修」等。庭上有被告觀看片段期間微笑。
+
+
+▲ （資料圖片）
+
+
+▲ （資料圖片）
+
+
+▲ （資料圖片）
+
+#### 黃表示負責向成員提供資金
+
+黃解釋，隊伍資金由他負責統籌及管理，如小隊成員需要資金，會問他拿取。控方展示黃與成員的對話，嚴文謙曾問黃：「大佬有冇零用？」，李家田則問：「係咪派錢買衫？」、「多謝大佬」。黃表示由於成員經常作戰示威，因此安排成員於11月19日到泰國旅行放鬆回氣。
+
+#### 黃：在「公海」認識同謀者吳智鴻、對方相約見面
+
+另外，黃表示於2019年7月認識同因本案被捕的「鴻仔」吳智鴻。黃解釋，7.21元朗白衣人無差別襲擊事件，引發社會討論警方選擇性執法，並加深民眾對警方的仇恨。黃在 Telegram 一個「公海」群組上，見到用戶名為「流浮山刀手」的人，發表了關於如何找白衣人報仇的言論，黃覺得對方「講嘢好有 point」，並認同其說法，因此私訊他。吳相約黃見面，以確認大家身份無可疑，亦不是警方潛伏在示威者一方的「鬼」。
+
+兩人在8月頭首次見面，黃應邀到旺角卡啦OK店「Red MR」與吳會面，在場還有吳的5名友人，其中一人為本案被告「阿恨」彭軍壕，其餘包括「大舊」、「神學佬」、「阿文」等。吳提及各人於佔中及佔旺事件認識，而「大舊」是其團隊的「金主」，有足夠資金支持團隊的抗爭運動。吳同時稱將會籌備引入「真槍實彈」及舉行軍事戰術訓練。黃表示當時抱着「聽住先」的態度，並與吳保持聯絡，吳亦不時資助黃參與前線運動。
+
+#### 黃：應邀參與勇武派會議、有人為與警方「武力對等」擬引軍火
+
+直至黃成立屠龍小隊後，吳開始與黃頻繁見面。吳於9月初邀請黃到科技大學會議室，參與「前線勇武派抗爭會議」。黃帶同其軍師「Kan」參與。而其他出席者包括：吳智鴻及其團隊成員「大舊」、「阿文」、「阿恨」彭軍壕及「神學佬」；另有「蜘蛛隊」的隊長 Jack、不屬任何隊伍的「老虎仔」、「本土民主前線」的鍾雪瑩及其男友「軍火佬」蘇緯軒。
+
+會議主持者之一的吳，提到勇武示威者與警方「武力不對等」，因「警方最高武力係槍，示威者就係得火魔法，即係汽油彈」。因此吳提倡「要武力對等，先有得玩落去」，抗爭運動才可以繼續。他又指，示威者「唔應該防守，要主動出擊」。吳又透露，其團隊認識軍火商，將會引入軍火包括「真槍實彈」，並希望可以鼓勵其他團體武裝，及後「大計劃一齊合作，去用呢啲軍火射殺警察」。
+
+#### 黃：花十萬買100枚汽油彈示威用
+
+黃在會上與「老虎仔」交換聯絡方式，後來黃向「老虎仔」購買汽油彈，以在示威使用。黃表示汽油彈為隊伍的最大支出，100枚汽油彈連同運費「至少十幾萬港幣」。而他們每次進行衝擊，最少需要用100枚汽油彈。另外，黃早前曾給予「老虎仔」十多萬，用作設置工場及請人製造汽油彈。黃表示，他會指示隊員到示威地點附近取汽油彈，而主要投擲汽油彈的是他、嚴文謙及張銘裕。
+
+#### 黃：「屠龍」獲邀參與台灣軍訓、相信小隊能力受欣賞
+
+其後，吳邀請「屠龍」成員參加台灣軍訓，由台灣退伍軍人設計課程，並有人免費資助食宿。黃當時相信吳「好欣賞我哋屠龍小隊嘅勇武能力，想將呢個機會給予我哋」，小隊的張銘裕提出想參與，他在9月中跟隨吳到台灣軍訓。
+
+#### 黃：因在中大抗爭受傷，未能參與試槍及炸彈
+
+直至10月1日的「反國慶遊行」，有年輕示威者在荃灣被警方開槍射中。事後吳表示，原本想在10月1日實行用槍計劃，但某些原因需要煞停，期間他有找人製炸藥。黃把消息告知其他隊員。於11月初，吳開設「行山討論區」群組，希望相約測試槍械及炸彈，黃被加進群組中。黃表示，吳邀請「屠龍」成員參與，原本打算自己及李家田一同前往測試，但自己在中大抗爭受傷，其「體能狀態應付唔到」，最後找曾經與吳一同軍訓的張銘裕代替，因吳會較信任他。
+
+事前各人在群組討論測試計劃，吳表示會在深山進行，來回均需要行山兩至三小時，並叮囑「自備刀，如有意外殺返條路出去」。吳又指，水警到達測試地點需時19分鐘，飛行服務隊則需時26分鐘。各人於11月16日晚上前往測試。
+
+案件明續審。
+
+本案共7名被告，其中6男即張俊富、張銘裕、嚴文謙、李家田、賴振邦及許湛榮，均否認《聯合國（反恐怖主義措施）條例》下的「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪、作為交替控罪的「串謀導致相當可能會危害生命或對財產造成嚴重損害的爆炸罪」；以及「串謀謀殺」罪，控罪所指的對象為警務人員。李家田另否認「意圖危害生命而管有槍械及彈藥」罪。女子劉佩凝則否認「串謀提供或籌集財產以作出恐怖主義行為」罪。
+
+本案由3男6女陪審團及法官張慧玲審理。控方代表為大律師周凱靈、高級檢控官劉允祥及伍永杰。張俊富由大律師李國輔及于雋謙代表；張銘裕由大律師姚本成及陳雅琪代表；嚴文謙由大律師梁鴻谷及柯愷欣代表；李家田由大律師林芷瑩及何正謙代表；賴振邦由大律師是香媛及余承熹代表；許湛榮由大律師陳偉彥及黃思希代表；劉佩凝由大律師馬維騉及容潔礬代表。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC164/2022、255/2023
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-04-30-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-7.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-04-30-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-7.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..a15508f0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-04-30-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-7.md
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【勇武7人案・審訊第七日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-04-30 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/aKa9Cy8.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#勇武派 #屠龍小隊 #串謀 #反恐"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 「屠龍」隊長黃振強：擬燒英皇集團中心、目的引警察到炸彈
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】2019年12月8日遊行前夕，「屠龍小隊」成員等人被指計劃遊行期間放炸彈及開槍殺警。6男1女否認「串謀謀殺」及「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」等罪。案件今（30日）踏入第7日審訊。早前已認罪、為本案「污點證人」的「屠龍小隊」隊長黃振強繼續作供。他稱起初打算在行動中用手槍「殺狗」，其後獲另一隊伍兼本案被告吳智鴻告知，區選前不要擅自行動。吳最後指示「屠龍」負責引警方出來，而吳的團隊會引爆炸彈。黃一度提議12月1日遊行時，在尖沙咀警署附近使用炸藥，或者先用真槍，但吳的團隊以未準備好為由拒絕。黃最終決定「屠龍」不會親自用槍或炸彈，只會配合計劃引警方出來。他建議12月8日行動當天，燒英皇集團中心，引警方到小炸彈。黃亦提議待示威者離開後，「槍手」才開始用槍射警員。至計劃前兩天，黃卻私心想用手槍，並問吳能否提供。
+
+#### 黃振強：兩隊員隨吳智鴻到西貢試槍，其中一人獲手槍及子彈
+
+黃振強為本案第二名證人，今第二日作供，由控方大律師周凱靈繼續主問。黃供稱「屠龍」兩名成員包括李家田及張銘裕，於2019年11月16日晚跟本案被告「鴻仔」吳智鴻的團隊，到西貢西灣亭試槍及炸彈。Telegram「滅龍」群組對話顯示，梁政希問：「試過未，副嘢？」，黃回答：「今晚試，副眼鏡唔知清唔清」；黃解釋「眼鏡」是「真槍」的術語，上述說話即嘗試真槍是否用到。有人問：「有冇眼鏡布呀？」，黃估計代表滅聲器。另有人問：「塊鏡片係空心定實心？」，黃估計「鏡片」即「子彈」。
+
+測試完畢後，吳將一支手槍及子彈交給李家田。黃於測試翌日，即11月17日在大鴻輝（荃灣）中心的一間餐廳舉行會議，要求所有隊員出席。出席者包括：黃振強、程于寶、嚴文謙、張銘裕、張俊富、林銘皓、李家田。會上兩人匯報試槍及炸彈的過程，各人亦討論如何處置這些槍械，但最終沒有結論。
+
+#### 黃稱打算在行動中自行用槍「殺狗」
+
+黃曾問及該支手槍的去向，並建議不要歸還吳，因「畀咗就拎唔返」。他又表示：「咩時期呀？冇得怕死，返嚟我要用眼鏡」、「返嚟我一定要殺狗」。黃表示將於11月19日，與5名隊員到泰國旅行數天，他打算回港後在某次行動中自行使用該槍。他又解釋，早前得知吳有方法引入真槍實彈，於是向對方索取槍械，但等了很久才成功獲得。他擔心若歸還的話，很大機會未能取回。
+
+#### 黃叫身處理大的隊員「快啲啪隻狗先」
+
+黃又指，其後隊員李家田及梁政希進入理工大學，雖然黃事前勸喻隊員不要入內，但兩人仍堅持。群組對話紀錄顯示，李表示：「個個備戰緊」，黃回覆：「快啲啪隻狗先」，他解釋意思叫理大示威者盡快向警方進行攻擊。黃又回覆梁表示：「狗一定要啪」；而「啪」意指「射殺或攻擊」。另有人說：「迫出老解？」，其意思是問，攻擊警察是否想迫出解放軍。黃一度指，若李未能離開理大，黃將自己實行用槍計劃。
+
+#### 黃：吳指示「屠龍」負責在行動中引警察出來
+
+於11月18日，吳智鴻向黃振強表示：「11月24日之前唔好用槍，用咗炸彈先」，黃回覆：「我哋冇炸彈」，吳表示：「我有，到時同你夾」。黃解釋11月24日是區議會選舉的時期。兩人相約18日晚在觀塘康寧道球場見面，吳表示槍械陸續到手、其團隊有人正製造 20kg 炸藥。吳表示，「屠龍」會負責「引警方出嚟」，但暫未有詳細計劃，「嚟緊有大型遊行嘅話，就係大行動（殺警行動）落實嘅日子。」吳又著黃找其餘兩個勇武小隊商討行動，包括「蜘蛛隊」及「閃燈隊」。
+
+於11月19日至23日，小隊其中6人到泰國旅行，包括：黃振強、程于寶、嚴文謙、張銘裕、張俊富及林銘皓。黃在泰國向隊員交代，小隊不會使用槍及炸彈，只負責透過堵路或「裝修」引警方出來。黃在群組表示會到泰國「驗眼鏡」，即在芭堤雅參加提供予遊客的「真槍活動」。梁政希問：「去驗眼鏡，究竟有幾多？」，嚴文謙表示：「200幾」，梁回應：「一人兩副都仲有突」。黃解釋是形容子彈的數量。
+
+#### 黃：「屠龍」決定不會親自用槍或炸彈
+
+於11月21日，沒有到泰國的隊員梁政希問：「你哋究竟幾時返嚟？24號區選嗰日可能大戰呀，會唔會又要孤軍作戰呀？」在泰國的林銘皓回覆：「有 plan，24號全部唔出住，睇啲狗點部署」。黃解釋，吳早前告知不要於11月24日之前擅自參與示威或實行計劃。梁再問：「可唔可以帶套重裝返嚟俾我呀⋯⋯乜彈都射唔穿個啲呢。如果有我做靶，你哋 cover 我咪得囉」，林回覆：「運到返嚟先得㗎」，黃則表示：「使乜重甲」。黃解釋，若想好如何配合吳的計劃，隊員就毋須重裝備。
+
+其後，李家田將「育龍」頻道的一個訊息轉發至「滅龍」群組，該訊息是黃或林或「龍女」劉佩凝所撰寫，主要向坊間澄清「屠龍」沒有隊員進入理大。黃續指，李及梁「唔聽指示堅持入去」，李看到澄清的訊息後「覺得好受傷」、「好似賣咗豬仔」，因此轉發訊息「發一發晦氣」。
+
+於11月底，「屠龍」成員在荃灣三陂坊舉行會議，得出結論是「屠龍」不會親自用槍或炸彈，只會配合吳智鴻隊伍的計劃。
+
+#### 黃：擬12.1遊行在尖沙咀警署附近用炸藥、惟吳回覆未準備好
+
+黃表示，打算在12月1日的尖沙咀遊行時，於尖沙咀警署附近使用該 20kg 炸藥，並表示：「尖沙咀狗屋對出，有個位好靚仔」。黃於11月29日找吳智鴻，打算與他商討如何配合。吳於11月30日表示「下星期六」才使用炸藥，即12月8日。他又指，遙控引爆器已準備好，只剩下俗稱「書包」的炸藥還未製作好。
+
+#### 黃提議先用真槍 槍手指需多等數天
+
+黃遂提議先用真槍，吳回應：「星期一（12月2日）如果真係有罷工會塞，我有槍手會攞步槍出嚟，你會唔會等佢？」，黃問：「你想邊度塞？」，吳回答：「至少引到狗出嚟」。黃解釋，當時示威者會發起罷工或堵塞交通的活動，吳問會否等槍手才行動。黃認為，槍手可在港島區用槍，「屠龍」則在九龍區包括尖沙咀「開花」示威。吳又著人將兩把手槍交予「屠龍」，並表示：「起碼啪10個8個」，黃回應：「正，你支步槍咩型號？」，吳回答：「AR15」。吳亦問黃是否準備好殺警後的安排：「你哋安排好走佬未？」
+
+其後，吳轉發「槍手」蘇緯軒的訊息，指「等多幾日啦，唔係唔打，打完之後全世界 Weapons free，第一波想盡殺，有幾多殺幾多，全民執槍」。以黃的理解，「槍手」想表達「佢用完步槍殺警，殺完之後全世界就會 Weapons free，示威者只要有一個肯用槍或者軍火，就會有其他示威者模仿或者跟隨」。黃續指，當「殺警數字最大化」，警員受傷倒地或者死亡，示威者就可以執警槍，從而達致吳所提倡的「武力對等」。但「槍手」等人尚未準備好，原本計劃的12月2日行動最終沒有進行。黃最後表示：「我哋實配合你嗰邊」。
+
+#### 黃：行動前5天見面確認
+
+吳智鴻於12月3日晚相約黃振強在荃灣「松記糖水」見面，並會合「屠龍」軍師 Kan 及「閃燈隊」隊長 Kristy。期間吳告知會於12月8日行動。之後各人前往荃灣「SOHO酒吧」，會合吳團隊的其他成員，包括彭軍壕及賴振邦。但賴留意到房間內有閉路電視，為安全起見於是沒有繼續商討。控方播放相關閉路電視。見面後黃發訊息表示：「辛苦了各位手足」、「唔該晒，星期日加油」。
+
+#### 黃：「屠龍」負責引警察到小炸彈
+
+黃講述計劃內容，該 20kg 炸藥被製成炸彈，當時打算放置一大一小炸彈。黃負責帶領「屠龍小隊」引警察到小炸彈附近，吳就會引爆炸彈嚇退警察，令他們撤退至大炸彈，其後吳再引爆炸彈。於12月5日，黃問：「有 location 未？」，吳將地圖發送他，上面標示了紅、藍、綠共3點。黃問：「紅係痴線佬？」，吳回覆：「紅色嚇鬼用，迫佢哋退去藍色」。黃解釋「痴線佬」即「槍手」，他在問槍手的位置。而「紅色」代表小炸彈，「藍色」代表大炸彈，綠色則代表「痴線佬」。
+
+吳叮囑黃切勿將地圖流出，事後吳已經刪除，並表示：「當然得我哋會知，如果走漏風聲就要暫停」。黃回應：「希望張圖得你、我、痴線佬知，其他隊員最好用口述」。黃亦表示，自己會於當日部署好引警方出來的行動細節。
+
+#### 黃稱打算燒英皇集團中心：燒完班狗實出
+
+其後，吳表示：「星期日 Action，修頓球場出面有中銀」，黃回應：「我哋要燒英皇，燒完英皇班狗實出」。黃解釋，吳建議「裝修」位於軒尼詩道的中國銀行分行，但黃認為燒中資店舖未必能引警察，反而燒英皇集團中心的話，較大機會引警察出來，因槍手位置剛好在英皇對面。吳一度指：「反正痴線佬位置睇晒成條軒尼詩道」。
+
+#### 黃建議待示威者離開後 槍手才開始射警員
+
+黃又表示：「叫佢（槍手）等班黑衫走晒先射」，黃解釋意思是「如果槍手開槍，等示威者走晒先好開槍射啲警員」。吳回應：「總之狗人分隔就會射」；黃理解其意思指，槍手會作出判斷，當示威者與警察分開後，就會射殺警察。黃其後稱：「我諗到啦，我帶支煙花咪得囉」，他打算在完成引警方出來的行動後，就點燃煙花，作為「正式開槍」的訊號。吳表示：「10樓打落嚟，好難打唔到自己人」，他又指：「做完自己嘢就散，唔好食花生，一定有片睇」。
+
+#### 黃：自己私心想拿手槍
+
+於12月5日，吳向黃表示可提供10塊防彈鋼板，並稱：「得塊防彈板，你要諗下點樣著上身」。黃表示可送到荃灣，最後安排張俊富協助接收。黃打算在12.8計劃中使用。
+
+於計劃前兩日、即12月6日，黃問：「星期日大概幾點開始？」，吳表示約下午4至5時。黃遂指：「諗諗吓我都想拎支眼鏡仔」。黃解釋，「屠龍小隊」決定不會用槍，但「我自己私心 request，想拎支手槍自己去用」。
+
+黃表示，他於計劃前一日、即12月7日在安全屋內，向隊員表示行動將於12月8日進行。在場的隊員包括：梁政希、程于寶、林銘皓、嚴文謙、張銘裕及張俊富。他透露「屠龍」只負責引警察出來，並指示隊員聽從其指揮。
+
+#### 黃稱計劃前一周租住安全屋 警方檢獲避彈衣等
+
+黃確認自己於2019年12月8日早上6時，在灣仔展鴻大廈12樓一單位被捕。黃表示單位是隊伍的「安全屋」，在12.8計劃前一周開始租住。該單位有客廳、廚房、廁所及兩個房間。當時黃在自己的房間，而張銘裕及嚴文謙則在另一房間。
+
+控方指，警方在黃的房間檢獲大量證物，並在庭上逐一展示。當中包括：頭盔、防毒面罩、膠盾、兩件避彈衣及防彈鋼板。黃解釋，每次行動前他都會添置防護裝備或武器予隊員使用，主要由家長售賣或提供。黃表示成立「屠龍」後，曾要求本案被告張俊富找一個工廈單位作為倉庫，以存放物資及武器，並由張負責管理。黃稱某次想親自將物資運到倉庫，因此向張查問地址，對方回覆柴灣角街的致利工業大廈。
+
+案件周四（5月2日）續審。
+
+本案共7名被告，其中6男即張俊富、張銘裕、嚴文謙、李家田、賴振邦及許湛榮，均否認《聯合國（反恐怖主義措施）條例》下的「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪、作為交替控罪的「串謀導致相當可能會危害生命或對財產造成嚴重損害的爆炸罪」；以及「串謀謀殺」罪，控罪所指的對象為警務人員。李家田另否認「意圖危害生命而管有槍械及彈藥」罪。女子劉佩凝則否認「串謀提供或籌集財產以作出恐怖主義行為」罪。
+
+本案由3男6女陪審團及法官張慧玲審理。控方代表為大律師周凱靈、高級檢控官劉允祥及伍永杰。張俊富由大律師李國輔及于雋謙代表；張銘裕由大律師姚本成及陳雅琪代表；嚴文謙由大律師梁鴻谷及柯愷欣代表；李家田由大律師林芷瑩及何正謙代表；賴振邦由大律師是香媛及余承熹代表；許湛榮由大律師陳偉彥及黃思希代表；劉佩凝由大律師馬維騉及容潔礬代表。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC164/2022、255/2023
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-02-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-8.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-02-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-8.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..d78cdbc6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-02-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-8.md
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【勇武7人案・審訊第八日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-05-02 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/aKa9Cy8.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#勇武派 #屠龍小隊 #串謀 #反恐"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 黃振強：隊員透露被警方跟蹤、計劃行動後全隊「走佬」到台灣
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】2019年12月，「屠龍小隊」成員等涉計劃放炸彈及開槍殺警。7人否認「串謀謀殺」及「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」等罪，案件今（2日）踏入第8日審訊。早前已認罪、為本案「污點證人」的「屠龍小隊」隊長黃振強供稱，他曾提議在尖沙咀警署或朗豪坊放炸彈，又表示「目標係要炸到最多狗」，但最終沒有實行。他們只會在12月8日負責「引戰」令警方到場，配合吳智鴻的行動。黃又指，當他知悉會參與吳的行動後，一直部署「走佬 plan」，打算在行動後安排「屠龍」全隊成員「走佬去台灣」，期間參與軍訓。黃亦表示，隊員李家田於行動前兩日表示「好似畀警察跟蹤」，於是黃給予他費用暫住酒店。直至行動前的晚上，李表示會到灣仔的安全屋，但他凌晨近4時仍未抵達，於是他著黃把鎖匙放在門口。黃於行動當日清晨被捕。
+
+#### 黃：「屠龍」軍師擬到尖沙咀踩線，準備12.1遊行用炸彈
+
+黃振強今第三日作供，控方大律師周凱靈繼續主問。黃供稱，11月25日在三陂坊舉行的會議上，出席者包括「屠龍」隊員程于寶、林銘皓、梁政希、張銘裕、張俊富及李家田。黃曾向隊員提及即將會有大行動，吳智鴻隊伍會負責用槍及炸彈，而「屠龍」則不會親手使用槍及炸彈，只會從旁協助吳智鴻隊伍。但會議當日尚未確認行動日子，因吳在12月3日才告知將於12月8日行動。
+
+於11月27日，張銘裕曾將引爆裝置的片段傳送到「滅龍」群組。程于寶問「一定要咁大舊㗎？個 size 有冇得濃縮？」，張銘裕回應「難啲，都係放入袋，冇所謂啦」。
+
+對話紀錄顯示，於11月29日，「屠龍」的「軍師」林銘皓將12.1尖沙咀大遊行的海報發送至「滅龍」群組，並稱：「今次應該哨到」。黃解釋林打算到遊行附近地點「踩線」或觀察，正常他們會在每次行動前視察路線，規劃「點樣打」。其後黃回應：「我直接打啦，仲哨？」，他解釋意指可以直接到場示威，毋須「踩線」。林再問：「講緊嗰 20，唔駛睇？」，黃理解他是說 20kg 炸藥。黃回應：「唔駛睇，我想落場打」，吳回答：「咁就咁㗎啦，你想做大嘢，係要 plan 㗎喎。一係直接嗰日用囉，一了百了」。
+
+#### 黃：提議在尖沙咀警署使用炸彈
+
+黃解釋，他本來打算在12月1日到尖沙咀如常示威暴動，但林卻提出當日使用吳智鴻的炸彈，並需要較謹慎進行「踩線」。黃回應：「好，啪尖沙咀狗屋」，林表示：「佢哋喺入面都炸唔死佢哋，佢哋要出嚟」。黃解釋，他建議在尖沙咀警署使用炸彈，但林認為警察在警署內不會出來。林續指：「一日未搞掂走佬 plan，都未有得用」。黃解釋，他打算完成12.8行動後，「帶成隊離開香港」，但需要部署好「走佬」計劃才可以實行大行動。
+
+另外，對話紀錄顯示林在群組表示希望取得防彈盾，嚴文謙則稱：「順便畀支 AR15 我」。黃解釋「AR15」是步槍，又指當時嚴只是「加把嘴講」，其發言屬開玩笑性質。
+
+#### 黃：準備90支汽油彈打算用 因嚴文謙不在港取消行動
+
+直至11月30日，黃表示：「聽日大遊行一齊去荃灣拎 gear」。他亦指：「預咗90支酒，聽日用」。黃解釋向「老虎仔」索取90支汽油彈，打算與隊友在翌日的尖沙咀示威中使用。林一度問：「唔係煙花咩？」，黃回覆：「買唔切」。
+
+黃最終取消了12月1日的行動，因平日會一同行動的嚴文謙不在港，他正身處韓國。黃解釋：「因為每次行動喺示威暴動現場，我同佢比較有默契，如果佢唔喺度我冇安全感，相信行動風險相對較高，所以取消決定唔出。」
+
+#### 黃：目標「炸到最多狗」、想建議在朗豪坊放炸彈
+
+黃亦向張俊富表示：「噚日都出咗旺角一轉，彌敦道朗豪坊個位最靚仔，佢哋一定會清場」。黃解釋，他打算在視察之後，向吳建議在哪一位置使用炸彈。張回應：「嗰個位好容易，一定經過，但係好多高樓大廈，好容易爆咗啲唔撚關事嘅人㗎喎」。黃則回覆：「我哋目標係要炸到狗，炸到最撚多嘅狗，我唔理其他人」。但最後吳自行決定在灣仔放置炸彈。
+
+12月1日，黃與程于寶到北區某一圍村購買了煙花和炮仗，打算親自搬去荃灣倉庫。黃對張表示：「阿塵，我買咗啲煙花同炮仗，我哋好快用，你擺喺倉先啦」，黃最後叫張在倉庫樓下等，協助接收物品。黃又指，吳曾經提供防彈板予「屠龍」。控方播放閉路電視片段，顯示於12月6日，吳在倉庫附近搬一個箱子，並由張俊富接收。
+
+#### 黃：計劃行動後全隊「走佬」去台灣、期間參與軍訓
+
+黃表示，得悉吳行動的雛形後，他就開始部署「走佬 plan」，並計劃安排「屠龍」全隊成員在大行動後「走佬去台灣參加第二次軍訓」。而出發日期大約是12月尾，軍訓為期約兩周，由「Christina」負責安排。黃又透露，關於軍訓的資訊由吳智鴻提供。於12月1日，李家田在「滅龍」群組問：「台灣有 plan 未？」，黃回答：「有」。有人說：「好似係一路 train 一路玩」。
+
+李家田於12月2日再問：「我最期待嘅眼鏡訓練呢？唔係有咩？」，黃回覆：「眼鏡建基於體能，想用好眼鏡，體能係必須」。黃解釋，張看不到有槍械訓練，但黃認為用槍需要建基於體能，因此訓練內容大部分是針對體能。
+
+#### 黃：行動前3日曾蒙面受訪
+
+黃於12月3日在群組表示：「今個星期四 Full Team 同 Lo 做訪問，6點。」黃解釋，當時有記者想訪問「屠龍」，他打算全隊出席，之後順便開會商討12.8行動。黃記得訪問日期為12月5日，地點在何文田，出席隊員包括林銘皓、程于寶、張銘裕、張俊富、嚴文謙及李家田。事前各人亦有商討拿取面巾及帽等，以便「Black Bloc」蒙面受訪。開會期間，黃表示屆時將「各自做各自嘅嘢」。
+
+另外，黃於12月5日在「滅龍」群組表示：「我拉咗啲龍B同新人入去」，他解釋希望行動當日有更多示威者參與遊行，因此邀請他認識的人到名為「皇馬龍利號」的群組，該群組不止「屠龍」成員，但新加入者並不知道會用槍及炸藥。黃於「皇馬龍利號」群組表示：「星期日嘅行動細節，我星期六會講，大家準備好 full gear，唔好遲到」。黃解釋，他只會提供裝備予隊伍的人。
+
+#### 黃：行動前2天隊員透露被警察跟蹤
+
+於12月6日，即行動前兩天，李家田在「滅龍」群組表示「好似畀警察跟蹤」，他問：「有冇竇可以轉？」黃開玩笑回覆：「我唔想揚，你自首啦」。黃之後叫李暫住酒店，並給予他有關費用。
+
+#### 黃：軍師表示引戰待警到場、隊員憂被誤會是放炸彈者
+
+同日，有隊員問：「8號之後我哋使唔使避？」，「軍師」林銘皓表示：「我諗諗」。程于寶則指：「淨係引班狗嚟就掂，走得」、「平時做嘅嘢，不過喺特定地方」。林回覆：「嗰個位我哋引戰，然後班狗嚟，一放煙佢就嚟」。黃解釋，行動當日「屠龍」會在特定位置「引戰」，當警察發射催淚彈之後，吳的團隊就會行動。嚴回覆林：「嗰個位我哋引戰，一班狗嚟，啲人應該會當係我哋放（炸彈）？」，黃解釋，嚴擔心若按照林的意思進行計劃，日後或被人誤當是「屠龍」負責用槍及炸彈。其後，程表示：「咁其實避避會好啲」。
+
+控方問，平時示威會否用「引戰」字眼。黃回答：「以前我哋唔會特別用『引戰』呢個字，通常有特定目標衝擊或者襲擊，今次大行動先會有『引戰』呢個 term。」
+
+黃接着轉發「家長」的鼓勵說話到群組：「話俾佢哋知，無論佢哋係邊，個個親戚都會記得佢哋。叫佢哋好好照顧自己，未做完嘅功課，會有人繼續做落去，希望佢哋都能夠享受成果」。程回覆：「喊咗」。
+
+#### 黃：已安排裝備及汽油彈予隊員
+
+另外，黃於12月6日及7日分別提醒隊員：「全世界唔好帶裝」、「聽日唔好帶任何工具同武器」。他解釋會安排裝備及汽油彈予各隊員，他們毋須攜帶個人裝備。關於準備隊伍物資方面，黃向負責管理倉庫的張俊富稱：「你照舊拎晒啲嘢出嚟，唔使計數」。黃解釋打算在大行動之後離港，若將物資存放在倉庫也沒有意義。
+
+於12月7日傍晚，黃打算將荃灣倉庫的物資搬到灣仔安全屋，並要求3名隊員協助。但嚴及梁均表示沒有空，黃遂回應：「乜都唔使做咩你哋？明知聽日大嘢，用得你哋幾多時間呀？」最終他們沒有搬運物資。
+
+#### 黃：行動前一日通知時間地點、表明「遲到就88，永不錄用」
+
+另外，黃於12月7日相約隊員準備翌日行動，並在「滅龍」群組表示：「9點灣仔浸信會見」。程問：「聽日引戰係咪幾支酒就得？」，嚴問：「full gear 嘅話直接打近身？」，程回覆：「咁咪你都中埋？」黃認為程是擔心「打近身」會受到炸彈和槍波及。控方另問，獲警方不反對通知書的遊行，與沒有獲不反的非法遊行，兩者相比哪一種會較多遊行人士。黃表示前者較多人。
+
+在12月7日，黃在「皇馬龍利號」群組稱：「星期日4點，軒尼詩道華星冰室，請準時」、「4:05會起行，遲到就88，永不錄用」。黃解釋，他們會在華星冰室出發，並於下午4時05分開始在軒尼詩道引警察到場。他希望各人能夠準時出席。
+
+#### 黃：李家田表示會來安全屋、著放鎖匙在門口
+
+於行動前的晚上、即12月8日凌晨，黃在安全屋過夜。李家田表示會來，黃於是提供安全屋地址，並教他要在上兩層出𨋢，以防被跟蹤。梁政希卻在群組表示：「我啱啱冇添，唔記得咗，下次注意返」，黃稱：「冇下次，你哋呢啲冇第二次機會」。黃解釋，他提醒梁要保持謹慎，不要鬆懈，因行動只有一次機會，「如果有咩 mistake 導致失敗，唔會有第二次機會可以重新嚟過、重新實行。」直至凌晨3時51分，李仍然未抵達安全屋，黃於是問：「瞓著啦，嚟未？」，李回覆：「擺條鎖匙喺門口」。黃於行動當日、即12月8日清晨在安全屋被捕，當時物資尚在荃灣倉庫。
+
+案件明（3日）續審。
+
+本案共7名被告，其中6男即張俊富、張銘裕、嚴文謙、李家田、賴振邦及許湛榮，均否認《聯合國（反恐怖主義措施）條例》下的「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪、作為交替控罪的「串謀導致相當可能會危害生命或對財產造成嚴重損害的爆炸罪」；以及「串謀謀殺」罪，控罪所指的對象為警務人員。李家田另否認「意圖危害生命而管有槍械及彈藥」罪。女子劉佩凝則否認「串謀提供或籌集財產以作出恐怖主義行為」罪。
+
+本案由3男6女陪審團及法官張慧玲審理。控方代表為大律師周凱靈、高級檢控官劉允祥及伍永杰。張俊富由大律師李國輔及于雋謙代表；張銘裕由大律師姚本成及陳雅琪代表；嚴文謙由大律師梁鴻谷及柯愷欣代表；李家田由大律師林芷瑩及何正謙代表；賴振邦由大律師是香媛及余承熹代表；許湛榮由大律師陳偉彥及黃思希代表；劉佩凝由大律師馬維騉及容潔礬代表。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC164/2022、255/2023
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-03-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-9.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-03-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-9.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..2f3c8ca8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-03-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-9.md
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【勇武7人案・審訊第九日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-05-03 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/aKa9Cy8.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#勇武派 #屠龍小隊 #串謀 #反恐"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 黃振強：開「育龍」頻道眾籌表明目標擊殺30警、受訪澄清小隊為真勇武
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】2019年12月，「屠龍小隊」成員等涉計劃放炸彈及開槍殺警。6男否認「串謀謀殺」及「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪，1女否認「串謀提供或籌集財產以作出恐怖主義行為」罪。案件今（3日）踏入第9日審訊。早前已認罪、為本案「污點證人」的「屠龍小隊」隊長黃振強供稱，於11月初認識本案女被告劉佩凝，黃表示自己是「屠龍揸 fit 人」，劉提出可資助，黃表明要買3支槍。劉多次轉賬數千至數萬元予黃。兩人共同成立及管理「育龍」頻道，作為眾籌之用以應付小隊開支。黃表示，於11月底要求加緊眾籌力度，因需資金安排「走佬 plan」。他於行動前兩日，在頻道表示「公會任務目標係集齊最少30粒龍心，有冇家長願意永久課金／支援玩家」。黃解釋目標「至少擊殺30個警察」。至行動前一日，當時頻道已成立一個月，黃表示共籌得30多萬。
+
+黃又指，頻道一度被誤會是「鬼」及「警方派人冒充」，於是他們接受《立場》及《蘋果》訪問，澄清小隊是真的勇武隊伍。
+
+#### 黃：資金來源包括「金主」及眾籌頻道「育龍」
+
+黃振強今第四日作供，控方大律師周凱靈繼續主問。控方問，「屠龍」是否在社會運動群眾之中有一定聲譽；黃認為是。黃表示，過往行動中會在示威者掩護之下，他帶領隊員去拿取汽油彈。
+
+黃同意，「屠龍」小隊需要資金購買裝備及武器，資金來源包括「家長」或「金主」，另外會從 Telegram 的「育龍」頻道眾籌。
+
+黃解釋，「家長」或「金主」一般會直接過數至其戶口，或者透過其他人轉交現金。控方展示 Telegram 紀錄，顯示用戶名「黑警」的人與黃對話。黃解釋，對方是其中一名「家長」或「金主」。黃向他表示：「今晚諗住燒太子」，對方回覆：「非常好」、「遲啲過數畀你買火」。黃回應：「公開眾籌先啦」，對方表示：「籌緊，前線勇武寶寶助養計劃正式啟動」。
+
+黃表示，於11月6日正式成立「育龍」Telegram 頻道，他認為「屠龍」長遠可以仿效政治團體，透過眾籌經營隊伍的開支。黃表示「育龍」頻道籌得的款項，是用作「屠龍」小隊所有開支。
+
+#### 黃表示經隊友認識女被告劉佩凝、對方負責開設頻道
+
+黃表示經隊友嚴文謙認識用戶名為「So fairy」、其後改名為「龍女」的「女手足」，即本案女被告劉佩凝。劉負責開設頻道；黃、劉及林銘皓三人一同管理頻道。但所有款項均由黃管理。
+
+
+▲ 女被告 劉佩凝
+
+#### 黃向劉表示「我係屠龍揸 fit 人」
+
+黃講述如何與劉認識並開展對話。控方展示兩人的對話紀錄，由於劉曾經刪除帳戶，因此紀錄顯示黃與名為「deleted account」的人有訊息來往。於11月4日，黃開始與劉對話，黃問：「你識屠龍？」，劉回覆：「我識一兩個」。黃表示：「我係屠龍揸 fit 人」，劉回應：「大佬唔好打我，我驚」。黃再問：「想知你乜水」，劉回覆：「channel admin」。黃解釋，他知道劉管理一個名為「春天花花」的頻道，屬於示威者「公海」群組。
+
+#### 對話顯示劉稱「要幾多，幫到我就幫」、黃回覆想買3支槍
+
+案發期間，劉多次轉賬予黃，每次金額數千至數萬不等。劉向黃表示：「有需要幫手可以出聲」，黃表示：「要錢，資金」，劉回應：「要幾多，幫到我就幫，唔得我就私人錢」，黃回覆：「你未必得，萬萬聲，寧願你轉介有錢嘅人嚟」。劉表示：「家長因為保障自己唔肯，我做家長咪得」。黃表示：「我哋想買🔫🔫🔫（即3支槍）」，劉稱：「我可能幫唔到好多，一萬都可以我諗」，黃再稱：「可以」。
+
+黃給自己的電話號碼予劉，以讓她用轉數快轉賬。劉卻表示：「我幫過你哋 team 兩個人，但你使唔使 fact check（查證）我個人先」，黃稱：「check 乜鬼？」。黃解釋之前已向嚴查證劉的身份。最後劉透過滙豐銀行轉賬至黃。
+
+#### 黃：可從其他「家長」款項中抽5千予「屠龍」
+
+黃亦曾向劉表示：「同埋好重要，屠龍方面嘅錢一定經我手，唔好亂畀其他人，個人名義我唔理」。黃解釋，只有他可以用「屠龍」名義向外籌集資金。劉一度說：「錢冇咗可以搵，出嚟行，手足冇咗就搵唔到」，黃卻回應：「最好你搵金主，長期你出太多」。黃又指：「我哋用嚟補資源同魔法」，即汽油彈。對話顯示，劉曾分別轉賬5千、2萬及6萬元予黃。
+
+劉又表示，會在其他渠道包括「家長」所籌得的款項，在當中抽取5千元給「屠龍」，但不會表明給予「屠龍」，僅提及給「魔法仔女」。黃解釋「魔法仔女」代表「前線勇武示威者」。劉曾發訊息指：「可能每次課金日完咗，嗰日就畀5千你哋」。
+
+#### 對話顯示嚴文謙建議成立頻道籌款
+
+黃講述頻道成立經過。至11月6日，嚴文謙向黃振強表示：「諗到個 R 資助嘅方法」、「TT 同阿 Kan 都覺得 ok，得閒 call 我」。嚴續指：「So fairy 嗰邊 channel 好垃圾，佢會開新 channel for 我哋，佢自己 run，叫老豆搵仔宣傳個新 channel」。以黃的理解，「老豆搵仔」是反修例期間，其中一個最知名及最多人追蹤的「公海」群組。嚴表示劉會負責管理頻道，有意資助的人可使用 PayMe 或面交方式，每次交易約3千至5千元。嚴補充：「令班狗就算知道我哋做緊乜，都搵唔到我哋係邊個」。最後，當日由劉負責開設頻道，之後黃找「老豆搵仔」頻道協助宣傳。
+
+#### 黃稱被誤會頻道是「鬼」及「警方派人冒充」
+
+頻道成立當晚，黃著劉將他設定為管理員之一。劉亦撰寫了一段訊息打算發布，並發送給黃檢視。該訊息內容為：「我地係一班前線小隊，屠龍。相信大家都聽過，平時睇片都睇唔少，我地呢班人，放棄左生活上太多太多既野......」，訊息最後提及「想幫手 PM：＠DragonBae」。黃解釋上述即劉的用戶名稱。
+
+劉又向黃表示：「成班喺度話你哋係鬼」，黃解釋當時很多示威者「話我哋 channel 係鬼」、「警方派人冒充」。黃表示：「我哋係真手足」。
+
+#### 黃：接受《立場》及《蘋果》訪問澄清
+
+頻道共有1.2萬人追蹤。黃表示頻道成立後，大部分時間由劉管理。對話之間，劉表明自己會負責頻道的文宣後勤工作。黃有時會撰寫特別的文宣在頻道發放，包括：「以下係龍隊其一成員 Healer 聲明，被踢或者離隊成員，唔使扮隊員抹黑我哋，得一隊屠龍其他咪扮嘢，咁樣好侮辱屠龍呢個名」、「屠龍或者真係有好幾隊，起碼我哋知道自己係真手足，爆破頭差啲死，冇必要搵條命嚟呃錢」。
+
+
+▲ （資料圖片）
+
+另外，黃稱曾在頻道轉載「屠龍」接受《立場新聞》訪問的連結，當時黃以化名「George」受訪。他亦轉載「屠龍」接受《蘋果日報》訪問的連結。黃希望藉訪問證明他們是真的勇武隊伍，亦想鼓勵其他前線示威者。同時希望增加眾籌金額。《立場》訪問題為〈再訪屠龍小隊 勇武也到瓶頸了〉，於11月8日被發布；《蘋果》訪問則於同月15日被發布。
+
+
+▲ （資料圖片）
+
+
+▲ （資料圖片）
+
+
+▲ （資料圖片）
+
+#### 黃：11月到泰國開戶口、以保障捐款人安全
+
+頻道曾發布一個馬會戶口、一個泰國銀行戶口及一個滙豐戶口收款，黃解釋11月初到泰國時他開設有關銀行戶口，以保障捐款人及隊伍的安全。而滙豐戶口亦屬他本人。黃指示劉將每天眾籌所得的金額整理，並給他過目，最後要每天將相關金額轉賬至黃的戶口。
+
+頻道訊息顯示：「詳情課金計劃洽談請 PM：@Abc123bbc」，黃解釋上述帳戶由他使用新電話專門為「育龍」開設，以作為頻道的擁有人；劉及林亦可以登入使用。此帳戶曾經回覆一些捐款者的私訊。
+
+#### 黃：發布小隊示威片段後、過百人欲捐款
+
+劉亦有協助將「屠龍」小隊的精華片段發布至「育龍」頻道及「連登」，黃表示：「條片出完反應幾好」，劉回應：「好多人 PM 我」、「我畀人炸爆」、「好多人話要幫手」。黃解釋，當時至少有過百人向頻道表示要捐款。
+
+#### 黃：頻道遭抹黑、劉建議在民間記者會澄清
+
+另外，劉表示早期成立頻道時受盡委屈，因遭人抹黑污衊，需花很多心力澄清。劉提議透過其認識的「民間記者會」團隊，在會上澄清「育龍」並非假冒，順道提高頻道的知名度。他們計劃由黃撰寫聲明，劉負責讀出，但黃不記得有否實行。控方問為何會選擇劉作為代表，黃表示信任其能力，認為她「可以做好呢件事」。
+
+另外，劉一度問黃：「話說你哋收入隊有咩條件？我男朋友都有啲想」、「我男友都係唔怕死，企最前個啲」。劉又將男友的照片傳給黃，黃著劉找嚴文謙處理。被問到傳送男友照片之目的，黃解釋：「好似見工咁，show 吓佢男朋友啲 quali。」
+
+#### 黃：11月底要求加緊眾籌力度、需資金安排「走佬 plan」
+
+於11月23日，黃向劉表示：「我哋嚟緊有大行動，call me」，兩人其後電話通話，黃交代小隊將會配合其他隊伍的槍及炸彈計劃，因此要求「加緊眾籌力度」，因「需要資金為我哋隊伍安排走佬 plan」。
+
+#### 黃於頻道表明目標「集齊30粒龍心」今解釋：希望擊殺30警員
+
+於12月6日，黃撰寫訊息並於頻道發布：「若有手足願意玩真屠龍 online game，公會任務目標係集齊最少30粒龍心，有冇家長願意永久課金／支援玩家，玩家不是 condom，詳情課金計劃洽談請 PM：@Abc123bbc」。黃解釋，其目標是「至少擊殺30個警察」，在追問下他指「擊殺」意思是「殺死」。他又指，相信示威者一方會看得明以上術語所代表的意思，並希望有人捐款予頻道。
+
+
+▲ （資料圖片）
+
+#### 黃於對話透露籌得30多萬
+
+於12月7日，劉轉發組織「國難五金」的訊息予黃，對方表示想向「育龍」索取10萬元。黃表示：「唔會畀，痴線，籌咗咁耐先得廿幾萬，而家叫我畀10萬冇見過嘅人，冇可能」。劉表示眾籌的金額至少有50萬，黃則不同意，表示正確來說只有30多萬，部分已用作籌備「著草 plan」及買軍火。
+
+同日，黃在頻道發布訊息，內容包括：「我哋本身唔少隊員正職收入都可觀，而家需要講課金，真係曾經有心理關口......我哋想準備更多措施，有效抗爭又保護到自己，始終一旦被捕，就好難繼續抗爭......」黃解釋，他希望用「煽情嘅文字」令示威者一方捐款予「屠龍」，然後利用款項部署「著草」計劃，在大行動後帶隊小隊所有成員離開香港往台灣，包括：梁政希、程于寶、嚴文謙、林銘皓、張銘裕、張俊富及李家田。
+
+
+▲ （資料圖片）
+
+
+▲ （資料圖片）
+
+案件下周一（6日）續審。
+
+本案共7名被告，其中6男即張俊富、張銘裕、嚴文謙、李家田、賴振邦及許湛榮，均否認《聯合國（反恐怖主義措施）條例》下的「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪、作為交替控罪的「串謀導致相當可能會危害生命或對財產造成嚴重損害的爆炸罪」；以及「串謀謀殺」罪，控罪所指的對象為警務人員。李家田另否認「意圖危害生命而管有槍械及彈藥」罪。女子劉佩凝則否認「串謀提供或籌集財產以作出恐怖主義行為」罪。
+
+本案由3男6女陪審團及法官張慧玲審理。控方代表為大律師周凱靈、高級檢控官劉允祥及伍永杰。張俊富由大律師李國輔及于雋謙代表；張銘裕由大律師姚本成及陳雅琪代表；嚴文謙由大律師梁鴻谷及柯愷欣代表；李家田由大律師林芷瑩及何正謙代表；賴振邦由大律師是香媛及余承熹代表；許湛榮由大律師陳偉彥及黃思希代表；劉佩凝由大律師馬維騉及容潔礬代表。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC164/2022、255/2023
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-06-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-10.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-06-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-10.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..0cb69fdb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-06-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-10.md
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【勇武7人案・審訊第十日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-05-06 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/aKa9Cy8.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#勇武派 #屠龍小隊 #串謀 #反恐"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 黃振強承認用屠龍眾籌資金約30萬賭波 否認擬行動後挾帶私逃
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】2019年12月，「屠龍小隊」成員等涉計劃放炸彈及開槍殺警。6男1女否認「串謀謀殺」及「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪。案件今（6日）踏入第10日審訊。早前已認罪、為本案「污點證人」的「屠龍」隊長黃振強接受辯方盤問。黃承認在2019年11至12月期間，自把自為使用「屠龍」資金當中約30萬賭波，並輸掉部分金錢。但他否認「私吞」金錢自用，並強調：「我覺得呢種係我用嚟紓壓嘅方法，雖然係唔好嘅途徑。」辯方指，黃計劃在行動翌日獨自前往台灣，「你諗住賣甩屠龍小隊嘅人，拎埋籌到嘅錢一走了之？」黃不同意。辯方發現紀錄顯示，黃在被捕後向警員透露，同案的吳智鴻稱若黃開槍殺警，可在抵達台灣後獲得一百多萬，因此黃一直「扮投其所好」、「氹佢咁樣」。黃在庭上解釋，對上述說法沒有印象，又指被捕後狀態混亂，不清楚為何這樣說。
+
+#### 有人稱「我們是台灣人」欲捐物資 黃回覆「需要軍火」
+
+黃振強第五日作供，控方大律師周凱靈繼續主問。黃早前提及與劉佩凝等成立「育龍」頻道籌集「屠龍」經費。頻道邀請捐款者私訊名為「Abc123bbc」的帳戶，主要由黃、劉及林銘皓回覆。控方展示對話紀錄，有人私訊問：「你好，我們是台灣人，請問是否需要面具、濾罐等物資？我們可以捐贈」，黃表示他回覆「好」。對方再問：「是否需要其他物資？」，黃回答「我們暫時有足夠，比較需要軍火」。對方續指：「軍火送過去比較難，要問問看」，黃再回應「主要是錢和軍火」。
+
+紀錄顯示於12月7日，帳戶向私訊者表示：「嗰啲乜 X 和理非呃人都有百幾萬，但真手足就冇人幫，仲有久唔久畀人中傷抹黑」、「目標500萬，而家得30萬，聽日就屠龍啦但係，30萬邊夠班仔走呀」。
+
+#### 黃用十多萬資金買百支汽油彈 辯方質疑：會唔會太誇張？
+
+控方完成主問，接着由辯方進行盤問。黃早前供稱「屠龍」籌集得的資金全數由他管理。代表被告張俊富的大律師李國輔指，張曾把「家長」給予的5千元捐款轉賬予黃。辯方問到，小隊成員是否信賴黃會善用資金；黃同意。黃亦同意較早時有前成員用「屠龍」名義向「家長」索錢並私吞，因此後來與害群之馬「割席」，而小隊資金交由黃負責管理。
+
+黃早前稱，他會花費小隊資金的十多萬元，向「老虎仔」購買一百支汽油彈。辯方問他有否向隊員交代此事，黃表示「冇特別講」。辯方問：「一支汽油彈一千蚊，會唔會太誇張？」黃解釋製作汽油彈屬嚴重罪行，「如果可以保障到隊員安全，我樂意用金錢轉介呢個風險喺『老虎仔』身上，用錢去買返呢個保障。」辯方追問：「你唔會格價？」黃表示不會。
+
+#### 黃承認用「屠龍」資金賭波 但否認私吞錢自用
+
+其後，辯方問：「隊員相信你唔會私吞資金，用喺唔係屠龍嘅嘢？」黃表示可以這樣理解。辯方問他有否將錢用在非小隊的事項上，黃表示有，包括吃飯、交通及買衣服等個人支出。
+
+黃作供時表示，2019年10月9日晚上曾與隊員去澳門旅行散心，至翌日清晨回港。黃表示，他們到達後「飲飲食食」及「揼骨」，希望離開示威氛圍，自己則用眾籌的資金支付旅程開支。辯方指出，黃等人出發是因張銘裕未能入境澳門，因此其他隊員打算嘗試自己能否入境。黃表示有可能。
+
+辯方指出，當日他們到澳門賭錢，黃更「輸晒啲錢」，要問張俊富借錢。黃表示不記得。辯方追問：「你係咪好鍾意賭錢？」黃強調：「唔係，唔同意。」辯方再問：「你鍾唔鍾意賭波？」黃僅回應：「有賭過，冇話鍾唔鍾意。」辯方展示黃的馬會戶口投注紀錄，顯示他自2018年12月至2019年11月期間多次賭波，投注紀錄共有68頁。辯方重複追問是否喜歡賭波，黃仍堅稱：「有賭，談不上鍾意，我鍾意打籃球。」
+
+辯方質疑：「你用屠龍籌嘅錢賭波？」黃表示：「冇印象，可能有，可能冇。」辯方展示黃在9月至12月的投注紀錄，顯示他多次賭波，在9月某賽事下了1.8萬元投注，在11月某賽事下了5萬元投注。黃早前稱已辭退搭棚工作全程投入示威，辯方問錢從何而來，黃表示：「唔記得。」辯方追問：「係屠龍籌集嘅資金？」黃回答：「應該係。」黃承認沒有向隊員說自己用資金賭波。辯方追問：「你私吞籌集嘅錢自己用？」黃不同意。辯方疑惑問：「因為輸咗嘅錢會作慈善用途，所以你唔同意？」黃堅持不同意。
+
+#### 辯方指一個月內用29萬資金賭波 黃：用嚟紓壓嘅方法
+
+辯方指經計算後，黃在2019年11月至12月共用了「屠龍」資金的29.7萬元賭波，最後「輸咗啲錢」；黃同意，但否認喜歡賭錢。辯方亦問：「當時你自把自為，拎咗屠龍籌咗嘅錢，私底下賭錢輸咗啲？」黃承認，並對辯方表示：「我冇計買咗幾多，感激你幫我計咗係29萬。」黃主動補充，當時籌得的金額多，「其中30萬用嚟賭錢，我覺得呢種係我用嚟紓壓嘅方法，雖然係唔好嘅途徑。」由於黃較早前沒有透露用資金賭錢，辯方遂質疑：「你頭先特登唔講？」黃回應：「感激你幫我記返起我咁唔好嘅行為。」辯方另質疑，黃並非使用十多萬向「老虎仔」買汽油彈，他只是「作大數」；黃不同意。
+
+#### 黃承認往打算行動後往台灣 否認想拿錢一走了之
+
+黃早前供稱會在行動後帶整隊人離開香港。辯方指，據對話紀錄顯示，黃曾於12月7日與被指為劉佩凝的帳戶商討眾籌資金，黃表示：「正確啲嚟講三十幾（萬），而家用咗少少喺著草 plan 同買軍火。」黃今解釋，部分資金撥作將來在台灣使用。辯方指出，黃根本沒有向隊員提及12.8大行動之後的「走佬」計劃，因此張並不知情。黃承認沒有交代計劃內容，但強調有在群組發布到台灣軍訓的資訊。辯方追問：「你有冇預備自己走佬？」黃回應有安排自己與「軍師」林銘皓的「走佬」計劃。
+
+辯方指出，黃打算在行動翌日前往台灣，黃表示不記得。辯方展示黃與「家長」佩兒的對話紀錄，顯示於行動前一日，對方問：「機票幾點」，黃回應：「我自己買，買完 claim 返」，對方又指：「行李你今晚拎畀我先」，黃表示：「我未執」。
+
+黃最終承認打算去台灣。辯方質疑：「你諗住大行動之後，你自己一個去台灣一走了之？」黃表示：「唔肯定係咪自己一個，但係有去台灣嘅打算。」辯方又質疑：「你諗住賣甩屠龍小隊嘅人，拎埋籌到嘅錢一走了之？」黃不同意。辯方指出，實際上黃與吳智鴻商討行動後，對方答應會在台灣給予他一百多萬。黃表示「唔記得」，但承認隊員不會知道金錢方面的事項。
+
+#### 黃庭上稱在中大暴動受傷沒去試槍 辯方揭曾表示扮傷
+
+辯方在下一階段問及錄影會面的內容。黃表示在混亂及慌張的狀態下錄取，並說出「我當時認為係真話」的內容。辯方指出黃在庭上的證供與錄影會面不一致的地方。
+
+黃在庭上表示自己參與中大暴動期間受傷，體能不足以應付到西貢測試槍及炸彈，並指示張銘裕代勞。辯方引述錄影會面紀錄，當時黃表示：「咁佢哋啲槍係到咗，邀請我去荒山野嶺試。我一直拖住佢，應承話好，因為我唔想試，呃佢話身體受傷不適，話唔去。」辯方指出，黃假扮受傷沒有前往測試。黃解釋會面時記憶錯亂，因清早被捕後經歷了很多事情，狀態不理想。
+
+#### 黃：以為用槍是說笑、「冇諗過嚟真」怕受牽連
+
+另外，對話顯示吳智鴻傳訊息指「我槍手想約你傾吓」時，黃回覆一個擁抱的表情符號。黃於會面時解釋：「其實嗰一刻好驚，佢一直講槍械，我表面話好正，心裏面都係講吓笑，想拎吓資助金。我冇諗過會真係嚟真，我唔想掂呢啲嘢，驚有槍牽連到我，我有啲受驚，擔驚受怕。」黃表示上述是其真實想法。
+
+#### 黃：向吳智鴻扮投其所好、對方表示到台灣會給予百萬
+
+對話顯示，黃向吳表示「我諗諗吓都係想拎支眼鏡仔」。黃在會面稱，當時表達想拿手槍，他解釋：「我想扮投其所好，氹佢咁樣」，「因為有次開會，佢話如果真係攞槍殺咗警察，著草去台灣，佢可能畀到百幾萬」，「我一直拖延住佢，一路從而攞啲資助金咁樣。」當時警員問：「即係佢話自己有百零萬，直情可以畀你哋？」黃回應：「我係向住呢筆錢。」警員又問：「攞支槍會畀多啲錢？」黃回答：「係呀係呀。」
+
+紀錄顯示，黃曾說「我諗住趁亂乘機啪兩條，永久棄」，而他在會面解釋只是氹吳的說法，「呃住佢」可能會用槍射警察，並希望「氹一氹佢，過咗台灣可以問佢攞多少少錢」。但黃最終拒絕取槍。
+
+在辯方盤問下，黃表示對於吳會給予百多萬的說法沒有印象，他強調會面時狀態混亂，不清楚為何這樣說。辯方質疑：「你喺證人枱係咪唔想講真話？」黃不同意。
+
+#### 辯方指黃與律政司商討答辯時 提及自己貪錢及要面
+
+辯方質疑，黃在會面時沒有提及想殺警察，現時在庭上卻表示想殺警察。黃表示不記得當時想法。辯方展示代表黃的大律師，於去年7月給予律政司的答辯商討文件。辯方引述，文件透露黃「沒有意圖用炸彈或槍造成警員嚴重傷害」。黃解釋，其意思是不會親自動手，只是向律師表達得不清晰。辯方質疑：「你係咪諗住用方法同律政司達成商討，欺騙佢哋？」黃表示自己不熟悉，有關方面要問律師。文件亦表明，黃之所以沒有反對殺警察的建議，是因黃的「貪念」及「要臉」。辯方問及為何這樣說，黃解釋：「呢個都係貪錢同要臉，都係會做呢件事嘅其中一個因素。」辯方追問是否打算將錢據為己有，用作著草到台灣。黃不同意，強調打算用在小隊上。
+
+#### 辯方：原名為「逃龍」借鑒「逃學威龍」、黃擅自改為「屠龍」
+
+另外，辯方指黃於8月被加入「荃灣示威群組」後，成員曾將隊伍改名為「逃龍小隊」，因他們經常被速龍警員追，並以「逃學威龍」借鑒。黃表示不記得。辯方指出，黃其後「自把自為」將隊伍改名為「屠龍小隊」。黃否認，強調當時各人有共識，隊員亦無當面指責其行為。「屠龍」曾分別接受兩個媒體訪問。辯方指黃沒有與隊員商量，便獨自接受《立場》的訪問；黃不同意。辯方另指，張俊富沒有接受《蘋果日報》訪問，其角色只是「運輸工人」，協助搬運裝備到場。黃同意這是張的功能之一。
+
+辯方指據對話紀錄顯示，黃於11月至12月分別向「閃燈隊」隊長 Kristy 及名為「佩兒」的「家長」，表示「條 team 無人做嘢㗎」和「我真心好躁，成隊好似來來去去得兩三個人做嘢」。黃解釋，當時向對方「呻」自己要處理隊伍的事情，情緒及體能均處於疲倦狀態，但其他隊員卻未能幫得上忙。辯方指張有私人事務要處理，包括正在公開大學修讀會計系三年級，需應付功課及考試。黃表示沒有印象。
+
+辯方亦指，張俊富無參與小隊的主要運作，亦非經常參與群組討論，有時他沒有回覆訊息；黃同意。辯方指出於11月11日，張與黃到葵芳參與示威活動，期間張的左小腿被鏹水掟中受傷，之後黃帶張到其葵涌邨的住所，由急救員協助處理傷口。黃表示不記得。但黃同意辯方所指，張沒有參與後來的中大及理大暴動。
+
+#### 辯方：張俊富反對用槍
+
+黃供稱11月17日曾與隊員在大鴻輝（荃灣）中心一餐廳內開會。辯方指，當晚黃透露有方法買槍並問隊員會否想用，張俊富隨即搖頭反對，表達不同意。黃表示不肯定。辯方又指，黃當晚沒有提及隊員需要配合吳智鴻隊伍的計劃。黃表示應該未，亦同意未得出要配合對方的結論。
+
+#### 辯方：黃沒有告訴隊員要配合炸彈計劃、只表示可用煙花炮仗擲警
+
+辯方續指，11月19日黃與隊員出發前往泰國，因其女友身處泰國。黃表示這並非主因。黃早前供稱，在泰國期間有向隊員談及「屠龍」不會親自用槍，只會引警察到場，以配合吳的隊伍使用槍及炸彈。辯方指出，黃在旅程上根本沒有提及上述計劃；黃不同意。
+
+辯方指，實際上黃向隊員展示內地公安遭煙花炮仗嚇至雞飛狗走的片段，並表示小隊可模仿片段向警察投擲煙花炮仗，如此吸引的畫面可放上「育龍」頻道作宣傳眾籌。黃表示曾分享片段，但不記得有否說過上述的話。辯方指，黃表示需要 20kg 的煙花炮仗；黃不同意。
+
+辯方指出，回港後張提議在11月25日開會期間討論「20kg」，他所指的是煙花炮仗，並非吳智鴻製造的炸彈；黃不同意，其後改稱不肯定。辯方指出，黃在會上沒有談及「屠龍」不會親手用槍及炸彈、只會從旁協助吳的隊伍；黃不同意。
+
+#### 黃起初不同意被警打故提供電話密碼 後改稱遭警揮棍及打面
+
+黃振強於被捕後遭警方檢取手提電話，他表示有提供電話密碼。辯方問是否自願提供，黃沒有正面回答，僅表示「同意提供」。辯方於是問：「係咪因為警員打你、嚇你、迫你、氹你？」黃不同意。
+
+黃於被捕當日錄取了兩份錄影會面。辯方再次問他是否受警員「打、嚇、氹」，黃表示當時狀態不理想。其後黃突然向法官張慧玲表示：「法官閣下，因為我喺投訴警察課有個案，我驚影響嗰邊，我可唔可以唔答⋯⋯」由於黃的代表律師團隊在場，因此法官給予時間黃向法律團隊索取意見。
+
+其後辯方再發問，黃卻改口表示當時「受到警察一定程度武力對待」，最後同意交出手機密碼。辯方質疑為何剛才他不同意被打，黃解釋：「我唔具備能力判斷警方使用嘅武力是否合適，要交畀警察投訴課決定。」辯方追問他受到的對待，黃表示：「警員用警棍向我身體揮動，手掌用力拍我面部。」黃表示警員揮動警棍約8至10下，雖然覺得痛但「判斷唔到係咪打」，需交由警察投訴課人士判斷。
+
+另外，偵緝警員16991早前供稱，於2023年5月至年尾，到荔枝角收押所會見黃約10次。黃表示首次會面是他主動找案件主管，表示想認罪及交代案情。黃不同意辯方指，曾與警員商討承認某些罪，換取其他罪豁免起訴。辯方亦問：「你有爆嘢畀警察，佢寫低咗？」黃不肯定。
+
+案件明（7日）續審。
+
+本案共7名被告，其中6男即張俊富、張銘裕、嚴文謙、李家田、賴振邦及許湛榮，均否認《聯合國（反恐怖主義措施）條例》下的「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪、作為交替控罪的「串謀導致相當可能會危害生命或對財產造成嚴重損害的爆炸罪」；以及「串謀謀殺」罪，對象為警務人員。李家田另否認「意圖危害生命而管有槍械及彈藥」罪。女子劉佩凝則否認「串謀提供或籌集財產以作出恐怖主義行為」罪。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC164/2022、255/2023
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-07-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-11.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-07-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-11.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b29486cc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-07-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-11.md
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【勇武7人案・審訊第十一日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-05-07 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/aKa9Cy8.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#勇武派 #屠龍小隊 #串謀 #反恐"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 黃振強否認為減刑而誇大證供令被告入罪 亦否認「為錢殺人」
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】2019年12月，「屠龍小隊」成員等涉計劃放炸彈及開槍殺警。6男1女否認「串謀謀殺」及「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪。案件今（7日）踏入第11日審訊。早前已認罪、為本案「污點證人」的「屠龍」隊長黃振強接受辯方盤問。辯方質疑黃為了想獲得減刑，因此在證人枱上「誇大張俊富嘅參與角色」，亦誇大張知道行動會用槍及炸彈，希望透過證供令張入罪。黃一律不同意。辯方指，黃在「育龍」眾籌頻道表示目標至少擊殺30個警察，藉此呼籲捐款，他亦貪取事成後的百萬酬勞。辯方質疑：「即係為錢殺人？」黃否認。另外，黃曾建議在朗豪坊放炸彈，「目標炸到狗，我唔理其他人嘅」，遭辯方質疑：「即係話你意圖係濫殺無辜？」黃承認，但強調主要想殺最多警察。
+
+#### 黃否認無告知隊員行動會用槍及炸彈、僅表示用煙花爆竹
+
+黃振強第六日作供，接受代表被告張俊富的大律師李國輔盤問。黃早前稱，曾向「屠龍」隊員表示小隊將於12月8日配合吳智鴻隊伍，負責引警察到場，吳則安排開槍及引爆炸彈。辯方指出，吳於行動前三日沒有向隊員提及上述計劃，他僅表示會使用煙花爆竹嚇警員，並與「閃燈隊」及「蜘蛛隊」合作。黃表示沒有印象。辯方指，黃亦向隊員表示若不使用煙花爆竹的話，就如往常般示威。黃對此不同意。
+
+辯方展示對話，指出黃一直建議用煙花爆竹。黃在「屠龍」、「閃燈隊」及「蜘蛛隊」的聯合群組「燈龍蛛」表示，「打陣地，我拎到煙花炮仗」。黃承認當時叫「家長」到錦田買煙花爆竹，並指「有新玩具」、「啲炮仗可以放足半個鐘，放喺狗屋門口」。黃於12月3日向「閃燈隊」隊長 Kristy 表示：「下星期日，30支，我要你哋搬，有煙花玩」。
+
+辯方質疑黃只打算在12月8日使用煙花爆竹嚇警察，但黃卻不同意，澄清是用作引警員出來，配合吳的行動。在法官追問下，黃又改稱其中一個目的是打算中途放煙花攻擊警察。黃同意在庭上首次說出上述版本，在早前的供詞亦無提及。
+
+#### 黃不同意張俊富說未能參與行動
+
+辯方指根據警員的跟蹤紀錄，於行動前一晚，黃及張俊富在安全屋樓下聊天。當時張問：「聽日係咪用煙花爆竹，如果係，第二日拎嚟？」，黃回應不需要。黃同意有說過，但否認當時已擱置煙花爆竹計劃。張亦表示自己受傷及需考試，翌日不會參與行動。黃對此不同意。
+
+黃早前亦供稱，行動前一日沒有將裝備由荃灣倉庫送往灣仔安全屋，亦提及因隊員沒有幫忙而未能成事，辯方指出，群組對話顯示實際上隊員有協助運送物資。黃最終承認有，但並非全部隊員協助。辯方亦指，對話顯示 Kristy 曾安排車手協助運送，對方一度表示「你陪多我一陣」。辯方問到兩人關係，「係男女朋友定曖昧？」黃表示：「相信係正常朋友踏入曖昧關係。」法官張慧玲問：「咩叫曖昧關係？」黃解釋：「大家對對方有好感，未正式成為男女朋友。」
+
+#### 黃否認利用其他成員 從而自己獲取百萬酬勞
+
+辯方指，黃根本無向張表示「屠龍」會配合吳的計劃引警察到場，亦無表示會計劃包括用槍及炸彈；黃不同意。辯方質疑，黃利用其他成員與吳智鴻合作，待事成後獨自「著草」到台灣獲取百多萬酬勞；黃不同意。辯方續指，黃知道若其他成員知道行動會用槍及炸彈後，他們不會參與，並會反對黃與吳合作。黃不同意。
+
+#### 黃否認誇大張俊富角色令其入罪 從而獲減刑
+
+辯方亦指，黃知道以控方證人身分作供可以獲得減刑。黃表示：「知道有機會因為我作證，而（法庭）會寬大處理判刑。」辯方質疑：「你成功令被告入罪，減刑會越多？」黃回答：「我冇聽過呢個講法。」辯方最後指出：「你因為想獲得減刑，所以喺證人枱上誇大張俊富嘅參與角色？你亦誇大張俊富知道行動會用槍同炸彈？」黃一律不同意。辯方指，黃想透過證供令張俊富入罪，從而令自己獲得減刑；黃不同意。
+
+#### 黃透露獲1百萬現金捐款 泰國旅行花費20萬
+
+其後由代表張銘裕的大律師姚本成盤問。辯方指：「可以用四個字形容點解你會被捕，就係貪心爛賭」，黃不同意。辯方指根據紀錄，就眾籌作恐怖主義行為的控罪，涉款約4百多萬元。黃同意上述金額不包括從「家長」或「金主」的現金捐款，而現金款項至少有100萬元。黃同意曾表示手頭上資金剩30萬，並指其餘款項在泰國戶口。
+
+辯方指案發時黃年僅20歲，根本沒有想過短短數月內，會有數百萬資金在手；黃同意。辯方亦指，黃三度用資金與隊員旅行，包括兩次去泰國及一次去澳門。黃透露其中一次泰國旅行花費約20萬。黃承認自己負責管理資金，其他被告對此一無所知。
+
+#### 黃否認「為錢殺人」解釋要錢走佬
+
+辯方引述「育龍」眾籌頻道的訊息，內容為「目標係集齊最少30粒龍心」。黃早前解釋意指至少擊殺30個警察。辯方遂問：「以殺30個警察作為餌？」黃表示：「作為招徠。」辯方質疑：「即係為錢殺人？」黃表示：「唔可以咁講⋯⋯我覺得需要錢 for 將來走佬 plan，行動之前想盡量籌多啲錢。」黃同意辯方所指，上述為顯示自己貪心導致被捕的例子。
+
+辯方續指，黃為貪取吳智鴻將會給予的一百萬，因此參與其計劃。黃回覆：「我唔同意為錢而殺人。」對話顯示黃曾表示「30萬走佬唔夠，要500萬」，辯方質疑：「你想攞多啲錢，挾帶私逃？」黃不同意。辯方又指，黃蓄意不把「著草」計劃告知其他隊員，他們一直被蒙在鼓裡；黃不同意。
+
+至於「爛賭」方面，黃昨被揭露使用約29萬眾籌資金賭波。辯方今問他在澳門之旅有否大額賭博，黃表示不記得，反指可問同行隊員。黃最終承認「好賭」，但重申是紓壓途徑。
+
+#### 黃表示成員僅反對親自用槍 但不介意他人用令警察傷亡
+
+至於軍火及炸彈方面，黃同意得悉吳智鴻希望購入軍火及炸彈，當時他認為對方「吹水」，抱持「聽住先」的心態。黃同意吳沒有要求「屠龍」協助製造或購買上述軍火炸彈。黃亦同意，成員張銘裕參與吳舉辦的台灣軍訓，與本案的串謀是風馬牛不相及。辯方展示張銘裕和吳智鴻的對話紀錄，吳在軍訓前提到：「之後可能會玩暗殺啲狗」，張表示：「如果我哋一日未出現槍殺，如果未諗住去到呢個地步，可能我唔係一個適合嘅人選」。黃表示沒有聽過上述說法。
+
+辯方亦指，小隊成員在11月得知吳有槍及炸彈後，曾表示「咪搞我，我唔會用槍同炸彈」。黃同意，但他否認直至12月8日，成員的立場維持不變。他解釋隊員有共識不會親自使用，但不介意其他人使用導致警察傷亡。
+
+#### 黃承認10.1開槍事件後「仇恨警察」
+
+辯方指，10月1日荃灣有示威者被警方開槍打傷，導致「勇武派」非常憤怒，「個個都要搵槍擸架生搵差人報仇」；黃同意有這個情緒，全隊人當時都仇恨警察。對話顯示黃曾經向吳索取手槍，黃同意自己「好仇恨警察」故想用槍。
+
+#### 黃建議朗豪坊放炸彈 承認會導致「濫殺無辜」
+
+辯方指，對話顯示黃提議12月1日在朗豪坊放炸彈，張俊富回覆：「但係好多高樓大廈，好容易炸到唔關事嘅人」，黃反駁：「我哋目標炸到狗咋嘛，炸到最多狗，我唔理其他人嘅」。辯方問：「即係話你意圖係濫殺無辜？因為你想殺狗，所以唔理其他人，好多無辜嘅人會畀你殺埋？」黃同意，但最後強調：「想殺到最多警察，濫殺無辜唔係我嘅目的。」法官追問：「你心態唔係濫殺無辜，不過如果殺警察而殺埋無辜，你唔計較？」黃表示：「當時心態係唔計較。」
+
+#### 黃否認曾向警方「講數」商討只認部分罪
+
+黃昨承認遭警員向其揮動警棍及打面，最後交出電話密碼。辯方今引述法庭紀錄指，黃的代表律師於案件首次提堂時表示，黃被捕時遭警員拳打腳踢，但沒有提及被警棍打。辯方指黃捏造被警棍打的情節，黃不同意。
+
+另外，紀錄顯示黃在2023年5月19日，首次在荔枝角收押所會見本案的案件主管，黃主動表示想認罪及交代案情。辯方指，黃一直維持不認罪，卻在被捕後的3年多突然想認罪，其目的是獲得減刑。黃不同意。
+
+黃堅稱會面期間，警員只是著他想清楚及告知其代表律師。辯方質疑會面歷時一小時，不可能只談及上述話題。黃解釋，當時被問及想認罪的原因，他表示知道犯錯及牽涉嚴重罪行，並不同意辯方所指「即係知道自己死梗，點打呀」。另外，黃表示警員亦有問及其還柙情況，黃補充：「唔知點解佢會咁關心我。」在辯方追問下，黃承認當時表示「全部罪都可以認」，又指可以交代自己的行為及其所知的情況。
+
+辯方指出，實際上警方在會面期間表示，「你想認罪講數，得，搵律師寫信入嚟，我哋會考慮」；黃同意對方有類似說法。但黃不同意辯方指，他當時想「講數認少啲罪」。辯方指雙方商討成功，最終黃毋須承認「串謀謀殺」等兩罪；黃同意。辯方質疑，黃是基於能夠獲額外刑期扣減，於是願意做控方證人；黃不同意，強調「呢個唔係我嘅原因」。
+
+案件明（8日）續審。
+
+本案共7名被告，其中6男即張俊富、張銘裕、嚴文謙、李家田、賴振邦及許湛榮，均否認《聯合國（反恐怖主義措施）條例》下的「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪、作為交替控罪的「串謀導致相當可能會危害生命或對財產造成嚴重損害的爆炸罪」；以及「串謀謀殺」罪，對象為警務人員。李家田另否認「意圖危害生命而管有槍械及彈藥」罪。女子劉佩凝則否認「串謀提供或籌集財產以作出恐怖主義行為」罪。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC164/2022、255/2023
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-08-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-12.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-08-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-12.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..388f8977
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-08-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-12.md
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【勇武7人案・審訊第十二日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-05-08 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/aKa9Cy8.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#勇武派 #屠龍小隊 #串謀 #反恐"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 黃振強承認瞞隊員索槍欲殺警 辯方質疑：佢哋咪畀你拉落水？
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】2019年12月，「屠龍小隊」成員等涉計劃放炸彈及開槍殺警。6男1女否認「串謀謀殺」及「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪。案件今（8日）踏入第12日審訊。已認罪、為本案「污點證人」的「屠龍」隊長黃振強接受辯方盤問。黃承認沒有徵詢隊員同意，便自行向吳智鴻表示小隊會配合其用槍及炸彈行動。黃亦承認沒有告知隊員行動細節，包括炸彈及槍手的位置。辯方指行動中的炸彈接近油站，牽涉人命後果不堪設想，「分分鐘（隊員）自己都畀人炸死埋」，而黃的做法對隊員不公，令他們無法判斷是否參與。黃堅稱提供的資訊已足夠。另外，黃承認瞞著隊員，私下向吳智鴻索手槍打算殺警，但得知行動會使用手榴彈後，就因「怕死」而改口不要槍。辯方質疑：「隊員跟住你行動，唔知你用槍，咪畀你拉落水，好似協助你咁？」黃強調最終沒有拿槍。辯方回應：「多謝你對啲隊員咁好。」
+
+#### 辯方指黃沒有徵詢隊員同意 自行向吳智鴻表示會配合行動
+
+黃振強第七日作供，接受代表張銘裕的大律師姚本成盤問。黃早前供稱，隊員於11月17日有共識不會用槍及炸彈，翌日黃與吳智鴻見面，對方告知稍後會有大行動，黃表示會配合吳。辯方質疑，黃深思熟慮後決定刻意不提「屠龍」不用槍或炸彈。黃否認，又指若對方問及會如實告知。辯方又指，黃從沒有徵詢過其他隊員的同意，便自行決定向吳表示會配合其行動。黃表示隊員確實沒有同意配合吳的行動，但他們是知情，並強調：「相信我同隊員嘅共識係一致。」
+
+黃作供提及於12月3日跟吳見面，對方落實12月8日行動。辯方問有否將會面內容告知隊員；黃承認沒有，解釋當時未計劃好行動細節。
+
+#### 黃承認無將炸彈及槍手位置地圖給隊員看
+
+另外，對話紀錄顯示，黃在12月5日收到吳智鴻傳來炸彈及槍手位置的地圖。黃同意當日稍後與隊員開會時，沒有將地圖給予他們看。黃提醒吳該地圖「唔好流出去」，並「希望張圖得你、我、痴線佬（槍手）知」。辯方質疑黃刻意不讓隊員知道。黃表示：「唔係刻意唔畀其他人（包括隊員）知道」，其意思僅著對方不要將地圖散播開去。
+
+黃堅稱沒有將地圖傳送予林銘皓，但辯方引述對話紀錄，顯示黃於12月5日曾將地圖傳送予林，並著林記下位置後，就要將地圖刪除。黃最終同意有將地圖給予第三者，但解釋林是隊內「軍師」。黃同意刻意不傳給隊員，但否認蓄意誤導他們。黃亦同意沒有向隊員講述兩個炸彈的實際位置，他解釋自己在行動前一晚仍然不清楚。
+
+#### 辯方指隊員不知會放炸彈及開槍 無法判斷是否參與
+
+另外，行動前兩日有隊員問到計劃的實際內容。程于寶在群組問：「其實我哋做邊個 plan？」，林銘皓回答：「淨係引班狗嚟，走得」。辯方質疑黃刻意不「搭嘴」，黃不同意。程續稱：「咁其實都係我哋平時做嘅嘢」。黃同意隊員理解行動只是如往常般參與暴動，包括投擲汽油彈及破壞「藍店」。林回應：「不過今次係要特定地方」，又指：「嗰個位我哋引戰，然後引班狗嚟」。黃解釋，當時尚未決定好實際地點。
+
+黃同意沒有在群組告知隊員有槍手會在高處開槍，亦無告知會在英皇集團中心附近放炸彈，而行動有危險性。辯方指出，行動涉及安全和影響無辜第三者，因此黃需要向隊員清晰交代內容，讓他們判斷是否同意參與。黃同意。辯方指，隊員不知道具體行動，無法判斷是否參與，「分分鐘自己都畀人炸死埋？」黃表示：「呢個係佢哋嘅判斷，我唔可以幫佢哋判斷。」辯方質疑，黃沒有給予隊員足夠資訊，對他們並不公平。黃堅稱資訊已經足夠。
+
+#### 辯方質疑無向隊員表示炸彈近油站 黃解釋沒留意
+
+辯方指是次行動「牽涉人命」，因此黃需提醒隊員保護自己及遠離槍擊地方，黃卻沒有做到。黃表示「唔完全正確」，因隊員清晰知道行動涉槍及炸彈，他們可自行選擇是否參與。
+
+辯方問，黃有否留意炸彈位置接近「加德士」油站，「爆起上嚟仲得了？」黃表示沒有留意。辯方追問：「你有冇講清楚呢個危險畀張銘裕聽？」黃承認沒有說：「首先我冇留意到炸彈同油站嘅聯繫，我都唔具備知識知道炸彈嘅實際威力。」辯方指，「你知道油站丟個煙仔都唔掂？」黃未有回答。辯方續問：「油站可以食煙？」黃表示：「冇光顧過油站。」辯方追問：「常識嚟㗎，後果不堪設想？」黃同意。辯方再問：「你冇同隊友講清楚呢個咁危險嘅行動？」黃表示：「當時認為係清晰。」辯方質疑：「你有講油站？」黃強調當時不知道油站與炸彈的連繫。
+
+辯方指，隊員不知道炸彈可能在遊行隊伍經過時引爆。黃解釋：「我哋有豐富嘅示威經驗。引戰嘅話，正常嚟講和理非、唔關事嘅都會退，得返勇武示威者。唔係話等遊行人士過咗先爆。」辯方卻指：「你要解釋清楚畀隊員聽，點樣藏身保護自己、邊度引爆，唔係佢哋點跟你去呢。」
+
+辯方又指，黃一直有機會向張銘裕說清楚行動內容，包括會用槍及炸彈。黃同意是有機會，但否認刻意不提。辯方指：「如果你話晒所有部署、可能嘅結果畀佢知，佢可以選擇唔參加？」黃同意。
+
+#### 辯方指行動前一晚 黃沒有向隊員交代細節
+
+黃早前稱，他在行動前的晚上，在安全屋告知隊員將於翌日行動。黃同意在被捕後的錄影會面中，沒有談及在安全屋的事情，直至2023年中向警方表示想認罪並錄口供時，才首次講述。黃同意辯方指，事隔3年多憑記憶交代事情有機會記錯。辯方指出，實際上黃沒有在安全屋向隊員交代行動細節；黃不同意。
+
+黃承認當晚並非所有隊員在場，而「閃燈隊」隊長 Kristy 亦身處安全屋。辯方指由於「唔齊人」及「有外人」，因此黃根本沒有告知行動細節；黃不同意。黃承認約凌晨12時與林銘皓一同離開安全屋，前往會合吳智鴻。黃表示出發前有告知隊員，但辯方指黃捏造證供，隊員根本不知情；黃不同意。
+
+#### 黃承認想索槍獨自殺警 知道隊員不贊成而隱瞞
+
+對話紀錄顯示，黃於行動前兩日向吳索取手槍，更表示想殺警察：「我諗住趁亂乘機啪兩條，然後永久棄」。黃承認當時打算在行動用槍，而這並非小隊計劃之內。對話間，黃向吳表示：「唔好畀我 teammate 知」。辯方質疑：「你自己私底下攞槍殺兩個警察，但係唔畀隊員知，因為你知道佢哋唔贊成呢個做法？」黃表示：「係。」辯方又指：「你隱瞞咗重要事項，唔對佢哋坦白講清楚？」黃承認。
+
+辯方指：「你掂軍火同槍，但係唔畀隊員知？」黃否認。辯方問：「你明知隊員唔會支持你，所以唔畀佢哋知？」黃解釋：「我哋（屠龍）同意唔用槍，但係我私心諗住攞支手槍殺警。我唔想隊員知，一嚟係私心，同埋無必要畀佢哋知道我做咁危險嘅事。」辯方指出：「隊員跟住你行動，唔知你用槍，佢哋咪畀你拉落水，好似協助你咁？」黃解釋最後決定不用槍。辯方回應：「多謝你對啲隊員咁好。」
+
+#### 黃承認知吳智鴻用手榴彈後「怕死」 決定不索槍
+
+對話期間，吳表示：「總之痴線佬開槍，唔係想打就好走」、「對家一到位，我就撳炸彈」、「會有人啪手榴彈」。黃聞後回應：「咁唔使畀支嘢我，我走先」。辯方質疑：「你知道有手榴彈，覺得分分鐘搞到自己，所以唔射差人，走先？」黃承認。法官張慧玲問，黃是否得知對方會用手榴彈後，隨即表示不要手槍；黃同意。黃承認當刻是首次聽到對方會使用手榴彈。辯方問到為何表示「走先」，黃解釋意指「類似係唔使畀我，走先拜拜」。法官再問：「係講笑定唔係講笑？」黃表示：「我哋當時呢啲年輕人，係嬉笑怒罵、調皮輕鬆嘅感覺」、「唔係嚴肅」。辯方最後問：「你會唔會聽到手榴彈，驚起上嚟唔用槍，話走先，驚畀人炸埋？」黃不同意。
+
+#### 兩人對話談及火箭炮及核彈 黃解釋僅說笑
+
+黃又向吳表示：「手榴彈佢因間緊張得滯跣手，我就（粗口）」。辯方問：「即係你怕死，驚佢炸埋你？」黃同意。吳隨後解釋該「手榴彈」由打邊爐氣罐製成，黃表示以為是軍用款式。兩人又談及「拎支 EMP（火箭炮）直接射去灣仔」、「有冇買核彈？」，黃解釋只是說笑。吳最終問黃：「如果炸完啲狗，你哋會唔會執槍？」，黃表示不會。吳亦問：「眼鏡仔仲要唔要？」，黃表示：「唔要」。
+
+#### 黃承認無叫隊員執嘢「走佬」首次解釋自己離港就「燒唔到其他人」
+
+就「走佬」計劃，辯方指黃沒有於行動前叫隊員收拾行李「走佬」。根據對話紀錄，嚴文謙在行動前兩日在群組問：「8號之後我哋使唔使避？」，林銘皓回應：「我諗諗」。黃承認自己在行動前已計劃好前往台灣。法官問：「你有冇喺任何一個群組叫隊員執嘢，話8號之後走？」黃表示沒有。法官追問：「點解唔講？你自己都預咗走？」黃表示需要思考，法官指可順便小休。
+
+黃相隔20分鐘後解釋：「阿 Kan（林銘皓）話呢單大嘢，一定要我一個人走，就算鴻仔（吳智鴻）嗰邊揚咗，只要我唔喺香港，就燒唔到其他人（隊員）。」黃憶述，林表示之後會陸續安排其他隊員到台灣。辯方質疑黃在小休期間捏造有關說法；黃強調：「不停咁諗，終於記返起。」他承認事隔4年首次提及上述事情。
+
+對話顯示，黃在行動前一日向「龍女」劉佩凝表示，眾籌資金只剩下30多萬，「但已經用咗少少喺著草 plan 同買軍火」。辯方問及如何將錢用在「著草」計劃及買軍火；黃承認未使用相關資金，並表示：「解釋唔到。」辯方問黃是否欺騙「龍女」，黃表示：「有可能呢句係呃佢。」他補充：「我懶得解釋點解得返30萬，唔得閒搞呢啲嘢。」
+
+案件明（9日）續審。
+
+本案共7名被告，其中6男即張俊富、張銘裕、嚴文謙、李家田、賴振邦及許湛榮，均否認《聯合國（反恐怖主義措施）條例》下的「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪、作為交替控罪的「串謀導致相當可能會危害生命或對財產造成嚴重損害的爆炸罪」；以及「串謀謀殺」罪，對象為警務人員。李家田另否認「意圖危害生命而管有槍械及彈藥」罪。女子劉佩凝則否認「串謀提供或籌集財產以作出恐怖主義行為」罪。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC164/2022、255/2023
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-09-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-13.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-09-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-13.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..93fa9578
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-09-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-13.md
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【勇武7人案・審訊第十三日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-05-09 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/aKa9Cy8.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#勇武派 #屠龍小隊 #串謀 #反恐"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 黃振強稱應酬金主似「做鴨」辯方質疑亂搞關係 黃激動嚎哭需被抬走
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】2019年12月，「屠龍小隊」成員等涉計劃放炸彈及開槍殺警。6男1女否認「串謀謀殺」及「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪，今（9日）踏入第13日審訊。已認罪、為「污點證人」的「屠龍」隊長黃振強接受辯方盤問。黃承認找泰國女友開戶口，收集約50萬眾籌資金。辯方指，黃同時與「閃燈隊」女隊長發生曖昧，他對各方「不忠」；法官張慧玲建議：「唔好用『不忠』，夫婦就不忠，男女朋友應該唔係不忠。」黃承認是「兩頭瞞」，但否認是「好色」。黃曾稱應酬「家長」及「金主」感辛苦，覺得「好似做鴨咁」。黃解釋僅與對方「傾計及食飯」，但辯方質疑「家長」甚至協助黃收拾行李，並「爭風呷醋」。辯方問黃：「你亂搞男女關係？」黃突然不斷喘氣，更大聲嚎叫及激動大哭，需由5名懲教人員抬返羈留室。
+
+另外，黃承認在泰國嫖妓，但為免女友知道，故要求隊友協助，著對方訛稱是他嫖妓。辯方質疑：「你利用隊友幫你解困？」黃重申是請求幫忙。
+
+#### 黃承認找泰國女友開戶口收錢 辯方質疑有「家長」爭風呷醋
+
+黃振強第八日作供，接受代表嚴文謙的大律師梁鴻谷盤問。辯方展示 Telegram 對話，顯示一名叫「佩兒」的「家長」曾表示：「你再搵泰國條女個戶口收錢，我就停課（金）」。在辯方追問下，黃透露有一名泰國女友，名叫「Rin」，當時找她成立泰國戶口收取眾籌資金，她為戶口持有人。而黃負責保管戶口銀行卡，他亦可透過網上銀行處理戶口事宜。
+
+黃於10月至11月三度前往泰國，頭兩次與小隊軍師「Kan」林銘皓同行，第三次則帶同其他隊員。黃承認第三次到泰國時，戶口約有50多萬，他提取當中20多萬，作為旅程支出。另外，黃承認與「佩兒」感情好，對方曾為他收拾行李。辯方質疑，對方是否因「爭風呷醋」而不滿；黃解釋：「佢應該係覺得唔安全。」
+
+#### 黃曾要求隊中軍師協助隱瞞嫖妓 辯方質疑利用隊友解困
+
+對話顯示，黃在泰國期間曾向同行的「Kan」表示：「我條女話佢今晚去返嗰間 bar，話 check 我。我驚佢問嗰條友，我有冇搵女仔。我噚日應承咗條女，即係噚日我揀嗰件女，話我今晚返去搵佢呀嘛，我驚佢認得出我囉」、「如果真係去咗嗰間呢，你同我攬住我噚日揀嗰條女，話係你條女」。
+
+黃解釋，前一晚到酒吧嫖妓，翌日會再與泰國女友以及隊員回去酒吧。黃擔心嫖妓事件「東窗事發」，於是著林攬住該妓女，並訛稱是他早前選中。辯方問：「實情你冰清玉潔冇嫖妓？」黃表示：「我記得有，但係冇發生性行為。」辯方問：「點到即止？」黃回應：「唔可以話點到即止，我擔心阿 Rin 知道。」辯方表示：「好忍得。」
+
+辯方質疑：「你利用隊友幫你解困？」黃強調：「我請求阿 Kan 幫我忙。」辯方指黃的語氣並不像請求，黃表示感慌張及擔心。辯方質疑：「你有需要嘅話，會講大話利用隊友？」黃不同意利用隊友，重申是「請求幫忙」而非利用。
+
+#### 辯方指黃與另一隊長有海量「情慾對話」
+
+黃早前稱，他與「閃燈隊」隊長 Kristy 發生曖昧關係。辯方亦問當時黃與 Kristy 是否已「撻着咗」，黃回應：「未發生性行為嘅地步。」辯方亦表示，紀錄顯示兩人有海量「情慾對話」，法官張慧玲及控方關注到「情慾」的用詞，法官認為「情慾涉及性」，控方則認為「海量」的字眼範圍太闊。法官最後提醒：「盡量唔好用呢啲形容詞。」黃主動提出：「我同其他異性嘅關係⋯⋯」，法官表示若她認為問題不適當，就會作出提醒。
+
+#### 辯方質疑黃對女方不忠 官認為夫婦才可用「不忠」
+
+辯方問：「你背住 Kristy 結交泰國女子？對兩位女性都不忠？」法官建議：「唔好用『不忠』，夫婦就不忠，男女朋友應該唔係不忠。」黃回應：「每個人對感情嘅理解都唔同，我同泰國女仔係發展情侶關係，同閃燈隊長係發展緊曖昧。」法官澄清辯方問題：「即係兩頭瞞？」黃同意。辯方最後指：「你話好賭因為有壓力要紓緩，係咪感情壓力？」黃不同意其壓力與女性相關。辯方最後問：「你認咗好賭，好色認唔認？」黃回答：「每個人對好色嘅理解都唔同，以我個人判斷，我唔同意我係好色。」
+
+#### 黃表示應酬「金主」感辛苦 「好似做鴨咁」
+
+辯方指，對話顯示黃曾經向 Kristy 表示：「我哋啲家長同我哋感情幾好，應該話同我感情幾好」，Kristy 回覆：「好正」，黃再稱：「好似做鴨咁」。辯方問及甚麼意思，黃解釋：「有啲講笑性質，應酬咁多家長同金主好辛苦好攰，好似做鴨咁。」辯方問：「講做侍應都得㗎？」黃解釋：「可能我個人，作為一個喺香港長大嘅人啦，我慣咗用呢啲俗語去講，相比你之下，我可能粗俗、低俗少少。」
+
+#### 辯方質疑「亂搞男女關係」黃突激動大哭、呼吸困難
+
+辯方追問：「你提供咗咩服務？點解話自己做鴨？」黃回答：「傾計、食飯、應酬。」辯方質疑：「傾到幫你執行李？」黃表示：「同每個家長嘅關係深淺程度唔一樣。」辯方問：「你亂搞男女關係？」這時黃不斷喘氣和深呼吸，更大聲嚎叫及激動大哭，期間他表示：「唔好意思法官。」黃身旁的懲教人員提醒：「放鬆啲，控制情緒。」其後兩名懲教人員將黃拉起，但他未能走動，最終由5名懲教人員抬起黃的手腳，將他帶返羈留室。
+
+法官遂安排休庭，約一小時後黃返回法庭，隨即向各方表達謙意：「唔好意思法官閣下、陪審團、律師團隊，啱先我情緒控制得唔好。」法官回應：「如果唔舒服通知我，畀你休息。」
+
+#### 黃承認發煽情文宣冀籌更多錢 但否認斂財
+
+辯方繼續盤問，指出黃曾稱發布煽情文章，是為獲得更多眾籌資金。「育龍」頻道發布的訊息提及：「612圍困開始，至少幾千個手足，爆眼、腦出血、斷手斷腳、被性侵強姦、實彈射爆內臟，無數嘅失蹤⋯⋯仲有幾多個大好前途、善良嘅年輕人，被政權親手推咗落樓⋯⋯」黃於錄影會面解釋，希望「文宣」盡量煽情，以籌得更多資金。他當時同意沒有理會文章內容的真假。黃現在表示，相信當時所說為事實。
+
+辯方質疑黃於案發期間，「唔理真定假，求財斂財為實？」黃不同意。黃承認在運動期間搞「文宣」，其中一個目的是「攞錢」，而資金用作「賭波」及「嫖妓」。辯方問：「你冇益其他隊員？有冇畀佢哋減壓？」黃表示有提供資金予隊員減壓，花費至少20萬，即每人至少兩萬。
+
+#### 辯方指不相信黃證供 官認為說話離譜 提醒陪審團自行判斷
+
+辯方亦指，黃被起訴後一直有律師代表，理應索取法律意見後才選擇是否認罪。黃解釋，他認為法援指派的律師團隊對案件不上心，「唔係好 care 我」，因此未能獲取有效的法律意見。辯方質疑：「你內心知道有做定冇做？」黃認為無法自行判斷相關法律定義。法官指問題涉及「法律專業保密特權」，因此不能詢問。
+
+黃表示，於2023年中向新的律師團隊徵詢意見，其後於5月主動要求聯絡警方，表達想認罪及交代案情。警方建議他找代表律師處理，於是他聘請新的律師團隊。辯方質疑黃為何不向律政司表達想認罪，反而找警察；黃解釋不熟悉程序。
+
+辯方其後再追問，黃有否親自寫信予律政司。法官打斷指，黃已經解釋自己不熟悉程序，並問辯方：「你有冇聽？」辯方回應：「聽咗唔信咋嘛。」法官聞後嚴肅稱：「你呢句說話好離譜，點可以喺法庭公開話唔信證人？唔好再嚟啦吓，真係好離譜！」法官又提醒陪審團，他們才是選擇是否相信證供的人，「係你哋決定信唔信。」辯方最後表示：「唔好意思。」
+
+#### 黃不同意自知「打唔甩」 故轉做污點證人以獲減刑
+
+辯方指出，黃知道面對的控罪非常嚴重，刑期遠超暴動等罪；黃同意。辯方再問：「你知道要人信你無心，係好難打？」黃選擇使用「法律專業保密特權」拒絕回答。辯方最後指：「你知道自己打唔甩，所以不如轉做污點證人，可以大幅度減刑？」黃不同意。辯方指出，黃主動接觸警方，因警方是「量度尺」，負責判斷黃的「爆料」內容。控方認為上述說法並非事實。
+
+黃在錄影會面承認，小隊最後選擇不加入其他隊伍，而是「我哋做返原本做嘅嘢」。黃重申會面時狀態混亂及慌張，記憶難免有出入。辯方質疑，黃後來發現錄影會面的證供，與表達認罪後錄取的「無損權益口供」的說法有出入，因此黃自行思考或被指示，如何在庭上解釋兩者的不同。黃否認知道兩者有出入。
+
+#### 辯方指嚴文謙多次不想參與黃號召的活動
+
+另外，辯方指嚴文謙過往多次不想參與黃號召的活動。辯方指對話顯示，11月4日黃問：「出唔出沙田？」，嚴表示：「陪緊條女」。11月13日黃在群組內向隊員分享在中大示威的情況，嚴表示：「我喺天水圍，出唔到嚟」。11月27日，黃在「滅龍」群組表示：「今晚出動喎」，嚴回應：「I can’t」、「date with my gf」、「prepare for our trip」。黃早前表示，嚴不在港跟他一起示威，令他沒有安全感，因此黃取消了12月1日的行動。
+
+但辯方引述對話指，程于寶同日問：「你哋唔出嗎？」，黃回答：「出呀」。黃解釋，當時仍打算堅持去示威，並著李家田代替嚴文謙的角色，「喺行動嘅時候睇實我」；但李表示：「你邊睇得實」。黃最後沒有行動。辯方指，黃早前沒有透露李家田這方面的原因，並指出黃像「tailor made（量身定做）」般編造供詞。黃不同意。
+
+#### 黃曾說「紅顏禍水」承認不滿嚴只顧拍拖而耽誤行動
+
+黃於行動前一日、即12月7日在群組表示：「6點荃灣」。黃解釋當日要求隊員幫忙到荃灣拿裝備，預備翌日大行動。嚴回應：「我今日唔得閒呀」、「我食飯5－7」。黃遂以粗口回覆並指：「乜都唔使做咩？你哋明知聽日大嘢，用得你哋幾多時間」。程于寶亦附和：「又瘟女」，黃則表示：「紅顏禍水」。
+
+辯方質疑：「你係咪施壓畀嚴文謙，要佢嚟？」黃表示不能定義何謂施壓，只是認為對方「掛住拍拖，耽誤咗我哋行動正事」。黃當時在對話補充，另一隊員「因為女朋友，退出我哋」，並指「而家連阿謙都係咁」。黃承認是「埋怨同鬧緊佢」。法官協助澄清辯方問題並問黃，嚴文謙是否本來不打算搬運裝備，但被黃責罵後就「改變初衷」，決定出來協助。黃同意。辯方最後指出，黃從來沒有向隊員披露行動會用槍及炸彈，因擔心他們會不參與；黃不同意。
+
+案件明（10日）續審。
+
+本案共7名被告，其中6男即張俊富、張銘裕、嚴文謙、李家田、賴振邦及許湛榮，均否認《聯合國（反恐怖主義措施）條例》下的「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪、作為交替控罪的「串謀導致相當可能會危害生命或對財產造成嚴重損害的爆炸罪」；以及「串謀謀殺」罪，對象為警務人員。李家田另否認「意圖危害生命而管有槍械及彈藥」罪。女子劉佩凝則否認「串謀提供或籌集財產以作出恐怖主義行為」罪。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC164/2022、255/2023
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-10-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-14.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-10-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-14.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..eb9e1f94
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-10-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-14.md
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【勇武7人案・審訊第十四日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-05-10 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/aKa9Cy8.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#勇武派 #屠龍小隊 #串謀 #反恐"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 黃振強投訴被捕時遭警毆打威嚇 不記得對方是否誘使「指控其他人就冇事」
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】2019年12月，「屠龍小隊」成員等涉計劃放炸彈及開槍殺警。6男1女否認「串謀謀殺」及「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪，今（10日）踏入第14日審訊。已認罪、為「污點證人」的「屠龍」隊長黃振強接受辯方盤問。黃承認在安全屋被捕時遭多名警員用手掌拍臉，以及用警棍向身體揮動。其後黃應警員要求提供電話密碼。辯方引述黃向投訴警察課作出的投訴紀錄，黃指控遭4至5名便衣警毆打，導致下半身瘀傷、嘴巴左邊面頰擦傷。他們亦曾用言語威嚇及誘使黃作招認。辯方問警員是否表示「講晒啲嘢，指控其他人就會冇事」；黃表示不記得。另外，辯方指黃訛稱受傷而推卻試槍行動，質疑他遇上性質嚴重的活動如軍訓及試槍，「你自己唔去，派你啲隊員去，令到自己隻手唔好掂呢啲咁嘅嘢？」黃否認。
+
+#### 黃表示6.21立法會外認識李家田
+
+黃振強第九日作供，接受代表李家田的大律師林芷瑩盤問。黃表示於2019年6月12日在立法會外參與示威時，首次認識李家田。辯方問，李有否透露自己在浸會大學修讀電影系高級文憑，主修機器及燈光。黃表示僅知道他修讀電影。黃同意，李曾表示對社會事件感興趣，並會到集會現場拍攝紀錄片。黃同意「屠龍」小隊的精華片段由李負責剪輯。
+
+#### 黃：被捕時遭警拍臉及用警棍向身體揮動、及後同意交電話密碼
+
+辯方問及黃於行動前、即12月8日清晨在安全屋被捕的情況。黃表示，超過3名警員破門進入安全屋，包括一名張姓女警。當時黃在自己房間，張銘裕及嚴文謙則在另一房間。黃指警員沒有表明作出拘捕，但多於一名警員在房間對他作出武力行為，包括用手掌拍向其臉部、用警棍向其身體胡亂揮動，歷時約15分鐘。但由於「熄咗燈」故他看不清楚實際的施襲人數。黃同意被拍臉及遭警棍打時感痛楚，並因而叫出聲。黃表示，沒有其他警員阻止施襲的行為。
+
+黃同意被警方武力對待後感覺「好驚」及無助。黃續指，其後警員將他帶出客廳，並提供水及著他冷靜。張姓女警則手持黃的電話，要求他提供密碼，黃最終同意交出。
+
+黃被警員5828戴明德以非法集結罪拘捕。辯方引述警員的記事冊指，黃當時向警員表示：「阿 Sir，10月20號我係有喺尖沙咀同旺角衝㗎」，黃亦有簽署確認。辯方問到說話是否屬實，黃起初說不記得，後來確認自己有簽署，並表示：「相信我應該有講。」辯方追問簽署時是否感驚慌，黃表示未能判斷。
+
+黃其後被帶返警署，並於下午1時多錄取兩份會面紀錄。警方問及，黃在警誡下的說話有甚麼意思。黃解釋，他於10月20日約3時，在尖沙咀十字路口參與堵路及傳遞物資。其後警方發射催淚彈，不少示威者回擲，但由於水炮車到場，因此示威者撤退至旺角。辯方問，警員有否叫黃「跟住佢版本講」，黃表示不記得。
+
+#### 黃：投訴遭4至5名便衣警毆打、導致下半身瘀傷
+
+黃於被捕後翌日、即12月9日被帶上東區裁判法院提堂。辯方指根據紀錄，黃在提堂後曾向投訴警察課作出投訴，相關文件由當時代表他的潘大律師撰寫。
+
+文件顯示，被投訴人士的身份包括：有組織罪案及三合會調查科警員5828戴明德，以及3名身份不詳的男子。黃指控被捕期間，遭4至5名不知名便衣警察毆打，導致其下半身瘀傷、嘴巴左邊面頰擦傷。他又指，同一班警察包括戴，曾用言語威嚇及誘使黃作出招認。黃其後送院接受治療，傷勢報告及照片顯示他臀部疼痛、瘀傷及浮腫，左臉有擦傷。
+
+#### 辯方質疑警員表示「講晒啲嘢，指控其他人就會冇事」
+
+辯方問及警員使用甚麼言語作出威嚇及誘使，是否表示「講晒啲嘢，指控其他人就會冇事」；黃表示不記得。辯方追問，黃進行第二份錄影會面時，是否同樣在被誘使的情況下作出；黃否認，但同意或有部分內容並非真確。辯方另問，黃是否因被警察恐嚇，因此說出一個「敷衍」他們的版本。黃表示不記得，但同意或有可能。
+
+#### 黃稱為取吳智鴻資金而投其所好 但否認「氹佢」及欺騙
+
+黃於錄影會面提及，當時吳「一直想安排我做佢槍手，幫佢射啲警察」，但黃只是敷衍吳並投其所好，聲稱要拿槍殺警，因吳實際上一直對「屠龍」作出資金援助，情況為「佢援助我哋 team 食飯買裝備，我會 keep 住問佢攞資金」。辯方質疑：「你冇意思參與計劃？」黃同意。
+
+黃亦在錄影會面表示：「佢一直講槍械，我表面話好正，心裏面都係講吓笑，想拎吓啲資助金。我冇諗過好似真係嚟真，我唔想掂呢啲嘢，因為軍火商有槍驚佢牽連到我」、「我有啲愕然同擔驚受怕」。辯方質疑，黃一直欺騙吳；黃不同意。辯方質疑，黃一直想「氹」吳以獲取更多資助；黃不同意。
+
+#### 黃表示自大覺得有實力 故毋須參與台灣軍訓
+
+黃早前供稱，李家田不聽其勸阻並自行入理大。辯方問：「你當時會唔會覺得佢唔聽你支笛？」黃表示不會。黃曾提及，吳智鴻於9月舉辦台灣軍訓，但黃本人及李家田等並無參與。辯方問：「點解你唔去？」黃表示：「我當時比較自大，自我感覺良好，覺得我嘅實力唔需要接受軍訓。」辯方指，對話顯示黃於11月17日被困理大，因此無法參與當晚在大鴻輝舉行的飯局會議。黃不同意，堅稱他有出席飯局。但他同意在早前的錄影會面中沒有提及。
+
+#### 辯方質疑黃避免參與性質嚴重活動 反而派隊員去
+
+黃早前指，吳建議「屠龍」派兩名成員去試槍及炸彈，黃打算自己及李參與。辯方問：「點解揀佢（李家田）？」黃思考後表示「直覺囉，當下嘅直覺」。黃表示，由於自己在中大暴動被海綿彈及橡膠彈打中而受傷，需要到診所處理傷口，並不能參與試槍，因此改為叫張銘裕代替。黃在庭上指，沒有相關醫療紀錄。辯方質疑：「你話你受傷係咪講大話？」黃否認。辯方指出，黃在錄影會面提及「因為我唔想試，呃佢話身體受傷不適，話唔去」，而這個版本才是真確。黃不同意。辯方質疑，遇上性質嚴重的活動如軍訓及試槍，「你自己唔去，派你啲隊員去，令到自己隻手唔好掂呢啲咁嘅嘢？」黃不同意。
+
+辯方指，前往試槍及炸彈的人士成立了名為「行山討論區」的群組，但李家田卻不在群組內。群組成員曾提醒各人在測試期間，不要打開電話的 GPS 定位及連接 Wi-Fi。黃同意沒有將消息告知李家田，但強調著兩人自行溝通。辯方質疑，黃沒有將吳的聯絡方式交予他，兩人根本沒有互相聯絡；黃不同意。
+
+黃曾表示，試槍期間吳智鴻把一支手槍給予李家田，黃不記得事前有否指示李家田取槍，但著他到手後小心保管。黃同意吳為人小心謹慎。辯方問，對於吳願意把槍交給不認識的李家，黃會否感奇怪；黃表示不會。黃同意最終沒有收過李家田的槍，因李已經應黃的指示把槍歸還吳。辯方質疑，黃捏造這方面的證供；黃不同意。辯方最後指出，李沒有參與黃跟吳合作的計劃；黃不同意。
+
+另外，黃同意曾轉賬1,500元予李家田買衣服，另一次則轉賬500元。辯方問，黃是否知道李的經濟環境「麻麻地」；黃表示：「相信每個人都係。」
+
+案件下周一（13日）續審。
+
+本案共7名被告，其中6男即張俊富、張銘裕、嚴文謙、李家田、賴振邦及許湛榮，均否認《聯合國（反恐怖主義措施）條例》下的「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪、作為交替控罪的「串謀導致相當可能會危害生命或對財產造成嚴重損害的爆炸罪」；以及「串謀謀殺」罪，對象為警務人員。李家田另否認「意圖危害生命而管有槍械及彈藥」罪。女子劉佩凝則否認「串謀提供或籌集財產以作出恐怖主義行為」罪。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC164/2022、255/2023
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-13-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-15.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-13-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-15.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..80db6f0c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-13-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-15.md
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【勇武7人案・審訊第十五日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-05-13 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/aKa9Cy8.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#勇武派 #屠龍小隊 #串謀 #反恐"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 劉佩凝一個月內向黃振強轉賬近25萬 黃承認用部分錢還債
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】2019年12月，「屠龍小隊」成員等涉計劃放炸彈及開槍殺警。6男否認「串謀謀殺」及「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪，1女否認「串謀提供或籌集財產以作出恐怖主義行為」罪，今（13日）踏入第15日審訊。已認罪、為「污點證人」的「屠龍」隊長黃振強接受辯方盤問。黃表示於11月4日首次與女被告劉佩凝對話，劉提出可協助時，黃表示「我哋想買🔫🔫🔫」。黃承認表達想買槍的意思，遭辯方質疑圖案是「水槍」或「膠槍」，並非「真槍」；黃表示「判斷唔到」。另外，紀錄顯示劉於2019年11月至12月期間，分7次共轉賬24.5萬元予黃。黃承認用轉賬的錢向3間財務公司還債。辯方質疑，若非收到劉的轉賬，黃的戶口結餘僅僅夠還錢，黃同意。黃另承認花其中2萬及5萬賭波，並曾中獎獲派8.6萬元。
+
+另外，辯方指「屠龍」在示威活動中，並無使用致命武器包括槍、刀或弓等。但法官張慧玲質疑：「我覺得汽油彈都可以致命，爭在有冇掟中嗰個人。」辯方又問：「屠龍嘅聲譽唔係話殘暴、兇殘，下下要殺人？」黃表示：「聲譽唔係我一個人可以界定到。」
+
+#### 辯方質疑黃被捕後無提及賴振邦在場 黃：當時未能冷靜想清楚
+
+黃振強第十日作供，接受代表賴振邦的大律師是香媛盤問。黃確認，12.8大行動以外，其他涉及個人或小隊示威活動的事宜，吳智鴻並不涉及在內。至於涉及大行動的計劃，黃承認並不知道吳與其隊員的傾談內容。
+
+另外，黃曾表示於12月3日與吳在荃灣「松記糖水」見面，在場的還有「屠龍」軍師 Kan 林銘皓、「閃燈隊」隊長 Kristy。期間吳將計劃簡單告知黃。4人於凌晨轉往附近的「SOHO酒吧」，會合吳團隊的另兩人，包括賴振邦及彭軍壕。黃早前稱，由於一名叫「Bobby」、後知為賴振邦的人，當時表示酒吧的閉路電視有錄音功能，為安全起見，各人最終沒有討論大行動內容。
+
+辯方質疑，黃在被捕後進行的錄影會面中，沒有提及酒吧有賴振邦及彭軍壕在場；惟事隔3年多在無損權益供詞中，他才首次提及。黃同意，但否認在庭上作供時記憶模糊，他解釋指錄影會面時未能冷靜想清楚事發經過，加上警員僅針對問與吳智鴻相關的問題。辯方質疑，黃之所以記起酒吧有賴及彭出現，是因為看過閉路電視截圖；黃不同意。辯方又指，實際上沒有人說過酒吧的閉路電視有錄音功能，因此不討論計劃內容，而黃記憶有錯誤。黃不同意。
+
+#### 被問劉佩凝是否「屠龍」成員 黃：視一份子但非核心隊員
+
+接着由代表劉佩凝的大律師馬維騉盤問。黃同意劉佩凝並無參與「屠龍」或大行動相關的 Telegram 群組，包括「滅龍」、「皇馬龍利號」、「燈龍蛛」及「行山討論區」。辯方問及劉是否屬「屠龍」成員，黃思考一會後回答：「呢個位有啲模糊，我視佢為一份子，不過唔係常規核心隊員。」
+
+#### 黃起初稱找劉是希望有人助眾籌 後改稱就誤傳消息「對質」
+
+辯方指，劉的英文名為「Soso」，其用戶名稱則為「So fairy」。黃表示以為兩者均是暱稱，並不知道其分別。黃同意沒有劉的電話號碼，兩人主要用 Telegram 通訊。紀錄顯示，兩人首次對話發生於11月4日。黃憶述當時要求嚴文謙提供人選，協助處理小隊眾籌事宜。但辯方引述對話紀錄，可見兩人起初的對話提及其他事項，黃傳送截圖並稱：「放過條友，自己友嚟，佢有白卡，畀人拉過兩次」。黃解釋，當時他認識的一名示威者，遭頻道「春田花花同學會」誤傳是「鬼」。黃向嚴文謙等不同途徑查證劉的身份，最終得知劉是頻道其中一名管理員，於是與她「對質」。
+
+黃澄清該示威者是「自己人」，並希望對方不要再散播消息指控。劉回覆：「明啦」，黃之後問：「你識屠龍？」，又表示：「我屠龍揸 fit 人」。黃解釋，劉表示認識「屠龍」其中一至兩人，於是他直接表明自己在小隊的角色。劉其後回應「大佬」、「唔好打我，我驚」。辯方問，劉是否表現對黃的敬佩及欣賞。黃認為是「正常年輕人對話」。劉之後回應：「想知你乜水，唔係講笑，呢刻嚇親」，黃同意劉的口吻輕鬆。黃表示：「有緣再見」。黃承認想終止對話，但其後劉回覆：「有需要幫手」。
+
+#### 黃表明「要錢」、否認知劉經營頻道收集資金
+
+黃聞後表示：「要錢，資金，講真」。辯方指兩人僅認識10分鐘，黃卻問對方拿錢，因此質疑黃一早知劉的頻道主要從「家長」或「金主」收集資金。黃不同意，解釋每次示威圈的人提出幫忙，「我都會問佢哋攞錢攞物資。」
+
+劉其後回覆「笑喊」表情符號，黃認為對方敷衍、「Hea」他。但當劉再稱：「要幾多，幫到我就幫，唔得我就私人錢」，黃認為對方真的想課金。辯方指劉的回覆有「推搪」意味，黃堅稱覺得對方想幫忙。黃當時回應：「你未必得，萬萬聲，寧願你轉介啲有錢嘅人嚟」。劉表示：「家長會因為保障自己唔肯，我做家長咪得囉」。
+
+#### 黃傳送3支槍圖案表示想買 辯方質疑是水槍或玩具槍
+
+黃其後表示：「我哋想買🔫🔫🔫」。辯方問黃是否誇張的說法，黃解釋：「呢度表達我想買槍，未必係3支槍，純粹想表達買槍。」辯方又指，該圖案表面看是「水槍」或「膠槍」，並不代表「真槍」。黃表示：「判斷唔到。」辯方再問：「玩具槍？」黃未有回答，辯方再指：「唔係好笑㗎，黃振強。」黃承認沒有澄清買真槍、氣槍還是玩具槍，之後亦沒有再提及需要錢買槍，當時亦未有計劃進行恐怖主義活動。
+
+劉及後回覆「掩面」的表情符號，即「🤦🏻♀️」。辯方指表面看來意思是「無眼睇」，黃不同意。劉表示可以用轉數快轉賬，並將自己電話號碼給予劉，附上訊息指「我朋友」。辯方問為何他這樣做，黃解釋：「我懶得搵 friend 幫我收，免卻麻煩所以直接畀自己電話，反正佢唔會知係咪我朋友。」辯方質疑：「你因為唔熟佢，要保障自己，唔好坦白？」黃回應只是貪方便。
+
+黃同意，相隔兩天後他指示劉開設「育龍」頻道，於是劉開新的帳戶，名為「龍女」。黃於11月18日著劉開設另一帳戶，名稱是「楓葉」的符號，黃及林亦可登入。辯方指出，頻道3名管理員分別是「楓葉」、黃及林銘皓；黃表示林並非管理員。
+
+
+▲ 女被告 劉佩凝
+
+#### 劉向黃轉賬24.5萬 黃承認部分錢用作還債及賭波
+
+辯方引述紀錄顯示，劉於2019年11月4日至12月4日期間，分7次共轉賬24.5萬予黃。辯方讀出相關轉賬紀錄，每次金額分別5千至5萬不等。黃同意自己沒有用上述款項買槍。辯方盤問下，黃承認分別在3間財務公司欠債，包括：UA亞洲聯合財務、邦民日本財務及 Welend。黃同意自己每月要償還900至1,280元予財務公司，連同修讀高級文憑兩年課程向政府借貸的十多萬，每月共需還債3千多元。
+
+根據銀行紀錄，黃每月轉賬1,200元予邦民。辯方質疑，若非收到劉轉賬的1.5萬元，黃的戶口僅餘1,900元，「僅僅夠畀邦民？」黃同意。黃亦分別轉賬940及964元給另兩間財務公司。
+
+紀錄顯示劉於11月8至11日，共轉賬15萬予黃。黃承認於11日及16日，分別花2萬及5萬買兩場波，後者中獎獲派8.6萬元。黃承認翌日跟隊員前往大鴻輝中心吃日本放題。
+
+另外，黃三度轉賬予名為譚嘉琪（音譯）的人，合共約9千元；黃表示不記得。黃又兩度轉賬1萬元予譚健英（音譯），他表示對方或者認識的示威者。
+
+#### 辯方指「屠龍」並無用致命武器 官質疑汽油彈亦可致命
+
+黃早前稱「荃灣示威群組」在二陂坊事件中，因示威者被黑社會斬傷，為復仇故破壞「黑社會睇場」的店舖，由於事件引起迴響故改名「屠龍」。黃同意辯方指，他和隊員事後「聲名大噪」。黃回應辯方時表示，當時沒有帶致命武器包括槍、刀或弓等攻擊。
+
+辯方指，小隊平日活動中沒有使用致命武器，但法官張慧玲質疑：「我覺得汽油彈都可以致命，爭在有冇掟中嗰個人。」辯方於是改問：「冇用致命、會導致死亡嘅武器，例如槍、弓、弩，不過有用汽油彈？」黃同意。辯方又問：「冇掟中人類？」黃表示在尖沙咀警署外曾經試過掟中警察。但辯方指該次是擦過警員腳邊導致著火。
+
+#### 辯方問「屠龍嘅聲譽唔係話殘暴、下下要殺人？」黃表示不懂判斷
+
+辯方再問：「屠龍嘅聲譽唔係話殘暴、兇殘，下下要殺人？」黃表示：「聲譽唔係我一個人可以界定到。」辯方追問：「冇人話你哋係兇殘，下下要殺人嗰種？」黃回應：「相信唔應該由我嚟判斷。」被問及其個人判斷，黃回答：「我唔係好識得判斷。」
+
+#### 黃曾以5,000元購300支汽油彈 辯方質疑為何早前要花10萬
+
+另外，對話紀錄顯示黃向名為「黑警」的「家長」表示「我前後整咗1300支（汽油彈）」。黃解釋，該些汽油彈並非他本人或小隊製造。對話又顯示，「閃燈隊」隊長 Kristy曾向黃表示：「我幫你搞緊300支，可能嚟唔切喎」，黃回覆：「轉頭畀錢你」，又問：「$5000夠唔夠？你哋買料錢、運輸使唔使$5000？」，對方表示「夠」。
+
+由於黃早前稱，曾花費約10萬元向「老虎仔」購買100支汽油彈。辯方遂質疑：「點解呢度講300支，連工包料$5,000都夠？汽油彈係咪因為唔同時間會漲價？」黃解釋：「老虎仔開呢個價，所以咪照畀。」辯方問：「Kristy 收$5,000幫你整300支，老虎仔收10萬，因為質素好啲？」黃解釋「老虎仔」有同學修讀化學，並會研究玻璃樽的易爆程度，「質素好好多」，而且對方能長期供應貨源。黃強調：「用得少錢梗係盡量用得少錢啦。」
+
+黃早前稱，自7.21事件後辭職參與示威，日常開支完全依靠他人資助。黃同意，當時用自己的滙豐銀行戶口及馬會戶口收錢，亦接受捐款者透過 PayMe 轉賬。黃表示有2至3名「家長」會捐助大額現金，每次超過10萬元。而上述金額以下的，則屬小額捐助，黃表明：「我唔會應酬佢哋，唔會為咗一萬幾千，面對面收佢現金。」
+
+黃承認於2019年10月28日首次到泰國期間，認識了泰國女友。黃同意該段時期已獲很多「金主」捐助。辯方讀出紀錄，指黃於5天旅行期間提款超過港幣3萬元。黃承認使用小隊資金，而其他隊員並不知道其花費金額。黃在11月7日第二次到泰國時，著對方開設當地銀行戶口。
+
+案件明（14日）續審。
+
+本案共7名被告，其中6男即張俊富、張銘裕、嚴文謙、李家田、賴振邦及許湛榮，均否認《聯合國（反恐怖主義措施）條例》下的「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪、作為交替控罪的「串謀導致相當可能會危害生命或對財產造成嚴重損害的爆炸罪」；以及「串謀謀殺」罪，對象為警務人員。李家田另否認「意圖危害生命而管有槍械及彈藥」罪。女子劉佩凝則否認「串謀提供或籌集財產以作出恐怖主義行為」罪。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC164/2022、255/2023
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-14-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-16.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-14-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-16.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..1180a123
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-14-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-16.md
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【勇武7人案・審訊第十六日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-05-14 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/aKa9Cy8.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#勇武派 #屠龍小隊 #串謀 #反恐"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 黃振強稱認罪協議條件包括「完全同意案情」因此「錯嘅事實都認」
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】2019年12月，「屠龍小隊」成員等涉計劃放炸彈及開槍殺警。6男1女否認「串謀謀殺」及「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」等罪，今（14日）踏入第16日審訊。已認罪、為「污點證人」的「屠龍」隊長黃振強接受辯方盤問。辯方引述黃的代表大律師就認罪商討去信律政司的文件。內容提及黃願意承認「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」一罪；換取「串謀謀殺」等4罪不起訴。黃今表示：「我當時願意承認所有控罪。」律政司回信指，認罪協議的條件包括必須完全同意控方撰寫的案情，最終黃接受。辯方指部分案情與「真相」、即黃庭上證供有出入，例如案情提及9月的台灣軍訓是為12.8大行動作準備；但黃在庭上卻指軍訓與大行動無關。黃同意案情所述有錯。辯方欲指出黃承認案情是因知道屬協議一部分，法官協助問：「錯嘅事實都認，係咪因為理解案情講咩都要認？」黃同意。
+
+#### 黃振強自2018年賭錢 辯方質疑為紓社運壓力說法「站不住腳」
+
+黃振強第十一日作供，接受代表劉佩凝的大律師馬維騉盤問。黃承認2018年之前已有賭波習慣，同年開設馬會戶口。辯方指根據法證會計師報告，顯示黃於2018年起頻密賭波，「差唔多日日賭，有時隔兩三日？」，每次金額數百至數千；黃同意。黃早前稱，因參與社會運動承認很大壓力，因此需要透過賭錢紓壓。辯方質疑其說法「站不住腳」，因2018年尚未有社會運動；黃不同意。
+
+
+▲ 大律師 馬維騉
+
+辯方問，為何黃聲稱有壓力而賭錢。黃強調他沒有說「因為壓力而賭錢」，僅稱「賭錢係紓壓方式之一」。辯方質疑：「冇壓力就唔使紓壓？」黃同意。辯方追問，賭錢期間每次投注一百幾十，「紓唔紓到壓？」黃表示：「相信2019年社會運動之前嘅壓力，一定冇社會運動嗰陣咁大。」
+
+#### 黃拒回答是否獲朋友「江湖救急」借錢 後稱對方「無條件饋贈」
+
+辯方指，根據紀錄黃自2018年起已經有經濟壓力，大部分時間戶口結餘數十元，並需要向3間財務公司借錢，朋友亦有借錢予他「江湖救急」；黃承認。紀錄顯示，黃曾轉賬予他人，亦獲他人轉賬。辯方逐一問及該些人的身份，黃一度表示不想解釋。辯方強調：「呢件案唔喺嚟揭你私隱」，但自己有責任問清楚。
+
+其後辯方再問黃，是否有人「江湖救急」借錢予他；黃表示：「我唔作答，因為唔關單案事。」他又指不記得是否有問朋友借錢。辯方其後引述紀錄指，有人向他轉賬並附註訊息「慳啲使啦，死仔包」，辯方問：「係咪江湖救急，問人借錢？」黃表示：「我拒絕作答，唔關單案事。」法官張慧玲表示他需要回答。黃強調對方「無條件饋贈畀我金錢，我唔想解釋咁多，牽涉唔係呢單案嘅人」。
+
+辯方指出，黃之後將錢轉賬予該人，因此可以排除對方是「無條件饋贈」。黃不同意，重申屬私人的資金往來，並不涉及本案。但黃承認在經濟有困難、戶口結餘不足100元時，獲他人在金錢上支援。其後辯方一度表示：「好奇問⋯⋯」，黃聞後即回應：「如果出於好奇八卦，我唔會回答任何問題。」辯方遂問黃向財務公司還款是最低款項還是定額還款，黃表示屬後者。
+
+#### 黃承認收過百萬捐助 其後頻繁賭波
+
+黃供稱，於2019年7月開始依賴「家長」及「金主」的捐助，部分人給予現金。黃會存放數萬元在家中或隨身攜帶。至8月底「屠龍」成立後，黃收到超過100萬現金捐助，當中六成用作購買示威裝備或材料。黃承認在「搵到錢」後，其投注次數變得頻繁，金額亦大增，每次投注2千至3千元。黃亦承認向財務公司借錢後，把部分錢轉到馬會戶口賭波。
+
+黃承認9月至12月期間，使用「家長」或「金主」給予的捐款進行賭博。黃亦同意辯方指，在9月起「屠龍」因二陂坊事件聲名大噪，捐款亦隨之增加，「除咗名之外，利都有？」黃承認自9月起「賭得大咗」，紀錄顯示他於9月1日，單日有21項投注，金額約3萬元。在9月期間，黃共投注104項，總數16.7萬。另外，黃同意辯方指，他在馬會「輸多過贏」。
+
+#### 劉佩凝轉賬後 黃認一個月花27萬賭錢、輸近4萬
+
+紀錄顯示，自「育龍」11月初成立後，劉佩凝共轉賬約25萬予黃。黃同意，11月共投注20項，總數27萬；其中4次獲派彩，共約23.4萬；但輸了3.7萬。劉於11月8至11日向黃的銀行戶口轉賬15萬。黃承認在11月9日轉賬其中2萬到馬會戶口，單次投注2萬。數天後，黃再將其中16.5萬轉賬至馬會戶口，並花費5萬元投注，最後獲得派彩。翌日黃與隊友到日本餐廳吃放題，他負責「埋單」。黃承認隊友不知道他賭波及贏波，他們以為資金來自「家長」或「金主」。黃亦同意劉不知道他賭波，亦無法得知其戶口的財政狀況。辯方指，若非有劉的轉賬，他無法還債；黃表示手頭上有現金也可還款。
+
+
+▲ 女被告 劉佩凝
+
+#### 黃同意社運期間賭錢輸近13萬
+
+黃一度問及，紀錄是否顯示他在社會運動期間賭錢輸了12.8萬。辯方指9月至12月期間，黃輸掉約10萬。辯方追問：「即係你想話畀陪審團知，唔係輸咗好多啫？」黃略為激動表示：「吓！我冇咁嘅意思喎，點解你咁樣曲解我嘅？我只係想知道輸咗幾多，我冇其他意思。」辯方回應：「如果你覺得我曲解你，唔好意思。」黃承認於8月向林銘皓、梁政希及嚴文謙分別轉賬3千至2.6萬元不等。
+
+#### 辯方質疑黃知道「警察唔高興」或再使用武力
+
+黃早前指，於12月8日清晨遭警方拘捕，期間被他武力對待，最後黃提供電話密碼。辯方又指，黃可選擇在錄影會面保持緘默，但他卻選擇說話，原因是他覺得若不再合作，必然會再受武力對待；黃不同意。辯方追問：「如果警察唔高興，好大可能會再使用武力？」黃表示離開單位後沒有再受武力對待，因此無再多想。
+
+另外，黃於被起訴的3年後才改為認罪。辯方質疑他有足夠時間考慮答辯意向，黃解釋認為原本的律師團隊不上心。辯方讀出紀錄，透露當時的代表大律師包括關文渭。黃又指，疫情關係他很遲才收齊法律文件，當中包括2萬張對話截圖，並指還柙期間每天只有3小時閱讀文件。
+
+#### 黃表示有責任說事實協助法庭 否認想做控方證人
+
+辯方又問，黃在還柙期間主動表示要見警察，目的是：「想良心過得好啲、抒發出嚟？做控方證人協助警方？想認罪商討減刑？」黃表示當時已還柙3年多，認為有責任說出事實協助法庭。辯方再問：「換句話講，當時打算以證人身份講事件經過，或者講自己做過嘅嘢？」黃不同意，因當時未知道會做證人。
+
+#### 黃提出認一罪換取其他不起訴 今表示：願意承認所有罪
+
+辯方引述黃的代表大律師就答辯商討，去信律政司的文件。內容提及黃願意承認「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪，並要求控方不提證供起訴上述的交替控罪、「串謀謀殺」罪、「管有爆炸品」罪及「串謀提供或籌集財產以作出恐怖主義行為」罪。辯方問，黃是否願意承認首罪；黃表示：「我當時願意承認所有控罪。」辯方再問：「你提出要求，希望律政司應承？」黃表示由律師團隊負責，自己不具備這方面知識。法官張慧玲問：「如果律政司話唔告晒，你唔會認晒？」黃同意。
+
+#### 黃同意控方提出條件包括需完全同意案情
+
+根據紀錄，律政司回信指，若黃願意承認「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」及「串謀提供或籌集財產以作出恐怖主義行為」罪，其餘3罪則可獲不起訴。但律政司提到，黃必須完全同意控方撰寫的案情撮要；黃同意。辯方問，當時控方是否還未撰寫關於籌集財產罪的案情；黃表示不記得。辯方指其後黃的律師團隊去信表示願意接受上述兩個條件；黃同意。
+
+#### 黃同意認罪要承認案情 因此「錯嘅事實都認」
+
+黃同意在8月24日錄取口供，4日後上庭時認罪並同意控方讀出的案情。辯方指部分案情與「真相」、即黃庭上證供不同，並問黃是否察覺。辯方舉例指，案情提及9月的台灣軍訓是為12.8大行動作準備；但黃在庭上卻指軍訓與大行動無關；黃同意，並指案情所述有錯。辯方欲指出黃承認案情是因知道屬協議一部分，法官協助問：「錯嘅事實都認，係咪因為理解案情講咩都要認？」黃同意。辯方追問：「你知道唔關事都照認，係咪你理解認罪要認晒案情？」黃同意。
+
+另外，案情提及黃與劉共同擁有並管理「育龍」頻道及「楓葉」帳戶。辯方質疑黃在案情中沒有交代真相，即林銘皓亦有份參與。黃表示案情並非由他撰寫。
+
+#### 黃承認目的想親手殺警 認為全部控罪「我都有罪」
+
+黃早前稱隊員不計較其他人殺警，只是不願親自落手；他又指自己向吳智鴻索取手槍，希望「啪兩件」。黃同意辯方指，自己目的想親手殺警。辯方問：「喺串謀謀殺罪呢條罪，你係有罪？」黃回答：「以我理解，全部我都有罪。」
+
+案件周四（16日）續審。
+
+本案共7名被告，其中6男即張俊富、張銘裕、嚴文謙、李家田、賴振邦及許湛榮，均否認《聯合國（反恐怖主義措施）條例》下的「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪、作為交替控罪的「串謀導致相當可能會危害生命或對財產造成嚴重損害的爆炸罪」；以及「串謀謀殺」罪，對象為警務人員。李家田另否認「意圖危害生命而管有槍械及彈藥」罪。女子劉佩凝則否認「串謀提供或籌集財產以作出恐怖主義行為」罪。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC164/2022、255/2023
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-16-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-17.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-16-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-17.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..0ac5b208
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-16-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-17.md
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【勇武7人案・審訊第十七日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-05-16 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/aKa9Cy8.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#勇武派 #屠龍小隊 #串謀 #反恐"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 黃振強稱欲取「龍心」意指奪警察命 辯方指他人或理解網上遊戲的「寶石」
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】2019年12月，「屠龍小隊」成員等涉計劃放炸彈及開槍殺警。6男1女否認「串謀謀殺」及「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」等罪，今（16日）踏入第17日審訊。已認罪、為「污點證人」的「屠龍」隊長黃振強接受辯方盤問。黃曾向捐助者表示：「簡單啲講，3個玩家永久退game，目標500萬」、「目標係集齊最少30粒龍心」。辯方問：「屠龍係咪有線上遊戲？」黃表示有。辯方指遊戲名稱為「屠龍傳記」及「屠龍新傳」，可多人連線玩。辯方再問：「知唔知其中有寶石叫『龍心』？知唔知可以攞真錢買，如果打得叻有30粒龍心，可以畀錢同你買一兩粒？」黃表示不知道。辯方追問：「你口中嘅龍心，話要攞警察命，但係人哋理解原來係寶石，你唔知？」法官認為這並非一般常識，「佢冇玩，點可以假定『龍心』係寶石？」，又指若有相關資料的話才會接納。
+
+另外，黃供稱曾向劉佩凝表示小隊將參與其他隊伍用槍及炸彈的行動，並著劉加緊眾籌力度。辯方質疑：「你作使用槍同炸彈嘅計劃出嚟誣衊劉佩凝，目的係你要認罪，要篤埋劉佩凝出嚟，所以作嘅？」黃不同意。辯方又問：「佢（劉佩凝）係你一隻好細嘅棋子，你唔會同佢講行動計劃？」黃回答：「我唔同意當時當佢係一隻棋子。」
+
+#### 黃表示用汽油彈亦算「恐怖主義活動」
+
+黃振強第十二日作供，接受代表劉佩凝的大律師馬維騉盤問。辯方問，除了12.8大行動外，黃有沒有組織或參與其他恐怖主義活動，例如使用大殺傷力炸藥或用槍掃射，令多人受傷或殺人。法官張慧玲改問，黃認為甚麼活動屬於恐怖主義。黃表示：「用汽油彈覺得都算。」
+
+
+▲ 大律師 馬維騉
+
+#### 黃同意花50萬買約500支汽油彈 但沒有買槍械或炸彈
+
+辯方問及黃在過往示威活動中使用汽油彈的情況。黃表示在6次示威活動中投擲汽油彈，包括10月1日「國殤日」示威，在荃灣使用約100支汽油彈，期間有蓄意向警方身上投擲，但不記得有否擲中。由於當日有示威者中槍，因此有人發起10月2日復仇行動。黃到大窩口新界南警察總部投擲汽油彈。黃於同月亦曾到尖沙咀及旺角警署投擲汽油彈。另外，他於11月曾在中大及葵芳投擲汽油彈。
+
+黃早前稱每次示威平均使用100支汽油彈，需向供應者「老虎仔」花費10萬元購買。黃表示中大該次沒有購買，主要用校內示威者製作的汽油彈。辯方計算後問黃，5次示威是否共使用約50萬買汽油彈；黃同意。辯方問，黃有否使用過「育龍」或劉佩凝給予的一分一毫，購買炸彈或槍械；黃表示「冇」。黃承認只是用上述金錢購買汽油彈。
+
+惟辯方指，對話紀錄顯示黃曾向名為「黑警」的「家長」聲稱要錢買槍。當時「黑警」問黃是否急需錢，黃回應：「筆錢俾手足下半世用，黎緊🔫🔫🔫」。黃現在確認自己從來沒有買槍。辯方質疑黃為何這樣回應對方，並指：「你問我，我覺得你呃緊人。」黃解釋，當時「好想可以有槍喺手，如果買咗槍，啲錢就係著草用」。黃同意劉並不認識「黑警」，亦無參與他們之間的協議。辯方問：「雖然唔關佢事，但係你都同意案情，因為作為認罪嘅一部分？」黃同意。
+
+
+▲ 女被告 劉佩凝
+
+#### 黃表示嚴文謙魯莽推行眾籌計劃 曾以粗口罵他
+
+另外，辯方指黃曾就眾籌計劃罵嚴文謙。對話紀錄顯示，嚴向黃表示：「我諗到資助方法，TT 同 Kan 都覺得 ok」。由於黃曾經回覆「講嘢」，辯方於是指黃「好有領隊風範」。黃聞後表示：「馬大律師，可唔可以盡量唔好加嗰啲『領隊風範』？」法官提醒辯方：「盡量減少你認為係對嘅形容詞啦，好冇呀？」
+
+黃同意，開眾籌頻道的概念由嚴提出，他亦推薦劉管理頻道。在「育龍」成立翌日，嚴向黃表示：「我諗個 plan 好好喎，係咪好好先？係咪安全先？又攞到錢」、「要有我呢個架構先可以發揮所長」。黃同意嚴在他面前「認叻」。黃附以粗口回應：「你收皮啦，呢個 plan 行得好，但係行得急，又係我幫你執手尾」。黃曾稱嚴與他一起參與示威活動，對方能給予安全感。辯方問：「一個你認為有安全感嘅人，你都用粗口鬧佢？」黃同意，但解釋指嚴在沒有與他商量之下，魯莽推行計劃，最後要黃自行接管。
+
+辯方又指，黃有份管理的「楓葉」Telegram 帳戶，曾向捐助者聲稱會將滙豐戶口所得款項，匯款至「龍女」的泰國戶口。對話紀錄顯示，「楓葉」稱：「⋯⋯或者過去我戶口，再轉匯畀龍女泰國戶口」。「楓葉」亦回應：「我係一次過夾晒所有錢過，因為手續費好貴」。但黃承認當時說謊，因他從來沒有將滙豐戶口所得的款項，轉匯至泰國戶口。辯方追問，黃是否連試圖匯款也沒有。黃回應：「無論邊個戶口，最終都係我管。」辯方遂問：「都會係你個袋度？」黃不同意，但承認沒有匯款的打算。
+
+#### 黃稱打算拎「龍心」後著草 辯方指他人或理解為網上遊戲的「寶石」
+
+另外，黃曾於12月6日向捐助者表示：「簡單啲講，3個玩家永久退game，目標500萬」、「目標係集齊最少30粒龍心」、「打爆機，拎咗龍心，就會著草」。黃同意相信行動後會「走佬」，因此其籌款目標是500萬。辯方問：「你自己有冇打屠龍 online game？屠龍係咪有線上遊戲？」黃表示：「有。」辯方再問：「你自己有冇打？」黃表示：「PSP 計唔計？係咪叫 PSP 我唔記得」，最後他表示有玩過「Switch」。有被告聞後不禁發笑。
+
+辯方追問黃是否知道遊戲名稱為「屠龍傳記」及「屠龍新傳」，「仲可以同好多人連線一齊玩？」黃表示知道是「online game」。辯方再問：「知唔知其中有寶石叫『龍心』？」黃表示：「唔知。」辯方又問：「知唔知可以攞真錢買，如果打得叻有30粒龍心，可以畀錢同你買一兩粒？」黃回答：「唔知。」辯方最後問：「你口中嘅『龍心』，話要攞警察命，但係人哋理解原來係寶石，你唔知？」法官打斷指，這並非一般常識，「佢冇玩，點可以假定『龍心』係寶石？⋯⋯如果有資料畀佢睇，我可以接納。」
+
+#### 辯方指劉佩凝沒有交現金予黃
+
+另外，黃於11月7日出發前往泰國，並打算在當地開銀行戶口。黃表示當日出發前，相約劉在觀塘海濱見面，以確認身份，並告知自己將會到泰國開戶口，請她稍後將號碼交予捐款人。同時，劉亦將數萬元現金給予黃。辯方指出，劉當日根本沒有給予黃現金，黃當時僅將戶口號碼給劉；黃不同意。黃於11月中向劉表示：「我哋嚟緊有大行動」，辯方指劉從來沒有過問小隊的行動及資金的用途；黃同意。
+
+#### 黃否認捏造證供誣衊劉 亦不同意當對方是「棋子」
+
+黃在11月19日再前往泰國，並於23日回港。抵港當日，黃致電告知劉，他們將會參與其他團隊用槍及炸彈的行動，並著劉加緊眾籌力度。辯方指出，實際上通話內容圍繞翌日見面交錢的時間及地點，黃亦叫劉「畀心機啲籌錢」；黃不同意。辯方亦指出，黃事隔4年，在2023年中錄取無損權益口供時，才首次向警員透露通話內容。黃同意沒有資料證明通話內容。
+
+黃於11月27日向劉表示：「嚟緊我哋好快有大嘢發生，辛苦你啦」。辯方指，既然黃已經向劉透露用槍及炸彈的計劃，何必再重複。辯方質疑：「你作使用槍同炸彈嘅計劃出嚟誣衊劉佩凝，目的係你要認罪，要篤埋劉佩凝出嚟，所以作嘅？」黃不同意。辯方又指：「佢（劉佩凝）係你一隻好細嘅棋子，你唔會同佢講行動計劃？」黃表示：「我唔同意當時當佢係一隻棋子，同埋唔會次次講槍同炸彈，所以簡略講。」法官協助辯方問：「你可以用其他字眼，同唔同意你（用詞）隱晦？」黃不同意。辯方最後問：「你專登加用槍同炸彈計劃，放喺無從對證嘅電話通話裏面？」黃不同意。
+
+案件明（17日）續審。
+
+本案共7名被告，其中6男即張俊富、張銘裕、嚴文謙、李家田、賴振邦及許湛榮，均否認《聯合國（反恐怖主義措施）條例》下的「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪、作為交替控罪的「串謀導致相當可能會危害生命或對財產造成嚴重損害的爆炸罪」；以及「串謀謀殺」罪，對象為警務人員。李家田另否認「意圖危害生命而管有槍械及彈藥」罪。女子劉佩凝則否認「串謀提供或籌集財產以作出恐怖主義行為」罪。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC164/2022、255/2023
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-17-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-18.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-17-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-18.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..d0300de0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-17-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-18.md
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【勇武7人案・審訊第十八日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-05-17 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/aKa9Cy8.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#勇武派 #屠龍小隊 #串謀 #反恐"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 報告指黃振強投訴遭警威嚇「掟上挪亞方舟送返大陸」黃今表示不記得
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】2019年12月，「屠龍小隊」成員等涉計劃放炸彈及開槍殺警。6男1女否認「串謀謀殺」及「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」等罪，今（17日）踏入第18日審訊。已認罪、為「污點證人」的「屠龍」隊長黃振強接受辯方盤問。控方播放黃被捕後的錄影會面，他表示遭吳智鴻教唆及慫恿成為「槍手」，自己並無參與處理槍械。他又說笑稱要「炸埋深圳」，因「唔鍾意共產黨」。黃早前稱錄影時狀態混亂慌張，辯方質疑片段所見他並不慌張；黃同意，但強調自己「衣衫不整，頭髮飛起晒」。黃否認為掩飾證供矛盾，故訛稱狀態欠佳，藉此欺騙陪審團。
+
+另外，辯方引述黃投訴警察的調查報告指，黃稱被捕時遭便衣警威嚇：「你信唔信8.31有死人，掟晒上挪亞方舟，掟埋你上去呀？可以送你上返大陸，你大陸仔呀嘛，你大陸係咪有親戚呀？」黃今表示不記得。辯方問：「你因為講得太多大話，唔記得邊啲係大話，邊啲係真話？」黃不同意。
+
+#### 黃同意劉佩凝對他「言聽計從」
+
+黃振強第十三日作供，接受代表劉佩凝的大律師馬維騉盤問。辯方問及，劉佩凝對黃而言，是否一個「言聽計從」的人，黃表示：「都係嘅。」黃同意劉照其要求開設「育龍」頻道，又將收集的資金轉賬予黃。辯方展示黃與劉的 Telegram 對話，當劉提出想在「育龍」發文時，黃表示「呢啲係你個 channel 講咪得囉，唔好亂咁用我個 channel 講嘢」。黃同意不想劉胡亂用「育龍」頻道發文。
+
+
+▲ 大律師 馬維騉
+
+#### 黃稱劉對抹黑感憤怒、在頻道發布情緒性說話 故嚴厲阻止她發言
+
+黃又對劉表示「嗱嗱嗱，講左重要嘢先。唔止係你，其他人都唔好講嘢啦，除咗我」。黃另提醒劉如何應對抹黑者，並稱：「（佢哋）私底下幾狗都好，你當無視佢啦，唔好講啲晦氣說話，我明白你都嬲嘅⋯⋯」黃解釋當時有人私訊罵劉，抹黑「育龍」頻道是假，導致劉情緒不穩定，並在「育龍」發布情緒性說話。黃遂制止她，著她「唔好講嘢住啦」。
+
+辯方問黃是否突顯其「話事權」，表達「我話事，唔好講嘢，除咗我？」的意思。黃稱這並非其意思，並解釋劉因抹黑言論感憤怒，並發表情緒性說話，於是黃使用「比較嚴厲嘅態度」去阻止劉。
+
+
+▲ 女被告 劉佩凝
+
+#### 黃同意無應嚴文謙要求給予「零用」但強調較重視對方
+
+辯方另指，對話顯示嚴文謙經濟拮据，因此需從事由「家長」介紹的兼職。對話又透露，嚴在11月7日問黃「大佬有冇零用？」，黃回覆「我未到手」、「我下個禮拜一返香港之後，先過錢畀你」。黃承認當時準備前往泰國，打算回港後轉賬予嚴。辯方則指，黃昨稱出發前獲劉當面給予數萬現金，為何會說「未到手」。黃卻沒有正面回答，僅稱：「以我記憶，要畀錢咁多位隊友，我幾乎係冇拒絕過。」辯方指出紀錄看不到上述轉賬，黃最終同意返港後沒有轉賬予嚴。
+
+嚴於11月14日再次向黃表示「跪求零用」，黃回應：「零用？」辯方問，為何黃會表示不知道「零用」的意思。黃解釋兩人相熟，這是與嚴之間的「輕鬆玩笑」對話。黃又指在眾多隊員之中，他對嚴「比較重視」。辯方不同意其說法，指黃收到過百萬捐助，卻不向嚴提供「零用」。辯方追問捐助者捐錢的原因，「係因為你係屠龍隊長，定因為你黃振強嘅個人魅力？」黃表示不得而知。辯方質疑，黃選擇在11月16日將銀行戶口的5萬元，轉至馬會戶口賭波，也不給「零用」予有逼切需要的隊友。黃同意，但強調在各隊友之中，自己給最多錢予其中3人，當中包括嚴文謙。
+
+#### 黃不同意為獲取減刑 誣衊劉知道「屠龍」的大行動
+
+辯方亦指，黃在第二份無損權益口供中，提及2019年11月8日凌晨抵達泰國後，用「楓葉」帳戶著「龍女」劉佩凝將錢轉賬至其滙豐戶口。辯方指出當時尚未開設「楓葉」帳戶，因此上述說法錯誤；黃同意，並解釋自己沒有留意。辯方質疑：「根本你冇睇內容，有咩簽咩？」黃回應：「大致上認為意思符合我憶述嘅事實。」
+
+辯方最後指出案情，包括劉佩凝從來不知道「屠龍」會於12月8日在灣仔進行大行動；她從來沒有聽過任何牽涉炸彈及槍的行動。黃一律不同意。辯方亦指黃捏造供詞，聲稱在11月23日的電話通話中，告知劉行動會牽涉炸彈及槍；而他誣衊劉，其目的是爭取成為控方證人及獲取減刑。黃亦不同意。
+
+#### 黃於錄影會面稱中大示威期間受傷 因此「想殺咗啲警察」
+
+控方接着播放黃振強於2019年12月8日被捕當日，在灣仔警署錄取的錄影會面片段。錄影會面由偵緝警員5828戴明德負責。黃當時被警方以「串謀意圖造成身體嚴重傷害罪」拘捕，警方指他連同另外8人，計劃在12月8日的港島公眾活動進行涉案行為。
+
+警員逐一問及從黃電話截取的 Telegram 對話內容。黃曾與「鴻仔」（即吳智鴻）對話，黃形容對方約23至24歲、身高約1.7米、身形瘦削、長髮及戴眼鏡。黃表示在「公海」群組認識對方。
+
+兩人於11月15日的對話顯示，「鴻仔」問黃：「安好？」，黃回答「重傷，走緊」。黃解釋當時在中大被警方用海綿彈及橡膠彈射中，傷勢嚴重。「鴻仔」回應：「頂住，好快覆桌」；黃表示「仆街，我今晚就想啪佢」。黃解釋被警察導致自己受傷，因此一時情緒高漲，並「想殺咗啲警察」。「鴻仔」一度向黃表示「我等X咗成個月，我都好想去啪狗」。
+
+#### 黃表示獲「鴻仔」金錢援助 認為對方想借他實行殺警計劃
+
+黃又透露，「鴻仔」聲稱自己管有手槍，計劃自用或提供予「屠龍」使用。而「鴻仔」一直有向黃提供援助金，包括給予現金及「請食飯」，以支持他參與堵路及和理非活動，整體金額約1萬元。被問到「鴻仔」為何會不斷在金錢上援助黃，黃表示：「我諗佢可能想有一啲人手幫佢實行計劃，想借我哋 team 幫佢實行殺警計劃」，並指對方想安排他做「槍手」。黃透露，「鴻仔」交代打算在計劃中用20公斤炸彈及手槍，並慫恿「屠龍」協助堵路或破壞「藍店」。「鴻仔」表明事成後到台灣，會給予百多萬予小隊。
+
+#### 黃：「鴻仔」教唆及慫恿他成為「槍手」一份子
+
+黃強調，計劃一直由「鴻仔」主導，槍械及軍火均由他負責。黃對此並不知情，亦無參與製作及運輸，只是「鴻仔」教唆及慫恿他成為「槍手」的一份子。
+
+黃曾向「鴻仔」謊稱自己受傷不能前往測試槍及炸彈，因「我唔想掂呢啲嘢，所以呃佢話受傷唔去」。黃又指，只是一直敷衍「鴻仔」，投其所好表示想要槍，目的主要想拿援助金。另外，「鴻仔」向黃表示11月24日區選之前，不要使用槍及炸彈，原因是「V小隊」曾提及想區選前殺警，「鴻仔」為免被誤會，因此不想太快實行計劃。
+
+#### 黃憂與「槍手」見面後會遭滅口
+
+黃表示，於科大一次開會期間見過「槍手」，其後得知他因一宗軍火案件準備判刑，刑期或達16年，因此「等唔切」，他在大行動後會離開香港。另外，黃表示一直沒有見過相關槍械，一度以為「鴻仔」是「車大炮」及「吹水」，於是好奇問「槍手」使用甚麼型號步槍。「鴻仔」回答：「AR 15」。
+
+黃透露，「鴻仔」表示「槍手」想與黃見面傾談，黃當時覺得「好驚」，害怕受軍火商牽連。黃又擔心與「槍手」見面後，得知對方秘密會遭滅口，於是問「鴻仔」：「係咪想啪咗我？」，對方回覆「啪你把鬼」。黃最終沒有與「槍手」見面。黃向「鴻仔」表示：「黑衫走晒先射」，因擔心自己在行動期間會被射中，而「我哋都驚死」。
+
+#### 黃對話提及「炸埋深圳」解釋自己「唔鍾意共產黨」
+
+「鴻仔」向黃表示會「拋手榴彈」，黃聞後擔心傷及無辜，打算「唔玩」。「鴻仔」遂澄清並非使用軍用「手榴彈」，只是用打邊爐罐加炮仗。兩人其後說笑稱要用火箭炮及核彈，提及「去咗台灣先撳制」、「炸埋深圳」。黃表示自己「唔鍾意共產黨」。
+
+警員另就黃與林銘皓「Kan」的對話提問。黃表示「Kan」作為「哨兵」，主要負責「睇水」，並不會參與小隊行動。
+
+#### 黃曾稱錄影時混亂慌張、看畢片段後同意「望落唔驚」
+
+錄影會面播放完畢，辯方進行盤問。代表張俊富的大律師李國輔早前問及黃在錄影時的狀態，黃當時回應其狀態「唔好」，感到混亂及慌張，但回答的都是他認為的真話。黃在看畢片段後，仍然維持上述說法。
+
+辯方指出：「你會唔會認同我嘅觀察，你冇表現得慌張？望落唔驚？」黃同意。辯方亦指他對答如流，「警員問咩即刻答？」黃同意自己是即時回答，但否認是對答如流。辯方改問是否對答清晰，黃亦不同意，但未能指出哪一方面不清晰。辯方最後問：「你狀態好好？」黃不同意，並指「心理好難睇」。
+
+#### 黃強調當時衣衫不整、頭髮飛起 否認訛稱狀態欠佳
+
+辯方問到：「表面上睇唔到你狀態唔好？」黃回應：「我諗你都見到，我成個人衣衫不整，頭髮飛起晒。」法官張慧玲表示需要翻看片段。黃再看片段後，同意沒有衣衫不整，但仍不同意「狀態好好」。辯方再問：「你反應好快？同唔同意？」，並舉例指他能夠即時會回答毋須律師陪同，又主動問警員有沒有地圖，甚至即時更正警員的口誤。黃不同意，認為當時狀態混亂，反指：「我諗混亂唔代表答唔到問題。」
+
+辯方問：「你話錄影會面狀態唔好、慌張？全部唔係真話？」黃不同意。辯方再問：「你為咗掩飾證供矛盾，欺騙我哋、欺騙陪審團？」黃不同意。
+
+#### 辯方引報告指 黃投訴遭警威嚇「可以送你返大陸」
+
+辯方又指，黃被捕後曾向投訴警察課投訴，兩名女警長於12月17日前往荔枝角收押所，向黃了解情況並撰寫調查報告。
+
+辯方引述報告內容指，黃當時正睡覺，突然遭便衣警闖入並掌摑，其後被掩着嘴巴。黃表示不記得細節。辯方引述報告，當時黃指遭便衣警威嚇：「你信唔信8.31有死人，掟晒上挪亞方舟，掟埋你上去呀？可以送你上返大陸，你大陸仔呀嘛，你大陸係咪有親戚呀？」黃今表示不記得，並一度低頭深呼吸。
+
+#### 辯方質疑「講得太多大話，唔記得邊啲係真話」黃不同意
+
+辯方問：「你因為講得太多大話，唔記得邊啲係大話，邊啲係真話？」黃不同意。辯方追問：「有冇發生警員威逼利誘你，真定假？」黃表示遭受武力對待屬實，其中一人是向他進行錄影的警員戴明德，但黃不清楚對方行為是否屬威逼。
+
+代表張銘裕的大律師姚本成則問，黃是否事隔4年才提及張銘裕曾投擲汽油彈。黃同意，但表示自己首次被問起。辯方指出，張只是參與勇武行動，但從來沒有投擲汽油彈；黃不同意。
+
+案件下周一（20日）續審。
+
+本案共7名被告，其中6男即張俊富、張銘裕、嚴文謙、李家田、賴振邦及許湛榮，均否認《聯合國（反恐怖主義措施）條例》下的「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪、作為交替控罪的「串謀導致相當可能會危害生命或對財產造成嚴重損害的爆炸罪」；以及「串謀謀殺」罪，對象為警務人員。李家田另否認「意圖危害生命而管有槍械及彈藥」罪。女子劉佩凝則否認「串謀提供或籌集財產以作出恐怖主義行為」罪。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC164/2022、255/2023
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-20-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-19.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-20-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-19.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..afab8d8e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-20-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-19.md
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【勇武7人案・審訊第十九日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-05-20 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/aKa9Cy8.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#勇武派 #屠龍小隊 #串謀 #反恐"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 有陪審員因病獲3天病假 今日不開庭押後續審
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】2019年12月，「屠龍小隊」成員等涉計劃放炸彈及開槍殺警。6男1女否認「串謀謀殺」及「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」等罪。已認罪、為「污點證人」的「屠龍」隊長黃振強早前接受辯方盤問，今（20日）踏入第19日審訊。惟法官張慧玲於開庭時表示，一名陪審員因病獲3天病假，因此今日不會開庭，但現時未決定下一步如何做，稍後會通知各方明天是否開庭。張官建議其他陪審員可以利用時間，閱讀早前的證供。
+
+本案由3男6女陪審團審理。案中共7名被告，其中6男即張俊富、張銘裕、嚴文謙、李家田、賴振邦及許湛榮，均否認《聯合國（反恐怖主義措施）條例》下的「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪、作為交替控罪的「串謀導致相當可能會危害生命或對財產造成嚴重損害的爆炸罪」；以及「串謀謀殺」罪，對象為警務人員。李家田另否認「意圖危害生命而管有槍械及彈藥」罪。女子劉佩凝則否認「串謀提供或籌集財產以作出恐怖主義行為」罪。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC164/2022、255/2023
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-23-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-20.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-23-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-20.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..310f117f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-23-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-20.md
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【勇武7人案・審訊第二十日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-05-23 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/aKa9Cy8.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#勇武派 #屠龍小隊 #串謀 #反恐"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 陪審員仍病假中 今明兩天不開庭
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】2019年12月，「屠龍小隊」成員等涉計劃放炸彈及開槍殺警。6男1女否認「串謀謀殺」及「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」等罪。已認罪、為「污點證人」的「屠龍」隊長黃振強早前正接受辯方盤問，今（23日）踏入第20日審訊。其中一名陪審員本周一因病獲發3天病假，法官張慧玲將案押後至今。法官透露，由於該陪審員仍獲數天病假，因此今天及明天均不會開庭。案件押後至下周一（27日）續審。
+
+本案由3男6女陪審團審理。案中共7名被告，其中6男即張俊富、張銘裕、嚴文謙、李家田、賴振邦及許湛榮，均否認《聯合國（反恐怖主義措施）條例》下的「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪、作為交替控罪的「串謀導致相當可能會危害生命或對財產造成嚴重損害的爆炸罪」；以及「串謀謀殺」罪，對象為警務人員。李家田另否認「意圖危害生命而管有槍械及彈藥」罪。女子劉佩凝則否認「串謀提供或籌集財產以作出恐怖主義行為」罪。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC164/2022、255/2023
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-29-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-23.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-29-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-23.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..5a9e156e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-29-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-23.md
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【勇武7人案・審訊第廿三日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-05-29 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/aKa9Cy8.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#勇武派 #屠龍小隊 #串謀 #反恐"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 辯方質疑黃振強因部分控罪存檔及獲豁免起訴書 故「唔介意唔講真話」
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】2019年12月，「屠龍小隊」成員等涉計劃放炸彈及開槍殺警。6男1女否認「串謀謀殺」及「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」等罪。本案設有9人陪審團，當中一人上周身體不適告假，法庭遂在第21、22天審訊處理案件管理事宜，沒有傳召陪審團。今（29日）續審並踏入第23日審訊。已認罪、為「污點證人」的「屠龍」隊長黃振強繼續接受盤問。辯方質疑，黃聲稱與警方錄影會面時狀態欠佳，只屬「掩飾之詞」，目的為掩飾會面紀錄與庭上證供的差異；黃不同意。辯方指出，由於黃知道認罪能獲刑期扣減，其餘控罪亦存檔法庭不起訴，而且獲控方的豁免起訴書，因此他「唔介意唔講真話」；黃不同意。另外，控方引述對話指，劉佩凝曾稱：「CID 已經開咗大 File 關於育龍」；黃解釋劉應從其他示威者收到消息，警察某部門正調查眾籌頻道「育龍」。經過14日，黃振強已完成作供。
+
+#### 辯方質疑黃稱錄影會面時狀態欠佳 目的為掩飾庭上證供的差異
+
+黃振強第十四日作供，接受辯方盤問及控方覆問。控方早前在庭上播放黃被捕後的錄影會面片段。代表嚴文謙的大律師梁鴻谷問到，黃與警方的對答顯示他思想清晰，能夠清楚表達，並非他所指狀態欠佳；黃不同意。辯方追問，黃聲稱狀態欠佳只是「掩飾之詞」，目的為掩飾會面紀錄與庭上證供的差異；黃不同意。辯方指出，由於黃知道認罪能獲刑期扣減，其餘控罪獲存檔法庭不起訴，而且獲控方的豁免起訴書，因此他「唔介意唔講真話」；黃不同意。
+
+#### 辯方質疑黃盡量與警方合作、配合調查
+
+代表李家田的大律師林芷瑩問到，黃早前稱每個隊員參與暴動期間均曾使用汽油彈，但實際上李家田沒有使用，黃只是捏造；黃不同意。
+
+代表劉佩凝的大律師馬維騉指，黃被捕後進行錄影會面時，警方問及黃電話內的 Telegram 訊息內容，黃屢回答不記得語音訊息的內容，即使是一天前的訊息他也表示不記得。辯方指出，黃似乎盡量與警方合作；黃表示不記得，又指被捕後狀態混亂及驚慌，故「心思唔會喺作供上面」。辯方亦質疑黃盡量客觀，且有問必答，似乎盡量配合警方調查；黃解釋：「想盡快結束件事。」
+
+#### 黃表示被捕至錄影會面期間沒有睡覺
+
+接着由控方覆問。大律師周凱靈指黃於清晨6時被捕，他當時是否睡醒；黃表示自己仍在床上，處於半夢半醒。黃於晚上9時進行第二次錄影會面，控方問中途他有否睡覺；黃表示沒有。
+
+另外，黃早前供稱張俊富的角色是負責運輸物資。控方今引述對話，指張曾問：「有冇人想要彈彈？」黃解釋「彈彈」意指伸縮金屬棍，他理解張當時問有沒有人想用，並表示可幫忙入貨。
+
+黃早前表示不少隊員包括張銘裕在10月1日之後，因為警方的行動而情緒高漲，並發表偏激的言論。紀錄顯示，張銘裕問「係咪有軍刀？想要把玩下」。控方問到，張是否因為10月1日的事件而想索取軍刀；黃表示依其個人判斷，認為不止是10月1日，而是整場社會運動的情緒亦牽涉在內。
+
+#### 劉佩凝曾表示「CID 已經開咗大 File 關於育龍」
+
+黃早前稱劉佩凝對他言聽計從，會聽從黃的指示做事，包括應黃要求為眾籌頻道「育龍」開設帳戶「楓葉」。控方引述對話指，劉曾表示：「CID 已經開咗大 File 關於育龍」，控方問說話是甚麼意思。黃表示，劉應該是從其他示威者一方收到訊息，警察某部門正調查「育龍」。黃承認這個消息與他同意劉設立「楓葉」帳戶有關。
+
+
+▲ 被告 劉佩凝
+
+黃振強已完成作供，案件明（30日）續審。
+
+本案共7名被告，其中6男即張俊富、張銘裕、嚴文謙、李家田、賴振邦及許湛榮，均否認《聯合國（反恐怖主義措施）條例》下的「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪、作為交替控罪的「串謀導致相當可能會危害生命或對財產造成嚴重損害的爆炸罪」；以及「串謀謀殺」罪，對象為警務人員。李家田另否認「意圖危害生命而管有槍械及彈藥」罪。女子劉佩凝則否認「串謀提供或籌集財產以作出恐怖主義行為」罪。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC164/2022、255/2023
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-30-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-24.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-30-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-24.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..0f2b2291
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-30-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-24.md
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【勇武7人案・審訊第廿四日】
+author: 法庭線
+date : 2024-05-30 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/aKa9Cy8.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#勇武派 #屠龍小隊 #串謀 #反恐"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 控方讀出承認事實 指警檢獲槍械彈藥、灣仔搜出兩土製炸彈
+
+
+
+
+
+【法庭線】《反恐條例》首案，7人不認罪，周四（30日）在高等法院踏入第24天審訊。認罪被告、自稱「屠龍小隊」隊長黃振強早前已完成作供，周四由控方讀出承認事實。承認事實列出眾被告被捕時間及被搜獲的物品等，又描述警方在灣仔華仁書院附近發現的土製炸彈。
+
+#### 承認事實：嚴文謙家中有多張餐廳現金券
+
+控方由高級檢控官伍永杰讀出承認事實，列出涉案各被告的被捕時間及檢獲物品等。承認事實指，警方於2019年12月8日進入灣仔一大廈單位，發現黃振強、張銘裕及嚴文謙，並搜出黑色頭盔、面罩、防彈背心及膠盾。
+
+警方拘捕3人，並把張銘裕押回葵涌住所，在其家中搜出24厘米長的刀具、透明護目鏡、護肘及面罩等。警方亦把嚴文謙押回葵涌住所，在其家中檢獲多張肯德基、唐記包點、麥當勞等現金券。至於張俊富，警方於同日上門到其葵涌住所拘捕他。及至2020年6月11日，警方於上水古洞拘捕李家田，同日進行錄影會面。
+
+#### 承認事實：吳智鴻被搜出手槍、彈藥
+
+承認事實續指，警方於2020年1月17日到荔枝角「3C 維修工作室」，拘捕賴振邦，並發現防毒面罩等物品。賴兩天後獲警方保釋，須每月到警署報到一次，並於同年6月拒絕繼續保釋，獲警方釋放，但於同年9月5日再次拘捕賴。
+
+針對被告許湛榮，警方於2020年1月17日到許寓所拍門，但當時他不在家，翌日許到灣仔警署被捕。至於唯一獲保釋的被告劉佩凝，警方於2019年12月9月在機場拘捕她。
+
+承認事實又提及，警方於2019年12月8日拘捕吳智鴻，並在其家中搜出一把黑色手槍、共106發彈藥、6張地圖、對講機、戰術背心、兩把短氣槍連彈匣及軍刀等。在其中一份地圖中，警方發現有吳智鴻及許湛榮的指模。
+
+#### 承認事實：涉案貨倉有煙花、避彈衣等
+
+至於認罪被告蘇緯軒，警方於2019年12月20日，當蘇緯軒與同案被告鐘雪瑩離開大埔翠屏花園時，被警方尾隨截停。警方檢獲一把手槍、彈匣連13粒彈藥、彈膛有一粒彈藥。
+
+隨後警方在附近發現一枚發射過的槍彈殼。翌日，警方於翠屏花園一單位內，搜出一把長槍、載有61發彈藥的彈匣、5個彈匣，內有共150發彈藥、兩個手槍彈匣，內有共30發彈藥，以及防彈背心。警方於2020年1月17日，到彭軍壕寓所拘捕他。
+
+承認事實形容，2019年12月3日凌晨，黃振強及張俊富把煙花爆竹存放於荃灣的貨倉。警方於貨倉發現，有13塊防彈板、煙花、多個濾罐、防毒面罩、黑色背心、電鑚及避彈衣等。
+
+#### 承認事實：警於灣仔發現兩土製炸彈 內含金屬釘、引爆裝置
+
+針對土製炸彈一事，警方於2019年12月9日於灣仔華仁書院附近發現兩個一大一細的土製炸彈。小炸彈內有2公斤硝酸銨及燃油、26克 HMTD 炸藥及由電話組成的電子引爆裝置、24根金屬釘。至於大炸彈則有8公斤 ANFO 炸藥、145根金屬釘、及電子引爆裝置等。
+
+警方於附近再發現一個黑色背囊，內有圍巾及電筒等，當中的 DNA 可能來自吳智鴻及彭軍壕。事隔4個月後，警方於2020年4月8日，於現場附近發現3個煙頭，經檢驗後其 DNA 可能屬吳智鴻及彭軍壕。警方於2019年12月18日亦到摩星嶺一帶搜查，發現一把手槍、兩個彈匣及8發彈藥。
+
+#### 承認事實：「育龍」TG 頻道曾發《立場》及《蘋果》訪問報道
+
+承認事實另提及，《立場新聞》曾發有有關「屠龍小隊」的專訪報道。而名為「育龍」的 Telegram 頻道中，亦曾發布《立場》及《蘋果日報》的相關訪問報道、「屠龍小隊精華片」的連結。
+
+針對被告的財政紀錄，承認事實指黃振強的戶口於2019年底的存款總額為112萬港元、提款總額為104.5萬，馬會戶口則有66萬存款。至於劉佩凝方面，其戶口存款總額為35.2萬、提款總額為32.9萬。
+
+案件由法官張慧玲及3男6女陪審團審理。7名被告為張俊富、張銘裕、嚴文謙、李家田、賴振邦、許湛榮及劉佩凝，起訴時年齡介乎20至29歲不等。
+
+案件押後至周五（31日）續審，預計播放被告李家田的錄影會面。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC164/2022、255/2023
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-31-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-25.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-31-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-25.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..7c21c7ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-31-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-25.md
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【勇武7人案・審訊第廿五日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-05-31 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/aKa9Cy8.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#勇武派 #屠龍小隊 #串謀 #反恐"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 認罪被告彭軍壕以控方證人身分作供
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】2019年12月，「屠龍小隊」成員等涉計劃放炸彈及開槍殺警。6男1女否認「串謀謀殺」及「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」等罪，今（31日）踏入第25日審訊。黃振強已完成作供，下一名控方證人為彭軍壕。彭向控方確認，自己於2020年1月17日在住所被捕，同年4月8日錄取「無損權益口供」。彭確認他已承認「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪，而「串謀謀殺」罪則獲控方撤回。由於需要安排律師向彭解釋「免予起訴書」內容，因此案件押後至下周一（3日）續審。
+
+為本案被告的彭軍壕，以控方證人身分作供，他是本案第3名證人。彭身穿淺藍色恤衫及灰色長褲，並戴眼鏡。彭由兩名懲教人員押解出庭，他行出庭時步伐緩慢。
+
+
+▲ （資料圖片）
+
+#### 彭的「串謀謀殺」罪獲控方撤回
+
+彭向控方確認，自己於2020年1月17日在住所被捕，同年4月8日錄取「無損權益口供」。彭確認他已承認「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪，而「串謀謀殺」罪則獲控方撤回。控方問彭，他是否收到控方於今年4月10日發出的「免予起訴書」；他表示沒有收到，亦無見過相關文件。控方及法官張慧玲均認為，需要給予時間彭閱讀及理解相關文件。法官指文件重要，而控方則向陪審團致歉，指需要安排彭的律師到法庭向他解釋。因此案件押後至下周一（3日）續審。
+
+本案共7名被告，其中6男即張俊富、張銘裕、嚴文謙、李家田、賴振邦及許湛榮，均否認《聯合國（反恐怖主義措施）條例》下的「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪、作為交替控罪的「串謀導致相當可能會危害生命或對財產造成嚴重損害的爆炸罪」；以及「串謀謀殺」罪，對象為警務人員。李家田另否認「意圖危害生命而管有槍械及彈藥」罪。女子劉佩凝則否認「串謀提供或籌集財產以作出恐怖主義行為」罪。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC164/2022、255/2023
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-03-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-26.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-03-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-26.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..ecf915f4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-03-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-26.md
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【勇武7人案・審訊第廿六日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-06-03 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/aKa9Cy8.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#勇武派 #屠龍小隊 #串謀 #反恐"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 認罪彭軍壕：「大舊」劉偉德為金主 資助台灣軍訓並擬用槍及炸彈對付警察
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】2019年12月，「屠龍小隊」成員等涉計劃放炸彈及開槍殺警。6男1女否認「串謀謀殺」及「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」等罪，今（3日）踏入第26日審訊。認罪被告彭軍壕以控方證人身分作供，他指於2014年社會運動期間認識吳智鴻，對方為激進示威組織「鐵馬組」的頭號人物。吳在7.21事件後，向彭表示要「吹大雞」入元朗「搵鄉黑覆桌」。彭其後跟隨吳到元朗示威，在場包括曾參選區議員的「大舊」劉偉德。彭得知「大舊」發起了新組織，他為「金主」並負責統籌，而彭則加入了組織。彭又指，「大舊」負責支付台灣軍訓的費用，他亦曾提及將會在之後的遊行使用真槍及炸彈對付警察。彭透露在西貢試槍及子彈前，曾依吳的指示到西環公廁拿取炸藥，但自己沒有參與測試，只負責「睇水」。
+
+#### 彭軍壕：2014年社運認識「鐵馬組」頭號人物吳智鴻
+
+為本案被告的彭軍壕，以控方證人身分作供。他是本案第3名證人，今第二日作供。彭身形瘦削，穿淺藍色恤衫、灰色外套及灰色長褲，並戴眼鏡。彭由兩名懲教人員押解出庭。
+
+彭向控方確認自己於2020年1月17日被捕。事隔兩年多，他於2022年10月承認「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪，而「串謀謀殺」罪則獲控方撤回。彭確認，控方於2024年4月向他發出免予起訴書。
+
+彭供稱，他認識本案其中5名被告，包括：吳智鴻、許湛榮、賴振邦、張銘裕及李家田。他亦認識其餘兩人，包括張堅順 Nelson 及「Hans」。彭表示在眾多被告之中，他首先認識吳智鴻。兩人於2014年社會運動期間認識，吳是激進示威組織「鐵馬組」的頭號人物。該組織會作出不是「和理非」的行為，例如設路障堵路、衝擊警方防線。彭其後認識吳的「左右手」許湛榮，他亦為組織成員。組織其他成員包括：另一頭號人物「Jack」，以及「Hans」。彭獲吳招攬加入「鐵馬組」，最後他答應。
+
+#### 彭：吳在7.21後表示要「吹大雞」入元朗「搵鄉黑覆桌」
+
+彭在2014年社會運動平息後，仍然逗留在「鐵馬組」，但沒有再與成員聯絡。直至2019年6月，彭當時任職西餐廳主管，吳致電彭詢問他有否參與反修例運動，彭表示需要上班，只能在下班後或放假時參與。在元朗7.21襲擊事件後一至兩天，吳向彭表示需要召開緊急會議，打算於7月27日「吹大雞」，「入元朗搵鄉黑覆桌，搵班黑社會報返7.21嘅仇。」
+
+其後吳、彭及許湛榮，抵達許位於太古城附近的住所樓下開會。彭知道吳想找2014年佔領區最外圍、負責「睇水」留意警方會否清場的示威人士，一同參與7月27日的行動。吳及後將防具及武器給予彭，包括：迷彩戰術背心、行山杖、眼罩及防毒面罩等，並表示留待當日入元朗使用。
+
+#### 彭：「大舊」劉偉德發起新組織，並作為「金主」
+
+彭遂攜同裝備，在7月27日進入元朗衝擊警方防線及破壞，同行者包括：吳智鴻、曾參選區議員的「大舊」劉偉德，以及曾用網媒《PPPN》記者身份在示威現場出現、為「蜘蛛隊」隊長的「Jack」。吳當時表示，「大舊」發起了新組織，他為「金主」並負責統籌；而彭、吳智鴻、許湛榮、「Hans」及「Jack」是新組織的成員。
+
+
+▲ 2019年7月27日 元朗遊行（資料圖片）
+
+#### 彭：「大舊」負責支付台灣軍訓費用，每人約8千元
+
+彭於8月27日在旺角 Red MR 再次與吳見面，當時有多人在場開會，包括：吳、許、「Hans」、稱作「阿文」的張堅順 Nelson，以及為「屠龍」隊長、稱作「Tomson」的黃振強。彭聽到吳表示即將會有大行動，因此需安排人手到台灣參與軍事訓練，為期兩周，定於9月16日出發。「大舊」會支付訓練費用，包括津貼機票2千元及食宿等6千元。若然參加者未能請假而需要辭職，「大舊」會支付一個月代通知金。彭表示自己當時已辭職。
+
+彭又指，他知道8月已有兩批人到台灣參與軍事訓練，9月是第三批，並會有7人參與。至於軍訓內容，吳表示將會由一名退役的陸戰隊員「常生」任教，又表示會很辛苦，著隊員「唔好當係去旅行」。
+
+#### 彭：退役陸戰隊員教授如何「搶槍」、用刀及製汽油彈
+
+彭最後有到台灣參與軍訓，他於9月16日與吳智鴻、許湛榮、張堅順、「Bobby」賴振邦、「小熊維尼」張銘裕乘搭同一班機到台中機場；「Hans」則自行乘搭較早的航班。各人前往台中彰化縣參與軍訓，期間他們居住在約4層高的宿舍，彭與張銘裕住在同一房間，但兩人並沒有交談。彭表示軍訓內容包括：體能訓練如跑步及游泳、增強重力訓練如舉重，以及加強反應能力訓練。另外，7人在 War Game 場地接受槍械訓練，「常生」會教授如何用槍及搶槍，他們亦到高架橋的橋底練習燒槍。「常生」亦有教授用刀攻擊的技巧，並由一名柔道教練教授搏鬥技巧。
+
+彭又指，「常生」亦有教授如何製作汽油彈及鋁熱彈，目的為對付裝甲車。他首先示範如何製作，有參加者嘗試製作，並在沒有點火的情況下投擲。至於製作鋁熱彈的材料則由吳購買，有參加者將製成的鋁熱彈擲向廢棄的電單車，最後著火焚毀。此外，「常生」有介紹製作炸彈會用到的原材料。
+
+#### 彭：聽到吳智鴻及賴振邦談論迫政府妥協
+
+彭表示在宿舍休息期間，不時聽到吳、賴及張閒聊，談及如何在遊行示威使用炸彈進行破壞，以及迫使政府妥協，對話間透露「大舊」想這樣做。但彭不想參與討論，他解釋：「我唔會刻意同佢哋傾偈，我鍾意自己一個」，因此選擇「鼠」入房。彭表示「大舊」沒有到台灣，只是派其軍師「阿星」在台灣拿示威物資返港。
+
+#### 彭：「大嚿」表示會在遊行用真槍炸彈對付警察
+
+於9月30日，吳著彭一同前往開會，他們抵達西環皇后街大廈，其中一個類似律師樓的單位。在場的還有「大舊」及「阿星」。會上「大舊」表示會在之後的遊行用真槍及炸彈對付警察，「阿星」則和議，而吳亦稱自己試過製作 TATP 烈性炸藥。另外，「大舊」表示原打算在10.1遊行使用真槍及炸彈攻擊警察，但「阿星」懷疑安全屋被警方監視，因此煞停計劃。吳又指，早前「大舊」想訂槍，因此吳透過人脈從美國訂購，但貨物卻被當局扣留。彭理解吳是想「大舊」支付有關費用。
+
+#### 彭：吳構思「掟鏹水彈」行動，最終因「錯失時機」取消
+
+其後在10月3日晚至4日凌晨，吳構思了「掟鏹水彈」的行動，打算在示威地點的高空向警方投擲鏹水彈。彭及吳到達灣仔軒尼詩道名為「卓軒」的旅館，賴及許其後到達會合。吳帶備了4支 750ml 的鏹水，以及兩支屬腐蝕性液體的洗石劑。
+
+吳、賴及許表示會負責行動，賴會負責「睇位」，他們會在警察經過時投擲，又指「高空掟落去，擋都冇得擋」。他們最後上天台準備，而彭則沒有參與，只是下樓買食物。最後3人表示「錯失咗時機」故沒有行動。
+
+#### 彭稱依吳指示 測試前到公廁拿炸藥
+
+至10月底，吳向成員表示：「呢排要盡量低調啲，嚟緊大行動要保留人手同實力。」在11月初，吳表示槍械已經到港，並表示「遲啲攞出嚟燒」，他最後開設試槍用的「行山討論區」，打算到深山試槍。
+
+6人最終決定在11月16日晚至17日凌晨到西貢試槍。彭表示前一天即15日，自己照吳的指示，負責到西環山道山景園公廁拿炸藥及向 Jack 拿對講機。彭表示炸藥用黃色紙袋盛載，內有兩包各一公斤的黃色粉末，以及一米長的引線。彭取得物品後，就乘的士前往炮台山富澤花園，吳下樓拿彭的背包。另外，事前吳曾著各人在測試前關上電話，賴表示可以提供二手電話及電話卡予大家使用，又提醒他們關閉 WiFi 及 GPS。
+
+#### 彭：吳帶3支手槍及一支步槍到西貢測試
+
+彭表示他與許在16日晚上10時多，乘搭的士到西貢西灣亭，吳則自行搭的士到場。吳其後在涼亭打開背包，內有3支入滿子彈的 Polymer 80 手槍、一支 AR 15 長形步槍、兩個手槍彈匣、20至30發步槍子彈、兩公斤 ANFO 炸藥，以及兩部對講機。吳將其中一部對講機放在涼亭，待未到達的人之後拿取。最終賴、兩名「屠龍」代表張銘裕及李家田亦到場。
+
+#### 彭：5人輪流試槍、自己則負責「睇水」
+
+吳及許表示曾經到場視察，於是兩人負責帶大家行上山。各人走了1個半小時到達大浪村位置，吳表示在該處試槍。他走到一個較隱蔽的位置，與許取出手槍檢查，然後「掹雞」，即把子彈從彈匣推上槍管。彭表示5人輪流試槍，向前邊地下的草叢開槍，並拍攝片段；而彭則身處較遠位置負責「睇水」。事後彭及其他人拾起子彈殼，離開時沿路投擲海中。
+
+在離開的路段上，吳找了一個斜路位置測試炸藥，彭亦站在較遠位置觀察。他指吳使用延時引爆，並聽到很大的爆炸聲。他們約6時走到北潭凹打算離開，這時吳拿出手槍，將15粒子彈重新放入彈匣，並交給李家田。據彭所知，「屠龍」一直催促要用槍，因此吳將槍交李。吳及彭分別叫了兩部的士，彭、吳及許乘搭同一部的士往港島，賴、張及李則乘搭另一部的士出九龍。
+
+#### 彭：曾與賴振邦到城大及浸大「爆實驗室」、偷化學原料
+
+於11月17日，吳要求彭協助張堅順，最後彭到愛民邨附近找張，負責「睇水」並協助他營救被困理大、從下水道離開的示威者。另外，數天後吳在群組表示「出面啲槍手出咗事」，其中兩個槍手曾借走槍，現在卻失去聯絡。吳在測試槍後又發現有問題，想彭拿給維修員修理，不過最後吳自行拿槍去維修。
+
+吳亦透露，賴負責製作炸彈，以及與引爆裝置的人聯絡。彭表示賴曾於11月14日提議到城大及浸大「爆實驗室」，偷取裏面的化學原料。賴首先到場，之後彭及張堅順亦抵達。賴找了學校的學生組成臨時隊伍，到化學實驗室偷取化學原料。
+
+案件明（4日）續審。
+
+本案共7名被告，其中6男即張俊富、張銘裕、嚴文謙、李家田、賴振邦及許湛榮，均否認《聯合國（反恐怖主義措施）條例》下的「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪、作為交替控罪的「串謀導致相當可能會危害生命或對財產造成嚴重損害的爆炸罪」；以及「串謀謀殺」罪，對象為警務人員。李家田另否認「意圖危害生命而管有槍械及彈藥」罪。女子劉佩凝則否認「串謀提供或籌集財產以作出恐怖主義行為」罪。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC164/2022、255/2023
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-04-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-27.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-04-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-27.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..9adc338e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-04-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-27.md
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【勇武7人案・審訊第廿七日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-06-04 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/aKa9Cy8.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#勇武派 #屠龍小隊 #串謀 #反恐"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 認罪彭軍壕：獲指示到麥花臣球場公廁取炸藥、與吳智鴻到港華組裝炸彈
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】2019年12月，「屠龍小隊」成員等涉計劃放炸彈及開槍殺警。6男1女否認「串謀謀殺」及「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」等罪，今（4日）踏入第27日審訊。認罪被告彭軍壕以控方證人身分作供，他稱於11月底到賴振邦位於荔枝角香港工業中心的「3C工作室」，測試賴有份製作的炸彈樣本。彭又指自己曾依吳的指示兩度接收手槍及炸藥，他首先到沙田接收3支手槍，並放置在摩星嶺公園橋底；其後又到麥花臣球場公廁的廁格，取走一袋炸藥。彭表示與吳到香港華仁書院，對方負責組裝炸彈，最後將炸彈放在該處。彭透露，他於行動前一日才獲告知細節，吳表示自己會在「屠龍」掩護下擺放炸彈，彭的角色是「睇水」；而「屠龍」等隊伍會破壞店舖及攻擊警方，迫防暴警靠近炸彈，吳負責引爆。最後其他人會在到警方「殘骸」附近「執槍」，賴振邦則會安排電單車及私家車，載走拾槍的「手足」離開。
+
+彭軍壕：前往賴振邦的「3C 工作室」試爆炸彈樣本
+
+為本案被告、早前已認罪的彭軍壕，為第3名控方證人，他第三日作供。彭表示，吳智鴻透露「Bobby」賴振邦負責製作炸彈，以及與炸彈引爆裝置的人聯絡。彭估計，由於賴早前到城大及浸大「爆 Lab」偷取化學品，因此吳著賴負責炸彈事宜。
+
+彭曾跟賴振邦及張堅順到城大及浸大，但自己沒有在實驗室偷取任何物品。他指賴在浸大取走部分化學品後，就前往城大宿舍休息室，並拿出多個貼有骷髏頭標誌的玻璃瓶拍照，彭理解上述物品是有毒。彭又透露，宿舍區有學生及示威者設置「兵工廠」，內有化學品。
+
+控方展示 Telegram 對話紀錄，顯示吳在群組稱「上次入 Lab 好似有支硫酸，有冇人攞走咗，有煉金師要」。彭回覆「啲料喺 Bobby 度」。吳其後指「個煉金師要 98%，1kg 出價1千」。這時台灣軍訓教官「常生」表示自己有一瓶，但運送上有困難。
+
+彭表示於11月底，吳著他一起到賴振邦位於荔枝角香港工業中心的「3C工作室」，測試由賴與他人製作好的炸彈及遙控裝置樣本。彭表示當時首次上賴的工作室，留意到內有等待維修的電話，以及維修工具，因此估計賴從事手提電話及平板電腦維修。
+
+彭：裝置發出聲響、吳智鴻表示試爆成功
+
+彭、吳及賴帶同炸彈樣本到後樓梯進行「試爆」，彭只是在旁觀察。吳首先從玻璃瓶取出火柴頭份量的 TATP 白色粉末，並放置在發熱線上。其後賴或吳致電裝置的手提電話，電話隨即震動，裝置發出「嘭」一聲。吳遂表示樣本試爆成功：「個裝置 work。」測試期間他們有拍攝片段，控方於庭上播放，顯示試爆後有人說「work」。
+
+事隔一至兩天，彭再應吳要求到「3C工作室」，因吳希望了解炸彈裝置的運作。彭自行到場，見吳在工作台前拿著焊筆燒電話。其後賴及一名穿校服的男學生回到工作室。賴表示一名稱為「煉金術師」、懂得合成炸藥的人，想直接跟吳討論製作炸藥的價錢。彭留意到該人的 Telegram 用戶名稱為「engred」，吳與他討論完之後，就跟彭一同離開。
+
+彭：依吳智鴻指示接收3支手槍 決定放摩星嶺公園橋底
+
+直至11月27日，彭收到吳的指示到沙田廣源邨、小瀝源附近的巴士站，向「維修員」取回一個袋。彭跟對方見面，並形容他是男性、年約30歲、身高約1.65米。該「維修員」將一個有重量的紙袋交予彭，而袋的外圍有膠紙封着。彭並不知道物品是甚麼，只獲吳指示先放自己家中保管。彭乘搭的士離開途中，在車上拆開紙袋，並發現是3支類似槍的物體。
+
+彭考慮到家中有小童，認為放家中會造成危險，因此自行決定放在摩星嶺公園橋底的隱蔽位置。彭在放低物品前再查看，發現共有3支槍，其中兩支沒有彈匣，另一支則有15粒普通子彈。
+
+彭：吳給他兩個裝滿空尖彈的彈匣
+
+於12月1日，彭依照吳的指示，將一支沒有子彈的槍交給一個不認識的人。對方派一名用戶名「馬修」的人，在旺角銀城廣場地下交收。彭認得他是早前在沙田廣源邨見過面的「維修員」。同日，吳又著彭將另一支有子彈的槍拿到其住所、即炮台山富澤花園的樓下公園。兩人在晚上7時見面，彭將槍交給吳，吳則給予彭兩個裝滿空尖彈的彈匣。
+
+彭：獲告知在行動中負責做「哨兵」
+
+吳透露，即將有行動並會用到空尖彈，因此需要收回所有普通子彈。他解釋空尖彈的殺傷力「大好多」，但普通子彈的穿透力則較強。他又指，行動中「屠龍」會負責護送吳，亦會運送及安置炸彈，吳則會親自引爆。吳指示彭的角色是「哨兵」，負責「睇水」。他亦表示已經「撈好」12公斤炸藥，仍有8公斤未「撈好」，不過行動地點及日期尚未決定。彭接過吳給予的彈匣後，將他們一併放在摩星嶺公園橋底。
+
+於12月3日晚，吳向彭表示相約了「屠龍」及「閃燈」出來商討，並著彭一同參與。彭立即到荃灣會合吳。兩人其後到糖水店，而「屠龍」隊長黃振強、「屠龍」軍師及「Kristy」亦在場。待賴振邦亦到場後，他們一行6人到荃灣沙咀道酒吧。吳、黃及「屠龍」軍師坐在一起討論行動。由於賴擔心閉路電視有收音功能，因此不想談論行動事宜。當晚的費用由吳支付。彭透露，自己當時沒有上班，吳或「Hans」會每月給予他8千至1.2萬元不等的資助。
+
+彭：獲指示到麥花臣公廁廁格取炸藥
+
+直至行動前一天、即12月7日下午，吳指示彭向「煉金術師」取物品，其用戶名為「Thkoy」。對方指示彭到麥花臣球場公廁的5號廁格拿取物品。彭到達發現廁格鎖着，於是用硬幣打開門，發現馬桶上有一個螢光黃色的海綿寶寶環保袋，並拉上拉鏈。彭拿上手後感覺重約十多公斤。
+
+彭應吳的指示，查看袋內是否有遙控裝置及數個玻璃瓶，內裝用作引爆的炸藥。彭表示他把袋輕微打開，以「鳥瞰」角度觀察，但沒有認真查看，其後搭的士到灣仔公園會合吳。控方展示兩人的 Telegram 對話，吳向彭表示：「兩個引爆，記住帶背囊，12kg」、「有冇漏味？小心輕放」、「小心漏味，畀的士佬篤灰」。彭回覆「全部包膠住」。吳一度表示：「好似有鬼」，彭估計吳被人跟蹤。
+
+彭：吳在華仁書院組裝炸彈
+
+彭與吳大約下午2時多會合，吳帶彭到他曾經就讀的香港華仁書院。吳表示想將炸彈放在華仁停車場後垃圾房的草叢，但發現一輛7人車上有司機看着他們，因此他們「轉地方」，改往回到皇后大道東斜路，該處的樓梯附近有平台，兩人放下環保袋。吳告訴彭晚上9時再集合。兩人當晚返回現場，並將環保袋轉移至學校附近的底樁。
+
+吳其後將黑色膠袋鋪在地上，拿出環保袋內約12至14包、各重1公斤的黃色粉末（即 ANFO 炸藥），並開始組裝炸彈。吳亦拿出一個可以控制50米範圍的遙控，以及不同型號的電芯。彭在旁拿着電筒協助吳。約一小時後，吳表示其中一個電池盒溶掉，於是致電賴並著他拿3套後備裝置。等候期間，吳將計劃詳情及各人角色告知彭，他表示民陣會於12月8日在灣仔舉辦遊行，而吳的計劃會有張堅順、賴振邦、「屠龍」、「閃燈隊」、「蜘蛛隊」及「本土民主前線」參與；另外吳已安排槍手。
+
+彭：吳計劃在「屠龍」掩護下擺放炸彈
+
+吳解釋，他與彭將於12月8日中午12時取回炸彈，並找位置觀察。當遊行隊伍到達軒尼詩道及菲林明道交界，吳就會在「屠龍」掩護下擺放大炸彈，並於東行50米再擺放小炸彈。而槍手則會身處軒尼詩道的「立興大廈」或「光華大廈」，即接近小炸彈的位置。
+
+彭：賴振邦負責安排電單車及私家車 載拾槍「手足」離開
+
+至於「屠龍」、「閃燈」、「蜘蛛」及「本民前」則會跟着遊行隊伍，當到達軍器廠街天橋位置，他們就會開始破壞店舖，並引防暴警靠近小炸彈位置，槍手會開第一下槍作為「訊號」，這時吳會引爆小炸彈。而「屠龍」及其他隊伍會攻擊警察，迫他們到大炸彈位置，再由吳引爆大炸彈。在爆炸之後，其他人會到警方的「殘骸」附近「執槍」，隨即離開現場。張堅順負責聯繫槍手，接載他到場及離開；賴振邦則負責安排電單車及私家車載走拾了槍的「手足」離開。
+
+彭：吳等人被捕後，賴表示想拿炸彈繼續執行計劃
+
+吳講解計劃後不久，賴駕電單車到場，並協助吳組裝炸彈至凌晨12點。其後吳把炸彈逗留原地，並用黑色膠袋包着。賴自行離開，吳及彭則到灣仔「薔紅」找黃振強吃宵夜，「屠龍」軍師及「蜘蛛隊」的隊員亦在場。黃、其軍師及蜘蛛隊隊員，一度問及吳關於12.8行動的詳情。吳表示只有他及「蜘蛛隊」隊長「Jack」知道行動細節，其他人只會知道行動牽涉槍及炸彈，以及各自負責的範疇。吳又帶大家走一次行動路線，彭表示：「我有去但係冇聽。」隨後吳及彭打算返回香港華仁書院，商討炸彈擺放位置。但由於灣仔公園已關門，因此將炸彈逗留原地。
+
+在12月8日早上8時，彭收到賴傳來新聞連結，顯示警方分別在北角及灣仔作出拘捕行動，彭估計是吳及「屠龍」成員被捕。賴不停問彭：「炸彈係咪擺咗喺華仁？」，並表示想拿取兩個炸彈繼續執行計劃。兩人的對話紀錄顯示，彭於12月9日得知警方在華仁搜獲炸彈，並向賴表示「好無奈，清唔切」。而張堅順則透露槍手仍然很想行動，彭著他安撫對方。「蜘蛛隊」隊長 Jack 最後宣布行動腰斬。
+
+案件明（5日）續審。
+
+本案共7名被告，其中6男即張俊富、張銘裕、嚴文謙、李家田、賴振邦及許湛榮，均否認《聯合國（反恐怖主義措施）條例》下的「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪、作為交替控罪的「串謀導致相當可能會危害生命或對財產造成嚴重損害的爆炸罪」；以及「串謀謀殺」罪，對象為警務人員。李家田另否認「意圖危害生命而管有槍械及彈藥」罪。女子劉佩凝則否認「串謀提供或籌集財產以作出恐怖主義行為」罪。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC164/2022、255/2023
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-05-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-28.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-05-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-28.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..da285cde
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-05-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-28.md
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【勇武7人案・審訊第廿八日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-06-05 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/aKa9Cy8.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#勇武派 #屠龍小隊 #串謀 #反恐"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 認罪彭軍壕透露父親是警署警長 稱想退出但憂被隊長殺及「搞屋企人」
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】2019年12月，「屠龍小隊」成員等涉計劃放炸彈及開槍殺警。6男1女否認「串謀謀殺」及「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」等罪，今（5日）踏入第28日審訊。認罪被告彭軍壕以控方證人身分作供，並接受辯方盤問。彭透露其父親為警署警長，案發時他正準備退休。辯方問彭，他聽到組織隊長吳智鴻談及炸彈大行動後，「你覺唔覺得吳智鴻係癲㗎？」彭表示：「覺。」彭承認向警方錄取「無損權益口供」時表示：「我就一直好想退出，但以鴻仔（吳智鴻）為人，我知道佢咁多嘢，佢亦知道我住邊度。如果我唔參與嘅話，佢可能會搵人殺我同搞我屋企人，所以我冇得唔參與。」但他否認說法是為推卸責任及減輕罪責。彭又指為免父親擔心，故沒有跟他商量如何處理本案。
+
+#### 彭軍壕：父親為警署警長、案發時正準備退休
+
+本案被告、早前已認罪的彭軍壕，為第3名控方證人，他第四日作供。控方已完成主問，彭接受辯方盤問。在盤問下，彭確認自己案發時33歲，並透露父親任職警察，職位為警署警長，案發時正準備退休。代表張銘裕的大律師姚本成問到，他是否知道組織隊長吳智鴻於1996年出生，而張銘裕於1999年出生、案發時20歲；彭表示不知道，但同意張看來比自己年輕。
+
+#### 彭同意抱「旅行散心」心態到台灣參與軍訓
+
+彭昨稱2019年9月到台灣參與軍訓時，與張銘裕同房，但兩人幾乎沒有溝通。彭今表示，自己沒有問張的姓名、工作及背景，亦不知道他到台灣的原因。彭表示，張曾是 Telegram「台灣按摩旅行團」群組的成員之一，但同意紀錄顯示他於10月已退出。
+
+在盤問下，彭表示隊長吳智鴻沒有迫他去台灣，只是「安排咗我去」，而自己有選擇權。彭同意吳沒有附加任何條件，亦沒有提及去完台灣後，需要參與大行動。辯方問，台灣軍訓與大行動是否「扯唔埋纜」；彭表示「可以咁理解」。彭同意軍訓包食宿，每位參加者可獲6千元津貼。而他當時正任職西餐廳主管，需請假去台灣，但由於負責批假的主管已離職，無人批出假期，因此彭選擇辭職。
+
+辯方指出，實際上彭抱着「去旅行散吓心」的心態去台灣；彭否認。辯方引述彭被捕後的錄影會面證供，他曾表示去台灣是想「做吓運動，操 Fit 自己」，彭同意有少許這個心態。彭最終承認自己很少運動，但因「有機會做多啲運動」及獲津貼而去台灣，並抱着「旅行」、「Relax（放鬆）」的心態。彭否認軍訓與12月大行動完全無關係，但同意當時尚未知道行動牽涉用槍及炸彈。
+
+#### 彭同意軍訓不太認真、無紀律及懲罰 僅要求兩小時內跑5千米
+
+辯方其後問及軍訓情況。辯方指軍訓為期13天，各人於9月16日出發，張銘裕提早3天離開。彭表示知道張早走，但因不相熟故沒有問及原因。辯方指，張因提早離開而沒有參與「燒槍」活動；彭不同意。
+
+彭表示，任教官的退役陸戰隊員「常生」只要求參加者在兩小時內跑5千米，若不想做的話可休息。辯方指，軍訓期間沒有明確的紀律及懲罰，「唔係真係軍訓？唔係好認真？」彭同意。辯方追問：「你有冇聽爸爸講，學堂點樣訓練？」彭表示有，並同意應該比較辛苦。辯方亦指出，軍訓內容並沒有實彈射擊及教導製作汽油彈；彭不同意。
+
+#### 彭同意沒有上班 僅聽從吳智鴻指示、並獲他津貼生活費
+
+彭表示回港後沒有上班，辯方質疑：「你無所事事，跟住吳智鴻，佢畀錢你使，佢叫你做乜你做乜？」彭同意。彭早前稱吳給他8千及1萬多作為生活費，辯方問如何決定金額；彭表示由對方決定，辯方卻質疑：「你唔係乞兒呀嘛！」彭又指，回港後並無與吳出去示威「搞破壞」。
+
+#### 彭同意試槍期間當「哨兵」、不知誰人開槍
+
+彭表示11月時應吳要求一同前往測試槍及炸彈，自己當時穿黑衫黑褲，為免有蜘蛛昆蟲上身，故用黑衫笠頭。彭透露在試槍期間，自己站在5米外當「哨兵」。彭昨稱同行5人輪流試槍，辯方質疑他看不到情況，只聽到5下槍聲，故不知道由誰開槍；彭同意。
+
+#### 彭承認有想過爆炸會「炸死好多人」
+
+彭表示，吳智鴻於12.8行動前一晚、即12月7日，才向彭透露行動細節。辯方質疑，彭與吳在事前兩個月有緊密接觸，但吳卻沒有提及過行動詳情；彭同意。吳當晚表示，行動期間會待遊行人士到達菲林明道及軒尼詩道交界，這時吳會擺放炸彈。辯方問：「你哋預期成條軒尼詩道都係人？」彭同意。辯方追問：「有冇諗過會炸死好多人？」彭表示「有」，但吳認為爆炸時現場不會有「唔關事嘅人」。
+
+#### 辯方問「覺唔覺得吳智鴻係癲」彭表示覺得、想退出但憂連累家人
+
+辯方亦指出炸彈位置接近油站，並問彭：「你覺唔覺得吳智鴻係癲㗎？」彭沉默一會表示：「覺」，並指聽到其計劃時已經覺得。辯方追問：「點解唔走？」彭反問：「走去邊？」辯方表示他可選擇「返屋企」。彭回答：「既然我覺得佢癲、佢嗰 plan 係癲嘅，即係我要返屋企累全家呀？」彭承認擔心會連累家人，因此沒有將事情告訴其任職警察的父親。
+
+辯方引述，彭曾在錄取「無損權益口供」時表示：「我就一直好想退出，但以鴻仔（吳智鴻）為人，我知道佢咁多嘢，佢亦知道我住邊度。如果我唔參與嘅話，佢可能會搵人殺我同搞我屋企人，所以我冇得唔參與。」彭承認於2020年4月錄口供時有說過，現在仍維持相關說法，並承認擔心任職警察的父親被吳「搞」。辯方最後指出，彭只是想「推卸責任、減輕自己罪責」；他不同意。辯方指根據對話紀錄，彭得悉有人被捕後，仍然附帶粗口表示「好無奈」，似是表達未能成事，而非覺得「甩身、好開心」；彭不同意。
+
+#### 彭表示不想父親擔心 故無與父親商量如何處理
+
+接着由代表李家田的大律師林芷瑩盤問。彭承認辯方所指，在他眼中吳是一個「好惡嘅人」，並「怕咗佢」。在盤問下，彭同意得悉吳被捕後，認為對方不能再「搞」其家人。彭表示，雖然自己參與本案，但得悉吳被捕後，他沒有與家人包括父親商量如何處理。被問及為何不問父親，彭沉默一會表示：「唔想佢擔心囉。」彭又指，若自己被捕的話他會選擇認罪。最終他在被捕後，曾向父親表達想認罪。
+
+#### 彭：獲囚友告知做「金手指」或可獲一半減刑
+
+辯方指，彭於2020年1月17日在住所被捕，同日晚上警方向他進行4次錄影會面。彭表示當時打算認罪故自願說話，並無遭警方威逼、毆打或利誘。辯方問彭為何拒絕提供電話密碼，他表示當時不想，但否認「有嘢唔想講畀警方聽」。另外，彭表示當時沒有想過要做「金手指」指證其他人，後來還柙荔枝角收押所時，獲囚友告知可以做「金手指」，而且或可獲一半減刑，於是他主動申請見警方。
+
+#### 彭否認為獲取減刑而作控方證人
+
+根據警方與彭會面的調查報告顯示，警方與彭會面共15次。首次在2020年2月4日，彭表示當時向警方表達想做「金手指」，但沒有談及案情，只是「傾吓入面生活娛樂」。雙方於同年3月12日第二次見面，紀錄顯示彭獲警方告知律政司的意向，他不記得內容，但否認律政司要求他指證所有人，才可換取機會撤控。直至同年4月7日，雙方第三次見面，彭表示警方為他錄取「無損權益口供」，對方用紙筆抄下。彭同時獲警方告知，做控方證人或可獲減刑。
+
+辯方追問他目的是否想獲減刑，彭表示「冇特別在意」，又指：「我都選擇咗認罪，做『金手指』認罪嘅扣減唔可以話冇意義，但係嗰比重冇咁大。」辯方追問：「警察有冇畀版本你講咩？」，彭表示沒有。彭於4月8日第四次與警方見面，並簽署「無損權益口供」。
+
+事隔8個月，彭於同年12月15日要求與警方見面。辯方質疑他是否就「金手指」一事催促警方，想了解接納他作證人與否。彭表示僅「少少擔心」。於2021年6月30日雙方再會面，彭否認擔心未能作為證人而要求見面：「唔係太過在意做唔做到，決定權唔喺我度，冇辦法在意。」其後雙方六度見面，直至2022年2月10日，警方到小欖跟彭見面。彭表示獲警方通知律政司接納他做控方證人，但否認警方目的是想確保彭肯做「金手指」。
+
+#### 彭撰信要求律政司遵從認罪協議 但否認錄口供前已商討成功
+
+辯方引述彭於2022年6月24日，親自用英文撰寫予律政司的信件。彭在信中引述早前與律政司達成的協議，他願意承認為交替控罪的「串謀導致相當可能會危害生命或對財產造成嚴重損害的爆炸」罪，並要求撤回「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」及「串謀謀殺」罪。辯方問，彭與律政司是否一早達成協議，彭表示不記得，又稱只是依照囚友提供的草稿撰寫。
+
+辯方質疑，警方是否一早表示若願意錄口供，就可換取撤回兩罪；彭不同意。彭同意知道「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」及「串謀謀殺」罪的最高刑期是終身監禁，因此不希望被起訴此兩罪。但他否認知道自己願意承認的交替控罪，最高刑期為監禁20年，並想控方起訴較輕的控罪。
+
+辯方問，彭是否與警方達成協議，若願意錄取「無損權益口供」的話，就豁免起訴「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」及「串謀謀殺」罪。彭回答，錄取口供時他只是被控「串謀有意圖而傷人」罪。辯方追問，在彭提供與本案相關的重要口供、指控不同人之後，控方就可改控現時的控罪；彭同意。惟彭否認錄口供前已與警方達成協議，協助警方指控各人。
+
+#### 彭表示沒有問父親如何獲撤控
+
+律政司最終於2022年8月18日回信予彭的大律師，表示不接受彭一方的建議，並提出另一條件，即彭需承認「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」，換取撤回「串謀謀殺」罪。辯方問，就上述認罪事件，彭有否問其父親如何能獲律政司撤控。彭表示沒有，又指自己被捕時父親已退休，他亦沒有給予建議。
+
+#### 彭承認無從得知手槍是「仿真槍」還是「真槍」
+
+此外，彭早前稱各人於2019年11月16日晚至17日凌晨，前往西貢試槍及炸彈，同行的包括吳智鴻及「屠龍」成員李家田。在盤問下，彭表示吳在西灣亭拿着3支手槍及兩個彈匣檢查。彭在旁觀察但沒有拿上手。彭同意辯方指，無從得知手槍是「仿真槍」、「氣槍」或「真槍」，亦不知道子彈是否屬「氣槍」專用。
+
+#### 彭否認訛稱吳智鴻把槍交李家田
+
+彭亦透露，吳在測試前指派他做「哨兵」，負責在5米外「睇水」。彭承認不知誰人有份開槍，亦未有目睹各人行為。彭稱吳在回程期間，表示其中兩支槍有問題。彭承認自己沒有目擊試槍過程，有可能3支槍也有問題。
+
+彭目睹吳將一支完好無缺、裝滿15粒子彈的槍給予李家田，李將其放背包內。彭同意上述所說均為真話，但辯方卻指出，彭被捕後在錄影會面表示，試槍後吳把所有手槍、彈匣及子彈拿走。辯方質疑彭在庭上給假口供；彭不同意。辯方指出，實際上吳沒有把手槍給予李家田；彭不同意。
+
+案件明（6日）續審。
+
+本案共7名被告，其中6男即張俊富、張銘裕、嚴文謙、李家田、賴振邦及許湛榮，均否認《聯合國（反恐怖主義措施）條例》下的「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪、作為交替控罪的「串謀導致相當可能會危害生命或對財產造成嚴重損害的爆炸罪」；以及「串謀謀殺」罪，對象為警務人員。李家田另否認「意圖危害生命而管有槍械及彈藥」罪。女子劉佩凝則否認「串謀提供或籌集財產以作出恐怖主義行為」罪。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC164/2022、255/2023
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-06-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-29.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-06-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-29.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..3e3a235c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-06-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-29.md
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【勇武7人案・審訊第廿九日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-06-06 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/aKa9Cy8.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#勇武派 #屠龍小隊 #串謀 #反恐"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 彭軍壕否認是吳智鴻的「左右手」及「第二把交椅」
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】2019年12月，「屠龍小隊」成員等涉計劃放炸彈及開槍殺警。6男1女否認「串謀謀殺」及「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」等罪，今（6日）踏入第29日審訊。為控方證人的認罪被告彭軍壕，接受辯方盤問。彭表示加入組織目的是「想為個運動做返啲嘢，冇諗過要做啲可能會傷害到人嘅嘢」。辯方質疑：「想有更完整計劃，去做更激進嘅行為？」，彭同意這樣會更好，「起碼大家知道自己做啲咩、負責啲咩，做起嚟會有效率啲」。辯方向彭指出：「你係等如吳智鴻嘅『左右手』，所以去邊度佢都帶埋你？」；彭不同意。辯方再指出：「同唔同意其實你喺吳智鴻隊伍等如『第二把交椅』？」；彭亦不同意。
+
+#### 彭軍壕指新組織約200人 估計成立目的為「有班人可以畀『大舊』用」
+
+本案被告、早前已認罪的彭軍壕，為第3名控方證人，他第五日作供，接受代表賴振邦的大律師是香媛盤問。彭軍壕確認自己就讀至中三，成績欠佳，因沒有興趣而輟學。彭昨稱父親曾任職警署警長，辯方今追問其隸屬隊伍，彭表示曾問父親但他拒絕透露。
+
+彭日前稱，在2014年雨傘運動期間認識激進組織「鐵馬組」成員吳智鴻，自己亦有加入「鐵馬組」。彭在盤問下表示，當時亦認識成員之一的「大舊」劉偉德，兩人私下並無聯絡。彭於2019年7月21日獲吳聯絡，對方要求他協助「大舊」在中聯辦遊行期間，在示威前線做「哨兵」以便運送物資。吳將彭的 Telegram 給予「大舊」，但完成當天的事情後，兩人無再聯絡。
+
+直至7月21日發生元朗白衣人襲擊事件後，吳通知彭參與「緊急會議」，希望「吹大雞」於7月27日入元朗報仇。彭表示知道行動或會使用武力，但仍願意參與行動，其後更收到吳提供的裝備及武器。但由於「礙眼」關係，他沒有帶吳提供的行山杖，只是將防毒面具及黑色替換衣服放在背包，去到現場亦沒有拿出使用。辯方質疑他實際上有攜帶及使用其他裝備武器，只是為減低自己參與而說謊，彭不同意。
+
+彭又稱，在7月27日參與行動後，他成為「新組織」一員，而吳則為組織其中一小隊的隊長。彭解釋以為組織是類似「鐵馬組」，亦預期將來可能需要參與暴力活動。他在場見到「大舊」劉偉德，對方曾在 Telegram 表示自己是「新組織」發起人，亦是「金主」並負責幕後統籌。被問到「新組織」共有多少人，彭表示：「吹盡雞最多200人」。彭又估計，「新組織」成立目的是「應該有班人可以畀『大舊』用掛」。
+
+#### 彭表示加入組織無想過做傷人事情 只希望分工更有效率
+
+辯方進一步問彭加入組織目的為何，彭表示：「當時主要係想為個運動做返啲嘢，冇諗過要做啲可能會傷害到人嘅嘢」。辯方追問為何彭不能單獨行動，而是需要加入組織。彭回答：「自己一個唔係唔得，但係多啲人一齊做會好啲」。辯方指單純的遊行亦有多人參與，彭同意但補充「嗰啲唔識」。辯方再問為何大家要互相認識，彭表示：「有默契啲掛」。辯方質疑，「想有更完整計劃，去做更激進嘅行為？」，彭同意這樣會更好，「起碼大家知道自己做啲咩、負責啲咩，做起嚟會有效率啲」。彭亦同意組織的行動較激進，因此要有組織性方便分工合作，包括需要「金主」資助購買物資。
+
+彭表示，他於8月27日應其隊長吳的要求到 Red MR 開會，在場亦有吳於2014年認識的張堅順 Nelson，以及「屠龍」隊長黃振強。彭表示，會議期間聽到吳表示即將有大行動，而且會舉辦台灣軍訓。他亦聽到吳講解軍訓的詳情，包括指訓練為期兩周，並由「大舊」津貼機票及食宿費用，參加者到達台灣後會收到現金6千元。
+
+惟辯方指出，彭在被捕後的錄影會面表示，首次與「大舊」見面時，對方已親口問他有沒有興趣參與軍訓，並表示會津貼機票2千元，及給予現金6千元，屆時吳會在台灣派發現金。彭同意在 Red MR 會議前，已知悉台灣軍訓一事，但強調在 Red MR 時不記得「大舊」早前已提及。辯方質疑彭沒有理由不記得，彭回應：「冇乜理由，唔記得咗就唔記得咗」。彭亦同意，在錄取「無損權益口供」時沒有提及獲「大舊」邀請參與軍訓，他解釋指「冇為意呢樣嘢」。辯方指實際上吳在 Red MR 期間沒有提及台灣軍訓，只是純粹與「屠龍」隊長黃振強見面；彭不同意。
+
+#### 彭表示台灣軍訓時「燒槍」地點隱蔽 辯方質疑捏造證供
+
+彭同意，吳吩咐去台灣的7人分批出發，到達目的地才集合，以免警方日後調查。彭表示與吳及許湛榮乘搭同一班機，抵達台灣機場後集合。辯方指出，賴振邦並無在機場集合；彭不同意。
+
+另外，彭早前指軍訓內容包括日間在高架橋底「燒真槍」，即用真槍實彈射擊。在辯方追問下，彭表示該地點隱蔽，因附近馬路有很高的石壆遮擋、馬路及高架橋均沒有車輛行駛，而且周圍無住宅及商舖。彭稱「燒真槍」時有槍聲，但認為教官「常生」對此不擔心。辯方指出：「日光日白冇理由喺咁嘅地方燒槍，所以冇呢件事？」；彭不同意。
+
+#### 辯方指軍訓不涉及教授製作汽油彈 彭不同意
+
+彭曾表示，一行人亦往柔道館參加搏鬥技巧訓練。辯方指出，實際上張堅順在該場地與其他人玩「Parkour（飛躍道）」運動；彭不同意。彭又指訓練包括教授製作汽油彈。辯方指在軍訓前，香港的遊行中已有人投擲汽油彈；彭同意。辯方追問，教官有否問參加者是否懂得製作及投擲汽油彈；彭表示不記得。辯方再問：「都需要特別訓練咩？」；彭表示訓練內容並非由他決定。彭亦透露，吳在台灣購買材料製作鋁熱彈。辯方指出，訓練期間根本不涉及製作和投擲汽油彈和鋁熱彈；彭不同意。
+
+#### 彭稱吳智鴻及賴振邦等討論要迫政府妥協 辯方質疑無發生
+
+彭另指，訓練期間在宿舍聽到吳智鴻、賴振邦及張堅順討論要進行破壞迫政府妥協，3人曾談論有關內容3至4次，彭每次到雪櫃拿飲品或出去吸煙時，都會經過並聽到相關對話，但他選擇離開並返回房間。在盤問下，彭表示3人在地下近門口圍着坐，以普通聊天的聲量討論，彭並沒有坐下加入，亦無停下聽他們對話。辯方質疑：「你唔係專登偷聽？」，彭否認。辯方最後指出，「根本冇呢啲談話？」；彭不同意。
+
+#### 彭否認是吳智鴻的「左右手」及「第二把交椅」
+
+彭的證供指，於9月30日跟隨吳到西環皇后街某大廈開會，該處為「大舊」辦公室。辯方問：「有冇諗過點解吳智鴻叫埋你去？」，彭表示沒有想過。彭同意在場亦有「大舊」及其軍師「阿星」，他們在會上談及會在遊行用真槍及炸彈，吳亦提及將會從美國運槍到香港。彭同意上述行動比各人提及進行破壞迫政府妥協更嚴重，但自己沒有借故離開，期間亦無發表意見。辯方問到，吳是否不擔心彭會洩漏會議內容，「佢信得過你？」；彭同意。彭表示小隊中只有他到場參與會議，但不知吳有否叫其他人來。
+
+辯方指出，彭在吳的隊伍中擔任重要角色；彭表示不清楚。辯方續問：「你係等如吳智鴻嘅『左右手』，所以去邊度佢都帶埋你？」；彭不同意。辯方再指出：「同唔同意其實你喺吳智鴻隊伍等如『第二把交椅』？」；彭不同意。
+
+彭早前提及，會議上「大舊」表示原本計劃在10月1日進行用槍及炸彈的行動，但「阿星」懷疑安全屋被警方監視故暫停計劃。辯方追問，彭當日有否自行參與示威；彭表示有與吳衝擊警方防線，但沒有進一步激烈行動如破壞港鐵站等。
+
+案件明（7日）續審。
+
+本案共7名被告，其中6男即張俊富、張銘裕、嚴文謙、李家田、賴振邦及許湛榮，均否認《聯合國（反恐怖主義措施）條例》下的「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪、作為交替控罪的「串謀導致相當可能會危害生命或對財產造成嚴重損害的爆炸罪」；以及「串謀謀殺」罪，對象為警務人員。李家田另否認「意圖危害生命而管有槍械及彈藥」罪。女子劉佩凝則否認「串謀提供或籌集財產以作出恐怖主義行為」罪。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC164/2022、255/2023
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-07-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-30.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-07-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-30.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..ae6b7e62
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-07-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-30.md
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【勇武7人案・審訊第三十日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-06-07 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/aKa9Cy8.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#勇武派 #屠龍小隊 #串謀 #反恐"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 彭軍壕認想「篤多啲人」但否認目的拉更多人落水換取做「金手指」
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】2019年12月，「屠龍小隊」成員等涉計劃放炸彈及開槍殺警。6男1女否認「串謀謀殺」及「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」等罪，今（7日）踏入第30日審訊。為控方證人的認罪被告彭軍壕，接受辯方盤問。彭同意有意做控方證人時，打算「篤多啲人出嚟」，即其他非本案被告的參與者。但他否認對賴振邦的指控全屬虛構，亦否認目的是「拉多啲人落水」，以換取成為「金手指」。另外，彭同意本案被告吳智鴻及許湛榮是中學同學及好友，兩人均為「華仁仔」。辯方指，吳於2013年12月曾「為情企圖自殺」，在海外讀書的許停學回港長期陪伴吳；彭表示不清楚。辯方亦指出，在行山試槍後許向吳表示「我唔會掂呢啲嘢」；彭表示記憶中沒有說，但不知道許是否有說過「唔想參與任何犯法嘅事」。
+
+本案被告、早前已認罪的彭軍壕，為第3名控方證人，他第六日作供。代表賴振邦的大律師是香媛進行盤問。
+
+#### 彭稱掟鏹水彈行動時自己去買食物 辯方質疑虛構以減輕罪責
+
+彭屬於吳智鴻的隊伍，他早前稱吳於2019年10月3日，構思在示威地點高處向警方投擲鏹水彈的計劃，並在 Telegram 群組「台灣按摩旅行團」告知各人。同日晚上約11時，吳相約彭到灣仔光華大廈的「卓軒旅館」，彭得悉吳打算當晚執行投擲鏹水彈計劃，並認為自己有機會要投擲。在辯方盤問下，彭表示沒有問吳是否有其他人參與。彭表示，吳在旅館時將地址傳給其他人，並著他們到場一同參與。
+
+最終賴振邦及許湛榮亦有到場，其後吳拿出4枝鏹水。彭表示，吳、賴及許共3人上天台「睇位」及行動，而彭則下樓買食物。但計劃最終因「錯失時機」沒有實行。辯方質疑：「呢個重要時刻你去買嘢食？」，彭表示：「係」。辯方再問：「點解你去買嘢食？」；彭回答：「肚餓咪買嘢食」。辯方追問：「唔早買、唔遲買，咁啱搵地方掟（鏹水彈）就去買？」；彭表示：「係」。
+
+彭同意下樓前，從窗戶看到軒尼詩道有人群聚集，下樓後看到對面馬路有催淚煙，估計警方已開始行動。辯方質疑：「咁嘅情況你繼續買嘢食？」；彭同意，並指沒有打算折返。辯方最後指出，彭根本沒有去買食物，「你作呢個出嚟，就係要減低罪責？」，彭表示不同意。辯方亦指出，實際上賴振邦當日不在場；彭不同意。
+
+#### 彭承認錄口供時心存僥倖不說真話
+
+彭另指，行動告吹後吳帶走鏹水，其後約彭到香港華仁書院測試鏹水彈。辯方問為何還要測試，彭解釋吳想知道鏹水可以「乸穿乜嘢」，但他沒有表明將來會繼續用鏹水彈。彭同意知道吳建議的行動涉及暴力，當他得知「屠龍」於11月向吳索槍後，曾提出不想太暴力。當時吳沒有甚麼反應，其後繼續吩咐彭做事。
+
+彭早前在庭上供稱，他於11月14日入浸大及城大的實驗室，一同在場的賴振邦負責偷取化學品。辯方引述彭在被捕後的錄影會面稱，自己沒有進入兩間大學，只逗留在學校外圍。彭今在庭上確認說法。辯方問及為何證供有改變，彭回答：「因為落口供嗰陣時，仲有少少僥倖嘅心態」，並解釋當時「講少啲」。在法官張慧玲追問下，彭同意會面紀錄的說法並非真確。法官續問：「僥倖心態即係唔講真話？」；彭同意。
+
+彭早前稱若然自己被捕，會打算認罪並向警方說真話。辯方質疑他在錄影會面提及的上述事情，「顯然唔係真話？」；彭同意。辯方續問，彭是否為了想減低自己罪責，故將罪責轉移至其他人身上；彭不同意。
+
+辯方指出，實際上彭負責入實驗室並偷取化學品；彭同意有入但重申沒有盜竊，因自己不懂得看英文標籤。辯方再指出，賴振邦並沒有出現過；彭不同意。辯方最後指出，彭的說法是為了減低自己罪責；彭不同意。
+
+#### 彭不同意賴振邦沒有參與行山試槍
+
+辯方其後問及11月16日晚至17日凌晨的試槍行動，彭表示出發前不知道有甚麼參與者。他又指起初大部份人有蒙面，但中途經過營地時，吳為免蒙面顯得突兀，於是叫大家不要蒙面。彭表示行山期間各人沒有聊天，抵達試槍地點後他在5米外把風。彭同意只是聽到槍聲，但不知誰人開槍。辯方指出，賴振邦沒有參與行山試槍，由於各人蒙面且沒有聊天，因此彭誤會；彭不同意。
+
+另外，彭稱於11月26日到賴振邦的辦公室「3C 工作室」，賴及吳在後樓梯試爆炸彈樣本。辯方指出當日賴不在場，完全沒有出現過，實際上試爆由彭進行；彭不同意。彭另指，吳約他在12月3日晚到荃灣酒吧，又指「屠龍」的黃振強會到場。彭表示各人最終沒有討論大行動事宜，因賴擔心閉路電視有收音功能。辯方指出，根本上各人只是「飲酒娛樂」，沒有人說過擔心被收音；彭不同意。
+
+彭的證供提及，他於12月7日與吳到香港華仁書院製作炸彈，其後因材料有問題故著賴將後備裝置送來。辯方指出實際上賴沒有來過；彭不同意。
+
+#### 彭否認「作故仔」減低自己罪責
+
+此外，彭稱得悉吳及黃在12月8日被捕後，深知自己「走唔甩」，若然被捕的話會選擇認罪。辯方問：「你未被捕前，已經諗好同差人講咩？」；彭表示沒有。辯方追問：「你有冇僥倖心理，作定故仔減低自己罪責？」，並問他有否將「故仔」寫在平板電腦；彭表示沒有。
+
+彭同意自己於2020年1月17日被捕時，其父親亦在場。辯方問，父親有否表示認罪可獲三分一扣減，以及有否詢問警方或提供建議。彭一律表示沒有，並同意辯方指父親「眼白白」看着警方搜屋及帶走彭。
+
+彭同意被捕當日在錄影會面期間，說話時抱着少許僥倖心態，希望警方不予起訴。辯方質疑，吳在會面提及吳知道其住址，因此不得不繼續參與行動，上述說法是為了減輕罪責而構思的「故仔」；彭不同意。辯方質疑，彭一直拒絕向警方交出電子器材的密碼，是因害怕被發現當中資料與其證供有矛盾；彭否認。辯方亦質疑，彭因兩度申請保釋被拒，因此改為「舉手做『金手指』」；彭否認。
+
+#### 彭同意打算「篤多啲人出嚟」
+
+辯方問，彭有意做控方證人時，是否打算「篤多啲人出嚟」；彭同意，並解釋「由頭到尾唔會只係得原本涉案嘅被告，會有更加多其他人」。辯方質疑：「你為咗想博取成功做『金手指』，除咗篤多啲人，仲加重人哋罪責、減輕自己罪責？」；彭不同意。辯方指出，彭證供中指控賴的事情，全屬虛構，其目的只是「拉多啲人落水」，以換取成為「金手指」；彭不同意。
+
+#### 辯方指吳智鴻於2013年「為情企圖自殺」其同學許湛榮從外地回港陪伴
+
+接着由代表許湛榮的大律師陳偉彥盤問。彭早前稱，他及許均屬於2014年社會運動激進組織「鐵馬組」成員。彭同意辯方指兩人當時僅十多歲。辯方指吳智鴻及許湛榮是中學同學，「兩個都係『華仁仔』？」；彭表示知道。辯方指：「佢哋嘅關係，係老朋友、孖公仔、形影不離、最好嘅朋友？」；彭同意。辯方又指，吳於2013年12月曾「為情企圖自殺」並送院，在海外讀書的許即時停學，特意回港長期陪伴吳；彭表示不清楚。彭同意在錄影會面時，提及許於2014年很少參與示威，他亦不知道對方全名。
+
+#### 辯方指吳等人在台灣為許慶生 彭表示印象中沒有
+
+辯方其後問及台灣軍訓內容。彭表示不知道參與者曾到酒吧喝酒，他大部分時間都留在房間。辯方指，許湛榮於軍訓期間的9月18日生日；彭表示不知道。辯方又指參與者在台灣為許舉辦生日會；彭表示印象中沒有。彭不知道吳邀請許去台灣的其中一個重要目的，是因對方生日。另外，彭同意在會面錄影中，沒有提及過軍訓內容包括製作汽油彈及教授搶槍技巧，亦無提及任何人談及迫政府妥協的行為。但他不同意許不牽涉製作或投擲汽油彈。
+
+#### 辯方指試槍後 許向吳表示「唔想參與犯法嘅事」
+
+辯方又指出，關於10月4日的投擲鏹水彈事件，實際上是許當時向其他人表示「唔想咁做」，最後大家才取消行動；彭表示不知道。辯方亦指，於11月16日行山試槍時，許曾向吳表示：「我唔會掂呢啲嘢」；彭表示：「記憶中冇講」，但他同意自己負責把風，因此不能肯定對方有否說。辯方指，下山之後許向吳表示「唔想參與任何犯法嘅事」；彭表示不知道。
+
+彭同意在「無損權益口供」中，沒有提及試槍事件後許對行動的參與，包括12月8日在薔紅餐廳的討論，以及踩線行動。彭最後同意於12月9日凌晨，有人在群組說：「同埋我想問，群組入面有冇邊個唔可以知道最新訊息，榮係其中一個」。
+
+案件下周二（11日）續審。
+
+本案共7名被告，其中6男即張俊富、張銘裕、嚴文謙、李家田、賴振邦及許湛榮，均否認《聯合國（反恐怖主義措施）條例》下的「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪、作為交替控罪的「串謀導致相當可能會危害生命或對財產造成嚴重損害的爆炸罪」；以及「串謀謀殺」罪，對象為警務人員。李家田另否認「意圖危害生命而管有槍械及彈藥」罪。女子劉佩凝則否認「串謀提供或籌集財產以作出恐怖主義行為」罪。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC164/2022、255/2023
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-11-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-31.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-11-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-31.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..1724e561
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-11-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-31.md
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【勇武7人案・審訊第卅一日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-06-11 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/aKa9Cy8.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#勇武派 #屠龍小隊 #串謀 #反恐"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 李家田被捕後稱已還槍 提到「屠龍」前身群組原意保護派文宣人士
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】2019年12月，「屠龍小隊」成員等涉計劃放炸彈及開槍殺警。6男1女否認「串謀謀殺」及「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」等罪，今（11日）踏入第31日審訊。第三名控方證人彭軍壕已完成作供，控方傳召下一名證人，即負責拘捕李家田的偵緝警員6314楊立隆。楊供稱在2020年6月11日到李位於古洞的住所進行拘捕及搜屋，李在警誡下表示：「我淨係去過西貢試槍，之後支槍就畀返『鴻仔』，佢話要返支槍嚟做嘢」。李其後被帶返上水警署進行錄影會面，期間提到「屠龍」前身的群組，是源於2019年8月5日的荃灣斬人事件，有人提出開設 Telegram 群組，原意是保護在地鐵站派發或貼文宣的人，「等佢哋唔使畀人打」。
+
+#### 彭軍壕否認試槍期間有份開槍
+
+本案被告、早前已認罪的彭軍壕，為第三名控方證人，他第7日作供。彭早前稱在西貢試槍期間，自己只負責在5米外「睇水」。代表張銘裕的大律師姚本成就這議題盤問，他問及彭是否記得試槍期間同行各人的衣著；彭表示沒有印象。辯方接着播放試槍片段，彭同意看到片中開槍者的衣袖是黑白間條，但案發時沒有留意，亦不記得對方是誰。辯方指出，實際上片中開槍者是彭，而他有份試槍；彭不同意。
+
+#### 警員指往李家田住所拘捕 他警誡下稱還槍予「鴻仔」
+
+控方完成覆問後，傳召第四名證人、即拘捕李家田的偵緝警員6314楊立隆。楊確認於2006年7月加入警隊，於2020年6月11日時，他駐守有組織罪案及三合會調查科，當日早上9時他獲上司指示，持搜查令與隊員前往上水古洞麒麟村拘捕李家田。他們於9時50分抵達李的兩層住所並拍門，李的母親應門。楊向她展示搜查令及解釋到場目的，惟對方以英語回應聽不明白，於是改由小隊指揮官以英語向對方解釋。對方最後表示李在屋內，並開門邀請警方進入。
+
+警方隨即進入單位，楊表示單位有兩層，連同外圍平地約有5千呎。李母表示兒子在上層電腦房，楊與警署警長47780、警員5820及警員13344進入房間。他們入房後發現李正睡覺，楊遂叫醒李並表明身份及目的，隨後要求對方出示身份證。楊確認身份後對李快速搜身，並以「串謀有意圖傷人」罪名將他拘捕，表示有理由相信他串謀其他人，於2019年12月8日用槍及炸彈傷害香港警務處人員。
+
+楊同時對李作出警誡，李回應：「我淨係去過西貢試槍，之後支槍就畀返『鴻仔』，佢話要返支槍嚟做嘢」。楊查問「西貢試槍」的意思及原因，李表示：「嗰日『鴻仔』畀支槍我，叫我試下開一槍，我照佢意思向空地開一槍」、「『鴻仔』想試下支槍可唔可以射到子彈，之後畀支槍我叫我試，我開完之後就知道支槍係真槍」。李又稱，在西貢試槍當日首次認識「鴻仔」，後來得知對方於12月8日被警方以「藏槍」罪名拘捕。楊把上述警誡供詞記錄在警員記事冊，並讓李檢視及簽署確認。楊亦向李發出被羈留人士通知書，對方簽署確認。
+
+
+▲ 拘捕李家田的偵緝警員6314楊立隆
+
+#### 警員稱李提供電話密碼、其後交重點搜查隊同事搜屋
+
+楊表示，其後他收到案件主管指示搜查電腦房，其餘3位同僚亦在場。警員5820則負責看守坐在椅子上的李。楊在電腦桌上搜獲6部手提電話、1部電腦及1部 iPad。他其後向李作出警誡，並查問其中一部 iPhone、Telegram 程式、iPad 及電腦的密碼，李於是提供密碼。楊將上述內容記錄在警員記事冊並由李簽署。
+
+#### 警員稱李沒有被毆打或威嚇
+
+由於現場範圍太大，楊獲指示在房間看守着李，以等待重點搜查隊同事入屋搜查。搜查隊首先搜查電腦房，直至同事開始搜查房間以外的地方，楊帶同李到其他位置見證警方搜查。楊表示，在場沒有警員毆打、威嚇或利誘李。完成搜查後，楊於晚上6時25分帶李離開單位，前往落馬洲警署，並向值日官匯報。
+
+楊表示，由於落馬洲警署沒有錄影會面設備，因此將李帶到上水警署。楊確保李吃過晚飯、向他提供水及帶他前往洗手間後，再向其發出被羈留人士通知書，其後進行錄影會面。至翌日即6月12日，楊獲指示返回李的住所進行搜查，目的檢取一個綠色斜孭袋作為證物。
+
+#### 李在錄影會面稱「鴻仔」要求取回手槍
+
+控方在庭上播放錄影會面片段，事前法官張慧玲提醒陪審團，片段內容雖然牽涉其他被告的陳述，但不能作為針對其他被告的證據。
+
+片段顯示，錄影會面於6月11日晚上9時進行。李表示自己的 Telegram 用戶名為「檸檬」及「黃又南」。李解釋早前在警誡下表示試槍後將槍歸還「鴻仔」的意思，他指手槍原本屬於「鴻仔」，但「屠龍」隊長「Healer」著李取槍，於是李「拎走支槍袋喺身」。其後「鴻仔」透過 Telegram 聯絡他，表示「想拎返支槍傍身」，最後兩人在新蒲崗雙喜街交收。
+
+#### 李稱開設荃灣群組 原意是保護派文宣人士
+
+李又提到「屠龍」小隊的前身，是源於2019年8月5日的荃灣斬人事件，當時有人提出開設 Telegram 群組，原意是保護在地鐵站派發或貼文宣的人，「等佢哋唔使畀人打」。其後群組內有人陸續離開，只剩下約10人，就成為了「屠龍」。成員包括：他本人、「Healer」、「小熊維尼」、「塵」、「呂布」、「TT」、「Kan」。李補充，「塵」是倉庫事件的被捕者。
+
+#### 李稱自己有份試槍
+
+李表示，2019年10月至11月，隊長「Healer」在「屠龍」群組問：「有冇人去試槍？」，李及「小熊維尼」表示會去。李當時估計是測試手槍。其後，李、隊長、「小熊維尼」及「Kan」共4人在荃灣某大排檔會面，隊長親自講述試槍的詳情。
+
+至試槍當日，李及「小熊維尼」相約在彩虹站乘車入西貢，抵達後再轉的士到某一山頭，然後由「小熊維尼」致電「鴻仔」，並與「鴻仔」那邊的3至4人會合。各人跟隨「鴻仔」步行了1至2小時山後，「鴻仔」在一個附近有士多的地點停下，並拿出背包內的手槍，然後對着空地開一槍。「鴻仔」將手槍上膛後，李及其他人亦輪流試開槍。「鴻仔」最後表示其中兩支槍有問題，然後拾起地上的彈殼。其後，「鴻仔」拿出炸藥進行試爆，期間他用火機燃點粉末。完成測試後回程途中，「鴻仔」將早前的彈殼丟到海中。
+
+案件明（12日）續審。
+
+本案共7名被告，其中6男即張俊富、張銘裕、嚴文謙、李家田、賴振邦及許湛榮，均否認《聯合國（反恐怖主義措施）條例》下的「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪、作為交替控罪的「串謀導致相當可能會危害生命或對財產造成嚴重損害的爆炸罪」；以及「串謀謀殺」罪，對象為警務人員。李家田另否認「意圖危害生命而管有槍械及彈藥」罪。女子劉佩凝則否認「串謀提供或籌集財產以作出恐怖主義行為」罪。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC164/2022、255/2023
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-12-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-32.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-12-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-32.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..1a76136c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-12-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-32.md
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【勇武7人案・審訊第卅二日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-06-12 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/aKa9Cy8.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#勇武派 #屠龍小隊 #串謀 #反恐"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 警否認向李家田施行「水刑」 致窒息 亦否認上級用槍指嚇、稱「殺咗你都冇問題」
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】2019年12月，「屠龍小隊」成員等涉計劃放炸彈及開槍殺警。6男1女否認「串謀謀殺」及「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」等罪，今（12日）踏入第32日審訊。辯方盤問拘捕被告李家田的偵緝警員楊立隆。辯方指出，警方到李的住所作拘捕時，將他推入廁所並武力對待約40分鐘。其中偵緝警署警長馮保羅（音譯）多次掌摑李的臉，追問手槍放在何處，又指「黃振強篤咗你出嚟啦」。馮亦恐嚇：「我而家喺度殺咗你都冇問題，就喺出面搵棵樹吊死你都得」，他更將自己手槍放李的手心，表示：「依家支槍有你指模，我可以話你搶槍，喺度開槍啪咗你都仲得」，他其後用槍指住李說：「同樣嘅情況可以出現喺你阿媽身上」。警員5820及楊立隆分別重拳毆打及腳踢李，楊恐嚇稱：「你係咪想玩滾水淥啫啫？」。楊及一名戴「勞力士」手錶的警員對李施行「水刑」，以濕毛巾蓋臉令其幾乎窒息。後者將自己手槍的子彈放李手上稱：「我可以話依粒子彈係喺你屋企搵到」。楊對於辯方說法一律不同意。
+
+#### 李家田稱保管手槍1至2周 其後歸還吳智鴻
+
+第四名控方證人，為拘捕被告李家田的偵緝警員6314楊立隆，他第二日作供。楊昨供稱，在2020年6月11日獲指示，到李位於古洞的住所進行拘捕及搜屋，李在警誡下表示：「我淨係去過西貢試槍，之後支槍就畀返『鴻仔』，佢話要返支槍嚟做嘢」。李其後被帶返上水警署進行錄影會面。
+
+控方播放錄影會面片段，李表示在西貢試槍回程時，「鴻仔」（吳智鴻）將一支手槍交給他，並展示內有彈匣連14至15粒子彈。「鴻仔」稱「屠龍」隊長「Healer」（黃振強）要求將槍交予李，李接過手槍後放背包。李表示有告知「Healer」手槍在自己手上，對方著他「袋住先」。李稱自己保管手槍約1至2星期，期間一直放在綠色斜孭袋，並無使用。其後「鴻仔」以 Telegram 聯絡李，表示「要返支槍防身」，兩人在新蒲崗雙喜街近公園位置交收。
+
+#### 辯方指警多次掌摑李家田 追問手槍下落並稱「黃振強篤咗你出嚟」
+
+其後由代表李家田的大律師林芷瑩進行盤問。偵緝警員楊立隆表示他當時駐守有組織罪案及三合會調查科A2隊。他確認當日一同前往拘捕的，還有案件主管女督察張堃婷、偵緝警署警長馮保羅（音譯）、偵緝警長 58438、偵緝警員 5820、13344 及 16117。
+
+辯方問到在拘捕李家田前，是否有人向楊表示日後拘捕任何人時，「唔好打得咁緊要」、「打都唔好留痕跡」，因早前被捕的黃振強事後投訴警方。楊表示沒有。楊早前的證供指，他們到李的住所時，由其母親應門。辯方指李母現已離世；楊表示不知道。
+
+楊表示，入房後發現李坐在椅子上睡覺，於是叫醒對方。楊不同意李睡眼惺忪，認為他處於清醒狀態。楊沒有詢問其精神狀態是否可以，便向他作出拘捕及警誡。李在警誡下有回答，楊承認沒有告訴他有權修改或增補記事冊上的紀錄，亦同意沒有受任何因素阻礙。楊亦承認沒有即時向李發出被羈留人士通知書，但否認故意不讓李知道其權利。另外，楊確認重點搜查隊及警犬隊到場搜屋3小時，最後沒有搜獲任何東西。
+
+辯方向楊指出案情，實際上他與另外4名同僚，即偵緝警署警長馮保羅（音譯）、偵緝警員 5820、一名戴「勞力士」手錶的警員，以及一名曲髮的警員，並無向李作出警誡、拘捕或展示搜查令。5人帶李入房後，警員5820用手銬將李雙手反鎖背後，他們強迫李坐在電腦椅上，並將他推入廁所。馮保羅（音譯）暴力地掌摑李的臉並問：「支槍喺邊？」，李反問：「咩槍呀？」，馮再掌摑李的臉數次，並對他大叫：「仲扮嘢？你係檸檬呀嘛。」。李否認，馮隨即恐嚇李：「黃振強篤咗你出嚟啦」。
+
+
+▲ 拘捕李家田的偵緝警員6314楊立隆
+
+#### 辯方指警向李施行「水刑」 以濕毛巾蓋臉令其窒息
+
+其後，警員5820用重拳打李的氣門數次，並問：「有冇呀？」。馮則表示：「嗱，我哋依家想搵返支狗（槍）啫，因為依家唔對數」，李回答：「冇」。其後，楊及警員5820一同打李的腹部，楊更用軍裝長靴踢李的左腰間，並大叫：「仲扮嘢？冇呀啦？」。不同警員在廁所內毆打李，維持約30至45分鐘。其後馮表示：「肯講未呀，依家我哋畀機會你，黃振強已經篤到你應一應，你講咗我哋就淨係告你支槍，如果唔係你就大鑊」，李回答：「冇」。
+
+戴「勞力士」錶的警員之後將毛巾放在李的臉上，遮蓋其眼、耳及口，並從後拉扯頭髮令其臉朝上。最後他對李施行「水刑」，他開花灑弄濕李臉上的毛巾，使其差點窒息。馮問：「講唔講？」，李回答：「冇」，戴「勞力士」錶的警員再次施行「水刑」。其間有警員不斷打李的腹部。馮再問：「講唔講？」，李表示：「我想食支煙先」，最後獲批准。
+
+#### 辯方指警向李表示「我殺咗你都冇問題」 將子彈放其手心稱已沾指模
+
+其後，馮再次恐嚇李：「諗清楚未呀？我要搵支槍啫，黃振強講晒你哋去西貢行山試槍嗰啲嘢出嚟啦，同鴻仔佢哋行呀嘛，知㗎啦。依家係唔對數啫，我哋係幫緊你咋」。李表示：「冇呀，真係冇」。楊再次對李施行「水刑」，李叫：「唔好呀」。馮表示：「你知唔知依啲係恐怖份子，我而家喺度殺咗你都冇問題，就喺出面搵棵樹吊死你都得」。
+
+楊之後扯李的頭髮令他站起，進一步恐嚇稱：「你係咪想玩滾水淥啫啫？」。「勞力士」警員則取出腰間的手槍，把子彈取出並放在李的手心上前後摩擦，並恐嚇他說：「依粒子彈而家有你指模，我可以話依粒子彈係喺你屋企搵到，到時你都係衰藏有軍火㗎咋，仲會連你阿媽都拉埋」。
+
+這時馮拿出自己的手槍，並按在李的手心，恐嚇他說：「依家支槍有你指模，我可以話你搶槍，喺度開槍啪咗你都仲得」。馮更用槍指住李說：「同樣嘅情況可以出現喺你阿媽身上」。李回答：「支槍唔喺我度」。馮追問：「喺邊個度？」，李回答：「喺鴻仔度」。
+
+#### 辯方指警展示其他人的相片 下令李記住
+
+其後馮打開電話的相片問李：「係咪依個？」，李回答：「係」。馮亦稱：「一個長毛係吳智鴻，你認得佢㗎嘛，認住佢呀」。他又展示另一相片說：「依個大舊衰你識㗎啦，你哋隊長呀嘛，Healer 呀，黃振強呀，你識㗎啦」。李回應：「嗯」。多名警員均向李展示相片，包括不同人物、身份證及閉路電視截圖。他們又介紹上述各人的代號及全名，並下令李要記住。
+
+當他們打開賴振邦的相片時，李表示不認得對方，警員隨即說：「依個乸乸地嘅係賴振邦，花名 Bobby，有同你一齊行山（試槍）㗎嘛，記住佢呀，一定要記住佢」。其後，楊要求李在電話上按密碼，李照做。他亦有提供 Telegram、iPad 及電腦密碼。接着，警員再教導李一些有關槍械的專用名詞，包括「扳機」及「上膛」，並要求李記住。
+
+對於辯方上述說法，李一律不同意。
+
+#### 警一度改口稱沒有上手銬
+
+辯方指，警員之後將飯盒給予李，並解開其手銬，讓他在廁所內吃飯。楊表示：「部分同意」，他不同意是在廁所吃飯。法官張慧玲質疑楊早前的證供沒有提及上手銬，楊於是澄清：「唔好意思，我澄清返係冇上手銬」。
+
+#### 警否認故意不讓李與母親見面
+
+辯方指出，李根本沒有說過記事冊所寫的警誡供詞，全部都是警員捏造；楊不同意。辯方又指出，由於警員在廁所毆打李，他在被威逼的情況下才交出密碼，以及在記事冊上簽署；楊不同意。楊承認在警方搜屋的8小時期間，李沒有與其母親見面，但楊否認是故意不批准見面，以免李向母親投訴遭毆打。楊表示不記得由誰看守李母。
+
+#### 辯方指警要求跟稿回答 若表現良好可獲保釋
+
+搜屋完畢後，李被帶到落馬洲警署。辯方指出，馮要求李記住一份稿，內容為：「黃振強係隊長，鴻仔畀槍我，我有同小熊一齊去試槍及試炸彈。行山時有見過賴振邦。我係屠龍小隊成員。我個花名係檸檬」。楊一律不同意。
+
+其後李被帶到上水警署進行錄影會面，他提及曾將手槍放在綠色袋。楊承認雖然李所述牽涉藏有槍械罪名，但沒有就此事再向他作出警誡，原因為他覺得沒有需要。馮又指，李回答警員問題時，需要將剛才的稿說出，若有細節不清楚可自行作答案。馮表示，若李在錄影會面的表現良好可獲保釋，李基於被威逼利誘及武力對待，遂答應馮的要求。另外，李因沒有回答警方喜歡的版本，故途中表示「唔好意思」。楊一律不同意。
+
+辯方最後指出，警方拍攝現場環境的相片中，一張可見有綠色斜孭袋放在桌上，另一張則沒有。楊未能解釋為何兩者有分別。辯方質疑警方故意捏造證供，將袋放在桌上；楊不同意。
+
+案件明（13日）續審。
+
+本案共7名被告，其中6男即張俊富、張銘裕、嚴文謙、李家田、賴振邦及許湛榮，均否認《聯合國（反恐怖主義措施）條例》下的「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪、作為交替控罪的「串謀導致相當可能會危害生命或對財產造成嚴重損害的爆炸罪」；以及「串謀謀殺」罪，對象為警務人員。李家田另否認「意圖危害生命而管有槍械及彈藥」罪。女子劉佩凝則否認「串謀提供或籌集財產以作出恐怖主義行為」罪。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC164/2022、255/2023
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-13-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-33.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-13-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-33.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..f6e8997b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-13-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-33.md
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【勇武7人案・審訊第卅三日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-06-13 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/aKa9Cy8.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#勇武派 #屠龍小隊 #串謀 #反恐"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 女督察承認知道彭軍壕父親為「伙記」 否認因此吩咐同事「輕手啲」
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】2019年12月，「屠龍小隊」成員等涉計劃放炸彈及開槍殺警。6男1女否認「串謀謀殺」及「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」等罪，今（13日）踏入第33日審訊。案發時為案件主管的女督察張堃婷接受辯方盤問。辯方問她是否收到消息指，彭軍壕為一名警方同僚的兒子；張同意拘捕前已得知彭父是「伙記」，但不知道對方的職級，亦無聽過對方向他們求情。辯方又問：「你有冇吩咐同事，因為彭軍壕爸爸係自己人嘅關係，放鬆啲手腳、輕手啲，唔需要咁肉緊？」；張表示沒有，並強調：「基本上對每個被捕人士都係照程序做。」
+
+#### 警不知李家田在提堂時投訴遭毆打
+
+第四名控方證人，為拘捕被告李家田的偵緝警員6314楊立隆，他第三日作供。代表李家田的大律師林芷瑩進行盤問，指李於2020年6月11日被捕，數天後即6月19日被帶往粉嶺法院提堂，期間他曾投訴被捕後遭毆打、恐嚇及要求認罪。楊表示不知道。
+
+辯方完成盤問，並由控方進行覆問。辯方昨指出，警方拍攝現場環境的相片中，一張可見有綠色斜孭袋放在房間的桌上，另一張則沒有。楊未能解釋為何兩者有分別，但強調沒有移動證物。辯方質疑警方故意捏造證供，將袋放在桌上；楊不同意。在控方今天覆問下，楊表示入房時見到桌上有該綠色袋，隨即拾起放進警方證物袋。後來同事提醒需要拍攝，因此他將袋放回原位，由同事拍攝。
+
+#### 搜查隊女總督察：沒有搜獲槍械或彈藥
+
+控方傳召第五名證人、當日為重點搜查隊隊長的女總督察莫藹謙。她於案發時為高級督察，駐守警隊策劃及發展部，其兼任職務是搜查隊。莫表示案發時被指派往上水古洞麒麟村一單位搜查，當日她帶領6名同事前往行動，目標是尋找槍械或彈藥。莫留意到單位不止一層，每層大約1千呎，外圍空地約半個籃球場大，並擺放了汽車。莫決定先進入單位搜查，策略為上而下、內而外。
+
+
+▲ 為重點搜查隊隊長的女總督察 莫藹謙
+
+莫表示，當時由刑事調查隊同事帶領前往搜查範圍，此外還有「狗隊」即搜索犬隊伍的同事到場。他們共搜查了3小時，至晚上6時離開，最後沒有搜獲任何槍械或彈藥。
+
+#### 女總督察表示同事告知毋須搜查廁所
+
+代表李家田的大律師林芷瑩昨指出，李在其房間的廁所內被多名警員毆打。辯方今進行盤問，莫表示獲刑事調查隊同事告知，房間的廁所並非他們的搜查範圍，因此他們沒有入廁所搜查，亦不知裏面發生何事。
+
+拘捕李的警員早前稱，將李帶返上水警署見值日官。當時為值日官的警署警長47674黃志偉（音譯）供稱，當日沒有接獲指示李需要特別監管，即安排單獨囚禁及專人看守；亦無獲指示不能讓他與律師以外的其他人接觸。
+
+#### 案件主管女督察：李牽涉嚴重暴力罪案、需特別監管
+
+控方傳召第六名證人、當時為本案案件主管的女督察張堃婷。張供稱，當日有向其下屬即警員楊立隆指示，李在上水警署需要接受特別監管及不得與外界接觸，原因為他牽涉嚴重暴力罪案，比起一般囚犯需要較高規格的措施，以免出現暴力行為。另外，張亦考慮到案中有在逃人士，而調查尚未完結，因此不想李與其他涉案人士溝通。
+
+
+▲ 為案件主管的女督察 張堃婷（網上截圖）
+
+#### 女督察承認安排同事跟蹤吳智鴻及黃振強
+
+代表張銘裕的大律師姚本成問到，張是否安排警方同事在12月7日至8日跟蹤本案的嫌疑人物，張同意有安排同事跟蹤吳智鴻及黃振強。辯方問，黃振強的一舉一動是否在警方監視下進行；張同意，但負責同事並不會向她直接聯繫。張不記得12月7日及8日，是否收到訊息指黃出現及離開安全屋。但她確認部署12月8日清晨的拘捕行動。
+
+#### 女督察承認得知彭軍壕為同僚兒子 但否認因此「輕手啲」
+
+張確認在12月8日的拘捕行動之後，花了數星期尋找彭軍壕。辯方問她是否收到消息指彭為一名警方同僚的兒子；張同意拘捕前已經得知彭的父親是「伙記」，但不知道對方的職級，亦無聽過對方向他們求情。辯方又問：「你有冇吩咐同事，因為彭軍壕爸爸係自己人嘅關係，放鬆啲手腳、輕手啲，唔需要咁肉緊？」；張表示沒有，並強調：「基本上對每個被捕人士都係照程序做。」
+
+#### 女督察指若李稱父親是「伙記」並要求不起訴 行為屬違法
+
+另外，張表示知道其下屬、即警署警長馮保羅（音譯）及警員5820，於2020年多次與彭在荔枝角收押所會面。首次會面是彭想提供資料，過程長達3小時。張表示事後下屬有口頭匯報，但沒有以書面形式記錄談話內容。辯方問她是否覺得做法不理想；張表示同意下屬沒有作紀錄。
+
+辯方又問，若然彭向警方表示「我阿爸係伙記，畀個面唔告我得唔得？」，警方是否需要記錄；張表示需要記錄，因行為「基本上係違法」，但沒有相關紀錄就代表「可能冇呢啲嘢發生」。張同意其後向律政司索取法律意見，當中有提及彭的意向。不久後警方獲律政司通知，可以向彭錄取「無損權益口供」，因此下屬與彭第二次會面。
+
+辯方再問張，警方與彭第三次會面之目的；張表示要錄取口供。張又指，事後下屬沒有將談話紀錄給她看，她本人亦無要求。至第四次會面，下屬帶備撰好的口供予彭簽署。張表示無印象下屬提及彭要求警方「告少啲」，並強調：「我哋警方冇任何話事權。」但張同意曾預期彭可能會要求減刑。
+
+#### 辯方指彭落口供後律政司改控
+
+其後由代表李家田的大律師林芷瑩進行盤問。張確認黃振強及吳智鴻於被捕時遭起訴「串謀有意圖而傷人」，但在彭提供「無損權益口供」後，律政司就改控各人現時的「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪及「串謀謀殺」罪等。張表示自己沒有指示下級撤銷彭的控罪，因並非其權限範圍內。
+
+辯方另問到搜屋情況，張確認有向重點搜查隊的女總督察莫藹謙發出指示，但沒有提及不用搜李的房間廁所。她指其他同僚亦沒有發出相關指示。張又指，自己雖然有進入房間，但沒有入過廁所。張表示沒有留意桌上是否有綠色袋。她另指，李被押離住所前遭同僚楊立隆上手銬。
+
+另外，張同意有規定指明被告遭起訴後，警方不能主動向被告錄取任何證供，但被告要求與警方見面的話，警方會前往見面。張又強調，律政司負責決定是否接納彭作為控方證人。
+
+案件明（14日）續審。
+
+本案共7名被告，其中6男即張俊富、張銘裕、嚴文謙、李家田、賴振邦及許湛榮，均否認《聯合國（反恐怖主義措施）條例》下的「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪、作為交替控罪的「串謀導致相當可能會危害生命或對財產造成嚴重損害的爆炸罪」；以及「串謀謀殺」罪，對象為警務人員。李家田另否認「意圖危害生命而管有槍械及彈藥」罪。女子劉佩凝則否認「串謀提供或籌集財產以作出恐怖主義行為」罪。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC164/2022、255/2023
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-14-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-34.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-14-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-34.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..a8271f62
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-14-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-34.md
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【勇武7人案・審訊第卅四日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-06-14 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/aKa9Cy8.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#勇武派 #屠龍小隊 #串謀 #反恐"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 警稱見污點證人目的是「心理輔導」否認要被告背人名、否則令他「坐十幾碌」
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】2019年12月，「屠龍小隊」成員等涉計劃放炸彈及開槍殺警。6男1女否認「串謀謀殺」及「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」等罪，今（14日）踏入第34日審訊。案發時駐守有組織罪案及三合會調查科、現隸屬國安處的偵緝警署警長馮保羅接受辯方盤問。馮表示本案污點證人要求警方到收押所見面，他指：「作為污點證人其實嗰心理壓力好大，大部分時間（我）係情緒上安撫。」辯方問馮與彭軍壕的十多次見面是否均屬「心理輔導」；馮同意，並否認目的為收集情報。另外，馮否認辯方所指，曾與同僚在警署要求被告賴振邦脫衣剩下內褲，亦否認自己有說過：「總之你同我背咗啲名，你只要話識佢哋，我就放你走，唔係我一定整到你坐十幾碌。」
+
+#### 警署警長馮保羅：會見彭軍壕評估他是否真誠悔過
+
+第七名控方證人，為案發時駐守有組織罪案及三合會調查科、現隸屬國安處的偵緝警署警長馮保羅。馮確認入職至今36年，2006年起任職警長，2016年晉升為警署警長。他確認於2019年12月8日有份拘捕黃振強，於2020年6月11日亦有份拘捕李家田。他其後負責到收押所會見本案3名作為「污點證人」的被告，包括：黃振強、彭軍壕及蘇緯軒。
+
+彭軍壕作供時透露其父親為警署警長。在代表張銘裕的大律師姚本成盤問下，馮表示「絕對唔認識」彭軍壕的父親，只是後期從案件主管口中得知對方為同僚，但沒有提及詳細資料。馮又指自己沒有直接或間接地接觸彭父。
+
+馮同意於2020年，他與警員8561多次到收押所會見彭，但每次均沒有記錄談話內容。首次會面於2月進行，馮表示當時彭要求會見警方，表示自己想認罪及做證人。馮續指，會面期間曾評估彭是否適合做證人，「根據我過往經驗，我會做評估，究竟佢係咪誠心、真誠作出悔過？定係有心將自己刑責卸畀（其他人）或者減輕？」於是馮「即興」與他聊天，以便「睇吓佢嘅心理狀態」。馮表示，彭沒有要求警方不起訴或「告少啲」，若他提出這些要求的話，馮會認為他是「有目的」而非真誠悔過。
+
+#### 馮保羅：彭心理壓力大、自己協助安撫情緒
+
+第二次會面為3月，馮表示向彭告知律政司的意向，其餘時間則是用作評估的「閒話家常」。第三次見面於4月，馮表示彭提供案情資料，警員5820負責記下重點，作稍後整合口供之用。翌日馮與同僚攜同口供的最終版讓彭簽署。辯方質疑：「隔一晚已經寫好？」馮這時改稱，第二次會面彭已開始提供案情，馮承認記錄上有遺漏。
+
+雙方於2020年12月再見面，馮解釋是彭要求，他理解對方想見面的原因，「作為污點證人其實嗰心理壓力好大，大部分時間（我）係情緒上安撫，佢壓力大到⋯⋯唔好話污點證人，普通證人壓力都好大。」辯方追問，其後於2021年至2023年的11次見面，是否均屬「心理輔導」；馮同意，並指「因為係一個持續性」。惟馮亦同意完全沒有記錄相關內容。
+
+#### 馮否認會面目的是收集情報
+
+辯方卻指出，同行的警員5820曾記錄會面目的是收集情報（intelligence gathering）；馮表示不知道，但肯定這並非會面目的。另外，辯方展示彭於2022年6月撰寫予律政司的信件，要求對方確認如協議般撤銷起訴「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」及「串謀謀殺」罪。馮表示，沒有答應過彭可能不起訴上述兩罪。
+
+辯方另問到，馮於2020年3月到收押所會見另一「污點證人」蘇緯軒，同樣是他主動要求見面。馮表示蘇提出自己有悔意，希望道出事實。而數次會面馮都是評估其心理狀態、是否適合做證人等，最後有為他錄取「無損權益口供」。
+
+#### 馮：負責最後把關、免污點證人用漏洞減罪責
+
+馮同意於2023年5月會見黃振強時，手上已經有彭及蘇的「無損權益口供」。黃當時表示想認罪、提供資料及做控方證人。馮表示，自己處理過無數牽涉「污點證人」的案件，因此他「作為調查人員會最後把關，唔會畀人哋用呢個漏洞，做污點證人減低自己罪責」。於是他亦對黃進行心理狀態評估，認為可以接受他作為控方證人。其後的數次會面，他都為黃進行「心理輔導」，他強調：「我唔係話心理專家，但係察覺到佢嘅狀態想搵我哋傾計。」
+
+代表嚴文謙的大律師梁鴻谷質疑，警方進行輔導卻沒有記錄會面內容，若然有關被告「大吉利是想自殺」，不就無法找回紀錄。馮不同意，並指內容對於調查不是太重要。辯方亦質疑，警方為何連被告表示想認罪也不記錄，馮解釋：「喺我角度真係唔係咁重要，唔係我涉及範圍」，但同意若有記錄的話較好。
+
+辯方指出，由於馮在隊中屬經驗豐富，因此獲上司指示會見黃，評估「投誠」轉做控方證人的黃，其質素如何。馮不同意上述說法，亦否認目的是調節其口供中與警方資料有出入的地方。他亦不同意如資料已「鐵證如山」，就不用黃協助警方。馮最終否認，不記錄是因知道調查報告將來會被公開。
+
+#### 馮稱黃振強撲向警方於是按其頭部 否認事後知道「重手咗」
+
+另外，在代表李家田的大律師林芷瑩盤問下，馮承認有份到灣仔安全屋拘捕黃振強，同行的還有警員5828。馮表示黃衝出並撲向警方，因此警員5828環抱式「攬住」黃，期間黃大力掙扎又撞又踢，因此馮連同3名同僚按着其頭部及雙腳。馮確認他們沒有武力對待黃，但辯方指黃曾經向警察投訴課投訴，遭到警察毆打導致臉及身受傷，他同時有拍下傷勢。馮表示不知道，亦否認有毆打黃。馮不同意事後知道「重手咗少少」。
+
+#### 馮否認掌摑李家田 亦否認為免留痕而用「水刑」
+
+辯方問及馮拘捕李家田的情況。馮表示與數名同僚一同進入李的房間，自己負責監察。馮稱沒有指示重點搜查隊的同事不要搜查廁所。辯方指出案情，當時馮與同僚強迫李進入廁所，馮多次暴力掌摑李的臉，並不斷追問手槍下落。警員其後對李拳打腳踢及施行「水刑」。馮不同意辯方上述說法，亦否認因早前毆打黃導致傷勢嚴重，為免被察覺及留下痕跡，故選擇「水刑」。
+
+馮亦否認恐嚇李：「我而家喺度殺咗你都冇問題，就喺出面搵棵樹吊死你都得」，以及將手槍放李手心說：「我可以話你搶槍，喺度開槍啪咗你都仲得。」另外，馮否認拿出電話要求李記住其他涉案人物的名字，亦否認警方威逼、利誘及恐嚇李在記事冊上簽署。此外，馮否認要求李在錄影會面前「背稿」。馮同意在李房間檢獲的袋中，並無檢獲彈屑。
+
+#### 馮否認要求賴振邦背人名 否則「一定整到你坐十幾碌」
+
+賴振邦於2020年1月17日被捕，紀錄顯示馮於兩天後、即1月19日帶領5名男警到長沙灣警署報案室。代表賴振邦的大律師是香媛問到，馮一行人是否前往會見賴；馮表示沒有印象。
+
+辯方指出案情，6名男警當時在警署2樓一房間要求賴脫下所有衣服，只剩內褲，並蹲在牆角。其後有警員給予電子裝置的相片予賴觀看，並追問下落。另外有警員不斷喝罵賴是「曱甴」。馮向賴表示：「唔理之前事實係點，總之你同我背咗啲名，你只要話識佢哋，我就放你走，唔係我一定整到你坐十幾碌，唔好以為我哋冇辦法整到你坐監。」馮續指：「而家快啲著返條褲，我畀第二條路你行，而家比個懺悔嘅機會你。」馮一律不同意。
+
+辯方續指，賴穿回褲子後發現有人將子彈放在褲內，有警員把其中一粒子彈放在賴的上半身摩擦。接着有警員拉扯賴的頭髮，亦有警員表示：「而家放你走都得，不過會同出面啲人講係你篤灰嘅，篤晒啲人出嚟。」及後馮吩咐賴穿上衣服，將他帶回拘留室期間，有警員將賴的頭及身體撞向牆。馮一律不同意，他亦表示不知道賴就此事向警察投訴課投訴。
+
+馮另不同意，由於彭在口供沒有提及過賴的名字，因此他要求彭「篤多啲人」及為涉案人物配上真實名字。
+
+#### 馮認為黃振強「作故仔」誣告警員毆打
+
+在代表劉佩凝的大律師馬維騉盤問下，馮承認處理犯罪組織首腦的指控時需要小心，因他可能會推卸責任。另外，辯方問馮是否認為黃「作故仔」，誣告警員毆打他；馮同意，但不能排除黃在掙扎期間弄傷。辯方質疑，若馮知道黃有捏造口供的行為，會否重新評估他是否適合做控方證人。馮表示會，但不能抹煞一個人經歷內心釋放去認罪表態。
+
+案件下周一（17日）續審。
+
+本案共7名被告，其中6男即張俊富、張銘裕、嚴文謙、李家田、賴振邦及許湛榮，均否認《聯合國（反恐怖主義措施）條例》下的「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪、作為交替控罪的「串謀導致相當可能會危害生命或對財產造成嚴重損害的爆炸罪」；以及「串謀謀殺」罪，對象為警務人員。李家田另否認「意圖危害生命而管有槍械及彈藥」罪。女子劉佩凝則否認「串謀提供或籌集財產以作出恐怖主義行為」罪。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC164/2022、255/2023
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-17-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-35.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-17-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-35.md
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-17-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-35.md
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【勇武7人案・審訊第卅五日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-06-17 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/aKa9Cy8.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#勇武派 #屠龍小隊 #串謀 #反恐"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 「槍手」蘇緯軒稱不願落手 憂被同夥殺害不敢退出 僅嘗試藉故缺席
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】2019年12月，「屠龍小隊」成員等涉計劃放炸彈及開槍殺警。6男1女否認「串謀謀殺」及「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」等罪，今（17日）踏入第35日審訊。在計劃中被安排任「槍手」的蘇緯軒，以控方證人身份作供。蘇供稱2014年在 FB 的「War Game」群組認識男子「Steven」，兩人不時相約打「War Game」，蘇一直敬佩對方。蘇表示在對方耳濡目染之下，開始支持港獨團體，最後應「Steven」邀請加入自組的隊伍並擔任其助手，目標以武力對抗政府。蘇指7月起協助吳智鴻買槍，但直至12.8行動前的數星期，才知道自己獲安排當「槍手」。蘇強調自己不願落手殺警，惟擔心遭「Steven」殺害故不敢退出，並嘗試在行動前一晚藉故缺席或拖延計劃。
+
+控方傳召第八名證人，他為早前已認罪、現為「污點證人」的被告蘇緯軒。現正還柙的蘇身穿白色恤衫及戴眼鏡、中等身形，由兩名懲教人員押解出庭。他精神不俗，作供時聲線響亮。
+
+#### 蘇緯軒稱因「War Game」認識「Steven」、受對方耳濡目染下支持社運
+
+蘇透露自己於2001年出生，案發時18歲。他中五畢業後，於2018年任兼職救生員及游泳教練，2019年則無業。蘇確認於2019年12月20日因本案被捕，於2020年6月15日簽署「無損權益口供」。他於2022年10月3日承認其中3罪，包括「串謀謀殺」、「意圖危害生命而管有槍械及彈藥」及「使用槍械及彈藥意圖抗拒或阻止合法逮捕」罪；至於「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪則獲撤回。其案件轉介至高院等候判刑。
+
+蘇講述參與本案的經過，源於認識男子「Steven」。蘇表示自己從小對槍械或軍事感興趣，並有打「War Game」的習慣。他於2014年底透過 Facebook「War Game」群組認識男子「Steven」，當時自己14至15歲，對方年約24至25歲。兩人投契並相約每月打一至兩次「War Game」，亦會在 FB 聊天。蘇形容對方對「War Game」很有認知，因此很欣賞及敬佩他。起初兩人的話題圍繞軍事及裝備，但在2014年「佔中」期間，「Steven」因擔心攜氣槍外出會遭警方截查，因此取消活動。
+
+蘇表示自己當時對政治運動沒有認知，自上述事件後，「Steven」提出其政治見解，兩人開始討論政治。直至2016年初旺角暴動事件，蘇表示在「Steven」耳濡目染下，當時對香港獨立團體「本土民主前線」等暴動者表達支持。
+
+#### 蘇：同意「Steven」提出武力對抗政府、加入隊伍任助手
+
+後來於2017年初，「Steven」提出其理念，目標以武力對抗政府、爭取獨立及港人自決權，蘇對此表示同意。「Steven」希望成立有組織性的隊伍，而他認為蘇擁有最多槍械知識並且信任他，因此邀請蘇擔任助手。蘇認為對方提出的邀請「非常吸引」，加上自己欣賞對方，故「冇可能拒絕到佢」，最後於2017年初加入隊伍。蘇表示，「Steven」提到將來的武力抗爭會涉及大量違法活動，因此建議轉用有較高保密性的 Telegram。
+
+#### 蘇：得知吳智鴻想買槍、故提供協助
+
+直至2019年6月反修例運動開始，「Steven」提出認識一些本土勇武份子，大家都想用槍進行武力抗爭，因此於7月派蘇與對方接觸。蘇表示：「我跟咗 Steven 咁耐，冇理由亦唔夠膽拒絕佢。」其後雙方會面，蘇表示其中一人為吳智鴻，另一人則為「Steven」早前要求他跟蹤的「金主」。蘇向對方解釋「Steven」有運槍經驗，因此「sell 佢哋買槍」。吳提出想買3支手槍，兩人交換 Telegram 以便溝通。蘇表示自己及「Steven」當時均牽涉另一案，因此不能用兩人的信用卡購買，最後選擇用不記名儲值卡購買，並安排陳玉龍協助收件。
+
+#### 蘇：10月「Steven」稱示威者要實彈還擊、提及用槍計劃
+
+其後10月1日，荃灣有防暴警用實彈射中示威者，「Steven」表示既然警方升級並使用實彈，示威者同樣用實彈還擊及對抗，亦是無可厚非。當時蘇首次聽到使用槍械攻擊警方的計劃，但未有執行日期。蘇當時相信「Steven」不會著他執行計劃。
+
+#### 蘇：11月獲指示教吳用槍、擔心被捕藉口缺席
+
+直至11月，蘇得知「Steven」已把槍交給吳，但「Steven」表示吳等人對槍械沒有認識，因此想蘇指導他們用槍。吳主動聯絡蘇，蘇得知對方會在11月到山上試槍，但他認為地點接近熱門的行山路線，故「基本上博拉」。但由於蘇擔心吳是「Steven」派來的人，因此未敢敷衍對方。最後蘇使用自己的「慣常技倆」，在測試前的兩至三小時表示有事未能出席。
+
+#### 蘇：11月尾得知計劃詳情但認為「齋吹」、其後獲安排當「槍手」
+
+後來在11月中至尾，他獲「Steven」告知計劃詳情。計劃將於12月8日進行，他們會在民陣其中一條遊行路線、即灣仔軒尼詩道放置一大一小炸彈，分別為2公斤及20公斤，兩者的外殼會擺放鐵釘，以增加殺傷力。而側翼則會有「槍手」埋伏在大廈天台。當警方防線沿軒尼詩道由東向西走，並經過紅色炸彈時，計劃者一旦確認警方已包圍炸彈範圍時，就會引爆小炸彈。當警方原路撤退至大炸彈時就會引爆，這時側翼槍手會開槍射擊警員。最後會有很多警員受傷甚至死亡，而其他隊伍會到場撿取警方的佩槍，可供日後遊行示威使用。
+
+惟「Steven」仍未提出確實日期，亦無表明蘇要負責的崗位，因此蘇相信是「齋吹」。但相隔一日後，「Steven」表示會安排蘇擔任槍手，並給予他5至6支手槍及步槍。蘇指自己因另案被警方監視，故擔心對方給予他參與程度更誇張的角色。蘇表示，吳在行動前數天再向他確認計劃細節，以及各人負責的崗位。
+
+#### 蘇：不想參與但未敢退出、因擔心遭殺害
+
+蘇表示雖然不想親身參與行動，但亦不敢退出，「表面上要繼續講到我參與，如果呢個關頭退出，我會好可疑。」他又指「Steven」對身邊人疑心非常重，「唔畀警察拉，都會畀佢搞」，「如果有人得知計劃或者退出，佢會嘗試殺害嗰個人。」
+
+因此，蘇打算於行動前一晚「重施故技」，找藉口拖延計劃或不參與行動。豈料12月8日早上，「Steven」告知取消行動，蘇在新聞看到同案被捕，而自己手上有槍，為逃避警方追緝，於是著「Steven」安排臨時住宿地點「避風頭」。
+
+#### 蘇：打算以沒有子彈為由拖延計劃
+
+控方展示黃振強與吳智鴻於2019年11月30日的 Telegram 對話，顯示吳轉發「槍手」即蘇的訊息，指「等多幾日啦，so sad，唔係唔打，打完之後全世界 Weapons free，第一波想盡殺，有幾多殺幾多，全民執槍」。蘇確認訊息原本由自己發送予吳。
+
+控方另展示蘇與吳在行動前4天、即12月4日的對話。當時蘇向吳發送西貢清水灣的地址，並稱：「drop zone」、「可以喺度放低我，之後可以自由走，即刻停埋一邊燒又得」。蘇解釋對話關於12月8日攻擊警察的行動，他表示在英皇中心對面的大廈完成行動後，會由「車手」在摩利臣山道接載自己，他會在某地點下車，而「車手」則可燒毀車輛，以消滅證據。
+
+至12月8日凌晨近4時，蘇向吳表示：「so sad 無彈」；吳回覆：「其實30飛乜都打晒」；蘇再表示：「係呀，如果慢慢打，一槍一個就係」、「不過要諗辦法運槍」。吳續指：「運去港島？聽日先囉」、「反正聽日人多，趁亂咪得」；蘇回應：「有難度，好大袋」、「睇吓朝早隧道咩環境」、「Safehouse 穩陣就朝早出」。
+
+蘇解釋對話的意思，由於他本人不想實際牽涉或親身參與，因此向吳及「Steven」提出對方無法拒絕的藉口，嘗試拖延計劃或不參與其中。蘇向吳表示沒有子彈，希望可以藉此拖延計劃。他又指屆時現場環境將會非常混亂，因此不可能「一槍瞄準一個警察咁樣，慢慢打落去」。
+
+另外，由於蘇居於將軍澳，若他要前往灣仔的話需經將軍澳隧道，蘇打算以無信心避過警方路障為藉口而不出來。蘇為防止對方懷疑自己刻意破壞行動，因此特意補充可叫車手將車泊在摩利臣山道。
+
+#### 蘇：被捕時遭便衣警拍膊頭、憂受傷害故向對方開槍
+
+蘇確認自己於2019年12月20日晚上約9時，在大埔翠屏花園地下對出的行人路被捕。控方播放閉路電視，顯示蘇被捕時的情況。蘇表示當時與女友鍾雪瑩同行，卻突然遭兩名男子從後接近並拍膊頭自稱「警察」，蘇見對方為便衣裝束故未能肯定其身份，「我擔心係傷害我嘅人」，因此拔出自己的半自動手槍並上膛，最後向該兩男開了一槍。
+
+蘇解釋，當時他攜有的是「Polymer 80」半自動手槍（簡稱P80）。他指根據美國法例就槍械的定義，該手槍並非「真槍」，而是屬「未成形手槍」，因它不能組裝扳機及擊鎚等「火控組件」。他表示在美國毋須經過登記或背景審查，可以直接購買這款手槍，購買者可以使用廠商附送的鑽頭，跟隨指示組裝「火控組件」。他透露手槍於2019年11月由男子「Steven」轉交男子「陳玉龍」，其後再給予自己。案發時手槍裝有彈匣，內有15發子彈。
+
+#### 蘇確認單位藏有步槍及彈匣
+
+蘇最後被制服及拘捕，其後遭警員押解至翠屏花園單位。警方當時「爆門」進入，發現蘇的床下收藏一支 AR 15 步槍、多個彈匣、避彈衣及止血帶。蘇解釋，AR 15 步槍經改裝後可以連發子彈，若他扣下扳機子彈就會自動發射，直至用盡所有子彈或放開扳機為止。而步槍最遠可瞄準8倍視力範圍。
+
+蘇另指，他藏有兩種彈匣，手槍彈匣內的是「中空彈」，而步槍彈匣內的是「實心彈」。他解釋兩者分別在於會對人體造成不同程度傷害。他指「中空彈」的殺傷力較高，因其彈頭向內凹陷、速度較低，子彈會留在人體內翻滾並造成破碎效應。至於「實心彈」的表面則完整光滑、速度及穿透力較高，即使擊中物品亦不太容易變形。
+
+警方亦於單位內檢獲台幣，蘇解釋當時認為一直逗留在臨時住宿地亦非辦法，因此探討前往其他地方的可能性。「Steven」遂安排台幣及台灣電話卡予他到台灣使用。蘇表示相信「Steven」至今仍未被捕。
+
+#### 蘇表示以其經驗 500米擊中人形目標沒有難度
+
+代表張銘裕的大律師姚本成進行盤問。在盤問下，蘇表示沒有上過大廈的天台，亦無獲告知天台高度；但他觀看地圖後，同意天台約16至17層高。辯方質疑：「你點知一定射到警察？」；蘇回應：「以我經驗，500米擊中人形目標冇難度」，而涉案大廈與目標位置相距500米內。辯方追問蘇有否用過真槍；蘇表示有。辯方再問是否用真槍殺人；蘇不同意，並解釋過往曾在外國靶場射真槍。
+
+#### 蘇：行動不會傷及無辜、否則輿論上會變「濫殺無辜嘅政治份子」
+
+蘇又指，以他理解在射擊期間，現場只有警務人員，並不會有其他遊行人士。辯方追問：「唔會傷及無辜？」；蘇表示：「感覺唔會，以我認知 Steven 為人對呢方面處理小心。以佢政治理念，只要平民受到攻擊，輿論上我哋會變咗濫殺無辜嘅政治份子」，最終只會達不到目的。
+
+蘇亦強調自己一直敷衍吳，雖然不至於對計劃反感，但卻不願意「落手」射殺警務人員，不過不敢告知對方。辯方追問：「你驚 Steven，驚佢殺你？」；蘇同意並指：「因為佢有過往經驗。」
+
+蘇已完成作供，案件明（18日）續審。
+
+本案共7名被告，其中6男即張俊富、張銘裕、嚴文謙、李家田、賴振邦及許湛榮，均否認《聯合國（反恐怖主義措施）條例》下的「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪、作為交替控罪的「串謀導致相當可能會危害生命或對財產造成嚴重損害的爆炸罪」；以及「串謀謀殺」罪，對象為警務人員。李家田另否認「意圖危害生命而管有槍械及彈藥」罪。女子劉佩凝則否認「串謀提供或籌集財產以作出恐怖主義行為」罪。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC164/2022、255/2023
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-18-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-36.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-18-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-36.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..e28b1ae3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-18-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-36.md
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【勇武7人案・審訊第卅六日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-06-18 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/aKa9Cy8.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#勇武派 #屠龍小隊 #串謀 #反恐"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 黃振強投訴被捕時遭毆打 警長稱黃同意「暫緩」投訴 直至刑事案完結
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】2019年12月，「屠龍小隊」成員等涉計劃放炸彈及開槍殺警。6男1女否認「串謀謀殺」及「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」等罪，今（18日）踏入第36日審訊。3名「污點證人」已完成作供，控方傳召處理本案的警員及軍械專家作供。據早前證供透露，黃振強曾向投訴警察課作出投訴，指被捕時遭數名警員毆打。負責調查投訴的女警長327何悅玲（音譯）確認，由於黃牽涉尚在審理的刑事案件，因此他同意「暫緩」投訴，直至案件結束後才繼續調查。辯方問：「唔會繼續處理投訴？」何回答：「係暫緩，唔係唔會繼續。」
+
+#### 軍械法證課專家：案中檢獲的3支手槍屬同一型號
+
+3名「污點證人」已完成作供，包括：「屠龍」隊長黃振強、屬「吳智鴻」隊伍的彭軍壕，以及「槍手」蘇緯軒。控方傳召第九名證人，為隸屬香港警務處軍械法證課的專家李啟輝。李負責檢驗吳智鴻管有的槍械及彈藥。他確認在吳智鴻住所搜獲的手槍、蘇緯軒被捕時發射的手槍，以及在摩星嶺附近檢獲的手槍，三者均屬 P80 型號，可發射的子彈口徑相同。但李未能確定吳的手槍屬原裝槍還是組合槍。代表張銘裕的大律師姚本成問手槍是否由美國生產，「唔係我哋祖國（生產）？」李表示各跡象顯示是由美國生產。
+
+
+▲ 警務處軍械法證課專家 李啟輝
+
+#### 李家田稱把手槍放袋 專家確認無發現彈屑或射擊殘留物
+
+另外，李家田在錄影會面下表示，曾把手槍放在一個綠色斜孭袋。李啟輝同意曾檢驗在李家田住所搜獲的綠色斜孭袋，以分析袋內是否有彈屑或射擊殘留物，結果沒有發現，他於2020年8月13日撰寫報告。李解釋，若手槍與袋有直接接觸，驗出殘留物的機會很大，但未能驗出亦有很多可能性，例如抽樣的偏差或袋經過清洗。李最後同意辯方指，該袋可能沒有盛載過任何槍械或彈藥。
+
+#### 財富調查組警員稱為黃振強錄口供 辯方質疑會面個半小時寫逾20頁
+
+第十一名證人為偵緝警員11627盧博文，他於2020年1月起隸屬財富情報及調查科的財富調查組，於2023年3月17日獲指派到荔枝角收押所，起訴黃振強「串謀提供或籌集財產以作出恐怖主義行為」罪。盧同意其隊伍負責調查黃及劉佩凝的資金來源及流向，並需要與有組織罪案及三合會調查科的警員合作。
+
+
+▲ 偵緝警員11627 盧博文
+
+於2023年9月20日，盧應黃的要求為他錄取口供。盧表示當時分別用口供紙及記事簿，筆錄黃的口供。他表示一般會在案件完結後銷毀。但他不同意記錄之目的，是為免日後就內容爭拗。在代表劉佩凝的大律師馬維騉盤問下，盧表示用作摘下要點的口供紙已銷毀，且無通知上司。另外，盧表示已刪除電腦上口供草稿的檔案。
+
+盧同意，黃最後於9月27日簽署口供。代表張銘裕的大律師姚本成進行盤問，他質疑盧與黃僅會面1個半小時，如何可以錄取共21頁的口供。盧表示以「Point Form」形式記錄黃的說話。辯方另指，根據紀錄「O記」警員與黃的會面時間，跟盧與黃的會面時間重疊；盧表示不清楚原因。此外，盧在盤問下承認向黃錄口供之前，已得知對方與律政司進行認罪商討，並希望豁免起訴資金相關的控罪。
+
+#### 黃振強投訴被警打 負責人員表示他同意完結刑事案後再跟進
+
+控方其後傳召處理黃振強投訴的投訴警察課人員。第十二名證人為高級警員54330林少文，他於1993年加入警隊，並確認黃振強於2019年12月9日，向投訴警察課進行投訴。黃指控遭4至5名便衣警毆打，導致下半身多處瘀傷，嘴部左臉頰亦擦傷，其後他在灣仔警署遭同一伙警察言語威嚇及誘使招認，其中一位是「O記」的戴明德。
+
+第十三名證人為女警長327何悅玲（音譯），她於1998年加入警隊。由於接獲黃的投訴，因此她於12月17日被派往荔枝角收押所會見對方，並撰寫報告。何確認，黃稱12月8日早上在灣仔展鴻大廈一單位內，遭5名便衣警員用武力進入房間，並以手銬鎖住雙手。黃沒有應警員要求提供藏槍地址，於是遭一名警員掌摑左臉4至5下。另有兩警以言語威嚇黃，稱要將他送返內地，並問其親戚是否居內地。黃稱有人關燈後，其大腿及臀部再被人用硬物毆打，並見一警手持警棍，他感害怕故選擇解鎖電話。何確認，黃沒有提及施襲警員的姓名，故她未有在報告撰寫。黃亦未有提及遭戴明德襲擊。
+
+在代表嚴文謙的大律師梁鴻谷盤問下，何確認由於黃牽涉尚在審理的刑事案件，因此黃同意「暫緩」投訴，直至案件結束後才繼續調查。辯方問：「唔會繼續處理投訴？」何回答：「係暫緩，唔係唔會繼續。」
+
+案件明（19日）續審。
+
+本案共7名被告，其中6男即張俊富、張銘裕、嚴文謙、李家田、賴振邦及許湛榮，均否認《聯合國（反恐怖主義措施）條例》下的「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪、作為交替控罪的「串謀導致相當可能會危害生命或對財產造成嚴重損害的爆炸罪」；以及「串謀謀殺」罪，對象為警務人員。李家田另否認「意圖危害生命而管有槍械及彈藥」罪。女子劉佩凝則否認「串謀提供或籌集財產以作出恐怖主義行為」罪。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC164/2022、255/2023
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-19-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-37.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-19-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-37.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..eee26830
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-19-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-37.md
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【勇武7人案・審訊第卅七日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-06-19 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/aKa9Cy8.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#勇武派 #屠龍小隊 #串謀 #反恐"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 警長否認到「3C維修工作室」拘捕時 嘗試迫賴振邦飲滴露及消毒酒精
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】2019年12月，「屠龍小隊」成員等涉計劃放炸彈及開槍殺警。6男1女否認「串謀謀殺」及「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」等罪，今（19日）踏入第37日審訊。案發時隸屬「O記」的偵緝警員、現升為警長的李維峻供稱，當日與偵緝警長28225及偵緝警員33215等人前往「3C維修工作室」拘捕賴振邦。辯方指出，期間李及其餘2名同僚嘗試強迫賴喝下工作室內的滴露及消毒酒精，並一度罵他「曱甴」；李不同意。另外，李表示帶賴離開單位押送上車途中，賴突然高叫：「我叫賴振邦，今年28歲，身份證號碼⋯⋯」，他亦著途人幫忙拍片及找律師。他又指：「我而家身體冇受傷，唔知一陣會點。」李表示在「黑暴」期間不少被捕人士有類似反應，但不像賴如此激動。
+
+#### 警長認為單位有危險人物 入房見張銘裕蹲床邊
+
+控方傳召第十四名證人，為負責向被告張銘裕搜身、案發時隸屬「O記」的警長劉俊髜。他確認於2019年12月8日清晨約6時，被指派往灣仔展鴻大廈拘捕張銘裕。劉表示，進入單位後發現洗手間旁的房間內有兩名疑犯，經查問後帶張銘裕到洗手間核對身份證，進一步確認其身份。其後劉以非法集結罪拘捕張，指他牽涉2019年10月20日的事件，張在警誡下表示「乜都唔知」。劉及後向張搜身，並在其身上及背包搜出兩部電話及兩張八達通。劉再搜查房間但沒有發現，及後他在記事冊作出紀錄，並由張簽署。
+
+代表張銘裕的大律師姚本成進行盤問，並指警方當時「撬門」進入單位。劉表示自己在大廈樓下候命，接獲指示上單位時，大門已經打開，因此不知道同僚如何入屋。劉又指，當時與其所屬B隊的5名同僚抵達單位，自己首先衝入去。劉同意當時覺得單位內有危險人物，他進入房間時已經見到張「好似踎咗喺床邊」，旁邊有3至4名同僚，但不記得對方有否使用暴力對待疑犯。辯方指出，當時床邊沒有黑色物體；劉表示無留意。
+
+劉起初否認有叫張拿起背包入洗手間，但在辯方追問下，他最終承認自己要求張「拎住自己啲嘢」到洗手間。劉亦指不知道另一房間有人制伏黃振強，亦聽不到對方大叫。辯方亦指出，其中一部沒有 SIM 卡的電話，並非在張身上搜獲；劉不同意。劉承認沒有向張查問有關搜獲的電話。辯方另指出，劉搜查十多分鐘後把張帶回睡房時，地上已沒有黑色物體；劉表示不清楚。
+
+#### 警長否認藉較輕罪名讓被捕人士透露案情
+
+代表劉佩凝的大律師馬維騉問到，劉是否知道將要拘捕的目標人士屬「危險人物」；劉形容對方為涉案人物。劉又表示，不知道藏匿地點有「危險人物」，亦不知拘捕行動涉及「屠龍」小隊，以及隊長黃振強可能是「危險人物」。劉僅知道拘捕行動與槍械炸藥有關，但辯方指出，沒有資料顯示拘捕的非法集結罪牽涉槍械炸藥；劉同意。辯方最後指出，警方以非法集結罪拘捕，目的是希望藉較輕罪名，讓被捕人士開始向警方透露案情；劉不同意。
+
+#### 警長稱在單位搜獲避彈衣
+
+第十五名證人，為案發時隸屬「O記」的偵緝警員、現升為警長的黃沛堯。黃供稱，於2019年12月8日獲指派前往灣仔展鴻大廈拘捕嚴文謙，他負責處理證物。黃表示清晨近6時在大廈樓下候命，其後獲指示上單位，並見爆破隊伍人員正準備「爆門」，現場合共有十多名警員。大門被打開後，黃與同隊的同僚進入單位，尋找目標人物嚴文謙。黃在房間內發現嚴與張銘裕，張當時被其他警員押離房間。待同僚拘捕嚴後，黃開始檢取桌上的華碩電話，又在地上檢取兩件黑色避彈衣。約7時嚴被帶離單位。
+
+控方吩咐黃在庭上展示兩件避彈衣，黃表示對避彈衣有認識，並指可拆開的內層避彈板，應由搪瓷製造。其中一件避彈衣內有兩塊避彈板，黃同意防護力會較高。
+
+在代表張銘裕的大律師姚本成盤問下，黃同意在房間內檢取證物時，均在張銘裕不在場的情況下進行，最後只是向嚴確認。黃又承認沒有就避彈衣作調查，沒有詢問屬於誰人。辯方指出，張被押離房間時，床邊並沒有兩件避彈衣，而警方事後為了拍照才擺放；黃不同意。
+
+#### 辯方指警拳打嚴文謙 並追問其他人去向
+
+代表嚴文謙的大律師梁鴻谷指出，當時至少3名警員襲擊嚴，包括將他按在床上導致臉部朝下，更用手踭襲擊嚴的身體，在沒有宣布拘捕或警誡，追問其他人的去向。嚴回應不知道，繼而遭警員用拳打及用手踭襲擊背部及腹側，並威嚇「唔講就繼續打」，嚴回答「真係唔知道」。黃不同意上述說法。另外，黃不同意辯方指全部避彈衣均在客廳，並沒有在房間內。
+
+#### 警長稱賴振邦被押解途中高呼 希望途人協助找律師
+
+第十六名證人為案發時隸屬「O記」的偵緝警員、現升為警長的李維峻。李供稱於2020年1月17日，獲指示到長沙灣的香港工業中心一間電話維修店，拘捕被告賴振邦。李當時與偵緝警長28225、偵緝警員33215及10269同行。李表示，抵達「3C維修工作室」時，正門已被打開。李看到賴戴着口罩，坐在工作枱前，於是出示委任證表明警察身分，並以「串謀有意圖引致他人身體受嚴重傷害」罪將他拘捕，賴在警誡下表示「我冇嘢講」。李遂向賴搜身，並檢獲兩條車匙。賴在查問下提供三輛電單車的停泊位置。
+
+
+▲ 案發時隸屬「O記」的偵緝警員、現升為警長 李維峻
+
+李續指，將賴帶離單位打算押送上車途中，賴突然高叫：「我叫賴振邦，今年28歲，身份證號碼⋯⋯」，他亦著途人幫忙拍片及找律師。賴又稱：「我而家身體冇受傷，唔知一陣會點。」李表示在「黑暴」期間不少被捕人士有類似反應，但不像賴如此激動。
+
+#### 警長否認強迫賴喝滴露及罵「曱甴」
+
+代表賴振邦的大律師是香媛指出，警方到場後衝入單位按着賴，期間沒有出示委任證，就作出拘捕。在搜查所有電話及電子裝置後，李與偵緝警長28225及偵緝警員33215，嘗試強迫賴喝下工作室內的滴露及消毒酒精，並罵他「曱甴」；李不同意。
+
+另外，辯方指出警方在搜查後，發現「3C維修工作室」是黃店；李不同意。辯方又指出賴沒有回答電單車的去向；李亦不同意。辯方指，賴於1月19日獲准保釋；李表示不知道。但他同意有份把證物交還賴，並曾經在賴住所樓下遇到他。
+
+第十七名證人為警長劉德培，他有份到「3C維修工作室」檢取證物。劉供稱檢取了20部電子器材，包括電話及平板電腦，並發現只有其中一部 iPhone 毋須密碼。劉發現電話內有賴的生活照，於是向上司匯報電話應該屬賴。
+
+案件明（20日）續審。
+
+本案共7名被告，其中6男即張俊富、張銘裕、嚴文謙、李家田、賴振邦及許湛榮，均否認《聯合國（反恐怖主義措施）條例》下的「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪、作為交替控罪的「串謀導致相當可能會危害生命或對財產造成嚴重損害的爆炸罪」；以及「串謀謀殺」罪，對象為警務人員。李家田另否認「意圖危害生命而管有槍械及彈藥」罪。女子劉佩凝則否認「串謀提供或籌集財產以作出恐怖主義行為」罪。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC164/2022、255/2023
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-20-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-38.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-20-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-38.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..539375d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-20-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-38.md
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【勇武7人案・審訊第卅八日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-06-20 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/aKa9Cy8.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#勇武派 #屠龍小隊 #串謀 #反恐"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 警檢取「3C 維修工作室」現金 否認目的阻「黃店」做生意
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】2019年12月，「屠龍小隊」成員等涉計劃放炸彈及開槍殺警。6男1女否認「串謀謀殺」及「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」等罪，今（20日）踏入第38日審訊。警長劉德培稱遵從上司指示，在賴振邦的「3C維修工作室」檢取了抽屜內的所有現金。辯方質疑，劉發現很多卡片均有政治立場，因此認為「3C」屬「黃店」，並希望檢走現金阻礙其生意運作；劉不同意。辯方亦指出，賴的胞姊同樣在「3C」工作，而同涉本案被捕的張堅順為賴的姐夫。另一警員確認張被捕後，曾著其妻致電「阿邦」找律師。
+
+#### 警長稱集中處理證物 故無問賴振邦哪一電子裝置屬他
+
+第十七名證人為警長劉德培，他昨稱於2020年1月17日，與同僚到「3C維修工作室」拘捕被告賴振邦，劉負責檢取證物。劉供稱得知工作室主要維修電子裝置，他當時檢取了20部電子器材，包括電話及平板電腦，只有其中一部 iPhone 毋須輸入密碼。劉發現電話內有賴的生活照，於是向上司匯報電話應該屬賴。
+
+代表賴振邦的大律師是香媛進行盤問。劉表示在拘捕行動前，僅獲案件主管告知本案涉及串謀傷人，但不知道已有其他人涉行動被捕。劉又指，他在進入單位時才獲案件主管指示，需檢取現場所有電子裝置。劉同意沒有向賴查詢哪一電子裝置屬他，雖然認同問題有重要性，但解釋指因自己集中處理大量證物，故忽略了問這些問題。辯方質疑：「你對物品擁有人嘅身份唔關心？」劉反問：「點樣唔關心呀？」
+
+劉亦同意，沒有向賴查問哪些裝備屬於其客戶，總之先檢取所有電子裝置。辯方指掛袋內放有8部電話，每個電話均有標貼，寫有顧客名稱及密碼；劉同意有標貼，但不記得內容。
+
+#### 警長否認無在現場檢視電話
+
+劉表示曾檢視一部不設密碼的電話，發現有賴的生活照，並向上司匯報。辯方質疑他沒有在記事冊或口供記錄上述行為；劉同意。辯方指出，劉在現場根本沒有檢視過電話內容，他在庭上聲稱看到電話內的照片，只是想作出彌補；劉不同意。
+
+#### 警長否認得知「3C」屬「黃店」 故檢走現金阻生意運作
+
+劉同意在場亦檢取了工作室抽屜內的所有現金，辯方追問原因，劉表示遵從上司指示。辯方質疑，劉發現很多卡片均有政治立場，因此認為「3C」屬「黃店」，並希望檢走現金阻礙其生意運作；劉不同意。辯方再指出，劉及另兩名同僚企圖迫賴喝下「滴露」及消毒酒精，其中劉持樽想「灌」賴，但因為賴「郁動」而沒有喝下。劉不同意上述說法。
+
+另外，劉同意於1月19日將不設密碼的電話交予偵緝警員8561；至於其他被檢取的電話，劉獲上司指示交還賴。劉表示曾於2020年2月3日前往賴的住所嘗試交還，但事前沒有致電他，最後未能找到賴，離開之際在附近碰到他。在辯方追問下，劉澄清記憶有錯，並承認紀錄顯示他有致電賴。劉表示，賴最終拒絕接收證物。
+
+#### 辯方指賴姐夫為同涉案的張堅順
+
+辯方亦指出，賴的胞姊同樣在「3C」工作，因此放置遊戲護欄供其幼兒使用。辯方又指，同涉本案被捕的張堅順，為賴的姐夫，他同樣在「3C」工作；劉表示不知道。
+
+#### 警員同意張堅順被捕後 著妻子致電賴找律師
+
+第十八名證人為偵緝警員8519白智峰，他被辯方要求接受盤問。白同意於2020年1月17日，接獲指示拘捕張堅順，他到廣源邨停車場截停正駕駛私家車的張，其後帶張到住所搜屋。白確認住所內有張的妻子，期間張叫妻子致電「阿邦」找律師，但妻子未能成功找到賴。白同意其後得知張妻子為賴的胞姊。同日張被押往警署錄口供。辯方問白是否知道張在「3C」做兼職；白表示不知道，只知對方任貨車司機。
+
+#### 警長否認與同僚要求賴脫光衣服 強調「冇咁嘅事」
+
+第十九名證人為偵緝警長50029張錦麟（音譯）。他供稱於2020年1月19日凌晨，警署警長馮保羅帶他及另外4名警員，到長沙灣警署報案室，事後張撰寫報告。張表示當時負責向值日官簽出賴，並與一名同僚將賴帶往警署二樓房間進行「debriefing」，即了解其背景包括政治立場、與其他被捕人士的關係。張強調並非調查本案的證據，又指事前僅知道本案有兩人被捕。
+
+
+▲ 偵緝警署警長 馮保羅
+
+張同意，事前知道有警員已向賴作出調查，但不知道賴在警誡下或錄影會面中均沒有說話。張表示，賴接受其查問時沒有回答，而自己沒有記錄相關內容。
+
+在辯方盤問下，張表示其餘4名同僚留在報案室「standby」、飲水或去廁所，並沒有一同會見賴。辯方指出張「講大話」，實際上6名警員均有會見賴；張不同意。辯方亦指出，6名警員要求賴脫光衣服剩下內褲，並蹲在牆角，期間警員不停罵「曱甴」。其後警員又展示相片問其他人的去向，並說「唔理之前事實係點，總之你同我背咗啲名佢。你只要話識佢哋，我就放你走，唔係我就一定整到你坐十幾碌，唔好以為我哋冇辦法整到你坐監」。張不同意並強調：「冇咁嘅事。」
+
+辯方續指，賴穿回褲子後，發現有人將一袋子彈放其褲內，有警員把一粒子彈放賴的上半身摩擦，目的是留下DNA。接着有警員拉扯賴的頭髮，並放入一袋子彈當中，亦有警員表示：「而家放你走都得，不過會同出面啲人講係你篤灰嘅，篤晒啲人出嚟。」及後警員吩咐賴穿上衣服將他帶回報案室，期間有警員將賴的頭及身撞向牆。張一律不同意。
+
+案件明（21日）續審。【編按：實際延至下週一（24日）續審】
+
+本案共7名被告，其中6男即張俊富、張銘裕、嚴文謙、李家田、賴振邦及許湛榮，均否認《聯合國（反恐怖主義措施）條例》下的「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪、作為交替控罪的「串謀導致相當可能會危害生命或對財產造成嚴重損害的爆炸罪」；以及「串謀謀殺」罪，對象為警務人員。李家田另否認「意圖危害生命而管有槍械及彈藥」罪。女子劉佩凝則否認「串謀提供或籌集財產以作出恐怖主義行為」罪。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC164/2022、255/2023
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-24-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-before-mitigation.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-24-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-before-mitigation.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..5d0081f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-24-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-before-mitigation.md
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・45人罪成明起求情】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-06-24 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 45罪成被告明起求情 首批為被指組織者 戴耀廷、區諾軒等5人
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47名組織及參與初選的民主派被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，31人認罪，不認罪16人中有14人被裁定罪成。45名罪成被告將於明（25日）日至8月5日起，分成6批求情。首批求情被告為被控方指為初選組織者的5人，包括認罪的戴耀廷、區諾軒、趙家賢、鍾錦麟；及被裁定罪成的吳政亨，預計需時3天。他們均自首提堂起還柙，至今逾3年3個月，其中沒有作供、也沒有旁聽的戴耀廷，將自2022年9月案件管理聆訊後首度在法庭公開露面。
+
+根據判詞，法官指戴耀廷為「35+計劃」大腦及主要推手；區諾軒負責聯絡和協調，在協助戴達到目標上扮演了關鍵角色，但作供時嘗試與戴劃清界線；民主動力趙家賢和鍾錦麟協助初選安排和後勤工作。至於發起「三投三不投」的吳政亨，法官指即使該運動可能是他自發，但肯定他已與戴耀廷有協議實行謀劃。
+
+根據《國安法》第22條，「首要分子或罪行重大」可判處10年以上至終身監禁，而揭發他人犯罪行為者可獲得減刑。料控辯雙方將會就被告是否採用同一刑期等級、是否屬首要分子等陳詞。
+
+#### 戴耀廷被指為計劃大腦及主要推手 2022年後未露面
+
+首批求情的被告，為被指為初選組織者的戴耀廷、區諾軒、趙家賢、鍾錦麟、吳政亨5人。
+
+其中戴耀廷於2022年6月的交付程序認罪，自同年9月出席案件管理聆訊後，未有再到庭旁聽審訊。根據法官判詞，戴耀廷是「35+計劃」大腦及主要推手，首先提出立會過半的構想，並提倡運用否決權作手段，迫使特首對五大訴求讓步，又多次撰文提倡「攬炒」，目標是推翻香港政治制度。法官又指，戴出席了所有協調會議，對每區進展全盤掌握，並游說參與者跟隨其理念和目標。
+
+#### 官指區諾軒予人感覺圖劃清界線
+
+至於區諾軒、趙家賢和鍾錦麟3人為從犯證人，根據《國安法》第33條，他們或因揭發他人犯罪行為等而獲額外減刑。針對區諾軒，法官指他是「35+計劃」兩名組織者之一，負責聯絡和協調，他一直知道戴耀廷的目標，並在協助戴達到目標上，扮演了重要和關鍵的角色，但其後退出。
+
+法官又指區作供時，予人感覺想一定程度與戴耀廷劃清界線，並縮短其參與的時間。法官又引述被問到戴耀廷是否騎劫「35+計劃」時，區回答要視乎個別參與者，法官指認為這是來自一名資深政客在指證曾與他站在同一陣線的人時，一個非常官腔的回答。
+
+#### 官指民動負責初選安排、後勤 未裁趙家賢可信性
+
+至於民主動力正副召集人趙家賢及鍾錦麟，判詞較少着墨，但提及戴耀廷和區諾軒邀請二人協助初選的安排和後勤工作，而戴於2020年2月與兩人會面，趙家賢和民動總幹事黎敬輝曾出席首次地區協調會議。趙家賢作供時，與區諾軒就協調會議情況的說法有出入，亦與鍾錦麟就民動何時加入初選有分歧，被何桂藍一方質疑可信性，不過判詞未有就此作出裁斷，並同時援引區諾軒和趙家賢就協調會議的證供。
+
+#### 官指吳政亨與戴有協議實行謀劃
+
+唯一受審後被裁定罪成、被指為「組織者」的吳政亨，被指發起「三投三不投」推動初選。法官在判詞指，吳與戴耀廷就初選事宜頻繁交流，即使「三投三不投」可能是吳自行發起，但他並非單獨行事，肯定吳在《國安法》前，已與戴同意推行涉案謀劃並有意實施。雖然其他參加者不知道吳的參與，但吳知道有其他候選人，並採取行動確保只有初選勝出者才能參與立法會選舉，吳與戴之間的協議，跟戴和其他人之間的協議是相同。
+
+#### 刑期三級制 官指示就是否採同一等級陳詞
+
+根據《國安法》第22條，一旦顛覆國家政權罪成，「首要分子或罪行重大」可判處10年以上至終身監禁；「積極參加者」可判監3至10年；「其他參加者」則判監3年以下、拘役或者管制。
+
+據悉，法庭6月初向控辯雙方發指示，指由於《國安法》下顛覆國家政權罪設有3級刑期等級，而本案被告被裁定為同一串謀的一分子，要求雙方就多項議題陳詞，包括所有被告應否採用同一刑期等級；如否，為何不同被告應採用不同等級；以及如採用不同等級，個別被告應採用哪個等級、建議量刑起點為多少、有何求情因素，以及有否任何符合《國安法》第33條的求情因素，包括自動放棄犯罪、自動投案及揭發他人犯罪行為等。
+
+#### 14人被裁罪成 認罪被告待審後一併判刑
+
+本案所有被告於2022年7月完成交付至高院的程序，先後共31人認罪。認罪被告同年9至11月進行案件管理聆訊，只有區諾軒和鍾錦麟望審訊後判刑，趙家賢則與控方達成協議，將在裁決後判刑，另有17名擬認罪被告表示望審前判刑。不過法官最終拒絕被告申請，決定擬認罪被告於審後才一併判刑。
+
+至於16名不認罪被告，案件去年2月開審，12月完成結案陳詞，審訊歷時118日。案件5月30日裁決，當中除劉偉聰、李予信2人外，其餘14人均被裁定罪成，須即時還柙。律政司就劉偉聰的無罪裁決提出上訴，沒有就李予信的無罪裁決提出上訴，罪成被告則分成6批求情。
+
+
+
+#### 16人不認罪 31人認罪
+
+本案16名不認罪被告為：鄭達鴻、楊雪盈、彭卓棋、何啟明、劉偉聰、黃碧雲、施德來、何桂藍、陳志全、鄒家成、林卓廷、梁國雄、柯耀林、李予信、余慧明及吳政亨。
+
+認罪的31人，包括：戴耀廷、區諾軒、趙家賢、鍾錦麟、袁嘉蔚、梁晃維、徐子見、岑子杰、毛孟靜、馮達浚、劉澤鋒、黃之鋒、譚文豪、李嘉達、譚得志、胡志偉、朱凱廸、張可森、黃子悅、尹兆堅、郭家麒、吳敏兒、譚凱邦、劉頴匡、楊岳橋、范國威、呂智恆、岑敖暉、王百羽、伍健偉及林景楠。
+
+當中僅呂智恆、林景楠和黃子悅獲保釋，惟黃另涉理大衝突案，承認暴動判囚37個月。其餘被告均還柙至今逾3年3個月。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69-70/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-24-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-39.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-24-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-39.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..3fe4354c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-24-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-39.md
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【勇武7人案・審訊第卅九日】
+author: 法庭線
+date : 2024-06-24 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/aKa9Cy8.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#勇武派 #屠龍小隊 #串謀 #反恐"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 控方財務專家確認劉佩凝戶口獲多筆小額存款 曾向黃振強轉帳24.5萬元
+
+
+
+
+
+【法庭線】《反恐條例》首案，7人不認罪，周一（24日）在高等法院踏入第39天審訊。控方傳召財務專家作供，他分析被告劉佩凝、自稱「屠龍小隊」隊長黃振強及另一男子的戶口交易紀錄、資金流向，確認劉名下戶口獲多筆小額存款，曾向黃轉帳24.5萬元。他另在辯方盤問下確認，警方曾向他提及 TG 頻道「育龍」，得知與眾籌相關，但不清楚頻道由誰管理或用途，警方亦沒要求他分析該 TG 頻道與眾籌是否相關。
+
+#### 財務專家分析劉佩凝、黃振強等戶口
+
+控方傳召財務專家分析涉案戶口交易紀錄及金額等。財務會計李騰耀在控方提問下確認，他為本案撰寫了會計報告，分析涉案9個銀行戶口，分別由陳奧文、被指協助籌款的劉佩凝、及自稱為「屠龍小隊」隊長的黃振強持有，每人各持3個戶口，包括馬會戶口等。李確認，報告中的「重點檢視」時間，為2019年8月1日至2019年12月9日，記錄各戶口資金流向。
+
+控方引述報告指，劉其中一個戶口於2019年9月26日開設，及至同年12月，共有206筆存款，金額為37.3萬元，及至12月7日時，戶口結餘1.4萬元。
+
+
+▲ 被告 劉佩凝
+
+#### 專家確認警曾提「育龍」頻道 但沒要求分析與眾籌關係
+
+控方續一引述報告內容後，由辯方展開盤問。第三被告嚴文謙的代表律師梁鴻谷問，報告顯示只有一筆匯款涉及嚴文謙，即2019年8月29日從黃振強的戶口匯出的3,000元。李確認。
+
+隨後由代表劉佩凝的大律師馬維騉盤問。馬問及，警方財務組著李為本案撰寫報告時，曾告知他須調查陳奧文、劉佩凝及黃振強3人的戶口，紀錄顯示他們的戶口用作收取存款，由不同人存款的眾籌活動。馬問，警方有否告知他，當中眾籌的意思？李表示沒有，亦沒獲告知所涉及的疑犯。
+
+馬續問，李是否得知本案涉及 TG 頻道「育龍」及「春田花花同學會」？李表示警方曾向他提及「育龍」，得悉頻道於2019年11月建立，與眾籌相關，但不清楚頻道由誰管理、營運至何時、以及用途等。但警方「冇叫我依個戶口資金流向分析，同眾籌拉上關係，純粹係背景資料畀我知道」。
+
+#### 專家確認陳奧文戶口曾轉帳劉佩凝
+
+馬維騉再問及撰寫報告的背景，李確認，他於2022年7月加入警方法證會計部，同年9月受訓成為專家證人，另有兩名同事一同完成本案報告，需時約10至11個月。馬問，其報告的結論，並無判斷相關戶口是否與眾籌相關？李確認沒有。
+
+馬引述報告指，報告顯示陳奧文的戶口只與劉佩凝及黃振強有一次聯繫，即曾轉帳約4萬元予劉，但未曾轉帳予黃？李同意。馬續指，劉的馬會戶口當中約0.3%款項用作賭博，只偶爾作小額賭注。李確認。馬另指出，曾有人於投注站向劉戶口轉帳，可推斷並非由劉親自轉帳？李確認。
+
+#### 專家確認劉戶口獲多筆小額存款
+
+馬另引報告指，劉曾以恒生戶口分成7次，於2019年11月4日至12月4日間，向黃振強轉帳24.5萬元。李確認。至於陳奧文的戶口，馬指早前有證供提及，劉向「家長」提供陳的馬會戶口，而根據該戶口紀錄，似乎與庭上證供的說法脗合？李指可如此理解。馬另提及，根據劉的儲蓄戶口紀錄，有超過93%屬一萬元以下存款，此模式反映，劉的戶口曾獲多筆小額存款？李同意。
+
+馬最後問，李曾否聽聞「屠龍小隊」，而黃振強自稱為小隊隊長？李指曾於2019年時在新聞中聞及「屠龍小隊」，但最近才知悉當中的成員。
+
+#### 7人被控《反恐條例》等罪名
+
+案件由法官張慧玲及3男6女陪審團審理。7名被告為張俊富、張銘裕、嚴文謙、李家田、賴振邦、許湛榮及劉佩凝，起訴時年齡介乎20至29歲不等。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC164/2022、255/2023
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-25-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-mitigation-day-1.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-25-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-mitigation-day-1.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..05cbb1a7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-25-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-mitigation-day-1.md
@@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・求情第一日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-06-25 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 10多人通宵排隊 曾與戴耀廷一起助選市民：真理未必短時間被看見
+- 戴耀廷等今求情 邵家臻：不要怕，我們有彼此
+- 戴耀廷21個月以來首公開露面 控方指組織者不屬「首要分子」有違常理
+- 辯方指戴耀廷國安法後角色有限 建議以3年為量刑起點 官：有點大膽
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】初選47人案今日（25日）開始求情，首批求情被告為被控方指為初選組織者的5人，包括認罪的戴耀廷、區諾軒、趙家賢、鍾錦麟，以及被裁定罪成的吳政亨，預計需時3天。他們均自首提堂起還柙，至今逾3年3個月。其中沒有作供、也沒有旁聽的戴耀廷，將自2022年9月案件管理聆訊後首度在法庭公開露面。有曾與戴耀廷一起助選的市民到場，她指對方正喝下「苦杯」，而真理未必短時間被看見。
+
+#### 「姨婆」直落旁聽 晚上不適需回家取藥
+
+《獨媒》記者昨晚11時半到達西九龍裁判法院，約10人正通宵輪候領取正庭籌號，有警員在場檢查身份證。法庭旁聽常客「姨婆」昨晚6時許已攜同其姨甥孫到場，她昨日已連續旁聽鄒幸彤案和屠龍小隊案，「直落」晚上到西九龍裁判法院通宵排隊。6月4日與姨甥孫在銅鑼灣被警方拘捕的她，事後感身體不適被送往醫院治理。通宵排隊的她身體亦難免不勝負荷，迫於無奈於凌晨3時半乘的士回家取藥。及後她堅持折返西九龍法院繼續排隊，又拿出「佔中三子」之一陳健民的「活得磊落真誠」簽名布說，自己毋忘初心，幾辛苦也要來，取藥亦不例外。
+
+
+▲ 「姨婆」
+
+64歲的阿偉說，自己通宵排隊是因為希望見到戴耀廷教授一眼。他認為他作為法律學者，不會無故犯法，有他的理由，「一個識法律嘅人唔會無端端犯法。」他指自己尊重法庭裁決，但不會認同。阿偉曾經歷過坐牢，指夏天的監獄熱得像火爐，而法庭外還有風可以撥涼，「人哋三年喎，（通宵排隊）捱一晚半晚，我覺得值得。」他想對戴耀廷說，要堅持下去。
+
+
+▲ 阿偉
+
+#### 涉另案李盈姿同到場
+
+涉「小彤群抽案」保釋中的李盈姿亦有通宵排隊，指今日求情是「歷史的見證」。上個月初選案裁決時，她保釋並梳洗後，凌晨四點到西九龍法院旁聽，目睹以前「排隊黨」，因此今次通宵排隊「唔想畀排隊黨霸咗啲位。」李稱，現場有很多蚊，但都要堅持。
+
+
+▲ 李盈姿
+
+同通宵排隊的64歲的黃先生，指已有多年未見過戴耀廷，指他已經辛苦了多年，希望可以為他打氣，且求情時能夠聽到他的心聲，「佢一開始已經認罪，想知佢嘅心路歷程，好似預咗做犧牲者。」
+
+清晨五時許，有其他人陸續加入排隊隊伍。現場多次落起驟雨。
+
+
+▲ 黃先生
+
+修讀歷史的何小姐攜帶了一本歷史書題為《毛澤東之後的中國》，在排隊時閱讀，她在早上六時前到場，2019年自己曾與戴耀廷一起助選譚爾培參選大埔區議會西貢北選區，且均為基督徒，因而結識，而譚最終亦獲勝。她表示戴耀廷愛好和平，是一個很和平的人，對他的遭遇感到無奈。
+
+何小姐指以基督徒的說法，認為戴耀廷正在飲一個「苦杯」並承受。她又以捷克宗教改革家胡斯為例，指他反對捷克教會腐敗，最終被火燒死，教廷在其死後500多年才道歉，指有時候一些真理未必能在短時間中被看見。
+
+
+▲ 何小姐
+
+Zoe 同樣為了支持戴耀廷而六點前排隊等候，指自己非常敬重戴耀廷，支持對方多年來所投身和提倡的東西。自己真心認同戴耀廷的出發點是愛與和平，亦都相信他並非煽動或離間任何人，認為他在初選案中只是表達了認為可行的方案，並預留一個很大空間讓其他人選擇是否參與，公開發表文章只是闡釋自己的觀念，「到最後有幾多人會同佢一樣，行喺呢一條路上面，其實佢控制唔到。」
+
+
+▲ Zoe
+
+Zoe 估計，戴耀廷在審訊期間未發表觀點，或已認為自己想說的說話已經說完，留待公眾表達如何看待他以及他的理念。她期待戴耀廷求情間，能夠聆聽他的發言，不過戴或只會陳述自己的理念，不會以求情的嚮導為自己發言。Zoe 希望，戴耀廷可知道有公眾其實有認真思考他的理念，而作出一些獨立的選擇。
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】初選47人案罪成的45名被告，分成六批求情，首批為被控方指為初選組織者的5人，包括認罪的戴耀廷、區諾軒、趙家賢、鍾錦麟4人；及發起「三投三不投」、被裁定罪成的吳政亨，預計需時3天。前立法會議員邵家臻今晨8時許到場，指初選案被告不乏「舊同事、老拍檔，好多都係我好尊敬嘅人」，從眾人被捕到被囚，「陪咗佢哋行咁多年」，到今天進行陳情「冇理由唔喺度」，「見到佢就見啦，聽到佢就聽啦，都希望畀佢哋見到我哋，畀佢知道其實都好多人喺唔同崗位關心緊佢哋」。
+
+邵說，「唔敢諗」各被告會說些什麼，指作為在囚者，他們面對歷史、面對法庭，思考會複雜很多，故不會對他們的說話有很多預設，「只係想見吓佢哋，畀佢見吓我哋，同埋聽到佢哋把聲，咁就好好㗎喇」，並想向47人說：「不要怕，我們有彼此。」
+
+
+
+戴耀廷自2022年9月後未再公開於法庭露面，曾探望他的邵家臻說，戴已適應監房生活，有自己的生活節奏和安排，像是何時讀報、寫作、祈禱、靈修等，戴常說規律令他心靈平靜、心定，以面對不斷變化的世界，邵形容「呢個係佢教我嘅功課」。戴耀廷將於7月12日迎來60歲生日，邵憶起有年他因收到太多生日卡被鎖，苦笑「個世界我哋真係唔係好認識點解會係咁」，他又說，「我哋嘅心意已經畀左佢。」
+
+
+▲ 邵家臻
+
+47人案被告之一、早前獲判無罪但被律政司上訴的劉偉聰今早近9時現身西九龍法院大樓。他主動向傳媒打招呼，並表示：「處理另一單案件，同47人案無關。」
+
+
+▲ 劉偉聰
+
+47名組織及參與初選的民主派被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，31人認罪，不認罪16人中有14人被裁定罪成。45名罪成被告今日至8月5日起，分成六批求情。首批求情被告為被控方指為初選組織者的5人，包括認罪的戴耀廷、區諾軒、趙家賢、鍾錦麟4人；及發起「三投三不投」、被裁定罪成的吳政亨，預計需時3天。他們均自首提堂起還柙，至今逾3年3個月。根據《國安法》第22條，「首要分子或罪行重大」可判處10年以上至終身監禁，料控辯雙方將會就被告是否採用同一刑期等級、是否屬首要分子等陳詞。
+
+
+▲ 李盈姿
+
+
+▲ 劉公子
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】初選47人案罪成的45名被告，今（25日）起於西九龍法院（暫代高院）分成六批求情，首批為被控方指為組織者的5人，包括戴耀廷、區諾軒、趙家賢、鍾錦麟及吳政亨，3人還柙至今逾3年3個月。其中戴耀廷自2022年9月案件管理聆訊後，首度在法庭公開露面，他頭髮灰白，神情輕鬆，頻頻向太太和旁聽人士微笑點頭，又展露笑容揮手。
+
+《國安法》第22條採用三級刑期分級制，「首要分子或罪行重大」可囚10年至終身監禁。控方同意各被告可按參與程度採用不同刑期等級，區諾軒等以從犯證人身分作供亦可獲減刑，但說組織者不屬「首要分子」是有違常理。法官陳慶偉一度問，控方指稱哪些被告為「首要分子」、「積極參加者」和「其他參加者」，控方表示難以回答。法官指控方必然有立場，若法庭裁定戴耀廷為最高刑期3年的「其他參加者」，肯定控方會立即提出上訴，戴聞言大笑。
+
+就控方引內地刑法的釋義及實用指南詮釋「首要分子」定義，法官李運騰亦關注終院明言不考慮與《國安法》無關的內地法律，控方做法是「走後門」。
+
+#### 被告由10懲教分開就坐 戴耀廷神情輕鬆
+
+案件由3名國安法指定法官陳慶偉、李運騰及陳仲衡審理，控方代表為副刑事檢控專員萬德豪、周天行、助理刑事檢控專員羅天瑋。戴耀廷由資深大律師黃繼明代表，趙家賢由大律師利琛代表，區諾軒和鍾錦麟由大律師陳慕賢代表，吳政亨由大律師石書銘代表。
+
+已還柙至今逾3年3個月的5人，今早約10時步入法庭，由10名懲教人員隔開，分成三行就坐。其中吳政亨坐在最上排、離公眾席最近的位置，戴耀廷則坐在中間一排、位處欄內較中央，至於任從犯證人的區諾軒、趙家賢、鍾錦麟則坐在離公眾席最遠的位置，區坐最上排、趙坐中間、鍾坐最前排，各人與戴和吳相隔約5至10米距離，並由懲教隔開。
+
+自2022年9月未有在法庭露面、下月踏入60歲的戴耀廷，一頭灰白頭髮、戴幼框眼鏡，身穿白色上衣、黑色西裝外套入庭，不少旁聽人士站起興奮向他揮手。戴精神不俗、神情輕鬆，頻頻向旁聽席微笑點頭，又向律師揮手。戴黑框眼鏡、穿藍色襯衫的區諾軒，微微仰頭向旁聽席四處張望，並向親友咧起牙齒。趙家賢穿黑色運動外套，身型消瘦；鍾錦麟則穿黑色西裝、戴口罩，向律師雙手抱拳。穿白色有領襯衫、黑色外套的吳政亨，亦向親友做口型和手勢溝通。
+
+資深大律師石永泰、大律師吳靄儀、前立法會議員邵家臻等均有到庭。至於同案其他罪成被告分成兩個延伸庭收看直播，其中二號法庭共有余慧明、吳敏兒、袁嘉蔚、何桂藍、鄒家成、譚凱邦及劉頴匡7人。鄒及劉向旁聽人士揮手及微笑。劉的女友 Emilia 亦有到庭。至於一號法庭則有施德來、彭卓棋、鄭達鴻、伍健偉、梁晃維、馮達浚6人。
+
+#### 控方：《國安法》最低刑期適用於串謀罪
+
+本案被告被控串謀顛覆國家政權，根據《國安法》第22條，一旦顛覆國家政權罪成，「首要分子或罪行重大」可判處10年以上至終身監禁；「積極參加者」可判監3至10年；「其他參加者」則判監3年以下、拘役或者管制。
+
+控方副刑事檢控專員萬德豪先作陳詞。他認為《國安法》第22條的刑期分級制及最低刑期，均適用於串謀罪。他解釋，《刑事罪行條例》第159C條有關串謀罪的罰則，列明可處的刑罰須與有關實質罪行的嚴重程度（gravity）相稱，而根據相關立法文件，條文用意是要令串謀罪的判刑與有關實質罪行一致（in line）。
+
+
+▲ 控方副刑事檢控專員 萬德豪
+
+萬續指，《國安法》第22條設立最低刑期，其立法原意清晰，明顯因該嚴重罪行有廣泛社會關注，要判處阻嚇性的刑罰。而由於串謀罪判刑須與實質罪行的嚴重程度相稱，因此就串謀罪條文的唯一解讀，就是《國安法》的刑期分級制和最低刑期同樣適用。法官李運騰一度質疑，控方未必是唯一正確的解讀。
+
+萬續指，雖然《刑事罪行條例》立法的1996年，《國安法》尚未出現，但立法者當時肯定已預想有類似情況出現，才提及須與罪行的嚴重程度相稱。李運騰一度問，控方能否舉例1996年時，本港有什麼其他罪行設最低刑期，又指控方就條文的詮釋也有限度。
+
+#### 控方確認視乎參與程度劃分刑期等級
+
+李運騰續問及控方對涉同一串謀的被告，判刑時是否採用同一刑期等級的立場，萬德豪確認刑期等級視乎各被告的參與程度及在串謀的角色。
+
+法官李運騰續引述辯方陳詞，認為「首要分子」應是指當選進入立法會投票否決預算案的參與者，至於「35+計劃」組織者則不屬「首要分子」。惟萬德豪指說法不可接受、違反常理，認為組織者發起整個串謀，必然是首要分子。他又舉例，若有人買兇殺人，若說這個主腦並非首要分子，不可能是正確，因「沒有主腦，就不會有刺殺」。
+
+#### 控方引內地刑法詮釋 官質疑「走後門」
+
+就「首要分子」的定義，萬德豪指內地刑法第105條提到的「首要分子」，與《國安法》第22條的「首要分子」類同，而根據《中華人民共和國刑法》釋義及實用指南，「首要分子」是牽涉組織罪行的犯罪者，可以是組織者或領導者。不過法官李運騰質疑，本港法庭有多大程度可以依賴內地法律，並指根據呂世瑜案，終院指《港區國安法》須與維護國家安全的全國性法律銜接，而不是與無關的內地法律銜接，並問控方所引用的內地刑法是否與《港區國安法》相關。
+
+控方堅稱法庭可以接納透過內地刑法來理解《港區國安法》，因為兩者使用相同字眼。惟李運騰質疑，控方所引條文是適用於所有內地刑法的一般原則，而非有關國安法的特定法律，問控方引入終院所排除的內地法律，是否「走後門」。控方否認，重申相關法律和字眼相近，是以具邏輯的方式去詮釋內地法律，因此能應用於本案。
+
+
+▲ 法官 李運騰
+
+#### 官問控方如何分類被告參與程度 控方指非常困難
+
+法官陳慶偉其後要求控方指出，指稱哪些被告為「首要分子」、「積極參加者」和「其他參加者」，並指毋須即時回答。萬德豪指這是非常難以回答的問題，陳慶偉隨即表示：「當然我會問困難的問題！」，在延伸庭的劉頴匡及吳敏兒聞後大笑。萬續指問題令控方陷入困難的位置，因需要考慮所有因素再決定判刑。但陳慶偉指控方必然有立場，舉例辯方指戴耀廷應屬「其他參加者」，相信控方不會接受，坐在萬德豪旁、代表戴耀廷的資深大律師黃繼明即反問「為何不能」，多人發笑。
+
+萬回應，認為一個領導者應是首要分子。陳慶偉續指，若法庭將戴裁定為最高刑期3年的「其他參加者」，「我肯定你會立即提出上訴。」戴聞言哈哈大笑，延伸庭的譚凱邦、劉頴匡、吳敏兒、袁嘉蔚及余慧明亦大笑。
+
+
+▲ 戴耀廷
+
+#### 控方同意從犯證人作供可減刑
+
+萬其後指，認為負責組織謀劃的被告應為「首要分子或罪行重大」，有積極參與角色的被告則是「積極參加者」，若不屬上述兩者，則為「其他參加者」。而法庭量刑時，可首先判斷被告屬哪一刑期等級，其後考慮該等級中的量刑起點，再考慮相關加刑或減刑因素，包括被告是否符合《國安法》第33條中，「揭發他人犯罪行為」或「提供重要線索以偵破其他案件」的減刑條件。法官問，任從犯證人的區諾軒和趙家賢，是否屬於「揭發他人犯罪行為」，控方確認。
+
+法官李運騰續質疑，條例字眼為「揭發」，但本案被告並非報案，而是審訊期間在庭上作供。控方回應「揭發」是籠統（general）的說法，而庭上作供亦算是「揭發」的一種，屬提供協助。戴耀廷聞後點頭。控方續指，若法庭裁定被告符合條例的求情因素，則要考慮給予「從輕處罰」還是「減輕處罰」。前者是在等級中給予較輕刑期，後者則是降低等級。
+
+散庭時，吳政亨高舉拳頭，戴耀廷則伸直右手微笑揮動。
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47名民主派被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」案，共45人罪成。被控方指為組織者的戴耀廷、區諾軒、趙家賢、鍾錦麟及吳政亨5人，今（25日）開始求情。代表戴耀廷的資深大律師黃繼明表示，本案是以串謀罪、而非《國安法》罪行定罪，故顛覆罪的刑期分級制並不適用。黃並指，戴耀廷真誠相信「35+計劃」合法，以非暴力手段，運用憲制權力爭取普選；而他在《國安法》生效後角色有限，他不會投票否決預算案、亦無法控制或指揮其他人，並非「首要分子」，建議法庭以3年監禁為量刑起點，考慮戴認罪扣減至2年。黃並指，有人或認為建議「太有野心甚至大膽」，但相關刑期實屬合適。法官李運騰一度笑言，辯方說法的確「有點大膽」，法官陳慶偉聞言大笑。法官陳仲衡亦一度問，若戴耀廷為「其他參加者」，那誰是「首要分子」和「積極參加者」？陳慶偉再次大笑。
+
+#### 辯方：被告就串謀罪定罪 國安法刑期分級制不適用
+
+控方今早就量刑原則完成陳詞後，由代表戴耀廷的資深大律師黃繼明陳詞。根據《國安法》第22條，一旦顛覆國家政權罪成，「首要分子或罪行重大」可判處10年以上至終身監禁；「積極參加者」可判監3至10年；「其他參加者」則判監3年以下、拘役或者管制。
+
+黃繼明表示，被告是就《刑事罪行條例》下的串謀罪被定罪，而不是就《國安法》罪行定罪；《國安法》的量刑可用作參考，但刑期分級制和最低刑期並不適用，法庭量刑時唯一考慮，應是《刑事罪行條例》第159C條有關串謀罪的罰則，而相關罰則沒有列明最低刑期。
+
+控方今早提到，認為2020年生效的《國安法》刑期分級制，適用於1996年增補的《刑事罪行條例》串謀罪罰則。黃質疑控方如何能將《國安法》套用至24年前的條文、並聲稱這一直是該條文的立法原意，形容做法「荒謬」；又指正確的做法，應是事後再立法，像今年3月生效的《維護國家安全條例》第109條，列明有關《國安法》罪行罰則的條文，亦適用於串謀罪的罰則。惟黃強調，該條文沒有追溯力。
+
+#### 辯方：國安法減刑因素屬一般因素
+
+黃又指，串謀罪罰則無提及最低刑期，就最嚴重的謀殺罪，亦只列明「可」就串謀罪判終身監禁，控方不能指最低刑期適用。黃又追溯條文立法歷史，指立法原意是打破原有串謀罪判刑的7年上限，令法庭有更大自由和酌情權根據實質罪行的嚴重性量刑，而非反過來限制法庭量刑的最低刑期。
+
+法官李運騰問，辯方認為最低刑期不適用於串謀罪，那《國安法》第33條有關自動放棄犯罪等可減刑的條文，是否同樣不適用？黃回應，作為非國安法案件，毋須使用第33條，因條文提到的減刑因素亦屬一般減刑因素。
+
+#### 戴耀廷一方倡以3年為量刑起點 官指「有點大膽」
+
+黃續表示，戴2020年7月1日《國安法》生效後，真誠相信計劃並非違法，認為法庭應採納3年監禁為量刑起點，考慮及時認罪等因素，扣減至2年。延伸庭有被告聞後互相討論，亦有人面露笑容。黃續指，有人或會認為2年的建議「太有野心甚至大膽」（too ambitious or even audacious），但辯方認為考慮相關法律原則和戴的個人情況，這是合適的刑期。法官陳仲衡指戴並非首次犯案，黃強調並非指戴沒有案底。
+
+法官李運騰其後一度笑言，正如辯方所言，辯方主張戴耀廷屬「其他參加者」的說法「有點大膽（a bit bold）」，法官陳慶偉大笑，戴耀廷亦微笑。黃繼明指，他不會就此道歉，強調自己並非輕易作出相關陳詞，「我認為我有權作出此陳詞，以恰當履行我的職責——不只是對我的當事人，而是對法庭。」
+
+#### 辯方指涉案言行《國安法》前合法 判刑不應考慮
+
+黃續指，本案控罪日期自2020年7月1日開始，法庭判刑時不應考慮戴耀廷此前的言行；而戴此後的角色亦相對有限。法官李運騰指，雖然7月1日前的行為並非刑事罪行，但不代表與判刑不相關，形容是讓法庭考慮罪行嚴重性的「社會背景」（social setting）。法官陳仲衡亦指判詞已清楚裁定，無差別否決預算案並非恰當履行立法會議員職責。
+
+黃回應，相關行為只是在《國安法》生效後才違法，若法庭予以考慮，是以戴在《國安法》生效前的言行懲罰他，這不能是正確。黃續反指，相關「社會背景」，就是戴耀廷與他人尋求以非暴力手段，運用憲制權力爭取《基本法》訂明的普選。
+
+法官陳慶偉問，辯方是否不接受串謀是持續罪行？黃同意是持續罪行，但指協議於7月1日才一夜由合法變為非法，而控罪的嚴重性，應只是在於被告在《國安法》後愚蠢地沒有退出。陳慶偉續指，戴耀廷「不僅沒有停止，而是繼續」。黃承認戴在《國安法》生效後決定繼續進行串謀，爭取35+和否決權，至7月15日才退出，這也是他認罪的原因，但強調不能以他此前的言行判刑。
+
+#### 辯方：戴不能控制或指揮他人、非首要份子
+
+法官陳仲衡其後問，若辯方指戴耀廷為「其他參加者」，那本案誰是「首要分子」和「積極參加者」？陳慶偉再次大笑。法官李運騰亦指，基本上每個被告也說自己並非「首要分子」。
+
+
+▲ 法官 陳仲衡（右）
+
+黃繼明回應，本案涉以無差別否決預算案的「非法手段」顛覆政權，反問一個不會使用這非法手段、亦無法控制或指示其他人這樣做的人，如何是「首要分子」？他又指，本案有別於主腦買兇殺人，因在該情況，主腦能控制和聘用那名殺手。
+
+法官陳慶偉指，不要忘記戴在7月6日和9日的訪問。根據判詞，戴會上提到「35+計劃」目標是取得立會過半並否決預算案。黃回應，戴是以法律學者、而非共謀者的身分發言，而相關片段正顯示他真誠相信初選和否決預算案是合法。
+
+戴耀廷一方未完成求情，明天繼續。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69-70/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-25-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-40.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-25-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-40.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..ebe9c72f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-25-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-40.md
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【勇武7人案・審訊第四十日】
+author: 法庭線
+date : 2024-06-25 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/aKa9Cy8.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#勇武派 #屠龍小隊 #串謀 #反恐"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 黃振強拘捕警否認曾威嚇及襲擊 稱其自願提供手機密碼、沒留意黃受傷
+
+
+
+
+
+【法庭線】《反恐條例》首案，不認罪的7人周二（25日）在高等法院踏入第40天審訊。控方傳召自稱「屠龍」隊長黃振強的拘捕警員出庭，早前黃曾在辯方盤問下指，被捕時曾被警員用手、警棍施襲，確認隨後經法律代表填寫投訴警察文件。拘捕警於庭上指，黃被捕時反應激烈撲向他，於是他緊抱著黃，令他跌在床上，由同袍協助制服，再由拘捕警鎖上手銬。
+
+#### 監視警指見黃振強等人出入大廈
+
+控方傳召負責監視行動的警員 X，於屏風後以匿名作供。X 確認，他於2019年12月7日晚上，負責於灣仔展鴻大廈外監視，目標人物包括黃振強、林銘浩、吳智鴻、張俊富、梁政希及張銘裕。X 確認他於當晚9時45分到達，隨後目睹張俊富與另一女子步入大廈。同晚11時許，黃振強與林銘浩從的士下車，於大廈門口吸煙，隨後黃按大廈大閘密碼上樓。梁政希再與另外兩女子抵達大廈外，梁獨自上樓。
+
+及至凌晨時分，黃振強、張俊富與兩名女子步出大廈，在門外徘徊聊天，而林銘浩與另一女子隨後亦參與在內。一行6人及後分三批離開現場。
+
+根據黃振強早前證供，梁政希及林銘浩為「屠龍」的成員。
+
+#### 拘捕警稱黃反抗 緊抱將黃撲在床上
+
+控方再傳召自稱為「屠龍」隊長黃振強的拘捕警員戴明德。戴確認於2019年12月8日清晨6時進入大廈單位，在內拘捕黃振強。戴憶述，當時單位重門深鎖，他表明警察身分不獲回應，再由隊伍協助破門入屋。他進入房間後，隨即表明警察身分，問黃「你係咪黃振強」，但黃立即撲向他。由於戴擔心黃會逃走，於是緊抱黃，將黃撲在床上。
+
+戴在張俊富的辯方代表李國輔盤問下稱，當時警署警長馮保羅、偵緝警 5820 及 8561 協助他制服黃振強。李國輔續問，當時戴或在場警員，有否要求黃振強提供藏槍地址、有否掌摑黃4至5次、言語威嚇黃等？戴一概否認。
+
+辯方再問，當時警員有否向黃表示「你信唔信 8.31 有死人？掟晒上挪亞方舟啊！掟埋你上去啊！可以送你返上大陸！你大陸仔啊嘛，你大陸係咪有親戚啊！」又因黃拒提供藏槍地點而用警棍襲擊黃。戴亦全盤否認。
+
+#### 拘捕警否認逼黃解鎖手機
+
+辯方再問，制服過程中警方有否使用警棍，戴表示沒有，又指當時把黃反鎖在床上，拘捕黃。辯方指，黃被捕後曾表示「10月20號我係有喺尖沙嘴同旺角衝咋」，當時黃是否曾受威嚇？戴否認，亦否認曾逼黃提供手提電話密碼解鎖，指黃願意提供密碼。辯方再問，當警員進入黃的房間後，有否關燈，並對黃拳打腳踢、掩住嘴巴、掌摑，以強逼他解鎖手機。戴一概表示沒有。
+
+次被告張銘裕的代表姚本成則問，戴有否察覺與黃糾纏時可能弄傷黃？戴指沒有見到黃受傷，確認黃沒有向值日官作投訴，亦沒有要求見醫生。辯方展示黃於12月9日，即拘捕行動翌日，黃於東區法院提堂時被拍攝的照片。辯方指其左臉上有損傷，戴則指當時沒有留意。
+
+#### 辯方指黃曾投訴被拘捕警施襲 警庭上否認
+
+代表李家田的大律師林芷瑩則關注，黃的臉上、膝蓋、大腿及臀部均有受傷，問是否由戴造成？戴否認。林芷瑩續指，黃曾到投訴警察課投訴戴有份對他施襲，「上述被告男子黃振強，被拘捕期間被4至5名不知名便衣警員毆打，導致下半身多處瘀傷，及嘴部、左邊臉脥擦傷。押返灣仔警署錄口供時，同一伙警察，用言語威嚇誘使招認，詳情不清晰，知道屬 O 記其中一名警員名為戴明德。」戴否認曾發生上述事件。
+
+被告賴振邦的辯方大狀是香媛則指，2020年1月18日，戴與隊員一同於警署對賴作出調查，又曾恐嚇毆打賴。戴一概否認。
+
+至於代表劉佩凝的大律師馬維騉則指，於拘捕行動當天，警方亦相信黃涉與爆炸品及槍械相關，屬「危險人物」，並安排隊伍到場協助爆門入屋。辯方問，當時戴有否擔心屋內人士有致命武器，戴指有，所以身穿避彈衣。戴又指，當他入房時，黃衝前推其胸口，需由同僚協助，用兩至三分鐘制服黃。戴又形容黃健碩，戴雙手緊抱著黃，令他跌向床。
+
+#### 拘捕警否認錄影會面前 「講定有咩要做」
+
+辯方續問，黃被制服後，被帶返警署進行錄影會面，同由戴負責。辯方引述紀錄指，當黃進行第二次錄影會面前，戴於晚上7時31分帶出黃，於9時28分才開機，相隔近兩小時。戴庭上解釋，當時要先為黃拍攝照片及打指紋，過程需時。辯方問，當時戴有否曾向黃「講定有咩要做」，表示「唔合作睇吓今朝點樣樣對你」、「唔好亂講嘢」等。戴一概否認。
+
+#### 7人被控《反恐條例》等罪名
+
+案件由法官張慧玲及3男6女陪審團審理。7名被告為張俊富、張銘裕、嚴文謙、李家田、賴振邦、許湛榮及劉佩凝，起訴時年齡介乎20至29歲不等。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC164/2022、255/2023
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-26-europe-in-indo-pacific.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-26-europe-in-indo-pacific.md
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@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Europe In Indo-Pacific
+author: Max Bergmann and Christopher Johnstone
+date : 2024-06-26 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/Z83rqYO.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Europe’s Security Role in the Indo-Pacific: Making It Meaningful"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_U.S. engagement toward Europe has been effective in highlighting the growing economic challenge posed by China in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond. But what security role should Washington seek from its European allies in the region?_
+
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+The Biden administration has long sought to focus Europe’s attention on the rising challenge posed by China in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. This effort began with a social media post before the administration even took office, when incoming national security advisor Jake Sullivan expressed concern over an EU-China investment agreement in December 2020. A few months later, Secretary of State Antony Blinken mentioned China 11 times in a speech at NATO headquarters about efforts to shape American alliances; he mentioned Russia only four. On a range of fronts and through multiple vehicles, including the Group of Seven (G7), Washington has worked with European and Indo-Pacific partners to build an agenda to reduce critical dependencies on China and build the capacity to resist economic coercion. However, despite Washington’s pressure on Europe to focus on China’s economic challenge, it has been less clear what the United States seeks from Europe militarily in the Indo-Pacific region — other than “more.”
+
+U.S. engagement has been effective in aligning European perspectives and approaches to the region. China is now a major focus of transatlantic discussions and European countries have prioritized developing a common approach. Although the shift is uneven, from London to Berlin to Rome most European capitals are adopting a tougher approach to managing the economic relationship with China — as shown by the European Union’s ongoing investigations into potential Chinese dumping of electric vehicles, medical devices, and solar panels. European countries are also deepening engagement with Indo-Pacific partners on issues related to economic security. Japan and the European Union are cooperating to promote supply chain resilience in critical sectors like semiconductors, for example, in a shared effort to reduce dependence on China — a dialogue that is more advanced than it is with the United States.
+
+However, the picture is less clear on defense and security issues, with little consensus or focus on how Europe should deepen its engagement with countries in the Indo-Pacific. The leaders of several close U.S. allies and partners in the region — Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea — have begun regular participation in the annual NATO summit, a significant development pushed by the Biden administration. But the ultimate purpose of this engagement remains unclear, and other steps — such as the purported plans to establish a NATO office in Tokyo in 2023 — have proven controversial and were opposed by several member states. The United Kingdom, through the AUKUS partnership with Australia and the United States and the Global Combat Aircraft Program (GCAP) with Japan, has stepped up engagement with Indo-Pacific partners. Yet other instances of defense engagement by European countries in the region have been mostly ad hoc and symbolic, such as the passing exercises with Asian partners through the European Union’s Operation ATALANTA, including with the Pakistani navy in June 2021.
+
+This picture of unfocused engagement and occasional mixed messages begs the question: What security role should the United States seek for Europe in the Indo-Pacific? Can European partners make a meaningful contribution to deterrence and contingency response in the region, and if so, how? Are the potential benefits of enhanced engagement worth the cost, given the ongoing war in Ukraine and the security needs of Europe? And more broadly, how should Europe engage the Indo-Pacific on defense and security issues?
+
+This report aims to address these questions. It finds that Europe has a significant interest in upholding a free and open Indo-Pacific and can contribute to regional security in targeted ways. The deepening cooperation and engagement between Moscow and Beijing underscores that security in Europe and the Indo-Pacific are linked — a reality that South Korea and Japan have clearly recognized through their strong support for Ukraine. In principle, a deeper European role in Indo-Pacific security would therefore be a welcome development and should be encouraged.
+
+At the same time, Europe’s role in the region in the near term is constrained by its limited military means and by the direct and intensifying challenge posed by Russia. Europe’s priority should therefore be to ensure its own security in the face of the Russian threat, and to build the capacity to enable the United States to shift focus and respond effectively in the event of a military contingency or crisis with China. The driving focus of European defense planning and procurement should be ensuring that Europeans can provide more for their own security at a time when U.S. military capabilities are needed elsewhere.
+
+But the need for Europe to focus on ensuring its own security does not make countries in the region irrelevant to security in the Indo-Pacific. Indeed, in addition to Europe’s extensive economic and diplomatic ties, European countries — particularly the United Kingdom and France — have important military resources, including space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and cyber capabilities, that can supplement those of the United States and Indo-Pacific allies on the margins. A revived European defense industrial base could provide a vital boost to global defense materiel production and increase the credibility of U.S. alliances globally. European arms sales and security assistance could also directly support capacity building among allies and partners in the region. Finally, the maintenance of a European defense presence in the region, however modest and if employed with purpose, can reinforce international law and send an important signal to China about the potential costs of aggression, particularly if that presence is linked to the European Union’s economic strength.
+
+___`The driving focus of European defense planning and procurement should be ensuring that Europeans can provide more for their own security at a time when U.S. military capabilities are needed elsewhere.`___
+
+Over the longer term, the United States should seek to provide pathways for an expanded European role. European rearmament is underway, meaning that where Europe is today does not reflect where it will be in 5 to 10 years. Thus, Europe may be able to contribute much more over time to Indo-Pacific security, as its capacity grows and if the Russian threat recedes. The United States should keep this in mind when considering its longer-term defense planning in the Indo-Pacific and should seek to shape European defense planning and transatlantic defense industrial engagement with an eye toward a potentially larger role in the Indo-Pacific over time. In short, encouraging and incorporating a greater European defense role in the Indo-Pacific should be part of a longer-term strategy toward the region.
+
+This report will first outline Europe’s strategic dilemma, in which it must balance significant interests in a stable Indo-Pacific with the imperative of deterring a revanchist and aggressive Russia on its eastern flank. It will describe the view from the Indo-Pacific, in which a broad demand for more European defense engagement is tempered by a desire to avoid dividing the region into blocs. The report will then explore the potential vehicles for Europe’s military engagement with the Indo-Pacific region and how these relate to U.S. regional interests. Finally, it will provide recommendations for what the United States should seek from its European allies.
+
+
+### Part I
+### Europe’s Role in the Indo-Pacific
+
+#### Economic Links
+
+Europe’s stake in a free and open Indo-Pacific is vast, and a conflict over Taiwan or in the South China Sea would directly impact its security and prosperity. The EU market is roughly equivalent in size to the United States or China, making it a key economic partner with countries throughout the region. Around 40 percent of the European Union’s foreign trade passes through the South China Sea, for example. Between 2011 and 2021, imports from the Indo-Pacific to the European Union increased 64 percent, from €515 billion (about $474 billion) to €844 billion ($776 billion), while exports grew 44 percent, from €407 billion ($374 billion) to €583 billion ($536 billion). The European Union is also the largest investor in the region, which includes four of the bloc’s top global trading partners: China, Japan, South Korea, and India.
+
+Moreover, any action taken by China to seize control of Taiwan or to threaten international maritime traffic in the South China Sea would directly affect European citizens in the region. The Indo-Pacific is home to millions of European citizens, including 1.8 million French and at least 1.7 million British across the region and more than 30,000 Europeans living in Taiwan.
+
+Beijing is keenly aware of the importance of Europe’s market and has consistently sought to undermine efforts within the European Union to forge a common trade and economic policy toward China. As such, China has worked to cultivate relations with individual European countries, most notably Germany, Europe’s economic powerhouse, and Italy, which initially signed on to the Belt and Road Initiative before recently withdrawing. China has also sought to create a new multilateral form of engagement with both EU and non-EU countries in Eastern Europe, called the 17+1, which was a deliberate effort to divide Europe.
+
+Further, China has sought to target European countries pursuing policies at odds with Beijing’s interests. For example, China imposed severe import restrictions on goods from Lithuania after the Baltic country withdrew from the 17+1 grouping and allowed Taiwan to establish a new trade office in Vilnius. After the Netherlands joined with the United States to restrict exports of high-end semiconductor manufacturing equipment to China, Beijing imposed export controls on critical minerals that are crucial to the European Union’s digital and green transitions.
+
+The European Union, with the authority to negotiate trade deals, regulate its single market, and impose sanctions, has recently taken the lead in forging a more collective European strategy toward China. President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen has championed a “de-risking” approach to mitigate critical dependencies and supply chain vulnerabilities, while avoiding the economic damage of a more comprehensive decoupling of trade ties. More broadly, the 2021 EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific aims at a free and open Indo-Pacific for all while building strong and lasting partnerships in areas including security and defense, ocean governance, and the green transition. To protect individual EU countries vulnerable to economic coercion, Brussels also created a new anti-coercion instrument that could allow the European Union to impose trade restrictions, such as higher import tariffs or limited access to EU public tenders. The European Union also passed a Critical Raw Materials Act specifically to reduce its reliance on China for key inputs to Europe’s manufacturing base for electric vehicles, wind turbines, and other green goods.
+
+#### Defense Ties
+
+Militarily, European countries have significant capabilities that in theory could be valuable in the event of an Indo-Pacific contingency. For example, European countries collectively possess 116 large naval surface combatants and 66 submarines as of 2021. Despite significant gaps compared to its U.S. ally, European forces also possess air enabling capabilities, including roughly 35 command and control (C2) platforms, about 150 air-to-air refueling aircraft, a few dozen reconnaissance aircraft, and roughly 200 uncrewed aerial vehicles. European states collectively possess sizeable fleets of fifth-generation fighter jets, which could augment American air power. Europe’s defense industrial capacity is also ramping up following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
+
+Two European countries, France and the United Kingdom, operate regularly in the Indo-Pacific region and maintain significant capabilities there. France has long been Europe’s most prominent actor in the region, through its overseas territories, permanent forces in both the Indian and Pacific oceans, regular multipurpose deployments, and strong cooperation and arms sales with strategic partners, including India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the United Arab Emirates, and Singapore. France has 7,000 permanently stationed personnel (4,100 across the United Arab Emirates, Djibouti, and La Réunion and Mayotte Islands in the Indian Ocean and 2,900 across New Caledonia and French Polynesia in the Pacific Ocean) with substantial capabilities, including fighter jets, surveillance frigates, and tactical transport aircraft.
+
+The United Kingdom also plays a significant role in the region. As then foreign secretary Boris Johnson declared in 2016: “Britain is back east of Suez.” Although the United Kingdom’s current military assets in the region are limited, London has prioritized engagement with the region through several long-term military agreements. Its participation in the AUKUS initiative will see it increase its military role, such as through presence in the Submarine Rotational Force-West out of Australia. Additionally, during then defense secretary Ben Wallace’s visit to Japan in 2021, the United Kingdom announced that it would permanently deploy two patrol vessels to the region, now hosted in Singapore. This followed the deployment of a carrier strike group to the region led by the HMS Queen Elizabeth which included U.S. and Dutch warships, designed to demonstrate freedom of navigation rights under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The deployment included joint exercises with Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, and Singapore under the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) established in 1971. Britain also concluded a Reciprocal Access Agreement with Japan in 2023 and has committed to a regular trilateral exercise with Japan and the United States beginning in 2025. And as noted, the United Kingdom is working with Italy and Japan under the GCAP program to develop a sixth-generation stealth fighter jet by 2035. For both France and the United Kingdom, European security remains the priority focus — but both have stepped up in the Indo-Pacific.
+
+More recently, a broader range of European countries has undertaken episodic long-distance deployments in the area. Following the release of the European Union’s 2021 Indo-Pacific strategy, Germany and the Netherlands deployed military vessels to the region for the first time. German defense minister Boris Pistorius described the Indo-Pacific as “the most strategically important region on Earth,” in which “decisions about freedom, peace, and prosperity in the world are made.” Aircraft from Germany, France, and Spain — together representing the trinational Future Combat Air System, expected to reach full operational capacity by 2040 — will depart on a major exercise tour across the Asia-Pacific in mid-2024 to deepen ties with regional partners. Italy is also ramping up its Indo-Pacific engagement, with plans to send its carrier strike group to the Rim of the Pacific exercise in June–July 2024. These deployments send a message by the participants that they reject China’s maritime claims, they are committed to upholding UNCLOS, and there will be costs to future aggression.
+
+While this increased military activity by European states sends a useful message to Beijing, what does it say about Europe’s potential role in a regional contingency? Some scholars contend that European states have critical capabilities that could be brought to bear in the defense of Taiwan and should be the focus of concrete military planning. For example, Luis Simón, Daniel Fiott, and Octavian Manea argue that “Europeans can play a strategically meaningful military contribution in the Indo-Pacific, both in peacetime and wartime. The subsurface domain would be particularly critical in any Indo-Pacific contingency, and the combined UK and French subsurface nuclear (SSN) force would constitute around 15–20 percent of the U.S. one, and far above anything U.S. regional allies may be in a position to bring to bear within the next decade at least.” After China carried out live-fire exercises surrounding Taiwan in July 2022, Admiral Pierre Vandier, former head of the French navy, noted that “against the Chinese navy, we will win if we fight together, in coalition” during a hearing in the French parliament.
+
+Yet U.S. military leaders planning and preparing for a possible conflict over Taiwan are focused almost exclusively on the role of allies who would be close to the fight. Although South Korea, Japan, Australia, and the Philippines would all be directly impacted by a conflict, the degree to which Washington can rely on even them to support U.S. military operations remains open to question. This uncertainty complicates U.S. military planning in a region that lacks a multilateral alliance structure with a unified chain of command. Attempting to comprehensively incorporate European partners, whose willingness and ability to contribute is even less certain, into U.S. military planning for a conflict over Taiwan has therefore not been a U.S. priority. In sum, Europe’s growing defense engagement in the region is useful from a messaging standpoint but will do little to reinforce deterrence or contribute if it remains episodic and unconnected to concrete contingency planning.
+
+___`In sum, Europe’s growing defense engagement in the region is useful from a messaging standpoint but will do little to reinforce deterrence or contribute if it remains episodic and unconnected to concrete contingency planning.`___
+
+#### The View from the Indo-Pacific
+
+For their part, all major U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific are pursuing deeper security engagement with European partners, as part of a larger strategy that acknowledges the linkages between security in Europe and Asia.
+
+Japan’s December 2022 National Defense Strategy, for example, states, “With partners like the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy, Japan will mutually reinforce involvement in global security issues as well as challenges in Europe and Indo-Pacific.” In an opinion piece published in 2023, then foreign minister Yoshimasa Hayashi wrote, “Japan will fundamentally reinforce its defense capabilities and strengthen cooperation with NATO and other like-minded countries, in order to shore up and defend the free and open international order based on the rule of law.” The European Union also maintains a Strategic Partnership Agreement with Japan that spans a wide range of economic and security issues and is arguably the most comprehensive of all European partnerships with Indo-Pacific countries.
+
+In Seoul, the government of President Yoon Suk Yeol has sought to build ties with NATO in part as a response to the UN Security Council’s inability to address North Korean provocations in the face of obstruction by China and Russia since early 2022. Facing this deadlock, South Korea seeks new global governance institutions and partners to address the growing threats from Pyongyang. South Korea’s national security strategy, released in April 2023, states, “The European Union (EU) and European countries share universal values with the Republic of Korea, [and] . . . the Yoon Suk Yeol administration seeks to strengthen solidarity and cooperation with Europe on global issues and build a value-based diplomatic partnership.”
+
+Australia demonstrates a similar approach. Its 2023 Defence Strategic Review notes, “We must also enhance . . . engagements with the E.U., its member countries, and NATO.” The strong support to Ukraine offered by Japan, South Korea, and Australia was aimed at strengthening relations with Europe, with the expectation that Europe would provide similar support in the face of aggression in the Indo-Pacific.
+
+At the same time, U.S. partners in the Indo-Pacific are at times ambivalent about the proper role of European partners in the region’s security and the best means to operationalize that role. While U.S allies have embraced a closer relationship with NATO outside the region, countries in Southeast Asia and among the Pacific Islands are wary of strengthening formal arrangements that could signal a region dividing into blocs — a sentiment China has actively sought to promote. In response to media reports that NATO was considering opening an office in Tokyo — an initiative that fizzled in the face of backlash from France and in the region — China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson asserted, “NATO’s attempt to make eastward inroads into the Asia-Pacific will inevitably undermine regional peace and stability. The countries and people in this region are on high alert against this and firmly oppose any words or actions designed to bring military blocs into this region and stoke division and confrontation.”
+
+However far-fetched, these arguments have resonance in parts of the region. In a May 2022 interview, then Singaporean prime minister Lee Hsien Loong commented, “Countries in Asia, many of them enjoy good ties with China, as well as with the US and the US’ treaty allies. . . . I think that is a better configuration than one where countries are divided along a line and one bloc confronts another.” He added, “That is the history in Europe, but it has not been the history in Asia. And I think it is better that it remains not.” In response to the reports about the possibility of a NATO office in Tokyo, an Indonesian diplomat wrote, “NATO has little to contribute toward stability in the Asia-Pacific region . . . bringing NATO to Asia will do more harm than good.” Participants from multiple countries in a CSIS study group voiced similar caution about the downside of deeper NATO engagement in the Indo-Pacific.
+
+In sum, while many Indo-Pacific partners — particularly U.S. treaty allies — in principle welcome deeper European defense and security engagement in the region and are pursuing their own deeper ties with NATO, how and where that engagement is executed, and through what structures, matters. This ambivalence serves to reinforce a key point: the concrete benefits to Indo-Pacific security of deeper European engagement — through strategic messaging, contingency planning, or capacity building — must outweigh the downside risk of playing into Chinese narratives on the “NATO-ization” of Asia, particularly in light of the need for Europe to sustain a focus on the security challenge posed by Russia in Europe.
+
+___`The concrete benefits to Indo-Pacific security of deeper European engagement — through strategic messaging, contingency planning, or capacity building — must outweigh the downside risk of playing into Chinese narratives.`___
+
+#### The Bear in the Room: What Would Russia Do?
+
+The dilemma for Europe is that while it does have military capacity that can contribute to deterrence in the Indo-Pacific and can be helpful at the margins in responding to aggression, it also faces a revanchist and irredentist threat from Russia. While Russian president Vladmir Putin will not remain in office indefinitely, as long as Russian foreign policy adheres to its anti-Western and revisionist outlook, Europe will have to remain on guard.
+
+Moscow would likely see Chinese military aggression as creating opportunities for Russia to exploit. Sino-Russian relations may fall short of an established alliance. But Chinese support for Russia, while perhaps less than what Russia initially hoped for — particularly in terms of direct military assistance — has proven vital to Russia’s war effort by reviving and ramping up Russia’s defense industry. In the event of a conflict over Taiwan, China would have a military interest in encouraging opportunistic aggression from Russia to create dilemmas for the United States in Europe and stretch U.S. forces. Moreover, the Kremlin would be eager to see a U.S. military defeat in the Indo-Pacific and would likely want to challenge or threaten Europe’s security architecture. Moscow is also willing to take risks in its deployment of military force, as demonstrated not just by its invasion of Ukraine, but also in its intervention in Syria, its use of a chemical weapon to assassinate Russian dissidents on UK soil, and the proliferation of Russian “private military contractors” in Africa to support anti-Western military leaders.
+
+___`In the event of a conflict over Taiwan, China would have a military interest in encouraging opportunistic aggression from Russia to create dilemmas for the United States in Europe and stretch U.S. forces.`___
+
+Thus, the potential for Russia to directly threaten European security and NATO would likely increase significantly in the event of a conflict in the Indo-Pacific. For example, in this scenario Russia might be more willing to gamble that the United States would be unable to respond decisively to a lightning attack on the Baltics.
+
+#### U.S. Overstretched?
+
+There is an ongoing debate about whether global demands on the U.S. military are overstretching its capabilities, particularly in responding to a conflict over Taiwan. While it is beyond the scope of this report to fully address this debate, it is fair to assume that a potential conflict with China over Taiwan would be all-consuming for the United States. China’s military buildup, including its modern rocket forces, space and cyber capabilities, advanced naval combatants, and large numbers of advanced fighter, bomber, and uncrewed aircraft would pose a major challenge to the United States and its Indo-Pacific allies. The United States would need to guard against the risk of opportunistic aggression within the region as well, as North Korea could seek to exploit a conflict over Taiwan to advance its interests on the Korean Peninsula. Europe and NATO should assume any conflict with China would stretch American military capacity.
+
+The United States would undoubtedly pull significant military assets out of the European theater to support a major campaign to defend Taiwan. These would likely include aircraft carriers operated by the U.S. Sixth Fleet headquartered at Naval Support Activity Naples and enabling capabilities such as airborne C2 and air-to-air refueling — where Europe lags far behind the United States. Moreover, the war in Ukraine has revealed both the massive quantity of munitions needed in a conventional conflict and Europe’s shockingly limited stockpiles. An Indo-Pacific contingency would consume vast quantities of U.S. munitions and defense materiel to the detriment of Europe, as the United States would be either unable or unwilling to supply considerable munitions to the European forces. As an example, a recent CSIS study found that the United States would likely consume the entirety of its inventory of Long-Range Anti-ship Missiles (LRASM) in a week during a conflict over Taiwan.
+
+___`An Indo-Pacific contingency would consume vast quantities of U.S. munitions and defense materiel to the detriment of Europe, as the United States would be either unable or unwilling to supply considerable munitions to the European forces.`___
+
+Russia could seek to take advantage of the shift in U.S. posture. Thus, the prospect of the United States pulling assets out of the European theater makes European participation in an Indo-Pacific contingency potentially challenging given the renewed threat posed by Russia on Europe’s eastern flank and Europe’s limited capabilities.
+
+
+### Part II
+### Objectives for European Defense Engagement in the Indo-Pacific
+
+The main contribution Europe could make to Indo-Pacific security in the short to medium term, given the continuing threat posed by Russia, is to alleviate the demands on U.S. forces by strengthening Europe’s own capacity for its defense at home. This will require significant resources and a change in emphasis of European procurement efforts and in how the United States approaches NATO and European security.
+
+However, while Europe’s military focus should be on NATO’s area of responsibility, that does not preclude a European contribution to the Indo-Pacific, particularly over the medium to long term. If Russia is deterred from military action and distracted and consumed by the war in Ukraine, or should a less anti-Western government emerge in Moscow, that may free up important European resources for the Indo-Pacific. As such, while the near-term focus of U.S. efforts should be on encouraging Europeans to build forces to deter Russia, the United States should not preclude European involvement in an Indo-Pacific contingency and should engage European partners in a discussion of requirements during a crisis. Furthermore, over the longer term, a Europe rearmed with capable and ready forces may be able to significantly contribute to security in the Indo-Pacific. That means the United States should seek to deepen European defense engagement with the region and expand the connections of European defense partners with the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) in Hawaii. These efforts should be undertaken bilaterally or with small groups of European partners — and not through NATO.
+
+#### Europe’s Core Military Role: Cover the Flanks
+
+In a world of rapidly growing Chinese military power in the Indo-Pacific and a proximate Russian threat in Europe, some geographic division of labor between the United States and its European allies is inevitable. Rather than avoid discussion of this reality, the United States and its European allies should acknowledge and explicitly plan for it. Doing so does not mean that the United States should focus solely on security in the Indo-Pacific; the United States can and should sustain a central role in European security for the foreseeable future, even as it dedicates increasing resources to the potential threat posed by China. Nevertheless, it is time for the United States and Europe to engage in a frank dialogue about priorities and trade-offs in U.S. force posture globally, and to prepare European partners for the need to sustain deterrence under conditions that involve a smaller U.S. presence.
+
+___`It is time for the United States and Europe to engage in a frank dialogue about priorities and trade-offs in U.S. force posture globally, and to prepare European partners for the need to sustain deterrence under conditions that involve a smaller U.S. presence.`___
+
+__Washington should press Europe to prepare to deter Russia with less U.S. support.__ The United States has not been frank with its NATO allies about the impact a war in the Indo-Pacific would have on its presence in Europe. The force planning construct underpinning the United States’ 2022 National Defense Strategy assumes a military that is sized to prevail in conflict against a peer competitor — with China identified as the pacing challenge — while employing “a range of risk mitigation efforts” to deter opportunistic aggression elsewhere. However, these statements remained largely undefined, and the reality is that a conflict with China would almost certainly precipitate major adjustments in U.S. force posture globally, including in Europe. The inclination of U.S. officials is to reassure NATO allies of its steadfast commitment to their security, regardless of global conditions, but doing so evades a necessary discussion of how a conflict in Asia would inevitably impact U.S. presence in Europe. In fact, an Indo-Pacific contingency greatly increases the potential for Russian aggression in Europe. This is the scenario that NATO and Europe need to prepare for — one in which Europeans are required to defend themselves while the United States is focused elsewhere. NATO planning must begin to consider the realistic possibility of opportunistic aggression by Russia in the event of a conflict over Taiwan or on the Korean Peninsula.
+
+__The United States should clarify to NATO allies the impact an Indo-Pacific contingency would have on the European theater.__ Requirements for U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific depend on the scenario, but a significant draw on a range of capabilities — particularly air, naval, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets — would seem nearly certain. It is critical that the United States attempt to give some clarity to NATO in order to provide direction to European procurement and planning efforts. As a general principle, the United States should take steps to be more transparent with European and Indo-Pacific allies about joint strategic planning and information sharing to live up to its commitment to make allies and partners a “center of gravity” in its 2022 National Defense Strategy. This will require a far more forward-leaning approach to information sharing on contingency planning than exists today.
+
+__European defense spending should focus on addressing potential gaps left by the United States.__ Defense spending by EU member states increased by 6 percent in 2022 compared to the previous year, reaching a record €240 billion ($260 billion). But European countries are not concentrating their efforts on procuring capabilities that can help mitigate the gaps that would be left by the United States in the event of a crisis elsewhere. U.S. engagement should encourage them to do so.
+
+__Europe should help secure sea lanes of communication and key maritime choke points.__ As the United States surges naval assets to the Indo-Pacific, Europe could help fill the gap. Simón, Fiott, and Manea argue, “Europeans can contribute by securing the sea lanes of communications in the Indian Ocean, which would be important in an Indo-Pacific contingency, but also in other important areas like space and ammunition, as well as investing in a common pool of inter-theater capabilities.” For instance, five European countries have military bases in Djibouti, as do the United States and China. Securing the entry point into the Indian Ocean from the Red Sea would be an allied priority and could be a focus for European militaries. Additionally, European naval forces could help deter opportunistic aggression from Iran and help ensure trade continues to flow from the Persian Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz.
+
+#### European–Indo-Pacific Security, Defense Cooperation, and Engagement
+
+Even as NATO and European states should focus on preparing to defend the continent with less U.S. support, there remain meaningful ways that they can contribute to deterrence and stability in the Indo-Pacific — and over the long term, the potential for significant contribution to security in the region is very real. European engagement in the Indo-Pacific should be targeted, and for the most part executed outside a NATO framework. As such, the United States should consider the following recommendations:
+
+__Keep NATO out of the Indo-Pacific.__ The downside of direct NATO engagement in the Indo-Pacific probably outweighs the benefits. The more than 30 members of NATO hold widely different views of China, a fact that would undermine the alliance’s ability to forge a meaningful agenda for the region. NATO engagement also risks playing into Chinese narratives regarding purported U.S. efforts to divide the world into competing blocs. With the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Europe’s security situation and NATO’s focus has reverted to its original raison d’etre, protecting Europe and deterring Russia. This is where it should remain.
+
+__But, bring the Indo-Pacific to NATO instead.__ On the other hand, the growing engagement of Indo-Pacific allies with NATO in Europe should be welcomed and expanded. The attendance of the IP4 countries at NATO summits (Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea) has demonstrated solidarity with Ukraine and support for European security. Indo-Pacific engagement with NATO could be a vehicle for valuable information sharing and exchange on Chinese and Russian threats and help to narrow gaps in perceptions across regions. It could facilitate increased coordination and set common standards for weapons production, such as munitions that could then be used interchangeably among countries. NATO can also provide important lessons learned on opportunities and challenges of coalition warfighting. Engagement could be expanded beyond the IP4 to include other likeminded allies and partners in the region, such as the Philippines and Singapore — should they express interest in joining.
+
+__Focus on building deeper and denser partnerships between Europe and the Indo-Pacific at the bilateral or “minilateral” level.__ Europe’s direct military engagement with the Indo-Pacific should be primarily done by individual European states. Thus, the United States should support expanded bilateral military-to-military and political-to-military engagement between European and Asian partners and expand efforts to engage and incorporate willing partners into defense planning. Instead of seeking to develop a formal multilateral structure for this engagement, such as a European “Quad” to engage the existing Indo-Pacific Quad (consisting of the United States, Japan, India, and Australia), the United States should encourage more organic cooperation. For instance, along the sidelines of the annual Shangri-la Dialogue in Singapore, European defense officials could arrange a structured dialogue with their Indo-Pacific counterparts, with or without U.S. participation.
+
+__Expand coordination and engagement between Europe and INDOPACOM.__ Incorporating a more significant role for Europe militarily in the Indo-Pacific necessitates a greater presence in Hawaii at INDOPACOM. Having a broad and robust global coalition of allies and partners committed to promoting regional stability and potentially joining the war-fighting effort has clear benefits. But a broad coalition can also add complications. Given the stakes of a war in the Indo-Pacific, the emphasis of U.S. war planners will be on what added military value can be brought to bear, as opposed to the diplomatic or optical value of having a large coalition. The United States should focus its engagement on a small subset of European partners who can make a meaningful military contribution during a conflict — in particular the United Kingdom and France — and work to define operational contributions during peacetime and contingencies. However, the United States should not preclude other allies and partners from contributing, especially as European defense capabilities expand in the years ahead. The United States should insist that European countries that wish to engage are prepared to bring real military capabilities and commitments to the table, even if small. Today the only European partners with liaison officers at INDOPACOM are the United Kingdom and France; several others, including Nordic states, have expressed interest. This interest should be encouraged, provided it is accompanied by a willingness to commit resources, however small, to the region.
+
+___`The United States should focus its engagement on a small subset of European partners who can make a meaningful military contribution during a conflict — in particular the United Kingdom and France — and work to define operational contributions during peacetime and contingencies.`___
+
+__Foster engagement between states on the Baltic and South China Seas.__ The Baltic and South China Seas have similar operating environments, with relatively shallow bodies of water neighboring revisionist powers who assert unlawful claims, engage in unsafe operational behavior, and threaten maritime neighbors. Nordic navies and coast guards could provide security and capacity-building assistance to the navies and coast guards of maritime Southeast Asia, such as training and equipment transfers. For example, the United States has provided coast guard cutters to Vietnam and the Philippines, which have been refurbished and become important naval vessels; it should encourage states on the Baltic Sea to offer similar capacity-building and training initiatives. Sweden has already participated in such a program through the European Union’s Capacity Building Mission in Somalia, donating vessels to the Somaliland Coast Guard and providing training and maintenance.
+
+__Promote the development of an EU naval mission in the Indo-Pacific.__ Europe’s naval presence in the region is useful in signaling to China that it is not just the United States that is concerned about a free and open Indo-Pacific. But Europe’s naval presence could send a stronger signal if it were more tightly linked to the European Union’s economic clout; after all, it is Brussels that will respond economically in a crisis, as it is responsible for the single market and therefore sanctions. A major purpose of freedom of navigation operations is to convey to China that Europe is both engaged in the region and concerned about Chinese behavior, meaning that action against Taiwan or international shipping will prompt a European response. Since this response is likely to be primarily economic in nature, meaning it would be an EU competency, it makes sense for the European Union to expand its naval efforts into the Indo-Pacific.
+
+The European Union has a track record of conducting naval operations in response to regional security threats. These include Operation ATALANTA to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia and the Horn of Africa and Operation IRINI in the Mediterranean to enforce a UN arms embargo to Libya. More recently, the European Union has launched a security and defense partnership with four coastal states by the Gulf of Guinea to mitigate pressure exerted by terrorist groups in the region. To protect cargo ships under attack by Yemen’s Houthi rebels, the European Union also launched a naval mission in the Red Sea in early 2024, with up to seven member states providing ships or planes. Finally, the European Union’s Coordinated Maritime Presences (CMP) tool enables the bloc to act as one militarily in areas of interest. This is essentially a way to work around the European Union’s inability to operate a formal naval command by establishing a maritime surveillance arm to coordinate air and naval assets, achieving the same effect.
+
+The European Union should focus on forging a more cohesive and integrated European approach to the region. This means linking Europe’s significant economic clout and its primary lever to impose costs against China — sanctions — with its diplomatic and military efforts and signaling in the region. The EU role would be to manage and coordinate Europe’s naval presence. For example, regional EU missions could serve as the anchor for a pan-European naval attaché or even as a liaison office for maritime operators. Having EU-flagged vessels traverse the region may also expand the number of EU countries willing to participate, as operating under an EU flag provides more protection against Chinese economic retaliation. Additionally, the European Union has the benefit of being a relatively new actor, without much of the historic baggage of the United States, NATO, or indeed many EU member states with a colonial past. As Eve Fitriani found in a Carnegie Europe paper examining Indonesia’s views of the European Union, “Compared with other major powers, the EU is seen more positively in the eyes of Indonesians, who prefer the EU as an international partner over the United States, China, or Russia.”
+
+__Encourage European partners to use regional deployments to directly challenge unlawful Chinese maritime claims.__ The periodic naval deployments of several European countries over the last few years — including the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy — sent an important message to the region about Europe’s stake in Indo-Pacific security, but the military value of such activities is limited. Given that their frequency is unlikely to change significantly, Washington should urge its European partners to define a clear operational purpose for such deployments. In addition to providing opportunities for ad hoc training and exercises, these deployments should be used to advance the larger effort to push back on excessive Chinese maritime claims and uphold international law. Specifically, in coordination with INDOPACOM, European navies could conduct transits of the Taiwan Strait — as the UK navy has done — or conduct freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea to contest specific Chinese maritime claims in the region. Simple “presence operations” are not enough: European navies should be prepared to directly challenge China’s unlawful claims, to reinforce the message that China’s actions are a global issue.
+
+__Elevate the U.S.-EU Security and Defense dialogue.__ The establishment of the U.S.-EU Security and Defense dialogue was met with considerable opposition inside the U.S. government. The dialogue has now been formed and has proved useful; however, the engagement is conducted at the deputy assistant secretary level on both sides. Given the potential utility of EU naval missions, the importance of the European Union’s voice in upholding international agreements such as UNCLOS, the development of significant EU-funded security assistance programs, and growing EU investment in defense, the dialogue should be elevated to an assistant secretary level and should include an official on both sides responsible for Indo-Pacific security affairs.
+
+__Encourage the European Union to speak out more forcefully on Indo-Pacific issues.__ Washington should encourage the European Union and European countries to speak out more forcefully when China violates international law and norms. For instance, China is routinely violating UNCLOS, to which European countries are signatories and can speak on with authority. The EU delegation to the Philippines in Manila put out a joint statement on UNCLOS and Chinese violations; this should be common practice.
+
+__Encourage defense industrial cooperation between Europe and the Indo-Pacific.__ There is growing defense industrial engagement between Europe and the Indo-Pacific. For instance, Poland has bought large quantities of Korean-made equipment, including tanks and artillery. Additionally, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Japan have joined together to produce a next-generation fighter jet under the GCAP program. This sort of collaboration may create stronger competitors to U.S. industry and at times further disrupt Europe’s already fragmented defense industrial base. Yet the United States should encourage these types of defense industrial engagements, which significantly strengthen ties and can help network U.S. allies and partners. They will increase industrial capacity globally and make Europe and Indo-Pacific partners feel more vested in the security situation in each other’s regions. For example, France’s extensive arms-sales relationship with India has helped strengthen ties between Paris and New Delhi. AUKUS has contributed to the United Kingdom’s Indo-Pacific tilt and provides perhaps the most prominent example of industrial cooperation between Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Additional partners, in Europe or the Indo-Pacific, should be brought in to collaborate on AUKUS Pillar Two as soon as possible.
+
+__Promote NATO standardization of armaments to boost capacity for partners.__ European defense production is ramping up in response to Ukraine, and this capacity could help augment U.S. production in a conflict. For instance, Europe can boost U.S. defense industrial capacity particularly when it comes to munitions, such as 155-millimeter artillery, and more sophisticated precision-guided munitions, such as Storm Shadow. However, that requires the defense industry to ensure U.S. weapons platforms can use such munitions interchangeably. Thus, the United States should prioritize ensuring a higher level of NATO standardization of munitions, because it has direct implications for the United States if it wants to tap into European defense production. The United States should also seek to encourage broader standardization among its allies — both in Europe and Asia. Thus, NATO could seek to include the armaments directors of the IP4 countries in many of its discussions and meetings to ensure broader standardization.
+
+__Encourage Europe to become a security assistance provider to the Indo-Pacific.__ EU assistance could be directed toward countries that complement U.S. engagement or have needs that go beyond what existing U.S. and other allied assistance can provide. Presently, European assistance efforts are limited by both decades of underinvestment in defense and the need to support Ukraine. Nevertheless, Europe may in the coming years increase its capacity to transfer weapons to Indo-Pacific partners.
+
+First, prior to the Ukraine war, the European Union created the European Peace Facility (EPF), a security assistance fund that can provide weapons to partners. The EPF is now being used largely to support Ukraine and has seen its budget dramatically increase to €17 billion ($18.5 billion) for use between 2021 and 2027. While Ukraine has been its overwhelming focus, the EPF was developed with the objective of aiding developing countries outside of Europe, much like the State or Defense Department’s security assistance fund. While the original budget for the fund is far less than U.S. security assistance programs, the fund’s budget before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was projected to be roughly €850 million ($1 billion) per year. The United States should engage with the European Union on this fund and encourage funding for the Indo-Pacific, and coordinate in identifying priority capabilities and partners.
+
+Second, Europe is engaged in a significant force modernization, which may lead in the coming years to the retirement of systems excess to requirements. Much of these systems will likely head to Ukraine, but there may be opportunities in the maritime domain. Lastly, Europe may also have significant spare production capacity in the coming years. As it ramps up to support Ukraine and rebuild its stockpiles, it may have significant overcapacity in future years that could be used to support and build ties with certain Indo-Pacific partners.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+China’s support for Russia in the invasion of Ukraine underscores the reality that security in the Indo-Pacific and in Europe are linked. U.S. alliances in Europe and the Indo-Pacific can therefore no longer be managed as separate entities, with contingency planning undertaken in isolation and without regard to trade-offs and the possible interplay of conflict across theaters. In the near term, U.S. policy should focus on ensuring that NATO and European allies can sustain deterrence in Europe with a reduced U.S. role. Europe’s role in Indo-Pacific security by necessity should therefore remain small and focused on discrete areas where concrete contributions are possible. Over the longer term, Washington should open a pathway for a European contribution to Indo-Pacific security.
+
+---
+
+__Max Bergmann__ is the director of the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program and the Stuart Center in Euro-Atlantic and Northern European Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
+
+__Christopher Johnstone__ is senior adviser and Japan Chair at CSIS.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-26-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-mitigation-day-2.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-26-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-mitigation-day-2.md
new file mode 100644
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@@ -0,0 +1,285 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・求情第二日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-06-26 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 戴耀廷一方指戴真誠誤信否決財案不違法 非為私利、而是畢生對法治民主堅定決心
+- 辯方倡3從犯證人減刑50%至66% 一度指趙家賢為「超級金手指」 官不同意
+- 吳政亨親撰求情信 稱堅信自由民主、信公平選舉防暴政 支持初選從來無關否決預算案
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47名民主派被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」案，共45人罪成。被控方指為組織者的戴耀廷、區諾軒、趙家賢、鍾錦麟及吳政亨5人，今（26日）續求情。代表戴耀廷的資深大律師黃繼明力陳，涉案謀劃在《國安法》生效後才違法，法庭判刑時不應考慮此前行為；又指戴雖曾具領導角色，但《國安法》後已非主腦，他不會參選立法會，也無法控制其他人行為。不過法官拒絕接納，法官陳慶偉並指，肯定戴耀廷沒有退出謀劃，指他是立法會選舉延期後，唯一一名繼續參加謀劃的組織者被告。
+
+辯方並呈上由港大法律學院講座教授陳弘毅、和首席講師張達明等撰寫的求情信，表揚戴對港大及社會的貢獻；又力陳「非暴力」是戴一生堅信的信念，他真誠誤信否決預算案沒有違法，甚至「誤導了自己」，但他做這些事非為個人利益，而是出於畢生對法治和民主的堅定決心。不過法官陳慶偉質疑，戴耀廷指初選不違法，或是游說其他人繼續參與初選。
+
+#### 鄒家成等3人獲安排正庭旁聽
+
+案件由3名國安法指定法官陳慶偉、李運騰及陳仲衡審理，控方代表為副刑事檢控專員萬德豪、周天行、助理刑事檢控專員羅天瑋。戴耀廷由資深大律師黃繼明代表，趙家賢由大律師利琛代表，區諾軒和鍾錦麟由大律師陳慕賢代表，吳政亨由大律師石書銘代表。
+
+求情5人於近10時進入法庭。吳政亨與親友做手勢，又豎起拇指。昨日有戴眼鏡的戴耀廷，今早則除下了眼鏡，看到旁聽親友時微笑揮手。區諾軒入庭時向旁聽席鞠躬，鍾錦麟向律師揮手。區諾軒、趙家賢和鍾錦麟與昨日一樣，坐在被告欄離旁聽席最遠的位置，與其他被告分隔。
+
+
+▲ 戴耀廷
+
+至於昨日在延伸庭看直播的譚凱邦、劉頴匡、鄒家成3人，則同獲安排在正庭就坐，鄒入庭後向旁聽席聳肩，並與譚和劉不住交談。其餘列席認罪被告繼續被帶到兩個延伸庭觀看直播，黃之鋒、余慧明、袁嘉蔚、吳敏兒、何桂藍、黃碧雲、黃子悅7人在二號法庭；施德來、彭卓棋、鄭達鴻、伍健瑋、梁晃維、馮達浚6人在一號法庭。
+
+#### 辯方：法庭不應懲罰《國安法》前行為
+
+代表戴耀廷的資深大律師黃繼明今繼續陳詞。黃強調，戴耀廷在2020年7月1日《國安法》生效前的行為絕非違法，雖然他曾被不少人批評，但這並非道德或政治的法庭，法庭判刑時不應考慮，否則是懲罰戴的合法行為，等同賦予《國安法》追溯力。法官陳慶偉指，但本案屬持續罪行；黃同意，但強調被告的協議因《國安法》才變成違法，其罪責只在於《國安法》生效後仍沒有停止。
+
+法官陳仲衡續舉例，若他以一年時間計劃打劫，其後再與另兩名法官達成協議落實，辯方認為判刑時不用考慮他此前的計劃？法官陳慶偉補充，假設陳仲衡一直在腦海中計劃，並曾將其意圖寫在紙上，最終3名法官達成協議，那張紙能否成為證據？
+
+黃認為並非正確類比，因打劫一直都是違法行為，但否決預算案本來並非刑事罪行、也不是民事過失，只是在《國安法》下才非法。他又強調，普通法下，除非法律禁止，否則所有行為均是合法，若被告《國安法》此前的行為真有違法，肯定政府會採取行動。法官李運騰續指，控方並沒有指控被告在7月1日前違法，否則控罪日期會提前。辯方重申，法庭不應懲罰戴耀廷以往合法行為。陳慶偉則再引打劫例子，指是懲罰長久以來有預謀的串謀（very lengthy and premeditated plan），黃稱不肯定是否正確，陳則表示，肯定那是正確的做法。
+
+#### 官指正在找謀劃背後的「黑武士」
+
+法官李運騰續指，涉案計劃的規模是判刑的考慮因素，法官衡量計劃規模時，能否只審視《國安法》生效後、而非生效前的行為？黃繼明指，初選本身不違法，違法的是被告協議達成的行為，即無差別否決預算案，而該部分與戴無關，他根本不會參選，亦無法控制或指揮其他人。
+
+法官陳仲衡即以電影《星球大戰》角色作比喻，指「35+計劃」是尋找進入立法會無差別否決預算案的35名「白兵（stormtroopers）」，而「我們正在嘗試找出謀劃背後的黑武士（Darth Vader）」。
+
+
+▲ 法官 陳仲衡（右）
+
+#### 辯方：《國安法》後戴耀廷已非主腦
+
+黃繼明續指，《國安法》後，戴耀廷已非涉案謀劃的主腦、也不能再控制該謀劃，法官陳慶偉遂問，那是誰在7月1日後負責（in charge），是否區諾軒？他並指，因本案組織者只有戴和區兩人，換言之辯方是指控區諾軒。鄒家成和劉頴匡等一度望向區諾軒發笑。
+
+法官陳仲衡又指，若辯方說戴耀廷在初選沒有任何角色，他7月中根本不需要宣布「休息」，黃指他的確不需要，只是作「交代」。惟法官陳慶偉明言，不接受戴在7月1日之後沒有任何角色；法官李運騰亦指，據趙家賢證供，戴在8月時仍提出望民主動力捐約100萬元予香港民研，以收集市民對否決預算案的意見。法官陳仲衡亦提出，有「三投三不投」計劃，此時譚凱邦、鄒家成和劉頴匡均大笑，吳政亨則無奈苦笑。
+
+黃澄清，不是指戴完全沒有角色，並接納戴7月1日前在謀劃是領導角色，但他7月1日後已不再是組織者，沒有打算進入立法會否決財案，也不能控制或指揮其他人如此做，是否參選和否決全然是其他人的決定。
+
+
+▲ 左起：戴耀廷、區諾軒、鍾劍華、趙家賢（資料圖片）
+
+#### 官拒納戴耀廷《國安法》後角色輕微
+
+法官陳慶偉在早休後，表示法庭不接納辯方指，戴耀廷2020年7月1日前的行為，與決定其罪責無關；亦不接納辯方指戴在7月1日後於本案只有很少或沒有角色。法庭亦無需辯方再就內地法律文件是否適用陳詞。
+
+#### 辯方呈陳弘毅、張達明等求情信 指戴主張非暴力、畢生追求民主法治
+
+辯方續就戴的個人情況陳詞。辯方呈上港大法律學院講座教授陳弘毅、港大法律學院講座首席講師張達明、蘇穎智牧師及戴耀廷本人的求情信。其中陳和張讚揚戴對港大和法律界的貢獻，指戴是最高質素的法律學者，曾發布多篇有關法律的文章，不僅獲很多教學獎項，亦曾於2001年因其推動基本法及人權教育，獲政府頒授榮譽勳章。蘇牧師則指戴是基督徒，對教會有重要貢獻，亦關注警方與學生之間的衝突。
+
+辯方指，戴一直主張非暴力，他真誠錯誤相信（genuine mistaken belief）運用否決權在《國安法》下並非違法，而他做這些事並非為任何個人利益，而是出於畢生對法治和民主、尤其是普選的堅定決心，而戴現時已知道其手段是錯誤。黃又指，非暴力是戴耀廷一生「堅定、堅定、堅定」的信念（“... non-violence has been a firm, firm, firm belief of D1 all his life.”）。法官陳仲衡指，控方本案已清楚表明串謀不涉暴力，這不是一個問題（non-issue）。
+
+#### 辯方：戴真誠誤信無違法、或誤導了自己 官質疑
+
+黃繼明又引不同新聞，指案發時不同法律學者和社會人士，包括政府、湯家驊、葉劉淑儀、陳弘毅等，均無明確表明初選或否決預算案屬違法。法官陳仲衡質疑，《國安法》剛實施，無人能肯定地說某些行為是否違法。黃回應，若有人計劃在立法會放炸彈，肯定每人都能說是違反《國安法》；但本案情況正是不確定有否違法，戴當時真誠相信是合法並非不合理。
+
+法官陳慶偉續主動提到〈真攬炒十步〉一文，指迫使特首辭職只是第七步，問辯方是否記得第八至十步。翻查資料，相關步驟提及《國安法》適用香港後，街頭抗爭變激烈和出現血腥鎮壓，港人發動「三罷」令社會陷入停頓等。黃指文章是在《國安法》前寫成，只涉運用憲制權力；惟陳慶偉不同意，指文章談及暴動和示威，超出運用憲制權力。黃回應那從來並非謀劃一部分，戴亦無因此被控；而戴終其一生從沒有提倡暴力，暴力並非他的意圖、亦與本案無關，不應納入考慮。
+
+陳慶偉指，其意思不是會將此納入加刑因素，只是認為辯方不能說戴耀廷是完全無辜、擁有真誠錯誤的想法；又指戴在《國安法》生效後曾強調在普通法下違法，因他知道《國安法》是由中國制定。陳遂說，「我可能是錯的」，但指戴耀廷這樣說，或是游說其他人繼續參與初選。黃強調，戴當時是以法律學者，而非共謀者或謀劃組織者的身分發言。法官陳仲衡指，若然如此，為何戴在《國安法》後向所有參加者指不提否決每個議案？陳慶偉亦指，其他參與者或認為某程度被戴誤導。黃回應，戴「可能自己誤導了自己」，強調他當時真誠相信是違法。
+
+#### 辯方：「攬炒十步」僅博弈理論 不代表一定發生
+
+辯方其後引戴耀廷的求情信，提及「攬炒十步」只是博弈理論（game theory），屬假設的情況、非預測未來的「水晶球」，事實不一定會按照他所指的逐步發生，強調戴一直也沒有提倡暴力，若因此指他提倡或鼓勵暴力，是對他不公。法官陳慶偉則指，判詞明言戴是望推翻一國兩制，辯方說法與裁決相違。副刑事檢控專員萬德豪其後亦補充，戴認罪案情承認撰寫〈真攬炒十步〉一文，以引發血腥鎮壓和外國制裁，目的明顯顛覆政權和癱瘓政府運作。
+
+
+▲ 副刑事檢控專員 萬德豪
+
+#### 官指肯定戴無退出 是唯一一名繼續參加謀劃的組織者
+
+黃繼明續指，在中聯辦譴責初選或違法後，戴耀廷重新評估情況並於7月15日選擇退出。陳慶偉即指他沒有退出，僅說會「休息」，而且他繼續與區諾軒和趙家賢談及有關民調的事。黃指，戴仍是被動角色，並非「首要分子」和「積極參加者」。惟陳慶偉指，認為戴耀廷是立法會選舉延期後，唯一一名繼續參加謀劃的組織者被告，又認為「他可能沒有之前那樣積極參與，但他肯定沒有退出」。黃指，戴決定退出，不代表他不會見任何人，他仍要處理眾籌資金。
+
+法官陳仲衡又質疑，戴是35+的設計者，辯方說戴宣布退出初選，為何他退出時沒有建議其他參與者一同退出？黃重申，就算戴曾是主要組織者，《國安法》後也如「共產」般，不比其他人有更大話語權。但法官則質疑，戴當時態度似乎是「我退出，但如你們想繼續，隨便」。
+
+法官陳慶偉最後指，辯方提倡的部分論點並不被法庭接納，或需召開紐頓聆訊處理，黃表示並非挑戰任何法庭裁斷，如有不一致的地方，辯方會接受法庭裁斷。
+
+#### 辯方指涉暴力推翻政府等方屬「重行罪大」
+
+就本案量刑，辯方認為不屬「罪行重大」，指本案不涉任何暴力行為，被告僅運用當時認為合法的憲制權力，亦有證據非民主派對否決預算案是否違法存疑。黃指，戴耀廷並非為了私利，而是爭取《基本法》訂明的普選，即使謀劃成功，亦不致推翻政府、全盤陷入混亂，因《基本法》有機制解決，最終交由選民決定。
+
+法官陳仲衡指，或許罪行不是最嚴重，但不代表不屬「重行罪大」。黃則回應，顛覆罪設三級刑期，認為涉暴力推翻政府、造成徹底混亂等情況，才屬「首要分子或罪行重大」的情況，本案情況不足以構成最重罪責。
+
+黃指，其他量刑因素，包括戴耀廷及時認罪，可扣減三分一。針對23條生效後，除非懲教信納「不會不利國家安全」，否則國安法囚犯不得獲行為良好三分一扣減，法官李運騰則指，法庭判刑時不會考慮懲教署的評估。黃亦確認，戴是涉佔領中環串謀公眾妨擾案保釋候上訴期間干犯本案。
+
+黃繼明於早上完成陳詞，為戴申請下午及餘下的求情聆訊不出庭，獲法官批准。散庭時，鄒家成與戴耀廷交談，戴搖頭，戴其後隔着玻璃與律師交談，做OK手勢，其後徑直步入囚室。
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47名民主派被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」案，共45人罪成。被控方指為組織者的戴耀廷、區諾軒、趙家賢、鍾錦麟及吳政亨5人，今（26日）續求情。3名從犯證人區諾軒、趙家賢、鍾錦麟先後求情，辯方基於區和鍾認罪和協助控方案情，主張減刑一半。法官李運騰指，辯方或會指沒有區的證供，控方案情甚至不能成立，並問辯方會否要求更多扣減，區諾軒做交叉手勢，辯方亦稱無相關指示、區非「超級金手指」，但最終同意倡減刑50至60%。趙家賢一方則指趙盡所能協助控方，最多可獲「超級金手指」的66%減刑，法官表明不同意，質疑只適用於需承受風險作供的人，趙終改為要求減刑40%至55%。
+
+#### 區諾軒求減刑一半 官問要否增加減刑幅度
+
+代表戴耀廷的代表大律師黃繼明上午陳詞完畢，下午先由代表區諾軒和鍾錦麟的陳慕賢陳詞。陳指，區諾軒在《國安法》後曾採取數項措施減輕犯罪情況，包括於中聯辦譴責初選或違法後，曾嘗試與官員對話，並於2020年7月15日在 Facebook 發文宣布退出初選，區亦曾與戴耀廷等人討論，最終成功游說趙家賢於翌日退出。辯方指，由於已沒有組織者，即使其他參與者繼續推動串謀，行為亦不會有效。
+
+法官李運騰則指，初選於7月11至12日投票，區於7月15日退出，組織者當時已沒有什麼進一步工作可以做。辯方回應，隨著組織者退出「35+計劃」，計劃便不具合法性。李再指，抗爭派被告7月15日在無組織者下舉行記者會，辯方指區當時已退出，不會進一步陳詞。
+
+辯方續同意，主要減刑因素是區及時認罪，及協助控方案情，亦同意依賴區當時相信謀劃不違法。法官李運騰直言，辯方或許會說「沒有區的協助，控方案情甚至不可能成立」。官再追問，區就《國安法》刑期分級制是否適用於本案有何立場，辯方表示態度中立，但同意若有助區會採納。
+
+#### 辯方指區非「超級金手指」
+
+法官陳慶偉追問，區諾軒一方是否要求法庭給予一半刑期扣減，陳慕賢確認。法官李運騰問，認罪及協助控方作供一般可減刑一半，辯方會要求更多扣減嗎？陳否認，區諾軒亦在位置上雙手打交叉示意。李指這似乎與區的指示不一致，問辯方需否向坐在被告欄的區索取指示，陳其後表示，「那我可能要求減刑60%」，區諾軒笑着搖頭，延伸庭被告亦不禁發笑，議論紛紛。法官李運騰指辯方需提供基礎，陳慶偉則打趣問，「為何不減刑90%？」
+
+法官李運騰續指，若被告屬「超級金手指（Supergrass）」，可減刑三分之二，辯方是指區為「超級金手指」嗎？辯方指留待法庭考慮，陳慶偉着她今晚想想。不過臨散庭前，陳慕賢更改說法，望法庭採用呂世瑜案所訂下的量刑5步驟，並基於《國安法》33條，降低區的刑期等級，而若該條文不適用，則按普通法原則減刑50%至60%。陳並指沒有獲指示區屬「超級金手指」，她說罷轉身望向區，區用力點頭，又雙手抱拳。區的求情約十數分鐘。
+
+
+▲ 鍾錦麟（左）、區諾軒（右）（資料圖片）
+
+#### 鍾錦麟同要求減刑50% 官明言證供相較區諾軒沒那麼有用
+
+鍾錦麟同樣由大律師陳慕賢代表，求情約6分鐘完成。法官陳慶偉明言，認為鍾的證供沒有區諾軒的證供那麼有用。陳解釋，這是由於鍾的參與程度有限，但他已盡所能協助控方，其證供亦加強了控方案情，因此要求法庭減刑一半。
+
+陳其後再次提到，區諾軒和鍾錦麟均已盡力（done everything they could do），法官陳慶偉指那並非好的論點，指減刑是基於證供是否有用，而非被告是否盡力。李運騰又再稱，辯方或說「沒有區諾軒的證供，控方基本上不會有他們的案情（“Without his evidence, prosecution simply does not have his case.”）」。正庭被告欄傳來「yes」，區諾軒則向法官和鄒家成雙手打交叉，又一度與鄒家成隔空交談，並不住搖頭。
+
+#### 趙家賢一度要求減刑三分二
+
+代表第三被告趙家賢的大律師利琛，則要求法庭考慮趙盡所能為控方提供資料，屬「超級金手指」，可減刑66%。法官陳慶偉聞言即指趙不是，李運騰亦指，不單只要在庭上作供，還要承受個人風險才屬「超級金手指」，而趙不屬這情況。辯方遂改為要求減刑40至55%。
+
+辯方續指，作為民主動力召集人的趙家賢於2020年5月才受邀加入初選計劃，直至7月16日退出，並只是負責協助初選行政和執行的工作，例如草擬提名表格、設立票站等。辯方亦認為《國安法》第33條適用，指趙於7月中已退出，並上庭作供，為控方提供新而有用的資訊，符合「揭發他人犯罪行為」，認為法庭可歸納趙為「積極參與者」中較高的量刑，再作減刑。
+
+
+▲ 趙家賢（資料圖片）
+
+法庭李運騰問到，辯方會否依賴趙真誠誤信當時行為並非違法，辯方指趙供稱他在較後期階段加入初選，承認對「攬炒」等概念知情，會接受法庭對其罪責的判斷。法官陳慶偉則指，有證供稱趙於較早階段加入初選，他在謀劃的參與不如辯方聲稱的短，利琛表示同意。
+
+#### 趙家賢求情提及2019年太古城遭咬耳 法官質疑與案無關
+
+法官陳仲衡其後主動表示，辯方的求情陳詞提及趙於2019年在太古城受襲一事，問辯方有何用意。翻查資料，趙當時被咬掉耳朵。辯方解釋，望指出趙多年來為溫和民主派，而他在事件遭受嚴重身體傷害，身心皆受創。
+
+法官李運騰質疑趙的受害人創傷報告可以如何協助求情。辯方指是顯示趙自2019年經歷多重困難。李官打斷稱與本案無關，辯方指只是想向法庭交代一般背景。李再問辯方是否想基於趙身體狀況令他坐監承受更多苦楚，而要求法庭減刑，辯方否認。趙的求情陳詞歷時約13分鐘。
+
+根據《國安法》第22條，一旦顛覆國家政權罪成，「首要分子或罪行重大」可判處10年以上至終身監禁；「積極參加者」可判監3至10年；「其他參加者」則判監3年以下、拘役或者管制。
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47名民主派被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」案，共45人罪成。被控方指為組織者的戴耀廷、區諾軒、趙家賢、鍾錦麟及吳政亨5人，今（26日）續求情。代表吳政亨的大律師石書銘表示，吳在本案僅輔助角色，他從未倡否決預算案，亦真誠相信戴耀廷稱否決預算案不違法，屬判監3年以下的「其他參加者」。
+
+石又於庭上讀出吳政亨親撰的英文求情信，吳稱一直堅信自由民主原則，認為社會分歧需通過文明民主方式處理，而公平公正選舉最能有效防止暴政出現。吳一直對民主陣營持續內鬥痛心，認為處理的最佳方法是初選，因此對初選「無限嚮往」，亦立下決心要盡一分力，發起「三投三不投」聯署。吳自言在整個初選中，從頭到尾都是一個「局外人」，故當控方指控他是本案組織者時「我感到非常驚訝」，並強調由始至終「我支持初選從來都僅是為了初選本身」，與承諾否決預算案無關。
+
+5人今完成求情，下周二（7月2日）將處理第二批被告求情，為6名港島初選參與者：袁嘉蔚、梁晃維、鄭達鴻、徐子見、楊雪盈及彭卓棋，料需時2天。
+
+#### 辯方：吳政亨非組織者、從未倡否決預算案
+
+戴耀廷、區諾軒、趙家賢、鍾錦麟今相繼完成陳詞，最後一位求情為吳政亨。代表吳的大律師石書銘指，雖然控方指稱吳為組織者之一，但隨着案中證據披露（transpire），可見吳不僅不是「組織者」，甚至不是「積極參與者」。石指，吳從一開始就是自行發起「三投三不投」計劃，過程中除了戴耀廷外沒有與其他被告溝通，其角色僅屬輔助（auxillary）。
+
+
+▲ 吳政亨（資料圖片）
+
+石又指，與其他被告不同，吳從未提倡否決預算案，其關注點從來在於初選及爭取35+，甚至曾於電郵表示拒絕將否決預算案納入「三投三不投」；即使法庭裁定戴耀廷曾與吳政亨溝通，判刑時亦不能假設二人討論的深入程度。
+
+法官李運騰指，吳政亨至少對涉案串謀知情，石同意，但重申不能確定他的參與程度。法官陳慶偉即指，吳政亨曾花大量金錢在《蘋果日報》登頭版廣告宣傳初選，法官李運騰亦指，吳是望確保「35+」成功。石回應，15萬元廣告費算合理，而且當時社會熱切討論否決預算案，但吳的廣告只是呼籲投票予支持初選的候選人，吳的關注點仍是在初選，並止於希望35+成功，而非進一步無差別否決預算案。
+
+#### 吳求情信：堅信自由民主原則、權力互相制衡
+
+石書銘續讀出吳的求情信英文版本，當中吳稱自13歲隨家人移民至澳洲，先後於當地的新南威爾斯大學獲得理學學士（主修數學）及商學碩士（主修精算）學位，並自言：「於成長過程中，我不算太熱衷政治」，但是他一直堅信自由民主原則，亦確信權力互相制衡的社會價值。
+
+
+▲ 吳政亨（資料圖片）
+
+吳認為，需要通過文明及民主方式去處理社會內部的分歧，由於「權力使人腐敗，絕對權力則使人絕對腐敗」，他相信定期舉行公平公正的選舉，最能有效制衡權力，減少權力成為暴政的可能性，所以他支持香港的民主運動。
+
+#### 吳：香港選舉制度對民主派不利 需妥善處理內部矛盾
+
+吳指，如民主派能在特首選舉獲勝，配合取得立法會過半數議席，就可以組建一個真正的執政聯盟，取得管治權。可是民主派面對巨大的障礙，因香港的選舉制度對民主派極為不利，導致他們過去未能憑藉選票優勢，贏得上述兩場選舉。
+
+吳又指，一直為民主陣營內的持續鬥爭痛心，認為須妥善處理民主派的內部矛盾，而最佳方法是通過文明而民主的程序去解決，亦即是通過民主派的內部初選，因此他對初選產生「無限嚮往」，亦立下決心，「必須為實現這夢想盡一分力。」
+
+#### 吳自言「無名氏」 對控方指控為組織者感驚訝
+
+吳表示，儘管他「在政圈內是一個完完全全的無名氏」，但是他相信自己有權利和義務去為初選出一分力，因此發起「三投三不投」聯署。吳自言：「在整個初選過程中，從頭到尾我都是一個局外人」，包括沒有參與組織「35+計劃」、沒有參與協調會議，亦沒有在初選中參選。「因此，當控方指控我是本案的組織者之一時，我感到非常驚訝。」
+
+吳表示，由始至終，他支持初選，與承諾否決財政預算案與否並無關係，「我支持初選從來都僅是為了初選本身，與其他事宜無關」。他最後稱：「我相信法治是自由民主制度不可或缺的一部份，只有當合理的法例被制定，而這些法例被尊重和公正地執行，一個社會才有繁榮的希望。」（求情信英文全文及中文翻譯見文末）
+
+#### 辯方：不能怪責吳政亨信戴耀廷稱初選合法
+
+石書銘續表示，從吳政亨的公開發言和電郵，他只是「局外人」，因其個人想法而發起「三投三不投」和推動初選，並像很多同案被告一樣，依賴戴耀廷指初選和否決財案不違法的分析，愚蠢地沒有意識到《國安法》的嚴重性。
+
+石續指，《國安法》是非常新的罪行，有人對此或持保守立場，有人則較有希望，「但我們當時都是在嘗試在黑暗中找到出路，包括吳政亨。」他又指，法律意見可能是錯誤，吳政亨亦要為此承受責任，但不能怪責吳政亨或其他被告，當時相信一名顯然具資格提供意見的人，正如律師不能怪責當事人依賴自己取得最終可能錯誤的法律意見。
+
+法官李運騰指，無論如何，吳政亨冒了犯法的風險，便須承擔後果，石同意，指因此吳坐在法官席前候判，只是希望法庭寬大處理。
+
+#### 辯方：吳政亨為「其他參加者」
+
+石續指，望法庭考慮吳真誠誤信謀劃為合法而作出減刑，並指吳在刑期三級制下屬「其他參加者」。石又引顛覆罪的條文，列明顛覆行為包括推翻中國根本制度、推翻中央或香港特區政權機關等，認為相關行為才算「罪行重大」，而本案則涉非暴力手段。法官陳仲衡一度指，非暴力手段可以比暴力手段更有效，惟石認為也要考慮後果，本案所涉嚴重干擾、阻撓、破壞政權機關履行職能的行為，或不涉人命傷亡。
+
+石總結，吳雖對涉案串謀知情，但沒有參與協調會議或實際參與組織謀劃，亦沒有參選，更不會投票否決預算案，望法庭裁定他最多只是「其他參加者」。
+
+根據《國安法》第22條，一旦顛覆國家政權罪成，「首要分子或罪行重大」可判處10年以上至終身監禁；「積極參加者」可判監3至10年；「其他參加者」則判監3年以下、拘役或者管制。
+
+#### 吳政亨求情信英文全文：
+
+Throughout the trial I was referred to as D5 and also my alias Lee Bak Loh. I wish to tell the Court who I am, what brought me into this arena of civil and political participation.
+
+I was born in Hong Kong in the year 1978, and migrated to Australia with my parents at the age of 13. While I was there, I graduated with the Bachelor of Science (majoring in Mathematics) and the Master of Commerce (majoring in Actuarial Studies) degrees, both from the University of New South Wales (UNSW). After graduation, I entered the financial industry. I worked in the industry, first in Australia and later in Hong Kong, for more than a decade. At no point in my life did I have affiliation with any political parties, nor did I run in any elections. I have no previous criminal records.
+
+Growing up, I was never too engaged in the world of politics, as I rarely had strong opinions regarding the specifics of policies one way or another. However, I have always strongly believed in the principles of liberal democracy, and the values of checks and balances in a society. Because in any community, there will always be differences in opinions among its members, and that these differences often need to be resolved before the said community can florish. It is much preferable if these differences were resolved through civilised and democratic means, rather than through violence or oppressions. Also, because “Power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely”, I believe that the holding of fair and regular elections provides the best counter balance against a power potentially becoming tyrannical.
+
+It is for these reasons that I support the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong, as I believe their cause of striving for democracy a noble one, and also a sensible one for the continued development of this city.
+
+It was obvious to me that if the pro-democracy camp could obtain a majority in the LegCo and achieved a peaceful transfer of legislative power, it would be a huge step forward for the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong. This would mean that for any ordinary government bill, after examining its contents, the pro-democracy camp could choose to accept or reject it as they saw fit. This in itself would be an awesome power that they never possessed in the HKSAR’s history. If the pro-democracy camp could manage to win the Chief Executive Election as well alongside a majority in the LegCo, they could then secure a true governing coalition, and this could change the democratic landscape in Hong Kong for good, and I believe for the better.
+
+Although clearly, there were huge obstacles to overcome before the pro-democracy camp could win either of these two elections. For one, the Hong Kong electoral system significantly disadvantaged the pro-democracy camp, and this was obviously the main reason why they could not translate their dominance in the popular votes into winning either of these two elections in the past. Yet, I thought the pro-democracy camp as a whole shouldered part of the blame as well. For too long, I had been dismayed at the continuous infighting within the pro-democracy camp, which contributed to their repeated underperformances in the elections. For the movement to proceed forward, these internal differences needed to be resolved.
+
+As I explained earlier, I thought the best way to resolve such differences would be through a civilised and democratic process, and this meant a primary election within the pro-democracy camp. Once the internal differences were suitably dealt with, and unity was achieved, I thought much was possible afterwards.
+
+It was through this reasoning that I developed a passion for such a primary election. It was also clear to me that such primary election for the LegCo General Election would be very difficult to bring to fruition, evidenced by the fact that such primary election had never been successfully held in Hong Kong before the material time. I endeavoured to do my utmost to help make this pipedream into a reality.
+
+There was, however, a glaring problem in my quest: I was a nobody in the political world. I had absolutely no name recognition among the public, nor among the political operators. This was made obvious by the fact that none of my co-defendants who gave evidence in Court knew who I was when asked. It was highly unlikely that I could make much of an impact in my endeavour. Yet, part of the beauty about democracy is that, in an election, no matter what a person’s status is, the person’s vote still counts as one vote, no more, no less. It is the voter’s right and possibly even the voter’s duty, to contribute a vote towards the total vote count, no matter how limited that contribution might be. Similarly, even though I was a complete outsider to the political world, I considered it my right, and possibly even my duty, to do something to increase the chance of a successful primary election, even if my contribution were going to be infinitesimal. It was with this mindset, that I launched the “Say No to Primary Dodgers” Campaign.
+
+Throughout the whole process, I remained an outsider. As the Court had judged and I agreed, I did not take part in the organisation of this “Project 35+”, or any of the coordination meetings, and that I was not a candidate. That’s why I was so surprised when the prosecution accused me of being one of the organisers in this case. My relationship with D1 Prof. Benny Tai was actually more akin to the one that a lobbying group had with a policy maker, in which the lobbying effort was largely ignored. One of my main advocacies was for the participants to treat the Primary Election’s results as final, eg, since they could only realistically target three seats in the Kowloon East Constituency, in my opinion, they should allow only three primary victors there. Instead, the organisers insisted on allowing five victors in the said constituency, and planned to have a second race based on opinion polls right before the General Election. This, in my opinion, would defeat the whole purpose of having a primary election in the first place. I made repeated protestations about this to the organisers and the candidates (including the public letter forwarded by D1 to the candidates on the 20th May 2020), yet I was unable to change anything on that front.
+
+It is important to note that among my advocacies, asking the candidates to promise to veto the Budget was never one of them. In fact, such notion never entered my mind until it became an issue in the public sphere, and it was most definitely not my original reason for supporting a primary election and launching my Campaign.
+
+As I have explained earlier, I considered the benefits of the pro-democracy camp achieving a majority in the LegCo quite obvious by itself, so I never thought this additional condition was necessary, nor did I think it was even desirable to a certain extent. Since I feared that this issue would be a potentially divisive one among the pro-democracy candidates, and one that could threaten the success of a primary election being held. While I expressed delight when I thought that the candidates had reached a consensus, I explicitly stated that the exact wordings of the consensus didn’t matter. Because what delighted me was the fact that they managed to reach a consensus, which allowed a primary to go ahead, rather than the contents of the consensus themselves. It was also why, when later on I realised that some candidates had refused to sign a promise to veto the Budget, contradicting a previous claim that all of them would sign such promise, I urged people to put that issue aside and to focus on completing the primary first. Because all along, my support for a primary election never hinged on whether it was attached with a promise to veto the Budget or not. My support for a primary election had always been for itself, and itself only.
+
+Last but not least, it should be noted that I had done my utmost to ensure my Campaign complied with the laws, whether they be the Election (Corrupt and Illegal Conduct) Ordinance, the Prevention and Control of Disease Ordinance, or any others. I believe that the rule of law is an essential part of any liberal democracy. It is only when reasonable laws are enacted, and that these laws are respected and justly enforced, that a society can hope to prosper.
+
+I urge the Court to consider the aforementioned factors when determining my sentencing.
+
+#### 求情信中文翻譯全文（轉載自吳政亨（李伯盧）關注組）：
+
+在整個審訊中，我被稱為第五被告或李伯盧(我的筆名)。我希望告訴法庭我的個人背景，以及我如何踏進公民和政治運動這個領域。
+
+我於1978年在香港出生，13歲時隨父母移民澳洲。我在當地的新南威爾斯大學(UNSW)獲得理學學士（主修數學）及商學碩士（主修精算）學位。畢業後，我投身金融行業，並先後在澳洲及香港金融機構工作超過十年。我一生中從未與任何政黨有政治聯繫，亦從未於任何選舉參與競選。我以前没有任何案底。
+
+於成長過程中，我不算太熱衷政治，因為我對政策的細節很少持強烈意見。然而，我一直堅信自由民主原則，亦確信權力互相制衡的社會價值，因為無論在任何體制中，成員總會在某些議題上持不同意見，而通常需要先處理這些分歧，才能使該群體得以蓬勃發展。
+
+我認為，通過文明及民主方式去處理這些分歧，總好過以暴力或鎮壓手段去解決。而由於「權力使人腐敗，絕對權力則使人絕對腐敗」，我相信定期舉行公平公正的選舉，最能有效制衡權力，減少權力成為暴政的可能性。正因如此，我支持香港的民主運動，因我相信他們對民主的追求是一個高尚目標，同時，為著這城市的持續發展，它(對民主的追求)亦是一個理性的目標。
+
+對我而言，明顯地，若然民主陣營能夠在立法會選舉中取得過半議席，並實現立法權力的和平轉移，這將會是香港民主運動的一大進步。這意味在任何一般政府議案上，民主陣營在審查其內容後，可以按他們的判斷選擇通過或否決該議案。這是民主陣營在香港特別行政區史上，從未擁有過的重大權力。如果民主陣營能在行政長官選舉上同時獲勝，配合立法會內的過半議席，就可以組建一個真正的執政聯盟，取得管治權。這將對香港的民主格局產生永久性影響，我亦相信這將會是正面的影響。
+
+然而，在民主陣營能夠贏得兩項選舉其中任何一項之前，顯然還有巨大的障礙需要克服。
+
+首先，香港的選舉制度對民主陣營極為不利，這絕對是民主陣營過去未能憑藉選票優勢，贏得這兩場選舉的最主要原因。但我認為民主陣營總體來說，亦需為他們的落敗承擔某程度上的責任。
+在過去一段太長的時間，我都一直為民主陣營內的持續內鬥痛心，這內鬥一直令民主陣營在選舉上，屢屢無法發揮最佳表現。而為了香港民主運動的前景，這些內部矛盾必須妥善處理。
+
+如前所述，我認為處理這內部矛盾的最佳方法是通過文明而民主的程序去解決，亦即是通過民主陣營的內部初選。當這些內部矛盾得到妥善處理，而民主陣營內一眾人士能齊心向前，我認為再困難的目標都有達成的可能。
+
+基於這個心路歷程，我對以上所形容的初選產生無限嚮往。但我亦明白，針對立法會大選的全民主陣營初選極難實行，觀乎在案發之前，此類初選從未能成功舉辦過，它的難度由此可見一斑。於是我立下決心，必須為實現這夢想盡一分力。
+
+然而，即使我希望出一分力，也要面對一個明顯的障礙—我在政圈內是一個完完全全的無名氏。無論在公眾層面、政圈中人眼中，我都沒有任何知名度。從本案所有上庭作供的同案被告作證時，被問及有關本人的事情，都表示在案發時不認識我，這明顯地證明了上述說法。
+
+以我的身份，對於在實現初選的過程中，能夠產生任何實質影響力的機會極微。不過，民主的其中一個可敬之處，就是在選舉中，無論投票者的身位地位如何，那一票都是算作一票，不多也不少。即使每一票的實質影響力有限，每一個選民都有權利，甚或可能是有義務，去貢獻這神聖一票。同樣地，儘管我在政治世界中完全是局外人，可以做到的是多麼的微不足道，我相信我有權利，甚至可能是我有義務，去為初選出一分力。
+
+而我正正是抱着如此信念去發起「三投三不投」聯署。
+
+在整個初選過程中，從頭到尾我都是一個局外人。正如法庭判詞所指、而我亦同意，我沒有參予組織「35+計劃」、沒有參予協調會議，亦沒有在初選中參選。因此，當控方指控我是本案的組織者之一時，我感到非常驚訝。
+
+我與第一被告戴耀庭教授的關係，實際上更像一個被無視的遊說團體與決策組織的關係。我其中一個主要倡議是「應將初選結果視為最終結果」。以九龍東選區為例，由於民主陣營在大選時，實際上最多只可望獲得三席，因此我認為初選時該區只應有三個優勝名單。可是，組織者堅持允許該選區有五個優勝名單，並計劃在大選前再以民調作第二輪競賽。對我而言，這做法與初選的意義背道而馳，我為此多次向組織者及參選人提出抗議（包括第一被告於2020年5月20日向參選人轉發的公開信），但我無法在此帶出任何改變。
+
+值得注意的是，在我的倡議中，要求參選人承諾否決財政預案從來都不是其中之一。說實在，在這成為公眾議題之前，我根本從來沒有這個想法，這亦絕對不是我當初支持初選及發起聯署的原因。
+
+正如前文所說，我認為民主陣營獲得立去會過半議席，本身已是足夠明顯的好處，所以我從沒有想過需要更多額外條件。在某程度上，我甚至不認為這額外條件可取。因為我害怕這議題可能會在民主陣營參選人當中引發爭議，從而威脅到初選的實現。
+
+當我認為參選人同意「共同綱領」時，我表示高興，但亦有明確表明我認為「協調成功」四字已是大快人心，根本無需看細節。因為令我高興的是參選人終於達到共識，令初選能夠順利舉行，而不是共識的內容本身。這亦解釋了當我之後得知「某些初選參選人拒絕簽署承諾否決財政預算案」，發現與之前「所有參選人都願意簽署」這一說法有所出入時，我懇求大家將這爭議放一旁，希望大家先聚焦於完成初選。
+
+因為由始至終，我支持初選從來無關承諾否決財政預算案與否—我支持初選從來都僅是為了初選本身，與其他事宜無關。
+
+最後值得留意的是，我一直盡我所能去確保「三投三不投」團隊遵守所有法律，無論是《選舉（舞弊及非法行為）條例》、《預防及控制疾病條例》或其他任何法律。我相信法治是自由民主制度不可或缺的一部份。只有當合理的法例被制定，而這些法例被尊重和公正地執行，一個社會才有繁榮的希望。
+
+我懇求法庭於決定本人刑期時考慮以上所述因素。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69-70/2022
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+---
+layout: post
+title : 【勇武7人案・審訊第卌一日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-06-26 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/aKa9Cy8.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#勇武派 #屠龍小隊 #串謀 #反恐"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 警長承認處理資料時出錯 庭上道歉稱：唔好意思，法官閣下
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】2019年12月，「屠龍小隊」成員等涉計劃放炸彈及開槍殺警。6男1女否認「串謀謀殺」及「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」等罪，今（26日）踏入第41日審訊。案發時為偵緝警員、現晉升為警長的5820梁樂文，負責檢視被告賴振邦的電話內容。梁承認在處理截圖等資料時兩度出錯，並在庭上道歉稱：「唔好意思，法官閣下」、「再一次致歉」。由於控方表示身體不適發燒，故案件押後至明續審。
+
+#### 政府化驗師負責檢驗貨倉的伸縮棍 指款式相類
+
+政府化驗師吳嘉豪博士確認，於2020年1月15日檢驗警方在「屠龍」荃灣貨倉搜獲的11支伸縮棍，他指各伸縮棍款式類同。吳在庭上示範如何打開伸縮棍，顯示棍會分為3節，共長約63厘米。他又指伸縮棍打開後，基本上會自行鎖定。代表張銘裕的大律師姚本成盤問時，問到伸縮棍是否與行山杖的伸縮功能大同小異；吳表示好像是。
+
+#### 警長稱負責將賴振邦電話交網罪科破解
+
+案發時為偵緝警員、現晉升為警長的5820梁樂文確認，他當時為本案的調查員，當日將拘捕賴振邦時檢取的電話，交予網絡安全及科技罪案調查科，以進行法證檢驗。經網罪科同事使用 Cellebrite 程式破解電話後，梁負責檢視內容，並揀選與案件、電話持有人及其他疑犯有關的資料。梁發現賴曾與蔡凱明在 Telegram 討論製作炸彈遙控裝置。
+
+#### 警長承認處理截圖時出錯
+
+梁承認在處理截圖等資料時兩度出錯，並在庭上道歉稱：「唔好意思，法官閣下」、「再一次致歉」。另外，電話中有一段介紹電池及電線裝置的影片。梁亦確認其中兩張照片有GPS定位資料。梁另確認於另一被告李家田被捕後翌日、即2020年6月12日，前往李住所拍照。
+
+#### 由於控方表示身體不適發燒，故案件押後至明（27日）續審。
+
+本案共7名被告，其中6男即張俊富、張銘裕、嚴文謙、李家田、賴振邦及許湛榮，均否認《聯合國（反恐怖主義措施）條例》下的「串謀犯對訂明標的之爆炸」罪、作為交替控罪的「串謀導致相當可能會危害生命或對財產造成嚴重損害的爆炸罪」；以及「串謀謀殺」罪，對象為警務人員。李家田另否認「意圖危害生命而管有槍械及彈藥」罪。女子劉佩凝則否認「串謀提供或籌集財產以作出恐怖主義行為」罪。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC164/2022、255/2023
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-27-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-42.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-27-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-42.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..8c0af2db
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-27-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-42.md
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【勇武7人案・審訊第卌二日】
+author: 法庭線
+date : 2024-06-27 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/aKa9Cy8.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#勇武派 #屠龍小隊 #串謀 #反恐"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 警指多次與污點證人會面屬「閒話家常」 否認曾威嚇被告
+
+
+
+
+
+【法庭線】《反恐條例》首案，不認罪的7人周四（27日）在高等法院踏入第42天審訊。警長梁樂文分別曾拘捕及會見被告李家田和賴振邦。他在盤問下否認曾威嚇兩被告，包括毆打、施行「水刑」，及稱「你屋企咪有兩個細路嘅，如果佢哋俾人推出馬路都唔知咩事。」辯方另關注，梁多次與從犯證人會面。梁表示只是閒話家常，稱從犯證人心情複雜，會面時會安慰對方。他否認警方與從犯證人達成協議，又指若知悉從犯證人黃振強投訴被捕時遭其毆打，不會繼續參與本案調查。
+
+警長梁樂文負責擷取被告賴振邦及李家田的電話資料。梁周三（26日）在控方主問下稱，經警方破解及復原資料後，在涉案電話檢取賴振邦的照片、遙控裝置照片等，另確認 Telegram 用名「接完紙鶴未？」，曾與另一被告蔡凱明談及製作炸彈遙控裝置。控方早前提及，賴的 Telegram 名稱為「接完紙鶴未？」。
+
+
+▲ 警長 梁樂文
+
+#### 辯方質疑與污點證人屢會面 警：閒話家常
+
+辯方周四盤問，梁同意於本案參與程度高，除處理被告賴振邦及李家田電話資料外，亦曾會見轉任控方證人的黃振強、彭軍壕和蘇緯軒，並就此撰寫調查報告。
+
+被告張銘裕的代表大狀姚本成關注，調查報告沒記錄會面內容。梁稱，此為一貫做法，毋須於報告中紀錄。姚遂問，就與彭軍壕的會面，彭有否提出特別要求，如希望「告少啲」、「阿 sir 畀返啲面我，我爸爸都係警方人員喎」等；梁稱沒有。姚又關注，彭是從犯證人，現時無從得知其錄取口供的經過，如是否有人提醒、或一字不漏講述其版本；梁同意沒詳細記錄與彭會面的內容。
+
+姚另指，於彭軍壕錄取口供後，警方仍多次與其會面，其中2021年下半年共有6次見面。梁指見面均是彭要求，稱污點證人的心情複雜，故與其閒話家常和安慰他。就部分會面沒列出會見時間，梁承認是個人疏忽。
+
+姚質疑，於2021年11月的會面中，梁在記事冊寫上「interview for IG」；梁解釋，「IG」意指收集情報，指此為會見犯人的籠統寫法。至於為何沒於記事冊，將其他會面標示為「for IG」，梁解釋指沒抄襲早前的紀錄，重申為籠統寫法。
+
+#### 警否認毆打、「水刑」威嚇李家田
+
+被告李家田一方指，梁警有份上門拘捕李家田。就李被捕時的情況，辯方指李遭警以「水刑」等方式施襲，威嚇「殺咗你都冇問題，就喺出面搵棵樹吊死你都得」；又稱「可以話你搶槍，喺度開槍啪咗你都得…同樣嘅情況可以出現喺你啊媽身上。」梁一概否認。
+
+辯方另指出，當日警方搜查隊搜屋時，李被鎖在廁所內、梁曾指示搜查隊毋須搜查廁所、李家田因警方威逼利誘而作出招認；梁一概否認。
+
+至被捕翌日，李被帶返住址蒐證，當時梁負責拍攝相片。辯方引述相片拍攝時間，指李家田房內桌子上原先沒有綠色袋，及後該綠色袋出現在桌子上。梁解釋，拍攝時發現有同僚已檢取該綠色袋，遂著同僚將袋子放回桌上，拍攝後才放入證物袋。
+
+#### 辯方質警與從犯證人達協議 警稱無權處理
+
+李家田的代表大狀林芷瑩則關注，轉任控方證人的黃振強，投訴被捕時遭警員毆打，而梁有份入屋拘捕黃。梁指，事前不知黃振強作出投訴，若知悉不會繼續參與調查本案。
+
+至於另一名從犯證人彭軍壕，辯方指彭的錄影會面與「無損權益口供」有很大出入。梁指，被捕人於被捕後或會推卸責任，但無法證實其說法；及至為彭錄取口供時，則按其說法紀錄，沒對比與錄影會面有否出入。
+
+辯方質疑，警方有否向彭提供內容，著他指控其他人？梁否認。至於彭曾去信律政司，指據雙方早前同意（as agreed），將撤銷《反恐條例》下爆炸罪和串謀謀殺。辯方質疑，警方是否早與彭達成協議；梁否認，稱警方無權處理。
+
+#### 警否認威嚇賴振邦
+
+被告賴振邦的代表大狀是香媛問及，賴於2020年1月19日被捕後於警署內的事。梁指，當時會見賴以了解其個人、政治背景；同日較早時段，梁亦分別會見被告許湛榮，及被列為同謀者的張堅順。梁確認，張為賴振邦的姐夫，於2020年8月離港。
+
+辯方指，賴被捕後沒作招認，故警員當晚在警署內毆打他，又指梁曾稱：「你屋企咪有兩個細路嘅，如果佢哋俾人推出馬路都唔知咩事。」辯方又指，警員事後多次與從犯證人彭軍壕會面，目的是「拉多啲人落水」。梁一概否認。辯方早前亦向拘捕李家田的警員指出相關案情。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC164/2022、255/2023
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-28-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-43.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-28-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-43.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..5ac6705a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-28-trial-of-hk-valiant-conspiracy-day-43.md
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【勇武7人案・審訊第卌三日】
+author: 法庭線
+date : 2024-06-28 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/aKa9Cy8.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#勇武派 #屠龍小隊 #串謀 #反恐"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 官指控方至少尚有3證人 審期料至8月中
+
+
+
+
+
+【法庭線】《反恐條例》首案，不認罪7人周五（28日）在高等法院踏入第43天審訊，再多一名證物警員完成作供。法官張慧玲對陪審團指，控方尚有至少3名證人，「分分鐘」下周三才完成舉證，審期「覺得去到8月中嘅機會都大…希望大家有心理準備」。警長陳智培稱，他兩度使用軟件「Cellebrite」擷取被告賴振邦手機資料，由另一警長梁樂文從中「搵嘢」，再由陳匯出及整理、燒錄光碟。匯出後，資料會載入試算表，陳承認曾刪去與案無關的「欄目」，但「打橫嘅資料」，即載入手機資料的「列」沒有增減，「我用整理去形容啦」。另外，警長在辯方盤問下確認，處理本案證物時，未考取「Cellebrite」檢驗資歷，事隔一年，即2021年初才考獲相關證書。
+
+#### 擷取賴振邦手機 警稱有專業資格處理
+
+控方傳召案發時替被告賴振邦手機取證的警長陳智培作供，主問下他提到當年隸屬網絡安全科技罪案調查組、數碼法理鑑證 B 隊，修畢「流動裝置法理鑑證課程」，獲取證專業資格。
+
+陳稱，2020年1月20日，他經軟件「Cellebrite」擷取賴振邦手機資料；翌日，負責調查本案的偵緝警員梁樂文（後升為警長）來其辦公室，檢視手機內容如相片、影片、Telegram 訊息和網頁瀏覽紀錄。陳稱之後把電話封存於僅他知道密碼的鐵櫃內，直至梁樂文同年4月再來；梁「負責搵嘢」，即檢視、揀選當中部分 Telegram 訊息，由陳「操作」，即匯出及整理、燒錄光碟。
+
+庭上向證人播放賴手機內兩條影片，其中一條展示疑似接上紅黑電線的電路板，並有男聲指，「本身係咁嘅，電池座啦，呢個 2A 電池座。同埋呢個，呢個係 1850 嘅電池座，兩粒 18650，3粒 2A 電，個結構係咁囉，我都唔知喺邊度買呢嚿嘢」。
+
+
+▲ 賴振邦（credit: Kensahung）
+
+#### 警認事隔一年 才獲取證軟件資歷
+
+在賴振邦的代表大狀余承熹盤問下，陳稱他2014年首度接觸「Cellebrite」。余指，陳的書面口供提過自己在2021年取得「Cellebrite」手機檢驗相關資格；問他是哪個月份取得？陳稱是2021年初。
+
+余質疑，亦即陳處理賴振邦時，未受訓練、無相關資歷？陳答「未考取個 certified 資歷」。余追問，取該證書前的課程上課時間，有否與處理賴電話時重疊？陳答沒有。
+
+#### 警解釋兩度擷手機資料 因首次沒擷出 TG 訊息
+
+余另問，為何經 Cellebrite 擷取資料後，分成兩個 .zip 壓縮檔。陳解釋 Cellebrite 有兩個擷檔方式，他先用「advanced logical」，但使用後沒擷出 Telegram 資料，故第二次改用「full file system」。余又問，陳基於甚麼認為所擷資料完整？陳答如失敗，系統會提示錯誤，但當時程式沒顯示類似提示。
+
+余再問，他擷取資料整個工序涉整整7小時，是否全程對著電腦坐著、沒睡覺？陳同意，「除咗去廁所」。
+
+#### 警否認有刪改內容
+
+對於陳主問下稱，經 Cellebrite 擷取資料後，系統會生成一個試算表，載有相關 Telegram 對話內容；余問現時看到的版本，是否系統原始版本？陳答資料一樣，但他曾刪走一些欄目（column），「留返啲與案有關嘅資料」，但強調所取內容沒有改，「我用整理去形容啦」。
+
+主控周凱靈覆問時，問陳有否對試算表中的記項做任何動作，例如加減。陳答「打橫嘅資料，無」。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC164/2022、255/2023
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-01-euro-sifmanet-online-report.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-01-euro-sifmanet-online-report.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..2cec7fbf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-01-euro-sifmanet-online-report.md
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Euro SIFMANet Online Report
+author: Jack Bell
+date : 2024-07-01 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/Tvj58D2.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "European Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network: Virtual Asset Sanctions Roundtable Report"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Stakeholders from the public and private sectors discussed the scope of Russian sanctions evasion activity in the virtual asset industry in May 2024._
+
+
+
+In May 2024, the Centre for Finance and Security (CFS) at RUSI convened a roundtable discussion with 23 stakeholders from the public and private sectors in Europe. The event was part of RUSI’s work to raise awareness on key challenges for sanctions implementation through the European Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network (Euro SIFMANet), funded by the National Endowment for Democracy. The discussion centred on outlining the scope of Russian sanctions evasion activity in the virtual asset industry, as well as jurisdictional vulnerabilities that can enhance exposure to this threat, and practical steps to mitigate the risk. This conference report represents the findings discussed in the roundtable discussion. None of the discussions from the event are attributable.
+
+
+### Background
+
+An opening question considered the extent to which virtual assets are being used as part of sanctions evasion strategies. Roundtable participants agreed that when comparing the current level of sanctions evasion by the Russian government within the virtual asset industry to circumvention through traditional financial institutions, the virtual asset industry is not currently a priority for transferring funds. However, the threat of sanctions on traditional financial institutions may trigger the Russian government to redirect its focus to the virtual asset industry in order to move funds, and thus coalition countries should be exploring and anticipating such activity.
+
+The US, for example, restricted Russian circumvention networks in 2023 when the Biden administration announced an executive order on “Taking Additional Steps with Respect to the Russian Federation’s Harmful Activities”. This executive order authorised the US Department of the Treasury to designate a foreign financial institution that has “conducted or facilitated any significant transaction or transactions for or on behalf of any person designated” for “such sectors as may be determined to support Russia’s military-industrial base”. As a result, the risk appetite of banks, particularly in China and Türkiye, may alter, resulting in their restricting support for the movement of funds on behalf of the Russian government. With these limitations in place, the Russian government may change its operations for financial transactions.
+
+In the last three years, multiple Russian-based virtual asset companies have fallen under US sanctions. This report frequently reflects upon one of these companies, known as Garantex, as the operations of this exchange dominated the roundtable discussion. In April 2022, the US designated Garantex, operating out of Moscow, on account of its “operating or having operated in the financial services sector of the Russian Federation economy”. This exchange, according to roundtable participants, continues to operate through regulatory arbitrage – that is to say, exploiting gaps in different countries’ regulations – as the international community has failed to anticipate the adaptations in sanctions circumvention techniques. There is, therefore, a critical need to identify the scope of threats and vulnerabilities related to the virtual asset industry.
+
+
+### Assessing the Scale of Risk
+
+The overarching question of the roundtable discussion centred on whether state sponsorship of virtual asset activity is present. In the case of Garantex, the US Department of the Treasury notes that the transaction record tied to the exchange depicts the facilitation of nearly $6 million in transactions for the Russian ransomware as a service (RaaS) group Conti, and approximately $2.6 million from a darknet market known as Hydra. As noted, despite US sanctions, Garantex continues to operate by deploying different laundering methods to obscure the source of funds. However, it is not known whether such virtual asset activity can be attributed to the Russian government or oligarchs.
+
+To fully understand the extent of Russia’s potential circumvention activity, the international community also needs to consider the available channels for Russia’s use of virtual assets to purchase dual-use components. To carry out this process, the Russian government or third-party individuals operating on behalf of the state would most likely need to convert virtual assets to fiat currency, as there are limited suppliers that would accept virtual assets as a legitimate form of payment. Subsequently, virtual assets would be one component in the broader sanctions evasion activity of the Russian government and therefore, the integration of this avenue within traditional circumvention techniques needs evaluation.
+
+Compounding the threat, one roundtable participant noted that malign actors tend to rely on the same platforms and facilitators. As shown by blockchain analytic data, North Korean actors have used Garantex to obscure the origins of criminal proceeds. If an attribution is uncovered, to any degree, of Russian state sponsorship of the Moscow-based exchange, financial evidence could further confirm UN sanctions violations.
+
+
+### Key Concerns for Russian Virtual Asset-Focused Sanctions Evasion
+
+Virtual asset-focused activity linked to potential Russian sanctions evasion includes the use of stablecoins, regulatory arbitrage, credit settlement in virtual assets, and virtual asset mining. This section outlines these avenues according to the roundtable discussion.
+
+#### Stablecoins
+
+Stablecoins – digital tokens that are pegged to an asset, generally fiat currency – are trending to be the preferred option for sanctions evasion, due to the lack of price fluctuation when compared to other prominent tokens. Furthermore, sanctioned entities have a greater incentive to use stablecoins pegged to the US dollar, as the US dollar still represents the primary reserve currency on an international scale, and accessing this currency through traditional means poses a challenge for such actors.
+
+The benefit of this adaptation by sanctioned entities, however, is that the international community may have options to respond to the evasion due to the underlying design of features linked to the tokens. For example, Tether, a company that issues the stablecoin USDT, works with law enforcement to freeze illicit actor-linked assets. However, in regard to sanctions circumvention, this process is dependent on verifying the activity, and attribution of the individual behind the virtual asset address poses a challenge. In addition, roundtable participants noted that this solution is not always feasible. This limitation occurs if the jurisdiction where investigations take place does not have the appropriate legal provisions to enable law enforcement to carry out the freezing process in partnership with Tether.
+
+#### Relocation to Other Jurisdictions
+
+In the last two years, Russian-based businesses have relocated to other jurisdictions, including Georgia, the UAE and Turkey. The virtual asset industry is not excluded from this movement. According to participants, Garantex moved activities to Georgia in an attempt to continue operations. However, roundtable participants noted that business operations of the exchange may be impacted, as in June 2023, the National Bank of Georgia announced the approval of a rule requiring registration of virtual asset service providers (VASPs). According to this rule, fit and proper criteria for administrators and significant share owners of the entity are required for VASPs, as well as anti-money laundering/counterterrorist financing requirements. These measures may result in the movement of Garantex once again, to a neighbouring jurisdiction that has yet to implement regulations for the industry.
+
+Along with forming shell companies in neighbouring jurisdictions, Garantex also, according to participants, produces new virtual asset addresses within a five-day period to move funds, and effectively operates as a nested exchange – a company that takes advantage of larger exchanges to service its customers.
+
+#### Credit Settlement in Virtual Assets
+
+Participants first discussed the use of virtual assets for credit settlement by the Russian government. In March 2024, Russian Federal Law No. 45-FZ, which made amendments to Federal Law No. 259-FZ on digital financial assets and digital currency, included a supplement stating that “digital financial assets may be used as a consideration under foreign trade agreements (contracts) concluded between residents and non-residents, which provide for the transfer of goods, the performance of work, the provision of services, the transfer of information and the results of intellectual activity”. Nonetheless, the definition of a digital financial asset within the legislation may not include virtual assets.
+
+Under Federal Law No. 259-FZ, digital financial assets include digital rights “to demand the transfer of emissive securities that are provided for by the decision on the issue of digital financial assets … the issue, accounting, and circulation of which are possible only by making entries in the information system on the basis of a distributed ledger, as well as into other information systems”. A Russian-based news source argues that, despite the mention of digital ledger, a definition under which blockchain technology falls, the definition excludes cryptoassets, including Bitcoin.
+
+The second part of this discussion involved the current activity within Russia regarding the use of virtual assets in credit settlement. In the event that sanctions evasion through this process occurs, Russia can use virtual assets as a method of credit settlement in a similar way to Iran. In January 2022, the head of Iran’s Trade Development Organization noted that virtual assets can act as a form of guarantee for small and medium-sized businesses that work with counterparts in other countries. Virtual assets, according to local news reports, would provide mutual guarantees and transfer the issuer’s credit to the importer of the goods into Iran.
+
+At least one fintech service in Russia, B-crypto, promotes its specialisation in cross-border settlements in virtual assets. B-crypto supports Rosbank, a Russian credit institution, with conducting pilot transactions for corporate and private clients. According to a Russian news source, the process for cross-border settlements by B-crypto involves the following steps:
+
+1. A Russian company that needs to pay for imported goods or services in virtual assets must provide for the token type and indicate its virtual asset address in the contract with the supplier.
+
+2. A foreign supplier then issues an invoice for payment to the Russian company with a description of the goods and services, the amount in virtual assets and the address of the virtual asset wallet.
+
+3. When the parties sign a contract, the Russian customer deposits fiat money for the purchase of virtual assets into his account in Rosbank and submits an application. The funds are then transferred to B-crypto, which buys crypto in “friendly countries” and sends it to a foreign supplier.
+
+The US designated Russian fintech service B-crypto in March 2024 for “operating or having operated in the financial services sector of the Russian Federation economy”.
+
+#### Virtual Asset Mining to Generate Revenue
+
+Participants identified that Russia could use natural resources to generate revenue through virtual asset mining. This process, first demonstrated by Iran, incorporates the use of cheap oil and natural gas as energy for virtual asset mining. Through the mining process, miners receive newly minted tokens that represent value on the blockchain that is not tied to previous transactions. In Iran, miners receiving the funds, according to the country’s licensing regime, are required to send funds to the central bank. These funds then support credit settlement for importing goods.
+
+In April 2022, the US sanctioned BitRiver, a company that hosts mining equipment for customers. In return for hosting the equipment, the client pays for the energy consumption and machine maintenance. According to the US Treasury, BitRiver helped Russia to “monetize its natural resources”. One participant identified that the underlying risk of generating newly minted virtual assets is that a VASP may not identify the source of funds as high risk, meaning that an individual can exchange the funds for fiat currency.
+
+Outside of undisputed Russian territory, this process is carried out by Russian individuals in illegally annexed and occupied territories. In these areas, the Russian government provides subsidised energy to keep the territory operational. Some of this energy, depending on the territory, is then fed into virtual asset mining operations to generate revenue that is free of any indication of sanctions evasion activity, and can be used to fund procurement or other illicit international Russian activity. Participants also noted that there is a potential exposure to this threat in Africa due to the presence of the Wagner Group and cheap electricity.
+
+There is also a risk of virtual asset mining pools being used as a laundering mechanism. Notably, B-crypto, the fintech service in Russia, claims on its website to have “access to the largest mining pools”. Participants noted that when monitoring virtual asset mining activity, stakeholders can identify where the nodes are located and determine an estimation on the level of revenue generation, but error exists in the case of a miner using a virtual private network to obfuscate their location. To resolve this challenge, the private and public sectors need to identify where the newly minted coins are sent. Notably, in the past, new coins were perceived as more valuable, as they had less exposure to potential crimes given their brand new nature. As of 2024, this perception has changed considerably, and now new coins are seen as a risk by some VASPs. However, there is still a possibility for miners to try to develop a legitimate transaction history prior to the funds reaching a VASP.
+
+A notable deficiency is the lack of attention applied by jurisdictions to virtual asset mining. Virtual asset mining companies often do not fall under the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) definition of a VASP due to the lack of custody of the client’s funds. As a result, some jurisdictions do not consider related risks while conducting a sectoral virtual asset risk assessment.
+
+
+### Public Sector Challenges and Responses
+
+Regulators of the industry need to understand how to identify and tackle sanctions evasion in the virtual asset industry. The roundtable participants discussed three topics in this regard: vulnerabilities that exacerbate exposure to Russian sanctions evasion activity; challenges around virtual asset regulation and enforcement; and lack of training and resources.
+
+When outlining general vulnerabilities that increase jurisdictional exposure to Russian sanctions evasion, participants identified that these factors include, but are not limited to: the ease of immigration for Russian nationals to that jurisdiction; the level of Russian language in the population; and lack of enforcement.
+
+The roundtable participants then discussed challenges around virtual asset regulation and enforcement. One concern raised by participants was the pressure applied to jurisdictions by the FATF to quickly implement regulation for the virtual asset industry. The short timeline for a jurisdiction to implement the related requirements in order to avoid censure and greylisting has resulted in inefficient regulation favouring form over substance, without consideration of associated risks. Jurisdictions need to be cautious about this process and ensure that they pass legislation that they can enforce.
+
+In relation to enforcement, authorities still have difficulty identifying VASPs that are operating illegally. To compound this challenge, participants said that company formation agents set up by Russian individuals are facilitating the relocation of high-risk VASPs. Along with this movement, participants noted that some high-risk VASPs have started to use obscure names for their companies to mask their involvement in virtual assets and evade oversight by designated authorities.
+
+Challenges around suspicious transaction reports (STRs) also persist. The designated authority for receiving STRs in high-risk jurisdictions needs training to understand how to identify and analyse sanctions evasion activity in the virtual asset industry. However, this challenge is exacerbated if the quality of the STRs submitted by VASPs is low. Supervisors therefore need to ensure that the reports submitted by VASPs are meeting expectations and that feedback is provided to the VASP industry on how to meet those expectations. Participants noted that in some cases, VASPs dump information from blockchain analytics tools into an STR, overloading the designated authority receiving the report.
+
+Finally, the roundtable discussion resulted in a question on how jurisdictions should identify which blockchain analytics tool to purchase in order to investigate suspicious activity. Each blockchain analytics company uses publicly available information on transactions and analyses it through company-specific methods, which the companies do not share, in order to keep a competitive edge. Along with separate methodologies, companies may have different data coverage and data available within their product. However, it may not be feasible for authorities in certain jurisdictions to purchase more than one tool to access the full scope of information, and therefore, investigations may be limited.
+
+
+### Private Sector Challenges and Responses
+
+The roundtable discussion outlined challenges and responses for blockchain analytics companies, financial institutions and VASPs.
+
+#### Blockchain Analytics Companies
+
+Participants said that illicit actors have attempted to gain access to credible blockchain analytics tools in order to monitor attribution and the level of visibility of their illicit activity. To restrict access that bad actors have to their platforms, blockchain analytics providers should conduct robust know-your-customer measures and due diligence on their customers. One participant highlighted their experience of an entity connected with sanctions evasion that had attempted to gain access to a blockchain analytics tool in order to gather information. To combat this risk and strengthen their sanctions compliance, participants noted that some blockchain analytics providers have denied access to their tools for individuals located in Russia or indirectly linked to Russia, and for entities where the ultimate beneficial ownership is tied to Russia.
+
+#### Financial Institutions
+
+To procure dual-use items, the Russian government or third-party individuals operating on behalf of the Russian state would most likely need to convert virtual assets to fiat currency. Therefore, financial institutions will still act as gatekeepers for restricting sanctions circumvention. To develop trust and verification for banking VASPs, some financial institutions use blockchain analytics tools. These tools can support financial institutions with identifying risk, as some include additional information on VASPs and their specific exposure to financial crime.
+
+#### Virtual Asset Service Providers
+
+For VASPs, a challenge can be linked to the fact that when the US Office of Foreign Assets Control lists a virtual asset address on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list, there are other unidentified addresses tied to the sanctioned address. Identifying these virtual asset addresses requires blockchain analytics tools or extensive time to uncover the unidentified addresses manually. Therefore, identifying addresses associated with the sanctioned virtual asset address takes significant resources for less mature VASPs without access to blockchain analytics tools.
+
+
+### Key Insights and Recommendations
+
+The roundtable discussion resulted in the following observations that international stakeholders should consider in order to restrict Russian sanctions evasion in the virtual asset industry.
+
+- __Despite US sanctions, the virtual asset exchange Garantex still continues to operate.__ Garantex continues operations by forming shell companies and registering in neighbouring jurisdictions, as well as producing new virtual asset addresses within a five-day period to move funds for operations.
+
+- __The public and private sectors need to coordinate to increase the speed of response to sanctions evasion activity in the virtual asset industry.__ It is important that VASPs are included in public-private partnerships as they are often not invited to participate. This limitation stems from the fact that such partnerships are built on a circle of trust so that information can be shared. These forums initially developed with commercial banks that have an innate distrust of VASPs, hence the latter’s exclusion. A key development that may begin to address this perception of VASPs in Europe is the introduction – and implementation – of the Markets in Crypto Assets Regulation.
+
+- __Funding should be provided by governments to train supervising authorities within jurisdictions neighbouring Russia on how to analyse virtual asset-related STRs.__ The process of training designated authorities on analysing STRs should provide awareness on Russian sanctions evasion typologies and ensure that there is access to the necessary resources for investigations.
+
+- __Blockchain analytics providers should ensure that they closely review customers attempting to gain access to their tools.__ Illicit actors have attempted to access blockchain analytics tools in order to monitor attributions and the level of visibility into their activities. To restrict this threat, blockchain analytics providers should consider conducting know-your-customer measures on new clients, along with due diligence.
+
+- __Jurisdictions need to ensure that they pass virtual asset legislation that they can enforce.__ The short timeline for a jurisdiction to implement FATF requirements related to virtual assets – and thus avoid the risk of public censure by the FATF – has resulted in inefficient regulation without consideration of associated risks. Jurisdictions therefore need to take a comprehensive approach when developing regulation for the virtual asset industry to ensure that enforcement is feasible, and should avoid prioritising form over substance.
+
+- __The FATF should assess the risk posed by virtual asset mining companies falling outside its current definition of a VASP.__ Virtual asset mining companies often do not fall under the FATF definition of a VASP due to the lack of custody of clients funds. As a result, some jurisdictions do not consider related risks while conducting a sectoral virtual asset risk assessment.
+
+In sum, the roundtable discussion identified a range of areas of vulnerability connected with the potential use of virtual assets and related infrastructure to facilitate Russia’s circumvention of both financial sanctions and procurement restrictions on high-priority items. While this may not currently be a central element of Russia’s sanctions evasion strategy, Ukraine’s allies need to ensure that, as Western sanctions on Russia tighten, the virtual asset community is equipped for what will inevitably be a growing front in the Kremlin’s sanctions evasion activity.
+
+---
+
+__Jack Bell__ is the Media Relations Manager at RUSI.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-01-secret-signals.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-01-secret-signals.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..d9ee7bc5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-01-secret-signals.md
@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Secret Signals
+author: Matthew P. Funaiole, et al.
+date : 2024-07-01 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/uSm1cbI.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Decoding China’s Intelligence Activities in Cuba"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_In 2023, U.S. officials acknowledged that China operates spy facilities in Cuba, but details have remained scarce. New satellite imagery offers an unprecedented look at four active sites in Cuba most likely to be supporting China’s efforts to spy on the United States._
+
+
+
+China’s ambitions to expand its global intelligence-gathering capabilities have drawn it to the doorstep of the United States. In a striking revelation last year, Biden administration officials disclosed that China has access to multiple spy facilities in Cuba. While China’s activities on the island remain shrouded in secrecy, satellite imagery analyzed by CSIS provides the latest and most comprehensive assessment of where China is most likely operating.
+
+
+
+> Sitting less than 100 miles south of Florida, Cuba is well positioned to keep watch on sensitive communications and activities in the region, including those of the U.S. military.
+
+
+
+> The southeastern seaboard of the United States brims with military bases, combatant command headquarters, space launch centers, and military testing sites.
+
+
+
+> Cuba has a long history of hosting foreign espionage operations targeting the United States. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union operated its largest overseas intelligence site at the Lourdes Signals Intelligence Complex.
+
+> Rumors of China snooping from the island have simmered for decades. The issue resurfaced in mid-2023 amid media reports of a Chinese “spy base” near Havana.
+
+
+
+> Satellite imagery and open-source information assessed by CSIS offers an unprecedented look at four active sites in Cuba capable of conducting electronic surveillance operations.
+
+> These four sites are among the most likely locations supporting China’s efforts to spy on the United States.
+
+Signals intelligence (SIGINT) is a core element of modern spycraft. Intercepting signals transmitted by both civilian and military actors can provide countries with valuable information about their adversaries, competitors, and allies alike.
+
+Collecting SIGINT is a complex task that requires specialized equipment, namely antennas, optimized for the signal characteristics of their targets. The size, number, orientation, and layout of these antennas determine their capabilities and function.
+
+
+### Basics of Beamforming
+
+
+
+> A single isotropic antenna receives signals from all directions, providing a wide coverage area but limiting its ability to focus the signal’s direction.
+
+
+
+> Two antennas can be synchronized to create a stronger, focused beam that reduces interference. This is called “beamforming.”
+
+
+
+> Beamforming can be further refined with more antennas. Adjusting the phase and amplitude of signals at each antenna allows for precise control over the beam.
+
+
+
+> Organizing the antennas into a grid allows for steering the beam without the need to physically move the antennas.
+
+Antennas arranged in a configuration known as a circularly disposed antenna array (CDAA) allow for 360-degree beamforming capability. CDAAs are highly effective at determining the origin and direction of incoming high-frequency signals and were commonly used by both the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War.
+
+
+
+Other types of antennas are also used for SIGINT.
+
+Dish antennas can focus radio waves into a narrow beam, making them effective for communicating with satellites far from the earth, as well as intercepting and collecting signals from a variety of sources. Radar antennas emit and receive radio waves to track physical objects, such as ships, aircraft, and missiles.
+
+Geography impacts the effectiveness of SIGINT. Over long distances, radio signals can become difficult to isolate from surrounding signal traffic. Radar transmissions generally require a direct “line of sight” to the target, leading to limitations caused by the curvature of the Earth and other physical obstacles.
+
+Cuba’s proximity to the southern United States and the Caribbean makes it a prime location for collecting SIGINT on the region. For Beijing, having access to SIGINT capabilities in Cuba would open a significant intelligence window inaccessible from within Chinese territory.
+
+
+### The following four SIGINT sites in Cuba are strategically located to spy on the United States.
+
+#### Bejucal
+#### 22° 56' 54.5"N 82° 21' 46.29"W
+
+
+
+> Nestled in the hills overlooking the capital city of Havana is the largest active Cuban SIGINT site reviewed by CSIS. Located near Bejucal, the complex gained notoriety during the Cold War for housing Soviet nuclear weapons in the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.
+
+> For decades, Bejucal has been subject to suspicion for its possible ties to Chinese intelligence activity, including in English and Spanish-language media reporting, U.S. congressional testimony, and unclassified government documents.
+
+> It even featured in the 2016 U.S. presidential primary debates, when Florida senator Marco Rubio called on Havana to “[kick] out this Chinese listening station in Bejucal.”
+
+> Satellite imagery from March 2024 reveals that the area has undergone major updates over the past decade — a clear indication of an evolving mission set. This includes the construction of a mysterious new radome that may contain a radar or ELINT system.
+
+#### El Salao
+#### 20° 0'19.16"N 75°44'48.49"W
+
+
+
+> On the opposite side of the island is a new SIGINT complex that has previously gone unreported. There have been numerous unverifiable sources asserting that China has operated a large antenna field in the country’s far eastern province of Santiago de Cuba since 1999. Access to such an outpost would provide China with a highly strategic vantage point near Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, a key U.S. military base in the region.
+
+> CSIS analyzed satellite imagery covering 2,900 square kilometers of the province but did not find such a facility. However, CSIS did uncover a significant new SIGINT collection site under construction just east of the city of Santiago de Cuba, near a neighborhood called El Salao. The structure, whose construction began in 2021, appears to be a large CDAA with a projected diameter of 130 to 200 meters.
+
+> Once operational, this CDAA will serve as a powerful tool for enhancing air and maritime domain awareness in the region, where the U.S. military and its international partners operate regularly. Some CDAAs of this approximate size are reportedly able to track signals anywhere from 3,000 to 8,000 nautical miles away.
+
+> Sites like these were a staple of SIGINT during the Cold War. As hostilities between the two superpowers faded and new technologies emerged, Russia and the United States decommissioned or abandoned most of their CDAAs. China, however, has been actively building major new CDAAs, including on its militarized outposts on Mischief Reef and Subi Reef in the South China Sea.
+
+#### Wajay
+#### 23° 0'27.63"N 82°25'13.48"W
+
+
+
+> Less than 10 kilometers north of Bejucal lies a smaller facility known as Wajay. The presence of security fencing and two guard posts strongly suggests that the site is intended for military or other sensitive activities.
+
+> The compound has gradually expanded over the past 20 years, growing from just one antenna and several small buildings in 2002 to a robust complex today. It now hosts 12 antennas of various sizes and orientations, significant operations and support facilities, and even a small solar farm.
+
+> Unsubstantiated rumors suggest that China played a role in either the site’s construction or its modernization.
+
+> No dish antennas are visible here, suggesting its purpose is primarily terrestrial signal interception and transmission. However, the variety of antennas present is a clear indication that Wajay is responsible for a reasonably complex SIGINT mission set.
+
+#### Calabazar
+#### 23° 0'48.87"N 82°19'58.91"W
+
+
+
+> Close by, a small Cuban military complex (which is associated with the name of the nearby town of Calabazar in declassified U.S. government documents) bears the hallmarks of SIGINT operations. Over a dozen dish antennas of varying sizes are scattered throughout the secured location alongside two visible pole antenna arrays. As is often the case with military intelligence installations, the number, location, and orientation of the antennas have shifted considerably over time, likely adjusting to changes in the site’s mission set. The newest dish was installed in 2016.
+
+Without access to classified materials, pinpointing the specific targets of these assets is nearly impossible. Nonetheless, the growth of space-monitoring equipment at sites like Bejucal and Calabazar is notable given that Cuba lacks its own satellites or space program. While it could operate downlink capabilities to access satellite data for a range of applications, the types of space-tracking capabilities observed are likely intended to monitor the activities of other nations (like the United States) with a presence in orbit.
+
+Even limited access to this equipment would provide China a far greater ability to monitor and communicate with its own space assets passing above the other side of the globe. Like the United States, Russia, and Europe, China operates a global network of ground stations from which it can conduct telemetry, tracking, and command (TT&C) on its satellites and spacecraft.
+
+China has historically lacked access to ground stations in North America. Accessing installations in Cuba could help close that gap.
+
+Cuban facilities would also provide the ability to monitor radio traffic and potentially intercept data delivered by U.S. satellites as they pass over highly sensitive military sites across the southern United States. Florida alone is home to the major space-launch complex at Cape Canaveral, the headquarters of both the U.S. Southern Command and Central Command, and multiple submarine and other bases.
+
+#### Key Bases and Installations in Florida
+
+
+
+Collecting data on activities like military exercises, missile tests, rocket launches, and submarine maneuvers would allow China to develop a more sophisticated picture of U.S. military practices. While modern military communications are highly encrypted — meaning the contents of the messages and data are hidden — information on the frequency, origin, direction, and pace of communications traffic can provide significant intelligence value.
+
+Other types of data can be collected with less concern for encryption. Notably, ELINT and radar systems, like the one possibly installed at Bejucal in recent years, are within range to monitor rocket launches from Cape Canaveral and NASA’s Kennedy Space Center.
+
+Studying these launches — particularly those of SpaceX’s Falcon 9 and Falcon Heavy reusable first-stage booster rocket systems — is likely of keen interest to China as it attempts to catch up to U.S. leadership in space launch technology.
+
+Intercepting the flow of commercial communications through vital economic centers across the southern United States could provide a treasure trove of data less restricted by encryption. The region hosts major research and manufacturing centers for industries such as aerospace, electronics, biotechnology, and other key strategic sectors prioritized by Beijing.
+
+
+
+Beijing has clear political and ideological motivations to keep afloat one of the world’s few remaining Communist Party–led governments. Yet its interests there are also clearly strategic.
+
+China’s ambitions to expand its overseas military presence are well documented, and Cuba provides an attractive foothold for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in the Caribbean. An unclassified assessment by the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence released in February 2024 lists Cuba as one of several countries where China is looking to establish military installations.
+
+Cuba is currently embroiled in its worst economic crisis since the fall of the Soviet Union, and Havana is in desperate need of external assistance. China has emerged as a critical lifeline, providing billions in debt relief and direct assistance in recent years.
+
+#### China-Cuba Military Ties
+
+
+
+Beijing-tied firms are also deeply embedded in Cuba’s technology sector. Chinese tech giants Huawei and ZTE — both blacklisted by the U.S. government over espionage risks — now form the backbone of Cuba’s telecommunications infrastructure. Frequent technical exchanges between Cuban and Chinese state-backed universities and technology firms likewise facilitate technology transfer.
+
+The PLA and Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) have maintained regular high-level exchanges since 1999. Most recently, in April 2024 the FAR’s most senior political leader met with a top PLA official in Beijing.
+
+While there is no official arms trade between the countries, China has been implicated in illicit weapons transfers to Cuba. Most notably, in 2015 a Chinese civilian-flagged cargo vessel carrying explosives and munitions bound for Cuba was intercepted by Colombian police.
+
+Detailed information about China’s presence in Cuba is scarce, and decades of speculation have made it difficult to decipher reality from rumors. Yet there are growing signs that China’s economic and political leverage may be opening doors for its military and intelligence services in Cuba. Even if China does not have direct access to facilities there, the data collected by Cuban counterparts could be readily shared with Beijing.
+
+Cuba’s revival as a key player in U.S. strategic competition should raise concerns in Washington and beyond. While China is unlikely to seek to establish major offensive capabilities on the island in the short term, the gradual expansion of its presence there will remain an enduring concern for policymakers in the United States and its regional partners.
+
+---
+
+__Matthew P. Funaiole__ is vice president of iDeas Lab, Andreas C. Dracopoulos Chair in Innovation and senior fellow of China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He specializes in using data-driven research to unpack complex policy issues, specifically those related to Chinese foreign and security policy, cross-Strait relations, and maritime trade.
+
+__Aidan Powers-Riggs__ is a research associate for China analysis with the iDeas Lab at CSIS, where he primarily supports the Hidden Reach special initiative. Previously, he researched China’s foreign and security policies and U.S.-China tech competition at the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR), the Asia Society Policy Institute, the China Power Project at CSIS, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
+
+__Brian Hart__ is a fellow with the China Power Project at CSIS. He also helps to lead Hidden Reach, a CSIS special initiative that shines light on underappreciated sources of China’s influence through open-source data and satellite imagery. Brian’s research focuses primarily on Chinese foreign and security policy, Chinese military modernization, U.S.-China relations, and Taiwan security issues.
+
+__Henry Ziemer__ is a research associate with the Americas Program at CSIS, where he supports the program’s research agenda and coordinates event planning and outreach. His research interests include transnational organized crime and human rights and security in Central America.
+
+__Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.__ is an internationally recognized analyst, award-winning author, and lecturer on North Korean defense and intelligence affairs and ballistic missile development in developing countries. He is concurrently senior fellow for Imagery Analysis at CSIS; senior adviser and imagery analyst for the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK); author for IHS Markit (formerly the Jane’s Information Group); and publisher and editor of KPA Journal.
+
+__Ryan C. Berg__ is director of the Americas Program and head of the Future of Venezuela Initiative at CSIS. He is also an adjunct professor at the Catholic University of America and visiting research fellow at the University of Oxford’s Changing Character of War Programme. His research focuses on U.S.-Latin America relations, authoritarian regimes, armed conflict, strategic competition, and trade and development issues. He also studies Latin America’s criminal groups and the region’s governance and security challenges.
+
+__Christopher Hernandez-Roy__ is the deputy director and senior fellow of the Americas Program at CSIS. Throughout his more than 25-year career, Mr. Hernandez-Roy has worked extensively to advance democratic governance, prevent and resolve conflict, strengthen the rule of law, respect human rights, ensure citizen security, and promote integral development across Latin America and the Caribbean. He has held various senior leadership positions at the Organization of American States (OAS), having served as a senior political adviser to two secretaries general.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-02-ransomware-victim.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-02-ransomware-victim.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..a7b3b8c4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-02-ransomware-victim.md
@@ -0,0 +1,554 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Ransomware Victim
+author: Pia Hüsch, et al.
+date : 2024-07-02 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/c9p36AS.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "“Your Data is Stolen and Encrypted”: The Ransomware Victim Experience"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_This paper aims to understand the wide range of harm caused by ransomware attacks to individuals, organisations and society at large._
+
+
+
+More individuals and organisations in the UK and globally are becoming victims of ransomware. However, little is known about their experiences. This paper sheds light on the victim experience and identifies several key factors that typically shape such experiences.
+
+These factors are context-specific and can either improve or worsen the victim experience. They include the following:
+
+- __Timing of an incident__, which may happen after a victim has increased their cyber security measures or at an already stressful time for an organisation, such as the beginning of a school year.
+
+- __Level of preparation__ in the form of strong cyber security measures and contingency plans explicitly tailored to respond to a cyber incident.
+
+- __Human factors__, such as the workplace environment and pre-existing dynamics which are often reinforced during an incident. Good levels of unity can bring staff together during a moment of crisis, but a lack of leadership or a blame culture are likely to aggravate the harm experienced during the incident.
+
+- __Engagement with third-party service providers__, such as those providing technical incident response or legal services, can alleviate the negative aspects of the victim experience by providing critical legal, technical or other help. However, they may aggravate the harm by providing poor services or losing valuable time in responding to the incident.
+
+- A successful __communications campaign__ is highly context and victim specific. It must include external and internal communications with staff members not part of the immediate response to ensure a good workplace culture.
+
+For support, many victims turn to public sector institutions such as law enforcement. Expectations for technical support and expertise from law enforcement are generally low, but victims feel especially unsupported where phone calls are not returned and there is no engagement or feedback loop. The National Cyber Security Centre enjoys a better reputation. However, there is widespread uncertainty about its role and the thresholds that must be met for it to provide support. This poses a reputational risk.
+
+Understanding how ransomware attacks are personally felt by victims and what factors aggravate or alleviate the harm they experience is key for policymakers seeking to implement measures to minimise harm as much as possible.
+
+#### Summary of Recommendations
+
+- While ransomware causes many kinds of harm, mitigating the psychological impact of ransomware attacks needs to be at the centre of the support given to (potential) victims preparing for and responding to a ransomware incident.
+
+ - Third-party service providers also need to recognise that efforts mitigating the psychological impact of ransomware attacks are critical to improving victims’ experience. They must therefore form part of their technical, legal or other services.
+
+ - Public policy on ransomware must centre on measures that mitigate victims’ harm. This includes acknowledging and mitigating the psychological impact on victims, for example through counselling, compensation or time off in lieu.
+
+- Victims should aim for the right balance of discretion and transparency within their external and internal communications.
+
+- Third-party service providers should actively enable information sharing, subject to the consent of parties, among past, current and potential victims through their networks.
+
+- Law enforcement and intelligence agencies should establish a positive feedback loop that shares success stories and notifies victims when the information they share has been successfully used for intelligence and law enforcement activities.
+
+- Government authorities need to clarify the tasks of relevant public institutions and their role in the ransomware response, including who can receive support and under what circumstances.
+
+- Given year-on-year increases in the frequency of incidents, the resourcing of the Information Commissioner’s Office should be routinely assessed to enable timely assessments of ransomware breaches.
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+When staff at Hackney Council encountered outages of its IT systems in October 2020, it quickly became evident that the council was facing a cyber attack. But the employees did not know that they would be dealing with its effects for years. Those who experience a ransomware attack experience a crisis, possibly even an existential threat for an attacked organisation and its staff. For those involved, it represents a low point in their professional and possibly even private lives, with consequences that are felt far beyond the immediate response.
+
+At Hackney Council, staff members had to improvise while their access to data and technology was disrupted, working long hours to compensate for the technical problems. Meanwhile, more than 250,000 residents living in the borough faced disruptions and delays to critical council services, including housing benefits, social care, council tax and business rates. Years after the incident, the repercussions were still being felt. These insights are based on unusually detailed public reporting of the aftermath of Hackney Council’s ransomware incident. However, they still provide few details on the actual victim experience.
+
+The staff and residents of Hackney Council are, of course, not the only ones affected by ransomware attacks. Ransomware criminals continue to target businesses of all sizes, as well as schools, healthcare providers, universities, charities and government entities. Prominent examples of 2023 ransomware victims in the UK include Royal Mail, an NHS trust and the outsourcing firm Capita, which handles the British Army’s recruitment process.
+
+Since the mid-2010s, ransomware has emerged as one of the most harmful forms of cyber-criminal activity for organisations. Ransomware operators encrypt files or systems, demanding a ransom payment in return for a private key to decrypt the affected data. Increasingly, ransomware operators also exfiltrate victims’ data and threaten to leak it on the darknet unless a ransom is paid. For an organisation and its employees this can be an extremely stressful, high-pressure incident that causes a wide range of harm to individuals, organisations and society at large.
+
+Although more individuals and organisations are becoming victims of ransomware attacks, little is known about the victim experience. Reporting often focuses on financial implications or technical details. In contrast, this paper sheds light on how organisations and their staff experience a ransomware attack. It offers a particular focus on the specific factors that – for better or worse – influence this experience. These factors include: the scale and timing of the incident; the size of the victim organisation; the level of preparation undertaken by the victim organisation prior to the ransomware event; the nature of the existing workplace culture; and the experience of dealing with third parties that form part of the ransomware response ecosystem, including the UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) and law enforcement; the role of communication; and the role of transparency and information sharing.
+
+Offering such detailed insights into the victims’ experiences of a ransomware attack gives policymakers, cyber security professionals and practitioners in the ransomware response ecosystem key knowledge. This is pivotal when designing effective response plans and policy measures and conducting incident response. It is also essential for providing personalised support to any victims. The research findings for this paper also inform any organisation or individual preparing for a possible ransomware attack or other cyber incident of what challenges they might face and how they can prepare for them.
+
+#### Structure
+
+This paper is structured as follows. Chapter I draws findings from, and identifies research gaps in, existing research, reporting and data that build an understanding of the victim experience. Chapter II summarises the findings from the original research to identify the factors that influence the ransomware victim experience, including: the scale and timing of the incident; the size of the victim organisation; the level of preparation undertaken by the victim organisation prior to the ransomware event; the nature of the existing workplace culture; and the experience of dealing with third parties that form part of the ransomware response ecosystem. The third-party organisations included in the analysis are those that were seen as most significant by interviewees and workshop participants. These are lawyers, insurance providers, incident responders, ransom negotiators and public relations firms. Chapter III analyses the role of public sector bodies, including local and regional police, the NCSC, the National Crime Agency (NCA) and the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO). The paper concludes with a range of policy recommendations.
+
+#### Methodology
+
+This paper is part of a series of research publications resulting from a 12-month research project, “Ransomware Harms and the Victim Experience”, conducted by RUSI and the University of Kent. The project is funded by the UK’s NCSC and the Research Institute for Sociotechnical Cyber Security. Its aim is to understand the wide range of harm caused by ransomware attacks to individuals, organisations and society at large.
+
+The research project focuses on the question: How is a ransomware attack experienced by victims, and what factors aggravate or reduce the negative experience(s)?
+
+The data collection and analysis for this paper entailed a literature review, semi-structured interviews and workshops.
+
+_Literature Review_
+
+The project started with a literature review of publicly available sources on ransomware harm and ransomware victims. It included a non-systematic review of publicly available academic and grey literature, including surveys and reports produced by stakeholders of the ransomware ecosystem. The initial literature review was conducted in August and September 2022.
+
+_Semi-Structured Interviews_
+
+The primary dataset for the paper is based on 42 semi-structured online interviews with both victims of ransomware attacks and subject-matter experts from across the ransomware ecosystem, including individuals from the insurance industry, government, law enforcement and incident responders. An overview of the background of interviewees is provided in Tables 1 and 2.
+
+Interviewees from ransomware victim organisations included both IT and non-IT staff. The scope of the interviews included personnel at a ransomed organisation; the research team did not interview wider knock-on victims (for example, those in supply chains or clients). Non-victim interviewees were selected for their breadth and depth of experience that involved multiple ransomware incidents spanning several years. Interviewees were predominantly from the UK, although a limited number were based in the US or other countries in Western Europe. Interviews were conducted between November 2022 and March 2023.
+
+All interview data was anonymised to allow individuals to speak openly about potentially sensitive issues. The research team then analysed the interview transcripts using a thematic analysis approach,which involved generating codes that reoccurred in interviews and identifying themes that provided insight into the research questions. The analysis was conducted using NVIVO. An anonymised coding system based on Tables 1 and 2 is used to refer to interview data in the footnotes.
+
+
+_▲ Table 1: Breakdown of Non-Victim Interviewees_
+
+
+_▲ Table 2: Breakdown of Victim Interviewees_
+
+_Workshops_
+
+The research team conducted two online workshops with key stakeholders from the UK government, the insurance and cyber security industries, lawyers and law enforcement. They were held in November 2022 and February 2023. Attendees included a mix of interviewees and new participants, using contacts established during the interview phase. The first workshop was used for data gathering. The second workshop was used to validate the research findings.
+
+#### Limitations
+
+This research project has been based on a large data corpus, drawing on interviews with ransomware victims and stakeholders from the ecosystem who support ransomware victims. Data collection therefore relied on the voluntary participation of ransomware victims and their support ecosystem. Understandably, victims of ransomware are often hesitant or unwilling to speak of their experience. The authors note the possibility of some participatory selection bias; for instance, ransomware victim interviewees who were willing to voluntarily give up their time to speak to the research team may also have been more likely to reach out to law enforcement or report to the ICO. It is also possible that ransomware victims who were willing to describe their experiences in a voluntary research setting may also have been less likely to have paid a negotiated ransom. Additionally, the majority of interviewees were UK-based; it is possible that geographic and, especially, cultural contexts affect ransomware experiences. The findings from this research therefore cannot be said to represent a universal ransomware experience.
+
+It is important to note that the findings of this project provide insights from a “snapshot” of the ransomware victim experience across a particular timeframe, with interviews ending in March 2023. As highlighted from this project’s data corpus, ransomware victims’ experiences are not the same; there is substantial variability that depends on internal and external factors. As ransomware is a dynamic threat that continues to evolve, it is important that researchers continue to engage with victims of ransomware to further build the understanding of how the experiences of future victims can be improved.
+
+
+### I. Existing Insights on the Ransomware Victim Experience
+
+Each ransomware incident is unique, although collectively ransomware experiences have much in common. A ransomware attack will typically follow a set of stages involving an initial attempt to access an IT estate, a successful breach, followed by further access across the network. The attackers will then seek to gain greater privileges, identify their desired sections of the network, exfiltrate data (if they are exfiltrating) and deliver their encryption payload (if they are encrypting). The attackers will then typically either use a splash screen or otherwise make contact with the victim to encourage them to commence discussions about ransom payment. As a general timeline, once a ransomware victim notices that they have been breached and/or have been contacted by the ransomware operators, there generally follows an immediate crisis period – which could last days or weeks – during which they seek to contain the attackers’ access, restore core systems and assess what data may have been exfiltrated. During this time, the organisation may or may not be able to operate normal functions. This core crisis period is followed by a gradual or staggered transition to normal operations. Victims of ransomware will often draw on the support of a range of third-party services, including but not limited to: cyber insurers; incident responders; ransom negotiators; lawyers; public relations services; and law enforcement or national cyber authorities (such as the NCSC in the UK). The roles that these services can play in influencing the ransomware victim’s experiences are explored later in this paper.
+
+Some understanding of “typical” ransomware victim experiences can be acquired through news reports and existing analyses of mostly objective factors, such as the financial and temporal impact of an attack. A novel study by Nandita Pattnaik and others drew on public reporting relating to a range of ransomware incidents to identify the scale and depth of harms to the victim organisation(s). More broadly, media attention focuses on the scale and scope of contemporary criminal ransomware activity, and the significant disruption that can be caused to organisations. An example of a widely reported ransomware incident is the DarkSide attack against Colonial Pipeline, a US gas supplier, in May 2021. As a result of the incident, the company switched off its pipeline systems for six daysand reportedly paid the attackers $4.4 million. Other attacks may be more prolonged. In October 2020 in the UK, Hackney Council was attacked by the Pysa ransomware group, which encrypted systems and exfiltrated sensitive data. A range of the council’s services, including critical services such as housing benefit and social care services, were not fully operable for roughly a year. In October 2022, it was reported that the cost of Hackney Council’s recovery effort in the prior financial year exceeded £12 million.
+
+Reports on ransomware attacks often depend on the information released either by a victim organisation or their legal representatives, or possibly the attackers themselves. For example, in January 2022 the British convenience food manufacturer, KP Snacks, was attacked by the Conti ransomware group. The attack became publicly known on 2 February, after the firm sent a letter to its distributors notifying them of a cyber attack. The Conti group darknet leak page shared examples of sensitive employee data – including birth certificates and credit card statements – and the group allegedly gave KP Snacks five days to pay a demanded ransom to prevent more proprietary data from being leaked. It is not clear what was the value of the ransom, whether it was paid, and how prolonged the impact within the company was. In such instances, insights into the victim experience are highly limited.
+
+Other reports have assessed a range of ransomware attacks in aggregation to quantify average ransomware impacts. Expense and downtime can be used as broad measures of victim harms and/or experience. For example, the most recent annual Sophos State of Ransomware report identified that the average ransom payment had reached more than $1.5 million (the median was $400,000).
+
+Ninety-seven percent of victims were reportedly able to regain access to their data, with backups the most common recovery method (70%), while 46% of victims elected to pay the ransom for a decryption key. The average overall recovery cost for victim organisations was reported to be $1.82 million. Drawing on Kovrr’s cyber incident database, a 2022 report by Check Point Research identified that the average “attack duration” was 9.9 days in 2021. However, while providing valuable information, these statistics reduce the victim to an abstract number and statistical event and do not account for the deeply personal experience a victim goes through when their organisation has been affected by a ransomware incident.
+
+To provide further insights into the victim experience beyond these initial metrics, academics and researchers conducted surveys and interviews with ransomware victims. This approach can enable more in-depth understanding and analysis of a given ransomware event. The ethical frameworks governing academic research may also provide assurances to ransomware victims, for example regarding anonymisation and data handling, which give the victims confidence to speak. This could include research into events that are not reported in-depth publicly. Leah Zhang-Kennedy and others focused on a ransomware incident at a US university, surveying 150 students and faculty members and interviewing 30 individuals to gain a range of perspectives about a single incident. Harry Harvey and others and Jane Y Zhao and others have conducted studies that have drawn insights from interviews with medical staff at healthcare organisations subject to ransomware, identifying the impact the incidents had on colleagues’ provision of care, and their emotional toll. A 2020 study by Lena Yuryna Connolly and others drew on original interviews with IT and security managers from 10 organisations to identify attack characteristics including ransom value and the nature of lost data. A study by the UK’s Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport drew on interviews involving 10 victim organisations that had experienced a range of ransomware or non-ransomware cyber breaches – with two employees from each – to develop case studies, exploring each organisation’s context and the impact of their cyber breach.
+
+As a rule of thumb, wider news reporting and annual summaries of ransomware attacks primarily focus on financial impacts or offer technical insights on how they were conducted. These are invaluable as a means of providing insight into the occurrence of ransomware and general trends and it is vital that journalists, private companies, governments and NGOs continue to publish frequently. However, the experiences of the individuals in the midst of the event are rarely discussed in reports and summaries. The interview-based research for this paper is an approach that can bring individuals and their experiences to the fore. Ransomware is a dynamic threat that has continued to change over time with, for example, new attack modalities, the emergence of ransomware-as-a-service and altered negotiation strategies. As such, academics, the wider public and policymakers must conduct further research to develop an understanding of the multi-faceted immediate, mid-term and long-term ransomware victim experience.
+
+
+### II. Factors Affecting the Victim Experience
+
+Gaining new understanding of what it is like to experience a ransomware incident helps policymakers to design policy interventions. Such interventions can explicitly consider evidence that demonstrates where harm occurs as well as what can alleviate the negative aspects of such experiences. Understanding the victim experience is an essential requirement to design effective policy interventions that counter victims’ harm. This chapter illustrates what victims experience and what factors alleviate or elevate the harm caused.
+
+The paper is structured around several key themes that impact the victim experience and that were identified based on the interview data and workshops: the scale and timing of the incident; the size of the victim organisation; the level of preparation undertaken by the victim organisation prior to the ransomware event; the nature of the existing workplace culture; the experience dealing with third parties; the role of communications; and the role of transparency and information sharing. Figure 1 illustrates how the various elements interact.
+
+#### The Scale, Timing and Context of the Incident
+
+The victim experience naturally depends on the scale and technical impact of the incident: the percentage and type of data encrypted, locked or exfiltrated might vary. A victim in the education sector, for example, found that all email servers and backups were encrypted but their database was not affected. Other interviewees experienced breaches that resulted in the encryption of core company systems, creating significant business interruption and organisation-wide disruption. The nature of the exfiltrated data may have a significant influence on the victim experience, especially where it involves the compromise of sensitive data. In other instances, the threat actors either did not exfiltrate data or siphone data that was of little material concern to the victim organisation. An interviewee from the education sector recalled their relief when the threat actors only threatened to release generic invoices rather than sensitive student data.
+
+
+_▲ Figure 1: Factors Shaping the Ransomware Victim Experience_
+
+The timing of an incident further influences the damage to victims and their ability to successfully respond to the attack. Many cybercriminals are known to time their attacks to inflict the maximum harm on victims. This increases the pressure to pay ransoms. For example, an attacker may launch attacks against the education sector at the beginning of a term or during exam periods. Additionally, prominent ransomware criminals are typically located in different time zones from their victims, naturally facilitating “out-of-office attacks”. Several interviewees reported that they were made aware of a successful breach during the night or while on annual leave. A common, although not universal, perspective was that the first tangible signs of a spreading encryption payload were the takedown of monitored on-site health and safety systems, including fire alarms and CCTV.
+
+The Covid-19 pandemic substantially shaped the external context for many victims. Some interviewees found that pandemic-related IT and work-from-home practices had made them more resilient, as much data had been moved to the cloud and people were accustomed to remote working or learning. For an interviewee in local government, the pandemic tested skills that were similarly required in responding to the attack – it was therefore a useful point of reference. Others found that the pandemic and their ransomware incident had a cumulative negative impact on themselves or their colleagues. For example, for one victim, pandemic-related practices had already cost staff much energy and resources and the incident thus came at a time when “people were already [at] rock bottom in terms of morale and resilience”. New working patterns established during the pandemic also made one victim’s IT estate more vulnerable as many devices were no longer switched off regularly due to remote working and did not therefore automatically update.
+
+However, the timing of an incident may, or may not, also coincide with internal procedures – this has an impact on how harmful the experience is for victims. While it might seem odd to speak of an “ideally timed” ransomware incident, timing can reduce possible negative experiences. For example, several victims reported that their incidents hit just after they had made payroll. Had they been unable to pay their employees, the harm for those individuals as well as the victim organisation would have been greater. Another victim experienced fortunate timing as the attack hit them several months after the organisation had run cyber exercises that resulted in hiring experts trained in responding to cyber incidents. As noted above, others had recently moved their systems to the cloud, ensuring access after the ransomware breach, thus alleviating some of the harm. In other cases, victims felt that the timing of the ransomware incident was particularly bad, with their breach occurring at a time of low budgets or acutely low staff morale.
+
+How much an organisation depends on its IT infrastructure or how time-sensitive its business is may also influence the degree of harm and disruption that the organisation and/or its staff experience. Victims operating in acutely time-sensitive client-facing contexts may lose contracts if they are unable to resume operations within a matter of days. In such contexts, the high stakes of an acutely time-sensitive incident response elevate pressure on colleagues handling the response effort. On the other hand, other interviewees reported that they had the (relative) luxury of time in their recovery effort.
+
+The timing, scale and context of the ransomware attack are therefore significant factors influencing the harm caused to and the fallout experienced by an organisation and its staff. Policymakers, business leaders and practitioners thus need to consider that while victims share similar experiences, individual circumstances and the extent of the attack heavily influence how much a victim is affected. These factors also contribute to how personally a ransomware incident is felt by its victims, a sentiment that was repeated throughout this research.
+
+#### Size of Organisation
+
+The size of a company can also influence the extent of the impact in a ransomware attack. This has also been confirmed in other reports. While larger companies typically operate a more expansive IT estate – which may include layers of end-of-life software – such organisations are likely to offset associated risks through their access to greater cash reserves either to pay a ransom and/or afford third-party help. They might also have a designated IT team, incident responders or lawyers on retainer and generally have greater experience in crisis management. This makes larger companies more resilient and less dependent on publicly available resources and expertise. Smaller companies or sole traders, however, may lack designated IT staff, the resources or the experience to successfully manage a ransomware attack. As a result, a ransomware attack can be significant, if not existential to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which are often more dependent on public resources and expertise. One interviewee who provides third-party services said that the impact on lives is particularly prevalent for very small business, for example where a couple are in business together and all their assets and income depend on that business. The interviewee found that “the existential threat for a business that’s much smaller is significant”. An interview with a micro-SME victim suggested that without the financial support and access to expertise provided through a cyber insurance policy, the firm would have ceased to trade and the business owner would have needed to sell their home. Additional pressure may arise for small business owners for whom their livelihoods and those of their employees are at stake.
+
+While limited in its insights on small business owners, the interview data raises questions about the impact of a company’s size on the harm experienced by ransomware victims. This has also been addressed in public reports, such as the news reports on the ransomware attack against hospitality and casino giant MGM Resorts. Such reports have questioned whether the company was “too rich to ransomware”, arguing that the impact was lower because of its large size. In contrast, other studies underline the disproportionate effect that is felt by small business owners or sole traders who become ransomware victims. While individuals working in large or small organisations may experience similar harm, such as psychological, on an individual level organisational size matters in terms of the financial harm and potential existential risk an organisation faces. Policymakers must consider that, to limit the harm felt by ransomware victims, organisations of different sizes might require different types and levels of government support in responding to ransomware attacks.
+
+#### Level of Preparation
+
+An organisation’s level of preparation prior to the incident is a significant factor determining the harm that a victim experiences.
+
+The existence and suitability of business continuity plans, for example, was repeatedly cited throughout the research project. The general assumption is that when an organisation has a “good resilience strategy, they can put in place a recovery process that would take days as opposed to weeks” and that such measures would allow them to resume services and thereby “minimise impact to the individual consumers”. While many interviewees stressed the importance of preparation to limit the harm ransomware attacks cause, this research project also found that many doubted the suitability of existing business continuity plans to respond to a ransomware attack. Business continuity plans for flooding or fire emergencies have little in common with those setting up response mechanisms to a ransomware or other cyber incident. As a victim in the education sector described: “people always have … business continuity plans … but actually they tend to go out of the window”.
+
+Business continuity plans for incidents other than ransomware or IT outages often presume that IT systems, such as email, continue to function and can be used to facilitate the crisis response. In practice, however, it is often the case that “There is no email. There is no Excel. Think pencil. Think paper”. Another interviewee noted that for “traditional”, more routine crises, they would typically bring in contractors to resolve the issue and pay them through the invoicing system, which was no longer possible during the incident.
+
+Specific preparation for a cyber incident, by pre-emptively increasing “resilience”, can help alleviate the harm victims experience. Business continuity plans need to be tailored, while retaining sufficient flexibility to adapt to variables such as the threat actor, attack modality, severity and scale of encryption or exfiltration.
+
+One way to prepare is by identifying essential systems for core organisational functionality. This guides the victim to set priorities for their incident response. A victim in the education sector, for example, stressed the importance of the student portals to enable students to study for exams. An incident responder recalled their experience of supporting a manufacturer, who insisted that their canteen facility must be restored as an urgent priority in the interests of maintaining staff morale.
+
+Another way to prepare is by running scenario tests, as undertaken by a victim in the engineering sector, who subsequently hired additional staff as a result of the exercise, whom they described as “absolutely critical” in the response to the ransomware incident the company experienced a few months later. A ransomware specialist mentioned pre-drafted communications and legal statements as a proactive way to successfully prepare for a ransomware attack. Several interviewees stressed that the ransomware business continuity documents themselves should be stored offline in analogue format to ensure access is possible following an encryption event. Policymakers and those trying to raise awareness and preparation levels among potential victims must thus continue to stress the importance of cyber-specific preparation that takes into account the unique features of a cyber incident instead of relying on generic contingency plans that are unsuitable in a digitalised context.
+
+Specific preparation for a cyber incident is tightly linked to the overall level of cyber hygiene and cyber awareness a victim organisation may have prior to the incident. As one interviewee from the technology sector pointed out, preparatory measures are “far more effective than just leaning in after the incident”. Particularly in the public sector, however, digitalisation has been a lengthy process. One victim described how in their institution they had to recover server-by-server as the integration between devices and data flows were “a nightmare”. Similarly, another victim from the education sector described how, at an earlier point, they used technology, but that they had “not paid enough attention to the kind of infrastructure and the security” that was needed. In hindsight, they said that they should not have been running old systems and ought to have allocated the budget “to do it properly”. However, this has financial implications. In the private sector, there are also examples of missing cyber security measures. An interviewee from the technology sector, for example, admitted that “probably there were things that we knew we should improve but because we were so busy we didn’t do them”.
+
+This may include the availability and quality of backups, particularly ones that are offline. An external counsel described a situation where there are no viable backups as the “worst case”. They stressed that such a difficult situation may be business critical and lead victims to consider paying the ransom where attempts to recover the data from other sources are unsuccessful. Furthermore, good detection capabilities may enable a victim to identify the attack early and take measures to mitigate further harm or even disrupt the attacker. Such damage limitation can significantly reduce the severity of the overall incident.
+
+Finally, a good awareness of the amount and kind of data an organisation stores helps it to react to the incident. One interviewee from law enforcement pointed out that many organisations do not “really realise how sensitive some of the data is that they hold”. They added that smaller organisations, as well as those from the public sector, are particularly impacted by ransomware attacks due to the type of data they hold. The interviewee gave an example of a law firm holding data on victims of sexual offences and people being accused of being sex offenders. As a consequence, “each individual person within that dataset became quite vulnerable quite quickly … because their names should never be released”. Similarly, an interviewee with third-party experience from the insurance sector found that unnecessarily holding a lot of personal data would be a factor that aggravates the victim experience, while good data management practices such as deleting data they no longer need or should not have can reduce that risk.
+
+General cyber security hygiene, good data privacy practice and specific cyber incident preparation can alleviate the harm experienced. Policymakers and public institutions must continue to raise awareness of such measures, particularly for small and micro-enterprises. When determining budgets for often tightly resourced public service providers, policymakers must allocate a budget for digitalisation and modernisation that goes beyond purchasing new technological equipment and considers the implementation and continued evaluation and adaption of cyber security standards. This also means that it is necessary to invest in adequate training or hiring dedicated IT staff.
+
+#### Pre-Existing Workplace Culture
+
+The interview data highlights the importance of the pre-existing workplace culture in aggravating or limiting ransomware harm. A ransomware attack is likely to intensify existing sentiment within and between teams. As one interviewee stated:
+
+> the stronger [the] culture you have, the more coherent, the more resilient that business will be to something like this happening … whereas internally, if you already have a poor culture, you have people that are quite disgruntled, then for whatever those reasons might be, you’re particularly vulnerable to this having a disproportionate effect on morale.
+
+Another interviewee, from a local government organisation, confirmed that the attack “definitely exacerbated areas where there were tensions anyway”.
+
+One interviewee went as far as stating that a good workplace culture has a greater impact on the ransomware victim experience than “a really well-prepared tech system”, as morale and culture cannot be replaced but may have a disproportionate impact on people’s resilience.
+
+A decisive factor is the overall atmosphere and level of cooperation among co-workers. A victim in the education sector spoke of a “real good spirit” among the team in response to the attack: people even wanted to help and unexpectedly came into the office, bringing cookies and cake. In this example, the interviewee stated that the ransomware attack brought the team really “close to each other in the end” and such bonds have continued to benefit the team spirit. Similarly, another interviewee in the education sector referred to an experience that strengthened the ethos at work like a “wartime spirit. Everybody pulled together”. A similar observation was made by participants from the local government sector.
+
+Interviewees linked the two themes of organisational preparation and pre-existing workplace culture. This identified the need for a clear allocation of jobs and responsibilities. Where tasks were clearly attributed, victims experienced less chaos and seemed to better stay on top of the incident, an important factor contributing to the maintenance of morale and the reduction of harm. It also helps to avoid duplication of efforts, which can be especially costly when hired third parties are involved. Additionally, the allocation of tasks should be accompanied by situational awareness; this reinforces the utility of pre-incident wargaming. An incident responder highlighted that chief information security officers (CISOs) and data protection officers were acutely at risk of being overwhelmed. They recalled a typical case where the CISO was “this one guy in the middle, who was the fundamental access point for all of the activity”.
+
+The allocation of jobs is closely linked to the reaction of, and leadership from, senior management and the board. Their role can help to alleviate harm or add additional burden. A victim in the technology sector felt that “we were ill equipped at senior leadership level to deal with this”, particularly regarding job allocation. An incident responder went as far as to say that the technical response to an incident is the easy part and that, instead, leadership rather than technical expertise is the overriding factor. A ransomware specialist explained that “one thing that makes [the experience] better is a strong CEO leadership or a strong senior board leadership, making a decision right at the beginning how they’re gonna deal with this and taking responsibility”. For example, the board may take additional action to support the incident response team. One interviewee explained how the chairman provided an additional office freezer for ice-cream, which was intended to be gentle on the stomach during late-night working. Conversely, the coordinator of a ransomware response at a charity organisation resented that senior management did not offer use of an existing apartment in the office building for rest and food consumption. In their case, the combination of lack of sleep, poor nutrition and excessive consumption of caffeine necessitated a visit to A&E.
+
+The extreme exertion that may be required to recover from ransomware – especially for IT staff – supports the organisation but may degrade the wellbeing of staff through sleep deprivation, physical inactivity, poor nutrition and strained relationships. As the primary interest of the board or trustees often remains the financial impact on an organisation, there is a risk of overlooking the physiological and psychological impact the ransomware attack might have on individuals. As an indication of a common trend, one IT expert in the charity sector stressed that they would have liked to see more support from senior management, for example with respect to looking after the health of the core team responding to the incident.
+
+This is not isolated to the ransomware crisis itself and can include a post-ransomware workplace legacy. One victim described how, after the incident had been resolved, they had to work harder and took longer to do tasks due to additional fail-safes, for example when manually creating reports that were normally done automatically. They added that they felt that “nobody cared that we were working harder” as the bottom line was the core concern. Messaging from senior leadership can also influence staff morale and the working environment during and after a ransomware event. Particularly where cyber awareness is low, board members or trustees might engage in a culture of blame, for example by accusing the IT team of failing to do its job. One victim described how there was no clear messaging from leadership, for example on communication about the incident. Given the lack of cyber awareness among senior staff members, IT staff also, at times, find themselves “leading the charge”, as a victim in the charity sector explained.
+
+Conversely, the role of senior management might be proactive and supportive, realising that a ransomware attack is not just an IT problem. In these cases, senior management can prevent burnout of team members, making sure to rotate staff and providing them with time off. In local government, for example, staff of a victim organisation were given extra holidays and paid time off once the immediate response was over.
+
+This highlights that responding to a ransomware attack must be thought of as a marathon, not a sprint. Many interviewees and, particularly, incident responders and external counsels stressed this point. Some of them highlighted that one of the first things they do is advise on the need to rotate staff and prevent burnout. This is true for staff at the victim organisation, but equally applies to third parties, such as incident responders. Such responders run a high risk of burnout and therefore need to rotate between incidents or have leave provided to limit the stress they experience.
+
+The general workplace culture is therefore a critical factor that determines how victims perceive a ransomware incident. While policymakers and cyber security professionals cannot have an impact on workplace culture, they can stress the important role that it plays in preparing for, and responding to, incidents. This includes drawing attention to the critical role of senior management and board members in managing the ransomware incident. Awareness and educational training must highlight the positive effects that stem from a clear division of tasks and vision for the response. Furthermore, awareness campaigns and best-practice guidance can outline practical examples of how to provide support for the core response team and avoid a culture of blame. Boards and senior management must also be cyber aware – this is a key aspect of an existing work culture that can contribute to alleviating the ransomware harm. New legal obligations and/or training of boards and senior management can achieve this.
+
+#### Paying (or Not Paying) a Ransom Demand
+
+Interviewees frequently spoke of the influence of ransom payments on the victim experience. The project team interviewed individuals from both ransom-paying and non-paying victim organisations. Only a minority of victim organisations who took part in the interviews paid ransoms. Two interviewees noted that their organisation made a ransom payment because it was the most efficient solution to decrypt affected systems in an acutely time-sensitive context. Another interviewee noted that their organisation had paid a ransom because they were very keen to dissuade the threat actors from releasing sensitive exfiltrated data. While the overall number of ransom-payers is limited relative to the number of interviewees, there are nonetheless significant insights that can be gleaned from the role that ransom payment (or non-payment) has in influencing the ransomware victim experience. Importantly, apart from select government or law enforcement interviews, interviewees were typically not directly asked about the morality of ransom payments or whether ransom payments should be permitted or prohibited. Rather, the focus was on the experience of paying (or not paying) a ransom and how this positively or negatively impacted the victim’s journey through a ransomware incident.
+
+In the cases above, the payment of the ransom significantly alleviated the harms experienced. Payment of the ransom meant, for example, that students were able to complete their exams in the usual way. This would not have been possible if the victim, who came from the European education sector, had sought to restore systems without a decryption key. For a victim working in the technology sector, the ransom payment was the only viable option to keep the company afloat. For the outsourcing firm, the payment of the ransom meant that, at least at the time of writing, the threat actors had not released exfiltrated data. While anecdotal, these case studies highlight that, in some situations, the payment of a demanded or negotiated ransom can significantly alleviate harms.
+
+It is, however, important to note that interview data also highlighted that a ransom payment is not a silver bullet. A ransomware negotiator noted that in their experience, all ransomware operators will eventually “go rogue”. For example, they may re-extort from the same victim after a ransom payment has been made, they may not deliver operable decryption keys, or they may renege on promises and release or sell exfiltrated data. Other studies have confirmed such outcomes, finding that a high percentage of victims who pay are victimised again. Similarly, studies report that not everyone paying a ransom actually recovers their data. In this light, whether a ransom payment successfully alleviates the harm that is experienced depends on the good faith of the ransomware operators and the technical efficacy of their malware (and decryption keys).
+
+Additionally, it is important to note that the payment of a ransom does not absolve a victim organisation of its obligations to report the incident to the ICO; the breach has still occurred. The compounding of reputational risk was cited as a concern. Non-paying victims noted that there was a stigma attached to paying organised criminals a ransom and noted that had they made a payment, it would have adversely affected their relationship with clients or other stakeholders. The logistics of making the ransom payment, including accessing large quantities of Bitcoin, can also be challenging. One ransom payer recalled that the process of multiple bank authorisation checks to purchase increments of Bitcoin was arduous and compounded their stress. It is worth noting that UK banks have increasingly prohibited customer access to cryptocurrency exchanges.
+
+
+_▲ Figure 2: Ransomware Payments in 14 Select Countries in 2022 and 2023 ($). Source: [Sophos, “The State of Ransomware 2023”, Sophos Whitepaper, May 2023](https://assets.sophos.com/X24WTUEQ/at/c949g7693gsnjh9rb9gr8/sophos-state-of-ransomware-2023-wp.pdf)._
+
+The decision on whether to pay a ransom weighed heavily on victims. Of course, paying a ransom is also a financial decision (see Figure 2), but whether to pay a ransom also raises other considerations for victims. An interviewee from a victim organisation that elected to pay a ransom noted that the decision-making was difficult and stressful for the executive board. A ransomware specialist noted that victim organisations that agonise over whether to pay a ransom prolong the initial (and most stressful) crisis phase of the ransomware event. Conversely, those that quickly ruled out a ransom payment were able to focus their energy on the rebuild.
+
+The payment of a demanded or negotiated ransom can thus both positively and negatively influence the ransomware victim experience. Preparedness is important. This should include delegating decisions to individuals to make payment decisions. Organisational leadership must also bear in mind that the payment of a ransom does not guarantee restoration of access to encrypted files or systems, nor the deletion of exfiltrated data. It is also important that organisations adhere to local regulations on reporting and sanctions compliance.
+
+_Experience of Dealing with Third Parties in the Ransomware Response Ecosystem_
+
+This section looks at some of the third parties a ransomware victim might typically be in contact with when reacting to a ransomware attack and further explores the degree to which these interactions influence the victim experience. Given the key role of law enforcement and other public sector service providers, Chapter III is dedicated to their impact on the victim experience.
+
+How organisations interact with third parties in the ransomware ecosystem is an essential component of the victim experience. Some victims have a very positive experience in their engagement with external parties. One victim in the private sector stressed that “we were really looked after”. Others gave less credit to external parties and stressed that, ultimately, they were alone in the experience. The interview data confirms that the interaction with third parties is an important factor for the victim experience. As a ransomware specialist phrased it: “harm does get amplified if [victims] don’t have good advice”.
+
+Some of the key third parties and their services are highlighted in Figure 3 and explored in the following sections.
+
+_Lawyers_
+
+Many victims acknowledged that legal advice on the repercussions of a ransomware attack is necessary, particularly on the implications of the data breach and potential lawsuits that might cause further harm. Increasingly, however, lawyers are consulted at the very beginning of an incident and subsequently manage relationships with all parties involved. One victim said lawyers helped with the risk assessment for exfiltrated data, particularly to assess the scope of potential lawsuits coming from those whose data has been exfiltrated. However, as lawyers are often tasked with avoiding potential further harms, their positive impact may be less tangible for victims. Additionally, lawyers typically work to protect the organisation as a single entity, rather than the individuals connected to it. Here, again, the interview data may speak to a dichotomy between the success and failure of the organisation and the real-time experiences of staff at the organisation. Some victims conveyed a negative experience dealing with lawyers, primarily stressing that the involvement of a legal team often meant that lawyers limited communications and information sharing about the incident – including as a precaution due to perceived legal risks. A victim in the education sector confirmed that the legal team was “really tight on what we could and couldn’t say”. This meant that they could only communicate that there was a cyber attack, but not a ransomware attack, which “made things hard at times”. One victim also felt that restrictions imposed by the legal team prevented them from sharing information, for example sharing technical indicators with the NCSC. Others also reported that they were unable to share information, and therefore were unable to warn colleagues in other institutions. This led to feelings of guilt when a later attack against an acquaintance might have been prevented had a warning been shared.
+
+
+_▲ Figure 3: Examples of Private Sector Third Parties Offering Victims Services and Support_
+
+The impact of legal wraparound on the ability of victims to share their experiences was also noticed by an interviewee from law enforcement. They stated that they “definitely found it hard to engage with organisations freely once a law firm becomes involved”. While they respected the lawyer’s prerogative to act in the best interest of their clients, the law enforcement interviewee nevertheless felt that it impacted their ability to “respond effectively”, for example, because they cannot take down an exfiltrated dataset if they do not know about it.
+
+Lawyers therefore reduce the harm to individuals and organisations in less tangible ways, for example by preventing future lawsuits. However, their concern over the legal implications stemming from oversharing information limits information and knowledge exchange. Their requirements to tightly control information are therefore perceived to potentially contribute to strained experiences.
+
+_Insurance Providers_
+
+Although most organisations do not have cyber insurance, interviewees from organisations that did were overwhelmingly positive about their interactions with cyber insurance providers. Interviewees credited their coordinating function and their ability to convene appropriate external service providers at speed. For example, one victim was “amazed at the scale and quality of support that was very quickly in place”. Another victim confirmed the central role of their insurance provider in the steering process, stating that without that service the start of recovery would have been delayed and taken a lot longer. Similarly, another victim confirmed that without insurance they would not have known how to find the right experts and would have taken much more valuable time to do so, describing having cyber insurance as “absolutely pivotal”.
+
+This data confirms the central role of insurance providers in coordinating the ransomware response and correlates with similar findings from prior research. There were two core benefits. First, access to a support network: “it’s the expertise and the people and how quickly you can assemble the team”. The value of cyber insurance in helping to manage the response is particularly important for smaller organisations given they are much less likely to have incident response or legal services on a retainer. Second, insurance provides access to a financial cushion: for example, one interviewee described the benefit of cyber insurance as allowing the company to respond to the attack without concerns over cost. Another victim, the director of a micro-SME, found that having insurance “saved everything”, and that without it “it would have been totals”, including the need to sell their home.
+
+The support and experience of insurance providers might also alleviate some of the stress and mental harm experienced by victims. One victim added that they were impressed that the insurers “were completely unflappable. They stood behind us straight away”.
+
+_Incident Responders_
+
+Interviewees painted a mixed picture with respect to the impact of incident responders. They were generally perceived as providing critical work limiting the – often technical – harm that victims experienced. This is especially true for organisations that do not have in-house IT teams with experience of handling ransomware incidents. Such organisations may feel that they are out of their depth in dealing with a ransomware incident.
+
+However, the context of external incident response support matters. One incident responder confirmed that in the past six months they were the second firm to be called to a case for roughly 50% of their ransomware cases. Some incident responders may not be well-aligned with the IT infrastructure of the victim organisation; in one cited example, an incident responder required several days to patch the client’s IT systems so that it could connect to the response firm’s forensic software. Other incident responders might lack the experience that can be acquired from handling high caseloads to result in the most efficient and effective path. An incident responder concluded that they had “seen some awful, awful aftermaths of either bad breach counsel, bad PR [and] even bad recovery”. Comments such as these stressed that third parties, including incident responders, can aggravate the harm victims experience when they provide a poor service, increasing the victim’s operational downtime and potentially forcing victims to reach out to a second incident responder for an expedited resolution.
+
+While primarily focused on technical response and recovery, incident responders may also alleviate the harm by providing mental wellbeing support. In part, this comes through the core service provided. This may include providing rapid access to professionals who have experience with ransomware incidents and who offer reassurance to victims. Other interviewees highlighted that some incident response firms had created add-on counselling services for their clients. An incident responder suggested that roughly 20% of clients had taken up a recently formed counselling service, and they confirmed that the service had been well received. This service was “air-gapped” from the technical incident response activity and was provided by a specialist.
+
+Apart from specialist counselling services, providing ad hoc mental wellbeing support can pose a challenge for incident providers, who are often hired for technical, rather than soft, skills. They often lack counselling qualifications. One interviewee confirmed that “in crisis management, you’re a bit of a grief counsellor”. Another interviewee described that they have worked with emotional clients who – although thankful in the end – were very angry, requiring the team of incident responders to be “on their tiptoes straight away”. This was reported as being especially the case when victims have a history of mental health difficulties. The success or failure of a business may also be closely entwined with an individual’s personal life, as with a micro-SME. In these instances, the incident responder described how they needed to shift to coaching more vulnerable individuals through an issue. In addition, they might help with writing the technical side of ICO reports, improving victims’ ability to effectively communicate to the ICO.
+
+Incident responders thus play a critical role in limiting the technical harms that victims experience. However, they can also increase harm where their efforts are unsuccessful. Furthermore, hiring incident responders is often expensive, adding to the financial harm that victims experience. Such costs pose significant challenges for small companies or publicly funded organisations already working with a tight budget, such as schools or local councils.
+
+_Negotiators_
+
+The interview data highlighted that contracted specialist negotiators can be a useful service that improves the experience of the victim organisation. Unlike the victim, who is likely to be in the midst of their first engagement with ransomware operatives, specialist negotiators have extensive experience of communicating with various ransomware operatives. They understand how to approach the operatives to either negotiate a lower ransom payment or acquire as much information from the operatives as possible. Conversely, direct negotiations between the victim and the attacker can introduce additional risk. A negotiator described how the “worst thing” a victim organisation can do is open discussions with the attackers at an executive level: attackers are likely to exploit this by ratcheting up pressure and insisting on demands for a high ransom. Interviewed ransomware victims noted that their contracted specialist negotiators would typically pretend to be a more junior member of the victim organisation, for example a secretary. This enabled the negotiator to feign technical ignorance and, importantly, insist that they needed to check with superiors before making any decisions or offers, potentially increasing negotiation leverage.
+
+In a trend that may closely mirror the earlier professionalisation of traditional kidnap and ransom services, threat actors likely know they are speaking to contracted specialists, rather than the victims themselves. However, there are still positive aspects of drawing on the services of negotiators. Notwithstanding general increases in the value of demanded cyber ransoms, there are some indications that threat actors and contracted negotiators are normalising a process and dialogue that sees ransoms haggled down by an “industry standard” of roughly 40%. Contracting negotiation services may therefore lower the ransom payment and overall incident costs. A prominent public example of ransomware negotiation comes from Royal Mail, which succeeded in stalling for time through negotiations. Royal Mail seemingly used the extended timelines to obtain proof of data theft from the criminals in order to implement technical measures that enabled the return of some of its operations by bypassing the encrypted systems.
+
+Specialist negotiators can also provide victims with advice about the ransomware criminals: for example, whether offered decryption keys are likely to be viable, or whether operatives’ claims about deletion of exfiltrated data are credible. This provides valuable insight when a victim organisation is seriously considering making a ransom payment. Negotiators can also use their experience to identify irregularities: for example, when the normalised dialogue referred to above is not taking place. A victim described how their negotiating service noticed that their threat actors seemed inexperienced. Thanks to the services of the negotiating firm, the victim organisation was able to exploit the threat actors’ inexperience by offering a low-ball payment.
+
+_PR Firms and Media Relations Teams_
+
+Many victims hire external PR support to ensure good communication throughout the incident and its aftermath. Some interviewees said that external communications services were helpful in guiding external communications and drafting statements. One victim described their communications service as “excellent”. Others, however, were less content. A victim in the education sector stated that the PR team engaged was not specialised in their sector and was therefore unable to comprehend the needs of a higher education customer.
+
+PR firms are often primarily hired to deal with media relations. Like many engagements with other third parties, interactions with media are a double-edged sword for the victim experience, as they serve as an amplifier of good or bad communications. While some companies, particularly Norsk Hydro, were cited as organisations that benefited from wider media attention, many victims remain sceptical of media reporting and are reluctant to engage with media representatives. One external counsel even spoke about an incident where the company sought “a complete injunction against any publication of any information concerning the incident, so there could be no media reporting” to ensure there were no reputational consequences. This was regarded among interviewees as a success.
+
+Again, it is the fear of further – reputational or other – harm that overshadows victims’ perspective on the role of media. One victim referred to a case where media coverage led to additional harm. They explained how, after the incident spread on the news, they experienced a “massive increase in … general denial of service attacks, people trying to get in the front door”. An insurance expert went as far as saying “if there’s any press interest … , that’s never good” – especially for smaller businesses not used to being in the spotlight, as was the case for an individual who had a photographer appear at their house. Further concern related to media coverage causing additional long-term harm, given that once the information is online it often remains publicly accessible long after the incident and can therefore also be read by new clients.
+
+Privately hired third-party service providers therefore significantly impact the victim’s experience. They are a powerful factor that can improve the victim experience if the relevant services are provided swiftly and are effective. However, if third-party service providers are unable to provide such positive impact, for example because they are inexperienced in a ransomware setting, fail to deliver adequate technical support, or provide advice that is not tailored to a victim’s specific situation, they may significantly contribute to the harm a victim experiences. Policymakers must therefore recognise the key role that private sector services play in the ransomware response and the victim experience. Initiatives setting out recommended incident-response services make it easier for victims to find a service that is more likely to provide services that lessen the harm experienced. Policymakers must also consider how ransomware victims, such as schools or councils, that often cannot afford the response services examined here or might not have cyber insurance, can have access to services that alleviate their harm.
+
+#### Internal and External Communications
+
+Communications are a critical element determining the victim experience and can either alleviate or aggravate the harm that a ransomware attack causes. Of course, communication can be interrupted on a technical level during an incident, for example because email servers are down or because employees’ phone numbers are not accessible. This section does not address these practical concerns but focuses on communications from a strategic perspective.
+
+_External Communication_
+
+External communication is often the main concern of victim organisations, particularly how to communicate with customers or stakeholders, as well as students or parents. Interviews generally pointed to the relevance of sector-specific and context-tailored communications and victims’ reluctance to be transparent in their external communications.
+
+Communicating a narrative of victimhood may also have a positive impact. This was the case for a victim in the education sector whose communications team managed communications, including on open social media. There, reactions entailed “a neutral to positive sentiment”, because “people saw us as a victim, which always helps because people sympathise with victims”. Interviews also highlighted that external communication is particularly challenging for those employees who are not part of the immediate response team. While they might not have comprehensive insights themselves, they are often the ones who must communicate with clients or customers in the aftermath of the incident. One interviewee spoke of “difficult conversations people had to have with their customers when they weren’t allowed to say anything”, which they described as “very stressful”.
+
+To limit their harm, victims must strike the right balance between over- and under-communication. This is a highly context-specific task. On the one hand, a classic mistake is “over communication and not thought through communication”, both to customers as well as in fulfilment of legal notifications. This can actually make the situation worse when the victim who wants to get the message out does not understand the wider implications. Too little communication, on the other hand, can cause additional harm, as the example of the 2023 Capita ransomware attack has demonstrated, where the victim was heavily criticised for insufficient communication. Interview data included a victim in the public sector who regretted not communicating more openly with residents to explain the gravity of the situation in more detail, which in turn led to frustration from their side. Another victim described that they “were so petrified” that their ransomware attack would be disclosed to clients that they did not communicate openly, instead referring to it as a “cyber incident”. However, employees were able to correctly guess what the incident entailed. This communication strategy led to a credibility gap, according to the victim.
+
+Striking the balance between over- and under-communication is often difficult for victims. This is especially the case when operating with limited time to fulfil noticing requirements, or where legal advisers or PR experts are telling them to limit communications and transparency, or when they fear that sharing too much information will result in further harm. This was, for example, the case for an interviewee who described the careful consideration that was needed in communications due to stock market rules. In some instances, even government ministers have told councils not to go public with the incident.
+
+_Internal Communication_
+
+The interviews stressed that internal communications had an important impact on the victim’s experience. Internal communication is a key tool to keep up morale and improve the effectiveness of the response. A victim from the education sector stated that “keeping people in the loop about what’s happening was a key factor in reassuring people that we would come through it”. Interviewees pointed out that internal communication is especially relevant to ensure that those employees who are not part of the inner circle that is responding to the incident are included and aware of what is going on. Likewise, where such communication is weak, they might feel excluded. This led one victim to regret not including earlier those not directly involved, for example by giving them advance notice of when they would be involved again. An interviewee in the technology sector identified the importance of better internal communications as one of their key lessons from the incident.
+
+When internal communication was poor, “it affected morale very quickly”, as one victim from the professional services sector explained. For them, internal communications “were not optimal” as the organisation handled internal questions poorly. In this instance, the poor communication led to “very worried staff and eventually that became public as well”.
+
+Internal communication includes communications with contracted third parties. It may also require victims to engage with other co-workers with whom they may not ordinarily work. Communicating during the incident can be difficult as it requires engagement with a wide range of stakeholders, varying in technical expertise and seniority. One victim described “flipping between different types of conversations” as “challenging”.
+
+Interviews also addressed challenges communicating technical problems to a non-technical audience. One IT staff member in the charity sector described the difficulties that they experienced in communicating what was happening to senior management whose members lacked technical knowledge. This staff member did not want to undersell the gravity of the situation, but equally did not want to overburden the other party. They also felt there was a risk that senior management could think the IT team was incompetent based on these communications. Similar observations were also true for incident responders, who might also have to brief CEOs of large companies, people with whom they would not normally interact without months of preparation, but now had to brief under considerable pressure.
+
+Similarly, a victim in the financial services sector felt that as boards “will only talk in money”, it was not sufficient to state that their team was performing poorly. Instead, they developed a cost model that described costs incurred – due to ill team members or the need to hire contractors or onboard new staff – to gain the board’s attention.
+
+Internal and external communications therefore have a strong influence on the victim experience. Striking the right balance between over- and under-communication can alleviate the victim’s harm; failing to do so can aggravate it. While communication strategies are highly context- and victim-specific, policymakers and practitioners must be aware of their potential impact and promote the importance of a good external and internal communication strategy. A strong internal communication strategy is particularly important as it risks being overlooked in current approaches to incident response and planning.
+
+#### Transparency and Information Sharing
+
+The role of transparency and information sharing was a recurring theme throughout the interviews. The importance of getting good advice from external parties, previous victims or the public sector stood in contrast to the limited transparency and secrecy that occurs in practice. Secrecy about the incident often results from feelings of shame or fear of reputational and subsequent financial harm. However, the advice of third parties such as lawyers and PR specialists can make victims even less likely to share their experience. This is the case when they are counselled against sharing too much information as it might be used against the victim in subsequent legal proceedings. Interviewees critically discussed the role of lawyers and legal privilege in this context. While many victims confirmed they were given legal advice not to share information, some experts did not see legal privilege as stopping victims from sharing information in all circumstances. One legal expert stressed that while they cannot share information about individual clients, general comments and anonymised information can nevertheless provide valuable insights on best practice, without legal risks.
+
+The lack of transparency among victims was repeatedly raised during the research for this paper. For example, one victim reported feeling isolated during the incident after they were told not to share their experience. During the interviews, it became evident that victims found it helpful to talk about their experience, either in the interview itself or in other forums they previously explored. One victim stated that they “found it quite useful just to talk to you and other people, in a candid open approach … I found that useful, and I think it might help people”. This again links to the limited attention paid to the psychological impact and the individual’s experience of a ransomware attack in corporate cultures that provide little opportunity to process the experience.
+
+But it is not just the individual victim that would benefit from greater transparency. More information exchange among victims and potential victims is a meaningful way to share best practices. One victim described the challenging situation that they faced when they wanted to warn a colleague and friend in another education institute, so that they could block IP addresses and take other enhanced security measures. However, legal advice prohibited the victim from sharing this information. Similarly, another victim in the public sector stressed the importance of sharing their experience to raise awareness among other public sector institutions, especially to challenge over-confident assumptions that they would not be impacted by an attack.
+
+Sharing information among victims offers unique insights: for example, as a reminder to others that they will make it through the incident. Victims might also provide recommendations for sector-specific best practices or be able to offer empathy on a deeper level. One victim described that they read ransomware reports prior to experiencing an attack themselves. However, it was more of an intellectual exercise, whereas after the incident, reading the reports made them “feel a lot of sympathy for the companies that are currently trying to navigate their way through these issues”.
+
+While interviewees broadly agreed that greater transparency was desirable, there was little agreement on the mechanisms to share information. Suggestions that government bodies such as the NCSC should encourage greater transparency or set up an exchange platform were met with mixed reactions. Some interviewees pointed out that any institutionalised approach would deter victims from sharing openly. There was a preference for a peer-supported group, but questions remained as to its exact structure and feasibility.
+
+Information sharing to enhance understanding of best practices and the desire for greater transparency among victims therefore stands in contrast to the secrecy that often surrounds ransomware attacks. While the benefits of more information sharing are clear, enabling such practices requires a forum where victims feel safe to share their knowledge.
+
+#### The Influence of Regulators
+
+Engagements with regulators have a significant impact on the victim experience. In the UK, a ransomware victim ought to report their incident to law enforcement, but they are not obliged to do so. If, however, the ransomware incident has affected personal data, the victim must report it to the ICO within 72 hours of first becoming aware of the event. The ICO safeguards data subjects who are affected by the exposure of their personal data. It is obliged to ensure that organisations – including those on whom ransomware has an impact – comply with mandatory data compliance. Framing the data subject as the victim-to-protect has important implications for interactions between the victim organisation (and its staff, who may also be data subjects), their third-party support and data regulators. This paper therefore does not provide a complete assessment of ICO activities but focuses instead on how ransomware victims perceive the ICO and its work.
+
+In 2022, a third of cyber cases reported to the ICO related to ransomware, possibly creating the most comprehensive database of UK ransomware victims. Interviewees were keen to share their experiences of engaging with the ICO during and after their ransomware incidents. Such engagement was repeatedly identified as a critical factor that aggravated the victim experience.
+
+The overriding complaint made about the “ICO experience” was the time taken for investigations. A range of factors determine the time taken to investigate. For example, they can include: an organisation’s ability to provide information; workloads during the Covid-19 pandemic; or funding models. In some instances, the time needed to engage with the ICO vastly exceeded almost all other remediation aspects of a ransomware event, barring data subject litigation. Another victim expressed frustration that a fresh request for information from the ICO asked “basic” questions that had already been comprehensively answered in a previous response. The engagement with the ICO was likely to last for months, but could extend to a year or more. An interviewee from an education organisation affected by ransomware noted that their case with the ICO was still ongoing two years after the incident. A legal practitioner with experience of supporting ransomware cases noted that they suspected that funding and/or staffing issues were causing this. Reporting has previously suggested that under-resourcing may be an ongoing issue, although the ICO’s annual reports highlight a significant increase in staffing from 2020/21 to 2022/23. Additionally, given that the ransomware victim experiences included in this project’s data corpus partially occur at the same time as various Covid-19 restrictions, it is possible that altered working practices contributed to some delays or the perception of delays in processing times.
+
+Nonetheless, the suggested delay in reaching “closure” from a ransomware event was a source of frustration, stress and upset for victims. Victims referred to a “Sword of Damocles” effect: they were unsure whether the ICO was going to fine or censure them. The process of engaging with the ICO was also described as laborious. A victim from the education sector, for example, described being “bombarded” with letters and felt victimised. A response to ICO letters would beget further letters requesting detailed information from the IT team.
+
+As indicated earlier, the ICO has a mandate to investigate data compliance practices. That said, there was a significant trend: interviewees widely noted that their experience with the ICO added further harm at an already difficult time. For some, the protracted timelines made it difficult for them to move on after other aspects of the incident had already been finalised. However, it must be noted that while most experiences with the ICO were negative, some interviewees reported more positive experiences. For instance, the coordinator of an IT ransomware response at a charity organisation noted that while there was a wait for the ICO response in their case, they felt that the response was supportive and understanding. While the reports and interviews took time, they found the overall experience to be “less terrifying” than anticipated.
+
+The conduct of those reporting to the ICO may also potentially have a bearing on experiences. An IT director from the education sector noted that they proactively kept the ICO up to date on the investigation and remediation processes; they believed their transparent and forthcoming approach smoothed their engagement with the ICO and facilitated an ideal outcome. A digital forensics and incident response interviewee noted that victim organisations – or those supporting them – need to have a clear picture of what data the organisation holds and which data subjects are affected; if a written response to the ICO did not provide all the information legally required, it was likely that the exchange of letters would be lengthier. The coordinator of an IT response at a multinational engineering firm noted that they sent a courtesy email to the ICO before they notified the stock market of their incident, but that because of the nature of their incident, there was no follow-up or investigation. There were also suggestions that organisations should not rush to make a report to the ICO before they have a clear understanding of what has occurred, and that ideally they should seek guidance from an experienced external counsel before making a submission. A legal practitioner noted that, despite their guidance, it was not uncommon for stakeholders at a client victim organisation to “panic overnight” in the first day or two of an incident and clumsily report to the ICO, causing additional avoidable pain in the ensuing months. This is a tricky balancing act, particularly given the 72-hour deadline for notifying the ICO following awareness of a breach.
+
+Additionally, it should be emphasised that the ICO has an important role in protecting the data rights of UK data subjects. Where a ransomware event impacts data subjects, they too are victims of the ransomware. Interviewees noted that the ICO was a necessary part of the UK’s regulatory system and that it was right that it should follow due process and work to drive positive transparency in organisations. Ultimately, the data corpus indicated that there is a balance that should be struck between empathising with organisations that receive a ransom note as victims of serious international organised crime and using regulatory pressure to encourage the adoption of stringent personal data-protection practices. While the purpose of the ICO may be apt, changes that can improve the victim experience may be possible. Those that can, wherever possible, reduce the prolonged stress and uncertainty are especially important. Victims also should not need to resubmit identical evidence or information when a prior comprehensive reply has already taken place. At the same time, victim organisations should be advised that they can submit a brief initial report within the 72-hour limit, and therefore avoid submitting a more detailed report in haste during the opening phase of an extremely stressful crisis situation. Here, the support of experienced external counsel may be particularly useful to coordinate a measured or cautious initial submission.
+
+
+### III. The Role of Government, the NCSC and Law Enforcement
+
+This chapter sets out the role of the public sector support and engagement network ecosystem. Findings are based on interview discussions on the support victims receive from local police, regional organised crime units (ROCUs), the NCSC and the NCA, as well as the engagements victims have with the ICO. The analysis does not cover the capacity of government and law enforcement bodies to bring ransomware operators to justice. Rather, it draws insights on the nature, scale and impact of public sector support for ransomware victims. Specifically, the focus is on the degree to which this support ecosystem improves and/or exacerbates a victim’s experiences during a ransomware incident.
+
+
+_▲ Table 3: Types of Support Provided to Ransomware Victims, by Organisation_
+
+#### Types of Support
+
+The police, NCA, NCSC and ICO may support ransomware victims in a variety of ways. Table 3 provides an indicative list of support categories. Note, pre- and post-breach notifications may most commonly relate to “Protect” notifications that law enforcement may issue to organisations after receiving intelligence about a current or likely breach. “Passive” crisis management support refers to activity such as sitting in on teleconference calls between victim personnel and colleagues from their third-party incident response firm. Conversely, “active” crisis management refers to on-the-ground remediation support, which may include technical remediation of affected systems. As highlighted in the next section, active crisis management is less commonly provided than its passive equivalent.
+
+#### How NCSC and Law Enforcement Support is Allocated
+
+The interview data highlighted that the makeup of the support ecosystem is likely to vary depending on the context of an individual victim. The NCSC’s cyber incident framework provides an indication, ranging from Category 1 (national cyber emergency) to Category 6 (localised incident). A direct victim experiencing a Category 6 incident is likely to find that their incident is supported by local police. At Category 4 or above, the NCSC may become involved, with a greater likelihood of NCSC coordination/lead at Category 3 and above. As the incident framework articulates, the assessment is, in part, driven by the likely impact of an incident on societal or governmental functions.
+
+In principle, an SME providing a vital service that experienced a disruptive ransomware incident could therefore receive NCSC support. There is a degree of fluidity with the support ecosystem, but this equally leads to a sense of uncertainty as to who can expect NCSC support and under what circumstances. A ransomware victim may find that the level of support aligns with, exceeds or does not meet their expectations. An incident responder described their view that UK law enforcement was “more hands off … [they’re] advising and taking details, and then waiting for the victim to provide additional information at a suitable time”. In some limited cases, victims may be able to draw on NCSC/GCHQ technical remediation support, although this service is constrained by resource availability. A government interviewee described how they were not resourced to compete with the private sector, noting that “[Microsoft, Google, Mandiant,] the budgets of these organisations outweigh anything I’ve got … [our] challenge is to work out how to … sit alongside and complement appropriately what exists out there … we need to be realistic. The national resource is targeted at nationally significant incidents”.
+
+The law enforcement engagement during a typical ransomware victim experience is likely to start with a submission to Action Fraud. Victims who call the national emergency number will probably be redirected to Action Fraud, unless they are particularly high profile. The victim enters text describing the nature of their incident into the Action Fraud submission page. From here, the case is reviewed and triaged; an SME, for example, may be supported by local police, whereas a larger organisation with a regional significance, such as a large university, may be supported by a regional organised crime unit (ROCU). It is also possible for some organisations to be directed to the police after being in contact with the NCA. The victim of ransomware can anticipate that the local or regional police will gather data about the incident, in part to support a regional or national profile of cybercrime trends. The victim may also receive support from law enforcement sources, for example guidance on external communications with stakeholders, or suggestions regarding post-incident “aftercare”, such as vulnerability assessments or cyber exercises. Figure 4 summarises the interactions that are possible.
+
+Processes are not, however, uniform and victim experiences may vary significantly even within a single jurisdiction such as England. On paper, while most victims should contact Action Fraud as a first port of call, there are circumstances where this step may be bypassed. A supplier of critical national infrastructure (CNI), for instance, could bypass Action Fraud altogether and instead report directly to the NCSC. It is also possible that the NCSC and the NCA may draw on intelligence to proactively reach out to a high-significance victim that has avoided reporting their incident. The length of time during which a ransomware victim can expect to liaise with law enforcement can also vary significantly, ranging from weeks to months. It is also worth noting that victims of ransomware may also avoid engagement with the NCSC or law enforcement altogether. All ransomware victims interviewed for this project had engaged with law enforcement in some way. This may reflect the bias of voluntary participation research; individuals who were willing to share their experiences with the research team may be more likely to engage with law enforcement. However, wider reporting suggests several reasons for avoiding law enforcement engagement. These include perceived reputational risks and the fear that law enforcement forensics may interfere with a restoration effort. Additionally, victims may fear that law enforcement, once involved, might find other things of interest beyond the ransomware incident to which they do not want to draw attention.
+
+
+_▲ Figure 4: How UK Ransomware Victims Interact with Public Bodies_
+
+Given the sensitivity of a ransomware incident and the desire to control external communications, victims may fear that engagement with law enforcement might increase possible negative exposure. This might include, for example, details of the incident appearing in the press. Additionally, the pressure to restore business operations and move on from the incident means that victims may be concerned that law enforcement agencies will want to take copies of impacted sections of an IT estate for forensic investigation, possibly stalling recovery efforts. This latter point – investigation versus recovery – is a potentially important area of contention. The interests of the individual victim organisation (an effective recovery as soon as possible) may run counter to the interests of wider society (understanding the nature of the ransomware threat). Counter-ransomware successes such as the February 2024 NCA-led takedown operation against LockBit benefit from maximum access to intelligence within the UK and among international law enforcement partners. Furthermore, counter-ransomware initiatives may also stem a ransomware group’s activity and thereby reduce future harm. Existing and new victims may also benefit from seized decryption keys being shared by law enforcement.
+
+#### The Impact of Police Support: Perspectives from Victims and Stakeholders
+
+M any interviewees were keen to share their experiences of their interactions with law enforcement services during and after their ransomware incident. Given the nature of the distribution of response – with the NCSC liaising with select cases – victims were much more likely to have experience of dealing with local or regional police. This section draws on insights from victims’ assessments of the efficacy of police in dealing with ransomware incidents. The analysis also draws on the perspectives of stakeholders from the ransomware support ecosystem, such as incident responders.
+
+Findings in this section need to be seen in their appropriate context: law enforcement services operate with limited resources, and ransomware victims are likely to be under severe stress during their incidents. With these circumstances in mind, the findings are nevertheless useful for policymakers and law enforcement stakeholders. For example, it may be possible to identify areas where tweaks to law enforcement practices for ransomware incidents may have a substantial positive effect on the typical victim experience. While it may not be possible to bring perpetrators to swift justice, law enforcement plays an important role as a public sector support system for victims, and as a collator of regional and national data on the ransomware threat landscape.
+
+Through the data corpus, negative perceptions about the role of law enforcement were widespread. A victim from a large multinational firm in the engineering sector noted that they “didn’t see the point” of reporting to law enforcement, citing the lack of a valuable return, during a crisis, and the concern that the police would request data for forensics investigations. Nonetheless, they were quick to add that they had proactively given intelligence to the NCSC and the NCA. A victim from a law firm recalled how they spoke with a cyber specialist from the police who appeared knowledgeable and initially suggested that help may be available to restore systems, but this help did not materialise after a follow-up and the victim was left with the perception that they were on “their own”. The victim cited their cyber insurance as the most valuable source of support.
+
+The director of a micro-SME compared two cases of police engagement: one on the ransomware attack against their business; and the other on the theft of their car. Within days, the car was identified and retrieved by police before it could leave the UK for illicit international resale; but no support was forthcoming for the ransomware incident. Multiple victims from the technology sector relayed their view that the police were ill-equipped and/or unable to support them during their incidents. One noted that, from their particular experience, they were left feeling that the police were not familiar with the terms “IP address” or “VPN”, indicating a significant lack of expertise. The policing “skills and resourcing gap” between analogue and digital crime response capability featured prominently in a recent report by the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy. Additionally, an inspection report had previously identified that ROCUs were competing with one another for a limited pool of skilled personnel.
+
+Interviewees highlighted that, in some instances, the creation of a crime number may be the extent of police engagement or support. While some victims will receive a visit from the police, others will not. Some victims may not receive any follow-up. More generally, it was notable that there is a degree of inconsistency in law enforcement’s engagement with ransomware victims. Concerningly, there were indications of a “postcode lottery”. While caveating that their experience may be anecdotal, an incident responder described how: “if you are based near Leicester and you report to Action Fraud, it’s going to make it to [the] NCA and they are then going to speak to the local constabulary and you’re actually going to get some kind of support. But if you’re somewhere else, it’s way less likely”.
+
+However, not all experiences were negative. A victim from the education sector described their police cyber unit as “super supportive … they were excellent, absolutely excellent”. An external counsel interviewee noted that while there continued to be a lack of understanding about the nature of the ransomware victim experience – and the needs of an organisation that has been affected by ransomware – there was an increasing “uptick” in interest among victims to report incidents.
+
+Pre-existing expectations were a critical factor when assessing law enforcement’s support. If a victim’s expectations were low, they were less likely to be disappointed when significant support was not forthcoming. This speaks to an important point: evaluations of the “efficacy” of law enforcement’s engagement with ransomware victims will depend on their understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the police in dealing with international cybercrime.
+
+Given limited resources, the police cannot serve as public sector incident response for ransomware. Interviews emphasised that the incident response ecosystem is almost entirely run by the private sector. However, the data corpus also highlighted a growing role of the UK police as a collector and disseminator of intelligence about ransomware threats.
+
+The role of police in ransomware response is, however, not necessarily clear to victims. As law enforcement’s ransomware threat landscape purview develops, there may be more opportunities to clarify the role and contributions of law enforcement. One way to do so is by reinforcing a positive feedback loop. An incident responder described how their perception had changed; previously, they saw the benefit of client engagement with law enforcement as “zero”, but their view was changing after law enforcement had proactively reached out to some clients to let them know that their IT estate was being maliciously accessed by threat actors. Unfortunately, this occurred after the ransomware payload had already been delivered, but the responder viewed the proactive contact with clients as a positive reinforcement for encouraging future client reporting to law enforcement. A similar experience was shared by an external counsel interviewee, who noted that while most engagements with law enforcement were “intelligence gathering” exercises, they had personal experience of a “handful” of cases where the police joined calls and provided updates on the victim’s data exfiltration, drawing on dark-web monitoring. This was regarded by the external counsel as a very helpful development.
+
+A law enforcement practitioner noted that, from their experience, ransomware victims typically reported because they “feel like they should”, rather than doing so out of anticipation of in-person support. Another interviewee – a legal practitioner with experience of supporting ransomware victims – highlighted a sense of pragmatism in their approach to engaging with law enforcement. They noted that while they were cautious about the level of information that they would share, there had never been “any detriment” to their engagement with law enforcement and that they were collectively united in the interest of fighting against ransomware. They suggested there were “myths” about the role of law enforcement that may be unhelpfully distorting perceptions of what help is or is not available. A positive feedback loop – in cases where victims have previously shared information with law enforcement – would therefore have an impact by showing victims how such information was used and how it contributed to successful law enforcement activities.
+
+The data suggests that context affects whether the extent of law enforcement engagement can aggravate or reduce the negative experiences of ransomware victims. A range of factors may influence this, including the nature of the victim organisation, its location (including at a county level) and the victim’s expectations. While some victims may welcome an arm’s-length response from law enforcement, others may want more active support, even if this is only an empathetic ear during a time of crisis. This reinforces the utility of an initial phone call or site visit from law enforcement, which can be used to understand a victim’s needs and provide clarity about expectations.
+
+#### The Impact of NCSC and NCA Support: Perspectives from Victims and Stakeholders
+
+Interviewees were also keen to share their perspectives on the perceived efficacy of the NCSC and the NCA in relation to the ransomware victim experience. The functions of the NCSC and the NCA are distinct. However, an interesting finding from the data corpus was that victims reported similarities in their experiences of engaging with the two bodies. It was reported that both agencies had roles in background coordination or oversight in certain ransomware incidents. Some ransomware cases drew the support of one agency while others triggered the involvement of both.
+
+On paper, the incident response framework referred to earlier in this paper partially clarifies the trigger points for NCSC and/or NCA involvement: for example, an incident in Categories 1–4 is likely to warrant some form of NCSC involvement. In practice, however, there was confusion about whether a victim can anticipate NCSC or NCA involvement and the degree of support that may be offered. A government workshop participant indicated that this may be intentional: “if I’m honest, we have used … a degree of ambiguity, and didn’t want to be overly prescriptive on who we wouldn’t support. Which I totally get can be frustrating, but … the desire on our side was to ensure that nobody ruled themselves out in coming forward”. Sensitivity about supply chains means that exceptions, caveats and reactivity were important in determining who can access higher levels of government support. For example, even when a victim is technically not part of CNI, their unique and important position in a supply chain might warrant NCSC or NCA support, as the impacts may be similar. Flexibility in how cases are triaged is necessary to manage limited resources and capacity. In the National Security Strategy Joint Committee report, it was recommended that the NCSC and the NCA be sufficiently funded to provide full-recovery support for all public sector ransomware victims. However, there may be some apprehension about providing the funding necessary for this level of service, particularly given the costs of competing with private sector incident response salaries.
+
+Some incident responders work with the NCSC and/or the NCA on almost all their cases due to the size of their typical clients. However, other interviewees reported frustration with the ambiguity surrounding the involvement of the two agencies. They urged that more clarity be provided on the circumstances in which the NCSC in particular becomes involved. Again, expectations on the timeline and level of support were important factors. An interviewee from a government body (with a significant societal purview) described how they informed central government immediately after the ransomware took effect, but did not get a response for seven days and brought on board private support. After this time had elapsed and public pressure mounted, NCSC personnel came on-site and worked 12-hour shifts alongside the organisation’s IT staff. As a further indication of inconsistent practices, another government body with a significant societal purview received “boots-on-the-ground” support from the NCA and a large incident response firm, with regular calls also including the NCSC.
+
+A victim from the technology sector noted that their initial impression after engaging with law enforcement was that the NCA would “own” the coordination of their response throughout the incident, but that, possibly due to resourcing constraints,– the response was, in effect, passed to the local police force. The victim expressed frustration on two fronts: first, the lack of engagement; and second, the lack of clarity about why the NCA withdrew from the case. It was also noted that information sharing with the NCSC and the NCA can feel like a “one-way street”, where agencies absorb threat and incident intelligence but infrequently share feedback or their own intelligence. The NCSC has also been described as “tactically focused”: predominantly interested in the core incident. A victim who kept the NCSC abreast of their incident remediation and shared intelligence thought that it would have been useful for an NCSC representative to have spoken with members of their executive group after the incident. According to them, this would have helped to relay the seriousness of the event to the business’s decision-makers.
+
+More positively, both the NCSC and the NCA were reported to be “trusted parties” when engaging with victims; victims can approach either body without fear that the government body would share information with the ICO or leak information to the press. An interviewee from a victim organisation that has a CNI-related purview spoke highly of the NCSC’s role as a trusted coordinating authority and found their role as a single point of contact to be useful. Both the NCA and the NCSC were also able, in some circumstances, to discreetly liaise with international law enforcement to arrange for the takedown of exfiltrated data. The February 2024 NCA-led operation that successfully seized LockBit servers included exfiltrated data (including data from those who had paid ransoms for deletion of exfiltrated data) and more than 1,000 decryption keys earmarked for victims. This publicly announced hack-back was internationally acclaimed.
+
+Additionally, some interviewees specifically appreciated the laissez-faire nature of NCSC engagement, believing that the victim’s own IT team and hired expertise were best placed to remediate the ransomware incident and achieve the best outcomes for the organisation. In part, this approach is pragmatic: the NCSC’s incident management team is small, and the agency is not able to compete with the private sector, both in terms of capacity and salaries offered to its staff. It was also suggested that as the NCSC is the public-facing element of a signals intelligence agency, it may not be particularly well placed to serve as an emergency service for most incidents. Ultimately, while the NCSC may serve as an actor-of-last-resort in select cases, it cannot take on this function for many victims. Instead, the NCSC was framed as a source of information and guidance for organisations. It offers a wide range of guidance that organisations can draw on, before and after an incident. This guidance generally received praise from interviewees.
+
+As noted, the data indicates that, broadly, the NCSC and the NCA have built reputations as trusted partners in coordinating ransomware incidents, particularly those that have a significant societal impact. Interviewees were also generally understanding of the resource constraints that the NCSC and the NCA face and that their active involvement in an incident remediation process must be rationed. This may temper expectations. There were, however, notable exceptions. Some victims felt that they should have received more active government support during their incident. This was particularly prominent in the education sector, which is not included in the UK government’s list of 13 CNI sectors. This may reflect a grey area between organisations that feel that they have a societally significant role, but which, according to the data, may not qualify for support. At the same time, ambiguity from the NCSC and the NCA may serve a useful purpose. How these considerations are balanced should be guided by the goal of minimising harms.
+
+As noted in this chapter, the influence of law enforcement on the victim experience reflects the fact that the enforcement “lag” is incorporated. There are significant structural and judicial impediments to law enforcement’s capacity to bring most ransomware operators to justice. However, law enforcement and regulators can play a role in either alleviating or exacerbating the ransomware victim experience. This chapter has identified a range of practices that can either improve or worsen the victim experience across the full timeline of a ransomware incident. This analysis recognises key nuances and the important role of the wider context. However, the analysis also highlighted important areas of divergence in support between, for example, different police forces. The NCSC’s informal policy of remaining ambiguous about the circumstances that attract its involvement may warrant refinement over time. Additionally, expectation management, clarity of communication and the use of feedback loops appear to be common underlying challenges.
+
+
+### Conclusion and Recommendations
+
+Ransomware incidents are deliberately designed to be high-impact events for victim organisations and their personnel. The criminals who code and deploy ransomware seek to cause calibrated harm – or the threat of imminent future harm – against their victims to encourage the payment of a ransom. Whether an attack comes in the form of an encryption or exfiltration event, or both, the attackers exploit an organisation’s reliance on its data and data systems. While a ransomware event is invariably a negative experience for victims, a range of factors can make it relatively “better” or “worse”.
+
+Drawing on original semi-structured interviews with ransomware victims and expert stakeholders who work with ransomware victims, this paper has identified a range of factors that can influence how harms are experienced. These include factors that are internal to the organisation, such as the level of preparedness and the organisational culture before and after the incident, as well as decisions that are made during the crisis and recovery phases. The overall influencing factors also include those that are external to the organisation, for example, the behaviour of the ransomware threat actors. As the paper has identified, additional external factors include the role(s) performed by third parties such as incident response services, lawyers and public entities (including law enforcement and regulators).
+
+Obviously, prevention of the incident is the optimal outcome. However, ransomware is very prevalent and can have a severe impact for any organisation. It is, therefore, necessary to also focus on “resilience”: the ability to reduce impact and maximise recovery after a breach. This paper’s analysis of the internal and external factors may be used to inform ongoing efforts to increase organisational resilience against ransomware breaches.
+
+Drawing on the analysis and findings, the paper proposes a range of cross-stakeholder recommendations that are based on the combined findings of this paper and an earlier RUSI paper on ransomware harms. That paper categorised first-, second- and third-order harms from ransomware incidents. This paper draws on the same original interview and workshop data corpus that informed the first paper. These recommendations focus on ways to alleviate the victim’s harm. To acknowledge the range of actors who can take measures to mitigate victims’ harms, these recommendations provide suggestions to victim organisations, third-party service providers and policymakers.
+
+#### Recommendations for Victims and Victim Organisations
+
+__Recommendation 1: (Potential) victims, including those who do not think they will become a victim of a ransomware attack, must continue to improve cyber-specific incident preparation and general cyber hygiene measures.__
+
+- _All organisations must consider themselves potential victims of ransomware attacks and must therefore continue to improve their cyber security and cyber hygiene measures._
+
+ Despite continued awareness campaigns, cyber security is still, all too often, a low priority for many organisations. This is especially the case for public service providers such as schools, and small and micro-businesses. The interview data has shown that good cyber hygiene and cyber security measures can significantly alleviate the harm victims experience. These include good data hygiene and an awareness that any organisation can become the victim of a ransomware attack.
+
+- _Organisations should develop cyber-specific contingency plans to prepare for a potential attack and run simulations of cyber incidents._
+
+ The interview data has further confirmed that while some organisations have contingency plans, they are largely irrelevant or unsuitable if they are not cyber specific. Cyber-specific incident preparation can also include running exercises simulating a ransomware or other cyber incident.
+
+__Recommendation 2: (Potential) victims who are preparing for and responding to a ransomware incident must recognise the importance of mitigating the psychological impact of ransomware attacks.__
+
+ Psychological impacts affect victims in various ways. They are often overlooked, both in the public discourse and among organisations that fall victim to a ransomware attack. Underlying health conditions and the exact role an individual plays within an organisation’s ransomware response can significantly influence their exposure to harm.
+
+- _When preparing for an incident, organisations and cyber security professionals must identify and implement measures to mitigate the psychological impact on individuals directly or indirectly affected by the ransomware attack._
+
+ This includes “soft” measures such as normalising discussions about the impact of workload and stress on mental health, as well as cultivating a supportive workplace culture. It also includes specific plans such as budgeting for mental health support and creating rotating schedules and a division of labour to avoid over-reliance on select individuals. Preparation must also view ransomware response as a marathon, not a sprint, and resources must be allocated carefully. Understandably, even with preparation, victim organisations may not necessarily be accustomed to the toll of ransomware incidents. Here, experienced external support can be instructive. Stakeholders in the incident response ecosystem can proactively offer bespoke pastoral support to personnel at victim organisations. As highlighted in this paper, there is anecdotal evidence that some incident response firms are offering a separate confidential service to clients to meet this need.
+
+- _During incident response, measures must be taken to avoid burnout and systematic overwork of individuals. Offering opportunities for victims to talk about their experience can further mitigate the impact of psychological harm._
+
+ Line managers should be sensitive to colleagues’ workloads and the psychological, physical and other harm the ransomware attack has on both the organisation and its staff members. While a ransomware incident will always remain an exceptionally stressful period for a victim organisation, flexibility is required to adjust to staff members’ mental health. Special attention needs to be paid to members of core IT teams, whose pivotal role in the technical elements of the initial remediation and the workload (and responsibility) they have during the incident exposes them to aggravating factors. This is set out in greater detail in the first of RUSI’s two papers. When over-reliance is unavoidable, annual leave or discretionary time off should be considered, once an immediate crisis period ends. A victim organisation can further offer counselling or therapy for affected staff or, at the minimum, an informal place to talk about their experience.
+
+- _When reflecting on the lessons learned after an incident, senior management must acknowledge the personal implications of the ransomware attack and should communicate this within their organisations._
+
+ Staff members are aware that a ransomware incident is a moment of crisis and, as such, any response has its flaws. However, several interviewees indicated that they were not looking to senior management for silver-bullet solutions. Instead, they wanted an acknowledgement of the personal implications that the ransomware attack had for them. For example, one internal report mentioned during the interviews included a post-incident analysis that focused on the financial impact the ransomware attack had on the organisation. It did not, however, speak of the personal toll it caused and the personal dedication and sacrifices it demanded of employees responding to the attack. Acknowledgment of how personally the attack is felt by staff members is a relatively easy, but meaningful, step that senior management and line managers can take to mitigate frustration and ensure good morale among their colleagues.
+
+__Recommendation 3: Victims should try to turn their experience into a lesson learned for others and, where possible, communicate with other victims or potential victims in their ecosystem. This can help with personal closure and to raise awareness.__
+
+ The research for this paper confirms that, for many victims, a ransomware incident is a stressful and potentially dark period in their life, making it hard to talk about their experience. However, the data has also demonstrated the value of talking about the experience, whether it is for personal closure or to provide critical insights to members of their ecosystem and sector to help them better prepare for a ransomware attack. Close communication with lawyers, PR advisers and senior management can help victims gain confidence in making decisions on the kind of information they can share. Victims can also signal their willingness to engage with other victims to their third-party service providers. This would allow such providers to act as networkers for those victims in the midst of a ransomware incident so that they gain the benefit of previous victims’ insights. Finally, regional or sectoral organisations, such as business associations, can offer platforms for victims to meaningfully connect or speak to their peers, providing valuable insights and contributing to raising awareness.
+
+__Recommendation 4: Victims should realise the importance of reaching the right balance of discretion and transparency within their external and internal communications.__
+
+ The research for this paper has demonstrated how the right amount of communication and transparency can have a positive impact on the victim experience. It has also underlined that ransomware attacks occur in unique circumstances and that their impact has substantial personal impact. Given the features of each case, it is not possible to provide general advice for victims on how to run their (external) communications during and after a ransomware attack. A victim’s external communication strategy is a highly context-dependent balancing act that seeks to avoid both under- and over-communication.
+
+ Nonetheless, the research has clearly stressed the importance of an internal communication strategy. Many victims, however, prioritise or only focus on external communication strategies. To retain morale within the affected organisation and to ensure that the staff members not directly working on the ransomware response do not feel left out, victims should establish regular and transparent communication with the wider organisation. This includes a recognition of the personal toll the ransomware incident has for many staff members (see above).
+
+#### Recommendations for Private Sector Service Providers
+
+__Recommendation 5: Third-party service providers must recognise the importance of efforts that mitigate the psychological impact of ransomware attacks and these must form part of their technical, legal or other services to improve victims’ experience.__
+
+- _Third-party service providers must understand the central role of psychological harm in the victim experience and adjust their performance to consider the individual and psychological needs of a victim._
+
+ Third-party service providers, such as incident responders and lawyers, offer highly specialised support to victims. While they may excel in their respective disciplines, they are often insufficiently trained in navigating communications with victims going through such a stressful incident for the first time. Organisations offering these services should provide training for their staff on how to offer both professional services as well as communicate in a considerate way to victims.
+
+- _Cyber insurance policies should provide coverage for mental health counselling during and after incidents, and insurers should add recommended counselling services to their panels of pre-approved vendors._
+
+ Third-party service providers cannot and should not be expected to offer counselling that goes beyond their professional obligations or capability. Instead, service providers such as incident responders should consider recruiting specific staff for their soft social skills, possibly including bespoke counselling staff, therapists, councillors and social workers who can support victims in additional ways.
+
+__Recommendation 6: With the consent of the clients, third-party service providers should actively enable information sharing between past, current and potential victims through their networks.__
+
+- _Third-party service providers should use their networks to actively encourage victims to share their experience with current and potential victims._
+
+ Third-party service providers see a large number of ransomware incidents unfold. This makes them highly experienced and puts them in a great position to network between past, current and potential victims. However, it can also mean that what might seem like a uniquely challenging situation to a first-time victim might be the bread and butter of a third-party service provider. Such providers should therefore encourage current and potential victims to talk to former victims who can offer peer insights from the perspective of someone who has gone through similar situations, providing empathetic and tailored support. This is a unique perspective that third-party service providers cannot offer: while they might have worked on many cases, they typically have not been a victim themselves. The research for this paper indicates that many members of the ransomware ecosystem rated these informal transparency and information sharing measures as highly impactful.
+
+- _When providing advice to victims on the degree of information sharing they can conduct, third-party service providers should not just take into account the interests of the victim organisation, such as mitigating legal or reputational risks. Instead, they should balance them against the psychological impacts on victims that might occur by preventing transparency._
+
+ There are instances when service providers have good reasons to advise a victim to restrict their information sharing or the degree of transparency in communications about their situation to external parties. However, interviews have illuminated that such advice might drive victims into isolation even though they often benefit from sharing their experience. Assessments of third-party service providers differed on whether restricting information sharing – and to what extent – is necessary, with some pointing out that general information sharing is not a problem from a legal perspective. Third-party service providers should therefore carefully balance their advice given to victims on restricting information sharing, taking into account not just the interests of the victim organisation as a whole (such as reputational or legal risks) but also the impact such advice can have on affected staff members and their mental wellbeing. A constructive approach finding a context-specific, carefully balanced solution is needed.
+
+#### Recommendations for Policymakers and Public Institutions
+
+__Recommendation 7: Public policy on ransomware must centre on measures that mitigate victims’ harm. This includes acknowledging and mitigating the psychological impact on victims.__
+
+- _Any guidance that is shared on how to prepare for, manage and respond to a ransomware attack must include best practices for mitigating the psychological harm, such as managing burnout and stress, as well as offering counselling services where appropriate._
+
+ The NCSC’s guidance on incident management or identifying relevant teams and roles supporting incident management, for example, do not include specific reference to softer measures to be taken to improve the victim’s experience and mitigate psychological impact. The NCSC has targeted guidance on “putting staff welfare at the heart of incident response”. However, greater value is achieved when mental health considerations are woven into guidance on preparation and incident-response plans at all levels. This would serve an important function in protecting IT teams and incident responders from adverse mental health impacts, as well as promote awareness and/or recognition from the board and colleagues.
+
+- _More public funding is needed for further free mental health services, including therapy tailored to individuals affected by ransomware._
+
+ While some public funding for counselling and therapy is already available, long waiting lists for mental health support indicate that demand is significantly higher than supply. The Action Fraud website refers to victim support provided by the charity Victim Support, primarily funded by the Police and Crime Commissioners, which now includes specific guidance for cybercrime victims and freely provides victim support tools and services, such as helplines and online tools and practices. Enquiries further found that the way to access victim support remained unclear and that gaps in its provision led to “loss of trust between victims and the systems in place”. While these findings related to fraud, the authors have found that they are also true for a ransomware context.
+
+__Recommendation 8: Public guidance to prepare and respond to an incident is already available and helpful, but must be easier to filter, including for quality.__
+
+- _Improve search functions of the NCSC list of guides._
+
+ Increased awareness, further research and wider coverage of ransomware incidents over the past few years has led to an extensive, yet decentralised, repository of publicly available information, for example in the form of statistics and advice on best practices. This is generally laudable, especially when sources provide practical information that is widely and freely available. There is now a need to filter this information in a central dataset. While many interviewees were aware of the NCSC’s guidance and commended its utility for ransomware preparedness and recovery, interviewees also found that it is generally difficult to filter for relevant information online, including within the NCSC repository of guides. For example, it might be more intuitive for victims to filter information according to “before”, “during” and “after” the incident than it may be to filter for certain authors.
+
+- _Establish a “Guide of Guides”._
+
+ Interviewees and workshop participants discussed the option of a “guide of guides” as a centralised repository including both NCSC-approved and NCSC-issued information. This would allow users to rely on a wider range of sources and to filter relevant information, for example, according to sector-specific advice. A “guide of guides” would also filter advice in advance of an attack, during an incident or on the ransomware landscape more generally.
+
+__Recommendation 9: Policymakers need to encourage transparency and information exchange by setting up informal safe space forums.__
+
+ Despite awareness campaigns about reporting incidents and information sharing, a lack of exchange and transparency still dominates the victim experience. This is highly regrettable, not just from a data-gathering perspective. Further transparency could not only improve statistics and insights into ransomware attacks but also improve the victim experience. When victims share their experience, potential victims can learn from their best practices and avoid their mistakes. Additionally, victims may also feel less isolated and may mentally benefit from sharing the information.
+
+- _As a well-connected entity, the NCSC must continue to act as an informal networker between past and potential victims and must encourage transparency and information sharing among a wide range of stakeholders._
+
+ In practice, victims are not incentivised to be transparent. This is especially the case in official or highly formal channels, as concerns over reputational harm or legal consequences outweigh the incentives to openly contribute to knowledge exchange. To counter these concerns, policymakers should encourage informal safe spaces where victims can anonymously share threat intelligence, best practices and other advice. The status of the NCSC as a “trusted partner” may support it as a coordinator of feed-forward forums.
+
+- _Greater promotion and expansion of NCSC trust groups is needed, and greater informality should be encouraged._
+
+ While some trust groups for specific sectors are already convened under the NCSC, victims were largely unaware of them. Furthermore, it is challenging for policymakers to encourage informal transparency as efforts will likely be seen as formal places for information sharing, making victims fear that any information may be leaked or used against them.
+
+__Recommendation 10: Establish a positive feedback loop that shares success stories and notifies victims where the information they shared is successfully used for intelligence and law enforcement activities.__
+
+ To increase transparency and reporting to the NCSC and law enforcement, policymakers should also focus on developing a positive feedback loop with victims that report. This should include sharing success stories of law enforcement activity directly with victims to illustrate their contributions. For example, where a victim organisation has contributed data that leads to a successful arrest, reclamation of ransom payments or prevention of further ransomware breaches against other organisations, this should be shared with the organisation in question to provide closure and endorsement, notwithstanding necessary redactions or anonymisation. Equally, where law enforcement and other public agencies manage to successfully disrupt cybercriminals, greater publicity of these success stories would further encourage support and enhance the reputation of law enforcement, generating further support and trust from wider society.
+
+__Recommendation 11: Government authorities need to clarify the tasks of relevant public institutions and their role in the ransomware response.__
+
+- _The NCSC should provide more clarity on when and how it can support victims._
+
+ The ransomware response ecosystem is complex and involves many actors from the public and private sectors. However, the interview data illustrated that such engagement is often challenging for victims, who are uncertain where to turn for assistance, to which organisations they should report incidents and what support they can expect from authorities, and how they interact with one another. Duplication of efforts when engaging with authorities often comes at a time of extreme stress for victims, who have little incentive to engage with authorities when they do not expect anything in return. Greater transparency on the relevant actors, the support they provide and coordination among different authorities would streamline communication efforts, manage expectations for engagements and, ultimately, encourage victims to report and provide information to public authorities.
+
+- _Additionally, the NCSC may consider providing tangible (if hypothetical) examples about differing organisations in various ransomware or cyber breach scenarios, identifying which ones would receive what support, and why._
+
+ While the public perception of the NCSC’s coordination role on ransomware is generally positive, the lack of transparency on the trigger points for NCSC support was criticised. Some ambiguity about the NCSC’s exact involvement may be desirable to maintain the flexibility to adjust to certain incidents or allocate resources more freely. But such ambiguity must be balanced against the need for expectation management and to avoid reputational damage to the NCSC. It is particularly important for the NCSC to set out its role in incident response and what it considers when deciding on whether to get involved in a given incident either directly or as a coordinator. Furthermore, victims require clarification on what kind of support they can expect from the NCSC. Better expectation management in relation to victims and the wider public ensures credibility of the NCSC and encourages victims to report their ransomware incident.
+
+__Recommendation 12: Police must assume their important role as an accessible face of authority in the ransomware response ecosystem, even where their ability to act is limited.__
+
+ Lack of resources and training currently makes local police units ill-equipped to contribute to responses. While it is unrealistic to expect law enforcement to provide emergency service technical response, it is nonetheless the case that local or regional police units provide the face of public authority for victims of ransomware. The experience, detailed earlier in this paper, of the micro-business director whose vehicle was stolen after their ransomware incident, was telling. The exceedingly efficient response to the “analogue” or traditional crime was juxtaposed starkly against the immaterial response to the ransomware incident.
+
+- _Victims of a serious ransomware breach must be offered telephone and/or on-site contact from a law enforcement body within a reasonable timeframe of the victim’s initial report to Action Fraud._
+
+ The interview and workshop data highlighted a wide disparity in the experience of ransomware victims, with indications that there may be a de facto “postcode lottery”. In some instances, ransomware victims have seemingly been given a disservice: for instance, when they reported a ransomware incident through Action Fraud but were never contacted by police. Arguably, all genuine ransomware cases should prompt a call and/or offer of a site visit from the police. The ransomware victims interviewed for this project felt – passionately – that they were undeserved victims of serious transnational organised crime. Additional distress was often caused by the fact that the attackers were perceived as remote and “faceless”. Local or regional police do not need to be faceless. When offered, a perceptible presence or gesture from local or regional police provides victims with a form of recognition of the crime that they have experienced.
+
+ This is not only about public relations; it is an important step in improving the feedback loop. Whether the initial contact with police is positive or negative has an important bearing on the likelihood that a victim engages further with local or regional police during and after an incident. Ongoing or intermittent engagement enables greater opportunities for information to flow in both directions.
+
+__Recommendation 13: The ICO should continue to work towards timely assessments of ransomware breaches to avoid further harm to victims.__
+
+ One of the most prominent “long-tail” negative experiences cited by ransomware victims was their ongoing engagement with the ICO. Victims routinely engaged in an ongoing exchange of letters with the ICO for months or years after the core elements of their ransomware recovery were complete. As previously noted, the ICO provides a vital service in overseeing compliance with data protection regulations, with a focus on protection of individuals’ personal data. Given the potential scale and depth of data exposure implicated by a ransomware event, it is important that the ICO scrutinises organisations. However, there may be a balance to be struck between the promotion of regulatory compliance and exacerbating a (possible) crisis situation for the ransomed organisation.
+
+- _The resourcing of the ICO should continue to be assessed, to maximise the efficient triage, assessment and completion of investigations, enabling timely closure and/ or accountability for organisations._
+
+ The authors of this paper do not determine where this balance lies. However, organisations that were victims of ransomware spoke firmly of their negative experiences of engagement with the ICO. Given that the ICO follows a mandate outlined in legislation, this suggests that legislators may want to reflect on whether the ICO’s approach to censuring victims of cybercrime strikes the correct balance. Additionally, the data corpus highlighted instances when stress was unnecessarily and avoidably exacerbated for ransomware victims. This was the case for a victim who was asked questions that had already been comprehensively responded to in a previous written response. If staffing or process issues contribute to such errors, stakeholders may need to consider whether the funding arrangements for the ICO are adequate to meet its task. It should be noted that the ICO has acknowledged the scale of this challenge and has outlined its ongoing efforts to meet it.
+
+---
+
+__Pia Hüsch__ is a Research Fellow in the Cyber team at RUSI, focusing on cyber, technology and national security. Her research focuses on the impact, societal risks and lawfulness of cyber operations and the geopolitical and national security implications of disruptive technologies such as AI.
+
+__Gareth Mott__ is a Research Fellow in the Cyber team at RUSI. His research interests include governance and cyberspace, the challenges (and promises) of peer-to- peer technologies, developments in the cyber risk landscape, and the evolution of cyber security strategies at micro and macro levels.
+
+__Jamie MacColl__ is a Research Fellow in cyber security at RUSI. His current research interests include ransomware, the UK’s approach to offensive cyber operations, cyber insurance and the role of private companies in global cyber governance. He has led a range of public and private projects for RUSI, with a particular focus on UK cyber policy. He is also currently a Senior Research Associate at the European Cyber Conflict Research Initiative and a Project Fellow at the Research Institute for Sociotechnical Cyber Security.
+
+__Jason R C Nurse__ is a Reader in Cyber Security in the Institute of Cyber Security for Society and the School of Computing at the University of Kent. He is also an Associate Fellow at RUSI, Visiting Fellow in Defence and Security at Cranfield University, and Research Member of Wolfson College, University of Oxford.
+
+__James Sullivan__ is the Director of the Cyber research team at RUSI. He founded and has grown a research group at RUSI that considers a number of themes, including the role of national cyber strategies, the cyber threat landscape, cyber security and risk management, offensive cyber, cyber statecraft and diplomacy, and ransomware.
+
+__Sarah Turner__ has a PhD in Computer Science from the School of Computing at the University of Kent, as a member of the Institute for Cyber Security for Society. Her research focuses on how families address the cyber security issues arising from using Internet of Things devices in the home.
+
+__Nandita Pattnaik__ is a member of the Institute of Cyber Security for Society at the University of Kent and has a PhD in Computer Science. Blending 25 years of experience in academia and the IT sector across the UK, Oman and India, Nandita works on the security dynamics of a connected home environment. Her research interests include cyber security and privacy perspectives of users in multi-user homes with multiple devices, insider threats in multi-user homes, the use of online data to understand the security and privacy perspectives of home users, and the effects of cyber incidents such as ransomware on individuals.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-02-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-mitigation-day-3.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-02-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-mitigation-day-3.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・求情第三日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-07-02 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 港島初選6人求情 梁晃維中學老師：歷史會判佢無罪
+- 辯方透露袁嘉蔚已於獄中結婚 盼盡快服刑完組織家庭
+- 梁晃維求情信稱從未失對港人信心、締造更美好香港是終生抱負
+- 辯方：楊雪盈毫不激進、參選只望令社區變得更好 官一度質疑無悔意
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】初選47人案今日（2日）開始處理第二批被告、6名港島初選參與者的求情，包括認罪的袁嘉蔚、梁晃維、徐子見，及受審後罪成的鄭達鴻、楊雪盈及彭卓棋，預計需時2天。不少被告的朋友到庭旁聽，其中梁晃維中學班主任讚揚梁秉承中學校訓「修己善群」，「無論認唔認罪都好，歷史都會判佢無罪」；楊雪盈友人指楊是十分願意協助的區議員，望傳承她的精神；徐子見友人讚揚他是「好有心嘅議員」，望讓他知道「我哋仲存在」，「我哋仲 support 緊佢。」
+
+
+▲ 《獨媒》記者今早約6時到達西九龍裁判法院，法庭門外已有逾50名市民排隊等候，當中有約40名市民戴帽、口罩和耳機等，部分背對行人路和低頭而坐，記者上前問何時到達、旁聽什麼案件均沒有回應。
+
+排頭位的是法庭旁聽常客「姨婆」，她與姨甥孫於昨晚10時30分已到達法院門外。早前涉「小彤群抽會」煽動案被捕的李盈姿昨晚現身銅鑼灣，今早則約清晨4時到達西九龍法院外，她向記者指今日6名求情被告都相當年青，認為各被告均無做錯，並稱：「香港人仲係撐佢。」
+
+
+▲ 姨婆
+
+#### 梁晃維中學班主任：梁秉承中學校訓「修己善群」
+
+現年約50歲的前教師林先生，在清晨約3時已經到達法院外位置。林先生稱過去多年一直有留意社運發展，「去到呢個時刻都會撐佢哋。」他續向記者指，梁晃維就讀伊利沙伯中學時，自己曾任其班主任，笑言：「最初佢好純㗎，後來無諗到佢咁勇」，他大讚梁讀書時期成績優異，秉承伊利沙伯中學「修己善群」校訓。
+
+多名被告還柙超過三年「未判先審」，林先生不時都會到荔枝角收押所探望對方，他指梁晃維現時精神狀態不錯。他最後再道，梁由被補到審訊，已達成其自己的目標，「無論認唔認罪都好，歷史都會判佢無罪。」
+
+#### 楊雪盈友人：會傳承佢嘅精神
+
+G小姐（化名）向《獨媒》表示，為了支持被告之一楊雪盈，今早約7時到達法院排隊。G小姐稱，自己於2017年一次遊行中認識楊雪盈，稱當時有社區規劃上問題，並指「好多人接觸過自己社區嘅區議員，都係完全問唔到」。正當無從入手之際，便「膽粗粗」向楊詢問意見，而楊亦願意和十分落力協助。
+
+
+▲ G小姐
+
+G小姐續指，每逢旁聽該案時都會穿着綠色衫，今日亦特意身穿綠色連身長裙，「因為佢（楊雪盈）話如果支持佢就着綠色衫啦。」楊雪盈還柙逾一個月，她就對楊身體狀況表示憂慮，擔心其身體會逐漸瘦弱，「好擔心佢愈來愈瘦，因為佢本身都好瘦㗎喇。」被問到有什麼說話向楊雪盈說，她就稱：「我會繼續喺我嘅崗位努力，傳承佢嘅精神。」
+
+#### 徐子見友人：我哋仲存在
+
+前東區區議員徐子見的朋友蘋果（化名），今特意乘頭班車前來旁聽，約7時許到達。她表示於2014年雨傘運動期間認識徐子見，認為徐是「好落力、好畀心機做好區務嘅一個區議員」，即使其他區的市民找他幫忙，也會落手落腳努力做好。
+
+蘋果坦言，對徐子見因參選而被捕有點可惜，但認為以現在時勢，即使他當時無參加初選，「都做唔到啲乜嘢」，故不會太過感慨，因「始終係佢嘅選擇」。徐子見選擇認罪，首提堂起還柙至今逾3年4個月，蘋果說有不時探望徐，形容他精神和身體狀態也不錯，今天到場是希望「show 吓我嘅存在畀佢睇，我哋仲 support 緊佢」、「我哋仲存在」。
+
+
+
+#### 某被告藝術班學生到場支持 稱其開朗正面
+
+其中一名被告的藝術班學生阿輝，今早6時半到法庭外排隊，他稱讚該名被告為人正面、開朗，不時鼓勵學生。阿輝續向《獨媒》表示，今日希望到場支持47人，他對案件橫跨數年感到無奈，多名被告還柙已久仍未有判決，故今日希望到場旁聽，令被告知道仍然有人支持自己，「其實都無了期咁樣好似咁，又冇咩可以做到，唯一可以做到就係精神上支持佢哋，嚟到都希望畀佢見到我哋，咁佢都知道我哋仍然支持佢。」
+
+
+▲ 阿輝
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47名民主派被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」案，共45人罪成，今（2日）開始處理第二批被告、6名港島初選參與者的求情，包括認罪的袁嘉蔚、梁晃維、徐子見，及受審後罪成的鄭達鴻、楊雪盈及彭卓棋，預計需時2天。代表袁嘉蔚的資深大律師祁志先進行求情，他認為顛覆罪的刑期分級制不適用於本案，而涉案謀劃「天真」、「註定失敗」，法庭不應基於猜測的嚴重後果、而應按被告實際參與判刑，而袁在報名參選後已被DQ，謀劃對國安造成很少甚至沒有危害。祁志又形容，袁是有理想的年輕女子，一生為人善良，對社會有抱負，並透露袁嘉蔚最近在獄中與另一人結婚，望及早服刑完畢，開始組織家庭。
+
+#### 被告精神不俗 由6懲教看守
+
+案件由3名國安法指定法官陳慶偉、李運騰及陳仲衡審理，控方代表為副刑事檢控專員萬德豪、周天行、助理刑事檢控專員羅天瑋。袁嘉蔚由資深大律師祁志代表，梁晃維由資深大律師彭耀鴻代表，鄭達鴻由資深大律師潘熙、大律師黃宇逸代表，徐子見由大律師黃雅斌代表，楊雪盈由大律師張耀良代表，彭卓棋由大律師盧敏儀代表。
+
+各被告於約10時步入法庭，此前獲保釋、罪成後須還柙的3人，鄭達鴻身穿深灰色西裝，較裁決日略為消瘦，精神不俗，微笑向律師和旁聽席揮手。啡色頭髮的楊雪盈紮髻，穿淺綠色背心連身裙、米白色通花外套，向旁聽席飛吻和微笑。在裁決日剷了光頭的彭卓棋，頭髮長了少許，身穿白色上衣、深藍色西裝外套，拉下口罩與旁聽席說話。
+
+至於已還柙至今逾3年4個月的另外3人，梁晃維戴黑框眼鏡，穿灰色西裝外套、繫黑白斜紋間條領帶。頭髮灰白的徐子見戴口罩，穿白色長袖裇衫，向旁聽席揮手，不時摸頭髮，又做OK手勢。袁嘉蔚則戴黑框眼鏡、穿黑色連身裙，束劉海和綁馬尾，早休後披上淺啡色外套。
+
+與戴耀廷5人求情時由約10名懲教人員分隔、各被告分坐在被告欄不同位置不同，今只有6名懲教在被告欄內，男女被告分成上下兩排就坐，梁晃維、鄭達鴻和彭卓棋之間更沒有懲教相隔。前立法會議員邵家臻、前東區區議員韋少力、大律師吳靄儀等都有到庭旁聽。
+
+罪成被告則分成兩個延伸庭觀看直播，二號法庭為吳敏兒、黃碧雲、余慧明和黃子悅4人，一號法庭為黃之鋒、劉頴匡、譚凱邦、馮達浚、施德來、伍健偉、吳政亨7人。
+
+#### 辯方：若考慮刑期分級制判刑為「走後門」
+
+根據《國安法》第22條，一旦顛覆國家政權罪成，「首要分子或罪行重大」可判處10年以上至終身監禁；「積極參加者」可判監3至10年；「其他參加者」則判監3年以下、拘役或者管制。
+
+代表袁嘉蔚的資深大律師祁志先陳詞。與戴耀廷一方一樣，祁志認為本案是以串謀罪、而非國安法控罪定罪，認為顛覆罪的刑期分級制並不適用，法庭判刑時應以普通法原則，根據《刑事罪行條例》第159C條，按被告參與程度、罪行嚴重性判刑。法官陳仲衡和李運騰提及，即使分級制不適用，也可用作參考，惟祁志指，若判刑時考慮不適用的成文法例是「走後門」。
+
+#### 辯方：謀劃註定失敗 法庭不應基於猜測後果判刑
+
+祁志續指，涉案謀劃本質上有缺陷（essentially flawed）、註定失敗（doomed to fail），政府或會DQ被告，而被告能否否決預算案，取決於立法會選舉結果，被告除地區直選外，亦須在功能組別取得大多數。即使他們成功否決預算案，選民會否再次投選同一人、被告會否履行承諾，均屬未知數（uncertainty）。祁志認為，法庭不應基於猜測（speculation）、假設性和不能證明會發生的嚴重後果判刑，而只應基於被告實際參與。
+
+
+▲ 袁嘉蔚（資料圖片）
+
+法官陳慶偉一度指，但戴耀廷不是這樣想，他相信他的計劃會成功。惟祁志反問，「戴耀廷被證明錯過多少次？」，重申法庭不能肯定謀劃會成功，若法庭以戴耀廷的想法、而非袁嘉蔚的參與及真誠相信謀劃是合法來判刑，那不可能是正確。祁志又引馬俊文和呂世瑜案，指判刑時須考慮實際後果、潛在風險和影響，惟政府最終延後選舉，本案謀劃沒有發生，只有很少實際的破壞。
+
+祁志又指，本案涉及以合法手段否決預算案，被告行為在《國安法》前屬合法，法庭判刑時不應考慮；而在《國安法》後，袁嘉蔚報名參選後也被DQ，涉案串謀短暫，只歷時29日，對國家安全只有很少甚至沒有危害。法官李運騰指，但被告有想好DQ的應對計劃，祁志則形容，計劃「天真」，強調本案並非「令人髮指（heinous）」的罪行。
+
+#### 辯方：本案行為屬顛覆罪最輕微
+
+祁志續引《國安法》第22條，指顛覆罪下列明4項顛覆行為，除本案所涉的「嚴重干擾、阻撓、破壞香港特別行政區政權機關依法履行職能」，還包括推翻和破壞中國憲法所確立的中國根本制度、推翻中央或香港特區政權機關，以及攻擊、破壞特區政權機關履職場所及設施，致使其無法正常履行職能。祁志認為，相較之下，本案所涉行為是4種行為之中罪責最輕微，因不涉中國根本制度及實際攻擊致政權機關「無法正常履行職能」。
+
+就袁嘉蔚的罪責，祁志指袁的參與程度較低，她曾參加選舉論壇，望參選取得合法權力，但其後已被DQ，沒有重犯機會。祁志又指，《國安法》目的在防範和制止危害國安罪行，而本案法律程序已帶出阻嚇訊息，本港已感受到《國安法》的影響；考慮到袁已還柙3年半，法庭判刑時可寬大處理、施以仁慈，給予被告個人背景求情因素更多比重。
+
+#### 辯方：袁一生為人善良、對社會有抱負
+
+就袁的個人背景，祁志形容袁是一名有理想的年輕女子（idealistic young woman），正如本案不少被告出身中產或勞工階層，並努力令自己變得更好，他們是「我們的同事，我們的孩子，我們的大人，我們的人民」，並非一般罪犯，他們相信其行為是合法。祁志續指，袁畢業於城大，主修中文及歷史，其後到南區的田灣做社區工作和任區議員，她一生一直都是善良的人，樂於助人，在獄中更因善良而惹上麻煩，而她對社會的抱負和善良的「回報」，卻可能是4至5年刑期。
+
+
+▲ 袁嘉蔚（資料圖片）
+
+#### 辯方披露袁最近獄中與另一人結婚
+
+祁志續提到，袁的人生因為被還柙而被改寫，如今「正在更生（rehabilitation）的路上」，若再判更重的刑期會毀掉她的更生進度。祁志又指，袁最近在獄中與另一人結婚，袁不希望在庭上披露男方的身份，但二人希望及早服刑完畢，開始組織家庭。
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47名民主派被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」案，共45人罪成，今（2日）開始處理第二批被告、6名港島初選參與者的求情，包括認罪的袁嘉蔚、梁晃維、徐子見，及受審後罪成的鄭達鴻、楊雪盈及彭卓棋。代表梁晃維的資深大律師彭耀鴻指，梁屬「積極參加者」且參與有限，他犯案是出於好意，望以合法手段令特首回應民意。辯方庭上讀出梁晃維親撰的求情信節錄，梁提及生於九七一代如「被詛咒的孩子」，每個人生新階段都會遇上香港的重大事件，如沙士、雨傘運動、反修例運動和疫情，深感與香港同悲同喜、命運緊緊相連。梁又指，香港自2019年面對困境，許多人感到迷失，「但我從來沒有對香港或香港人失去信心」，憑着對這片土地的熱愛，及前人承傳下來的精神，他相信香港定能繼續逆風而行，且「只要我還活着，締造更美好的香港永遠都會是我的終生抱負」。
+
+#### 辯方：「墨落」於國安法前發起 僅重申已達成共識
+
+袁嘉蔚一方今早完成求情後，由梁晃維及鄭達鴻一方陳詞。代表梁晃維的資深大律師彭耀鴻表示，梁晃維是「墨落無悔」聲明書發起人之一，但聲明於《國安法》生效前發布，只是重申已達成的共識，法庭不應考慮。法官陳慶偉指，聲明雖於《國安法》生效前發起，但其後沒有撤回。彭同意，但指那沒有加重太多梁的參與。陳慶偉又向彭確認，梁曾出席抗爭派記者會，指會將此納入考慮。
+
+
+▲ 左起：袁嘉蔚、梁晃維、鄭達鴻（資料圖片）
+
+#### 辯方：梁晃維為「積極參加者」 但國安法後參與有限
+
+彭續指，梁晃維被DQ後，沒有再找 Plan B，亦表明不會這樣做。法官陳慶偉問有何證據，法官陳仲衡則指，梁曾解釋不找 Plan B 的原因，是因難以找到有共同政治理念又沒有觸及「紅線」的候選人，指不是他不想，而是他找不到 Plan B。
+
+彭續指，梁並非「首要分子」，他沒有組織或計劃涉案謀劃，只是參與者。辯方同意梁是「積極參加者」（量刑為3至10年），但強調他在《國安法》後的行為非常有限，只曾出席競選街站、出席抗爭派記者會等。
+
+#### 辯方指梁晃維誤信計劃合法 官質疑
+
+彭耀鴻續強調，梁晃維並非蓄意不尊重法律。法官陳慶偉打斷指，但梁晃維認為戴耀廷太過溫和，因此才發起「墨落無悔」；又質疑梁並非因對法律無知而犯案，梁與袁嘉蔚的情況有點不同，梁比袁做得更多。法官李運騰則舉例，有部分候選人或對法律無知，真誠相信戴耀廷稱計劃合法；但有其他候選人或是頑固的激進或極端分子（diehard radicals or extremists），無論《國安法》有否落實也會繼續，並公然違抗法律。李指針對後者，對法律無知並非求情因素。
+
+
+▲ 袁嘉蔚（左）、梁晃維（右）（資料圖片）
+
+彭同意，但引述梁晃維曾稱，「無論我哋係對政府嘅提案定財政預算案投下反對票，呢個都係我哋作為代議士一個合法嘅權利，唔代表佢係一個非法嘅初選」，指梁當時相信否決是合法。惟法官陳慶偉搖頭，指辯方說法須有更多證據支持。彭重申，梁當時相信所做的是正確，望法庭定下量刑起點時考慮本案嚴重性，即謀劃原本設計是使用合法手段，非公然違法，及被告對法律無知；其後再考慮梁及時認罪，給予三分一扣減。
+
+#### 辯方：梁具良好動機 望以合法手段令特首更聽民意
+
+至於梁晃維的個人背景，彭耀鴻指，梁不僅沒有案底，而且根據其家人、相識的人所撰的求情，他是一個有愛心的年輕人，會照顧流浪動物，而從他在大學學生會、區議員等參與，可見他真誠承諾服務社區。彭又指，本案顛覆非常獨特，被告犯案非為個人私利，而是出於良好動機，尋求以他們認為合法的手段帶來改變，令特首更加回應民意；謀劃極不可能成功，但他們不是要破壞，而是望爭取好的結果。
+
+彭續引述梁的求情信，他明白自己作出違法行為，須承擔責任，而他在過去數年反省，承認案發時部分言行不成熟，對很多人造成傷害，望就此道歉。梁又指，自首提堂後還柙的3年間，他嘗試適應獄中生活，學會處理孤獨，並於獄中度過24至27歲生日，自言感到「迷惘」。
+
+#### 梁晃維求情信：從未失對港人信心、相信香港能逆風而行
+
+彭最後讀出梁求情信最後兩段，梁提到參選立法會時使用「休戚與共，長風破浪」為口號，這並非適合用於遊行集會的感性口號，而是結合他個人對香港的感受和抱負。梁提到，自己在香港主權移交那年出生，他那一代人常被戲稱為「被詛咒的孩子（the cursed children）」，每逢踏入人生新階段都會遇上香港大事——幼稚園畢業遇上「沙士」、小學畢業時是豬流感、中學畢業遇上雨傘運動、大學畢業又遇上反修例運動和疫情，梁自言在與香港同悲同喜的同時，「我深感我的命運與香港緊緊相連。」（“I deeply feel that my fate is deeply tied with Hong Kong.”）
+
+梁指，香港是他成長的地方，是他各種經歷的舞台、是他珍視的價值的搖籃，「我發現我無法輕易切斷與香港的連繫，也無法容忍作為旁觀者。」梁續指，無論未來的人生如何，「我會繼續與香港休戚與共」，為其成功喝采、為其衰落沮喪。梁又指，2019年以來，香港面對複雜和困難的處境，許多人對這個城市的未來感到迷失，「然而，我從來沒有對香港或香港人失去信心。」梁最後指，「憑我們對這片土地的熱愛，以及前人所承傳下來的精神，我相信香港能繼續逆風而行，克服當前挑戰和未知困難。只要我還活着，締造更美好的香港永遠都會是我的終生抱負。」（“As long as I am alive, building a better Hong Kong will always be my lifelong aspiration.”）（梁求情信節錄見文末）
+
+梁晃維一方早上完成求情，梁表現平靜，散庭時向旁聽席揮手，又做心形和OK手勢。
+
+根據《國安法》第22條，一旦顛覆國家政權罪成，「首要分子或罪行重大」可判處10年以上至終身監禁；「積極參加者」可判監3至10年；「其他參加者」則判監3年以下、拘役或者管制。
+
+#### 庭上讀出的梁晃維求情信節錄（中文為記者翻譯）：
+
+在2020年立法會選舉中，我用了「休戚與共，長風破浪」作為口號，這並非適合用於遊行集會的感性口號，而是結合我個人對香港的感受和抱負。作為生於香港主權移交那年的人，我這一代人常被戲稱為「被詛咒的孩子」，每逢我們踏入人生新階段，香港都會面對疫情或重大事件——幼稚園畢業遇上「沙士」、小學畢業時是「豬流感」、中學畢業遇上雨傘運動、大學畢業又遇上反修例運動和世紀疫情。在與香港同悲同喜的過程中，我深深感覺到我的命運與香港緊緊相連。
+
+香港是我成長的地方，是我各種經歷的舞台、是我珍視的價值的搖籃。我發現我無法輕易切斷與香港的連繫，也無法容忍作為一名旁觀者。無論我將來的人生如何，我會繼續與香港休戚與共——為其成功喝采、為其衰落沮喪。2019年以來，香港面對複雜和困難的處境，許多人對我城的未來感到迷失，然而，我從來沒有對香港或香港人失去信心。憑藉我們對這片土地的熱愛，以及前人所承傳下來的精神，我相信香港能繼續逆風而行，克服當前挑戰和其他未知困難。只要我還活着，締造更美好的香港永遠都會是我的終生抱負。
+
+In the 2020 Legislative Council election, I used the slogan "sharing weal and woe, braving the winds and tides". It is not an emotional slogan fit for chanting at rallies or marches. It combines my personal feelings and aspirations for Hong Kong. As someone born in the year of the handover, our generation is often humorously referred to as the "cursed children." Every time we stepped into a new stage of life, Hong Kong was hit by an epidemic or some significant events - SARS at kindergarten graduation; swine flu at primary school graduation; the Umbrella Movement in high school; when we entered into society after graduating from university, there were the anti-extradition movement and the pandemic of the century. In this process of sharing Hong Kong's joy and grief, I deeply feel that my fate is tightly linked with Hong Kong's.
+
+Hong Kong is where I grew up; it's the stage for all kinds of experiences and the cradle of values that I hold dear. I realise that I cannot easily sever ties with Hong Kong nor tolerate being a bystander here. No matter what kind of life I live in the future, I will continue to share weal and woe with Hong Kong - cheering for its successes and feeling downcast about its decline. Since 2019, Hong Kong has been facing complex and difficult situations, many people feel lost about our city's future. However, I have never lost faith in Hong Kong or its people. With our love for this land and the spirit inherited from our predecessors, I believe Hong Kong will be able to brave the strong winds, overcoming current challenges and other unknown difficulties. As long as I am alive, building a better Hong Kong will always be my lifelong aspiration.
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47名民主派被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」案，今（2日）處理第二批被告、6名港島初選參與者的求情，包括認罪的袁嘉蔚、梁晃維、徐子見，及受審後罪成的鄭達鴻、楊雪盈及彭卓棋。就鄭達鴻、徐子見及楊雪盈3人，辯方指他們案中參與程度低，應歸為「其他參加者」，判監3年以下。其中楊雪盈一方呈上32封求情信，讚揚她對社區和藝術文化的貢獻等；楊又親撰求情信，自言無黨無派，誤信初選合法才參加，誤墮法網「實在愚蠢」。辯方指楊毫不激進，有良好動機，參選只望令社區變得更好，望法庭以「新角度」審視，惟法官陳慶偉一度質疑辯方是指楊不應被定罪、反映楊沒有悔意，又指辯方似是上訴而非求情。
+
+徐子見一方透露其父親在他還柙期間離世，徐並親撰求情信稱明白罪行嚴重性，望對受影響的人深切道歉。鄭達鴻一方則指他只是跟從黨立場，他參選後已被DQ，其後宣布退黨、自願停用社交媒體、無再參與政治事務，他誤信初選合法才犯案，沒有重犯機會。
+
+#### 辯方：楊雪盈屬「其他參加者」 呈藝文界等32封求情信
+
+袁嘉蔚及梁晃維一方完成求情後，由鄭達鴻、徐子見及楊雪盈一方陳詞。辯方認為三人均屬「其他參加者」，量刑起點不應超過3年。
+
+代表楊雪盈的大律師張耀良，認為楊屬罪責最低的參與者之一，為「其他參加者」；又指雖然法官裁決時依賴從楊搜得的文件將她定罪，但該些文件尚未發布，仍有機會修改，沒有進一步證據顯示她屬「積極參與」。張呈上32封求情信，來自楊本人、家人、朋友、同事、街坊，亦包括前南區區議會副主席司馬文、香港戲劇協會會長馮祿德、藝術發展局前委員張秉權等，顯示楊的多個面向，包括樂善好施、熱心文藝、服務社區，亦參與動物保護、文化保育、表演藝術等，當中沒有一封求情信形容楊是「政客」。
+
+其中司馬文表示2015年認識楊，二人理念一致，認為不是要推翻而是要加強管治，並望改善香港生活質素，尤其是城市規劃和環保方面。司馬文又形容，楊為溫和民主派，對她的熱情、願意學習維繫社區關係的經驗感到印象深刻，二人任區議員時曾在環境保育等合作。張秉權則指楊本性和善、絕不好鬥，只是跟隨當時的時勢而行。
+
+張耀良又引述求情信，指許多人曾受過楊的幫助，例如楊曾邀請單親家長與孩子到她家暫住、給予新移民金錢援助，又曾幫助其他人照顧寵物。有大坑街坊則提到，曾看過很多區議員當選後失蹤，但楊當選後情況改變，讚揚楊全心服務社區，不為政治利益。
+
+#### 楊撰求情信稱以為初選合法 愚蠢誤墮法網
+
+張耀良強調，楊雪盈毫不激進、沒有政治聯繫，她對政府不關心她所關注的議題感不滿，相信如能當選立法會議員，便能有助推動她所提倡的政策，這也是她參與初選的唯一原因。張又指，雖然楊被搜得的文件提及否決預算案，但她與其他人有不同的議程，是望令社區變得更好，望法庭能將她與其他人區分。
+
+
+▲ 楊雪盈（資料圖片）
+
+張續引述楊所撰的求情信，楊自言出身基層，在香港土生土長，熱愛社會服務、醉心文藝，2015年以此為志當選區議員，得到機會服務弱勢社群、推動動物和文化保育等，形容為社會貢獻是她一生夢寐以求的事。
+
+楊又認為，可就社區問題與政府磋商，落實更好方案，舉例曾成功推動活化閒置用地擴建動物拯救中心、保留香港唯一龍窯「青山龍窯」、改變工廈用途讓藝術家進駐等，均證明政府樂意接受她的意見，是對社會有正面效益的溫和路線。楊自言，自己一直無黨無派，默默為社區貢獻，沒有參與激烈政治行為，參選單純望將上述議題和初心帶去立法會跟進。楊又指，一直以為初選無牴觸《國安法》才愚昧加入，當時新法剛實施，她對法例了解不足，誤墮法網，「現在想來實在愚蠢」。
+
+#### 辯方望法庭以新角度審視 官質疑無悔意、拒納無意圖傷害政權
+
+張耀良續指，望法庭聽取求情後，能以一個新角度（new light）審視楊的案情。法官陳慶偉問何謂「新角度」，法官李運騰亦指「我們不能違反我們的事實裁斷」，張解釋是指楊參選立法會，只是望推動其社會政治議程。法官陳仲衡續指已裁定楊具犯案意圖，法官陳慶偉則問，「你是說你的當事人不應被裁定有罪嗎？」，張否認，指他是作求情陳詞。惟陳慶偉即高聲指：「對我來說，你似乎不是在求情，而是提出上訴理據」。張澄清，楊是有良好動機，但採用了錯誤的方法。
+
+法官陳慶偉其後再次質疑，根據辯方陳詞，楊雪盈是否對其行為沒有悔意（not sorry for what she did）？張耀良回應指她在求情信已表示對發生的事感抱歉，惟陳慶偉再質疑那並非反映她有悔意（remorse）。張再稱，楊在求情信已表達得很清楚，惟陳再反駁，楊表達得很清楚是一回事，「但你的求情似乎是往相反的方向作出」，「她的求情很清楚，但對我來說，你似乎並不接受！」。
+
+法官李運騰最終問及，辯方求情重點，是否為她有良好品格、出色的公共服務、出於良好動機犯案，張耀良確認。法官陳仲衡並補充，法庭不會接納楊自言「我從不曾意圖傷害政權」。
+
+
+▲ 法官 陳仲衡（右）
+
+#### 辯方：鄭達鴻屬「其他參加者」、被DQ後退黨
+
+代表鄭達鴻的資深大律師潘熙指，本案罪行嚴重，但鄭的角色相對輕微，他只是跟從公民黨立場，曾在討論謀劃的階段表達不同意，《國安法》生效後修改政綱，報名參選後亦被DQ，其後沒有再參與「35+計劃」，在串謀再沒有角色。潘又指，鄭於2020年12月發文宣布退黨，不再參與政治；而涉案謀劃不涉武力或威脅使用武力，最終也沒有實現，無對政權造成實際傷害，鄭屬「其他參加者」，應判監3年以下。
+
+
+▲ 鄭達鴻（資料圖片）
+
+潘又形容，鄭一直希望成為立法會議員，他參與涉案謀劃並非為個人私利，而是望服務公眾及改善基層生活。不過法官李運騰指，若被告是為私利犯案，或屬加刑因素。
+
+#### 辯方：任多年區議員 參選望改善基層生活
+
+就鄭的個人背景，潘熙表示鄭達鴻現年36歲，他曾修讀法律博士（JD）和法學專業證書（PCLL），望幫助街坊，並曾任8年丹拿區議員，望法庭考慮他曾參與多年公共服務，具正面良好品格而減刑。潘熙又呈上7封求情信，來自鄭本人、家人、朋友、支持者等，鄭求情信解釋其心路歷程，提到被捕後沒有再使用社交媒體，也沒有再向其他人發訊息。法官陳仲衡一度問，不能使用社交媒體是否其保釋條件，辯方否認，指其保釋條件僅包括不可發放危害國安的訊息，鄭是自願刪除FB專頁。
+
+#### 辯方：誤信計劃合法、無重犯機會
+
+潘又指，《國安法》是新的法律，雖然對法律無知不是辯護理由，但鄭曾供稱公民黨三度諮詢戴耀廷的意見，獲回覆稱初選合法，鄭亦曾自行研究《基本法》條文，湯家驊也受訪稱初選不違法。潘指法庭評估鄭的罪責時，應考慮他是因對《國安法》欠缺理解，誤信法律意見而犯案，而非刻意不遵從（willful disregard）。潘最後指，鄭沒有重犯的機會，他被捕後已辭任區議員、無再使用社交媒體和參與任何政治事務，望考慮他犯案時間短、誤信計劃合法等，給予這個年輕人一次機會。
+
+
+
+
+#### 辯方：徐子見無政治聯繫 屬「其他參加者」
+
+代表徐子見的大律師黃雅斌表示，根據《刑事罪行條例》第159C條串謀罪罰則，法庭有廣闊酌情權根據案情量刑。黃認為，徐屬「其他參加者」，並指串謀中部分參與者是知名人士，由強大的政黨支持，向其他人施壓參與初選，甚至有「三投三不投」運動，指候選人若不參與初選便是「懦夫」；惟徐是獨立候選人，無參與上述活動，其罪責屬最低。
+
+#### 辯方：徐還柙期間父離世、撰求情信致歉
+
+黃續求情指，徐現年56歲，於香港出生和長大，他最近離婚，育有一名26歲兒子，其母親89歲，父親則於2023年、徐還柙期間離世。黃指，徐患有慢性病，引致嚴重痛楚，法官李運騰關注辯方是否指其病情會令徐服刑時承受更多苦楚，黃僅指其皮膚的狀況惡化，無披露更多詳情。
+
+黃續指，徐是政治素人，沒有任何政治聯繫，從沒有表達激進政治理念，於2014至2015年因健康和家庭出狀況才開始參政，服務社區令他找到人生意義。辯方呈上多封由街坊所撰的求情信，提到徐曾免費維修輪椅和電器、免費剪髮、探望露宿者和長者、為少數族裔義教中文、颱風後協助清除障礙物、處理鼠患等，疫情期間又響應政府呼籲，鼓勵長者接種疫苗。黃形容，徐是「行動派（a man of action）」、是聆聽者，而不只是空談理念的人。
+
+
+▲ 徐子見（資料圖片）
+
+黃又引述徐子見親撰求情信，徐提到明白所犯罪行的嚴重性，自知不能逃避罪責，而他未能為社會作出貢獻，反而帶來極為負面的影響，望對受影響的人深切道歉。
+
+5名被告今完成求情，明早將由代表彭卓棋的大律師盧敏儀進行求情。散庭時，梁晃維向旁聽席揮手，又雙手放頭做大心。
+
+根據《國安法》第22條，一旦顛覆國家政權罪成，「首要分子或罪行重大」可判處10年以上至終身監禁；「積極參加者」可判監3至10年；「其他參加者」則判監3年以下、拘役或者管制。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69-70/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-03-iranian-nuclear-question.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-03-iranian-nuclear-question.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..15c687d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-03-iranian-nuclear-question.md
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Iranian Nuclear Question
+author: Darya Dolzikova
+date : 2024-07-03 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/8gB9903.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "The Limited Options for Managing the Iranian Nuclear Question"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_While persuading Iran to roll back its nuclear programme at this stage may be difficult, the US and its allies can and should seek to reinforce Tehran’s perception that a decision to weaponise the programme would increase Iranian isolation and insecurity._
+
+
+
+In recent months, unsettling rhetoric from senior Iranian individuals over the country’s nuclear programme – alongside continued Iranian advancements in this area and escalating tensions in the Middle East – has highlighted the urgency of finding a resolution to the now decades-old Iranian nuclear question. The options available to the US and its partners for inducing a roll-back of Iran’s programme are limited, given that economic threats and incentives, as well as security assurances, will be difficult to make meaningful and credible. However, Iran still appears to perceive some benefit from maintaining a threshold nuclear programme rather than developing a nuclear weapons capability. The US and its partners should leverage remaining carrots and sticks to reinforce this assumption, making clear to Tehran that it would be worse off with a nuclear weapons capability than its current threshold nuclear status.
+
+
+### Limited Incentives and Assurances
+
+As it stands, US intelligence does not believe that Iran is conducting weaponisation-related research. However, the country possesses a highly advanced – and advancing – nuclear programme. The escalation in regional violence in the Middle East – including direct Iranian and Israeli strikes on each other’s territories – appears to have increased Iranian reliance on the advanced programme as a source of deterrence. In recent months, a number of senior Iranian individuals have alluded to the country’s technical and political ability to reconsider its stated policy of not pursuing nuclear weapons, should the need arise. Meanwhile, according to a recent poll, the Iranian public appears to be increasingly in favour of developing a nuclear weapons capability. Masoud Pezeshkian – the reformist candidate who secured the greatest number of votes in the first round of Iran’s presidential elections – has signalled a willingness to return to nuclear diplomacy. This is a positive sign; however, it is unclear how Pezeshkian’s intentions will align with the priorities of the Supreme Leader, who ultimately sets the direction of Iran’s foreign and security policy. Should hardliner candidate Saeed Jalili be elected to the presidency, a more conciliatory stance on the nuclear question would be unlikely.
+
+There is increasingly a dearth of credible incentives and assurances that the US and its partners can offer Iran. One often-mentioned source of leverage is the option of “snapping back” UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran which had been lifted in 2016 under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). If not snapped back, the suspended sanctions resolutions will expire in October 2025, removing the option of reimposing them and closing the Iran nuclear file at the UNSC. The prospect of passing new sanctions is highly unlikely considering the current politics of the UNSC. Snapback would reintroduce a range of international prohibitions and other restrictions on Iranian economic activity, including an expectation for member states to stop and inspect Iranian vessels suspected of sanctions violations and to “exercise vigilance” when dealing with Iranian banks. Critically, it seems that snapback would likely result in the reimposition of targeted financial sanctions (TFS) on individual entities. Presumably, this would once again grant the Financial Action Task Force (the global financial crime compliance watchdog) a mandate to evaluate and report on member state compliance with said TFS, which it lost in October 2023.
+
+___`While Tehran may have in the past felt that it could use its nuclear programme to secure concessions from the West, it has probably lost much of its value as a meaningful source of leverage for Iran`___
+
+However, UNSC sanctions have lost much of their teeth in light of the increased politicisation of the UNSC and the expansion of Iran’s economic and military relationship with Russia. Furthermore, the expansive scope of US unilateral sanctions on Iran significantly limits the practical impact of UNSC sanctions reimposition, as many financial institutions globally already refuse to do business with Iran so as not to run afoul of US regulations. Any promises of US sanctions relief will also be challenging to make credible, regardless of who ends up in the White House following the election later this year. As became clear during efforts to revive the JCPOA in the first two years of the Biden presidency, the extent and complexity of US sanctions on Iran, as well as the massive political divide in Washington over how best to deal with Iran, mean that sanctions relief will be difficult to deliver even if Donald Trump does not return to the presidency. There is equally no guarantee that any diplomatic or economic promises would survive the 2028 presidential election. Europe’s impotence in offering Iran economic benefits after the reimposition of US sanctions in 2018 also undermines the credibility of any European offers of economic engagement with Iran. The negative normative implications of being a UNSC-sanctioned country are also likely to be of decreasing relevance to Iran as the practical economic impacts wane and as Iran continues to expand its political, economic and security relationships with Russia and others.
+
+As such, while Tehran may have in the past felt that it could use its nuclear programme to secure concessions from the US, Europe and others, the programme has probably lost much of its value as a meaningful source of economic and diplomatic leverage for Iran. The primary value for Iran of an advanced nuclear programme now likely rests in a perception of its ability to deter – or secure assurances against – direct threats to Iranian security, namely the targeting of Iranian assets abroad, military attacks on Iranian territory, and regime change. Arguably, the programme has been unsuccessful in deterring against the first and – in part – the second. Israel has continued to target Iranian assets abroad and carried out a strike – albeit a limited one – on Iranian territory in April. However, Iran may still perceive some value in the programme’s ability to deter large-scale attacks on its territory or efforts at regime change. Incentivising Iran to roll back its nuclear programme would therefore require decreasing Iran’s reliance on its nuclear threshold status as a source of security. Tehran would need to be convinced that it would not become vulnerable to military strikes against its territory or forced regime change should it agree to nuclear concessions. Here, too, making credible commitments will prove challenging.
+
+The US has in the past publicly stated that it is not pursuing regime change in Iran, and has reportedly privately communicated that message to Tehran more recently. The high political costs and escalatory risks of a US decision to carry out military strikes against Iranian territory – or even (perhaps to a lesser degree) US support to Israel or others for carrying out such strikes – should also provide Iran with some reassurance that it is highly unlikely that the US would pursue such a course of action. However, it is unclear to what extent the government in Tehran believes that the US would not accept these risks at some point in the future, particularly if Iran were to give up or significantly roll back parts of its nuclear programme.
+
+Critically, the US cannot provide Tehran with credible assurances that Israel would not strike Iran. Washington can privately urge Israel against such attacks or refuse to materially support them (which may operationally undermine Israel’s ability to carry out certain types of attacks), but this may not be sufficient to forestall an Israeli decision to strike. Any commitments made in private could be easily denied and reneged on; meanwhile, public Israeli commitments not to strike Iran are politically unfeasible. The recent escalation in Iran’s nuclear rhetoric suggests that Tehran is not entirely convinced of US or Israeli restraint and still feels the need to flex its threshold nuclear status, presumably as an insurance policy against any such attacks.
+
+
+### Remaining Carrots and Sticks
+
+Yet, weaponisation of the Iranian nuclear programme is not inevitable. The earlier-mentioned rhetoric from senior Iranian figures suggests that Tehran perceives its current threshold status as a sufficient guarantor of security. The relatively modest Iranian response to the recent Board of Governors resolution calling out Iranian unwillingness to cooperate with the IAEA also suggests that Tehran is for the time being unwilling – or does not see the need – to push the nuclear envelope much further than it already has. Recent reports of indirect diplomacy between Iran and the US through Oman, which seems to have succeeded in limiting progress on at least some parts of the Iranian nuclear programme, are also promising. There is, of course, no guarantee that this will hold perpetually. Should Iran feel that its threshold nuclear status is insufficient to guarantee its security – for instance, following further attacks on its territory or a further degradation of its regional assets and proxies – it could still decide to pursue a nuclear deterrent. A number of carrots and sticks remain available to the US and its partners to reinforce the message that Tehran stands more to lose than to gain from a decision to acquire nuclear weapons.
+
+Despite the limited practical economic implications of reimposed UNSC sanctions, it is still worth threatening the possibility of snapback while it is still available; however, this should not be the sole point of leverage. The threat may produce little result, or it could convince Iran to make some limited concessions – perhaps increasing IAEA access to its nuclear programme or freezing enrichment levels. At the same time, 15 months is not a long time to resolve the myriad issues that would need to be addressed to justify the closing of the Iran nuclear file at the UNSC; Iran may just run down the clock by making perfunctory concessions that could be reversed after October 2025. Meanwhile, actually acting on the threat to reimpose sanctions would run a high risk of Iranian escalation – including a potential withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which could make monitoring and preventing weaponisation harder. This catch-22 situation points to the ultimately limited relevance of snapback for meaningfully dealing with the Iranian nuclear question. Alternative options for incentivising and deterring Iran are needed.
+
+___`The recent escalation in Iran’s nuclear rhetoric suggests that Tehran is not entirely convinced of US or Israeli restraint and still feels the need to flex its threshold nuclear status`___
+
+Diplomatic and economic pressure from countries still friendly towards Iran may prove helpful. The acquisition of a nuclear weapon would likely lead to political and economic ostracisation by countries like China, India, South Africa and others that may tolerate a threshold Iranian nuclear capability but not a nuclear-armed Iran. Pre-emptively encouraging these countries to place additional pressure on Tehran to forego weaponisation – particularly in ways that threaten key diplomatic and economic lifelines for Iran – may help influence Iranian decision-making. However, the extent of influence that these countries would have in Tehran, and whether they would be willing to expend any political capital to prevent weaponisation, is debatable. Should the decision be made to snap back UNSC sanctions, this may grant the necessary political cover to increase economic and diplomatic pressure on Tehran for countries that wish to do so.
+
+Maintaining diplomatic channels between the US and Iran – even indirect ones like the Omani channel mentioned above – will remain important for making it clear to Tehran that a diplomatic resolution remains possible. At the same time, sensitively communicated threats of military escalation by the US should not be ruled out. Making any such threats credible will be challenging, however. The advanced and hardened state of Iran’s nuclear programme will make it impossible to permanently eliminate the possibility of it being reconstituted in the future. Meanwhile, risks of escalation in regional violence and political pushback even from allies would be very high. Washington may in the end decide that the gamble is not worth the uncertain prize. However, the escalatory risks should also mean that strikes would not be considered short of the most extreme of circumstances – namely, an Iranian decision to weaponise. Drawing red lines in this instance would also be challenging, as defining and detecting a decision to weaponise will be difficult. However, this ambiguity could be helpful in discouraging Iran from trying to test how much it can get away with. Any military threats must be made discreetly, denying Iran the opportunity to point to such threats as a reason for future escalation of its nuclear programme. Such discretion will also allow Tehran to save face by avoiding the perception that it is making concessions to Washington, while equally permitting the US to retain flexibility in deciding whether and when Iran has crossed a red line.
+
+The proposed solutions are imperfect – none guarantee success, none will be straightforward to implement and some – particularly threats of UNSC sanctions snapback or of military attack – pose the risk of backfiring. The US and its partners will need to weigh these and other policy options against assessments of how likely Iran is to be moving towards a decision to weaponise its programme, and how much convincing is needed to keep it from doing so. Hard decisions may have to be made on whether certain risks may ultimately be necessary and worth taking to avoid the potential emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran.
+
+---
+
+__Darya Dolzikova__ is a Research Fellow with RUSI’s Proliferation and Nuclear Policy programme. Her work focuses on understanding and countering the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology and strategic aspects of civil nuclear technology. She has conducted research on the Iranian nuclear programme and related diplomacy, Iranian and North Korean proliferation-related sanctions evasion, nuclear safety in Ukraine, the role of Russia in global civil nuclear supply chains, and other issues relating to nuclear technology and proliferation.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-03-shaping-tomorrow.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-03-shaping-tomorrow.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..af186eeb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-03-shaping-tomorrow.md
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Shaping Tomorrow
+author: Oksana Ihnatenko
+date : 2024-07-03 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/YjH3OVl.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "A Roadmap for Ukraine’s Reconstruction using Virtual Assets"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_This Policy Brief examines whether virtual assets can be used to facilitate donations to Ukraine’s urgent reconstruction efforts._
+
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+The Russian invasion of Ukraine has left much of the country in ruins. Rallying international support for the nation’s swift recovery has therefore become a necessity. From the beginning of the full-scale invasion, the international community has shown support for Ukraine and reaffirmed its commitments to help the country during the reconstruction process. Despite ongoing battles on the frontline and air raids, the rebuilding of affected areas started during spring 2022 and is ongoing. This Policy Brief examines whether virtual assets can be used to facilitate donations to Ukraine’s urgent reconstruction efforts and looks at how stakeholders can provide transparent information about how funds are used.
+
+Virtual assets are already a feature of the war in Ukraine. From the start of the Russian invasion, the country has received aid in virtual assets from different parts of the world. On the second day of the invasion, Minister of the Digital Transformation of Ukraine Mykhailo Fedorov pushed for virtual asset donations and set up official governmental wallets to accept payments. This idea evolved into a project called Aid for Ukraine, which funded military and humanitarian aid.
+
+The estimated cost of rebuilding Ukraine varies between $486 billion and $1.1 trillion. Historically, international governments have donated funds for reconstruction that filter through financial institutions and third parties to key stakeholders in the impacted country. However, foreign-government-funded projects, although a major support, can be delayed by authorisation and due diligence procedures. Many regions in Ukraine require immediate funds for urgent projects. To receive funds for urgent projects, a government platform, United24, allows virtual asset donations via Silent Donor. However, there is limited transparency on how money is allocated for specific reconstruction projects – there are only general mentions of potential projects, and no itemised list of needs.
+
+A separate platform, Digital Restoration Ecosystem for Accountable Management (DREAM), developed in collaboration between Ukraine and international partners, provides an opportunity for international governments to support specific projects and see progress linked to allocated funds. However, there is no public information on how virtual assets donated to United24 transfer to reconstruction projects on the DREAM platform, or if a direct link between the platforms even exists. It is also not possible for individual members of the public to donate.
+
+This Policy Brief outlines the steps that the Ukrainian government must take first to include virtual asset donations for specific reconstruction projects. These steps include ensuring a regulated environment, safeguards relating to cyber security, and additional layers of verification to confirm how funds are used.
+
+The brief is informed by 12 semi-structured interviews with experts in the field of virtual assets and cyber security and representatives of government bodies. Interviews took place in January and February 2024. The qualitative data collected from interviews has been supplemented by a review of policy literature published between 2020 and March 2024.
+
+
+### Virtual Assets in Ukraine
+
+Ukraine’s desire to regulate the virtual asset industry dates back to at least 2020, before the full-scale invasion. In anti-money-laundering legislation, signed by President Zelensky in 2019, Ukraine defined a legal framework for anti-financial crime regulation of virtual assets. However, these specific features applying to virtual assets have not yet been put into practice.
+
+A further attempt to bring the regulation of virtual assets in Ukraine in line with international standards was made in 2022, when Ukraine adopted and signed the Law on Virtual Assets No. 2074-IX. This law establishes a requirement to either amend or apply the Tax Code of Ukraine to account for virtual assets. However, it has not yet been decided whether to amend the tax code to encompass virtual assets or to accept cryptocurrency under the existing code.
+
+The full-scale invasion only strengthened Ukraine’s ambition to build a blockchain-friendly economy. As a result, two competing draft laws are currently in progress, both primarily aiming to address the tax issues in relation to virtual assets and thereby provide a basis for regulating the virtual asset market. Currently, both draft laws are undergoing review by the Taxation Committee of the Ukrainian parliament (Verkhovna Rada) and it remains unclear which one will be adopted.
+
+The following table outlines the key differences between the two draft laws that include information on tax rates and the approach more broadly.
+
+
+### Draft Laws for Amending the Virtual Assets Framework in Ukraine
+
+
+
+The two draft laws have generated significant debate, especially in relation to the tax regimes proposed. One expert interviewed for this research argued that neither of the proposed laws and therefore amendments to Law on Virtual Assets No. 2074-IX are needed, as the current Tax Code of Ukraine should be flexible enough to incorporate virtual assets.
+
+
+### Why Even Consider Virtual Assets?
+
+Virtual assets present challenges that need to be considered prior to implementing a virtual asset donation option for reconstruction. For instance, the value of certain tokens can fluctuate rapidly, which can result in funds diminishing or increasing based on the market. Along with this, the virtual assets industry needs to overcome financial-crime-related challenges, such as the need to identify the source of donated funds. However, at the same time, interviewees for this research identified several benefits of regulating and safeguarding the industry in Ukraine.
+
+The benefits of using virtual assets rather than fiat currency in reconstruction efforts will include speed, transparency, traceability and lower transaction costs. Notably, a challenge with disaster relief financial support is the lengthy and difficult process of sending funds via a cross-border transaction. Virtual assets, which are known for fast cross-border transactions when compared to fiat currency, can streamline the process.
+
+Although there is no international practice for blockchain technology for disaster relief or reconstruction, it is already used for humanitarian aid in Kenya and Ecuador. In Ukraine, virtual assets are used to make humanitarian payments to internally displaced people through a UNHCR project with the support of the Stellar Development Foundation. One expert interviewed detailed this process, noting that recipients are identified via Know Your Customer controls and can receive cash in return at MoneyGram locations in Ukraine. A similar model could be used for the reconstruction funds.
+
+Despite the potential benefits, there is not enough research on the best solution for the integration of virtual assets for disaster relief projects, as ongoing programmes are in pilot phases. More research must be done on best practices for directing virtual asset donations to support reconstruction. The next section outlines possible ways for Ukraine to expand financing opportunities for reconstruction.
+
+
+### The Conundrum: How to Develop a Virtual Asset Option
+
+Experts interviewed for this research were asked to consider two models for the use of donated virtual assets in the reconstruction process. The first involved the consolidation of donations by a centralised entity, donations that would then be converted to fiat currency before being used to pay the construction and other companies involved in a reconstruction project. The benefit of this model is that virtual assets would reduce the delay caused by cross-border fiat currency transactions. Once the money arrives in Ukraine, the country already has the financial infrastructure to support fast onward fiat transactions.
+
+The second model involved a centralised entity consolidating donated funds, then distributing the virtual assets directly to construction companies. There was, however, a general view among interviewees that this model would not be practical for construction companies. In addition, virtual assets have limited usability for purchasing goods and services in Ukraine. Although some weapons companies have accepted virtual assets as payment in Ukraine, it is unlikely that reconstruction companies will have the capacity to use virtual assets to purchase machinery and raw materials or pay staff. In addition, if only some construction companies decided to accept virtual asset payments, these companies would inevitably monopolise the market. Therefore, there was broad agreement that any donations of virtual assets would need to be converted to fiat currency before being transferred to companies involved in reconstruction projects.
+
+Additionally, some interviewees proposed the use of a blockchain protocol that offers smart contracts, that is, blockchain-based digital code that can support the execution of financial transactions. Notably, two experts identified that too much automation through smart contracts can result in a “death spiral”, leaving more room for error. Research has noted that security flaws in smart contracts can lead to exploitation. Therefore, if this option were integrated, great care would need to be taken to prevent illicit activity.
+
+Finally, an alternative option could be to develop a central bank digital currency (CBDC). In 2021, the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) piloted the project e-hryvnia, a blockchain-based electronic form of the Ukrainian currency issued by the NBU. The NBU plans to conduct an open test of the state’s digital currency to understand its effectiveness and the feasibility of full-scale implementation. However, the CBDC would need to undergo extensive testing, which is why it would not be a practical option due to the immediacy of the need for reconstruction funds.
+
+In view of this, consolidating donations through a centralised entity, then converting funds to fiat currency before paying construction companies appears to be the most practical option. The next section analyses this option in more detail.
+
+
+### How to Operationalise the Model
+
+This section provides an overview of the four steps that Ukraine should consider before establishing a virtual asset donation channel for reconstruction.
+
+#### Step 1: Understand Regulation
+
+In this model, which involves a virtual asset service provider (VASP) consolidating or exchanging virtual asset donations, stakeholders must have a clear understanding of the regulatory status of the company. With the current absence of an applied regulatory framework for virtual assets in Ukraine, the VASPs involved need to have controls in place to identify financial crime activities during the donation process. Without proper financial crime controls in place, international donors may lack confidence in the system, resulting in a shortfall in donations.
+
+To complement the process, Ukraine should implement robust regulation for the virtual asset industry. As noted above, two bills to amend the tax code are currently under consideration, along with the third option of accepting it under the existing Tax Code.
+
+Ukraine is accountable for its implementation of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) standards on virtual assets. The FATF requires countries to meet specific standards regarding virtual assets, which include: understanding the risks posed; ensuring the registration and supervision of VASPs; and confirming that these entities have effective anti-money-laundering/counterterrorist-financing controls.
+
+#### Step 2: Consider Pre-existing Infrastructure
+
+Ukraine has multiple avenues for enhancing the transparency of the reconstruction process, yet there is no one platform that includes an option for the general public to support specific projects through virtual asset donations and to see the progress of the project. The appropriate authorities could expand the platforms identified in the Introduction by building additional infrastructure to enable this possibility.
+
+Research for this brief suggests that Ukraine should build a centralised environment for virtual asset donations for reconstruction using existing platforms. Multiple platforms accepting donations, with several options included, carries a risk of fraudulent platforms falsely claiming official status in order to request donations.
+
+Ukraine could expand one or more of the three existing government-run platforms. Aid for Ukraine is a product of collaboration between the Ministry of the Digital Transformation of Ukraine and virtual assets exchange Kuna. At the beginning of the full-scale invasion, this public–private partnership was a crucial conduit for donations, with Kuna providing the infrastructure to receive donations and transmit funds on behalf of the government for war and humanitarian efforts. United24, a government-run platform built for accepting donations, is another option. Funds donated to United24, including virtual assets, are collected and transferred to official NBU accounts, and then assigned to the relevant ministries. Finally, the DREAM platform aims to create digital routes for the reconstruction projects. The platform allows local authorities to develop a project, upload the necessary documents, receive funds for the restoration, conduct procurement and thereafter monitor the construction. Each one of these platforms contains characteristics that, in combination, could result in a centralised and transparent reconstruction process.
+
+The addition of a VASP to one of these platforms could ensure the scalability and credibility of the process, as VASPs regularly invest in technological advancement around cyber security, anti-financial-crime measures and consumer protection. Rates of digital transformation in Ukraine are high, but there might still also be a need to engage foreign companies and their technical expertise. Within the context of this project, the partnering company must not have ties to Russia. Implementers of this project need to ensure that companies supporting Ukraine reconstruction efforts are not facilitating Russian interests.
+
+#### Step 3: Develop Strong Cyber-Security Infrastructure and Protocols
+
+Strong cyber-security infrastructure and protocols are key to developing a platform for consolidating virtual asset donations. During the design process, it is important to anticipate attacks, identify potential risks and define use cases.
+
+To authorise virtual asset transactions, an encryption key known as a “private key” is used. This needs to be protected from cyber threats. Robust storage methods should be implemented for private keys to prevent illicit actors gaining unauthorised access.
+
+Another issue to consider is who has access to the private key(s) linked to donations. To reduce corruption or bribery risk, no individual should have sole access to private key(s) linked to donations, as this would represent a single point of failure. For example, a corrupt individual with sole access to the private key could authorise a transaction to send funds to another virtual asset address under their control. Or, if a private key held by an individual was compromised by another entity without the knowledge of the holder, the illicit actor could authorise a transaction – in other words, steal the funds. Therefore, strict processes must be in place to determine which stakeholders have control over private key(s).
+
+At the same time, if a VASP takes responsibility for consolidating donations, and authorities responsible for donations have an account at the exchange, there could be consequences if the exchange is hacked. A credible virtual asset company with robust cyber-security practices would be essential, as government bodies may not have the resources and expertise to develop a scalable process for receiving and exchanging virtual asset donations.
+
+If a stakeholder has sole access to the private key(s), there should not be only one method of unilateral control. Two options should be considered for secure storage of donations. One option would be the use of multi-signature wallets, that is, the requirement of multiple authorities to “approve” transactions before execution. However, this approach to storage could potentially result in cyber-security risks if not properly implemented. To mitigate this risk, a second option could be multi-party computation, which involves designated authorities receiving shares or pieces of essentially a single private key, along with the use of third-party authentication applications for verification. The pros and cons of each option must be thoroughly understood to identify the right approach.
+
+With the involvement of government bodies, it is critical to ensure that cyber-security teams are integrated with other agencies, including law enforcement, and synchronise their efforts. Anyone who has access to a share of the private key(s) should be trained in and understand cyber-security threats. Cyber-security teams should monitor new crime methodologies for cyber threats on online forums such as Telegram. Ensuring the monitoring of new cybercrime methods is crucial, as there are many examples of Russian actors targeting Ukrainian infrastructure.
+
+#### Step 4: Test the System Before Launch
+
+Before the full-scale public launch of a virtual asset donation option, Ukraine should conduct a test of the system in a secure environment. The pilot of the platform should scale up slowly to identify potential failure points and ways to mitigate vulnerabilities. Using an isolated environment to test the platform would help to identify risks and the appropriate regulatory treatment of the platform.
+
+Along with technical testing, authorities should use a regulatory sandbox to determine how the product fluctuates more broadly before the official launch. Currently, the Ministry of Digital Transformation in Ukraine is working to develop such a sandbox. The aim of the sandbox is to create an effective system of communication between businesses, regulators, law enforcement and supervisors. If it is ready in time, Ukraine can use it to test a prototype for donating virtual assets to urgent reconstruction projects.
+
+A project will not be perfect for the first testing procedure. Therefore, there should be several rounds of testing before the product’s launch.
+
+
+### But Virtual Assets Won’t Solve the Entire Problem …
+
+Since the concept above involves consolidating donations in virtual assets, then converting funds to fiat currency, there is another side to the transparency problem. There needs to be enhanced transparency on sending fiat payments to construction companies and how the projects progress.
+
+It will be important to verify construction companies receiving funds. Some companies might commit fraud by obtaining funds allocated for the reconstruction process without intending to carry out a project. As with any large construction project, there is a risk of bribery and corruption; robust identification of beneficial ownership of construction companies can help to reduce this risk. Ukraine has already progressed towards this step by passing a new law on ultimate beneficial ownership in September 2022, improving the process of registration and verification of beneficial ownership information.
+
+In addition, the process should incorporate regular audits of construction projects. Some platforms rely on public access to information to assess construction progress. However, it may be possible for companies to use technology such as generative AI to fake progress. To mitigate this, an in-person audit may be beneficial. The risk of corruption and fraud cannot be reduced to zero, but a robust audit process can limit the risk.
+
+Ukrainian authorities responsible for reconstruction need to ensure that capacity and resources are available to keep track of projects. In a vulnerable environment, authorities need to understand the scope of risks before funding reconstruction projects on a larger scale.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+Ukraine already accepts virtual asset donations for war and humanitarian efforts, therefore developing a robust virtual asset framework is becoming increasingly important.
+
+As Ukraine maintains reconstruction efforts, fundraising opportunities not only should include a virtual asset donation option to allow the general public to donate directly to urgent projects, but must also provide transparent updates on progress. Since Ukraine has available expertise and platforms, a centralised environment with a virtual asset donation option should be developed. However, to achieve this goal, responsible authorities must first implement robust virtual asset regulation, expand pre-existing infrastructure, develop cyber-security safeguards, and test the system before launch.
+
+Virtual assets will not solve the entire problem of limited transparency. Therefore, authorities should consider options to ensure the verification of construction companies that receive reconstruction funds, and undertake audits to determine progress on projects. Taking these steps can streamline and maximise the use of virtual assets for a transparent reconstruction process.
+
+---
+
+__Oksana Ihnatenko__ is a Researcher for the Supervising and Monitoring Ukraine’s Reconstruction Funds (SMURF) project at the Centre for Finance and Security at RUSI. Her research examines resilience and integrity of the Ukraine’s financial system. In particular, her research focuses on Ukraine’s adherence to FATF standards, fighting financial crime, anti-money laundering efforts, and issues surrounding reconstruction.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-03-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-mitigation-day-4.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-03-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-mitigation-day-4.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・求情第四日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-07-03 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 辯方指彭卓棋被捕後推廣《基本法》、維護國安 官質疑屬投機
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47名民主派被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」案，今（3日）續處理6名港島初選參與者的求情。代表彭卓棋的大律師盧敏儀表示，彭基於對新法無知而犯案，他在《國安法》後已通知民主動力移除政綱，誤以為足以確保不違法；而彭具持續的愛國聯繫、熱心服務國家，曾推廣年輕人到大灣區創業，被捕後又受僱於「香港基本法基金會」，推廣《基本法》、維護國家安全，犯案是與其良好品格相違。惟法官拒納彭有撤回政綱，並質疑彭初選時以極端激進言辭反對政府和國家，被捕後改為到推廣基本法的組織工作，其行為不一致、只是另一投機之舉，彭或是「一個偽裝成愛國者的機會主義者」；法官又質疑，辯方求情明顯與法庭裁決、以及彭在初選的形象相違，明言難以接納。基本法基金會秘書長侯叔祺也有到庭旁聽。
+
+第二批被告今完成求情，本周五（7月5日）將處理第三批被告求情，為6名九龍東初選參與者：黃之鋒、譚文豪、李嘉達、譚得志、胡志偉及施德來，料需時2天。
+
+#### 鄭達鴻、徐子見無到庭
+
+參選港島區初選的袁嘉蔚、梁晃維、鄭達鴻、徐子見、楊雪盈昨完成求情，法庭今處理彭卓棋的求情。
+
+昨已完成求情的鄭達鴻和徐子見兩人，今沒有到庭，其餘4人分成兩排就坐，向旁聽席微笑揮手。昨天紮髻的楊雪盈今束低馬尾，昨繫領帶的梁晃維今則無戴領帶，其餘各人裝束打扮與昨天大致一樣。佔中「大黃伯」、前立法會議員梁繼昌、前民陣召集人陳皓桓、社運人士曾健成等均有到庭旁聽。
+
+
+▲ 「大黃伯」（左）、曾健成（右）
+
+#### 辯方指彭為「機會主義者」服務國家
+
+代表彭的大律師盧敏儀表示，其立場與書面陳詞一致。法官陳仲衡引述辯方陳詞，提及彭卓棋是「機會主義者」，把握每個機會為國家服務，陳質疑法庭在判詞形容彭是「機會主義者」，意思非如辯方所指（“... that’s not what we mean”）。盧表示明白，但強調她對於所說的很認真（“I mean everything I said.”）。翻查判詞，法官指彭是是個投機取巧及不可信的證人，作出對自己有利的說法（“opportunistic and incredible witness who gave self-serving evidence”）。
+
+#### 辯方：彭基於對新法無知犯案
+
+盧敏儀表示，彭是基於對法律的無知犯案，解釋《國安法》是新法例，在通過前沒有任何公眾諮詢和醞釀、也無時間讓公眾了解和調整其行為，不是普通的法例。法官陳慶偉指法例由全國人大通過，當然不是普通法例，但指其時為2019至2020年，本港幾乎不可能通過任何法例。
+
+盧續指，彭卓棋沒有案底，案發時僅約25至26歲，沒有政治聯繫，誤信當時所做的行為，包括通知民主動力移除政綱，已足以確保他沒有觸犯《國安法》。惟法官李運騰質疑，彭其後派發撕掉的政綱，又發布手持爛單張握拳的相片，姿勢像是抗議，法庭不接納彭有撤回他此前立場。
+
+
+▲ 謝偉俊（左）、盧敏儀（中）。謝偉俊律師行於本案代表彭卓棋、區諾軒及鍾錦麟。
+
+#### 辯方指彭已移除政綱 官質疑屬抗議、拒納有撤回立場
+
+盧敏儀補充，彭曾到初選票站確保政綱被移除，又從新聞得悉有愛國者稱初選不違法，錯誤以為其行為已足以表示他已退出「35+計劃」。惟法官陳慶偉表明不能接納這點，並指彭大可退出初選。盧同意那更理想，但指彭參選只是望服務人民，惟陳慶偉再指，彭並非如辯方所說的「天真」，提到區諾軒供稱與戴耀廷在初選前接觸彭時，彭關注投電子抑或實體票，可見彭一開始已對計劃感興趣，亦「完全知道他參與的是什麼」；而《國安法》後，他又發布撕掉選舉單張的相片作為抗議，其握拳姿勢是「對抗多於順從」。
+
+盧敏儀指，彭是被攝影師要求做出該姿勢，法官陳慶偉指情況或許是那樣，「但誰是老闆？他是老闆！他應該告知攝影師他想呈現怎樣的形象！」盧續指，彭作為想參與初選「試水溫」的人，若發布這樣的相片猶如「政治自殺」，惟陳慶偉指當時正是要「鬥黃」。盧續指，彭在《國安法》改為發布實用資訊，他沒有出席任何組織者舉行的記者會，已做出明確行為顯示他誤以為所做的足夠避免犯法。
+
+#### 辯方指彭受僱基本法基金會續維護國安 官質疑屬投機
+
+盧敏儀續指，彭的家人、太太和弟弟，以及香港基本法基金會秘書長侯叔祺今也有到庭支持。法官陳仲衡指，彭自2022年5月後受僱於基本法基金會，問辯方陳詞是否指他犯案後「悔過（repent）」，抑或他一直都是愛國者。盧一度同意前者，陳仲衡即追問那彭為何不認罪？盧其後指聽錯問題。
+
+
+▲ 基本法基金會秘書長 侯叔祺
+
+法官李運騰續問，辯方能否澄清本輪求情陳詞，是顯示彭有悔意、顯示他有更生，還是什麼？又問他現時受僱情況與判刑有何關係。盧指，《國安法》目的是維護國家安全，如被告有進行維護國家安全的行為，應屬求情因素；又指彭被聘為「基本法學生中心」會長，基金會不會隨意聘請任何人，他們對彭有觀察。
+
+法官李運騰問，那是彭案發後的行為，如何協助說服法庭減刑；陳慶偉亦指，盧形容其當事人為「機會主義者」，這或是他另一次投機。法官陳仲衡補充指，是「一個偽裝成愛國者的機會主義者（an opportunist masquerading as a patriot）」。
+
+#### 辯方呈求情信 官質疑與裁決相違、彭為人不一致
+
+盧指她不能同意，李運騰續指如辯方立場是彭已經改變，不大可能重犯，他可以理解，但除此以外不認為其受僱情況與判刑有關。盧續補充，彭參與基金會工作，更顯他的堅決和投入。惟李即指，彭卓棋先是推廣大灣區創業，至初選時用極端激進言辭反對政府甚至國家，被捕後卻再次改變，改為到推廣《基本法》的組織工作，「除了指他事實上就是一名機會主義者，我們如何能看出你當事人的行為是一致？」（“How can we see any consistency in the behaviour of your client, apart from saying that he is in fact an opportunist?”）法官陳仲衡亦指，對彭在選舉期間所說的話「記憶猶新（fresh in our mind）」，法庭已拒納他解釋自己僅在說「選舉語言」。
+
+盧續指，彭曾創立「香港青年創業聯盟」，盡其所能協助年輕人到大灣區創業，可見他有良好品格；又引述多封求情信，來自已認識彭多年的朋友、老師、同事等，顯示他一直推廣大灣區創業，有社工亦指他為弱勢社群和年輕人轉介工作，其性格並非突然改變。惟李運騰再指，法庭已裁定彭有意圖顛覆國家政權，求情信呈現彭不同的形象、與裁決相違，質疑可給予多少比重；又指串謀歷時不短，即使辯方指彭一時誤入歧途，法庭也難以被說服。盧指她完全接納法庭裁決，求情信是顯示彭犯案與本性不符。
+
+#### 辯方指彭具持續愛國聯繫 官明言難以接納
+
+法官陳慶偉續主動引述，盧在書面陳詞形容彭「有持續的愛國聯繫，具能力和熱情服務國家（continuous patriotic affiliation and his ability and enthusiasm to serve the state in Hong Kong）」，李運騰指似乎是描述一個與初選時完全不同的彭卓棋，與法庭所見完全不同。盧指，涉案言行已經作出，它們全部屬錯誤。李運騰即問：「如果他犯案與本性不符，那你最好告訴我們，他當時為何說出那些話、做出那些事？」盧敏儀回應指彭有「服務的抱負」，李運騰反問：「服務誰？服務他自己？」盧指是服務香港和國家，惟李再指：「很坦白地說，我們很難接受。」盧同意，但指「我不能扭曲我所理解的」，李再笑着反問：「你是在說我們扭曲證據嗎？」
+
+盧重申，求情信反映彭的真實性格，望法庭考慮彭任區議員所參與的公共服務，及他推廣大灣區創業，被捕後又參與維護國家安全、推廣一國兩制和《基本法》而減刑。法官李運騰最後指，能看出盧非常盡力幫助被告，盧則重申，無論是書面或口頭陳詞的每個字都是真誠，望法庭考慮。
+
+散庭時，彭卓棋和梁晃維向旁聽席揮手。
+
+案件由3名國安法指定法官陳慶偉、李運騰及陳仲衡審理，控方代表為副刑事檢控專員萬德豪、周天行、助理刑事檢控專員羅天瑋。袁嘉蔚由資深大律師祁志代表，梁晃維由資深大律師彭耀鴻代表，鄭達鴻由資深大律師潘熙、大律師黃宇逸代表，徐子見由大律師黃雅斌代表，楊雪盈由大律師張耀良代表，彭卓棋由大律師盧敏儀代表。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69-70/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-04-misuse-of-ai-in-gaza.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-04-misuse-of-ai-in-gaza.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Misuse Of AI In Gaza
+author: Noah Sylvia
+date : 2024-07-04 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/uqeUaIw.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "The Israel Defense Forces’ Use of AI in Gaza: A Case of Misplaced Purpose"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_The evidence suggests that the Israeli military’s use of AI tools during the Gaza conflict has been more about speed than accuracy._
+
+
+
+Nearly nine long months into Israel’s war on Gaza, few topics remain as controversial as Israel’s targeting mechanisms, especially the reported use of several AI systems in its processes. Following the initial reports on “Gospel”, I argued that such a model has a more limited role in the targeting cycle. However, later reporting on models like “Lavender” challenged many assumptions, and raised further concerns about AI in Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) decision-making roles.
+
+Unless the IDF permits full access to its systems, we cannot fully gauge the veracity of reported claims, including the +972 Mag’s reporting, the facts of which remain contentious. In light of continued disagreement on the actual capabilities and roles of these systems, it is crucial to understand the many considerations of the targeting process and the many points of failure inherent in such a cycle.
+
+This is neither an evaluation of the IDF’s legal targeting standards, an assessment of its operational efficacy in achieving war aims, nor a simple criticism of the staggering human cost imposed by the IDF upon the Gazan population. Instead, this piece outlines broadly how targeting cycles operate, including the critical points where technology could limit or expand civilian deaths.
+
+This article will focus on procedures surrounding air-based targeted killings and dynamic strikes, to differentiate from fire support for ground forces. While targeting shares many of its aspects across military branches, it should be noted that IDF procedures, including targeting, are believed to differ across sectors and commanders in Gaza.
+
+
+### Intelligence Gathering and Processing
+
+In Gaza, Israel maintains one of the densest intelligence networks of any modern conflict zone, which has been built up since its occupation of the Strip. Gazan militants lack any real air defences, permitting crewed and uncrewed aircraft (both Israeli and non-Israeli) to perform near-constant surveillance, producing droves of electronic and communication intelligence. Other forms of intelligence collection include imaging from satellites, ground troops relaying operational information, and a variety of intelligence from Western governments. Combined with Palestinian data archives from decades of surveillance, the IDF possesses as close to perfect intelligence as possible in a modern combat environment.
+
+The sheer quantity of Israel’s intelligence could cripple its ability to translate data into actionable insights. Raw data from cameras, radar, phone data and other sensors must be sorted, cleaned and delegated to the appropriate places for “exploitation”. “Cleaning” this data manually would be impossible, so to minimise the number of human analysts and avoid fatigue-induced errors, AI is typically involved at this stage. Machine learning (ML) models can use pattern recognition to identify potentially relevant information from raw feeds, including persons or objects of interest, vehicle movements, or even rocket launches. The intel is typically translated into common formats which can be combined to present a holistic view of the battlespace for an analyst.
+
+Assuming that the quantity of intelligence is positively correlated with accuracy and certainty in decision-making, an intelligence-sifting system which processes far greater quantities of data than a human analyst would reduce unintended casualties in the targeting cycle. However, this is only possible with a reliable system that avoids frequent false positives (hallucinations) while simultaneously not missing relevant intelligence (errors). The model would also likely exhibit the biases of the humans who created, trained and trialled the system, bottlenecking the intelligence that can be used at future stages.
+
+___`Theoretically, the processing power of machine learning could empower analysts to make decisions with much higher accuracy, combining intelligence to provide a rigorous depiction of the potential target`___
+
+Fine-tuning to avoid these inaccuracies would occur during the model’s training, but occasional mistakes are inevitable in any such system. Yet there has been no indication of processes to correct the model while in operational use (see below). Meanwhile, the +972 Mag’s reporting claims that Lavender’s apparent 10% misidentification rate is considered tolerable by the IDF.
+
+
+### Intelligence Analysis
+
+Once the cleaned data is aggregated, an analyst will search for actionable intelligence, either tracking previously banked targets or looking for specifically identifiable ones. Satellite images of weaponry/equipment, enemy faces in video feeds, and the location of specific radio signatures are all examples of intelligence that can lead to target creation.
+
+Analysis models would parse the cleaned data to recognise specific identifiers comparable to the processing systems, albeit with greater specialisation. Analysis might involve several models, each focused on a certain type of analysis, such as spectrum analysis, face recognition, vehicle/weapon identification or voice recognition, while machine outputs could range from basic intelligence profiles to actionable targets.
+
+Instead of a binary selection, models would provide a likelihood of positive identification, which could be summarised as “X model identified X militant with a certainty of X%”. ML excels at this form of probabilistic pattern recognition and could ideally make the targeting process more transparent and accurate. However, these benefits hinge solely on how a potential model is employed. Even if the certainty is outputted for analysts (a simple matter for a model), the analyst and commander must understand how and why the model produced both the target and the certainty. Unless the certainty is near 100% for a given target (and hopefully even then), positive identification should be corroborated by other intelligence mediums, such as phone signals or human intelligence.
+
+Furthermore, the IDF likely has a threshold for determining whether a strike is warranted. With high-fidelity systems, a high threshold for identification would reduce the risk of civilian deaths due to target misidentification, while a low threshold could result in an effectively indiscriminate campaign against a population. This is arguably the point where human involvement is most important. Theoretically, the processing power of ML could empower analysts to make decisions with much higher accuracy, combining their various ML-enabled intelligence reports to provide a rigorous depiction of the potential target.
+
+Investigative reporting has cast doubt upon the image of a human-centred targeting process. According to these claims, human involvement is only a cursory check, lasting under a minute. The reasons for such a hurried, shallow review are likely a mix of automation bias, pressure to create/approve quantities of targets, and old-fashioned analyst fatigue. Similar considerations around errors, hallucinations, data quality and bias from the “processing” stage also apply for machine analysis.
+
+The IDF’s response claims that such a system is limited to intelligence management tools more akin to sophisticated intelligence-cleaning models, which output mere correlations in the data. Even if they are not using a target creation system (which would still reasonably fall under the category of “ecision support system”), analysts would need to understand how these tools autonomously collate intelligence on suspected militants, as well as the reliability of their correlational mechanisms. Still, the sheer number of targets struck by the IDF lends weight to the argument that humans are not fully creating, or at least thoroughly analysing, each target.
+
+
+### Operational Planning
+
+Upon the identification of a target, it is either added to a target bank to be monitored and struck at a later time, or sent up the chain of command for strike planning and approval. When choosing the most appropriate means for a strike, timing and location selections require the balancing of target vulnerability with risk to families or bystanders. Delivery platforms comprise crewed and uncrewed aircraft launching air-to-ground munitions, although planners would ideally choose from a variety of means, including ground-based fires or pinpoint raids using small arms. Acceptable limits on these factors are predefined as rules of engagement (ROE) for a specific operation or set of operations.
+
+These ROE are often less stringent for dynamic strikes against targets of opportunity – typically those presenting an imminent threat and/or a limited window of opportunity. These strikes are not preplanned and are instead identified and struck in real time, reducing the time for collateral death estimates (CDE). The IDF apparently began shifting towards more dynamic strikes as it exhausted its previously banked targets.
+
+When responding to criticism over civilian deaths from strikes, the IDF typically cites the use of “precision munitions”. However, precision does not equate to discrimination. A munition’s precision is simply its likelihood of hitting its intended target, so a precision munition is a guided bomb, rocket or shell with a high likelihood of striking its target. The controversial 2,000 GBU-31 bombs are precise when outfitted with the JDAM guidance kit, with the decrease in required munitions translating to less destruction, but this does not mean that strikes are discriminate. A discriminate strike is one that only hits the intended target. While it is extraordinarily difficult to conduct a strike in an urban environment with a 0% chance of collateral damage, the choice of a GBU-31 (or even the 1,000 lb GBU-32 or various 500 lb bombs) indicates intentional indiscrimination – the 900 kg munition has a lethal radius of hundreds of metres, and can create a crater several metres deep.
+
+Munition selection also depends on the availability of different munitions. Despite their greater payload and therefore less discriminate nature, large, air-dropped munitions are typically the first choice of munition due to their price point.
+
+Key to understanding the IDF’s operational planning is the value it places upon the lives of its soldiers relative to Palestinian civilians. Especially compared to US and allied militaries, the IDF appears to be willing to inflict immense cost upon civilians to reduce the risk to its soldiers. The preference for air strikes over ground, even at the risk of increased collateral damage, is driven by decades of Palestinian dehumanisation, combined with intense domestic pressure to protect Israel’s conscripted population.
+
+It remains unknown whether the IDF’s ML systems are used during the operational planning stage or during dynamic targeting. In theory, systems could incorporate ROE to predict a strike’s impact for an analyst, akin to the reporting on Lavender and “Fire Factory”. The IDF also claim that the models generate CDE, the accuracy of which – given the sophistication of Israeli intelligence – there is no reason to doubt, regardless of whether it is generated by a human expert or a machine.
+
+Ideally, a model for operational planning would provide the user with the ability to visualise the civilian impact of different munition and location choices faster than humanly possible, which – when combined with proper Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) adherence – would lower civilian deaths or cause the cancellation of a strike altogether. In this manner, the model would not be treated as a replacement for a human analyst, but as an operational planning tool.
+
+
+### Legal Considerations and Commander Approval
+
+This piece seeks to sidestep the many legal debates about both Israel’s right to respond militarily and its wider conduct in the war, instead focusing on the considerations surrounding a single strike. During the operational planning and command approval stages, legal considerations about a strike determine compliance with LOAC. The legality of any individual strike (given jus ad bellum) rests mainly on the concept of proportionality. Given proportionality’s subjective nature, the legality of killing civilians remains a contested concept in LOAC, demonstrating the tension between legality and morality.
+
+Besides proportionality, an attacker must undertake “feasible measures to minimise harm to civilians” when undertaking strikes against enemy targets. Historically, the IDF often undertook several types of warnings prior to its strikes to get civilians out of harm’s way. Even besides the mixed success of these measures, they cannot obfuscate the high rate of civilian deaths per strike compared to other conflicts. This highlights the lack of numerous other feasible precautions, such as the operational considerations in munition selection and timing discussed above.
+
+___`In the case of the IDF, it seems clear that it has used AI systems not to refine targeting, but to expand and expedite its target cycle`___
+
+Every state – including the “most moral army in the world” – must abide by LOAC, regardless of an enemy’s violations of international law. Additionally, the embedding of an insurgent force within a population is not a new phenomenon and does not absolve the IDF of its LOAC commitments. The presence of human shields or hostages does not change the fact that these are civilians, who must be treated as such.
+
+It remains unclear how Israel applies these legal considerations in its targeting cycle. Traditionally, a legal advisor (a Military Advocate General’s Corps officer [MAG] in the IDF) is consulted during operational planning, but given the sheer quantity of airstrikes conducted – especially at the beginning of the war – the likelihood that a judge advocate rigorously examined every single strike is low. Consequently, “legal advising” might merely comprise checking “yes” or “no” to decide whether the predicted deaths are consistent with “acceptable” rates.
+
+The claim in the +972 Mag’s reporting thus begins to look more likely, with commanders relying on a “predetermined and fixed collateral damage degree” rather than in-depth proportionality assessments for each strike. These are values given to commanders indicating the maximum “acceptable” number of civilians who can be killed as collateral in a strike. A commander can exceed this number for a high-value target only with approval from higher levels of command. The number differs depending on the target; for example, it is allegedly 15–20 civilians per “low-ranking militant” and over 100 civilians for a more senior commander. The use of a discrete value has precedent, such as the US’s “non-combatant casualty cut-off value” in Iraq and Afghanistan, although it remains controversial due to the subjective valuation of some lives over others and the high discrepancy between the number of civilian deaths considered tolerable by Western militaries and the IDF.
+
+Besides the questions about if and how models generate collateral estimates, all other responsibility at this stage rests on human actors. Any programming of LOAC into the models is unlikely due both to the complex, often abstract reasoning required as well as the continued misgivings about military AI from the legal community. Instead, a commander must understand the logic and evidence behind any strike recommendations, regardless of whether they are created by an analyst or model.
+
+
+### Post-Operation Assessment
+
+Any strike or operation requires a post-mortem to understand what went right and what went wrong. Battle damage assessments determine whether the strike was successful at eliminating the target, while analysts conduct collateral damage assessments to ensure greater civilian protection in future strikes (assuming they are directed at only ostensibly military targets). Autonomous models could perform some of these tasks, parsing intelligence about the strike to provide insights to commanders and analysts. These insights, whether produced by man or machine, should then be fed into models at the “processing” and “analysis” stages of the cycle, creating a feedback loop. Absent this “on-the-job-training”, not only will a model never improve beyond its starting capability, with its biases and errors repeated ad infinitum, but it could potentially worsen as model drift increases.
+
+Unfortunately, there has been no indication that the IDF has been attempting to learn lessons from its strikes. It is fairly easy to verify deaths from specific strikes using reports from journalists in Gaza and the Ministry of Heath, not to mention the IDF’s continuous surveillance of the besieged territory. With the continued large-scale killing of innocents, one may be forgiven for assuming that either the IDF does not recognise these deaths as errors, or it is simply indifferent. The +972 Mag’s report even claims that damage assessments were abolished for junior militants. Although the rate of civilian deaths during the war has slowed relative to the first months of the war, this has been mainly as a result of international pressure, rather than humanitarian concern from the IDF. Any desire to review procedures only appears when the Israeli government faces a heavy backlash from its dwindling number of allies.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+The use of AI in the targeting process is not inherently inhumane, but this depends entirely on how models are trained, tested and employed. In the case of the IDF, it seems clear that it has used systems not to refine targeting, but to expand and expedite its target cycle.
+
+If true, this would indicate, at best, a carelessness and recklessness from the IDF, placing speed of target generation above discrimination and the preservation of civilian life. At worst, such a target selection process constitutes a systematic devaluation of Palestinian lives, which could be reasonably considered collective punishment. Ultimately, while technology can change the speed or scale of military action, any accuracy or discrimination failures in the targeting cycle must be blamed solely on human choices.
+
+---
+
+__Noah Sylvia__ is a Research Analyst for C4ISR, especially its intersection with Emerging Technology, on the Military Sciences team at RUSI.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-05-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-mitigation-day-5.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-05-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-mitigation-day-5.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..71f48e7d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-05-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-mitigation-day-5.md
@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・求情第五日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-07-05 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 譚文豪友人請假排隊：「一定要入到去！」
+- 前區議員齊撐前同事：於心無愧就得、大家陪緊你喺度
+- 黃之鋒無撰求情信、望本案後重新開始 辯方指屬「積極參加者」
+- 辯方：譚文豪已離政壇 盼追回與子女相處時間
+- 辯方指李嘉達為改現況參選、回看屬錯誤 難再任社工將另覓方法服務社會
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47名民主派被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」案，今（5日）處理第三批被告、6名九龍東初選參與者的求情，包括認罪的黃之鋒、譚文豪、李嘉達、譚得志、胡志偉，及受審後罪成的施德來。
+
+繼續有人通宵排隊，排頭位是旁聽常客「姨婆」及其外甥，於前一晚10時多到場。凌晨近2時，警員逐一搜查排隊者的隨身物品及身分證。凌晨4時左右，陸續有更多人前來排隊，有人攜來雪條和凍飲，給徹夜排隊的人降溫。天還未亮，隊伍已有近40人。
+
+
+
+譚文豪的友人梁小姐在凌晨三時許乘Uber到達。她說已三年沒見過譚，但有寫信，非常掛念他，故今日特意請假前來，「一定要入到去！」她又笑言，原本打算在等候期間寫信，但因太疲倦而未有落筆。
+
+
+▲ 梁小姐
+
+梁小姐每日都有關注初選案進展。她留意到早前報導指早上已有數十人排隊，「即係入唔到啦！」，所以今日目標是比「排隊黨」早到。她形容譚是目標明確、非常堅毅的人，希望祝他一切安好。
+
+
+
+凌晨4時多到場的黃小姐則希望探望「快必」譚得志。她表示，自己曾為快必助選，自他入獄後有寫信和探監，對上一次見他是今年4月。她認為，快必不願屈服的精神難得，但嘆現時連旁聽亦有白色恐怖，因有機會被搜袋、查問個人資料等。
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47名民主派被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」案，今（5日）處理第三批共6名被告的求情，包括前香港眾志袐書長黃之鋒、資深民主派胡志偉和「快必」譚得志、前立法會議員譚文豪、前觀塘區議員李嘉達及前黃大仙區議員施德來。
+
+開庭前約三小時，前觀塘區議會主席蔡澤鴻與兩名前同事鄧先生和 Martin，一同現身旁聽隊伍。談到被告兼前同事李嘉達，鄧先生和 Martin 首先形容李是「有領導力、有諗法、有熱誠」的人，常有不同想法，想為社區帶來改變，又會定期做社區論壇，以不同方法與老人家溝通，增加居民社區意識；又大讚有與朋友組成樂隊的李唱歌好聽。蔡澤鴻就坦言，與李不算認識很久，但知道他很感性和細心。
+
+對於李嘉達陷獄，鄧先生直言：「於心無愧就得㗎喇」，又望對他說：「出嚟一齊飲一打啤酒！一齊去合興食豬腸粉！」Martin 則說：「頂住啦！大家陪緊你喺度。」社工註冊條例修訂後，任社工的李嘉達要永久除牌，Martin 嘆可惜，指李是「有心嘅社工」。
+
+
+▲ 鄧生
+
+#### 嘆過往可不約而聚 今「轉場」探監、聽審、圍爐
+
+除了李嘉達，任職區議員近30年的蔡澤鴻與其他九東被告，也起碼共事10年以上。其中，他與胡志偉是在1991年直選時相識，至今已30多年。蔡形容胡做事有原則，性格刻苦、堅持，現時約每月探望他一次；他又坦言因胡還柙已逾三年，探望時已經沒新鮮事可分享。不過他們仍常常說笑稱，以前再熟亦不會約見面，因為七一、六四等日子一定見到彼此：「見到就嘈，見唔到就『仆街，點解你唔嚟？』，完咗，啱嘅就一齊食飯。但宜家就冇喇，宜家轉咗場地。」
+
+
+▲ 胡志偉（資料圖片）
+
+蔡澤鴻嘆，嘆無論對牆內或牆外人而言，最難受是不可預計：「起碼我知要坐幾耐，有個期。宜家係無了期。」23條生效後，他預料初選案的被告不會有行為良好扣減三分一刑期，故即使樂觀估算，他相信要待2027年才見到他們出獄。
+
+蔡又說，留下來的人之所以不開心或有很多情緒，其中一個原因是「我哋仲緊張，我哋仲 care 呢個地方嘅一啲嘢」。蔡續說，「我諗每個人都可以諗吓，自己喺自己嘅崗位上可以做啲乜嘢」，像他可以多些探監、聽審，朋友之間也可以多圍爐，「畀大家知道我哋原來仲喺度」，就像他會與以往九龍東的同事隔數個月也會吃飯、「圍爐」。
+
+蔡最後寄語眾被告「希望唔好死住」，並直言現時「唯一可以做就係支援佢哋，同埋畀佢哋見到我哋仲喺度，我冇避到，大家都係一齊」。
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47名民主派被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」案，今（5日）處理第三批被告、6名九龍東初選參與者的求情，包括認罪的黃之鋒、譚文豪、李嘉達、譚得志、胡志偉，及受審後罪成的施德來。多人久未露面，譚文豪和李嘉達消瘦不少，快必譚得志多了不少白頭髮，不住向旁聽席戚眉和露出笑容，至於黃之鋒則被安排獨自坐在離旁聽席最遠的角落，由懲教隔開他和其他被告。代表黃之鋒的大律師李國威先進行求情，黃曾提及國際游說和簽署「墨落無悔」，但無參與組織初選，屬「積極參加者」，並望法庭考慮他以往曾就多宗案件服刑、參與公共服務而酌情減刑。辯方又呈上黃之鋒母親、教會牧師和老師的求情信，黃本人則無撰寫求情信，辯方指這是其選擇，指黃希望在本案後重新開始（move on）。
+
+#### 黃之鋒與其他被告相隔 快必頻向旁聽戚眉發笑
+
+案件由3名國安法指定法官陳慶偉、李運騰及陳仲衡審理，控方代表為副刑事檢控專員萬德豪、周天行、助理刑事檢控專員羅天瑋。黃之鋒由大律師李國威代表；譚文豪由資深大律師何沛謙代表；李嘉達由大律師陳德昌代表；譚得志由大律師梁寶琳代表；胡志偉由大律師郭子丰代表；施德來由大律師黃廷光代表。
+
+各被告於10時前陸續步入法庭，與律師溝通，其後由6名懲教分隔就坐。其中黃之鋒一人坐在離旁聽席最遠的被告欄角落，與其他被告相隔4名懲教人員、以及囚室門前的走廊。其餘5人則坐在被告欄中央和靠近旁聽席的位置。
+
+
+
+此前獲保釋、其後被裁罪成還柙的施德來，穿淺藍色裇衫，向旁聽的妻子微笑點頭。至於已還柙至今逾3年4個月的另外5人，黃之鋒穿深藍色裇衫、深灰色針織外套，向旁聽席點頭。快必譚得志梳中分髮型、多了不少白頭髮，身穿達明一派演唱會「REPLAY」T裇、外穿花紋短袖襯衫，入庭時笑着摸頭髮，又向旁聽席張開雙手和揮手，又指着自己的襯衫擺姿勢。
+
+消瘦了不少、有不少白頭髮的譚文豪，戴黑框眼鏡和口罩，身穿白色裇衫、深藍色西裝外套，並在聆訊時除下口罩。胡志偉亦戴眼鏡、穿摺起至中袖的白色裇衫，向旁聽席揮手。李嘉達穿灰藍色西裝外套及褲、白襯衫，手捧文件，看見親友後面露笑容和揮手。
+
+各被告就坐後，快必一度與相隔數米外的黃之鋒交談，黃說：「Cat. A（甲級犯）呀！」，快必又主動與胡志偉和施德來談話。快必聆訊期間不住對旁聽席擠眉弄眼、發笑，又豎起拇指。黃之鋒則單手持耳機，不時托頭望向旁聽席，又低頭抄寫。譚文豪則坐得畢直，專注望向前方。
+
+民主黨前主席劉慧卿、副主席莫建成，社民連曾健成、陳寶瑩，前觀塘區議會主席蔡澤鴻、前黃大仙區議員張茂清等均有到庭旁聽。
+
+
+▲ 左起：譚文豪、黃之鋒、李嘉達、譚得志、施德來、胡志偉（資料圖片）
+
+#### 辯方：黃之鋒屬「積極參加者」
+
+根據《國安法》第22條，一旦顛覆國家政權罪成，「首要分子或罪行重大」可判處10年以上至終身監禁；「積極參加者」可判監3至10年；「其他參加者」則判監3年以下、拘役或者管制。
+
+代表黃之鋒的大律師李國威進行求情陳詞。就黃的角色，李認為應屬「積極參加者」，雖其簽署「墨落無悔」聲明為加刑因素，但黃在案發期間只是參與者，沒有參與組織或協助初選進行，望由法庭決定適合的量刑起點。李又指黃及早認罪，應獲三分一扣減。
+
+李承認黃競選時提到「國際戰線」、到美國等地游說等，但指涉案謀劃屬本土事件，尋求外國支持為2019年運動的大環境，與本案控罪無關，亦不屬《國安法》第30條提到涉勾結外國勢力顛覆國家政權的情況。
+
+
+▲ 大律師 李國威
+
+#### 辯方：黃曾就多案服刑 望考慮整體原則酌情扣減
+
+李又指，黃之鋒曾因數宗非法集結及未經批准集結案服刑，望法庭判刑時考慮整體量刑原則（totality principle），運用酌情權扣減部分刑期。翻查資料，黃之鋒涉2019年6月21日號召包圍警總，承認「煽惑他人明知而參與未經批准集結」及「組織未經批准集結」，判監13個半月；同年10月5日，涉銅鑼灣參與未經批准集結及違禁蒙面法，承認控罪判監4個月；2020年六四參與維園集會，承認參與未經批准集結罪，判監8個月。黃另涉轉載西灣河開槍警及家人資料，承認藐視法庭，判監3個月。
+
+李表示，黃承認他被控的所有控罪，望法庭能調整量刑起點或作出減刑。法官陳仲衡指，但黃此前已承受罪責，法庭並不會給他額外的扣減。李同意黃之鋒於保釋期間干犯本案為加刑因素，但望法庭能酌情判刑，以免造成壓毀性影響（crushing effect）。
+
+#### 辯方：黃無寫求情信 望本案後重新開始
+
+就黃的個人背景，辯方呈上其母親、老師及教會牧師的求情信，指黃希望在服刑後放下過去，改過自新（part with his past history and be able to reform himself）。法官陳仲衡指，那是其他人代表黃之鋒說的話，而不是黃自己親口說。李同意黃沒有寫任何求情信，指這是他的選擇，但重申其指示是黃之鋒希望本案後重新開始（move on after this offence）。
+
+
+▲ 黃之鋒（資料圖片）
+
+辯方最後提到，黃在疫情期間即使沒有任何公職，亦搜購了150萬個口罩。法官陳仲衡指相關因素已被其他法官考慮，故「我們不能循環再用」。李表示，這顯示黃持續幫助其他人。法官陳仲衡指，不能將黃視作有良好品格，因他有案底；法官李運騰亦質疑，相關因素於另案已考慮，不能因此給予額外扣減。李重申，不是要求額外扣減，只是顯示黃一直積極幫助社區的人。
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47名民主派被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」案，今（5日）處理第三批被告、6名九龍東初選參與者的求情。代表前公民黨立法會議員譚文豪的資深大律師何沛謙表示，譚出身草根，從政只想回饋社會，並非激進政客；他曾多次贊成政府撥款，沒有無差別否決，更獲政府官員私信感謝。辯方又指，譚辭任立法會議員和退黨後，已完全離開政壇，譚還柙至今逾3年，望過新生活，彌補與家人包括龍鳳胎子女相處的時間。
+
+辯方又透露，譚曾於2021年下半年自願錄口供，提及如果知道會犯法，「我係絕對唔會參加呢個初選」，辯方強調他當時不知道「紅線」在哪裡；庭上又讀出譚親撰的求情信，提及望向法庭表達對過去言行深感悔疚，並「希望公開向香港社會各界以及中央政府真誠道歉」。辯方認為，譚屬「積極參加者」，望法庭考慮他對香港貢獻和真誠悔意而減刑。翻查資料，譚的一對子女將於本月中迎來10歲生日。
+
+#### 辯方：譚出身草根、非激進政客 只盼回饋社會
+
+黃之鋒一方今早求情完畢，其後由譚文豪一方求情。代表譚的資深大律師何沛謙表示，譚文豪出身於草根家庭，其父親為的士司機，譚靠其努力於澳洲修讀機械及太空工程，並成為一名民航機師。譚自2016年當選立法會議員後開始從政，他並非為個人名利或榮譽、也從沒有意圖成為激進政客，只是想回饋社會，令香港成為一個更好的地方、一個更關愛的社區。何指，譚過去曾在多個範疇服務，如他曾撰寫一本有關機師的書，並設立獎學金予望成為機師的年輕人，他對年青人和社會有真誠的熱情。
+
+#### 辯方引投票紀錄 指譚文豪支持撥款、曾獲官員私信感謝
+
+何又引用譚文豪過往的立法會投票紀錄，指他多次支持政府撥款申請，並於2020年6月至7月初選進行得如火如荼之際，仍與其他議員合作，在立法會會期完結前，盡力通過最多民生議案。辯方又引政府官員與譚的對話，提及當時能通過相關撥款屬「奇蹟」，該名官員並回覆「非常感激」。
+
+法官陳仲衡說，辯方所述的表現，是一般市民期望立法會議員有的表現，不能作為良好品格的求情因素；又指重要的不是譚以往如何投票，而是他是否無差別投票。何指譚正正沒有無差別反對，而是真誠支持民生議案，強調他非常認真、盡責履行議員職責。
+
+法官陳慶偉再指，辯方所述只是譚在該個會期的行為，但本案關乎在下屆議會無差別否決，譚亦已認罪。何強調，當時是2020年7月，正值初選的時候；又強調「行動比說話重要」，望能呈現譚較全面和正確的形象，而非僅如庭上證供所述。何又指，譚毫不激進，法官陳慶偉即指「但他的黨非常、非常激進」，李運騰亦指，鄭達鴻供稱譚文豪在公民黨3月25日記者會前的籌備會議上，提議「搶韁」。（編按：此為區諾軒寫予鄭達鴻信中的形容）
+
+
+▲ 2020年3月25日，公民黨記者會。（資料圖片）
+
+#### 辯方：譚望與親人團聚、已完全離開政壇
+
+何沛謙續指，譚文豪現已還柙逾3年，望能建立新生活，彌補他所失去與家人包括妻子、龍鳳胎子女和母親相處的時間。而譚曾開設茶餐廳，但其後因疫情結業，其妻子因照顧家庭未能找到全職工作，譚感到很抱歉。
+
+何又指，譚2020年11月辭任議員後，其政治生涯已完結，並於2021年3月退出公民黨，同年4月公開呼籲公民黨解散，完全離開政壇，足見其真誠悔意，沒有重犯機會。而譚在還柙期間成為基督徒，又修讀會計和企業管理課程，名列前茅，正裝備自己彌補過失、尋找新職涯。辯方又呈上多封求情信，讚揚譚謙卑、溫柔，是真誠和務實的人。
+
+#### 辯方指譚曾自願錄口供 稱如知犯法絕不會參加初選
+
+辯方指，最大求情因素是譚文豪及早認罪，甚至在看過同意案情前已表明會認罪；又指他在2021年下半年曾自願進行警誡錄影會面，談及自己的參與。法官陳仲衡問是否招認的證供，法官陳慶偉表示不肯定，但肯定是「自利（self-serving）」的證供。
+
+何續引述譚當時稱：「如果知道當然啦，你問返我轉頭，我係絕對唔會參加呢個初選，如果我哋知道係會犯法嘅話」，指這是他當時真誠的想法。
+
+何強調，當時初選有很多不確定和困惑，無人知道「紅線」在哪裡，而公民黨在《國安法》頒布後曾開會及修改政綱，盡量遠離紅線，雖然事後看來知道所做的是錯誤，但法庭不應從事後去裁斷被告，而應審視他案發時的真實心態，強調譚並非公然違反法律的「頑固分子（diehard）」，而是嘗試符合法律，站在正確的一邊。
+
+#### 辯方：量刑時不應考慮《國安法》前言行
+
+就量刑原則，何沛謙指法庭應考慮涉案謀劃存在的不確定性，又指《國安法》沒有追溯力、被告此前行為並非違法，法庭考慮被告角色和判刑時，不應考慮其在《國安法》前的言行，只能以相關言行判斷涉案謀劃是否存在、以及被告有否參與。至於被告的罪責，辯方主張應考慮《國安法》後的實際行為，例如參加初選、參與選舉論壇和提交提名表格。
+
+法官李運騰不止一次提到，控方並非說《國安法》前行為是犯法，但問題是相關言行能否作為背景判斷串謀協議的規模和被告的參與程度；法官陳慶偉則指，法庭已表明認為《國安法》前行為與判刑相關。何重申，只能用相關行為確立被告有罪，但不能用以考慮判刑。
+
+#### 辯方：譚為「積極參加者」
+
+何續指，認為譚文豪屬「積極參加者」，並在法官追問下，指可考慮3項行為量刑，包括譚於《國安法》後參與選舉論壇、參加初選及提交選舉提名表格。法官陳慶偉指，這樣的話就沒有行為顯示其顛覆意圖，何強調，《國安法》前行為是合法，而《國安法》後譚的行為，僅在參與一個已成立的謀劃。
+
+另外，譚文豪為「民主動力」的執行委員會委員，民主動力協助初選舉行。何沛謙表示，民動並非為初選而設，只是泛民一個很鬆散的組織，約一年開一次會，而趙家賢決定參與初選前，並沒有諮詢譚文豪等成員，譚沒有參與管理民動，其在民動的角色與本案無關。
+
+#### 譚文豪求情信：望向社會各界及中央政府真誠道歉
+
+何最後重申，望法庭考慮譚對香港的貢獻、及早認罪、真誠悔意而酌情減刑，並以譚求情信最後一句作結：「在此我希望向法庭表達，我對過去的言行深感悔疚，希望公開向香港社會各界以及中央政府真誠道歉。」
+
+辯方完成求情後，萬德豪補充，針對譚所作的錄影會面，並不是對其參與角色的正確描述。法官李運騰指那沒有關係，被告認罪已獲三分一扣減。
+
+根據《國安法》第22條，一旦顛覆國家政權罪成，「首要分子或罪行重大」可判處10年以上至終身監禁；「積極參加者」可判監3至10年；「其他參加者」則判監3年以下、拘役或者管制。
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47名民主派被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」案，今（5日）處理第三批被告、6名九龍東初選參與者的求情。代表前觀塘區議員李嘉達的大律師陳德昌指，李屬「積極參加者」較低級別，望以3年至6年半為量刑起點。陳續指，李曾任社工，2019年目睹年青人感無力沮喪，遂決定成為區議員，其後望投身更大政治舞台改變現況，遂參與初選，事後回看屬錯誤。辯方又指，李還柙3年4個月已付上代價，其女友曾提議結婚，但他望對方等待自己出獄，以辦正式婚禮。雖然李被定罪後無法再成為社工，但有非政府機構願在李獲釋後聘請他。
+
+辯方最後提到，今午與李會面時，李提及自兩年前認罪後，一直未有離開過赤柱監獄，而他今天往法院途上，看到外面樹木翠綠、陽光燦爛、天空蔚藍，一切令人提起精神。辯方指李已改變，他表明會離開政治，邁向人生新階段，繼續服務社會。李庭上聞言一度落淚。
+
+#### 辯方：李嘉達屬「積極參加者」 量刑起點不超6年半
+
+黃之鋒及譚文豪完成求情後，由李嘉達一方求情。代表李嘉達的大律師陳德昌指，在刑期分級上，李應該屬「積極參加者」的較低級別，並非最嚴重的一種，建議以3至6年半監禁為量刑起點。
+
+就李的背景，陳指他1992年在內地出生，現年33歲，為家中獨子。李3歲時來港定居，在工人階層家庭成長，居於觀塘。李在中學的成績優異，曾於2008年汶川大地震期間為災民發起籌款，其後入讀香港大學社會工作系，並於2013年畢業，同年成為註冊社工。陳指，李被定罪後難再成為社工，但不會形容為「世界末日」，因他會找到其他方式服務社會。
+
+翻查資料，《社會工作者註冊條例》修訂今刊憲生效，犯危害國安罪的人將永久除牌。
+
+#### 辯方：李望改變現況故參與初選 卻犯下錯誤
+
+陳續指，李曾在學校擔任社工，並向特殊教育需要（SEN）學生教授戲劇。陳續略為哽咽提到，有學生家長撰寫非常感動的感謝信予李，讚揚在李的努力下，其子女變得更願意打開自己。陳形容李對工作充滿熱誠，盡心服務兒童，表現出色。
+
+陳續指，李進修關於表達藝術治療的碩士學位，直至2019年，李目睹社會情況導致年青人感無力和沮喪，於是決定成為區議員，冀回應他們的關注，影響更多人。李成為區議員數個月後，決定投身更大的政治平台，以改變當時的情況，於是提交初選表格。陳形容李因此步入了黑暗（dark side），開始走向下坡，事後回看是犯下了錯誤。
+
+#### 辯方：李盼出獄後結婚、有NGO願聘用
+
+陳強調，李及早認罪並承認全部案情，顯示最大的悔意，應該獲得充足的刑期扣減。而李還柙期間，其女友曾提議結婚，但李希望等待至自己出獄，以舉辦正式的婚禮，邀請親友觀禮。辯方亦呈上41封求情信，來自李本人、女友、家人、中學校長、大學教授和同學、任職社工時的服務對象、觀塘區街坊及教會。有非政府機構表明願意聘請李作為研究助理，並保留職位待他出獄再聘請。
+
+陳指，李還柙3年4個月，已經付上代價。他還柙期間祖母不幸離世，其女友等待他成婚，亦有一份工作等待他，是一個誤入歧途的好人（a good man went to the dark side）。辯方指，李表明會離開政壇，望出獄後能夠展開新生活，找尋方法以社工、戲劇導師和治療師的身分，繼續服務社會。
+
+#### 辯方引李嘉達談近況 李一度落淚
+
+陳最後指，今天午膳時間時曾會見李，李說自2022年6月認罪後，已沒有離開過赤柱監獄。陳問及有何不一樣，李提到前往法院途中，看到「樹木翠綠，陽光燦爛，天空蔚藍，一切都令人提起精神」。（“The trees are green, the sun is bright, the sky is blue, everything is very refreshing for me.”）
+
+陳表示對此感到驚訝，因自己有時會到赤柱，但卻從沒有留意。陳強調，李已經改過自新，知道生命中重要的東西，並望邁向人生新階段，服務社會。陳提起這段對話時，李嘉達頻頻眨眼、流下眼淚，並用手擦拭，離開法庭時他向旁聽席再揮手，並以紙巾拭鼻。辯方申請李明日不到庭獲批。
+
+
+▲ 李嘉達（資料圖片）
+
+散庭時，胡志偉微笑向旁聽席雙手合十、做致敬手勢，快必在進入囚室前伸直手臂做出心心動作。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69-70/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-08-a-hollow-force.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-08-a-hollow-force.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : A Hollow Force?
+author: Matthew Savill
+date : 2024-07-08 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/QoEHmac.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Choices for the UK Armed Forces"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_As the new UK government grapples with the current state of the Armed Forces, hard thinking and prioritisation are needed to ensure they can provide capable and coherent forces to NATO and deal with modern threats._
+
+
+
+We have been told we live in a “pre-war” era, characterised by a darkening global mood, conflict and competition and the erosion of the so-called global order, and with a requirement to defend UK interests, by force if necessary. This is the context in which the previous UK government announced its intent to increase defence spending to 2.5% of GDP, and regardless of how much this produces in terms of “new” funding (it certainly isn’t £75 billion), the UK’s Armed Forces face a series of major decisions, especially given the forthcoming review of Defence.
+
+
+### (Re)learning the Lessons of Major War
+
+Governments and commentators alike have identified a rogues’ gallery of state threats, with Russia and China in the vanguard, Iran and North Korea following close behind, and non-state groups like Yemen’s Houthis filling in the gaps. While the headline is one of state-based competition and “peer conflict”, no cosy assumptions can be made about the end of significant threats from terrorism, nor insecurity caused by threats which don’t reach the threshold of open war, but which affect trade or business. To reinforce the point, NATO’s most recent Strategic Concept sets out the same range of threats, highlighting Russia along the way. With a core task of deterrence and defence, there is no doubt that industrial warfare is one of the key factors shaping NATO militaries.
+
+Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine follows on from the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan as a testbed for the clash of arms on a scale unseen in Europe since the end of the Second World War. The Middle East is also highlighting the role of long-range missiles, air defence, urban warfare, and irregular or non-state forces with an ability to pose a threat to forces on land, in the air or at sea, as well as to target critical infrastructure. And the continued growth of the Chinese military is a modern case study in the development of armed forces with an assumed focus on challenging a superpower in a war that will be fought in all environments over a vast area.
+
+Learning lessons is not as straightforward as it might be, given the human tendency to fall prey to biases such as anchoring around pre-conceived ideas and recency, as well as the difficulty in identifying long-term trends based on snapshots of incomplete information. But it seems plausible to advance several arguments.
+
+___`The UK can do some things well, but not at a particularly impressive scale when the adversary is a state with significant military power of its own which is prepared to suffer losses`___
+
+First, numbers matter. Firepower and destructive force are the overarching measures of a force’s combat output, and military power is about threatening to use or actually using force to destroy things and kill or coerce people. The war in Ukraine has seen casualties and losses of equipment on a scale consistent with previous major wars, but which boggle the mind in a modern context. The Russian invasion force in Ukraine now numbers over half a million after an estimated 460,000 killed or wounded. It has lost thousands of tanks and armoured vehicles. The artillery duel has seen requirements for shells reach as high as 7,000 a day for the Ukrainians on the offensive. Looking across to the Middle East, Iran used nearly 200 cruise missiles and drones in its attack on Israel, and in firing 110 ballistic missiles, it assembled the largest single salvo of such weapons seen in the past 40 years, other than in the first 48 hours of the Russian attack on Ukraine in 2022.
+
+These numbers not only matter for combat output, but also for the resilience of countries in war, their industrial capacity and their ability to sustain a campaign. The Russian “special operation” was supposed to be short, lasting days not years, but Sir Lawrence Freedman has written compellingly about the (seductive) myth of the “knockout blow”, and Ukraine provides an ample modern reminder. It is obvious but bears re-stating: industrial war is protracted and costly, more so when national survival is on the line.
+
+Once in such a conflict, militaries are stressed across the full range of their capabilities and not just the combat arms. The oft-quoted line about amateurs, professionals and logistics is well-worn, but warranted. Militaries that can’t resupply and sustain themselves have no endurance, and precision or one-shot firepower is of little use if it can’t achieve repeated success, especially in major war. RUSI has written recently about the challenges of land logistics on the front-line, but the same is true of being able to resupply navies at sea, and to ferry weapons to air forces who have to conduct strikes repeatedly. Logistics supply chains and capabilities need to be either very rapid or integrated into the combat force (ideally both) and capable of surviving in modern combat environments, with pervasive surveillance and long-range weapons able to strike in shortening timelines. The force that cannot be sustained can’t fight for long.
+
+
+### You and Whose Army?
+
+Can the UK’s Armed Forces put together such a force for modern warfare? The answer, at least in the eyes of the UK Parliament’s Defence Committee, as well as some recently responsible for testing Defence planning, would appear to be no. The trend of the past 35 years has been to trade numbers for sophistication, but this has overall led to a diminution of total firepower. The UK can do some things well, but not at a particularly impressive scale when the adversary is a state with significant military power of its own which is prepared to suffer losses. Even a recent defence secretary admitted that the forces had been “hollowed out” over a period of years.
+
+Consider the carrier strike group; this represents a sovereign UK capability, with a full range of aircraft and vessels deployed. But in the case of the Royal Navy, a “full fat” carrier group comprises almost the totality of the deployable Royal Navy. Two Type 23 frigates and two Type 45 destroyers would – on most days – be all that the current Navy could sustain for major operations beyond an additional frigate as the Fleet Ready Escort for home waters. Protecting it with a hunter-killer submarine would also be taxing, given the UK generally only has one or two deployed at any given time. Meanwhile, the slow buildup of the F-35B force means there are enough pilots currently qualified for carrier operations for a single squadron (hopefully soon to be two). Each jet represents a potent stealth aircraft, able to evade enemy air defences. But a closer look at the programme gives us pause to consider the combat output of each jet. If it is operating within range of hostile air defences, it will only be using its internal weapons bay; it is currently only able to carry Paveway IV guided bombs and air-to-air missiles, so no stand-off weapons are available to strike ground targets. The missiles being developed under SPEAR Capability 3 won’t be integrated with F-35 until “the end of the decade”. Additionally, it only has room for two such bombs, and as it would be risky to allocate one bomb to any given target, the best each jet can be expected to strike is a single target of modest size given the 500 lb payload of each Paveway. In other words, the current entire output of the carrier wing in a single set of sorties is 8–12 targets, assuming 100% aircraft availability and success rate. For a demonstration of intent, as part of a coalition operation, this might suffice, but in a genuine state war of attrition, this is limited.
+
+Similarly, when RUSI analysts last looked at the Army, and the combat division the UK claims to have, it measured the number of main battle tanks and self-propelled artillery in the UK’s inventory and found the numbers wanting when set against a “credible” armoured division of anywhere from 170 to over 300 tanks and around 110 to 220 artillery pieces. The numbers have not improved in the subsequent four years: under the Challenger 3 programme the UK will have a total of 148 main battle tanks (in 2030). Meanwhile, the UK has essentially removed the AS90 artillery from service by donating 32 to Ukraine, replacing them with 14 Archer guns until such time as the “Mobile Fires Platform” is procured (some time “this decade”). The Challenger 3 may be the “most lethal tank” ever fielded by the British Army, but it is going to be available in such limited numbers that it will have to perform heroically in the face of a notional foe in the form of Russian ground forces, such as a Combined Arms Army.
+
+
+### Tooth to Tail: Sustaining the Combat Force
+
+Beyond the industrial capacity modern states need to go to war, and the volume of ammunition or fuel consumed, forces in combat require the ability to move supplies around, to conduct surveillance to target the enemy, and to use other systems such as electronic warfare to ensure that their weapons can reach their targets and their forces can communicate. For the UK, the picture here is no less problematic in terms of the gap between aspiration and reality. RUSI experts assess that for the Army to deploy a single armoured brigade would require the commitment of around 70 to 80% of its total combat engineering capabilities in order to cross gaps and rivers or to breach minefields. The notion that the UK has enough to properly deploy a full division is fanciful. Meanwhile, manoeuvring this force successfully will require effective coordination via secure modern communications. Unfortunately, the Army will have to once again extend its obsolete Bowman system because of delays to MORPHEUS, already late and now possibly another decade from proper service. It may also come as a surprise to a generation weaned on popular culture’s pervasive use of spy satellites to learn that the UK is wholly dependent on others for space-based imagery; the ISTARI network is in development, but won’t start launching until 2026.
+
+Once deployed, ground forces need protecting, especially from air attack. But the UK has a tiny number of Sky Sabre systems currently available; while public debate has focused on the (wholly unnecessary) idea of an “Iron Dome” across the UK, the more pertinent question would be who is defending UK land forces if they face an enemy air threat: at the moment this would have to be done by partners or the RAF (which lacks the ability to suppress sophisticated enemy air defences).
+
+___`It will take novel thinking and the development of doctrine and tactics to achieve increased combat output and effect with forces that appear unlikely to increase in terms of personnel`___
+
+Use of air power requires also effective coordination. The RAF has replaced its ageing E-3D Sentry airborne early warning aircraft with the E-7 Wedgetail. However, these won’t start being in service until 2025, and the UK is only buying three; this doesn’t even guarantee 24-hour availability (a “task line”) of a single aircraft, once again putting the emphasis on partners and ensuring that each aircraft is irreplaceable. Meanwhile, the RAF has also retired its C-130 Hercules transport fleet, to be replaced by the A-400M Atlas aircraft. This is more capable in terms of the payload it can carry individually, but with smaller numbers in the replacement force compared to the original C-130 force, just sustaining the same number of task lines will require much improved aircraft availability.
+
+Returning to the carrier strike group, the UK ability to sustain it over long distances relies on a single Fleet Solid Support Ship, RFA Fort Victoria. When that is in maintenance (or if it were destroyed in a war), the UK has no backup and must rely on others. It is at least being replaced by three new ships, but they are not due to arrive in service until 2031 (and one of the industrial partners involved in their construction is now in financial difficulties).
+
+
+### Less than the Sum of its Parts?
+
+These are but a selection of the issues facing the modern UK Armed Forces in terms of combat power, before we even consider recruitment, retention, training and other personnel issues. The conclusion should not be one of despair, or that the UK does not have capable people and equipment. But it has tried to pursue a classic “full spectrum” of capabilities, and found itself stretched thin beyond the point where it can deploy fully integrated and credible forces that could fight in a modern war for any length of time. The choices available to the government have therefore been constrained, such that the UK can make a decent contribution to a coalition force in terms of specific capabilities, but it can’t provide a sizeable fully coherent force commensurate with its status as the (now) third-largest spender in NATO without the support of others.
+
+Solutions are available, but they will require hard thinking and prioritisation. In some cases, increased firepower will be desirable. But it may be that the UK should be investing in sustainment and enablers like bridging equipment before purchasing a single additional tank or jet that it can’t, in any case, deploy and support. Technology should play a key role – for example, learning the lessons about where drones can complement artillery and provide effective local surveillance. But it will take novel thinking and the development of doctrine and tactics, allied to new training, to achieve increased combat output – and effect – with forces that appear unlikely to increase in terms of personnel. More radical choices about improving output – for example, through the use of uncrewed systems, or AI to make sense of information and take decisions – should also be considered. In addition, the UK will need to decide where it provides a sovereign advantage that acts as a force multiplier for the rest of NATO, and where it will create tough, capable, fully integrated forces that do not create obligations for other NATO Allies. Otherwise, the UK’s claim to be a leading country in NATO will be undermined by a military providing less than the sum of its parts.
+
+---
+
+__Matthew Savill__ is the Director of Military Sciences at RUSI, focussing on developments and trends in modern conflict, and the use of force in the 21st Century.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-08-combating-disinformation.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-08-combating-disinformation.md
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@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Combating Disinformation
+author: Christopher B. Johnstone and Leah Klaas
+date : 2024-07-08 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/IVRBcBO.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "An Agenda for U.S.-Japan Cooperation"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Disinformation is a daunting challenge for the United States and its allies and partners. This report assesses Chinese and Russian disinformation efforts in the Indo-Pacific and charts an agenda for the United States and Japan in combating it._
+
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+Disinformation and other forms of “information operations” have become tools of choice for authoritarian regimes seeking to coerce and influence adversaries in the “gray zone” below the threshold of military conflict. Russia famously employed these tools in its effort to influence the U.S. presidential election in 2016 and continues to use them as part of its war of aggression against Ukraine. China uses disinformation to influence political developments across the Indo-Pacific region, including through an effort to influence the results of Taiwan’s presidential election in January 2024. As Japan’s National Security Strategy notes, “Grey zone situations over territories, cross-border cyberattacks on critical civilian infrastructures, and information warfare through spread of disinformation, are constantly taking place, thereby further blurring the boundary between contingency and peacetime.”
+
+This report explores the disinformation threat environment in the Indo-Pacific region, with a particular focus on China and, to a lesser extent, Russia. It examines tools and methods for combating disinformation and seeks to chart an agenda for deeper collaboration between the United States and Japan in addressing this growing challenge. This report incorporates the results of a closed-door conference held at CSIS in February 2024 which featured experts on this subject from the United States and Japan.
+
+___`Disinformation and other forms of “information operations” have become tools of choice for authoritarian regimes seeking to coerce and influence adversaries in the “gray zone” below the threshold of military conflict.`___
+
+#### Scope and Definitions
+
+There are many terms used to describe the manipulation or selective use of information for malign purposes, many of which are used interchangeably. These terms carry specific connotations, which “can lead to assumptions about how information spreads, who spreads it, and who receives it.” Therefore, it is important to foster a common lexicon of terms for this report:
+
+- __Information operations__ (also referred to as “influence operations”) encompass various strategies aimed at influencing a targeted audience’s decisionmaking, beliefs, and opinions or otherwise affecting their mindset, as defined by Kuwahara Kyoko. John Garnaut further describes these as a type of “political interference”: covert, corrupt, or coercive actions designed to manipulate public opinion. Information operations serve as the umbrella concept that encompasses the other terms identified here.
+
+- __Disinformation__, a key component of information operations and the focus of this report, is characterized by a deliberate intention to deceive and manipulate. Perpetrators deliberately and often covertly disseminate false information, making attribution challenging. Externally originated disinformation narratives often intertwine with domestic ones and commercial sensationalism, further complicating identification. It is crucial to recognize that disinformation may not be entirely false; effective disinformation typically blends truth (verifiable facts) with fabrication (unverifiable information).
+
+- __Misinformation__, on the other hand, refers to verifiably false information disseminated regardless of intent to mislead.
+
+- __Malinformation__ involves sharing genuine information with the intent to cause harm, often by exposing private details to the public sphere.
+
+- Lastly, __propaganda__, which often is overt in origin, is orchestrated by operators seeking to influence public perception through information that can be true but is typically of a biased or misleading nature.
+
+
+### Assessing the Threat Environment
+
+China and, to a lesser extent, Russia are the primary sources of information operations and disinformation in the Indo-Pacific. This section highlights the objectives and strategies of China and Russia and describes specific narratives they seek to propagate.
+
+#### China
+
+Chinese information operations have expanded significantly in scope and sophistication in recent years, particularly after the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic as Beijing sought to shape international views of the virus’s origin. Beijing is working to promote both positive views of China in the region and to stimulate negative views of the United States and its allies. Narratives that China seeks to spread vary regionally and closely relate to its larger strategic objectives, including degrading the willingness of partners to work closely with the United States and weakening Southeast Asian unity on regional security issues such as territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Recent research indicates that China’s primary goals — and the associated narratives used to achieve them — are as follows:
+
+1. __Promote a positive view of China and of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), including bolstering Xi Jinping’s image.__ For example, Beijing depicted itself as a benevolent aid giver during the Covid-19 pandemic. China frequently attempted to arrange handover ceremonies and statements of gratitude from countries where it sent medical supplies and vaccines. In fact, however, 99 percent of its medical supply exports and 96 percent of its vaccine exports were sales, not donations.
+
+2. __Promote China’s style of governance as a model for developing countries to emulate, weakening the international liberal world order and the influence of democracy.__ Xi Jinping is known to assert, for example, that China’s system offers “a new option for other countries and nations who want to speed up their development while preserving their independence.”
+
+3. __Encourage openness to Chinese investment and strategic engagement abroad by highlighting the benefits of the Belt and Road Initiative and spreading the narrative that cooperation with China produces “tangible economic benefits.”__ In one such instance, China emphasized the connection between population surveillance and economic growth to Nigerian state-level officials when pitching a comprehensive “safe city” package, a move designed to make people associate norms of surveillance and information control with prosperity.
+
+4. __Marginalize, demonize, or suppress anti-CCP voices and commentary that presents the Chinese government and its leaders in a negative light.__ Examples of this include the recent sentencing of Australian scholar Yang Hengjun and the detainment of Hokkaido University professor Iwatani Nobu. Yang is a pro-democracy activist who was arrested for espionage in 2019. Iwatani is a Japanese historian apparently arrested for possession of materials related to the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937−1945) — suggesting that Beijing is focused on controlling historical narratives related to the origins of the People’s Republic of China.
+
+5. __Foster doubts about U.S. intentions and commitment to the region and undermine U.S. relationships with key allies and partners.__ For example, between 2018 and 2020, China used a network of 161 Facebook and Instagram accounts to promote negative public opinion in the Philippines of the U.S.-Philippines alliance. The disinformation campaign portrayed U.S. actions in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait as aggressive, praised Chinese naval operations in the South China Sea, and promoted Filipino leaders with favorable opinions toward China’s regional policies.
+
+These various narratives are perpetrated and supported by the Chinese government, but they also emerge organically both inside China and among populations abroad who have been influenced by the CCP’s strategic messaging. A prime example of this dynamic is the disinformation surrounding the release of treated water from the Fukushima nuclear power plants (discussed in more detail later in this report). While Beijing has sought to promote a false narrative that the water release presents a health risk to the Indo-Pacific, similar narratives have emerged organically, both inside Japan and in the region.
+
+___`Chinese information operations have expanded significantly in scope and sophistication in recent years, particularly after the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic as Beijing sought to shape international views of the virus’s origin.`___
+
+#### Chinese Disinformation Strategies: Four Main Lines of Effort
+
+Analysis shows that China uses a variety of techniques to spread preferred narratives and influence the information environment. Its strategies and tactics reflect increasing sophistication and employ novel techniques and goals:
+
+1. __Generate pro-China multimedia content that is accessible and compelling and that appears credible.__ Beijing creates approved content and makes it readily accessible to Chinese media outlets around the world, including in the Mekong region, Kenya, Brazil, and many other nations worldwide; in some cases, it offers content for free or at reduced rates. China also influences foreign opinions through content-sharing agreements with media outlets in countries ranging from Australia to Zimbabwe to Peru to Thailand.
+
+2. __Amplify pro-China content and maximize channels for distributing it.__ All major state media outlets have accounts on X (formerly Twitter) and Facebook, and some make use of YouTube and Instagram. Collectively, these accounts have substantial followings, in some cases in the tens of millions. These approaches are complemented by the development and deployment of social media networks such as WeChat and TikTok, which are increasingly influential globally. WeChat also performs a surveillance function, monitoring politically sensitive conversations among users outside of China. The U.S. Department of State’s Global Engagement Center found that as of August 2023, China has roughly 333 “diplomatic and official media accounts,” with nearly 65 million followers.
+
+3. __Influence local media to suppress criticism and promote China-friendly narratives while spreading narratives critical of the United States and other countries China sees as adversaries.__ China employs fear to suppress information and narratives it finds unfavorable, in some cases by threatening physical violence, taking legal action, or restricting access to the lucrative Chinese market for foreign media outlets, journalists, and academics. Punishment of academics or journalists who write content critical of the CCP’s leadership incentivizes self-censorship both within China and internationally. Opportunistic reporting is another tactic, in which China amplifies stories that undermine its adversaries and stoke historical animosities. China has sought to disseminate news stories exaggerating safety concerns in communities surrounding U.S. bases in Japan, including crimes involving U.S. military personnel in Okinawa, and issues relating to the history of Korean “comfort women” during the Japanese colonial period.
+
+China’s disinformation campaigns are increasingly sophisticated and far-reaching. Prior to Taiwan’s presidential election in January 2024, for example, Beijing employed a comprehensive strategy that ranged from framing the choice between the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT) as one of “war” versus “peace” to exploiting local issues and using local proxies to promote rumors of scandal involving DPP leaders. The effectiveness of China’s disinformation efforts remains open to question, however. The campaign against Taiwan, which has developed a robust rapid-response infrastructure to combat disinformation, was ultimately a failure, and there are numerous examples elsewhere of propaganda not resonating due to a lack of credibility, anti-China sentiment, and competition from foreign media outlets with well-established reputations. A recent report from the Center of Analysis for Democracy finds that pro-China propaganda on popular streaming platforms in Latin America and Spain has failed to attract Spanish-speaking audiences. Research on strategic messaging in Tibet shows how anti-China sentiment limits the efficacy of the CCP’s “patriotic education programs,” even inside of China. And the Center for Naval Analyses highlights widespread suspicion of China in the Mekong region.
+
+___`The effectiveness of China’s disinformation efforts remains open to question.`___
+
+It is also unclear whether China itself possesses tools for measuring the effectiveness of its information operations; the bureaucratic apparatus surrounding these campaigns appears to emphasize quantity over impact. For example, China has expanded state-owned media outlets globally over the past decade, reaching 181 bureaus in 142 countries as of August 2021. Some of these outlets produce massive numbers of articles, such as the bureau in Nairobi, whose 150 journalists and 400 staff produce 1,800 stories a month. However, the rapid expansion of state-owned outlets has not corresponded to a general increase in readership or perceived credibility.
+
+That said, quantity can take on a quality of its own. In 2020, Google suspended tens of thousands of YouTube accounts linked to Chinese information operations. Many of them pushed disinformation that was poorly created and easy to identify as false. But by repeatedly exposing users to the same false narratives, these accounts sought to create a sense of familiarity and thereby convince the public of the accuracy of their narratives. As a report by the Institute for Strategic Research at the French Ministry for the Armed Forces explains, “Actors involved in disinformation campaigns will not always bother adopt [sic] an appearance of authenticity for the information they propagate. This is the reason why Chinese actors, in particular, seem to put quantity before quality.”
+
+#### Russia
+
+Although Russia’s information operations have been thoroughly studied, its efforts to shape the information environment in Japan and the Indo-Pacific are less well known.
+
+Russia’s global efforts currently focus on undermining support for Ukraine by pushing the narrative that Ukraine was always “Russian” and sowing doubt about U.S. leadership, commitment, and intentions — narratives that also impact the Indo-Pacific. The U.S. Department of State’s Global Engagement Center (GEC) analyzed seven Kremlin-aligned disinformation proxy sites that amplified false narratives critical of the United States around the world. Japan and Australia were among the Indo-Pacific nations where narratives resonated most and where accounts sharing the content were concentrated. For example, content from the Russian-registered website SouthFront, which pushed “deep-state” conspiracy theories on the origins of the Covid-19 pandemic and U.S. border-wall funding, was particularly popular among Japanese media users.
+
+___`Although Russia’s information operations have been thoroughly studied, its efforts to shape the information environment in Japan and the Indo-Pacific are less well known.`___
+
+Regarding Japan, Russia attempts to spread the narrative that the two countries’ dispute over the Northern Territories — which the United States recognizes as Japanese — is an artificial creation and that Japan is a remilitarizing nation acting at Washington’s behest. Like China, Russia seeks to promote self-determination narratives in Okinawa to sow division domestically. It leverages anxieties in Japan about China’s military buildup by asserting that Tokyo should maintain good relations with Moscow to avoid pushing Russia toward China — a narrative that is far less effective since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
+
+Russia’s disinformation and propaganda ecosystem is made up of a “collection of official, proxy, and unattributed communication channels and platforms.” The GEC breaks these channels into five pillars: official government communications, state-funded global messaging, cultivated proxy sources, weaponized social media, and cyber-enabled disinformation.
+
+Russian disinformation tactics also encompass “offline” strategies aimed at influencing foreign journalists, academics, and policymakers by inviting them to Russia, granting them access to high-ranking officials, and promoting narratives favorable to Moscow through platforms such as the Valdai Discussion Club. Political commentator Tucker Carlson’s February 2024 interview of Vladimir Putin is an obvious example of this. As “agents of influence,” these individuals serve as (potentially) unwitting conduits for Kremlin narratives.
+
+#### Collaboration between China and Russia
+
+Experts on disinformation have an ongoing debate about the degree to which China and Russia explicitly coordinate information operations. Hosaka Sanshiro argues that cooperation in this realm has historically been a “forbidden zone,” with intelligence agencies from both nations protecting their independence and avoiding coordinated efforts, in part due to diverging geopolitical interests. The GEC’s 2023 special report argues the opposite, noting that in 2020 China and Russia agreed to “jointly combat disinformation [and] offer an accurate account of facts and truth.” The report outlines numerous examples of where China’s messaging amplified or mirrored Russia’s messaging, particularly on the war in Ukraine.
+
+Both nations seek to capitalize on underlying tensions in Okinawa related to the U.S. military presence there, hoping to sow division and undermine support for the United States. There are anecdotal examples of Russian and Chinese platforms echoing similar talking points or relying on the same proxy voices, such as an Indian geopolitical expert who has contributed to both the Global Times and Sputnik. At the very least, there is clear evidence that both countries opportunistically leverage disinformation and narratives that align with their geopolitical agendas.
+
+While it is unclear if these examples reflect explicit and deliberate cooperation, the increasing sophistication of China’s information operations clearly reflects learning from Russian strategies and techniques. A 2020 Freedom House report highlights the rapid evolution of Chinese disinformation methods, indicating a deliberate effort to adapt and refine strategies. Chinese attempts to meddle in social media, starting as early as 2017, appear to have drawn inspiration from Russia, although they appear less sophisticated. This gap may narrow as China continues to refine its disinformation techniques, potentially rivaling Russia’s expertise in the future.
+
+___`The increasing sophistication of China’s information operations clearly reflects learning from Russian strategies and techniques.`___
+
+Furthermore, China’s sponsorship of journalists who parrot official stances on Xinjiang reflects a concerted effort to control narratives and shape perceptions, mirroring Russia’s use of state-sponsored media outlets. Chinese authorities have also delved into “offline disinformation” methods taken from Russia’s playbook, exemplified by the CCP United Front Work Department’s activities in Australia and New Zealand, which aim to silence dissent and exert influence through financial largesse and coercive networks. A 2016 conference in Beijing that focused on Okinawa offers another example of how China uses in-person engagements strategically to exchange tactics and narratives.
+
+_CHINESE AND RUSSIAN INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN AND AROUND JAPAN_
+
+Given Japan’s geographical proximity to China, economic significance, and position as a U.S. ally, it is an inevitable target for Chinese information and disinformation operations. However, China’s efforts within Japan appear to be largely ineffective. Disinformation alone has been unable to offset the increasingly negative perceptions of China’s behavior among the Japanese public. Indeed, annual opinion surveys conducted by the Japanese government indicate historically high levels of confidence in the United States — and historically high levels of distrust toward China. Other factors, such as the limited presence of foreign media in Japan and the country’s distinct cultural and linguistic characteristics, contribute to the diminished impact of such influence operations.
+
+However, Japan has become the target of Chinese disinformation campaigns elsewhere in East Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific. Beginning in January 2023, China began a disinformation campaign to inflame international public opinion regarding Japan’s release of treated wastewater from the Fukushima nuclear reactor meltdown. In social media posts and news articles, China referred to “nuclear-contaminated wastewater” instead of “treated wastewater,” even though the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) determined that the release would have little impact on humans or the environment. Between January and August 2023, when the first batch of wastewater was released, posts by Chinese officials, state media, and pro-China influencers mentioning “Fukushima” increased by more than 1,500 percent.
+
+___`Given Japan’s geographical proximity to China, economic significance, and position as a U.S. ally, it is an inevitable target for Chinese information and disinformation operations.`___
+
+Chinese disinformation related to Fukushima also targeted non-Japanese audiences. For example, the Global Times published around 126 English-language articles between January and August 2023 about the wastewater release. Similarly, Chinese state media ran at least 22 advertisements in languages such as English, German, Portuguese, and Khmer, emphasizing risks associated with the release.
+
+Most concerningly, China amplified narratives questioning the accuracy of the IAEA report on the treated wastewater, implying that Japan had bribed the agency to support the release. On June 21, 2023, a South Korean media report surfaced that falsely claimed that Japan had made a €1 million ($1.1 million) political donation to the IAEA to resolve differences of opinion about the safety of the wastewater. Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded the following day with a press release unequivocally denying these claims. Yet, as reported in the Global Times, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs continued to call for Japan to explain why these allegations surfaced.
+
+
+### Strategies for Combating Disinformation
+
+The growing threat of disinformation across the globe poses a daunting challenge for the United States and its allies and partners. Liberal democracies, with their commitment to freedom of expression and open media environments, are particularly vulnerable and face an asymmetric disadvantage. While banning the use of many Western social media platforms internally, for example, China uses those same platforms to influence the information environment around the world. To address this challenge, scholars and experts have identified various strategies and techniques involving technology, education, and regulation which, when used in combination, can help detect and mitigate information operations.
+
+___`Liberal democracies, with their commitment to freedom of expression and open media environments, are particularly vulnerable and face an asymmetric disadvantage.`___
+
+#### Public Education and Media Literacy
+
+Education and media literacy aim to address the root causes of political polarization and division that contribute to the spread of deceptive narratives. Recognizing that disinformation can both influence and be influenced by existing polarization, it is crucial to tackle underlying societal divisions to effectively mitigate its impact. While disinformation usually originates from malicious actors, its dissemination is often facilitated by unwitting individuals, particularly those dissatisfied with the existing political status quo.
+
+Both the United States and Japan have a long way to go in improving media literacy and building resilient societies capable of critically assessing information. As of 2021, they ranked 15th and 16th, respectively, out of 44 countries worldwide in terms of media literacy education.
+
+In the United States, there are currently no nationwide initiatives for enhancing media literacy and preparing Americans to think critically about mis- and disinformation. However, the nonprofit group Media Literacy Now has reported progress at the state level, with 19 states passing legislation providing funding for or mandating media literacy education in primary schools and in professional development programs. In addition, the Center for Information, Technology, and Public Life has developed a freely accessible syllabus for professional disinformation researchers or higher-education institutions in the United States that explicitly addresses how social inequalities and power structures shape disinformation. The Digital Inquiry Group has also partnered with Google to develop Civic Online Reasoning, a free website with curricula and research on countering information operations. However, these efforts still pale in comparison to concerted nationwide efforts in other countries, including Australia, Belgium, Canada, Finland, and Singapore.
+
+Japan also lacks a comprehensive nationwide effort to promote media and information literacy, particularly in the context of mis- and disinformation. As in the United States, there are some isolated efforts to address the challenge. The Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK) has introduced an online resource for teaching media literacy to elementary and middle school children, for example. The SmartNews Media Research Institute generates similar resources. In addition, the Japan Association for Educational Media Study has begun incorporating the topic of media literacy into its annual conferences for educators.
+
+In Europe, initiatives such as the regular defense courses offered by the International Centre for Defense and Security to opinion leaders — some of which have focused on elements of countering information operations — offer a blueprint for fostering high-level policy dialogue and curricula that can help maintain vigilance against disinformation. Nongovernmental organizations in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have launched a multilateral disinformation-monitoring platform focused on the Russian threat. Similarly, NATO has established the Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence to monitor Russian information operations and share research on the latest technological developments that Russia uses to spread disinformation. However, in the Indo-Pacific region, the absence of a larger multilateral security apparatus like NATO complicates coordinated responses to disinformation.
+
+#### Technology-Based Approaches
+
+Artificial intelligence (AI) and other emerging technologies are a double-edged sword in dealing with information operations. While there is increasing attention to how AI can help combat disinformation, “deepfakes” and other forms of synthetic content can also be used to amplify false narratives, creating highly convincing yet fabricated content at significant scale. With at least 64 countries worldwide holding elections in 2024, deepfakes impersonating political candidates, aimed at swaying voting habits, are a particular concern.
+
+While emerging technologies can exacerbate the mis- and disinformation problem, they also can play a pivotal role in the ongoing battle against it, offering various tools and capabilities to identify, track, and combat deceptive content. Defensive AI systems are designed to detect patterns of behavior indicative of coordinated disinformation efforts, contributing to the early identification and mitigation of false narratives. AI tracking mechanisms deployed by platforms such as Overwatch and Google enable the monitoring of online activities to identify suspicious behavior and content. Companies and platforms such as Inflection AI, Google Gemini, and Blackbird AI offer narrative-identification and monitoring tools that recognize cultural nuances, allowing automatic response mechanisms to analyze comments and engage more effectively with diverse audiences, responding convincingly in real time — thereby combating disinformation at its source. Additionally, AI-enabled social-monitoring platforms can categorize narratives and extract insights from articles, enabling the identification of common threats and the development of targeted responses. AI and other technologies can play an integral role in advancing the following methods of combating influence operations.
+
+_FACT-CHECKING AND DEBUNKING_
+
+Fact-checking and debunking methods play crucial roles in combating disinformation. While fact-checking typically adopts a broad and impartial approach, debunking is more strategic and targeted, aiming to address specific actors or topics.
+
+Given the longstanding nature of the Russian threat, European allies have pioneered efforts to fact-check and debunk disinformation. The NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence delineates six primary goals of debunking, including asserting the truth, cataloging evidence of false information, and attributing sources of disinformation. Journalists and civil society organizations are also instrumental in leading regional fact-checking initiatives, collaborating with governments and private-sector entities such as Google. Examples of such organizations in the Indo-Pacific include FactCheck Initiative Japan (FIJ), Thai Fact-Checking Network, Annie Lab at the University of Hong Kong’s Journalism and Media Studies Centre, Rappler IQ in the Philippines, and CekFakta in Indonesia.
+
+AI-supported fact-checking — which incorporates manual, human verification of automated checks — can be critical for an effective response. Organizations such as The Factual, Check by Meedan, Logically, Full Fact, and FIJ all implement AI tools for fact-checking. These tools rely on natural language processing (NLP) and information retrieval techniques such as speech recognition, reverse image searching, video forensics, and semantics analysis to assess whether information is likely to be false or misleading. Fact-checking — whether supported by AI or not — also serves as a fundamental prerequisite for prebunking efforts (discussed in the next section).
+
+Japan is somewhat late to the game in developing a fact-checking ecosystem. This is due in part to a lack of urgency — at least until recently — as disinformation was perceived more as a problem for the United States and Europe. The relatively delayed digitalization of mainstream media, coupled with the significant power held by Japanese broadcasters and news outlets, further slowed progress in fact-checking efforts. Nevertheless, there has been increased awareness and action, including the establishment of the Japan Fact-Check Center, which receives funding from tech giants such as Google and Yahoo. Moving forward, efforts to expand the scope of countermeasures are essential for effectively combating disinformation in Japan.
+
+_PREBUNKING_
+
+Prebunking involves issuing proactive forewarnings and preemptively refuting false narratives. A dramatic example was the United States’ use of declassified intelligence information in the run-up to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The timely and repeated release of information on Russia’s military build-up and intentions limited Moscow’s ability to shape the media environment in advance; for example, this strategy undermined Russia’s plans to use a false-flag operation as an excuse to launch the invasion. Recent research suggests that prebunking is more effective than fact-checking, especially among populations who were previously misinformed or particularly susceptible to mis- and disinformation.
+
+The scale of the disinformation challenge limits the practicality of prebunking as a strategy to some degree. Not every narrative can be preempted. Still, like-minded governments can focus more on anticipating the narratives that adversaries might employ, such as China’s efforts to exploit the Fukushima water release. When resources are limited, selective prebunking is a practical and efficient strategy to address the most concerning narratives. Credibility is a critical factor in successful prebunking, with the perceived trustworthiness of cited sources often more important than the expertise behind it. Resources such as The Debunking Handbook 2020 and A Practical Guide to Prebunking Misinformation provide valuable insights and guidance for successfully implementing prebunking strategies, including effective narrative structures and technology-based tools for active and passive prebunking.
+
+_REMOVING FALSE NARRATIVES (CONTENT MODERATION)_
+
+Removing fake content or restricting access to it is a strategy employed by platforms such as X (formerly Twitter), which has previously acted against inauthentic accounts originating from China and removed tens of thousands of posts. By tracking Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, platforms can identify the source of such content, including those from Chinese military bases. However, despite efforts to identify and remove fake content or inauthentic accounts algorithmically, this approach is not effective alone, as perpetrators often find ways to circumvent these measures; tactics include simply creating new accounts, operating from locations where IP addresses do not raise suspicion, or employing locals to disseminate false information. Moreover, a lack of transparency on how algorithms identify and remove content has sparked backlash among users and accusations of censorship in democratic societies. In part due to these challenges and financial streamlining, many companies are severely limiting or removing content moderation policies altogether. However, when used in tandem with other tactics, content removal can be an effective component of an overall strategy.
+
+_LABELING, TRANSPARENCY, AND RISK MONITORING_
+
+Efforts to strengthen digital content labeling have gained momentum globally. Some tech companies are developing digital stamps to indicate AI-generated content, particularly to target the threat posed by deepfakes. For instance, the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity aims to authenticate media by issuing “icons of transparency,” essentially a digital watermark for verified content. Transparency initiatives extend beyond identifying artificially generated content. Google took steps as early as 2018 to label government-funded content on YouTube, alerting viewers to sources that might amplify propaganda or conspiracy theories.
+
+#### A Key to Success: Go on the Offensive
+
+The strategies and techniques listed above are defensive, aimed at resisting and debunking adversaries’ disinformation campaigns. But ultimately success will hinge on pairing these approaches with an offensive strategy of strategic messaging to promote narratives that accurately and effectively reflect U.S. objectives, priorities, and values — and doing so in close coordination with like-minded allies and partners. An offensive strategy would center on both promoting affirmative narratives about U.S. power and purpose, as well as refuting the self-serving messages that China and Russia promote about themselves — such as that China does not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries or that China offers a model for economic development that should be emulated elsewhere in the Global South.
+
+___`Success will hinge on pairing these approaches with an offensive strategy of strategic messaging to promote narratives that accurately and effectively reflect U.S. objectives, priorities, and values.`___
+
+> #### `Japanese Government Approaches to Countering Disinformation`
+
+_`The Japanese government is dedicating increased effort to addressing disinformation and information operations. Japan’s 2022 National Security Strategy, for example, acknowledges the urgent need for developing a posture for “information warfare,” which it defines as using “the spread of disinformation prior to an armed attack.” This definition is arguably too narrow, however. As this report shows, Beijing’s disinformation campaigns in peacetime are central to a larger strategy of propagating influence to enable China to “win without fighting.” Japan’s current efforts to combat disinformation also suffer from decentralization and a lack of coordination across the government — although it is hardly alone in this regard. In addition, budgets for combating disinformation and information warfare remain thin. Collectively, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Ministry of Defense, and the National Police Agency allocate just 7.72 billion yen (about $49 million) against the threat. Draft legislation to strengthen Japan’s cyber capabilities and establish authorities for active cyber defense has languished, with no clear timeline for passage. In the meantime, MOFA has begun to introduce AI-based technologies to assist with analysis of international developments that could pose national security challenges.`_
+
+
+### An Agenda for U.S.-Japan Cooperation
+
+The United States and Japan have begun coordinating responses to the growing challenge posed by disinformation. In December 2023, the two governments signed a memorandum of cooperation on countering foreign information manipulation, laying the groundwork for shared approaches and activities such as information sharing and capacity building — and which Prime Minister Kishida Fumio and President Joe Biden endorsed at their meeting in April 2024. This is a good start, but far more needs to be done to address disinformation, a defining challenge of the modern era.
+
+The United States and Japan now need to design an operational strategy for cooperation that also incorporates other key partners in the region. This project identified several avenues for enhancing collaboration between the United States, Japan, and other Indo-Pacific nations in combating disinformation. Unlike in Europe, where a variety of efforts to combat disinformation are underway through NATO, there is no existing multilateral structure that can be used to forge a common approach to the threat. Yet there are various areas of potential bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the Indo-Pacific:
+
+- __Deepen cooperation on strategic messaging.__ Japan, the United States, and other like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific should develop a coordinated offensive strategy for strategic messaging aimed at promoting narratives that support shared values and promote common objectives. This coordinated messaging should directly challenge the narratives, cited earlier in this report, that China and Russia seek to propagate. The raw material for this common strategy already exists — the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy is a clear articulation of U.S. policy, as is Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept. A coordinated messaging strategy should focus on amplifying and reinforcing those themes and countering the pro-China narratives pushed by Beijing. Such an effort is probably best undertaken by Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Department of State.
+
+- __Launch a collaborative research program and share lessons learned.__ The United States and Japan should launch a multilateral research program in collaboration with like-minded allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific — such as Australia, South Korea, and the Philippines — to explore the evolving nature of Chinese and Russian disinformation tactics. This effort should also include universities and private research organizations. NATO’s Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence offers a blueprint for how to create a bilateral or multilateral framework for sharing research on these topics. In particular, Japan and the United States could quietly engage Taiwan to better understand both the tactics Beijing used to attempt to influence the 2024 presidential election and the strategies Taipei used to combat the threat. Building on the agreement at Camp David in 2023 between Japan, the United States, and South Korea to coordinate efforts to counter information manipulation, the allies should work to develop a multilateral framework for information sharing and lessons learned in countering disinformation. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue — consisting of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States — is another potential venue for this work.
+
+- __Expand cooperation on open-source intelligence collection and analysis.__ The explosion of open-source information represents a significant challenge to governments seeking to better understand national security threats. No single government has the capacity to collect, process, and assess all of the open-source information available on a given topic — a challenge amplified by the imperative of distinguishing between facts and mis- and disinformation. The United States, Japan, and other partners, such as Australia and South Korea, should launch an open-source intelligence partnership to share strategies, assessments, and tools, including technology-based approaches that utilize artificial intelligence.
+
+- __Coordinate prebunking.__ The United States, Japan, and other partners should work together to prebunk problematic Chinese and Russian narratives. Like-minded governments should do more to both anticipate the narratives adversaries are likely to promote and undermine existing messaging that reflects biased views of China’s global role. The coordinated release of information on anticipated issues such as Chinese behavior in the South China Sea could also be an effective means of countering Chinese narratives.
+
+- __Support education and training in third countries.__ Fact-checking institutions already do some work together, demonstrating ample potential for building connections and pooling resources in the digital age. Examples of such efforts include individual country programs, such as the Ukraine Crisis Media Center and StopFake, as well as multinational and regional collaborations, such as EUvsDisinfo, the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, and balticdisinfo.eu. The United States, Japan, and other partners could work together to support education and media literacy programs across the Indo-Pacific.
+
+- __Cooperation on content sharing.__ Taking a page from China’s own playbook and subsidizing trustworthy news sources to counter China-sponsored fake news sites could be a further opportunity for collaboration. The United States and Japan could consider content-sharing agreements with nations inundated with disinformation and propaganda from China and Russia. Kyodo News and the Associated Press are examples of credible wire services that Japan and the United States could quietly make more widely available to media markets in the Indo-Pacific.
+
+---
+
+__Christopher B. Johnstone__ is senior adviser and Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
+
+__Leah Klaas__ is a research assistant with the Japan Chair at CSIS.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-08-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-mitigation-day-6.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-08-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-mitigation-day-6.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・求情第六日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-07-08 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 辯方指譚得志屬「其他參加者」 已退出人民力量、無機會重返政壇
+- 胡志偉獲前黨友兼局長張炳良、羅致光撰求情信 稱胡溫和理性務實
+- 辯方指施德來已退出民協、以社工身分服務公眾抱負破滅
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47名民主派被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」案，今（8日）續處理第三批被告、6名九龍東初選參與者的求情。代表快必譚得志的大律師梁寶琳認為，譚屬於「其他參加者」，指他雖有簽署「墨落無悔」和「共同綱領」，但沒有組織初選；又強調初選是開放予所有人參加的民主選舉，譚辦街站、參與選舉論壇等只是一般選舉會做的事。
+
+辯方指，譚曾因煽動等罪成服刑40個月，望法庭考慮整體量刑原則酌情減刑至少20個月。辯方又強調，譚被捕後已退出人民力量，再沒有機會重返政壇，他還柙逾3年已付上代價；作為基督徒、取得基督教研究和神學兩個碩士學位的他，正在讀《懺悔錄》，嘗試學習和懺悔。法官陳仲衡和李運騰聞言一度表示，他們未能讀完該書。
+
+#### 李嘉達無到庭 5人由4懲教隔坐
+
+參選九東初選的黃之鋒、譚文豪、李嘉達上周五（5日）完成求情，法庭今處理譚得志、胡志偉及施德來3人的求情。
+
+已完成求情的李嘉達今無到庭，其餘5人續坐在同一排，由4名懲教人員隔坐，黃之鋒續被安排坐在離旁聽席最遠的被告欄角落位置，與其他被告相隔3名懲教。胡志偉步入庭時，看到旁聽親友即面露微笑說「喂！」再揮手，黃之鋒展示手中書本並豎起拇指，施德來和譚文豪亦揮手。快必譚得志則拿梳梳頭，又豎拇指和戚眉，他手持一張寫有字的紙，懲教一度着他「唔好 show」，他笑言「廢紙嚟」、「呢度點敢 show」。聆訊期間，譚得志和黃之鋒不時低頭抄寫，譚又頻向旁聽席做手勢和發笑。
+
+
+▲ 左起：譚文豪、黃之鋒、李嘉達、譚得志、施德來、胡志偉（資料圖片）
+
+#### 辯方：辦街站、參與論壇為一般選舉會做的事
+
+代表譚得志的大律師梁寶琳表示，譚生於1972年，現年52歲，是香港大學和中文大學的畢業生，擁有基督教研究和神學兩個碩士學位，他曾任職電台主持逾20年。
+
+辯方主張，譚得志為「其他參加者」，指他沒有組織、計劃、發起或領導初選計劃，而雖然他有簽署「墨落無悔」和「共同綱領」、提交提名表格，但無證據他製作相關文件，他僅僅是計劃的參加者。辯方同意，譚在《國安法》生效後沒有退出計劃，但強調舉辦街站、參與選舉論壇等，只是一般選舉會做的事；而控方指稱譚於論壇自言為「強硬反對派（hard-line rebel）」，亦是一般選舉論壇會說、用以贏得選舉的說話，而譚只是呼籲人們投票，並一如其他候選人般派發口罩和防疫物資，只屬普通參加者。
+
+法官陳仲衡主動提到，辯方引用中國刑法的釋義及實用指南，定義「積極參加者」為「主動參加犯罪集團並多次參與犯罪活動」，問譚得志是否屬於此類別。法官李運騰亦指，表面看來譚是符合該定義。梁寶琳表示，譚作為人民力量副主席，的確是自行參與初選，但強調初選作為開放予所有人參加的民主選舉，譚主動參與並不應構成他屬「積極參加者」；又指當時對於參與初選是否犯法並不清楚。
+
+#### 辯方：曾因煽動等判監40個月 望酌情減刑
+
+辯方續指，譚得志於2022年11月因發表煽動文字等11罪成而判監40個月，指該案與本案案發時間相近，望法庭考慮整體量刑原則（totality principle），酌量減刑至少20個月，以免造成壓毀性影響（crushing effect）。辯方又指，譚已自2021年起還柙，他因本案被捕後已退出人民力量，在初選亦只排名第四，已再沒有機會重返政壇（no chance of him going into politics ever again）。
+
+
+▲ 譚得志（左）、陳志全（右）（資料圖片）
+
+#### 辯方指譚每天讀《懺悔錄》 官稱未能看完
+
+梁寶琳又指，譚得志是基督徒，他現在每天都會讀《懺悔錄》（Confessions），正在嘗試學習和懺悔，顯示他的悔意。法官陳仲衡即笑說，「我的『懺悔』是我嘗試看完那本書，但從不成功。」（“My confession is that I tried to finish that book, but I can never.”）李運騰接續說：「我也是，我只讀了第一章，便無法繼續下去。」（“Me too, I just read the first chapter, I can’t carry on.”）梁續說，「他就是這樣的人，堅持不懈（perseverance）。」李運騰指，希望這個「堅持」是好的方面。（“I hope you used perseverance in a good sense.”）梁回應，無論如何，譚已經還柙逾3年，他已為這案所做和所說的付上了代價。不時向旁聽席戚眉發笑的譚得志，在求情最末表現平靜，手搭着手閉上眼睛。
+
+散庭時，快必對旁聽席梳頭，又笑着揮手說：「Bye bye!」，「I love you!」、「I love you all!」
+
+翻查資料，《懺悔錄》為公元394至400年聖奧古斯丁用拉丁語寫的自傳體回憶，全書分為13卷，概述了奧古斯丁年輕時犯下的罪過和他改信基督教的過程。
+
+案件由3名國安法指定法官陳慶偉、李運騰及陳仲衡審理，控方代表為副刑事檢控專員萬德豪、周天行、助理刑事檢控專員羅天瑋。黃之鋒由大律師李國威代表；譚文豪由資深大律師何沛謙代表；李嘉達由大律師陳德昌代表；譚得志由大律師梁寶琳代表；胡志偉由大律師郭子丰代表；施德來由大律師黃廷光代表。
+
+根據《國安法》第22條，一旦顛覆國家政權罪成，「首要分子或罪行重大」可判處10年以上至終身監禁；「積極參加者」可判監3至10年；「其他參加者」則判監3年以下、拘役或者管制。
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47名民主派被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」案，今（8日）續處理6名九龍東初選參與者的求情。代表胡志偉的大律師郭子丰表示，胡無組織涉案謀劃，屬「積極參加者」的較低級別，並獲前運房局局長張炳良、副局長邱誠武及前勞福局局長羅致光3人撰寫求情信，指胡溫和、理性、務實，以人民和社會的最大利益為先。
+
+辯方指，根據胡的背景、品格和多年政治信念，他無疑並非蓄意危害國安的激進政治人物，案發時真誠誤信運用否決權屬合法；又指謀劃成功的機會極微，因民主黨議員對預算案如何投票無最終決定權。辯方又指，胡自2021年1月還柙至今，並就六四及七一集結案服刑，望法官考慮整體量刑而減刑。法官則指，胡的良好品格和對社會貢獻已被早前案件考慮作減刑因素。
+
+#### 辯方：胡志偉最多屬「積極參加」較低級別
+
+譚得志一方完成求情後，由胡志偉一方求情。代表胡志偉的大律師郭子丰表示，胡志偉最多只是「積極參加者」的較低級別，因無證據顯示他組織「35+計劃」，他只是透過參與選舉論壇、街站、接受訪問、參加初選和報名立法會選舉等，作出和應（echo）。
+
+郭又指，民主黨起初無對否決預算案的計劃「落水」，其中胡於2020年6月九東初選論壇便曾反問，難道「起醫院、起學校我哋都要反對咩」，顯示他當時對「攬炒」和無差別否決預算案有保留。
+
+
+▲ 胡志偉（資料圖片）
+
+#### 張炳良、邱誠武、羅致光撰求情信 指胡溫和、理性、務實
+
+郭子丰續指，胡志偉參與公共和政治事務逾30年，他曾當選市政局議員，學會制訂政策、解決社會矛盾時尋求「雙贏」方法，而非「攬炒」，他亦秉持此原則行事。而這並非胡的一面之辭，他獲前運輸及房屋局局長張炳良、副局長邱誠武、及前勞工及福利局局長羅致光撰求情信（其中張和羅曾為民主黨成員），3人均形容胡是溫和、務實的人，即使不同意政府政策仍然保持有禮、理性，以人民和社會的最大利益為先。
+
+
+▲ 前勞工及福利局局長 羅致光
+
+辯方又指，胡的貢獻獲政府肯定，如2006年政府曾就他為黃大仙區的服務頒授榮譽勳章；他亦曾獲委任加入中央政策組、大嶼山發展諮詢委員會委員等，顯示政府視他為可靠、負責的人，也可見無差別否決預算案不符他的本性。
+
+#### 辯方：民主黨議員投票須獲授權、謀劃成功機會極微
+
+郭續提到，根據民主黨黨章，如有成員不滿該黨立法會議員的決定，可召開會員大會要求推翻；議員在投票前須獲得授權，若無授權下仍一意孤行便須退黨，可見立法會議員對預算案如何投票沒有最終決定權。辯方指，由此解釋了胡志偉和所有民主黨員在競選時，也沒有完全承諾無差別否決或「攬炒」，只是提倡會運用《基本法》權力迫使政府回應五大訴求，因他們不能作出那樣的承諾，否則是向公眾公然說謊。
+
+郭續指，判刑時須考慮涉案謀劃的可能性，並指謀劃本身因不同因素已難以實現，而民主黨的制度令其更難實現，因即使該黨議員同意無差別否決，但最終無獲授權、或不願退黨便不能如此投票，客觀而言，謀劃成功的機會極微。
+
+法官陳慶偉指，無論謀劃成功與否，胡志偉已認罪，代表他有意圖顛覆，辯方同意，但重申謀劃充滿不確定、其後果只能臆測。陳慶偉再指，但戴耀廷對此非常樂觀，辯方回應只能代表胡志偉陳詞。
+
+
+▲ 大律師 郭子丰
+
+#### 辯方：胡真誠誤信可用基本法權力游說政府
+
+辯方續指，胡志偉案發時真誠相信涉案謀劃為合法，相信可運用《基本法》賦予的憲制權力游說政府。雖然事後回看知道屬錯誤，但根據胡的背景、品格、多年政治信念，無疑他並非蓄意危害國安的激進政治人物。
+
+法官陳仲衡一度問，辯方如何能說胡志偉當時真誠相信投票顛覆政府是合法？郭重申，胡當時認為運用《基本法》賦予的權力是合法，並同意法官李運騰總結，胡當時是利用合法的手段（means），去達致顛覆的非法目的（end），認為可因此減輕其罪責。
+
+#### 辯方指胡曾就兩案服刑望減刑 官稱前案已考慮
+
+就胡志偉的定罪紀錄，郭子丰指，胡於2021年1月8日因違反七一案保釋條件而遭還柙；其後涉2020七一遊行案，承認煽惑及組織未經批准集結兩罪，判監10個月；再因六四31年集會案承認明知而參與未經批准集結罪，判監4.5個月，他並於2022年1月服刑完畢。
+
+郭指，上述案件與本案的案發時間和性質相近，當中七一案中，胡曾手持「反對國安惡法，七一齊上街」的標語牌、亦提及初選，至於六四案雖非明確與《國安法》有關，但望法庭考慮過往30年也有紀念六四的集會，各政黨亦會藉此機會發聲，望考慮整體量刑原則（totality principle）而減刑。
+
+法官陳慶偉指，胡志偉擁有良好品格及對社會的貢獻，已被早前案件的法官考慮作減刑因素；法官陳仲衡亦指，張炳良此前也曾為胡撰求情信。郭同意胡不能享有雙重折扣，又指張炳良求情信的內容有所不同，主要談及對胡以及涉案謀劃的理解。
+
+
+▲ 前運輸及房屋局局長 張炳良
+
+胡志偉聽取求情時表現平靜，求情完畢後，向旁聽席微笑揮手。
+
+根據《國安法》第22條，一旦顛覆國家政權罪成，「首要分子或罪行重大」可判處10年以上至終身監禁；「積極參加者」可判監3至10年；「其他參加者」則判監3年以下、拘役或者管制。
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47名民主派被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」案，今（8日）續處理6名九龍東初選參與者的求情。代表施德來的大律師黃廷光表示，施德來屬「積極參加者」的中至低級別，施於本案後已辭任主席和退出民協，重犯機會低。辯方又指，施為註冊社工，但在新修訂的《社工註冊條例》下，罪成的施將無法再任社工，形容其以社工身分服務公眾的抱負破滅。惟辯方指，施於獄中報讀都大心理學課程，望裝備自己，在服刑完畢後以其他崗位貢獻社會。
+
+第三批被告今完成求情，本周三（7月10日）將處理第四批被告求情，為6名九龍西初選參與者：岑子杰、毛孟靜、馮達浚、劉澤鋒、何啟明、黃碧雲，2名超區初選參與者岑敖暉、王百羽，及衞生服務界參選者余慧明，料需時3天。
+
+#### 辯方指施德來已不再是民協成員
+
+譚得志及胡志偉求情完畢後，由施德來一方進行陳詞。代表施德來的大律師黃廷光表示，施德來為註冊社工，已婚，育有一名9歲兒子，其妻子和家人好友也有到庭支持。黃指，施的學業成績雖然並非特別出眾，但以其努力一步一步邁向成功，他2005年於城市大學副學士畢業，再於雪菲爾哈倫大學（Sheffield Hallam University）取得社會科學學位，並於2018年取得理工大學社工碩士，成為社工服務公眾。
+
+辯方指，施2008年加入民協，2016年當選黃大仙區議員及成為民協主席，亦曾獲委任為淫褻物品審裁委員小組成員9年，不同政府部門曾發信表揚他的貢獻。而施在本案後辭任民協主席，以非政治的方式服務社會，現時亦不再是民協的成員。
+
+#### 辯方指屬「積極參加者」、罪成令社工夢碎
+
+辯方續指，根據上周生效的《社工註冊條例》修訂，若被裁定危害國安罪成的人將無法再任社工，形容施德來以社工身分服務公眾的抱負破滅。雖然如此，施於獄中報讀都會大學的心理學課程，希望更好裝備自己，服刑完畢後以其他崗位貢獻社會，望法庭考慮施具良好品格。
+
+黃廷光承認，本案性質非常嚴重，但望法庭考慮施屬「積極參加者」的中至低級別量刑。黃又望法庭考慮施擁有正面良好品格，他積極服務公眾和社會，真誠誤信運用否決權合法，亦展示真誠悔意，重犯機會低，望法庭能寬大處理。
+
+散庭時，黃之鋒、胡志偉、施德來、譚文豪均向旁聽席揮手，譚文豪亦向旁聽席微笑點頭。譚得志與律師溝通後，亦對旁聽席梳頭，又笑着揮手說：「Bye bye!」、「I love you!」、「I love you all!」
+
+根據《國安法》第22條，一旦顛覆國家政權罪成，「首要分子或罪行重大」可判處10年以上至終身監禁；「積極參加者」可判監3至10年；「其他參加者」則判監3年以下、拘役或者管制。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69-70/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-08-uk-eu-security-pact.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-08-uk-eu-security-pact.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : UK–EU Security Pact
+author: Ed Arnold and Richard G Whitman
+date : 2024-07-08 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/nFp7s5s.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "What Can the New Government’s Proposed UK–EU Security Pact Achieve?"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Post-Brexit UK–EU security cooperation has grown since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Practical cooperation on sanctions and support for Ukraine has opened other possible avenues for collaboration. The new Labour government wants an ambitious structural alignment with the EU, but it is uncertain exactly what it could achieve._
+
+
+
+Russia’s war on Ukraine has driven a better UK–EU working relationship, especially on Russian sanctions, diplomatic support for Ukraine, and coordinating military training programmes for Ukrainian recruits. This improvement is best illustrated by the resolution of the dispute over the Northern Ireland Protocol through the Windsor Framework. This has happened without any formal agreement on foreign, security and defence policy cooperation, which was omitted from the 2020 Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) that governs the post-Brexit UK–EU relationship. Indeed, the previous government was concerned over the potential “overstructuralisation” of cooperation with the EU on international affairs.
+
+In contrast, the new government has been vocal about a new UK–EU relationship and “reconnecting” with the continent after Brexit. Foreign Secretary David Lammy has designated the EU as his number one foreign policy priority, including structured foreign policy dialogues, which could lead to an ambitious “UK–EU security pact”. This reconnection has started immediately with the foreign secretary travelling to Berlin – key to unlocking better UK-EU relations and the target for a new bilateral defence and security treaty – within the first 24 hours.
+
+Meanwhile, Defence Secretary John Healey wants a “UK–EU defence pact” as a “bespoke relationship” that could include UK third-party participation in EU military and civilian Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and enhanced cooperation on “internal” security issues such as illegal migration, border control and terrorism.
+
+
+### What Might the EU Think?
+
+These collective propositions, alongside Labour’s UK–EU trade ambitions, bear some resemblance to Theresa May’s “dual pillar” proposals during Brexit negotiations. At the time, the EU did not enthusiastically respond, nor did it offer detailed counterproposals that would have superseded extant third-country arrangements.
+
+EU leaders and officials have been both welcoming and non-committal on closer UK–EU cooperation. The EU has a range of existing formal agreements with third countries, and the UK is unique in not having such a relationship. They conform to similar templates, and none are bespoke (excepting the US) along the lines that the Labour Party wants. The UK’s capabilities and prominent role in European security should give weight to a distinct relationship. However, beyond rhetoric from the EU’s leadership, there appears to be a lack of imagination and an absence of political will to conceive of a future relationship that would deliver maximum value and mutual benefit.
+
+
+### The Politics are Getting More Challenging
+
+In the context of UK–EU relations, political conditions in London have stabilised at the exact same time as they have become more complicated in Brussels. As last month’s EU Parliamentary (EP) elections demonstrated, the politics of the EU looks to be moving to the right as the UK gets its first left-of-centre government in 14 years. The impact of the EP results is already being felt. French President Emmanuel Macron immediately called for a national parliamentary election as the far-right National Rally defeated his Renaissance Party 32% to 15%. While the National Rally fell short of its own expectations in the subsequent election, Marcon’s authority is still weakened and it will be challenging keeping his new centre-left coalition together. The EP result for the opposition Christian Democratic Union and the far-right Alternative for Germany also reinforced the sense that German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s coalition government is a lame duck, with over 14 months to limp on. Elsewhere, existing authoritarian inclinations in Hungary are complemented by right-leaning leaderships in Slovakia and the Netherlands. Others might follow.
+
+___`The purpose of any UK–EU cooperation should first and foremost be to deliver additional value for European security as it faces its biggest crisis since the Second World War`___
+
+However, there are opportunities for the UK to use its considerable political influence with EU member states, especially in defence and security policy, which has grown since the 2022 invasion. As an example, in Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas, the newly nominated High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the UK has a powerful advocate for stronger UK engagement at the heart of the EU’s institutions. However, the emerging EU political landscape will require careful management by the new government. In some instances, such as the special relationship that had developed between former Prime Minister Sunak and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and her political ascendency in the EU, relationships may prove to be more rather than less complicated with the change of government in the UK.
+
+
+### What is the Objective?
+
+The primary driver for Labour’s UK–EU pact seems political – drawing a clean break with the previous Conservative approach. However, this focus confuses means and ends. The purpose of any UK–EU cooperation should first and foremost be to deliver additional value for European security as it faces its biggest crisis since the Second World War. Sunak’s government has already done some of the work by jettisoning some of the Brexit divisiveness and rhetoric such as “Global Britain”. This must be furthered to capitalise on the unity that support for Ukraine has fostered and to stress that the UK and EU are allied in a shared common purpose to strengthen European security.
+
+London should therefore be less obsessed with potential structures and getting a formal agreement over the line, and more driven on those areas where stronger UK–EU cooperation adds real value and cohesiveness to European allies and partners as they continue to respond to Vladimir Putin’s destabilisation of European security. Labour’s use of the language of a “security pact” with the EU is eye-catching, but of greater value are the substantive issues rather than the packaging.
+
+There is also a cost to an agreement that is intended to encapsulate and facilitate a wide range of areas of cooperation. For the EU, the more ambitious the agreement, the more policy areas governed by different EU legal and decision-making arrangements it will have, making it longer and more complicated to negotiate and ratify.
+
+London should also be prepared for a heavy dose of realism as to what a pact might deliver, regardless of its ambition, as value for both sides is not a given. Indeed, even when the Labour government under Tony Blair set up the European Security and Defence Policy – the precursor to CSDP – in 1998, alongside France and against advice from his own diplomatic and military establishment, it was not a priority for the UK. It failed on its central “Helsinki Headline goal”, and the UK continued to align most closely with the US and NATO in the major conflicts that followed in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya.
+
+The UK will inevitably experience frustrations as a partner of the EU, with different tempos in their respective policymaking machinery. As recent examples, the UK and EU have both embarked on counter-Houthi naval operations in the Red Sea and training for Ukrainian soldiers, but it took the EU a considerable time to agree on the structure for its own missions. In the interim, the UK made other arrangements – supporting the US in the former and choosing to establish its own Ukraine training mission, where the speed of implementation attracted the participation of Finland and Sweden – then EU but not NATO members – in advance of the establishment of the EU Training Mission. An agility disparity would likely persist even if a formal UK–EU agreement is reached.
+
+
+### Mechanisms
+
+The new UK government should focus on agreeing a “UK–EU Joint Declaration on defence and security” as soon as practically possible to set a strong direction of travel. This would affirm the designation of each party as key allies who should engage in foreign, security and defence cooperation of a scale and scope that reflects their status. The Declaration would also set out a roadmap for substantive areas of cooperation to form building blocks for a modernised relationship. If this could be agreed in the remainder of this year, the UK could then use its strong relationship with Poland - as it takes over the rotating EU Council Presidency from 1 January 2024 – to undertake the substantive negotiations, also knowing the outcome of the US presidential election.
+
+Such a Declaration would not conflict with the existing TCA, nor require its revision. However, the periodic review of the TCA, first set for 2026, might be used to reconsider whether the limited provisions that it contains on UK–EU cooperation on international issues might be adjusted to be more expansive. The TCA review timetable would also align with the announced timeline for the Strategic Defence Review that Labour has pledged for its first year in office. This would allow for clarity from a new UK government as to the ideal form and function of cooperation with the EU on defence and security. Moreover, it would be wise to keep defence and security policy as a separate mechanism from the TCA in order to increase flexibility in a fast-changing European security environment.
+
+
+### What Substantive Areas Should It Cover?
+
+A UK–EU Declaration should prioritise substantive areas for cooperation, rather than institutional landmarks, as the key to a close relationship.
+
+First, there needs to be a full alignment of Ukraine and Russia strategies for the long term. Supporting Ukraine to liberate its territory and denying Russia any strategic benefit from its invasion is a shared priority. While the current political strategy is set in NATO and the G7/Quad, as Ukraine moves down the road towards EU and NATO membership, there will be a need for better UK–EU coordination. The UK no longer has a say in EU enlargement, but it does have a significant stake in its successful conclusion – and, unlike the EU, the UK has a direct say in NATO’s enlargement. Both the EU and the UK will have a shared interest in Ukraine’s dual membership tracks proceeding in a synchronised manner.
+
+Second, there is China and the Indo-Pacific. The UK and the EU both have Indo-Pacific strategies, alongside five other individual European countries. As such, the broad European approach to China is disconnected and very piecemeal in some areas. At a minimum, the EU and UK need closer coordination (notably on the Indo-Pacific), especially as the UK is making long-term defence commitments through AUKUS and the Global Combat Air Programme that will be more effective if better coordinated. Moreover, for both the UK and the EU, greater European coordination may be necessary to manage any deconfliction with the US in its intent and interests in the Indo-Pacific.
+
+___`The Labour Party has acknowledged that a more coherent UK–EU relationship on foreign, security and defence policy would be beneficial, but it needs to make its ambitions more concrete`___
+
+Third, the idea of an EU Defence Union now has a strong grip inside Brussels and some national capitals. The UK interest is in an “open” form of strategic autonomy and to embrace the EU as a vehicle for enhancing member state defence capabilities through encouraging greater economies of scale in defence procurement and driving down inefficiencies and duplications. A UK recognition that the EU is now an actor in European defence could be translated into greater advocacy for EU–NATO cooperation, rather than the current ambivalent position. The UK’s expectation might then be that the EU is more accommodating of the UK within its current defence industrial policy ambitions.
+
+Fourth, the emerging EU defence industrial policy ecosystem is largely closed to third countries (excepting EEA states). The direction of EU policy is of significant interest to the UK as a large defence industrial player and – just as importantly – if EU policy succeeds, European defence capabilities development will have a positive impact on what the 23 joint EU–NATO members contribute to assets available to the Alliance. The UK’s defence industrial footprint and its collaborative programmes with European states are an asset of benefit in any plan to rebalance the European and US contributions to European security.
+
+Fifth, third-party participation of the UK in CSDP missions would be of greatest benefit to the EU, with its Strategic Compass focus on Crisis Management. The former has an expeditionary mindset and capabilities to back this up. The UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force is a practical example of the benefits of setting significant ambitions for European states to operate collectively for pronounced effect.
+
+Sixth, intelligence. There is a significant disparity between UK and EU intelligence capabilities. The EU would benefit greatly from UK intelligence in all domains. The UK would also be able to actively contribute to the development of a European intelligence capability that addresses shared collective challenges more effectively.
+
+
+### Getting It Over the Line
+
+While Russia’s war on Ukraine has demonstrated that shared interests can drive the UK and the EU to work closely together, there is a need for both sides to think long-term for the benefit of Europe. The Labour Party has acknowledged that a more coherent UK–EU relationship on foreign, security and defence policy would be beneficial, but it needs to make its ambitions more concrete. Thus far, the EU has not felt compelled to set out its own agenda for future security cooperation with the UK. Leadership changes in Brussels and London will allow for a stock-take of where cooperation might be enhanced. Moving quickly – especially in a climate in which US leadership may be in a state of flux – will be important, but ambitions for an enhanced relationship should privilege policy substance over a push for expansive formal agreements.
+
+---
+
+__Ed Arnold__ is a Senior Research Fellow for European Security within the International Security department at RUSI. His experience covers defence, intelligence, counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, within the public and private sector. His primary research focus is on the transformation of European security following Russia’s war on Ukraine. Specifically, he covers the evolving Euro-Atlantic security architecture, the security of northern Europe, and the UK contribution to European security through NATO, the Joint Expeditionary Force, and other fora.
+
+__Richard G. Whitman__ is an expert on the UK’s foreign and security and defence policies of the UK and the EU. He is Professor of Politics and International Relations at the University of Kent. He is the author and editor of eleven books and published over sixty academic articles and book chapters on European integration and UK foreign and security policy. Professor Whitman is currently leading on a project Securing Global Britain: Building and Sustaining Plurilateral Practices of Security Cooperation in Europe, funded by the Economic and Research Council’s UK in a Changing Europe initiative.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-10-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-mitigation-day-7.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-10-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-mitigation-day-7.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・求情第七日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-07-10 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 罪脫李予信凌晨排隊旁聽：唔講太多點解，淨係想過嚟，想喺度
+- 毛孟靜獲石禮謙撰求情信、盼與夫度餘下時光 何啟明為高尚目的犯案
+- 岑敖暉求情信稱與妻分隔愛意未減 每刻最大願望回家共度時光
+- 獄中瘦20公斤 王百羽撰求情信望早日回家擁抱家人 庭上拭淚
+- 辯方指馮達浚不知行為違法、《國安法》後爭取權力變顛覆
+- 黃碧雲獲張炳良撰求情信 指屬2019年「對抗式政治」受害者 劉澤鋒參選為服務香港
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47名民主派被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」案，今日（10日）處理第四批共9名被告求情，包括參選九西的毛孟靜、岑子杰、何啟明、馮達浚、黃碧雲、劉澤鋒；參選超區的岑敖暉、王百羽；及參選衞生服務界的余慧明。
+
+清晨5時半，西九龍裁判法院外已有40人排起長龍，自備雨傘、折凳等輪候入場旁聽。排在隊伍前列的，包括曾參與超區初選，被裁定罪脫、律政司亦無提上訴的李予信。戴鴨舌帽、穿白色上衣和短褲的李，排在隊伍約第5位。他表示因為知道有排隊黨，今凌晨約1時攜露營椅和乾糧到場。李說有密切留意早前的求情聆訊，至於今天為何到場，他表示：「唔講太多點解，淨係想過嚟，想喺度。」
+
+
+▲ 李予信
+
+#### 何啟明友人讚「默默支持弱勢社群」
+
+何啟明的教會朋友李先生，今晨約5時到場，他認識何逾20年，形容他在深水埗區多年是「好好嘅議員」，很多事情親力親為，甚至會親自執老鼠。李先生又指，何辭任區議員後仍然服務社區，形容他「唔係一個身分先做嘢，係本身人品都會一直默默去支持弱勢社群」，也與基督信仰的精神「貫徹如一」。李說望親身入庭，對被囚禁的人表達支持。對於刑期長短，他坦言不到他考慮，「有啲嘢你都控制唔到，諗嚟都無謂，諗啲可以控制到嘅嘢。」
+
+#### 被告友讚「好有原則」
+
+其中一名被告的朋友阿修今晨約8時到場，表示「想見一個朋友」。他指認識該被告7年，形容他「好有原則」、有時甚至「好惡」，會很執意解決朋友矛盾，笑言他「好難相處」、「通常啲矛盾都喺佢度嚟」，但也有他的優點：「佢會好講件事公唔公平。」阿修又讚這位朋友「好識煮嘢食」，最深刻是他曾煮過清酒煮花甲，二人又會一起打牌，新年時看《喱咕喱咕新年財》。
+
+
+▲ 阿修
+
+阿修說，與該被告現已沒什麼聯繫，但從其他朋友口中，聽到他為人比以前平靜，推斷以他的性格「已準備好面對佢要面對嘅嘢」，希望「有機會一齊食嘢」。
+
+#### 市民：希望佢哋知道仲有好多人記住
+
+莫小姐於早上約8時到達，表示希望支持被告，特別記掛岑敖暉、毛孟靜、余慧明等人，指在2019年運動時看到岑「瘦咗好多」，想看看他現在的情況。莫在初選47人案首度提堂、裁決日、求情聆訊等也有來旁聽，「希望佢哋知道仲有好多人出面記住佢哋。」自認「姜糖」的莫小姐帶同印有姜濤頭像的扇到場，被問到有哪首歌鼓勵她，她笑說「冇諗過」，想了想後選擇了《濤》：「雖然19年運動唔成功，但都激起個浪濤，起碼全世界都知道香港發生咩事。」
+
+
+▲ 莫小姐
+
+初次來旁聽的阿T（化名）則表示，47人只是在「行使公民權利」，認為否決財政預算案是《基本法》賦予的權利，讓議員能監察政府運作，如今的指控為「莫須有」。他認為過往立法會內存在太多利益輸送，導致許多工程以嚴重超支、大白象收場，當初47人提出的方法能改變議會。阿T不滿稱現在的財委會「好垃圾」，「幾分鐘就批八十幾億啊、一百億咁。」
+
+
+▲ 阿T（化名）
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47名民主派被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」案，今（10日）處理第四批共9名被告求情，包括參選九西的岑子杰、毛孟靜、何啟明、馮達浚、黃碧雲、劉澤鋒；參選超區的岑敖暉、王百羽；及參選衞生服務界的余慧明。毛孟靜一方望以監禁5至6年為量刑起點。辯方指，毛孟靜對否決預算案有保留、私下反對「攬炒」，亦非組織者，她明白對公眾造成的潛在危害，望真誠道歉，並可與丈夫度過餘下時光。毛亦獲前立法會議員石禮謙、融樂會等撰求情信，提到她政見不同仍願交流，及為少數族裔貢獻。
+
+何啟明一方則望判監3年或以下。何獲前民協主席馮檢基等撰求情信，指他熱心服務弱勢社群。辯方指何出於良好動機、具高尚目的而犯案，他望令香港變得更好，只是採用了非法手段；而他被捕後持續服務社區，包括跟進保育深水埗主教山配水庫，本案後打算遠離政治，專注教會事奉。辯方又提及，何本質上是一名好人，法官陳仲衡即指，不認為本案有任何被告本質上是一個壞人，多名被告發笑。
+
+#### 被告分兩排就坐 毛孟靜做心心、飛吻
+
+案件由3名國安法指定法官陳慶偉、李運騰及陳仲衡審理，控方代表為副刑事檢控專員萬德豪、周天行、助理刑事檢控專員羅天瑋。岑子杰由大律師郭憬憲代表，毛孟靜和岑敖暉由大律師黃雅斌代表，何啟明由大律師阮偉明代表，馮達浚由資深大律師祁志代表，黃碧雲由大律師沈士文代表，劉澤鋒由大律師黃錦娟代表，余慧明由大律師石書銘代表。
+
+各被告於約10時步入法庭，男女被告分成上下兩排，由6名懲教隔開就坐。此前獲保釋、其後被裁罪成的何啟明，戴眼鏡、穿深灰色短袖上衣，看到旁聽席後不住雀躍微笑揮手。黃碧雲則穿有橙色圖案的深藍色上衣，微笑揮手。
+
+至於其餘被告均還柙逾3年，毛孟靜紮髻，穿黑色連衣裙、卡其色針織長外套，站起向旁聽席張望，又雙手放頭做心形手勢和飛吻。紮起馬尾的余慧明同樣穿黑色上衣、卡其色外套，向親友揮手。
+
+
+▲ 左起：張崑陽、馮達浚、何啟明、劉澤鋒、劉偉聰、毛孟靜、岑子杰（資料圖片）
+
+岑敖暉穿米白色上衣，外穿深啡長袖裇衫、牛仔褲；王百羽穿開胸白色長袖裇衫、露出內裡的黑色內衣，大幅度揮手；戴白色口罩的岑子杰，穿黑色Polo上衣，身形較健碩；馮達浚穿深藍色摺至中袖的裇衫、繫藍白斜間領帶，微笑望向旁聽席；劉澤鋒穿白色裇衫、戴淺藍色口罩。何啟明、岑子杰、王百羽等人，也與旁聽席做手勢和口型溝通。
+
+罪脫的李予信、毛孟靜的丈夫、前立法會議員邵家臻、前沙田區議員李志宏、前民陣召集人陳皓桓、社民連陳寶瑩等均有到庭旁聽。
+
+#### 辯方稱毛孟靜質疑否決財案、倡以5至6年為起點
+
+毛孟靜一方先進行求情。代表毛孟靜的大律師黃雅斌同意，毛在初選勝出後報名參與立法會選舉，接受她有一定程度的參與，建議以5至6年為量刑起點。
+
+黃強調，毛從不曾向人施壓、或譴責不跟隨涉案謀劃的人，亦曾質疑否決預算案的需要；毛現時已反省，明白對公眾可能造成的潛在危害，她真誠道歉和有悔意。
+
+#### 石禮謙、融樂會等撰求情信 毛望與丈夫度過餘下時光
+
+辯方遂呈上多封求情信，包括其大學同事、街坊、學生等，讚揚她真誠關心弱勢社群。其中前立法會議員石禮謙表示，即使政治立場與毛孟靜不同，但毛總是願意交流意見，以制訂政策，對香港整體有利。服務少數族裔的非牟利機構融樂會，則指毛利用立法會的機制和資源更好地保障少數族裔，又設立首個針對少數族裔議題的委員會。
+
+
+▲ 石禮謙（資料圖片）
+
+毛的政治助理則指，在初選前後均重複聽到毛表示反對否決預算案，認為只是政治姿態、他們亦不夠票，若否決預算案，便無法建學校和醫院。辯方強調，毛孟靜視立法會為能為社區做正面的事的地方，她對參與本案串謀感到後悔，並於今年1月撰信對其參與真誠道歉。
+
+黃指，毛孟靜現年67歲，她在任職立法會議員前，曾長年從事傳媒行業，其後從事教育。其丈夫亦撰信，辯方指其丈夫有一些個人情況，但不便公開，並指毛非常希望能與丈夫度過餘下的時光。
+
+
+▲ 毛孟靜（資料圖片）
+
+去年有報導指，毛孟靜的英籍丈夫、八旬資深傳媒人 Philip Bowring 因肺炎入住醫院深切治療部近3周，他其後出院。
+
+#### 官關注曾獲諮詢意見 辯方指毛非組織者
+
+法官陳仲衡主動引毛的求情信，提及明白到自己透過只是私下反對「攬炒」和相關政治行動，成為了串謀的共犯，她要承擔後果。陳問毛是否即指，她因沒有公開反對「攬炒」而成為共謀者？黃否認，指承認毛有參與串謀，但有人可以意圖參與串謀的同時，也對計劃有所保留，強調其悔意屬真誠。
+
+辯方又強調，根據求情信、毛過往的經歷、對立法過程的真誠關注，她有可能不會真的否決預算案。法官陳慶偉和李運騰關注，戴耀廷曾就初選的合法性諮詢毛的意見，法官陳仲衡亦認為，因此不能視她對法律無知，黃則回應，毛從來不是涉案謀劃的組織者或推動者。法官陳慶偉亦提到，毛曾提到尋求國際線協助，黃回應這與本案控罪無關；又重申毛公開所說和私下的意見有所不同，現時已有真誠悔意。
+
+#### 辯方指何啟明是好人 官同意本案被告非壞人
+
+其後由何啟明一方陳詞。代表何啟明的大律師阮偉明先表示，望說服法庭，何啟明本質上是一個好人（by nature a good man）。法官陳仲衡即指，不認為本案有任何被告本質上是一個壞人。岑敖暉、何啟明、黃碧雲、馮達浚等聞言發笑，岑子杰亦用力點頭。
+
+
+▲ 左起：岑子杰、毛孟靜、何啟明、張崑陽（資料圖片）
+
+阮偉明續呈上9封求情信，來自何的父母、兄弟、女友、校長、神學院教授、朋友及前民協主席馮檢基。阮表示，何自小已有愛心、關愛他人，是個照顧弟弟的哥哥，他出身草根、在基督教學校受教育，成為一名虔誠的基督徒，並以其基督精神，積極幫助貧窮和有需要人士。
+
+阮續指，何大學畢業後於2015年加入民協，因民協的願景與他一致，即為弱勢社群爭取利益和服務社區。阮又呈上何的 Facebook 專頁截圖，指何在2020年立法會選舉延期、2021年因本案被捕後，仍繼續爭取保育深水埗主教山配水庫，直至該配水庫獲評為一級歷史建築，強調他持續服務社區，並非為競選而做。
+
+#### 辯方指何被捕後仍服務社區、獲馮檢基撰求情信
+
+阮偉明又引用馮檢基的求情信，指馮是資深政治人物，作為2021年立法會選舉的候選人，是獲確認參選資格的「愛國者」，望法庭能考慮。馮信中提及，在何啟明2013年為民協工作時認識他，對何服務弱勢社群的熱情和投入印象深刻，指他的熱情不僅在於他所屬的社區，而是令整個香港成為更好的地方。
+
+
+▲ 馮檢基（資料圖片）
+
+阮續指，何啟明在本案後打算遠離政治，並專注教會事奉，故過去數年開始在神學院修讀基督教研究碩士課程，並獲認識何近20年、與他關係親密如母子的牧師寫求情信。
+
+阮表示，本案屬非常嚴重的罪行，望法庭接納何啟明是一個好人，他犯案後有良好動機、高尚目的（honorable goal），只是採用了非法手段。阮又指，何希望成為立法會議員，令香港成為更好的地方，更好地服務社會。何已對其行為深切反省，不大可能重犯，指他不應承受長期監禁，認為3年或以下的刑期已足夠反映其罪責。
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47名民主派被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」案，兩名超區參選人今（10日）午求情。庭上讀出岑敖暉親撰的求情信，他表示經過反思後，發現自己過去被憤怒充滿、參與政治並非完全出於良好和有建設性的意圖，對此深感後悔；他亦承認否決預算案會影響政府運作，從而危害國安，對違背公眾期望感到深深後悔和抱歉。岑又提到，與妻子分隔逾3年，但愛意無隨時間流逝而減退，反而日益深厚和強烈，「我現時內心每一刻最大的願望，就是回到我們一起建立的家，與她共度所有時光，這是我這個魯莽和愚蠢的人，對她無條件的愛和支持所能做的回報。」
+
+#### 岑敖暉求情信：昔日言行被憤怒推動、非全出於良好意圖
+
+參選超區初選的岑敖暉和王百羽先後求情。代表岑敖暉的大律師黃雅斌指，無意減輕岑的參與程度，並呈上街坊等求情信，指岑並非只喊口號、而是願意親力親幫助居民，而他現時已改過自新。
+
+黃續讀出岑的求情信（英文全文見文末），岑提到他自還柙起，自願進行單獨囚禁，並視之為機會以投放時間反思及閱讀。岑自言被捕前，曾任社運人士多年，望能建立更公平、平等和自由的社會和政治體制，但經過仔細反思，他發現他政治參與背後的一些原因，「並非像他們看起來那樣光采」。
+
+岑形容，他過去是被憤怒所充滿的人，更壞的是，憤怒有時演變成仇恨或怨恨，驅使他作出某些政治行為、修辭和言論。過去數年，他閱讀哲學、歷史、文學、靈性等著作，最重要是有他妻子的愛，他慢慢意識到憤怒，更莫說仇恨或怨恨，絕對不能將世界或他自己帶去任何地方——至少不能帶去任何美好、有建設性或充滿愛的地方。經過深切反省，他譴責（denounce）自己案發時的行為，包括參與涉案謀劃。
+
+
+▲ 岑敖暉（資料圖片）
+
+岑續指，他明白以否決預算案作為政治手段，不僅嚴重破壞、干擾和阻撓人們的生活，以及政府機關履行職能，亦會危害國家安全，亦離他當初的政治願景更遠。因此他譴責自己過去的言行，不僅在於違法，更重要是它們並非出於完全良好和有建設性的意圖，他對此深切後悔。
+
+#### 岑：與妻分隔3年 內心每刻願望回家共度時光
+
+岑表示，望向公眾造成的傷害深切道歉，包括其言行所造成的社會分裂和政治風險。他指，案發時作為頗具影響力的政治人物以及區議員，公眾寄望他會服務大眾，但其行為與該目的背道而馳。自還柙後，他無法再服務公眾，對那些寄望他為負責任公眾人物的人，「我令他們失望，為此我深深懊悔、後悔和抱歉」。
+
+岑最後指，與可愛的妻子分隔逾3年，「我的愛沒有隨時間流逝而減退，反而日益深厚和強烈」。岑形容，妻子是他反省生活和改過的動力，「我現時內心每一刻最大的願望，就是回到我們一起建立的家，與她共度所有時光，這是我這個魯莽和愚蠢的人，所能對她無條件的愛和支持的回報，雖然我這些年帶給她的憂傷、痛苦和寂寞是永遠無法彌補」。
+
+岑表示，明白他犯下嚴重罪行，長期監禁是無可避免，「我願意接受我過錯所帶來的所有後果」，只望刑期不會剝奪他改過和向家人彌補過錯的機會。
+
+
+▲ 左起：黃之鋒、岑敖暉、何桂藍（資料圖片）
+
+#### 庭上讀出的岑敖暉求情信：
+
+I am writing to express myself for the mitigation of HCCC70/2022 which I’ve pleaded guilty. Upon voluntary, I have been placed under solitary confinement since I was taken into jail custody, taking this as an opportunity to invest my time mainly on reflecting on myself and reading various aspects of materials.
+
+Prior to my arrest, I had been a political activist for years, with self-perceived goals of creating a more just, egalitarian and liberal society and political institution. Upon painstaking reflections however, I figured out some underlying causes of my political participation were not as bright as they may appear to be. I was a person filled with anger, worse still, anger sometimes evolved into hatred or resentments, which occasionally fuels or drives my political acts, rhetorics, and utterances.
+
+During the past years, I became gradually aware of these aims with various philosophical, historical, literary and some spiritual readings and most importantly, with the love of my wife, I gradually realised that anger, not to mention hatred or resentment, could lead the world and myself to absolutely nowhere, at least nowhere bright, shining, constructive or loving.
+
+Upon deep reflection, I denounce the action undertaking at the material time, including but not limited to my participation to the scheme. I understand that had the budget been vetoed, the so called political means, not only the people’s livelihood and performances of the duties and functions discharged by the HKSAR government would be seriously interfered in, destructed, undermined, and hence endangering national security, also place nowhere near, if not further away from the aforementioned political vision. As such, I denounced the actions and utterances I had done, not merely because it breaches the law, but equally importantly, it was not made out of purely good and constructive intentions, I am deeply regretful and remorseful of that.
+
+I would also like to apologise for the harm to public, especially for the great social political risk and ruptures created, I acknowledge my actions and utterances contribute to that and I deeply apologise. Moreover, having been quite an influential figure and district councillor at the time being, the public has placed hope upon me to serve the public. Not only did my action contradict with that purpose, since I was remanded in jail, I have not been able to continue to serve the public. To those who looked up to me as responsible public figure, I have let them down, and for that I am deeply remorseful, regretful and deeply apologetic.
+
+Having been separated from my lovely wife for more than 3 years, my love did not fade gradually with the passage of time, but became deeper and stronger bit by bit daily. She has been my motivation of reflection, living and reform. The greatest wish at every single moment in my mind now, is to return to the home my wife and I build together, and to spend all my time with her. This is all this reckless and foolish man can return for her for her unconditional love and support, although the sorrow, pain and loneliness I brought to her for these years could never be compensated.
+
+I understand that I committed a serious crime. I understand that an imprisonment with substantial length is inevitable, and I am willing to accept all the consequences brought about by my wrongful act. I just humbly pray the sentence would not deprive me of the opportunity to perform penance for my family.
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47名民主派被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」案，兩名超區參選人今（10日）午求情。辯方指，王百羽並非謀劃組織者，屬「積極參加者」，他還柙逾3年，體重減了20公斤，又患高血壓需服藥控制，望獲釋後繼續以專業服務社會。庭上讀出王百羽所撰的求情信，他感激家人不離不棄，形容他們是「天下間最好的父母」、「家人是我最珍視的寶物」，「我非常渴望能早日回家、擁抱家人，好好地盡孝道，孝順父母。」辯方讀出求情信和談及其家人時，王百羽雙眼通紅，數度以手和紙巾拭淚。
+
+#### 辯方：王百羽屬「積極參加者」
+
+代表王百羽的大律師黃俊嘉表示，王屬「積極參加者」，其罪責屬於高級別，但並非謀劃的組織或協調者，只是一名參與者。辯方指，王已深切反省，知道其行為屬不恰當，如再有機會，他並不會這樣做。
+
+辯方指，王來自勞動階層，於香港出生、長大，是家中第一名入讀大學的成員，其父母對他非常自豪，其母親今亦有到庭，給予兒子無條件支持。辯方指，王有貢獻社會的抱負，他畢業於科大計算機科學及工程學系，從事資訊科技工作，尹認為香港需要更多社區服務，故參與義工服務弱勢，並當選特首選委委員、港區全國人大代表選舉團成員，至2019年當選元朗區議員，會議出席率100%，為該區居民帶來改變，反映他的公共服務獲得認可。
+
+辯方指，王兼顧繁重工作和社區服務，令他有巨大的精神和生理壓力，患有高血壓，至今仍需服藥控制；王亦對因本案而無法服務居民感到深深抱歉。王百羽聞言時點頭。
+
+#### 王百羽稱望及早回家盡孝 庭上落淚
+
+辯方續讀出王百羽的求情信節錄，提及對家人的愛和感激。王表示：「家人是我最珍視的寶物⋯⋯我非常渴望能早日回家、擁抱家人，好好地盡孝道，孝順父母⋯⋯他們是天下間最好的父母，直到今天我的家人對我都仍不離不棄，我十分感激。疫情期間未能親自照料家人，只能獨自擔心卻無能為力，令我有很大的反思。看到他們能夠活得健康精神，是我現在最開心的事。」
+
+
+▲ 王百羽父親
+
+黃俊嘉朗讀求情信時，王百羽眼眶通紅，不禁落淚，他一度用手揉眼睛，又拿出紙巾數度拭眼和鼻。黃續指，王百羽其中一名祖父母年近九旬，王望能好好照顧家人，王早前置業，但因本案未能負擔供樓開支，需由家人承擔，黃望為他所犯的過錯道歉，並向家人表達感謝。
+
+#### 還柙期間減20公斤
+
+辯方最後指，王已是一名改過的人，他還柙逾3年，減輕了20公斤，獲得珍貴的機會反省自我，並制訂將來的計劃。他沒有放棄原本的專業，一直留意最新的科技發展，望獲釋後繼續以其專業，以恰當和合法的方式服務社會，重犯機會輕微。
+
+法官陳仲衡指，辯方提及王真誠誤信謀劃為合法，但看畢3頁求情信，似乎看不到他有這樣說。法官李運騰亦指，辯方可提供王百羽在初選期間說過的話，以顯示他當時相信是合法。黃俊嘉稱會索取指示，遂押後至明天繼續求情。
+
+
+▲ 王百羽（資料圖片）
+
+散庭時，毛孟靜再向旁聽席以手臂做出心心手勢，何啟明則向律師表示：「唔該晒！」
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47名民主派被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」案，今處理參選九西初選的6名被告求情。代表馮達浚的資深大律師祁志表示，本案被告是法官「永遠不會在被告欄見到的人」，他們有學識、表達和思考能力高，並告訴法庭他們是出於良好動機而犯案。祁志形容，案發時24歲的馮達浚是年輕、熱心和幼稚的理想主義者，他畢業自拔萃男書院，望服務社區，而他成長於有多元辯論和選舉文化的香港，當時提出反對不僅合法，也是人們生活的基石，通識教育亦鼓勵人發問和思考，惟在《國安法》後，這樣的情況結束，爭取權力監察政權，一夜之間變成了顛覆。
+
+辯方強調，馮案發時真誠相信謀劃合法，政府亦於《國安法》後逾半年才將他們拘捕，認為謀劃無對國安造成危害，望法庭按其參與程度判處較輕的刑期。辯方又引述馮所撰求情信，指自己還柙3年已反省和改變，他現時已不在意特首會否下台，並向他曾無禮對待的泛民致歉。
+
+#### 辯方：被告為民主社會領袖 望以和平手段服務社會
+
+毛孟靜和何啟明一方完成求情後，由馮達浚一方求情。代表馮達浚的資深大律師祁志表示，在法官席前的案件獨特，是這個司法管轄區從未聽過的，本案被告是各法官「永遠不會在被告欄見到的人」，他們被指以非法手段尋求改變，望透過選票進入議會，並告訴法庭他們是出於良好動機犯案，是其他案件所沒有的。
+
+祁志續舉例，搶劫犯運用暴力手段偷竊，販毒者從他人痛苦賺取利益，危駕者為他人帶來巨大傷害；但法庭從逾百日的審訊和聆訊，會得知本案被告均是民主社會、或「相對民主社會」的領袖，他們真誠相信多元主義（pluralism），望以和平手段服務社會，是有學識、表達和思考能力高的人，馮達浚亦是其中之一，因此法庭的量刑並不容易。
+
+#### 辯方：馮達浚為理想主義者、望服務社區
+
+祁志提到，馮達浚與他另外代表的袁嘉蔚一樣，是本案最年輕的被告之一，當中袁比馮年長，此時岑子杰和王百羽在唇邊舉起手指做出「shh」的手勢。
+
+祁志指，馮達浚案發時是一名24歲的理想主義者，他是一個「DBS boy」，畢業自拔萃男書院和浸會大學，從無隸屬任何政治組織。馮2014年受到雨傘運動觸動，其後開始服務九龍城社區，並於2019年參選區議員但失敗；惟他繼續懷有理想，為社區工作付出所有，他口中的「本土派」，是指對九龍城和九西社區工作的「本土」。
+
+#### 辯方：馮熱心幼稚、真誠信謀劃合法
+
+祁志指，馮達浚不是街頭抗爭者、也不暴力，只是一個熱心和幼稚的年輕人，望服務社區，盡力令他的聲音被聽見，真誠相信謀劃合法。但他能帶來影響的機會很微，他最終亦在初選被公眾所「拒絕」。
+
+
+▲ （資料圖片）
+
+祁志認為，法庭判刑時應合乎比例、避免壓迫性的刑罰；又指本案是以串謀罪而非《國安法》定罪，《國安法》第22條的三級刑期分級制不適用，法庭應按《刑事罪行條例》第159C條有關串謀罪的罰則，按串謀的嚴重性和危害來判刑，而本案串謀屬最輕微，馮的參與亦屬較低程度。
+
+#### 辯方：被告國安法後逾半年始被捕、選舉延後無續危害國安
+
+祁志續指，法庭判刑時僅應考慮事實和實際後果、而非臆測和假設性的結果，而涉案謀劃不大可能成功，因能否取得35+、立會重選後能否再當選等均屬未知數。
+
+祁志又指，若被告行為對國家安全有任何實質威脅，大可在《國安法》生效後不久將他們拘捕，但這期間政府沒有指各人違法，他們最終在6至7個月後才被捕，認為事實上涉案謀劃和被告並無對國安造成危害，馮達鴻參與串謀的時間短。
+
+法官陳慶偉打斷指，那是因為立法會正式選舉延期，惟祁志指，政府是稱因疫情而延後，而出於幸運，被告因此不能進一步危害國安，串謀的影響也停止，該「幸運」的利處應歸於被告。陳慶偉指他不同意，又提到根據庭上證供，戴耀廷此後還打算找香港民研做民調，謀劃沒有即時停止。祁志則重申，馮達浚的參與和造成的後果，在當刻已停止。
+
+#### 辯方：馮成長於多元社會、鼓勵公開辯論
+
+祁志又提到，案情提及馮達浚在2020年6月26日的選舉論壇，在「對《國安法》有全面理解（with full appreciation of NSL)」下，表達對《國安法》的不滿。惟祁志強調，《國安法》條文於6月30日晚才頒布，由特首簽署生效，被告沒有水晶球、事前無人見過內容，社會只對可能有《國安法》感到恐懼，被告此前並不知道所做的行為是違法。即使《國安法》通過後，行政會議成員、資深大律師湯家驊也不肯定是否違法。
+
+祁志指，馮達浚成長的香港社會，有多元辯論和選舉文化，提出反對不僅合法，也是港人生活和政治的基石；而香港有不同語言的報章，可從不同角度辯論政治議題，通識教育亦是教育制度重要一環，年輕人被訓練問問題，也被鼓勵思考和在公開及私下辯論。惟在《國安法》生效後，這樣的情況結束，爭取權力監察政權，一夜之間變成了顛覆。
+
+#### 馮達浚求情信向泛民道歉 官一度問有否提悔意
+
+祁志續指，馮達浚撰寫了6頁的中文求情信，形容他在法律界多年，從沒有看過如此準確和字體工整的求情信。當中馮表示已深切反省，不再談及政治。
+
+法官陳仲衡表示，他讀過求情信，問其信中有否提及悔意。祁志解釋，馮達浚並非空洞的道歉，而是在信中探索其內心，稱自己成為更冷靜的人。馮又提及2020年末決定不再參與選舉，而他還柙3年已經改變，現時已不在意特首會否下台，並望向他曾經非常不禮貌對待的泛民、他的團隊、家人等道歉，對困擾社會感到後悔，並感謝家人和他的貓的支持。
+
+馮的母親亦指馮望貢獻社會，已經反省和改變。馮亦獲浸大新聞系前高級講師呂秉權和另一講師撰求情信，指他對干犯《國安法》感後悔，並嘗試理解整個圖畫，而非只聆聽單一聲音。
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47名民主派被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」案，今處理參選九西初選的6名被告求情。代表黃碧雲的大律師沈士文指，黃的角色次要，沒有出席任何協調會議、無簽署「墨落無悔」聲明，她是在選舉論壇被激進派「逼到牆角」，受壓下才提及否決預算案，應屬「其他參加者」。辯方又引包括前運輸及房屋局局長張炳良等撰寫的求情信，指黃溫和、務實，屬「對抗式政治」的受害者，犯案與本性不符。
+
+代表劉澤鋒的大律師黃錦娟則指，劉生於廣州，熱心服務弱勢，參選是望服務他熱愛的社區，即香港和香港人，望考慮他為「其他參加者」或「積極參加者」較低級別。辯方又指，劉在獄中沒有放棄自己，修讀會計課程，望將來繼續服務社區和長者，並引其好友寄語：「雨後會是天晴」。
+
+#### 辯方：黃碧雲受壓下始提否決 屬「其他參加者」
+
+代表黃碧雲的大律師沈士文指，涉案謀劃在於當選後無差別否決預算案，惟能實現的機會很微。沈形容，黃碧雲的角色非常次要（peripheral），她並非組織者，並在社會氣氛熾熱時，從沒有親身出席任何協調會議、沒有簽署或支持「墨落無悔」聲明、政綱沒有提及否決預算案，亦從沒有公開表達對預算案的看法，而是專注在民生議題。
+
+
+▲ 黃碧雲（資料圖片）
+
+沈續指，黃碧雲之所以被定罪，主要因法庭裁定時任民主黨主席胡志偉的言論可指證黃，以及她在選舉論壇的言論。惟沈指，黃在論壇被激進派強烈批評，被「逼到牆角（cornered）」後才表示會用盡憲制裡的權力，包括否決預算案。沈指黃的角色非常被動，她沒有提倡無差別否決，反而是避免（refrain）這樣做，片中可見她頗為緊張，受壓才提到否決，考慮她的政治背景和往績，懷有顛覆國家政權的意圖嚴重干擾阻撓政權機關運作，與她本性完全不符。
+
+沈又指，雖認為《國安法》第22條的三級罰則不直接適用本案，但考慮被告角色時仍可作參考，並認為黃的角色屬最低級，為「其他參加者」。
+
+
+▲ 黃碧雲（左）、胡志偉（右）（資料圖片）
+
+#### 張炳良為黃碧雲撰求情信 稱屬「對抗式政治」受害者
+
+就黃碧雲的背景，沈士文指，她於加州大學洛杉磯分校（UCLA）取得政治科學博士，2012至2020年任兩屆九西區立法會議員，2020年立法會選舉延期後沒有被DQ，但自願辭職，其後沒有再參與政治，黃亦曾於理工大學任多年講師。
+
+辯方呈上前民主黨員、運輸及房屋局局長張炳良所撰的求情信，形容黃碧雲是2019年「對抗式政治（confrontational politics）」的受害者，捲入本案不符其性格。其他求情信亦指黃在社區及立法會工作獲得正面評價，對政治採取溫和、務實的做法，在撥款議案與政府合作，亦關心社區健康和福利事宜。
+
+
+▲ 前運輸及房屋局局長 張炳良
+
+沈又提及，前特首曾蔭權於2010年提出政改方案，在功能組別增加5席「超級區議會」，議案在黃碧雲的支持下獲得通過，顯示她務實，望香港循序漸進實現民主化。黃亦曾於2015年揭發「鉛水事件」，曾召開記招要求政府成立獨立調查委員會徹查，對公共衞生等議題作出貢獻。
+
+沈又提到，控方證人區諾軒曾發表一篇論文，提及民主黨認同「一國兩制」，支持香港回歸中國，並引黃碧雲為傳統民主派的例子。沈另提及，黃有2個定罪記錄，涉於2020年5月及10月擾亂立法會會議，黃被控違反《立法會（權力及特權）條例》，承認兩項藐視罪，共被判監4星期。
+
+#### 辯方指劉澤鋒參選為服務香港 屬「其他參加」或「積極參加」較低級
+
+代表劉澤鋒的大律師黃錦娟則指，劉生於廣州、來自草根家庭，案發時剛畢業於樹仁大學、近24歲，現年近27歲，一直投入義工和社區服務，是政治素人，參選是嘗試以他的知識服務他熱愛的社區，即香港和香港人。辯方望法庭考慮劉只是報名參加初選，簽署「墨落無悔」、參加選舉論壇和接受一些訪問，並於初選落敗，之後沒有再參與謀劃，其參與時間較短、角色輕微，認為劉屬「其他參加者」、最多是「積極參加者」較低級別。
+
+
+▲ 劉澤鋒（左）、余慧明（右）（資料圖片）
+
+黃續指，劉還柙至今逾3年，其家人今有到庭支持，認識他逾12年的友人、同學、牧師等亦撰求情信，指劉一直樂於助人、熱心服務弱勢，曾發起協助無家者的計劃，亦會探訪長者，為他們清潔家居。黃指，劉還柙至今逾3年並沒有放棄自己，他修讀中大的會計課程並取得不俗成績，望日後進修輔導、管理及運動治療等課程，望繼續以知識幫助別人和服務香港社會，尤其是長者。
+
+黃最後引述劉澤鋒好友求情信，指劉曾提及在獄中，雨天時會感到比較舒服，好友寄語「雨後會是天晴」。黃提及，劉參與謀劃與其性格不符，他錯誤相信謀劃屬合法，望法庭能寬大處理，令劉能獲釋並看到雨後晴天。
+
+
+▲ 左起：何啓明、劉澤鋒、劉偉聰（資料圖片）
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69-70/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-11-israeli-military-tactics-in-gaza.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-11-israeli-military-tactics-in-gaza.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Israeli Military Tactics In Gaza
+author: Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds
+date : 2024-07-11 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/vUWCmUw.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Tactical Lessons from Israel Defense Forces Operations in Gaza, 2023"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_The Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) operations in Gaza, beginning in October 2023, provide valuable lessons for the conduct of urban operations._ _While there are many aspects of the fighting specific to Gaza, other lessons are more widely applicable. This paper seeks to identify lessons relevant to the British Army, based on analysis of IDF operations in autumn 2023. The paper is a study of military tactics and does not address the wider operational and strategic situation_
+
+As regards dismounted close combat in an urban environment, the IDF found that the risk of fratricide owing to cross-boundary fires meant that units should have non-contiguous unit boundaries for units advancing along the same axis. Thus, IDF units would have a movement corridor, and a fires corridor allocating on each side. Given the very narrow frontages of manoeuvre, it was found necessary to have combined arms elements in intimate support down to platoon level.
+
+The IDF had persistent challenges with rubblisation, both because it created obstructions for movement and degraded the ability to describe the terrain and thus coordinate and control fire. The IDF has concluded that specific training is necessary for what it is terming “devastated terrain warfare”. Specific drills for talking soldiers onto target when looking at irregular terrain must be practised.
+
+It was also found that adopting a sequential approach to surface and sub-surface operations ceded initiative to the enemy and reduced tempo as units mounted deliberate clearance operations in their rear area. Instead, the IDF found that it was more effective to carry out simultaneous surface and sub-surface operations. This required careful battlespace management as movement below ground did not always correlate with unit boundaries above ground. In general, the IDF did not find that there was much of a requirement to deliberately clear high-rise buildings, as there was limited tactical value in being above the second floor.
+
+Operations in Gaza have highlighted the criticality of organic lethality at echelon. Hamas tactics have evolved over the course of the fighting, but each iteration saw different groupings of fighters endeavour to rapidly engage isolated IDF units before disengaging. In practice these tactics did not perform well because Hamas was not able to concentrate sufficient firepower. It therefore often failed to inflict significant damage, while the IDF were generally able to suppress attackers and thereafter deliberately target them. For the British Army the lesson is clear: organic lethality must be increased in close combat echelons.
+
+The ability to responsively employ precision fires in close proximity to friendly forces – allowing higher echelons to increase the lethality of close combat forces – has become critically dependent on access to the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). The IDF found that once units had UAS organic to their formations, there was a significant challenge to identifying friend or foe. Once the enemy was also employing UAS, friendly electronic protection saturated the spectrum, interfering with digitised command and control. This has produced a requirement for reversionary methods to be available, and for improved EMS battlespace management.
+
+The IDF ultimately suppressed Hamas’s capacity to concentrate forces because of its access to air delivered effects. It is worth noting that buildings do not offer significant protection against air delivered munitions, because of the weight of ordnance that can be dropped with precision. The lesson for the British Army is that urban defence must be premised on effective air defence covering the urban space.
+
+The application of air delivered fires to bypass the physical protection offered by urban terrain creates significant challenges for discrimination. First, there is the question of what cannot be seen as regards concealed civilians. Second, in conventional and unconventional conflict, combatants are increasingly blending in with the civilian population in a manner that makes discrimination difficult. The IDF have struggled with this problem and it has been exacerbated by the IDF ceding critical elements of the information environment, such as casualty estimates, to entities associated with Hamas.
+
+The humanitarian situation in Gaza has been disastrous. Much of this relates to issues of getting aid into the Strip, which, other than ensuring the efficiency of searching cargos at scale, is a political rather than tactical military problem and therefore falls outside of the scope of this paper. Where there are transferable lessons for the British Army is in the challenges the IDF have had in distributing aid. On the one hand Hamas has sought to gain control over aid distribution to re-establish control of the territory. This is antithetical to Israel’s war aims. Yet the IDF closely supervising distribution is a recipe for clashes at aid points. The IDF has not found a system that assures adequate supply and distribution of aid while also preventing Hamas from exerting control along the process. This dynamic challenge bears careful study as meeting humanitarian obligations are an essential part of urban operations, but when required at scale can rapidly unhinge the tempo and capacity of a formation.
+
+There are many more lessons identified in this paper that bear scrutiny. There are also likely to be further lessons that emerge from later stages of IDF operations in Gaza.
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+The spectre of urban operations has been an enduring concern among professional militaries. In 2017, the liberation of Mosul was perceived as simultaneously demonstrating how difficult such operations are and providing an effective model for how Western militaries could project power into urban spaces while transferring the risk onto partner forces; in that case, the Iraqi security forces. The war in Ukraine has resurrected appreciation of the need to be able to conduct complex offensive action into urban terrain, for while the conditions for an urban operation are set in surrounding rural areas, translating tactical success into operational success is often dependent on the ability to enter and successfully seize towns and cities. Given repeated warnings from British defence figures that today is a “pre-war” period, any opportunity to learn lessons about the contemporary battlefield that could improve the readiness of the British Army deserves study.
+
+When Hamas launched an armed attack on Israel on 7 October 2023, massacring civilians and taking over 250 hostages, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) did not have the option of transferring the risk onto a partner force. Faced with the simultaneous – and more severe – threat from Hezbollah on Israel’s northern border, the IDF elected to conduct a rapid combined arms assault into dense urban terrain, which had been extensively prepared by Hamas to support protracted defensive operations. Moreover, the assault was in terrain inhabited by a large civilian population hostile to the IDF’s presence and under intense international scrutiny. Given that the IDF is a modern military, drawing on a range of emerging capabilities, its operations are worthy of study to identify lessons relevant to the British Army.
+
+This paper examines IDF operations – tactics, force structure, capabilities and operational design – during the initial operation in Gaza City in autumn 2023. The paper is intended to highlight tactical lessons that have wider applicability and to discuss the problems that have driven tactical adaptation in the field.
+
+It is important to emphasise what this paper does not attempt to do. It is not an assessment of the likely efficacy of the IDF’s operational design or strategic goals. Nor does it make recommendations about how the conflict may conclude. Rather, it is a study of military tactics. The paper does not assess the ethical or political debate surrounding aspects of Israeli operations, except insofar as the challenges confronted by the IDF would also pose tactical challenges to the British Army under comparable conditions. These questions, while highly important and the subject of ongoing debate, are best addressed separately. The paper is also limited to discussion of operations in 2023 in Gaza City and does not extensively cover subsequent operations in Khan Younis or Rafah.
+
+The evidence base for this paper draws on author interviews with strategic-, operational- and tactical-level IDF commanders and analysts from a range of units that have operated in the Gaza Strip during the war. This includes interviews with Israel’s Southern and Northern Commands, with personnel from divisional and brigade staffs and at the battalion level. The IDF have also established lessons learned cells in all their formations, and with battalions assigning an officer to provide observations to the brigades from the beginning of their ground operations. These were analysed at the divisional and regional command echelon, and where contradictory information arose, were investigated. The authors spent time with the lessons learned officers and saw samples of their data. Of the 44 core interviews with IDF personnel, most interviewees ranked between OF4 and OF7. The authors directly observed some of the processes described. The authors also engaged with IDF personnel prior to the conflict and observed IDF training, including for urban operations. In addition to this primary evidence collection, the authors have collated and analysed a significant body of combat footage and reports on the conflict written by both journalists and academics and have maintained contact with some humanitarian personnel working on and in Gaza.
+
+There are significant limitations to the evidence collected, and the extent to which it can be used. Hamas commanders were not accessible for interview. The authors did not endeavour to interview diplomatic and UN staffs, whose work does not cover military operations. There is also a significant body of evidence collected that cannot be made public or exploited in this paper because its publication would breach operational security. Where this arose, the authors did not address these subjects. The exact details of Israeli intelligence processes and adaptations following the failure to anticipate the attack on 7 October are sensitive, and it was decided to omit discussion of this topic, rather than address it in a manner that was self-evidently inadequate. Another area that is not substantially addressed is the efforts to recover Israeli hostages. While they have had a significant impact on the conduct of the war, these operations are also sensitive, and lessons relating to hostage rescue cannot be adequately covered at this time with the information that is releasable.
+
+The paper has seven chapters. Chapter I is a brief overview of the context within which the IDF formulated its operational plan and the scheme of manoeuvre for the first operation against Gaza City. It is not intended to be a detailed narrative of the war. The subsequent chapters each cover lessons relating to warfighting functions: mounted and dismounted close combat; combat engineering; subterranean operations; fires; information operations; and humanitarian support operations. The paper concludes with considerations of the relevance of the identified lessons and specifically how they relate to emerging concepts in the British Army.
+
+
+### I. Operational Context: 7 October to 24 November 2023
+
+Hamas initiated its ground invasion of Israel on 7 October 2023 with a carefully synchronised breakthrough of Israel’s border defences. Although combat groups of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades (the military wing of Hamas) had been instructed to train and equip for the assault and capture of Israeli villages and IDF outposts for some time, these small-scale exercises by individual Hamas units had become somewhat routine. The planning for 7 October had been carried out by a small group, with instructions to individual Hamas units given in isolation, so that only upon assembly were its fighters given briefs on their specific objectives and an indication of the scale of the operation. These briefs were detailed, covering the location of IDF defensive positions and command posts, the layout of military installations and kibbutzim, and in some cases, the working and sleeping quarters of IDF commanders and local officials. The original breaching force also operated with effective communications discipline, with very little use of mobile phones or other communications systems until they were engaged by the IDF.
+
+The breaching of the border saw Hamas coordinate the blinding of surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities using UAVs, snipers and anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) to destroy the cameras and communications antennae along the Gaza border. This simultaneously prevented IDF command posts from receiving information and stopped their transmission of instructions to subordinates. Breaches of the border fence were then executed at 50 points using bulldozers, frame charges and explosive Bangalore torpedoes. In addition, six fan-powered parachutes flew to three points inside Israel, while seven fast boats attempted a maritime insertion along the Israeli coast. The assault force was spearheaded by up to 2,000 Hamas fighters and participants from other armed groups in Gaza. The initial assault force was divided into combat groups, each of which was given specific objectives with prepared intelligence on the location of individual Israeli commanders and garrisons. The headquarters of IDF units and police forces were directly attacked. As the raid occurred during a national holiday in Israel, the IDF were left with very little situational awareness, without their communications infrastructure to coordinate a response, and with a lack of mobile reserves. Hamas teams also seized and held road junctions, impeding IDF movement.
+
+In terms of setting the initial conditions for the conflict, it is important to note that Hamas fighters deviated significantly from their own plan during its execution. Following behind the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigade fighters were around 1,000 Gazans, who – seeing the breaches in the fences – followed the assault force onto Israeli territory, and were the source of a significant proportion of the social media posts and videos from 7 October. Discipline among Hamas fighters at this point appears to have broken down. The original planning documents showed that Hamas had intended to fortify the positions it had seized and use hostages to complicate the IDF’s retaking of these positions. Hamas had brought rations and medical and combat equipment for extended operations. The chaotic massacre that unfolded diverted efforts to prepare for a deliberate defence. In some respects, the devastation created chaos that complicated efforts to bring the immediate situation under control on 7 October. At the same time, Hamas’s lack of prepared fighting positions made the IDF’s reclamation battle for the seized territory far easier over the following days.
+
+IDF forces mobilised extremely quickly. In the initial 24 hours, this was to a large extent a process of self-mobilisation, whereby reservists and soldiers on leave rushed to the area near the Gaza border without clear chains of command established, or unit boundaries drawn. This resulted in losses of personnel and equipment. A good example is an IDF CH-53 helicopter, piloted by a former member of the aviation unit, which picked up a unit of paratroopers and flew them directly into the combat zone without deconfliction. The troops were inserted, but the helicopter was destroyed. The deployment of this unit was not part of any higher-level plan but was implemented by commanders and reservists at unit level. Despite this intermingling of troops from units across Israel creating an extremely chaotic battlespace, it also seriously disrupted Hamas fighters’ freedom of manoeuvre in and around the locations they had seized. Command and control (C2) of the IDF’s initial response was also complicated by the fact that Hamas had destroyed many of the antennae supporting military C2 systems around Gaza, while the capture of a large quantity of Israeli communications equipment forced the IDF to distribute new encryption keys for its military communications before they could be used. This meant that the IDF had to revert to civilian communications for the initial 48 hours of the war, with a corresponding lack of operational security.
+
+IDF mobilisation became more deliberate within 48 hours as reservists were called up, assembled and moved to assembly areas. The appearance of formed units with their command echelon in the battle area enabled an increasingly deliberate series of reclamation battles to take occupied positions. The IDF had largely regained control of the ground within 72 hours, with clearance operations for a further three days eliminating surviving pockets of resistance. Some infiltrators remained on Israeli territory for up to three weeks but were not operationally significant beyond the first five days.
+
+In response to the 7 October attack, the Israeli cabinet declared war on Hamas. Given that the Israeli government had seemingly not anticipated any such attack, a precise formulation of Israeli war aims took some time to coalesce, and some tenets of the implementation remain subject to debate. Nevertheless, within the first five days IDF commanders were planning against three core military objectives:
+
+1. The destruction of Hamas’s military infrastructure and capabilities to a point where they no longer threatened Israel.
+
+2. The recovery of hostages.
+
+3. The removal of Hamas as the de facto government in Gaza in order to deny Hamas the ability to regenerate its combat power.
+
+These objectives, authorised by the Israeli cabinet, became the basis for operational planning as soon as the IDF had regained control of Israeli territory. Other objectives that were more political in character were articulated at various points by Israeli ministers.
+
+IDF officers concluded that a ground invasion would be necessary to remove Hamas from control of the Gaza Strip. The IDF had previously conducted incursions into the Gaza Strip, as during Operation Protective Edge in 2014. However, the aims of the incursions between 2008 and 2023 were far less ambitious in terms of the amount of terrain that had to be manoeuvred through. The IDF had plans for the full occupation of Gaza, which had been rehearsed in command post exercises. Nevertheless, the number of troops assessed to be necessary meant that these plans could not be fully exercised without a call up of reserves. The scale of the operation envisaged in 2023 meant that there was a requirement for a deliberate force build-up and an extended period of planning.
+
+The period available for preparation was – in the view of IDF planners – constrained by three factors. First, alongside the ground attack on 7 October, Hamas initiated a massive rocket barrage of Israeli military and civilian sites. In response, the Israeli Air Force conducted an immediate large-scale air campaign against identified Hamas targets in Gaza and assessed rocket launch sites. Despite these efforts, it was assessed that rockets would continue to be launched if Hamas could cache weapons underground, and so would only be prevented from launching more rockets by the IDF physically seizing the terrain.
+
+Second, IDF planners believed that there was a window of opportunity created by the 7 October attack during which the international community would give Israel freedom of action, and that this window would close. This belief stemmed from the experience from previous rounds of fighting. Indeed, just prior to 7 October, a senior IDF planner had indicated to one of the authors that the closing of the window within which operations could be conducted had prevented any kind of critical threshold being reached to change the dynamic during previous rounds of escalation with Hamas, as during 2021. The scale of the Hamas incursion in October 2023 meant that the IDF expected to have a longer period with freedom of action, but time was nevertheless considered a finite resource, and this created a belief among planners that they had to act sooner rather than later.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 1: Axes of IDF Advance During Initial Break-in Operation.__ Source: Israeli military presence in Gaza Strip citing Institute for the Study of War & Critical Threats Project. Maximum IDF advance citing New York Times and Wall Street Journal. Made using [OpenTopoMap data., CC BY-SA 4.0](https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=138592589). Edited by RUSI._
+
+Third, although Hezbollah had not coordinated any operations against northern Israel with Hamas on 7 October, it did begin to attack Israeli communities with rockets in the days following the operation, and mobilised a large body of fighters. With the threat of a major escalation in the northern theatre coinciding with the commitment of forces in Gaza, the IDF assessed that it needed to be able to rapidly complete the most intensive part of operations in Gaza – the urban break-in – to enable forces to subsequently pivot north. Moreover, the longer the Hamas rocket barrage continued against Israel, the more Iron Dome interceptors would be used, increasing Israel’s vulnerability to Hezbollah’s much greater missile arsenal.
+
+Given the impetus to act quickly, the plan formulated by the IDF ground forces involved an advance into Gaza City on three axes. First, there were raids planned towards Beit Hanoun. These incursions, largely at night, both enabled the emplacement of forces in Gaza and confirmed Hamas in its belief that its phase lines for a deliberate defence should be orientated to confront an assault from this axis. The second axis divided Gaza City from southern Gaza by pushing along the northern side of Wadi Gaza, thereby isolating Hamas forces in the city from their line of resupply. The third axis was the main effort, heading south along the coast on a narrow front and then turning in to Gaza City. The coastal axis was intended to enable the IDF to circumvent most of Hamas’s prepared defences. The plan therefore committed three mechanised divisions simultaneously into an area smaller than 70 km2 to confront an adversary of approximately 20,000 personnel amid a civilian population of more than 600,000 people (approximately 1.1 million in the operational area north of Wadi Gaza, as compared with 40,000 Hamas fighters across the Strip).
+
+It is worth noting that there has been some discussion of Gaza’s population density in the media, suggesting that it is one of the most densely populated cities in the world. Exact measures of population density vary, depending on where studies draw their boundaries. Like most cities, Gaza City had some pockets of extremely high population density, while across the Strip, the density is within the distribution for modern cities. Recognising that Gaza is not exceptional as an urban space is important, because it makes the lessons from Gaza in this regard transferable to other militaries in other theatres of operation.
+
+These lines of effort were initiated on the night of 27 October and made considerable progress, so that by the time a ceasefire was declared to allow the exchange of prisoners for hostages on 24 November, a large part of Gaza City was under IDF control. The IDF has subsequently conducted operations against Khan Younis, and at the time of writing is conducting operations in Rafah, and it has also undertaken further raids into Gaza City in response to Hamas re-entering parts of the city that had previously been cleared.
+
+With a rough outline of the scale of operations and scheme of manoeuvre, it becomes possible to identify a range of tactical lessons and adaptations that the IDF has learned over the course of the fighting.
+
+
+### II. Mounted and Dismounted Close Combat
+
+The scheme of manoeuvre for each axis was drawn up at the divisional echelon, under the IDF Southern Command as the operational headquarters. On the main axis, the division committed two brigades to an axis of advance less than 1 km wide. The brigade composition was an armoured battalion, a mechanised infantry battalion, an infantry battalion, a combat engineering battalion, an artillery battalion, a special forces attachment, and enablers. The boundaries between battalions were drawn down the centre of city blocks. The initial incursion was led by D9 bulldozers, intended to overcome IEDs. Exact employment differed block by block and between units, as the formations used were ad hoc. However, a rough outline of the tactical approach saw the D9s work one bound ahead of Merkava main battle tanks, with the heavy armour moving in pairs of vehicles. They would establish overwatch to enable Namer infantry fighting vehicles to then move forward and disembark infantry into buildings flanking the next bound. As the mechanised infantry moved forward, light infantry would advance to clear and hold terrain to prevent attacks on the rear.
+
+There has been some debate as to the significance of high-rise buildings during urban operations and the extent to which armies need to work out how to fight within them. The evidence from Gaza suggests that these structures are of limited military value. In terms of their use as observation posts, it is difficult for observers positioned on the higher floors to maintain oversight of the cityscape beneath them without also exposing themselves to observation. Above a certain height, the streets become dead ground. Furthermore, fighters who move up a multistorey building lose the ability to reposition laterally. The IDF therefore found that observers would remain in the first few levels of a building (not least because observation from higher altitude can be achieved more effectively by UAVs), while fighters rarely ventured above the second level. This is consistent with observations from Ukraine, largely for the same reasons. Using sensors to detect activity on higher floors to engage them with fires is a relevant capability, but there appears to be a limited requirement for ground manoeuvre forces to extensively occupy and clear higher floors. Tall buildings do bring complications for close combat elements, however. First, to attack an enemy on lower levels with fires often requires higher payload ordnance. This is because the angles available to reach a target in a high-rise area are constrained by obstructions, and thus attacks often need to strike a higher floor but impact a lower floor. This has implications for collateral damage. It also means that there is an increased risk of rubble and debris falling further away from the building, increasing the minimum safe distance from friendly infantry within which fires could be employed.
+
+Although the IDF made rapid progress during the early break-in, rubblisation caused a range of problems. Tank drivers could not accurately assess the depth of craters through night vision, especially when there had been rain, and some vehicles were lost owing to roll-overs when vehicles drove into shell holes. Another problem arose from a lack of terms for coordinating direct fire. Fire control in either an offensive or defensive context is best conducted through the designation of unit boundaries, arcs of fire, known friendly and enemy positions, and reference points. The integration of many mobilised reservists with the mixed professional and conscript force proved a challenge. While all Israeli reservists have full-time military experience from, at minimum, initial service as conscripts, many reservists had not conducted much substantial training for several years. As a result, many were out of practice and would to varying degrees operate according to outdated doctrine, impeding a common understanding when attempting to coordinate either movement or fire.
+
+Environmental factors exacerbated this problem. Gaza City’s high population density and limited urban planning created an urban environment characterised by narrow streets and irregular high-rise buildings. Furthermore, the progressive reduction of the terrain to rubble through the course of fighting resulted in an irregular, congested and complex visual environment. The extreme degree of irregularity and rubblisation proved manageable when mapping terrain from above, but was anathema to the accurate identification and designation of reference points and targets for ground units. If targets were seen by a ground unit, they would often defy precise verbal description, creating scope for their mis-designation. Forces that had been trained to talk one another onto targets using the windows and floors of a building as reference points struggled to rapidly convey where enemy were to one another in structures that no longer had uniformity. The contrast with other urban operations the IDF had conducted was sufficient that the IDF’s lessons learned teams have referred to what was experienced as a distinct category of urban operations – “devastated terrain warfare”. It should also be noted that rubblisation was to a large extent a product of IDF air- and artillery-delivered fires. This should therefore have been a factor in the planning of movement corridors and boundaries.
+
+Related challenges that IDF personnel confronted were friendly fire and combat accidents, of which there were three main causes. The first, and simplest to resolve, was unfamiliarity with the impact of heavier weapons in close terrain, especially for weapons that soldiers were qualified on but rarely used. The most common culprit was M203 grenade launchers, with several soldiers injured by fragmentation after engaging targets at too close range. Another issue was accidental cross-boundary fragmentation between units caused by heavier weapons carrying on through structures and therefore entering another unit’s manoeuvre corridor. It should be noted that communication between armour and infantry – in the IDF, this is generally done via radio – was critical for confirming channels of fire. Methods such as the use of phones mounted on the rear of tanks to speak to the crew inside were dangerous, given the functioning of active protection systems on Israeli armour.
+
+The second cause of friendly fire and accidents, and much more challenging, was the difficulty in judging range and thus deconfliction lines between manoeuvre corridors. This was most pronounced when units were looking diagonally down a line of buildings. As rubblisation caused ruined buildings to visually merge, with the effect becoming more pronounced over distance or at night, movement in a building in an adjacent unit’s movement corridor would frequently be mistaken for movement within a unit’s area of responsibility. This issue was reduced, but not fully eliminated, by placing gaps between units’ movement corridors rather than having contiguous boundaries, where both adjacent units had freedom to engage targets in the intervening space. This fire zone was usually placed along a block of buildings. Another important mitigation was to use rangefinders to distinguish buildings and thereby overcome the visual merging of structures.
+
+The third cause of friendly fire related to perceived profiles. On several occasions, IDF personnel being tracked as mounted units dismounted to inspect buildings, run to colleagues’ vehicles to coordinate, or otherwise shifted profile. Where this caused them to appear on ISR feeds in both unexpected locations and as small numbers of armed dismounts, misclassification occurred and in some cases, strikes were directed against them. This was a particular challenge for UAV operators, since while thermal imaging allows personnel to be accurately distinguished from the background terrain, it also reduces the visual distinctiveness of uniforms and equipment. The latter problem was exacerbated by IDF reservists wearing privately acquired armour and uniform elements that did not conform to IDF-issue equipment, reducing the uniformity of the force. Given the lack of uniform among Hamas fighters, this made it difficult to accurately distinguish targets. The challenges of distinguishing Hamas fighters from civilians are discussed later in relation to targeting and fires.
+
+Hamas’s tactics may be said to have evolved in three stages. At the beginning of the operation, Hamas appears to have conceived of its defence as being based around key junctions on the anticipated Israeli axis of advance. A strongpoint, from which a position could be overlooked, would fix IDF elements on a given avenue and coordinate the movement of small teams to then attack IDF units in flanking ambushes. This approach was disrupted by the unexpected axis of the main IDF advance. After many of the designated ambush sites were approached from different directions, Hamas thereafter began to raid and fight for key buildings and strongpoints. The fighting therefore shifted to a second stage, from being over particular intersections with favourable sight lines to building complexes that drew in IDF forces to enable attacks. The third stage of Hamas tactics emerged after the week-long November ceasefire and saw the emergence of harassing attacks by small, dispersed groups which would try to converge fires onto isolated IDF elements. As larger-scale engagements and the superiority of IDF fires inflicted heavy losses, Hamas instead switched to trying to attack weaker and smaller patrols of IDF personnel, rather than engage combined arms units. This near-uniform adaptation among Hamas cells demonstrates that they retained the ability to pass information during the initial phase of IDF operations, suggesting that the IDF was unsuccessful in fully degrading Hamas’s C2. The adaptations were consistent with Hamas’s assessed strategic objective of surviving as an armed presence across Gaza and thus retaining administrative control, even with a heavily depleted force.
+
+Combined with the use of fires ahead of manoeuvring elements to disrupt Hamas repositioning, the IDF did not confront heavy anti-armour ambushes, but rather sporadic and harassing engagements. However, once the IDF pushed into an area, Hamas would begin to emerge from subterranean infrastructure to conduct rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) and sniper engagements against IDF vehicles through rubblised structures. In some cases, heavy weapons were brought out from tunnels camouflaged with earth. In others, Hamas fighters would move in civilian profile without weapons and then retrieve cached arms at their intended point of ambush to conduct the engagement. Hamas arms caches were widely dispersed throughout the terrain, with IDF units reporting that about a third of structures in Gaza City contained arms. The attack groups would withdraw to subterranean positions once they had conducted an attack. Hamas’s coordination of these actions appeared to depend on spotters tracking IDF positions and then using fixed lines or runners to communicate this information. The passage of information could also be enabled through social media activity, largely indistinguishable from civilians commenting on events unfolding around them but providing significant situational awareness to combat groups.
+
+The sporadic anti-tank guided missile and persistent RPG threat – often manifesting from a 30–50-m distance from IDF vehicles – posed a challenge for active protection systems (APS). Where APS had either been turned off, did not have a sufficient line of sight between the sensor and the threat, or had already been expended, hits were achieved on IDF vehicles. Nevertheless, while Hamas believed that APS could be defeated with close engagements, this problem was resolved through software updates. In most cases, APS proved effective, although the distance between armour and infantry for APS to be fielded safely also offered Hamas fighters the opportunity to come in extremely close proximity to some vehicles. Nevertheless, it was found that having pairs of vehicles operate in intimate support helped to increase their survivability, as the APS could often overlap and thereby increase the magazine depth to protect the vehicles.
+
+It is worth briefly highlighting the number of casualties in Gaza since 7 October 2023, since these provide an indicator of the intensity of the fighting. In terms of individual engagements, Hamas has rarely concentrated forces above the size of the platoon. Nevertheless, because urban terrain causes high-intensity combat between relatively small groups of people, these fights have often been costly. From the beginning of ground operations in Gaza on 27 October 2023 to the time of writing, 287 IDF soldiers have been killed in combat, with a further 1,798 wounded, of whom 357 were classified as severely wounded. The IDF has therefore had more personnel killed so far than the UK did in the campaign to retake the Falklands from Argentina in 1982, or during the entire British campaign in Iraq from 2003. Hamas has not released casualty figures. The IDF estimated that it had killed between 10,000 and 12,000 Hamas fighters by February 2024. Estimates of civilian and combatant casualties among Palestinians exceeded 35,000. In reality, the number of people whose bodies remain under the rubble make a conclusive figure impossible to provide. However, these estimates give a sense of the intensity of the fighting, albeit one distorted by the proportion of casualties from air-delivered and indirect fires.
+
+
+### III. Combat Engineering
+
+Israeli operations started with the assumption that Hamas would have extensively laid landmines and IEDs along the anticipated routes into Gaza. Thus, Israeli forces at first either avoided roads or only used them in conjunction with meticulous clearance operations with support from D9 bulldozers, which slowed the pace of their advance. The IDF determined that it required 20 D9s per brigade to meet the required tempo of operations, although this was only allocated to the lead brigades. This proved to be largely unnecessary, as Hamas had not laid mines in sufficient concentration, and those that it had deployed along roads were often surface laid and thus easy to detect and simple to remove. It is debatable whether Hamas’s decision not to lay significant IEDs on the roads into Gaza City reflected a recognition that Israel’s combat engineering assets would make these efforts redundant. In other words, it may be that the density of breaching equipment pushed Hamas to prioritise efforts elsewhere. Hamas’s failure to mine the approaches could also have arisen from the limited time available, intensity of overhead observation, and local political impact on civilians prior to 7 October.
+
+While route proving did not demand significant engineering support, clearance and search operations placed a heavy demand on dismounted combat engineers. First, Hamas seeded IEDs throughout buildings in the Gaza Strip, and at the time of writing, these continue to inflict casualties. IEDs were also used to defend the entrances to tunnels and slow the IDF’s passage into Hamas’s subterranean infrastructure. Thus, dismounted combat engineers became an integral element of all combined arms operations. Alongside explosive ordnance and disposal (EOD) search and clearance, combat engineers were also critical to the breaching of buildings and rooms to enable the IDF to move unpredictably through the urban terrain. This reduced the exposure of manoeuvring infantry to traps and ambushes.
+
+Overall, the technical combat engineering skills required are unsurprising; any observer with experience of coalition operations in the wider Middle East and Afghanistan would be familiar with most of the dynamics at play. However, the need to integrate combat engineers with ground combat formations at the sub-unit level re-emphasised the need for a significant number of appropriately trained personnel. This also raises questions about how to distribute engineers across different formations while maintaining the ability to centralise combat engineer operations where necessary, and to assimilate lessons learned, spread them across the force and conduct training – all essential to combining arms at scale for urban warfare. Furthermore, as will be covered in the next chapter, the subterranean nature of some of the fighting meant that difficult engineering tasks would have to be conducted under even more challenging conditions underground.
+
+Another consequence of the engineering challenge was that the use of novel sensors to locate subterranean infrastructure required close collaboration between technically sophisticated engineering units and intelligence practitioners. Here the IDF benefited from the experience of reservists with skillsets beyond the traditional military competencies. Capturing Hamas fighters or their caches and thus their documentation demanded the ability to move through terrain quickly. This required breaching and rapid EOD support. Conversely, when examination of captured materials or interrogation of captured fighters enabled the identification of tunnels, this often required engineering reconnaissance expertise to rapidly turn this information into an actionable plan on the ground. The level of engineer training at the sub-unit level therefore exceeded what would traditionally be covered by a pioneer, but instead necessitated sappers to be distributed across the force.
+
+The complexity of the terrain also produced tactical challenges where engineering equipment had to be moved between echelons quickly. The repair of water pipes and facilities would normally sit at a relatively high echelon in dedicated engineering units, as a function brought in to stabilise an environment and tend to civilians after the completion of major clearance operations. In some instances, however, the IDF elected to flood Hamas tunnels using seawater and conduct other new engineering tasks during fighting. This required specialised expertise to be brought into the area of responsibility of combat arms units during combat, and thus brought engineers to an echelon with which they did not routinely train. Nevertheless, such techniques allowed some challenges to be bypassed.
+
+At higher echelons, plans for engineering proved critical. Rainfall in Israel and Gaza can be intense, as it usually falls in concentrated periods. The impact of rainfall on the terrain was uneven, producing mobility challenges, as well as humanitarian problems relating to sanitation. This meant that as units rotated into and out of the Gaza Strip, viable movement corridors and the engineering support equipment necessary to restore mobility changed over time. Given the need to have the equipment available within a short timeframe, despite its large footprint, equipment needed to be accessible to units without being organic to them and thus a burden. This required intelligence and planning so that appropriate equipment could be pre-positioned.
+
+
+### IV. Subterranean Operations
+
+The extent of Hamas’s subterranean infrastructure in Gaza makes it an almost unique operating environment. While not on a comparable scale, subterranean manoeuvre has been an element in fighting in Mariupol, Bakhmut, Mosul and other urban operations. This chapter is, therefore, probably the most case specific in its conclusions, but the lessons are still valuable.
+
+In the years prior to the 7 October attack, Hamas claims to have constructed more than 500 km of tunnel networks under Gaza. This required an immense volume of cement, concrete and iron, not to mention the removal of soil. The level of and exact split between Hamas coercion of and active collaboration by the civilian population remains unclear; the tunnels and their entrances run under residential buildings, schools, mosques and hospitals.
+
+To describe Hamas’s subterranean infrastructure merely as “tunnels” is a mischaracterisation. Some were intended as covert passageways between key points – such as beneath Wadi Gaza. Others were made with the intent to bypass Israeli defences. Still others housed barracks, caches, C2 centres, data storage and manufacturing facilities. There are roughly two levels of subterranean infrastructure – commanders’ tunnels and operatives’ tunnels. These are separated, with commanders’ tunnels running deeper and with a better quality of construction and more facilities, enabling them to be used for longer-term habitation and operations. The tunnels are not one single network. While some sections are linked, many are smaller sub-networks that are not integrated into an overall underground structure, with the segmentation of the network limiting the exploitation potential of any given tunnel. While at least one major data centre was captured, the majority of underground C2 nodes were very small, consisting of as little as internet-connected or ethernet-connected laptops. These could be found throughout the tunnel networks.
+
+Prior to the current conflict, it was well known that Hamas conducted tunnelling and built underground infrastructure. However, even with a capable ISR apparatus, the IDF lacked the ability to accurately map the subterranean environment. While various units of the IDF had conducted training exercises focused on hypothetical operations in Gaza, Hamas had a far better understanding of the terrain than the IDF, and this was especially true of the subterranean environment. The tunnels were also central to Hamas’s concept of operations, allowing them to reinfiltrate areas on the surface that the IDF had cleared and granting them a safe haven from the fighting above ground.
+
+At the beginning of the operation, the IDF conceived of surface and sub-surface operations as occurring sequentially: ground would be occupied and thereafter searched, with tunnels found and denied. As the operation developed, it became evident that this allowed Hamas to persist in conducting ambushes for a protracted period and to then transition to a layered defence of underground facilities. Nor could underground infrastructure be safely bypassed. Instead, therefore, the surface and sub-surface fighting needed to be carried out simultaneously, posing competing dilemmas for Hamas’s schemes of manoeuvre. Access to the tunnels required combat engineering, while entering and clearing them demanded highly specialised equipment and procedures, and thus personnel.
+
+The IDF found that subterranean fighting was extremely stressful for its personnel and required many distinct techniques. The fact that every corner could lead to an extremely close confrontation with an enemy, or the discovery of an IED, created a staccato quality to the pressure on individuals that was corrosive of morale. This was exacerbated by the fact that while the risk of close confrontations can arise in urban operations, in tunnels there was no ability to attack from unexpected axes, or to move around a threat. Tunnels had to be cleared deliberately, and the enemy could fight a series of delaying or blunting actions throughout this process that could not be circumvented.
+
+At the beginning of the incursion, the IDF stressed identifying, controlling and sealing or denying the entrances of tunnels. In some cases, tunnels could be collapsed from the air, a factor that drove the use of heavy air-delivered ordnance early in the war. In most cases, however, this could not be done, for several reasons. While tunnel infrastructure could be assumed to be explicitly military in a way that above-ground infrastructure could not, offensive operations were slowed by the concerns for hostages who might be held there. Furthermore, collapsing underground tunnels could threaten the structural stability of civilian buildings above ground. Sensitive site exploitation was necessary both for obtaining further intelligence on Hamas and the missing hostages, and for documenting and attributing Hamas military activity directly below civilian infrastructure. These factors influenced a slower and more deliberate pace of subterranean operations.
+
+To enable the widespread deliberate clearance of Hamas’s subterranean infrastructure, the IDF increasingly paired conventional and special operations units together. The special operations forces involved were predominantly a combination of troops from Shayaret-13 (Israel’s naval commandoes) and Yahalom (Israeli special forces engineers). These troops would be attached at brigade level. Clearing underground areas needed to be slow and deliberate, and there were limitations to how closely this could or should be tied to progress above ground, given the inability to provide effective mutual support or shared situational awareness except at tunnel entrances. However, by coordinating offensive operations above and below ground, dilemmas could be imposed on Hamas, constraining their movements and preventing them from using the tunnels as they wished. The specialist capabilities of special operations forces could be brought to bear in the subterranean environment, but this required a good working relationship with conventional forces that included the rapid sharing of intelligence and information, which did not always come naturally to the special operations forces and had to be actively fostered. While robots and military working dogs assisted in route proving in tunnels, much of the clearance operation continued to have to be carried out by humans, given the number of doors, steps and other obstacles confronted.
+
+One challenge to simultaneous surface and subterranean manoeuvre was that the tunnels did not adhere to the boundaries of the units operating above ground. Because of the need to have relays behind an advancing force in the tunnel to maintain communications, the C2 of units underground had to be managed by the brigade to which the forces were attached. Nevertheless, they would often cross into another unit’s boundary. This could be deconflicted through notification, but it added a further consideration for units above ground of the effects they employed and which routes were used by heavier vehicles.
+
+
+### V. Fires
+
+Fires coordination during the operations in Gaza was complicated by being applied through several parallel processes. First, the IDF had a high-value target list that it began to prosecute at the onset of the conflict. This had been built using all-source intelligence fusion and included both persons and structures, including some subterranean targets. Stand-off targeting continued throughout the operation. Targets located by intelligence would be framed by reconnaissance, to cue precision strikes. “Framing” is an Israeli doctrinal term indicating that positive identification is established and then maintained until the target is struck. The processes for these targeted killings were largely unchanged from before the war; where they became significantly more complicated was how they interacted with the other forms of strike that arose during the war.
+
+Alongside targeted killings, the IDF prosecuted signature-based strikes in response to targets identified through surveillance. Early in the conflict, a good example of this kind of strike was against rocket launchers. Subsequently, the identification of groups of militants by UAVs or other routine surveillance could lead to the generation of a strike. It is important to note that because the IDF could not choose the time and place of these interdiction strikes, they would often be carried out in areas where there had not been an intelligence soak to provide a detailed assessment of likely collateral damage. Just as dynamic strikes in Mosul led in some cases to large numbers of civilians being killed because their presence inside buildings could not be detected within the timeframe of the engagement, IDF dynamic strikes against large structures have led to intergenerational casualties within civilian families. There has been much speculation in the media about the extent to which the IDF was using AI to build the target packs for such strikes. A more accurate characterisation would be that the IDF targeting teams used software tools to assist in fusing large volumes of data to generate strikes. This has significantly increased the speed and scale at which target packs can be generated. Often the target generation process has outstripped the planning process to enable targets to be prosecuted. However, the decision to strike is still made by a human, and it is a human who is accountable for how the ecosystem of data processing tools is employed. The errors that have been made are therefore not because of the software – which provides decision-makers with all the information necessary to test its conclusions – but often because operators are not taking sufficient time to verify automated conclusions.
+
+The third kind of strike was one that emerged from ground forces calling for fires. In the IDF, fires – including air strikes – were allocated to brigades, with the brigade staff responsible for determining the synchronisation of these effects with their scheme of manoeuvre, or setting targets during the time when a strike is available in response to a threat. Although ground commanders can be connected to pilots to impart their intent, the technical coordination of air strikes is carried out at the brigade command post in the IDF. The IDF does not use Joint Terminal Attack Controllers to direct strikes. Despite this, the IDF managed to conduct strikes in extremely close proximity to manoeuvre elements – up to 200 m – with minimal fratricide.
+
+As a consequence of these three types of strike, in any given piece of battlespace there were three targeting processes. Different elements of international humanitarian law (IHL) and the laws of armed conflict are relevant to each process. Interception or negative treatment operations – the intelligence-driven targeting of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad personnel – had the tightest controls around them. The IDF works to positively identify a target and then to continuously frame it until it is struck. Targets tended to work hard to avoid giving the IDF easy shots, exploiting protected sites to narrow the opportunities to attack them.
+
+The IDF also had to deal with the problem of the revolving door. Known members of Hamas could be treated as combatants. During 7 October and Israel’s subsequent ground operations in Gaza, however, there were many Gazans who participated in military activities against the IDF. These ranged from picking up weapons and participating in fighting, to retrieving cached equipment, or “spotting”, to sustain Hamas fighters. While these individuals could be struck as participants in the conflict while they conducted these activities, targeting them once they had stopped this participation, unless they were confirmed to be members of Hamas, raises more complex legal questions. The distinction between someone incidentally participating in hostilities and someone routinely supporting Hamas can be difficult to make clearly in a way that is consistently applicable. For example, a military cook is a legitimate target in war. A civilian providing food to Hamas fighters could be a civilian providing a service and thus not a legitimate target. However, there is a boundary where this same individual becomes a participant, actively deviating from normal civilian behaviour to sustain an armed force. Where precisely the line is drawn is a matter of judgement, and under time pressure in a large-scale operation, the exact demarcation can become variable between who is making the decision and the context in which it is being made. It is important to note that this is not a challenge unique to Gaza. It has been confronted in almost every conflict to varying degrees and is becoming more complicated as the boundaries, for example, between civilian communication and spotting become harder to distinguish.
+
+The process of dynamic strikes could fall either under the same rules of engagement as targeted strikes, or under the rubric of self-defence in the case, for example, of destroying the launch sites of Hamas rockets. Unlike targeted strikes where the IDF had some control over the timing and thus more time to evaluate whether there was military necessity and proportionality before striking, dynamic strikes had to be carried out quickly. While the same IHL obligations applied, the time in which to exercise judgement was shorter, with a greater likelihood of mistakes. For those cases where IDF troops were in contact and called for fires, the justification for the effect was self-defence, with proportionality judged against the expected harm to IDF personnel. The judgements of proportionality and military necessity often posed problems. For example, a high-value target might be close to civilian structures. However, to attack the structure with ground forces would require strikes to support the passage of those forces to the target and would affect a much greater area of civilian structures. An air strike might cause greater immediate collateral damage, but less secondary collateral damage. Mistakes could easily be made when the same target began to be assessed on multiple processes. A high-priority target that was positively identified, but where framing was lost, could be reacquired subsequently for a dynamic strike, without the same confidence of their identity being established.
+
+The biggest challenge for targeteers was to construct a system to address the IDF’s obligation to take measures to reduce civilian harm, before making a judgement on proportionality. Any system devised had to scale, given the number of troops operating in the city. The eventual approach was to divide the Gaza Strip into boxes. For each box, an assessment would be made, and routinely updated, as to the density of civilians prior to the conflict, their status and how many had been displaced. IDF personnel began to examine forthcoming operational plans and synchronise measures to move the population away from areas likely to see intense fighting. This was usually done through a mixture of leafleting, outreach to mobile telephones, and recommendations on timing and routes for movement. Estimating displacement allowed for the grading of each box as to the level of civilian presence and thus the appropriate rules of engagement in the area. Such a system clearly had significant drawbacks. First, not all civilians could move. Second, the civilians had a limited understanding of the boundaries between the boxes, so that someone who had left might later return. Third, the movement corridors became threat vectors that Hamas would try to exploit, while deconflicting strikes from these corridors at such a scale proved highly challenging. There were inevitably mistakes. There has been some reporting of this process as designating IDF “free fire zones” in Gaza. Instead, the IDF was endeavouring to provide troops with rules of engagement that were appropriate to the area within which they were operating, for commanders acting on variable levels of information.
+
+In the eventual structure, each brigade fielded an intelligence and strike cell consisting of officers from both specialisations working in tandem, along with support personnel. However, divisional headquarters oversaw much of the targeting and deconfliction. The process was refined until it followed the stages below:
+
+1. Intelligence-gathering and defining the location of the target.
+
+2. Comparing the target with the evacuation map to determine whether the area was sufficiently clear of civilians.
+
+3. Checking whether the target was close to any sensitive sites.
+
+4. Checking whether any civilians could be seen or identified on target.
+
+5. Considering the issuing of warnings.
+
+6. Choosing the correct munitions for the desired effect.
+
+7. Confirming the rules of engagement.
+
+8. Decision.
+
+In practice, when applied, this process produced a range of outcomes. Higher echelon decision-makers often lacked the sensors to have a high confidence assessment of civilian presence inside structures. Lower echelon decision-makers often perceived a greater direct threat to themselves or their personnel and had to decide within a compressed timeline. In some instances, where the incentives to strike between these echelons reinforced one another, errors were made. Where framing was not continuous – during dynamic strikes – assumptions could be made that led to tragic outcomes, as was the case with the strike on workers for the aid organisation World Central Kitchen in April 2024.
+
+One area where it did prove highly effective to hold organic capabilities at lower echelon was tactical strike UAVs. It was discovered that units that had these systems as well as ATGMs could monitor more urban terrain and conduct precision strikes at tempo in support of tactical actions. The IDF benefits considerably from its fielding non-line of sight ATGMs in its units. The small size of the munitions used meant that they could be used with an expectation of precision. In some cases, one screening company with these tools was able to hold the ground that would otherwise require a battalion to manage.
+
+Due to the limitations of synchronisation and airspace deconfliction measures, it proved impossible to fully track or communicate UAV use. IDF ground combat units therefore found a high degree of air defence fratricide to be unavoidable, and shot down a large number of their own UAVs. Operations also highlighted that the technology and concepts of employment for UASs had outpaced the evolution of training, and IDF personnel had to learn on the job how to both tactically employ UAVs and defend against them. This was exacerbated by the disinvestment and retirement of many short-range air defence capabilities from the IDF arsenal and order of battle.
+
+
+### VI. Information Operations
+
+Given the IDF’s planning assumption that there would be a window during which international opinion would allow for the greatest freedom of action, the IDF has worked to try to extend the timeline. First, the IDF has slowly released information as investigations have progressed about events surrounding 7 October, to keep the atrocities committed and the justification for the war as part of the discourse. Packaging video from 7 October and showing it to journalists also extended the timeframe within which the context of 7 October framed reporting on subsequent developments. Footage has continued to be released, focusing on emotive topics such as the treatment of women. This has also been used to keep the story of Israel’s hostages at the forefront of the public discourse, since this is a justification for continuing operations.
+
+Despite being forward leaning on much information release, however, information operations is an area where the IDF has underperformed during the conflict. First, there have been inconsistencies between Israel’s military and political messaging that have undermined the communication of many of the control measures put in place by the IDF. Second, the IDF has repeatedly inflated expectations of what will be found – for example, by briefing that there was a Hamas C2 centre beneath Al-Shifa hospital and releasing graphics suggesting a digitised C2 hub – and then failing to reveal something that met expectations. The IDF also undermined its own credibility by presenting a document showing the days of the week as a guard duty roster for hostages, owing to a shortage of Arabic speakers.
+
+Beyond these tactical errors, it is notable that Israel has not been proactive in controlling the narrative surrounding the conflict. A good example of this is the reporting of casualty figures. Civilian casualties are to be expected in high numbers during any urban operation. In Gaza, journalists had come to rely on reporting from the Gaza Health Ministry for casualty figures. The Gaza Health Ministry has a track record of producing reasonably accurate aggregate counts of casualties in previous rounds of fighting, but during the current war, the level of damage to health infrastructure has caused the ministry to have to change its methodologies from a central reporting system to a scrape of social media and reports from families, rendering aggregate numbers more questionable. The issue from an information operations point of view, however, is not the precision of the overall count. No one disputes that civilian casualties have been high. Because the Health Ministry does not distinguish between combatant and non-combatant casualties, its use by journalists drives a distorted discussion of the proportion of civilian and combatant casualties. Moreover, because the Health Ministry is controlled by Hamas, it can issue disinformation at critical moments. For example, the ministry was quoted by journalists as stating that 500 civilians had been killed at a hospital by an air strike, with much subsequent confusion, when in reality a Palestinian rocket had harmed a smaller number of civilians at the site. Israel has been quick to use the many inconsistences in Health Ministry data to try to undermine its credibility. These efforts have failed, however, because there is no alternative data source. The IDF has not endeavoured to release its own estimates, nor to proactively explain civilian casualties. Indeed, when the IDF releases assessments of combatant casualties, they tend to contrast these with the aggregate casualties reported by the Health Ministry, despite also arguing that this same source is inaccurate.
+
+Another sustained issue has been the use of mobile phones and the internet by IDF personnel. This has caused problems, for example during prisoner detention. In some areas, the IDF detained a significant number of people. Given that Hamas fighters were wearing civilian clothes without distinguishing markers, and that there were civilians still in the areas being contested – some of whom participated in the fighting – distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants was challenging. This required individuals to be detained and processed. In view of the fact that Hamas has a long history of using IEDs to target Israeli soldiers, and noting the widespread practice by Islamic State of seeding suicide bombers into surrendering groups, the IDF took to requiring those being detained to strip. Several problems emerged. Detainees were not allowed to dress immediately after being verified as unarmed. They were also filmed while being processed. The fact that large numbers of troops have cameras on the modern battlefield, combined with a growing cultural tendency to film a wide variety of events, means that the filming of detainees has become quite common. Where reservists or recently mobilised civilians are in the battlespace, this is even more widespread. Indeed, poor discipline by some IDF personnel has done significant harm after being filmed and released publicly. Nevertheless, there are two lessons to be drawn. First, the uncontrolled use of mobile phones to film and release information can be highly damaging. Second, while UK and other NATO doctrine for dealing with captured persons exists, it is not clear that the procedures are well rehearsed when required at scale. The processes for managing an unanticipated large number of captured persons also bring with them significant disinformation risks.
+
+It must be noted that there are peculiarities to this conflict that make it an especially difficult context within which to conduct effective information operations. Globally, there is an animated audience in favour of both parties, and consequently, the actors directly involved have less agency in crafting perceptions. Instead, information is liable to be interpreted in the least favourable light by supporters of each side, and these individuals then amplify the worst interpretation available to their own communities. Within Israel, there is a prevailing sense that the battle is not worth contesting and that the vehemence of Western policymakers in directing Israel to pursue or refrain from particular courses of action is largely driven by the level of domestic political pressure they feel, rather than by any sustained conviction as to how the situation might be improved. This despondency does not help shape the environment.
+
+
+### VII. Humanitarian Support Operations
+
+Prior to the conflict, Gaza’s habitability was already weak. Gaza urbanised rapidly during the 20th and early 21st centuries, and its population growth outstripped the resource-constrained municipality’s ability to provide essential services for residents. Urban planning has been poor, and the infrastructure supplying potable water and power has lacked either resilience or redundancy. This was exacerbated by Hamas’s use of construction materials for military purposes, which led the IDF to sustain the blockade of the Gaza Strip and limit access to dual-use materials. The IDF did have extensive surveillance and databasing of information regarding the civilian population, but given the lack of physical presence in the Gaza Strip in the years leading up to 2023, and the fact that these capabilities were security oriented and had not been intended or optimised for humanitarian work, these needed to be supplemented with dedicated humanitarian mechanisms that could operate multilaterally and integrate different NGOs, international agencies and Israeli government entities.
+
+Given the size of the population and the disruption caused by the conflict, a large volume of supplies soon became necessary. This need was exacerbated by damage to Gaza’s infrastructure, with bottled drinking water needing to be brought in. Initially, flows into Gaza were disrupted by Israel’s desire to isolate it and the declaration of a total siege. At the political level, the siege became a point of discussion relating to leverage over the release of hostages, with Hamas threatening to execute hostages in response to strikes. This initial measure, taken in the aftermath of 7 October, was counterproductive and was quickly reversed under international pressure. However, once aid was allowed into Gaza in principle, ensuring a sufficient volume could enter Gaza remained challenging.
+
+Once IDF forces began to operate inside Gaza, the main constraint on flows of humanitarian aid became the inspection of shipments to prevent Hamas rearming. The rate at which aid entered was around 70 trucks per day during the early phases of the operation, a number clearly inadequate to support the population. It then rose to 140 trucks per day early in 2024 and at the time of writing was between 300 and 400 trucks per day. These remain lower in number than aid flows prior to the conflict.
+
+The most contentious part of the inflow of trucks was who to trust to search for incoming military materiel destined for Hamas. Given that Hamas moved large quantities of weaponry into Gaza prior to the war, Israel is wary of those who have previously managed crossings and inspections. This mistrust arguably led to relatively poor coordination with organisations endeavouring to move materiel into Gaza. Aid agencies, for example, reported uncertainty as to what constituted dual-use items that would be prevented from moving.
+
+There are many ways in which the process for getting aid into Gaza could be improved. Most of these are highly context specific, however. For the purposes of this paper, the area of friction in humanitarian operations that has the broadest relevance is the distribution of aid. This has been complicated by the close proximity of Hamas positions to civilian objects, which means that almost any part of Gaza is necessarily adjacent to sites from which attacks could emanate. Thus, separating areas of military operation from areas for humanitarian operations has proven complicated.
+
+Furthermore, simply allowing humanitarian aid to flow into Gaza has also presented challenges. First, where the need has been greatest, desperation has driven violence around aid distribution centres, such that protection for humanitarian workers has been advisable. Even where more orderly processes emerged, this did not mean all was well. The theft of supplies by Hamas to sustain their own forces is clearly an issue of interest to the IDF. Separately, control over food is a vector for exerting control over the population. Since one of Israel’s goals in the war is to supplant Hamas’s control over the population, it goes directly against Israeli war aims to allow Hamas to exert control over aid distribution. Further complications have arisen in Israel with aid being attacked by Israeli citizens in protest. It is notable that the IDF has been less active in preventing this kind of disruption to supply. The point here is that while it might be desirable to leave humanitarian activity to humanitarians and thereby impose some separation between the IDF and the civilian population, in practice, the IDF has had to be heavily involved in the protection and distribution of aid in Gaza. Even where humanitarians were leading at the point of delivery, their movements had to be deconflicted from IDF manoeuvre and fires plans. Another complicating factor was the requirement for the IDF to use military engineering to restore some services.
+
+An enduring challenge for the IDF was that distribution of aid could be taken over by Hamas and used to maintain control over the local population, thereby preventing the implementation of one of Israel’s war aims. However, if the IDF took over distribution, the distribution point would also become a target for attack, to which the IDF would respond, risking the lives of civilians in the ensuing crossfire. There was also the risk that desperate people would end up in confrontations with soldiers who would use force in self-defence.
+
+Another element of the humanitarian situation has been the impact on health infrastructure and its coordination. First, the IDF at several points during large troop movements cut access to the internet and phone network in Gaza to limit Hamas’s ability to report on its movements. This made military sense. It also collapsed the coordination of medical services during these periods. The IDF therefore came under significant international pressure to restore these services. The impact on health infrastructure of the fighting in Gaza has been devastating and will be long lasting. The IDF took care not to fire directly on functioning hospital buildings, which have protected status. However, as hospitals became isolated, they also ceased to function. Thereafter, Hamas occupied and operated from some hospital sites, such as Al-Shifa. At this point the hospital lost its protected status and ground operations in and around the area destroyed it. This is to some extent analogous to the international coalition bombing the hospital building in Mosul because it had ceased functioning as a medical facility and was being held by Islamic State fighters. While such actions may be legal, the long-term consequences of the destruction of a healthcare facility are severe. Moreover, alternative provision of medical care was not readily available, even as supplies of medicine necessary to keep the facilities running were disrupted.
+
+It is reasonable to conclude that the IDF have made attempts to address the humanitarian issues, while continuing to pursue their military objectives. But none of the measures taken have been successful in preventing significant harm to the civilian population. Conditions in Gaza for civilians remain very poor as regards sanitation, the ability to move beyond areas of active fighting, and access to food and healthcare. The lesson here for militaries observing the conflict is cautionary. Many of the demands placed on the IDF by humanitarian organisations are incompatible with achieving the military tasks which they have been assigned. These conflicting imperatives remain messy and complex and have in the long run proven very damaging to the IDF politically. Learning from and improving methods for the provision of humanitarian assistance in urban warfare, where fighting will remain close to sensitive sites, is a challenge worthy of further consideration by the British Army and other militaries.
+
+
+### Conclusions
+
+Many of the lessons identified by the IDF from the conflict in Gaza have direct relevance to other militaries. Nevertheless, there are observations that have specific salience for the British Army from the conflict that are not as significant for the IDF. It must also be acknowledged that there are particularities of the fighting in Gaza that are context specific. In parallel to their internal lessons learned process, the IDF has also had to establish an unlearning process to avoid tactical adaptations in Gaza being carried to the northern border with Lebanon, where some would be dangerous. One distinct characteristic of the fighting in Gaza is that Hamas – unlike Hezbollah – has no effective artillery. This has given the IDF rear-area security for their enablers and has also meant that units have been able to concentrate in a way that troops in other theatres, such as Ukraine, have found perilous. For the British Army, which must be ready to fight Russia to effectively contribute to NATO’s deterrence posture, capabilities must be aimed at maximising the ability to concentrate effects without concentrating forces. To this end, the levels of dispersion of Israeli mixed UAV and ATGM armed companies may be highly instructive as to the force density required to effectively screen urban terrain. But the levels of dispersion of Israeli infantry are less indicative of what would be viable in a conflict with Russia.
+
+Another fundamental difference between IDF operations in Gaza and most other theatres – including Israel’s northern border with Lebanon – is the IDF’s total dominance in the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). On the northern border, where Hezbollah has been using one-way attack UAVs and other capabilities to strike Israeli positions, the need for electronic protection has produced such a cluttered EMS that the IDF has had to revert to printed maps, rather than depend entirely on digital map interfaces. For the British Army, given the extent of Russian electronic warfare, the battlespace management challenges that have emerged on Israel’s northern border are potentially more instructive than how centralised C2 has been conducted in Gaza. Unit boundaries and control measures remain relevant, but the blue force tracking possible in Gaza cannot be ensured in a highly contested EMS.
+
+A further consideration is the scale of the enemy force. Hamas predominantly operated in small groups of two to five personnel, with five or so groups often attacking within the same area. Hamas rarely concentrated above platoon strength. Although its 40,000 fighters make a sizeable force, the scale of its operations after 7 October was extremely limited. For the British Army, it is in some respects more useful to consider itself in Hamas’s position: defending urban areas with a coastline to the rear against a numerically superior enemy operating at divisional scale. It is the ability to effectively blunt Russian forces that is at the heart of the Land Operating Concept and thus the British Army’s contribution to NATO’s deterrence posture. Viewed from this perspective, some distinct lessons come into stark relief.
+
+The foremost observation of relevance to the British Army is the decisive role played by firepower in determining initiative during the fighting in Gaza. Ultimately, the superiority in responsiveness and organic lethality of IDF units made it costly for Hamas to mount attacks, and the larger the force it endeavoured to bring to bear, the higher the cost of any given action. Furthermore, while indirect fire prevented Hamas from concentrating its forces, the limited organic lethality of its teams meant that once they engaged IDF troops, they were quicky suppressed and thereafter destroyed. In many wargames, the British Army currently avoids confronting its diminishing tactical lethality by drawing on fires or capabilities held at the highest echelon represented in the scenario. In a war, however, these echelons would have other lines of effort to support, and these fires cannot be allocated to multiple targets. The lesson is clear. Firepower at the tactical level matters a great deal. The risk for the British Army is that the Land Operating Concept’s conclusions are not funded, so that while British troops may be trained to fight like the IDF, they find themselves equipped to die like Hamas. Increasing the British Army’s organic lethality at echelon should therefore be a high priority.
+
+A second important lesson for the British Army is the criticality of air defence to maintaining a position in an urban space. Hamas’s lack of ability to threaten Israeli aircraft and ISR meant that it was unable to concentrate and lacked freedom of manoeuvre. Once its defensive strong points were identified, they could be reduced. The weight of munitions deliverable from the air outweighs anything deliverable from artillery systems, such that many of the defensive advantages of urban terrain can be bypassed if it is possible to conduct precision bombing from medium altitude. The ability to operate from an urban environment, therefore, requires air defences, whether ground based or delivered through offensive and defensive counter-air patrols. In a major conflict, the density of enemy air defences means that the availability of counter air patrols may be extremely constrained. Thus, it seems clear that for the British Army to fight competitively on the ground, it must be able to hold enemy fast air at risk when flying at medium altitude. This lesson also reflects experiences in Mosul, Raqqa and throughout Ukraine. In Mosul, the ability of coalition fast air to enable Iraqi units to level defended positions fixed Islamic State to defend where they could not be detected. In Ukraine, whenever the Russian air force has established access at medium altitude near an urban settlement, it has rapidly destroyed it, enabling subsequent capture.
+
+A third lesson is that the relationship between offence and defence in the urban environment is micro-tactical. If the enemy can get around a flank, dislodging it requires attack into urban spaces, accompanied by its associated complications. For this reason, slowing the pace of enemy manoeuvre through urban terrain is critical to enable repositioning and preventing the defence from becoming unhinged. The most effective tool for this purpose is counter-mobility support. This is critically lacking in the British Army and is necessary.
+
+The freedom a force gains from air defence and counter-ISTAR allows it to manoeuvre in the urban environment, and manoeuvre is critical to urban operations. The force density required to hold a specific piece of urban terrain means that most armies will need to choose which parts of a city they contest at any given time. Furthermore, not all urban terrain is equal. The significance of Wadi Gaza and other movement corridors that, once controlled, limited Hamas’s ability to resupply or redeploy was disproportionate. Control of the rural–urban interface is necessary to sustain a force within an urban stronghold. Sensitive sites such as hospitals also have a significant shaping effect on the tempo and scope of urban manoeuvre. A city should not be examined as a homogeneous environment. It is critical that terrain assessments identify seams and vulnerabilities in a defence that can be exploited to move without having to directly confront prepared enemies in defensive positions. Careful planning can turn an urban space against the defender. To enable manoeuvre in ways that are not canalised by urban planning, there is a need for a high density of engineers. This spans mobility support, breaching, explosive ordnance search and clearance, and engineering reconnaissance. It must also be supported by a critical mass of relevant engineering platforms. The notion that a force can do without these enablers is a non-starter.
+
+The British Army must consider how it conducts battlespace management in urban environments. Deconfliction of boundaries in urban spaces requires different tactics, techniques and procedures to fire control outside the urban environment, because an enemy will often be placed between friendly units, and reduced ranges mean that fire may carry through into friendly units. There is therefore an increased likelihood of friendly fire and combat accidents. Training that disproportionately focuses on small arms rather than heavy weapons can exacerbate this problem. If troops do not have an intuitive appreciation for how backblast, for example, is redirected in urban spaces, they will suffer combat accidents. Procedures for blue force tracking must account for the transition from mounted to dismounted patrols and must be pushed across unit boundaries.
+
+The application of fire in urban terrain results in different echelons having overlapping responsibilities, because the distances between echelons is compressed. High-payoff targets are therefore hunted in the same battlespace that tactical ISR and strike assets endeavour to find and strike dynamic targets. This leads to different rules of engagement – divided by target – in the same area of responsibility. Given the scaling of targeting that takes place in a major conflict, there is a significant risk that errors will be introduced if targets shift between targeting processes. The ability to explain how the force applies fire is important to ensure compliance with IHL, but also to set expectation among civilians in the environment about risk, and to shape the information environment.
+
+There are more lessons to be learned from the Gaza conflict, but at this juncture, it is necessary to allow more time to elapse for the relevant details to be releasable and therefore available for analysis. This paper is, therefore, a starting point for the analysis, rather than a conclusion.
+
+---
+
+__Jack Watling__ is Senior Research Fellow for Land Warfare at RUSI. Jack works closely with the British military on the development of concepts of operation and assessments of the future operating environment, and conducts operational analysis of contemporary conflicts. He is a Global Fellow at the Wilson Center in Washington, DC.
+
+__Nick Reynolds__ is Research Fellow for Land Warfare at RUSI. Nick’s research interests include land power, wargaming and simulation.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-11-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-mitigation-day-8.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-11-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-mitigation-day-8.md
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@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・求情第八日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-07-11 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 余慧明求情信稱仍信以投票改變秩序無錯 唯一錯誤或是「太愛香港」 官打斷促勿發表政治演說
+- 岑子杰獲區諾軒撰求情信 稱岑非暴力、反對無差別否決
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47名民主派被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」案，今續處理參選衞生服務界的余慧明求情。代表余的大律師石書銘表示，余以護士為志業，組織工會和參選僅為服務公眾，她一直倡以非暴力和合法手段向政府施壓，惟本案後很大機會不能再任護士，已付出代價。而余所屬的衞生服務界沒有協調會議、亦無討論35+後的行為，認為余屬「積極參加者」較低級別或「其他參加者」。
+
+庭上又讀出余撰寫的求情信，余提及參選立法會是望增加議價能力和改變死局，但卻被指控為顛覆國家政權，「是其他民主國家聞所未聞」；而法庭裁決指「五大訴求」為空中樓閣，但當中包括落實《基本法》承諾的雙普選，余反問：「如果政府視落實23條是憲制責任，難道落實雙普選不是一樣嗎？」余又表明，即使到現在仍認為透過在立法會投票改變既定秩序並沒有錯，「或許我唯一犯下的錯誤，就是我太愛香港。」法官陳慶偉聞言後打斷，指這並非求情信，着辯方勿發表政治演說；又一度說：「那就不要求情，你不用求情，那沒有問題。」
+
+#### 毛孟靜、岑敖暉、何啟明無到庭
+
+已完成求情的毛孟靜、岑敖暉、何啟明今無到庭，其餘6人則按男女分成上下兩排，由懲教人員隔坐。昨繫領帶的馮達浚今無繫領帶，岑子杰則換上一件深藍色T裇，並向旁聽席展示背面圖案，又拉下口罩逐一向旁聽人士微笑揮手，又向律師揮手。余慧明則身穿卡其色外套。
+
+多名社民連成員包括周嘉發、陳寶瑩、黃浩銘，前民陣召集人陳皓桓，及前沙田區議員李志宏等均有旁聽。
+
+#### 辯方：余以醫療服務為志業、組織工會為服務公眾
+
+大律師石書銘先為前醫管局員工陣線主席余慧明求情，石陳詞期間，余坐得畢直，表情嚴肅望向前方。石指，余案發時33歲，已婚，在香港出生和長大，在大學時已以醫療服務為志業，修讀護理系並成為註冊護士，再進修成為深切治療部護士。余在前線工作多年，但因貢獻有限，因此決定轉到醫管局總部，擔任醫療信息管理助理主任。石強調她不是望有更舒適的環境工作，而是希望令更多病人受惠，並形容從余的學歷、職業，再到2019年組織工會，一路以來，都可見她熱心公共服務。
+
+石形容，余是政治素人，對政治不感興趣亦無參與政治，2019年的運動令香港市民關注日常生活的法律與秩序，是她的覺醒（awakening）；直至其後疫情爆發，影響每名香港人，驅使她作出行動。石強調，工會獲同事支持，提出的關注與政治無關，而是關乎公共衞生和採取措施以防生命損失。
+
+
+▲ （資料圖片）
+
+石指，一個巴掌拍不響，無論事後回看余的想法何其激進，但當時他們只是對當權者的做法作出回應，可惜要求封關的訴求最終不獲理會，余遂決定參與立法會選舉。石又指，余出身自勞動階層的家庭，以非凡的努力實踐專業，再決定參政，作為一名花這麼多時間就公共衞生作出貢獻的工會領袖，余在其他地方或會被嘉許，但因本港政治環境獨特，余如今面對的卻是定罪。法官陳仲衡打斷，指余是因案發的行為、而非因其公共服務而定罪，石書銘表示明白，但強調余所做的是她公共服務之路的一部分。
+
+#### 辯方：余不知謀劃非法、倡以非暴力和合法手段施壓
+
+石書銘又指，余供稱否決預算案的理念來自網上和傳媒的討論，當時「35+」是熱門話題，但討論並非關於意圖顛覆國家政權，而是圍繞民意如何能在立法會更好地反映，亦是余參選的原意。雖然余亦多次提及否決預算案以令政府對話，但相關行為在《國安法》生效前屬合法。
+
+
+▲ 余慧明（資料圖片）
+
+石續指，案發時無人清楚知道初選或涉案謀劃是否合法，包括余慧明，而她唯一獲權威告知合法性，是2020年7月9日出席初選記者會時，戴耀廷提及認為初選在《國安法》後仍合法，石望法庭接納余案發時一直強調運用合法手段。
+
+法官李運騰要求提供證據支持，指明白戴耀廷曾稱謀劃合法，但問題是被告是否相信，因或許有頑固的激進分子（die hard radicals）明知非法仍願繼續。石指，余並非那些頑固的激進分子，並舉例余在疫情時曾望發起「大三罷」，她不是望以暴力手段、而是運用法律下示威的權利進行施壓。
+
+石又指，作為從事醫療行業的人，余並非會使用暴力的人，她亦不想見到更多傷亡，就如她提到2019年醫院附近施放催淚彈影響病人，令她非常關注。而余相信《基本法》對落實雙普選的承諾，認為屬「五大訴求」中最重要，她一直以合法和非暴力手段向政府施壓，以帶來改變，並相信否決預算案是在《基本法》框架底下。
+
+#### 辯方指余或失護士資格
+
+石指，余是一名年輕的理想主義者，她本性非常有同情心，不幸地因對法律的不確定，選了錯誤的一邊。而余作為一名註冊護士，本案後很有機會面對紀律處分，亦因本案控罪非常嚴重，可以肯定當局不會從輕處理（taken lightly），很大機會余不能再成為一名護士。石指，余成年後的人生均貢獻於醫療服務，但現在因為本案，她須以餘生付出代價，望法庭考慮並判處合適的刑期。
+
+
+▲ 余慧明（資料圖片）
+
+#### 余慧明求情信稱唯一的錯或在太愛香港
+
+石書銘續指，今早聆訊前，收到來自余慧明的求情信，並望於庭上讀出。（＊英文全文及中文翻譯見文末）余提及，2019年100萬名港人上街反修例，但聲音不獲聆聽，引發激烈街頭抗爭，余不欲再看到示威者再犧牲和被捕，加上政府未能及時採取措施預防新冠疫情爆發，故望進入體制，增加議價能力和為改變當時的死局，但此舉卻被指控為顛覆國家政權「是其他民主國家聞所未聞」。
+
+余又指，法庭裁決提到「五大訴求」是空中樓閣，但當中包括落實《基本法》承諾的雙普選，反問：「如果政府視落實《基本法》23條是憲制責任，難道落實雙普選不是一樣嗎？」余又表示，「即使到現在，我仍然認為透過在立法會投票，改變既定秩序並沒有錯，或許我唯一的錯誤，就是我太愛香港。」
+
+#### 官打斷促勿發表政治演說、不求情沒問題
+
+石欲繼續讀下去時，被法官陳慶偉打斷，指：「這不是一封求情信，這是政治演說，如果你想代你的當事人發表政治演說，我沒有問題，但不要在我的法庭這樣說。」石書銘回應，余在這封信解釋了她參與本案的原因，惟法官李運騰指，問題是在信中看不到減刑因素。
+
+石再解釋，這是還柙多時的余所表達的想法。陳慶偉重申她可以在法庭外這樣做，但不是在這個法庭，又提高聲量說：「事實上，相反地，我們看不到任何悔意（“In fact, on the contrary, we see no remorse whatsoever.”）」，並補充「那沒有問題的，我們不是要求悔意，那是她的選擇」。
+
+石續指，本案涉及政治，如被告對所做的表達悔意，或被人質疑他們的信念是否真誠。陳慶偉聳肩和搖頭說：「那就不要求情，你不用求情，那沒有問題。（“Then don’t mitigate, you don’t have to mitigate, you see, that’s fine.”）」石最後指，認為余在信中有展示悔意，惟陳慶偉不接納，石續沒有讀出餘下內容。
+
+#### 辯方建議余為「積極參加者」較低級別
+
+就余的參與程度，石書銘指，衞生服務界的情況與其他區有些不同，該界別初選的意圖只是防止分薄票源、增加勝出機會，而且沒有舉辦協調會議和選舉論壇，參選人也沒有與組織者討論達成35+後要做什麼。石形容，在整個案發過程，余基本上獨自行事，亦無證據她就35+與其他人討論，她簽署「墨落無悔」時亦認為不少內容不適用於衞生服務界。
+
+石又指，余在謀劃的參與程度一直較低，她沒有策劃謀劃，即使她出席7月15日抗爭派記者會，亦是最溫和的參與者，只提及期望勝出者有更多合作，沒有提倡否決預算案。雖然有其他同場參與者提及否決，法庭亦裁定可以「共謀者原則」指證余，但不代表余支持，而余在會上親自說的話，或更值得法官在判刑時考慮。
+
+石指，若以三級刑期分級制作參考，建議余屬「積極參加者」（判監3至10年）的較低級別，但亦補充，雖余較其他被告就否決預算案表達較清晰的立場，但從整個謀劃來看，衞生服務界較其他界別少競選活動和討論，望法庭亦考慮余屬「其他參加者」。
+
+#### 辯方：余很有可能被DQ、謀劃不大可能成功
+
+石又提到即使余在初選勝出，以她案發時的言論，也很有可能被DQ。法官李運騰關注，有辯方稱被告無被DQ，故顯示他不激進；有辯方則稱因被告被DQ，其參與較輕，似乎無論DQ與否都是求情因素，兩者陳詞矛盾。石解釋，若被告被DQ，則無法繼續落實謀劃並帶來危害，並同意法官總結指，政府能DQ候選人本身，已顯示謀劃不大可能成功，不會造成潛在危害，是針對所有被告的求情因素。
+
+#### 辯方引抗爭派記招問答 指王真誠誤信否決屬合法
+
+此外，王百羽一方昨求情時，法官關注辯方稱王案發時真誠誤信謀劃為合法，但看畢其求情信，似乎看不到他有這樣說，要求辯方提供具體證據。代表王的大律師黃俊嘉今補充，2020年7月抗爭派記者會上，有記者問及承諾否決所有議案是否涉違《國安法》時，有發言者解釋否決是議員被賦予的合法權利，不存在任何脅逼或違法情況，王百羽續說「係啦」，可反映他肯定該發言者的理解，即否決屬合法。
+
+法官陳仲衡表示，《基本法》賦予否決預算案的權力、但並非無差別否決，而該發言者也沒有就無差別否決作出回答。黃俊嘉指，對法律錯誤的理解正是由此而來，因當被問及無差別否決是否違法時，發言者回答這是《基本法》賦予的權力。
+
+案件由3名國安法指定法官陳慶偉、李運騰及陳仲衡審理，控方代表為副刑事檢控專員萬德豪、周天行、助理刑事檢控專員羅天瑋。岑子杰由大律師郭憬憲代表，毛孟靜和岑敖暉由大律師黃雅斌代表，何啟明由大律師阮偉明代表，馮達浚由資深大律師祁志代表，黃碧雲由大律師沈士文代表，劉澤鋒由大律師黃錦娟代表，余慧明由大律師石書銘代表。
+
+根據《國安法》第22條，一旦顛覆國家政權罪成，「首要分子或罪行重大」可判處10年以上至終身監禁；「積極參加者」可判監3至10年；「其他參加者」則判監3年以下、拘役或者管制。
+
+#### 庭上讀出的余慧明求情信節錄（中文為記者翻譯）：
+
+正如我在證供所說，對我來說，一切都源自2019年的反修例運動。當時一百萬名香港人上街，和平地反對修例，遺憾地，他們的聲音不獲聆聽，最終引致激烈的街頭抗爭。而現在，在那場民主運動開始逾5年過後，政府視那些參與的市民為「暴徒」，並標籤運動為「黑暴」。
+
+2020年時，我相信即使有持續的街頭抗爭，政府仍然對公眾的不滿置若罔聞。我最不想看到的，是有示威者再犧牲和被捕。再者，由於政府未能及時採取措施預防新冠病毒在社區爆發，因此我希望進入政治體制——參選立法會，增加議價能力，改變當時的死局。然而，此舉被指控為顛覆國家政權，這是其他民主國家聞所未聞。
+
+法庭裁決提到「五大訴求」是空中樓閣，但是那些訴求當中，包括落實《基本法》承諾的雙普選。如果政府視落實《基本法》23條是憲制責任，難道落實雙普選不是一樣嗎？即使到現在，我仍然認為透過在立法會投票，改變既定秩序並沒有錯，或許我唯一犯下的錯誤，就是我太愛香港。
+
+As I have stated in my evidence, for me everything stemmed from the Anti-Extradition Bill movement in 2019. Back then over a million Hong Kong citizens took to the streets and expressed their opposition to the amendment peacefully. Regrettably, their voices went unheard and eventually triggered off vigorous street protests. And now, more than 5 years after the democratic movement began, the government regards those citizens who took part in the movement as thugs and labels the whole movement as “Black Riot”.
+
+In 2020, I believed that even with continuous street protests, the government would still turn a deaf ear to public grievances. The last thing I wanted to see was further sacrifices and arrests of the protestors. Moreover, since the government failed to take timely measures to prevent the community outbreak of COVID-19, I thus wanted to enter our political institution – to stand for election in the Legislative Council, to increase the bargaining power and bring changes to the deadlock at that time. Yet it was accused as subverting the State Power. This is unheard of in other democratic countries.
+
+The Verdict stated that “Five Demands” were castle in the air. Yet among those demands was the implementation of dual Universal Suffrage as promised by the Basic Law. If the government deemed implementing Article 23 a constitutional duty, isn’t implementing dual Universal Suffrage the same? Even now, I am still of the view that there is nothing wrong in bringing changes to the established order through voting in the legislature, perhaps the only wrong I have committed was that I love Hong Kong too much.
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47名民主派被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」案，今（11日）續處理參選九西及功能組別被告的求情。代表岑子杰的大律師郭憬憲，庭上讀出同案從犯證人區諾軒為岑子杰撰寫的求情信，指岑是九西協調會議上反對無差別否決預算案的關鍵人物，區又形容岑是非暴力的人，在2019年組織公眾活動時與警方合作。據了解，區諾軒於2022年12月主動替岑子杰寫求情信。
+
+
+▲ 區諾軒（資料圖片）
+
+第四批被告今完成求情，本月30日將處理第五批被告求情，為8名新界西初選參與者：朱凱廸、張可森、黃子悅、尹兆堅、郭家麒、吳敏兒、譚凱邦、伍健偉，料需時3天。
+
+#### 辯方指岑子杰2012年未經批准集結罪成後 無重蹈覆轍
+
+余慧明一方完成求情後，代表岑子杰的大律師郭憬憲表示，已呈交書面陳詞，庭上只有簡單補充。
+
+他指，岑於2018至2020年擔任民陣召集人，並引述同案從犯證人區諾軒為岑撰的求情信，指岑是九龍西協調會議上反對無差別否決預算案的「關鍵人物」，對於阻止無差別否決預算案成為九西的共識具決定性作用。郭憬憲指，岑的罪責和其他人不同，參與程度屬最輕。
+
+
+▲ 岑子杰（資料圖片）
+
+郭又提及，岑於2012年曾干犯組織及參與未經批准集結罪，判處罰款5千元。法官李運騰指，相關案底已是10年前，辯方毋須提及，郭則強調，岑已汲取教訓，他在2019年曾舉行很多集會，全部均有向警方申請不反對通知書，指只是一次定罪便令他改變，再沒有犯下相同錯誤，正如區諾軒在信中提到，岑是非暴力和守法的人，2019年組織公眾活動時與警方合作。郭並指，就其他個人情況已寫在書面陳詞上，不會再在庭上重複。
+
+散庭時，岑向旁聽席微笑豎起拇指，又向律師席的郭憬憲做致敬手勢，黃碧雲和王百羽等也向親友揮手。
+
+#### 區諾軒求情信節錄英文原文（中文為記者翻譯）：
+
+I would also like to invite your lordship to consider mercy on account of his political orientation. As what I have mentioned in my testimony, with representing League of Social Democrat, he was the key person who objected the advocacy of voting against the budget indiscriminately in the Kowloon West coordination meeting at material period of time. Despite any of his offence afterwards, I would like to emphasise his objection was decisive in preventing the advocacy to be the consensus in the Kowloon West meeting.
+
+我邀請法官閣下考慮岑子杰的政治取向，寬大處理，正如我的證供所述，岑代表社民連，是九龍西協調會議上反對無差別否決預算案的關鍵人物，不論他事後的控罪，我希望強調他的反對，對於阻止無差別否決預算案成為九西協調會議的共識，具決定性作用。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69-70/2022
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+---
+layout: post
+title : U.S.-Japan Security
+author: Christopher Johnstone, et al.
+date : 2024-07-11 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/bgbBsXb.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "The Evolution of the U.S.-Japan Security Partnership"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_A history, supplemented by timelines of key events, official documents, and interviews with experts, shows the security partnership from 1951 to 2024._
+
+
+
+In the last few years, Japan has taken historic steps to strengthen its defense posture and in turn the U.S.-Japan alliance, which has entered a period of unprecedented integration.
+
+This is a far cry from the time of the alliance’s origins in 1951. With pacifist principles deeply embedded in its postwar constitution, Japan once prioritized economic development and resisted defense cooperation with the United States.
+
+From this starting point, how did Japan evolve into a significant military power capable in its own right of reinforcing deterrence across the Indo-Pacific region?
+
+The [CSIS Japan Chair](https://www.csis.org/programs/japan-chair) compiled a short history, supplemented by a repository of official statements and interviews with experts, to document the remarkable evolution of this security partnership. This is Alliance Online, a resource tool documenting the evolution of the U.S.-Japan alliance, a security relationship critical to the history — and future — of international relations in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.
+
+
+### [ 1951–1960 ]
+### The Strategic Bargain
+
+> #### 9/8/1951
+
+
+_▲ [The San Francisco Peace Treaty and Security Treaty between the United States and Japan are signed.](https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20136/volume-136-I-1832-English.pdf)_
+
+> #### 3/8/1954
+
+
+_▲ [The Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement is signed.](https://japan2.usembassy.gov/pdfs/wwwf-mdao-mdaa1954.pdf)_
+
+> #### 6/9/1954
+
+
+_▲ [The Japanese Self-Defense Forces are established.](https://www.loc.gov/resource/llglrdppubt.2019668409/?sp=2&st=text)_
+
+> #### The foundation for the U.S.-Japan alliance took form with three key events:
+
+1. The signing of the [1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty](https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20136/volume-136-I-1832-English.pdf) that ended the Pacific War
+
+2. The signing of the [1951 Security Treaty](https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/japan001.asp) between Japan and the United States
+
+3. A subsequent revision of the bilateral treaty in 1960 known as the [Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security](https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html)
+
+Based on the Security Treaty, Japan retained the right to self-defense under [Chapter VII, Article 51 of the United Nations Charter](https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-7). However, Japan also renounced war as a sovereign right under [Article IX](https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html) of its new constitution, written by the United States during the postwar occupation.
+
+Japan and the United States signed the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, which allowed U.S. forces to retain bases in Japan after Japan regained sovereignty. However, the first version of the treaty included no obligation for the United States to defend Japan.
+
+#### The Yoshida Doctrine
+
+As pressure from the United States on Japan to strengthen defense began to increase, Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru reluctantly [established](https://www.loc.gov/resource/llglrdppubt.2019668409/?sp=2&st=text) Japan’s Self-Defense Forces in 1954.
+
+This was based on a government interpretation of the constitution that minimal defense capabilities were permissible under Article IX.
+
+Although some conservatives in Japan at the time pushed for a stronger military and for a broader interpretation of the constitution to allow the right of collective self-defense, Yoshida [advocated](https://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/event/forum/pdf/2003_01.pdf) a minimalist approach to allow Japan to focus on economic recovery.
+
+The so-called [Yoshida Doctrine](https://www.csis.org/analysis/kishidas-realism-diplomacy-yoshida-doctrine-values-based-diplomacy), under which Japan would ally with the West but do the minimum necessary for defense cooperation while focusing on reviving the economy, took hold.
+
+
+_▲ A military parade to commemorate the establishment of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force in July 1954. | Mainichi Newspaper via Wikimedia Commons_
+
+#### The Strategic Bargain
+
+As Cold War tensions in Asia intensified in the aftermath of the Korean War, the two governments [revised](https://www.mod.go.jp/en/j-us-alliance/joint-declaration/treaty/index.html) the bilateral security treaty in 1960.
+
+The revised treaty enshrined the U.S. commitment to defend Japan in Article V in return for permission to retain bases in Japan “for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East,” captured in Article VI. The United States also retained control of Okinawa until 1972. This was the broad strategic bargain that remains the foundation of the U.S.-Japan alliance to this day.
+
+In these early days, few in either country thought that Japan would eventually emerge as a true military partner of the United States.
+
+The massive protests that took place in Japan in response to the revised treaty — [which led President Eisenhower to cancel a planned visit](https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v18/d201) to Japan in June 1960 — reflected concerns about the potential to become drawn into Cold War conflicts.
+
+Nevertheless, Japan gradually focused more on defense as the regional security environment became more severe.
+
+
+### [ 1960–1989 ]
+### The Cold War
+
+___`Despite the controversy in Japan surrounding the 1960 security treaty, strategic debates also reflected a parallel concern that a failure to develop defense capabilities could weaken U.S. support for Japan.`___
+
+
+_▲ During the Cold War, Japan’s proximity to the Soviet Union necessitated a focus on homeland defense, especially in the surrounding seas._
+
+This created an “entrapment vs. abandonment” dilemma that animated Japanese defense policy during this period.
+
+The expansion of Soviet military power in East Asia would eventually necessitate increased emphasis on homeland defense, especially in the surrounding seas, to deter a Soviet attack and secure imports of natural resources critical to Japan’s economy.
+
+Sea lane defense was the focus of two key documents: Japan’s [National Defense Program Outline](https://worldjpn.net/documents/texts/docs/19761029.O1E.html) of 1976 and the [Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation](https://japan2.usembassy.gov/pdfs/wwwf-mdao-defense-guidelines1978.pdf) of 1978, highlighting the alliance’s increased importance in the Cold War. This set the stage for Japan’s [commitment](https://www.nytimes.com/1981/05/09/world/japanese-premier-vows-even-greater-efforts-on-defense.html) in 1981 to take on responsibility for defending sea lanes out to 1,000 nautical miles from Japan.
+
+#### Reinforcement of the Yoshida Doctrine
+
+Even as Japan took modest but important steps to strengthen defense cooperation with the United States, it also implemented new measures that reinforced the Yoshida Doctrine.
+
+In 1967, Japan adopted the [Three Non-Nuclear Principles](https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/nnp/index.html#:~:text=My%20responsibility%20is%20to%20achieve,line%20with%20Japan's%20Peace%20Constitution.), barring the country from possessing, manufacturing, or introducing nuclear weapons. The same year, it imposed an [effective ban](https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/policy/index.html) on defense equipment exports. And in 1976, Japan announced a [policy](https://www.nippon.com/en/features/h00196/) of limiting defense spending to 1 percent of GDP.
+
+True to Yoshida’s vision, Japan focused on economic recovery while remaining allied with the West — yet gradually embraced a greater role in defense in response to the Soviet threat.
+
+
+_▲ Students demonstrating against nuclear weapons in front of a train station in Tokyo collect signatures in 1963. | Claude Jacoby/Ullstein Bild via Getty Images_
+
+#### Burgeoning Economic Friction
+
+Yoshida’s emphasis on economic revival also featured prominently during this period, and by the 1980s Japan’s economic power became a source of friction with the United States.
+
+The [1985 Plaza Accord](https://web.archive.org/web/20181203003241/http:/www.g8.utoronto.ca/finance/fm850922.htm) was intended to rectify trade imbalances, but it instead increased Japanese investment in the United States and generated criticism of Japan’s economic prowess as the U.S. economy struggled.
+
+This introduced a new dynamic to alliance ties that threatened to overshadow progress in defense cooperation critical to U.S. strategy in Asia.
+
+
+### [ 1989–2000 ]
+### Purpose Lost and Regained
+
+___`A series of crises in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War precipitated an effort to redefine strategic objectives for the U.S.-Japan alliance.`___
+
+
+_▲ In the post-Cold War era, the rise of security threats close to home — including North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs — convinced Japan to expand its traditional concept of self-defense to focus more on regional security._
+
+During the first Gulf War in 1991, Japan [considered](https://www.nippon.com/en/features/c00202/) dispatching the Self-Defense Forces to support peacekeeping operations in response to U.S. pressure but failed to do so and was criticized for “checkbook diplomacy” after [contributing $13 billion](https://www.nippon.com/en/features/c00202/) to support the coalition against Iraq.
+
+#### Renewal of Alliance Purpose
+
+The [collapse of Japan’s “bubble” economy in 1992](https://www.imes.boj.or.jp/research/papers/english/me19-s1-14.pdf) and subsequent U.S. emphasis on trade imbalances complicated the bilateral relationship even as the regional security environment deteriorated. Washington became increasingly focused on the threats posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and a newly rising China. But a coalition government in Japan began to emphasize multilateral diplomacy and a focus on Asia over the alliance with the United States.
+
+Alarmed by the potential for drift in the relationship, then assistant secretary of defense Joseph Nye launched a strategic review of the alliance. He published a [report](https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/east-asia-strategy-report/) in February 1995 that emphasized the importance of U.S. forward military presence in East Asia in a post–Cold War world.
+
+Events in and around Japan added further urgency to the reconsideration of alliance purpose.
+
+The rape of an Okinawan schoolgirl by U.S. servicemen in 1995 precipitated a political crisis in the U.S.-Japan alliance and increased pressure to reduce the U.S. military footprint on Okinawa.
+
+Other events drove home the continued relevance of a robust forward U.S. military presence for regional stability. The [Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995–1996](https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/3253814/averting-escalation-and-avoiding-war-lessons-from-the-19951996-taiwan-strait-cr/) — in which China conducted missile tests around Taiwan in response to Taiwan president Lee Teng-hui’s visit to the United States — prompted the United States to respond with aircraft carrier deployments to the Taiwan Strait.
+
+
+_▲ An aerial view of the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in Okinawa prefecture, Japan in 2006. | Hiroaki Maeshiro/Bloomberg via Getty Images_
+
+In the context of these events, Washington launched a dialogue with Tokyo to define the future of the U.S.-Japan alliance and rebuild the consensus in both capitals about the relationship’s importance.
+
+This effort culminated in April 1996 with a [joint security declaration](https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/security.html) that affirmed the alliance as the “cornerstone . . . for maintaining a stable and prosperous environment for the Asia-Pacific region.”
+
+In that document, the two governments [agreed to revise](https://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/11591426/www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/us/anpo/pdf/19970923.pdf) the 1978 guidelines for defense cooperation, to include cooperation for the first time in “situations that may emerge in the areas surrounding Japan” — code for a Korean contingency — signaling Japan’s willingness to loosen its traditional emphasis on primarily its own defense to focus more on regional security.
+
+In 1996, the governments also produced a blueprint for reducing the impact of the U.S. presence on Okinawa, including plans to relocate Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, which is located in a heavily populated area and thus is a symbol of local frustration with the U.S. military presence on the island.
+
+
+### [ 2000–2012 ]
+### The War on Terror and Rebalance to Asia
+
+___`The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, marked the beginning of a new chapter in alliance cooperation.`___
+
+In contrast to the Gulf War period, Japan under Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro moved quickly to support the United States after the attacks and passed [special legislation](https://japan.kantei.go.jp/policy/2001/anti-terrorism/1029terohougaiyou_e.html) to dispatch Maritime Self-Defense Force vessels to the Indian Ocean in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.
+
+A [similar bill](https://japan.kantei.go.jp/koizumispeech/2003/07/26danwa_e.html) was passed after the onset of the Iraq War to allow the Self-Defense Forces to support reconstruction efforts under Operation Iraqi Freedom. Some 600 Ground Self-Defense Force personnel were deployed to Iraq to provide non-combat support to the war effort.
+
+Both “special measures” laws were historic and facilitated a role for Japan in international security beyond its immediate region. Initially unpopular, both measures earned public support over time as Japan’s contributions were [recognized internationally](https://avalon.law.yale.edu/sept11/state_009.asp).
+
+The expanding role for Japan under Koizumi prompted the U.S. and Japanese governments to initiate a review of alliance roles, missions, and capabilities in a regional and global context.
+
+The U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee or “2+2” process — meetings between the U.S. secretaries of state and defense and their Japanese counterparts — became the driver of progress in the alliance.
+
+Joint statements in [February](https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint0502.html) and [October](https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/doc0510.html) 2005 outlined common strategic objectives for the alliance and added efforts to improve the international security environment as a third pillar for alliance roles and missions (in addition to the defense of Japan and situations surrounding Japan).
+
+#### Friction over U.S. Force Posture in Japan
+
+In May 2006, the two governments announced a new [realignment plan](https://bsp.guam.gov/wp-bsp-content/uploads/govarchieve/G01-60.166%202006%20May%201_United%20States-Japan%20Roadmap%20for%20Realignment%20Implementation.pdf) for U.S. forces, including a plan to move approximately half of the 18,000 U.S. Marines stationed on Okinawa to Guam.
+
+The effort to realign U.S. force posture stemmed from a desire to better position the United States to address international terrorism and other new global security challenges while reducing the impact on the Japanese people.
+
+But Japanese concerns about the latter would test the alliance a few years later during a period of political transition in Japan.
+
+In 2009, the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) [wrested political power from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)](https://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/31/world/asia/31japan.html), which had ruled for much of the postwar era.
+
+Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio was chosen by the DPJ as its first prime minister. He introduced the concept of an “[East Asian Community](https://japan.kantei.go.jp/hatoyama/statement/200911/15singapore_e.html)” as the centerpiece of his foreign policy, placing greater emphasis on multilateral diplomacy to promote economic and security cooperation.
+
+Hatoyama also sought to revise the 2006 realignment plan for U.S. forces and [suggested](https://japan.kantei.go.jp/hatoyama/statement/201005/28kaiken_e.html) that the entire U.S. Marine Corps presence on Okinawa be relocated off the island. Although neither proposal was realized, the process of revisiting alliance agreements was challenging for alliance managers.
+
+
+_▲ Delegates from the United States and Japan give a post-meeting statement on May 1, 2006, following the finalization of the realignment plan of U.S. forces in Japan. | Alex Wong/Getty Images_
+
+#### The Great East Japan Earthquake and Rising Threats in Asia
+
+Frictions over the alliance continued until the Great East Japan Earthquake of March 11, 2011. That natural disaster cast the U.S.-Japan alliance in a new light as the U.S. and Japanese militaries [coordinated large-scale humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R41690/16) to support Japan’s recovery.
+
+By early 2012, the alliance was again on firm footing, and under Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko the two governments successfully negotiated [adjustments](https://www.secnav.navy.mil/eie/ASN%20EIE%20Policy/2012-04-27%20Joint%20Statement%20of%20the%20Security%20Consultative%20Committee.pdf) to the 2006 force posture plan, preserving plans to reduce the Marine Corps presence on Okinawa while changing the composition of units moving to Guam.
+
+The need for Japan to strengthen deterrence in response to China’s military ambitions and tensions in the South China Sea and East China Sea subsequently shaped defense policy debates, ultimately yielding new strategies released after the LDP returned to power in late 2012.
+
+This coincided with a strategic decision on the part of the United States to focus more cohesively on regional affairs under President Obama’s “[rebalance to Asia](https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/asia_pacific_rebalance_factsheet_20130412.pdf),” reviving a process of strategic alignment with profound implications for U.S.-Japan alliance cooperation.
+
+
+### [ 2012–2024 ]
+### Alliance Integration
+
+___`Under Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, Japan unveiled its first National Security Strategy in 2013.`___
+
+
+_▲ China’s growing assertiveness in the South and East China Seas, combined with increasing frictions over Taiwan, prompted a shift in Japan’s focus to the south and west._
+
+This strategy defined Japan’s national interest in strengthening its own defense capabilities, the U.S.-Japan alliance, and partnerships with other like-minded partners in Asia to manage a rising China and shape the regional order.
+
+The Abe government pushed through a [reinterpretation of Article IX of the constitution](https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/gaiyou/jimu/pdf/anpohosei_eng.pdf) to allow Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defense under limited circumstances.
+
+It then prevailed in a contentious policy debate that resulted in a [package of defense policy reforms in 2015](https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000143304.pdf) to codify the reinterpretations and authorize expanded roles for the Self-Defense Forces in a contingency.
+
+As a member of the United Nations, Japan already enjoyed the right of collective self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter, but since Yoshida, successive governments had chosen not to exercise that right.
+
+Abe considered this step essential to enhancing Japan’s role as an alliance partner, and though limited in scope, the 2015 reforms allowed Japan to provide direct support for U.S. military operations if an attack against the United States threatened Japan’s survival.
+
+The range of Japan’s new contributions featured in [revised guidelines](https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000078188.pdf) for U.S.-Japan defense cooperation released that same year. The new guidelines enabled the two militaries to plan for a wider range of contingencies and strengthen interoperability between them.
+
+#### The Birth of FOIP
+
+Abe also established Japan as a regional leader. His government released a broad diplomatic strategy in 2016 known as the [Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)](https://www.mofa.go.jp/afr/af2/page4e_000496.html) strategy.
+
+FOIP was designed to foster bilateral and multilateral interactions on political, security, and economic affairs while promoting regional institutions to support regional stability and prosperity.
+
+Japan’s blueprint for what it called “[multilayered security cooperation](https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/pdf/2019boueikeikaku_e.pdf)” informed the regional strategies of the United States and several other nations, which all introduced their own FOIP visions to underwrite a free and open rules-based order.
+
+Throughout the postwar era, Japan enhanced its defense capabilities and roles in the U.S.-Japan alliance incrementally in response to changes in the security environment.
+
+But in many ways, the postwar constraints on Japanese defense policy remained in place even through the Abe era.
+
+
+_▲ Delegates from Japan and the United States meet in Tokyo in October 2020, prior to Japan-U.S.-Australia-India Foreign Ministers Meeting, to affirm their commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific region. | David Mareuil/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images_
+
+#### Enhancing Defense Cooperation
+
+The Russian invasion of Ukraine — and Beijing’s support for Moscow — had a galvanizing effect on Japanese public opinion. In 2022, the government led by Prime Minister Kishida Fumio unveiled the second [National Security Strategy](https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/221216anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf), a new [National Defense Strategy](https://www.mod.go.jp/j/policy/agenda/guideline/strategy/pdf/strategy_en.pdf), and a [buildup plan](https://www.mod.go.jp/j/policy/agenda/guideline/plan/pdf/program_en.pdf) to dramatically strengthen Japan’s defense posture and enhance defense cooperation with the United States and other like-minded partners.
+
+This ambitious agenda includes plans to nearly double the defense budget by 2027, invest for the first time in long-range counterstrike missiles and other capabilities to strengthen deterrence, and bolster Japan’s defense industrial base.
+
+
+_▲ Japan's Defense-Related Expenditures* (1997–2023)_
+
+The April 2024 Kishida-Biden summit in Washington clearly demonstrated a commitment to [strengthen defense cooperation](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/04/10/united-states-japan-joint-leaders-statement/) with the United States. Kishida also has worked to deepen Japan’s ties with other like-minded partners, including [South Korea](https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/na/kr/page1e_000810.html), [Australia](https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/ocn/au/page1e_000761.html), the [Philippines](https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100575977.pdf), and the [North Atlantic Treaty Organization](https://www.mofa.go.jp/erp/ep/page7e_000023.html) (NATO).
+
+These changes represent a fundamental departure from Japan’s strategy at the onset of the Cold War, when pacifist principles, concerns about entrapment in military conflict, and a focus on economic power were the dominant features of Japanese strategic culture.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+Japan and the United States are building an alliance that is more integrated bilaterally and with other partners to maintain stability and order in the Indo-Pacific.
+
+Despite important constraints, including Article IX of its constitution, Japan will likely continue to move away from the Yoshida Doctrine and invest even more in defense to ensure the security of the nation and the region as a whole.
+
+If the postwar history of the U.S.-Japan alliance is any guide, this process will continue to evolve in response to new challenges that could undermine that order in the future.
+
+
+_▲ [The U.S.-Japan Alliance Database](https://allianceonline.csis.org/)_
+
+---
+
+__Christopher B. Johnstone__ is senior adviser and Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
+
+__Nicholas Szechenyi__ is a senior fellow with the Japan Chair and deputy director for Asia at CSIS.
+
+__Leah Klaas__ is a research assistant with the Japan Chair at CSIS.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-12-a-pre-storm-gathering.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-12-a-pre-storm-gathering.md
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-12-a-pre-storm-gathering.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : A Pre-Storm Gathering?
+author: Ed Arnold
+date : 2024-07-12 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/QeGksVI.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "The 2024 NATO Washington Summit"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Political challenges among NATO members, the spectre of a second Trump presidency, and a bleaker military situation in Ukraine – compared to the expectations at the 2023 Vilnius Summit for the Ukrainian counteroffensive – made Washington feel like a “pre-storm summit”._
+
+
+
+The Washington Summit – double-hatted as the NATO 75th anniversary – focused more on the founding of NATO and its past success as “the world’s most successful military alliance” rather than fully engaging with future challenges, both immediate and long-term. Moreover, scheduled in July, it was a summit designed to support President Joe Biden’s re-election bid, maximising the celebrations and avoiding controversies. The deliberately lowered expectations led to only incremental progress, both in the ongoing transformation of the Alliance’s defence and deterrence posture, and on support to Ukraine. Instead, the summit was dominated by the DC chatter surrounding the US presidential election in November, which will be hugely consequential for NATO, Ukraine and European security.
+
+
+### Political Volatility
+
+The political preamble to Washington was intense. Biden’s underwhelming performance in the first election debate has sparked growing calls for him to cede to a younger Democratic candidate. These interventions grew louder during the summit, with the closing unscripted press conference becoming a litmus test of the president’s abilities on the world stage, which he failed. Over in Europe, centrist parties were overcome in the EU Parliamentary elections in June, which pressed French President Emmanuel Macron to call a snap parliamentary election. While the worst-case scenario – a majority for the far-right National Front – was averted, French lawmaking will now be paralysed, giving more electoral ammunition to the far right for the 2027 presidential election. Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s ruling coalition in Germany was equally challenged, but it will likely limp on for another 15 months. Going against this grain, in the UK, the Labour Party won a landslide election victory and with it a strong mandate to govern. Meanwhile, Hungarian President Viktor Orban – who holds the rotating EU Council Presidency – visited the Kremlin on a “peace mission” and shook hands with President Vladimir Putin, providing a stark reminder that NATO has a growing Hungary problem.
+
+This last development is particularly repugnant as the summit week began with Russia bombing the Okhamdyat children’s hospital in Kyiv and other medical facilities. These strikes were likely a deliberate policy to demonstrate to already nervous European countries the cost of escalation. If this was the intent, it backfired as NATO countries rallied together to announce an additional strategic and tactical air defence package for Ukraine.
+
+
+### What is New?
+
+Surprisingly, the language on China is now much stronger than at previous summits, with Beijing now labelled a “decisive enabler” of Russia’s war in Ukraine. The declaration states that “The PRC cannot enable the largest war in Europe in recent history without this negatively impacting its interests and reputation”, which is a significant step for the Alliance in calling out its hostile intent. However, it mainly identified and admired the problem, rather than outlining what NATO should do about it.
+
+In addition, defence industrial cooperation was a focal point, with a separate “NATO Industrial Capacity Expansion Pledge” published alongside the main declaration, which will be critical in restocking NATO militaries as quickly and as efficiently possible, together with ensuring long-term industrial support to Ukraine.
+
+One of the central objectives was to “Trump-proof” NATO support to Ukraine. With no invitation, NATO sought to “bridge” membership through three measures.
+
+First, a “NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine” will be established – at a new command in Wiesbaden, Germany – to transition lead responsibilities from the US to NATO on coordinating support and training and place it on an “enduring footing, ensuring enhanced, predictable, and coherent support”. This is twinned with the creation of a senior NATO civilian representative post in Kyiv to allow closer coordination. However, Germany vetoed its original “mission” designation over concerns this could be escalatory. These semantic gymnastics and overall timidity towards Ukraine will be seen by Putin as weakness, and degrade NATO’s own deterrence.
+
+___`The deliberately lowered expectations led to only incremental progress, both in the ongoing transformation of the Alliance’s defence and deterrence posture, and on support to Ukraine`___
+
+Second, a €40 billion package was agreed for Ukraine in 2025. A five-year commitment had been favoured by the NATO Secretary General, but Allies wanted an annual review.
+
+Third, a Joint Analysis Training and Education Center will be set up to jointly identify and apply lessons from the current war and increase Ukrainian interoperability with NATO. This will act as a critical feedback loop for NATO’s Allied Command Transformation.
+
+These commitments are not trivial, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky was very careful to not come across as ungrateful as he was at Vilnius, which annoyed many Allies at the time. However, these collective commitments do not move the dial decisively in Ukraine’s favour. Political slogans to support Ukraine for “as long as it takes” were repeated. However, there were no definitions from the many speakers at the Public Forum on what a Ukrainian victory would actually look like – or, for that matter, a Russian defeat. At Vilnius, the requirement for Ukrainian membership of NATO was “when allies agree and conditions are met”. A year on, Ukraine is still none the wiser as to what these conditions are.
+
+
+### A Missed Opportunity?
+
+The central victory for Ukraine was the following passage from the summit declaration:
+
+“We welcome the concrete progress Ukraine has made since the Vilnius Summit on its required democratic, economic, and security reforms. As Ukraine continues this vital work, we will continue to support it on its irreversible path to full Euro-Atlantic integration, including NATO membership”.
+
+Ukraine, and its advocates, secured the stronger language of an “irreversible” path towards NATO. However, this wording is anything but irreversible for two reasons. First, a future President Donald Trump could renege on the commitment, with fears that a US government led by him could offer up a commitment that Ukraine will never join NATO in future negotiations with Russia. Second, Macron, straight after the declaration from the 2019 London meeting of the North Atlantic Council was published, rowed back on the agreed language on China. Summitry wording does not equal policy.
+
+In fact, the only procedurally “irreversible” mechanism would be an invitation for Ukraine to join the Alliance. It was a missed opportunity for several reasons.
+
+First, unity. The short-term desire to harness the unity that NATO has enjoyed since Russia’s 2022 invasion is detrimental to its longer-term health. It has been 16 years since NATO made the commitment at the Bucharest Summit that Ukraine (and Georgia) “will become members of NATO”. With the irreversible language in 2024, NATO has backed itself into a corner, with little semantic room left for the subsequent years. As such, it will get harder and harder for NATO to satisfy support for Ukraine.
+
+Second, a formal invitation would give NATO, and the US, greater control on the timing of Ukraine joining at the precise moment “when conditions are met”. Through the use of Article 11 (Ratification) of the Washington Treaty, the Allies could show support to Ukraine and gradually manage escalation with Russia, even using it as a punishment for Russian behaviours by incrementally moving Ukraine closer through national ratifications in response to Russian atrocities such as the Okhamdyat strike. This would be preferable to waiting until “conditions are met” – presumably an end to the war in Ukraine’s favour – and then starting the process, which could take years (the quick ratifications of Finland and Sweden’s accession were an exception to the rule).
+
+Third, there is nothing in Article 10 (Invitation) to suggest that NATO can withdraw an invitation once made. Therefore, this could “Trump-proof” Ukraine’s membership of NATO and ensure it is not offered up in any peace deal with Russia that would surely cause a deep rupture in the Alliance.
+
+Fourth, an invitation now would pre-empt more difficult electoral maths in national parliaments to ratify the Assession Protocols. With such political instability across the Euro-Atlantic, NATO might never have had a better chance of getting ticks in the box. Of course, there is a possibility that parliaments – under different compositions – could “deratify” the protocols in the future, but this would be difficult to do.
+
+Fifth, it would firmly anchor Ukraine into the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. Policymakers should consider what is currently happening in Georgia as a cautionary tale. There is no guarantee that a future political leadership in Ukraine might not also turn away from Europe. It was striking that the Washington declaration removed all reference to Georgia, showing that 16 years of hard work since Bucharest in 2008 have been wasted due to the passing of Georgia’s new foreign agents law – widely dubbed the “Russian Law” – derailing Tbilisi’s Euro-Atlantic path.
+
+Finally, an invitation would be the ultimate expression of democracy – mentioned in the preamble to the Washington Summit – allowing Allies and national Parliaments to demonstrate support for Ukrainian membership, and those that have reservations to voice them.
+
+
+### UK Leadership
+
+With political challenges for the leaderships of the US, France and Germany, the contrast with the UK’s new government mandate at a critical time for the UK, Europe and NATO was stark. The summit was an immediate opportunity for new UK Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer to meet and greet world leaders. The momentum will continue next week as the UK hosts the fourth European Political Community summit with around 40 European leaders at Blenheim.
+
+___`Due to the transatlantic political volatility, there is a real opportunity for the UK to increase its leadership role within NATO`___
+
+The prime minister, flanked by his new Foreign Secretary David Lammy, his Defence Secretary John Healey and Minister for European Relations Nick Thomas-Symonds, put on a show of force in the US to reassure allies and partners. Throughout its election campaign, the Labour Party emphasised its NATO credentials, historically referencing the Party’s and Ernest Bevan’s role and confirming an “unshakeable” commitment to NATO and an “iron clad” commitment to the nuclear deterrent.
+
+Due to the transatlantic political volatility, there is a real opportunity for the UK to increase its leadership role within NATO. Indeed, it is likely to be necessary. However, the UK’s ability to lead within NATO – beyond words – largely rests on the conclusions of the UK’s next Strategic Defence Review (SDR), which will be announced by the prime minister next week. Three steps will make this possible.
+
+First, Defence Intelligence and the wider UK Intelligence Community should be used to make an assessment of when the government believes the UK might have to commit to war in Europe. This would bring the UK in line with NATO itself and many European allies, and it would be the key to informing resourcing and capability choices – the difference between getting ready for 2027 versus 2033 is stark. It would also provide a target to communicate to the Treasury to negotiate the required increase in funding, or argue to more appropriate funding mechanisms for defence. This assessment should also be openly communicated to UK society.
+
+Second, to meet a “NATO first” approach, the SDR should fully align with the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) rather than try to circumvent it. The UK should directly ask NATO what is required through the process for this four-year cycle and likely the subsequent two. This would then become the foundation of the SDR to avoid national programmes and projects that do not align.
+
+Third, the role of UK nuclear weapons should be emphasised. The UK, unlike France, assigns its nuclear forces to NATO, and in a more dangerous world and with the risk of a disengaged US, Europeans are putting more emphasis on nuclear deterrence. The UK’s nuclear capability should also be better used as a bargaining tool within the NDPP, rather than an added extra.
+
+
+### America First
+
+Despite the multiple European elections this year, it is only the US election that really matters for European security. Former President Trump was not at the summit, but his spectre loomed large. Next week is the Republican National Convention, where he will officially become the nominee. If he does win the election, the 2025 NATO summit in The Hague will be very different to Washington, and it will force NATO to face the hard choices that it continues to defer.
+
+---
+
+__Ed Arnold__ is a Research Fellow for European Security within the International Security department at RUSI. His experience covers defence, intelligence, counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, within the public and private sector. His primary research focus is on the transformation of European security following Russia’s war on Ukraine. Specifically, he covers the evolving Euro-Atlantic security architecture, the security of northern Europe, and the UK contribution to European security through NATO, the Joint Expeditionary Force, and other fora.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-16-between-ambition-and-reality.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-16-between-ambition-and-reality.md
new file mode 100644
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-16-between-ambition-and-reality.md
@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Between Ambition And Reality
+author: Juliana Suess
+date : 2024-07-16 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cGZRSSr.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "How Space Fits into the UK Defence Framework"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_A wider understanding of the services and support that space can offer is needed across defence._
+
+
+
+Space is ubiquitous in modern defence: space capabilities are essential in areas such as gathering intelligence, enabling navigation and precision firepower via GPS, and communicating beyond the line of sight. Furthermore, the utility of space increasingly renders capabilities a target for hostile action. Attacks on space-enabled communications services, as seen during the war in Ukraine, are just one example of how counter-space capabilities are already being used. In the future, adversaries may not restrict themselves to non-kinetic means, and space itself might turn into a battlefield.
+
+UK defence views space as both a domain and an enabler, although the balance is skewed towards enablement. It follows that the space domain must be protected to guarantee its utility as an enabler. The mixed message about space given to the services is part of the reason why space is perceived as complicated – it is used by all the armed forces, yet its potential for supporting other domains is not fully understood. A wider understanding of the services and support that space can offer is needed across defence – what it enables, what capabilities are dependent on it, what new vulnerabilities have been exposed as a result, and what investments may be needed to optimise its use. This understanding is important for ensuring that space can continue to be used even when its capabilities are under attack, and so that reversionary non-space-dependent alternatives are developed and trained for, where necessary. UK Space Command will be vital for providing the broader education and wider promotion of space needed across UK defence.
+
+The current approach of treating space as a niche subject area is not only conceptually flawed but also risks leaving space-enabled capabilities vulnerable and space services under-utilised, and reducing the capacity of a growing Space Command to perform its role effectively. This approach has already led to compromises in relation to the Skynet programme that could undermine the security of space assets. In the coming years it will be vital to include UK Space Command in all appropriate discussions to ensure full protection of UK space assets and to allow the command to grow and establish itself.
+
+This paper argues that:
+
+- The Ministry of Defence and Space Command should emphasise doctrinally that space must be understood as both a domain and an enabler, while acknowledging that currently UK defence uses space capabilities more heavily in the enabler role for terrestrial operations than for defensive or offensive operations in space itself.
+
+- There should be a greater emphasis across the services on education about space capabilities, the degree to which terrestrial systems and concepts of operation rely on them, and the potential vulnerabilities created that must be mitigated.
+
+- This education effort should be part of a wider promotion of the message that space is not reserved for a few specialists in Space Command and in space programmes, but instead is critical for all the services. As such, space must be widely understood, used, built into operational planning as a key capability across domains, and protected.
+
+
+### INTRODUCTION
+
+Space is increasingly recognised by UK government as a vital part of defence. It featured prominently in the UK Integrated Review in 2021, and this was followed by the release of three strategy documents: the National Space Strategy in 2021; the Defence Space Strategy in 2022; and the Space Power Doctrine in 2022. The focus on integration – highlighted in both the 2023 Integrated Review Refresh and the associated Defence Command Paper – is intended to counter the new threat environment and is meant to “[enable] the UK to deliver disproportionate effect relative to [its] size”. Space acts a critical enabler for this integration.
+
+However, there is also the recognition that space and the cyber and electromagnetic activities that underpin capabilities “are the least understood domains in UK Defence”. This lack of understanding and lack of priority status is also reflected in budgets: in 2022, a mere £1.4 billion was promised for space capabilities over the following 10 years, apart from the £5 billion to be spent on the UK’s Skynet Programme. Meanwhile, the UK spent £52.8 billion in total on defence in 2022/23.
+
+#### BACKGROUND
+
+While it appears that government has started to take space more seriously, as shown by the publication of two strategies, a more general understanding of how space enables many defence functions remains absent.
+
+The Space Power Doctrine 2022 document goes into greater detail, outlining how space capabilities should contribute to UK defence’s integrated approach. It also highlights (to an extent) where space already supports and enables capabilities, and explains the current responsibilities and organisations involved in the defence space structures. UK space doctrine states that “the vast majority of military operations could not be sustained without space capabilities”, and space is often referred to as forming part of the “Defence Digital Backbone”. Essentially, space allows defence to know where its own forces are (Positioning, Navigation and Timing [PNT], linked to situational awareness applications), and to know where adversaries and associated threats might be (earth observation/ISR), and it enables satellite communication channels that are vital for command and control (C2) purposes (SATCOM). Space assets are critical to enabling the use of long-range precision weapons for strikes in high-threat areas through the provision of ISR data for targeting, PNT services for guidance and navigation, and SATCOM links for C2 functions.
+
+Most of the UK’s space doctrine deals with explaining what space is, including descriptions of space debris and solar weather. This is necessary to some extent, as it is the UK’s first dedicated space doctrine (previously it was part of airpower doctrine), and one of its aims is “to provide a basis of understanding”. However, this concentration on the basics of space as an environment means that details on how space enables terrestrial capabilities are relatively thin on the ground, and cannot educate readers on terrestrial alternatives or how outages should be dealt with . To make up for this missed opportunity, later iterations of strategy/documentation will need to expand further on how space is used to enable practical military effects. One way to do this, while not losing sight of the basics, could be to update the UK Military Space Primer from 2010 and point towards that document in future updated doctrine documents. This would leave more room in the updated doctrine for information that would help readers appreciate the operational potential of space. It would further promote debate on the subject and help potential beneficiaries engage better with the subject.
+
+This problem is not unique to the UK. Jeffrey Caton has commented that current US space and cyberspace doctrines “often devolve to technical descriptions of their operation”. One of the core purposes of doctrine is to provide “a common basis for understanding the nature and conduct of armed conflict”, but initial theorising can end up taking this more technical approach, as understanding of the potential of space capability to support and enhance military activity has started to permeate to the tactical level but has not yet systematically reached the operational level. Some analysts have argued that doctrine tends to be developed on the basis of practical experience in a given domain or in the context of new tactics, rather than being seen as a prerequisite for practical success, as encapsulated in the phrase “doctrine is the daughter of history”. In the same vein, while systematic thinking about the air domain developed rapidly during the First World War, the RAF was already well established before a unified body of UK airpower doctrine was written.
+
+#### PURPOSE
+
+What is currently missing from discussions is an assessment of how decision-makers within the UK defence and security community view space, how this thinking has shaped nascent defence space infrastructures, and how the various structures involved affect the future trajectory of using the domain.
+
+The aim of this paper is to outline how UK defence can use space to its fullest extent. Although Space Command was created as recently as 2021, this does not mean that space is a new concept in the UK: rather, space capabilities have formed a little-acknowledged part of UK defence capabilities for decades. With space rising to prominence again around the latter half of the 2010s – evidenced by the establishment of space commands and accompanying strategies and documents in several states – a change in perception is overdue. Space needs to be understood at every level of UK defence, and by policymakers and practitioners alike. This paper outlines how this understanding can be achieved – with education and promotion through Space Command. This perception shift would help the command to fulfil its task of protecting space as a domain.
+
+This paper is primarily aimed at UK defence personnel: both those who are already familiar with space and those who are not. While the information about the threats to space capabilities will not be news to some, the message about education and promotion needs to be heard by all. Meanwhile, the rest of defence needs to hear the message that space is essential to modern conflict at all levels of intensity, and that it is not a specialised area for a few select experts, but rather one that has capabilities and vulnerabilities that need to be understood by all defence professionals.
+
+#### METHODOLOGY
+
+The research for this paper is based in part on a review of academic literature and extant military doctrine, but it also draws on 15 interviews with experts conducted by the author between October 2022 and August 2023. The interviewees include current senior serving members of the armed forces, academics, and experienced people working in the commercial space sector, selected for their expertise. Most interviews took place online, with two interviews conducted in person and one via phone call. All interview data has been anonymised. Given the paper’s focus on UK defence space, most of the experts interviewed are based in the UK, with only one interviewee based in the US. The UK experience, however, is not unique among relatively new space powers, and some lessons may also be applicable to similarly sized space powers.
+
+#### STRUCTURE
+
+This paper consists of two main sections. The first section illustrates how space is currently conceived of as both a domain and an enabler, with the current skew towards it primarily acting as an enabler. This may yet change (for example, if on-orbit activities and threats to space assets increase), and the paper uses analogies from the early days of the RAF to showcase this. As interviews revealed, space is often misunderstood, if it is considered at all.
+
+The second section deals with the implications of these current patterns of thinking. The section argues that space is of vital importance for UK defence, and that it is currently not given the prominence and consideration that it should be across the wider armed forces. It also argues that space education across the UK armed forces is vital to understanding: how space already supports operations as a critical enabler; its vulnerabilities; and potential non-space alternatives that might be required to sustain operations if space assets are disrupted or altogether unavailable.
+
+In conclusion, it becomes clear that Space Command must be structured to ensure that the UK’s space capability will flourish – both as an enabler of other domains, through services like PNT, ISR and communications, and in terms of enabling it to fulfil its core role, the protection and defence of space assets.
+
+
+### THE CONCEPTION OF SPACE WITHIN THE MILITARY
+
+To understand space as part of the UK defence framework, it is important to understand how it is thought of in defence decision-making circles. Space has been physically explored for the better part of the past seven decades. However, the thinking around how it can be used for military purposes, and how it should be conceptualised as part of an integrated force, lags behind thinking related to the traditional domains and to cyberspace.
+
+UK space power doctrine considers space a domain, applying NATO’s doctrine that it is an operational domain alongside land, air, maritime, and electromagnetic and cyber. Space is currently conceived of within the Ministry of Defence (MoD) as an “independent operational domain” which enables a whole host of capabilities. This seems consistent with both UK and NATO doctrine – after all, space is a physical environment that can be entered, and in which operations can take place.
+
+While the term “domain” is itself contested, it is commonly defined as “a sphere of the operating environment that has physical characteristics requiring unique doctrines, organizations, and equipment for military forces to effectively control and exploit in the conduct of military operations”. This is the case for space: the physical characteristics of the environment require a unique approach.
+
+The laws of physics as they apply in space, the associated speed of travel, and the remoteness of the environment are just a few of the initial factors that need to be considered when operating in space, and they have implications for deployment and maintenance. For example, assets deployed in space, in addition to inherently requiring special design features, also need to cope with the fact that maintenance in space is generally not possible. While in-orbit refuelling, repair and even manufacturing are developing areas of the space industry, they are still far from routine. For the moment at least, a satellite’s lifespan is dictated by its fuel supply. For assets in geostationary orbit this is typically 15 years, although the lifetime of many satellites is stretched out for longer. Space is also different from other domains in that its defence assets are not crewed; the phrase “satellites don’t have mothers” echoes discussions in other domains around the use of UAVs and other remotely operated capabilities, in relation to concerns that the loss of hardware is not considered enough of a deterrent, thereby potentially lowering the threshold of conflict.
+
+In short, the uniqueness of the environment requires targeted thinking that accounts for the specific characteristics of space as a domain. The conceptualisation of space as a domain also carries with it structural, administrative and budgetary recognition. It could even be argued that the categorisation of space as a separate domain was an important part of the justification for the establishment of UK Space Command as a joint two-star headquarters under the RAF in 2021. The primary task of Space Command, which is the protection and defence of space assets, reflects this categorisation as a separate domain.
+
+However, the establishment of Space Command may also send an unhelpful signal to the rest of defence: that space is “taken care of” and is a niche topic that only concerns those working in the command itself. That space is sometimes forgotten about was confirmed by a group captain in the MoD Space Policy team, who stated that space sometimes falls down the priority list for funding, as it is primarily regarded as an enabler for other activities. This highlights why further education and promotion among the rest of the services is a crucial task for Space Command in the coming years, so as to firmly establish the importance of space, its ubiquity in UK defence, and the overall dependence on the domain.
+
+Moreover, viewing space from a domain-centric perspective can also be unhelpful, and viewing space solely in this way limits understanding of how it can influence military operations. As a senior military officer at UK Space Command put it, “we might not win a war using only space, but we will not win a war without it”. The three main roles of space – PNT, ISR and SATCOM – are fundamentally important because they support other, terrestrial, capabilities. Most of the capabilities that space unlocks and enables do not exist in isolation but rather are used as part of wider operational or tactical systems. However, sometimes military users are wholly reliant on SATCOM, especially on early entry deployments or where the ranges or terrain prevent the deployment of terrestrial networks. For example, SATCOM played a vital role for Western forces in Afghanistan, where it was often the only viable communications option for deployed bases or patrols. Space is vital for connectivity in multi-domain settings, for example allowing naval forces to communicate in real time with higher headquarters and ground forces ashore.
+
+#### THE BALANCE BETWEEN DOMAIN AND ENABLER
+
+Within UK defence circles, space has been treated more as an enabler than as an operational domain (although this attitude may not last). John Klein put it succinctly: “The inherent value of space is what it allows you to do”. This perception has structural implications: the conception of space as primarily an enabler might suggest that it should not be an independent command, in view of historical precedent.
+
+For example, the RAF became an independent service only in 1918. For most of the First World War, aircraft were thought of – in their reconnaissance and artillery observation roles – as enablers for land and maritime forces. Towards the end of the war, though, the increasing use of aircraft in strategic bombing campaigns to disrupt the enemy’s industrial war efforts prompted a shift in the perceived balance between airpower’s importance as an enabler and as a separate domain of warfare. This shift towards thinking about airpower in domain-centric terms was ultimately reflected in the granting to the RAF of its status as an independent service in the final year of the war. As George K Williams wrote, “[the] issue of strategic bombardment was from the outset inextricably conjoined with the creation of the third service”.
+
+While the origins of modern air forces may to some extent serve as an analogy for the origins of national space commands, there are important distinctions to be made. Among them is the fact that air-to-ground and air-to-air combat, if only rudimentary, began to take place almost as soon as the air began to be used for military purposes. While physical combat in orbit would be possible, this has not yet occurred. Furthermore, while space is already providing powerful new benefits for states (echoing the way that the air domain proved revolutionary), it does not provide the same initial benefit of comparatively low cost of entry to achieve transformative effects. Operating in space, as we are often reminded by launch failures and long project timelines, is difficult and expensive.
+
+The duality of space as both a domain and an enabler is not necessarily permanent, as it may evolve into a domain in which direct acts of war happen. If space warfare were to become a regular feature of conflicts, this would even out the balance between space’s domain/enabler roles. The current imbalance would then shift, leading to space doctrine and concepts changing, just as they did in the air domain. For the moment, considering space as a domain as well as an enabler is necessary for the protection of its assets, as well as for creating the budgetary and structural latitude for space within UK defence.
+
+In conclusion, the conception of space as both a domain and an enabler is correct but skewed, which further complicates the way in which it is perceived by the rest of defence. Space Command’s official functions are “delivering day-to-day space operations, growing and training defence’s space workforce, and developing and delivering space equipment programmes”. Treating space as a domain is thus central to the role of Space Command in the delivery of space operations, but it is also important in terms of promoting space, educating the wider forces about their dependence on and the utility of space services, and – perhaps most crucially – protecting the domain by looking after the assets within it. In short, the domain must be protected, so that it can also be used as an enabler. This is why it is important to have a dedicated structure for space in the form of a Space Command: effectively, Space Command deals with space as a domain, while the rest of the services treat space as an enabler for their own conventional capabilities.
+
+
+### FUTURE STEPS FOR UK SPACE
+
+Having discussed how space is currently perceived within UK defence, it is important to consider next steps for UK space, including what Space Command’s role entails. Given the current state of understanding of space discussed above, the priorities for focus can be divided into three distinct categories: education; promotion; and protection of assets.
+
+#### THE NEED FOR EDUCATION AND PROMOTION
+
+Due to the ubiquitous nature of the space services underpinning many of the conventional capabilities that modern forces depend upon, the services require a broader understanding of space’s contribution to their operations. Space Command’s expertise covers space as a domain, and the threats posed to assets in orbit. While the Command can help with education and promotion, the rest of defence needs to engage more closely and actively improve its baseline knowledge. This includes what kind of disruptions are to be expected, how these can be minimised, and what alternatives are available if satellite services are degraded or fail altogether. As previously outlined, current policy documents – the Space Power Doctrine, the Defence Space Strategy and the National Space Strategy – to some extent explain why space is important, where dependencies lie and what threats to anticipate, but these documents remain rather limited in scope.
+
+In interviews, concerns were expressed about a degree of myopia among the services; but it was also noted that this might change as thinking about cross-domain integration evolves, with space becoming more prominent in discussions. A senior government official at the MoD remarked that there was “education left to do”, and a “low space IQ across departments”. There was a general consensus among interviewees that more space education was required in defence circles not immediately adjacent to space, with Space Command playing a key role in bridging that gap. The need for education was further emphasised in a House of Commons Defence Committee report in 2023, which also acknowledged that modification and development of training was underway.
+
+Some measures are already being taken to address the issue: the Space Power Doctrine outlines the idea that space is part of an integrated approach, partly enabled and coordinated through a network of space liaison officers. Although this goes some way towards alleviating the problem, the presence of a few space experts scattered around the services is not going to prompt a seismic change in understanding. In fact, the designation of space experts risks sending the wrong message: that space is so complicated that it is the domain solely of specialised experts, rather than an area that concerns everyone.
+
+Another vehicle for education is the Space Academy, which is to open at the end of 2024 as part of the UK Defence Academy. Including space as part of wider defence education and situating it naturally among the other domains is the right approach: space forms a crucial part of defence infrastructure and should not be treated as so specialised that it is reserved for a select few.
+
+In interviews, one senior RAF officer noted that the problem with attempting to spread knowledge and awareness of space more widely among defence was that content was overly complicated, requiring the topic to be communicated repeatedly. This highlights the need for marketing as well as education: it is not just space’s importance that needs to be communicated, but also that the topic is not as difficult as is sometimes perceived.
+
+Part of the problem could be how the topic is currently explained. Everyday end-users of space services – such as a soldier using a satellite phone – might be familiar with the space-enabled device in their hand, but not with the space threats that could degrade its functionality. Although considering space solely from a domain perspective facilitates the scrutiny of space threats and other important environment-specific topics, it all too often obscures the enabler elements and neglects the tactical level at which space plays a key role in terrestrial activities. The soldier with the satellite phone may not consider themselves to be a space user, despite the degree to which the success of their mission, or even their survival, depends on it.
+
+When communicating why space matters, therefore, it might be more fruitful to stress the domain’s potential as an enabler, as well as the number of terrestrial capabilities that could not operate in their current capacity without it. The current deficit of clear communication creates a gap, whereby understanding at the operational level is often lost. This is problematic given that understanding of potential capabilities, vulnerabilities and dependencies is necessary at the operational level to ensure that disruptions to space services do not catch troops off guard, and that reversionary measures can be implemented quickly.
+
+It will therefore be Space Command’s fundamental task over the coming years to educate and to spread awareness among the rest of the joint force. Space liaison officers are a good start, but they are not a panacea – space is not a niche topic and ought no longer to be treated as such. It is vital to ensure that space quickly becomes part of defence’s “business as usual” activity so that its importance is more broadly recognised. While space’s unique characteristics affect how it fits into the defence framework, treating it as a specialised, discrete part of defence will hinder full integration and contribute to the perception of space as an overly complicated department with a high barrier to entry. A modern fighting force that is truly integrated cannot function if it is unaware of how one of its main enablers works (or if its fighting force is put off learning about it because the subject matter is considered too complicated). This does not mean that space specialists are unnecessary – in fact, they are very much needed, and well placed within Space Command – but space should not be regarded as a field that only concerns a few specialists.
+
+Space Command is currently best placed to drive the education and promotion campaign that is necessary if this understanding – that space is everyone’s concern – is to be attained. One of the key requirements will be developing skills associated with education and promotion. Cyber security in the civilian sector provides a useful analogy. Since every company uses the internet to some extent, most companies provide cyber security training for their staff, for example to make them aware of phishing emails and the ways in which their organisation could become vulnerable in the event of a breach. In the same way, every soldier who handles space-enabled equipment (a category that likely includes most service personnel) needs to be aware of the limitations of the tool and the threats to its associated systems. The absence of such awareness risks late detection or incorrect addressing of counter-space measures. Moreover, users need to be acquainted with the backup options available (or at least be aware of the degree of risk if there are no backup options). Although recent combat operations undertaken by the British armed forces in Iraq and Afghanistan did not involve significant contests in the electromagnetic spectrum, the experience of the current war in Ukraine suggests that this situation would change in a peer-to-peer (or near-peer) conflict.
+
+#### THE NEED FOR PROTECTION
+
+The effectiveness of space assets has increasingly led to them being seen as potential targets. Geospatial analytics company Hawkeye 360 has reported that there was “increased GPS interference in and around Ukraine in the months leading up to the February attack as well as since”. Similarly, Elon Musk reported attacks against the mega-constellation Starlink – the space-enabled internet provider that has supplied Ukrainian troops with much-needed connectivity. On the morning of the invasion of Ukraine, another space-enabled internet provider, Viasat, was targeted in a cyber attack, although it is unclear to what extent one of its clients, the Ukrainian Armed Forces, was affected by the resultant outage. What is clear, though, is that adversaries and competitors have realised the utility of space assets, and will endeavour to ensure they are disrupted or made inaccessible.
+
+This is further evidenced by Russia’s focus on information dominance. Space, as one of the major conduits for information flows, is a crucial attack vector. Russian electronic warfare (EW) capabilities did not initially prove as dominant in Ukraine as had been assumed, primarily due to a lack of in-depth Russian planning during the opening phases of the invasion. While Russia’s use of EW capabilities has increased significantly in both scope and sophistication since the opening stages of the war, these have not been particularly successful in denying Ukraine access to satellite-enabled communications, in part due to the resilience of the Starlink constellation. Nevertheless, they are having a negative effect on positioning, thus “slowing down vital kill chains and imposing significant limitations on Ukrainian reconnaissance in depth”.
+
+Despite the limited initial use of EW capabilities in Ukraine, it must be assumed that space capabilities, such as SATCOM, would be at least partially disrupted in any future peer-to-peer (or near-peer) conflict. This is important, especially given the ubiquity and utility of the electromagnetic spectrum for C2 purposes, including communications, coordination and targeting. Western forces largely conduct training in environments that are unrealistically permissive from an electromagnetic spectrum perspective. Likewise, most recent Western combat experience has been in expeditionary operations where the space environment has been largely uncontested. For example, whereas SATCOM ground stations could become targets for physical attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan, the satellites and the links themselves were not at risk. In 2003, Iraqi EW systems were present and alleged to have been provided by Russia, but they proved incapable of jamming US systems and were ultimately destroyed.
+
+The consistent attempts to target space-enabled capabilities in the war in Ukraine are not an outlier. Both Russia and China view Western (and specifically US) dependence on space as a weakness to be exploited. While China and Russia both run significant counter-space programmes, it is not only space powers that are capable of disrupting or destroying space assets. Cyber attacks against space systems and direct attacks/sabotage targeting ground stations are just two ways in which a non-space power could disrupt space systems. Attacks in the electromagnetic spectrum, such as jamming and spoofing, have become part and parcel of modern warfare and could even be carried out by non-state actors, given the widespread commercial availability of jammers.
+
+In response to the degree of dependence on space services and the rapidly expanding threat they face, the US Army and the US Air Force have already begun training under GPS-denied conditions – Exercise Red Flag in 2018 was a prominent example. In all NATO countries, services dependent on satellite-enabled services – air forces, armies and navies – should increase reversionary training. In many cases, potential reversionary options already exist for situations where space services are degraded or denied. For example, GPS alternatives for the Royal Navy have been suggested, such as an automated celestial navigation system, magnetic anomaly navigation and bathymetric navigation. Even where one method may not provide a comprehensive service, the combination of alternative navigation methods could offer resilience in scenarios where GPS is disrupted or completely unavailable. In this instance, a primary, alternative, contingency and emergency (PACE)-like approach, as used for communications planning, could prove equally useful for PNT and other space systems.
+
+In conclusion, it is inevitable both that space will be a critical enabler in future wars and that space assets will be specifically targeted, given their centrality to modern capabilities. Consequently, understanding of space needs to extend far beyond those immediately responsible for space assets, reaching out across the whole breadth of modern forces. This highlights the necessity of education at a general level in defence about the dependencies and vulnerabilities of systems relying on space assets, alongside appropriate involvement of Space Command in programmes to perform its core task of ensuring that assets are defended against space threats.
+
+#### STRUCTURAL AND ORGANISATIONAL IMPLICATIONS FOR “PROTECT AND DEFEND”
+
+While UK Space Command is still in its early days, the structures that are being shaped now will be fundamental not only to the command’s success but also to how effectively space can enable wider cross-domain integration. As Bleddyn Bowen puts it, “the primary questions of a space force should be who can manage space infrastructure and its protection best, and which branches of the military should engage in counterspace missions, most often involving terrestrially based weapons”.
+
+When it was inaugurated in 2021, UK Space Command was established under the financial umbrella of the RAF, with its headquarters located in High Wycombe. This was at least in part due to the fact that most suitably qualified and experienced personnel on space issues in defence were deemed to work in the RAF already. At the time, there were discussions about whether the command should sit under Strategic Command, given that it is a joint enabler and essential to integration, and also considering that the Skynet programme, which at approximately £5 billion makes up the vast majority of the UK defence space budget, already falls within its remit. However, the scope of operations, capability development and training, and the fact that almost 70% of the UK Space Command workforce comes from the RAF, led to the command being formed under the RAF. This decision was echoed in the German armed forces (also in 2021), and is in line with several other countries (including France, which created its Air and Space Force in 2020). UK Space Command is not a single service function, however. It is a joint command that acts as the UK’s nerve centre for space, and is staffed by personnel from all three services, although administrative staff and logistical underpinnings are provided by Air Command.
+
+There are three questions to be answered in this context:
+
+- Should Space Command be an independent service?
+
+- Is it best placed as a command or headquarters under the auspices of the RAF, as is currently the case?
+
+- Should it instead be moved to Strategic Command?
+
+It is currently not clear whether Space Command will eventually outgrow its parent organisation and become an independent service. For the time being, however, it is too small to function as a standalone service. Leaving aside budget considerations, it is probably wise for Space Command to be made its own service only if exclusive space operations become substantial enough for the enabler/domain balance to tip towards the domain end of the spectrum. As long as space is primarily used as an enabler, it seems most reasonable for the command to fall under one of the more established services.
+
+If Space Command is not an independent service, then, what is the best way to carve out a nerve centre for space when decisions made by Space Command will affect all the other services? How should capacity and responsibility for different space functions, such as ISR, SATCOM and PNT, be allocated within the services? UK space power doctrine suggests that, where further clarification is required to avoid doubt, a mission should be labelled according to its effect rather than its means. This, however, poses a question about the extent to which it is possible to have exclusively space missions. Space is “a prime integrator” and is very rarely used in isolation. What are operated are assets that send data to ground stations, which in turn assist terrestrial assets – whether by providing images through ISR, coordinates via PNT, or data through SATCOM. Protective measures for satellites would fall squarely in the space mission category, though current anti-satellite measures are most likely to come in the form of jamming, spoofing and cyber attacks – all of which attack the links (and potentially terrestrial elements such as ground stations), rather than directly targeting the space assets themselves.
+
+All of this suggests that Space Command is probably best placed under Strategic Command at this stage, for two reasons. First, if Space Command is tasked with the protection and defence of space assets against attacks (most of which are likely to take place in the electromagnetic and cyber realms), it would be best placed to work with the command that already owns most of those capabilities. Second, moving away from the top-level budget of the RAF would send a powerful cultural message that space enables the full spectrum of military capabilities and affects everyone, not just aviators.
+
+There are deep intra-dependencies within each domain, and perhaps especially within space, which acts as the glue that holds the other domains together. Therefore, losing access to the space capabilities that are crucial for achieving operational success might be particularly disruptive for the complex system of interdependencies across the air, land, maritime, cyber and space domains. In interviews, one official stressed that the potential risk of overlap was not unique to space, but happened in other areas as well. This seems to suggest that an overlap of space roles mentioned in the Space Power Doctrine is widespread across defence and is actually a “growing pain” of the continuing trend towards integration. As a former signaller reflected during interviews, the main problem with integration was that people saw it as a destination rather than as a journey that in reality never ends, due to technology change, with no final end state.
+
+The pervasiveness of space means that there is also a danger of insufficient involvement and consultation of Space Command on projects or systems that concern space. A prime example of where this could be potentially harmful is the Skynet programme, a hardened constellation of X-band satellites that provides all beyond line of sight communications to the UK military. The programme has been running since the late 1960s, and the next generation of satellites is already being planned: Skynet 6A has been promised to provide “more capacity, speed and greater versatility”. The Skynet programme, despite being a critical space asset, falls under Strategic Command, and it is the biggest UK defence space project. While there are long-term ambitions to move the programme to sit under Space Command, there are no immediate plans to do so. However, other new space capabilities being developed, such as the ISR constellation Istari and the integrator system Minerva, are planned to fall within Space Command’s remit.
+
+As the UK’s biggest defence space project, it may seem counterintuitive that Skynet is not allocated to Space Command. However, given the advanced stage the project had reached by the time that Space Command was being created, and the project’s sheer scale, its placement was a logical decision. A huge project such as Skynet requires a command that can support it with the scale of staffing it needs. As a space industry expert has observed, Space Command is currently not “configured” to take on large projects. Furthermore, there is experience within Strategic Command to help guide how Skynet ought to be run – including how its services can reach the “frontline” when necessary. This is in part enabled through the Chief Information Officer within the MoD, and guided by the Digital Strategy for Defence, ensuring that “frontline forces … have real-time access to data”. Taking Skynet out of these tried-and-tested structures, while attempting to manage such a big project and learning “on the go”, would have been counterproductive, and could have led to the loss of crucial expertise, such as appropriate bandwidth for operations. In the view of a senior military officer at UK Space Command, taking on the Skynet programme at such an early stage of development of the Command would have caused significant issues, given the size of the programme, and would have been all-encompassing.
+
+This is not to say that the inclusion of Skynet under Space Command in the future would not strengthen the command (albeit requiring additional budget and people). Space Command is already responsible for the “protect and defend” element of Skynet – ensuring that it is safe from hostile intent. Moreover, Skynet 6 will be in orbit for many years and will carry out critical mission support, making it a legitimate target for adversaries. Given the evolving nature of space threats and the importance of the service provided, it has become evident that additional protection is needed beyond the measures that were initially specified at the start of the programme. Ultimately, the problem with Skynet has been that, despite the large budget, it would be challenging to meet the requirements of protect and defend from within Skynet’s existing funding. This is because when the requirements were set, the initial threat assessment assumed a different geopolitical situation (and a different risk level for satellites). When Space Command was established, it was relatively late in the process to influence the requirements for Skynet 6A and Enduring Capability, and for agreeing the appropriate balance of responsibility between Space Command and Strategic Command for delivering the protect and defend mission. The case of Skynet is perhaps unique, in the sense that the timing of the establishment of Space Command did not lend itself to sufficient consultation. However, it is an example that shows that the vulnerability and protection of satellites need to be considered more extensively. Where compromises had to be made for the current programme, this has been considered a lesson learned, and significant progress is being made towards understanding how future Skynet spacecraft can be protected and defended.
+
+This dynamic is not unusual for a defence programme of this scale. Given the long development and deployment timeframes usually involved, security requirements can quickly become outdated. However, in most major defence projects, modifications to hardware and configuration can be made at multiple points during a capability lifecycle to improve responsiveness to evolving threats. Space assets are somewhat unique, in that generally only the software can be updated once an asset has been placed in orbit. Therefore, a greater degree of horizon scanning is required, and software adaptability built in to ensure the ability to protect the asset throughout its lifespan. This is particularly true for satellites in geostationary orbit (like Skynet), which remain in orbit for longer periods of time.
+
+The lesson must be that the protection and defence requirements of any future space asset need to be decided within Space Command and included in the core specifications from the inception of any project. Given that Space Command will ultimately hold operational responsibility for Skynet, the way that the programme has been managed in terms of ownership creates a gap between those who designed the programme and those who will be ultimately responsible for it. This not only increases the potential vulnerability of a strategic asset, due to a lack of focus on protect and defend requirements during development, but also potentially risks a fledgling Space Command looking ineffective in the event of any issues with Skynet 6 Enduring Capability once in service, which could hamper the command’s future development.
+
+The Skynet programme serves as an example for the wider structure: bigger projects that require a large budget and many personnel are best placed outside Space Command, at least while the command matures, but must involve the command to the extent that it can assure its future mission of protecting and defending space assets once they enter service. In this way, the “domain” thinking sits within Space Command, while the “enabler” elements stay with the relevant parts of the services or UK Strategic Command.
+
+Space will become increasingly contested as the reliance on space-enabled assets grows. It is therefore vital that modern armed forces are ready for this contest – this cannot be done with only a handful of people in a single command recognising the potential dangers. Thus, the setting up of a dedicated Space Command should not send the message to the rest of the force that space is now “taken care of” – space operations do not happen in isolation from other domains.
+
+
+### CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+UK Space Command was formed in 2021. Now, three years after its inception and the publication of the National and Defence Space Strategies, important lessons have been learned. Global trends, not least those observed during the war in Ukraine, have made it abundantly clear that space services are not a niche capability. Space is a ubiquitous and essential integrating layer for modern military operations, and as a result it is also increasingly being directly and indirectly targeted by adversaries.
+
+With space underlying so many military capabilities, space knowledge cannot be left to a few specialists in UK defence. Rather, its dependencies and vulnerabilities and non-space-based alternatives need to be widely understood. An understanding of space and what it can do for UK defence and security needs to permeate all of UK defence, and be promoted at every level to guarantee continuous access to space and the capabilities it enables.
+
+The inclusion of a Space Academy at the Defence College is a step in the right direction, as it further drives home the message that space does not require special treatment, as a discrete entity, but is instead vitally integrated into the way that defence operates. Widespread understanding of how space enables modern warfare will be fundamental to early threat detection, the prevention of service disruption and, ultimately, unlocking true integration. It is therefore vital that space education is made a core part of broader military education and training within defence.
+
+As well as enabling this wider education, a core role for Space Command in the coming years will be the protection of space capabilities. As space becomes more woven into defence structures, and space capabilities become more resilient (but also dispersed across a wider array of constellations and services), the challenge of protection will become more complex. Space Command needs the tools and the people to counter these threats. This requires involving Space Command from the beginning of projects so that the security of space assets, rather than being an afterthought, is designed in from the start. Space security must be considered at every level, and from the beginning – otherwise a multitude of terrestrial capabilities may become vulnerable or even be rendered ineffective through attacks on the space assets that enable them to function.
+
+While the concept of space power is gaining importance and visibility across the military, it is now time to engage the wider community of space beneficiaries across UK defence in much greater detail. Space is an enabler for many fundamental capabilities, such as the orbital ISR, PNT and SATCOM that make modern warfare possible. Space is an integrator of many capabilities and functions. It is therefore important to recognise and counter threats to these functions, both from the harsh space environment and from adversaries, who are increasingly investing in tools that make disruption or denial of space-enabled capabilities possible. Thus there is a need for wider education and promotion of space within the armed forces, as well as for potential structural changes to both programme management and service ownership to ensure that Space Command can ultimately fulfil its role of protecting and defending the domain.
+
+---
+
+__Juliana Suess__ is the Research Fellow on Space Security in the Military Sciences team at RUSI and the host of the War in Space podcast. She was previously Project Officer and Research Analyst at RUSI International. Her research interests include global space governance, counter-space capabilities and space warfare.
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+---
+layout: post
+title : House Of Cards?
+author: Heather Williams and Doreen Horschig
+date : 2024-07-18 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/z5UboKK.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Nuclear Norms in an Era of Strategic Competition"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_While the norms against nuclear proliferation, use, and testing are widely supported and critical for stability, they are increasingly contested. The fragile interconnectedness of the norms urges global action to reinforce these pillars and prevent a destabilizing cascade._
+
+
+
+In recent years, nuclear norms have faced significant challenges, as exemplified by Russian president Vladimir Putin’s November 2023 decision to withdraw Russia’s ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). This decision is part of a broader trend undermining nuclear institutions, such as the breakdown of bilateral arms control dialogue and the failure to achieve consensus within the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The erosion of these norms poses a critical question for the international community: Can the nuclear order be maintained — or will it collapse under persistent contestation?
+
+This paper analyzes the health of three key nuclear norms: nonproliferation, nonuse, and no testing. The findings indicate that while these norms are broadly supported and critical for stability, they are increasingly contested. The research paints a picture of a network of nuclear norms under stress. This contestation is led by a relatively small cast of characters, but growing friction within nuclear institutions from multiple directions and by a wide set of actors also challenges the existing nuclear order.
+
+Norm development is frequently depicted as a cascade, yet this cascade can also operate in reverse should a norm experience significant weakening. Such a reverse normative cascade has the potential to make the nuclear order collapse like a house of cards, whereby the violation of a single nuclear norm, such as the norm against testing, could have knock-on effects potentially undermining other norms, such as the one against proliferation. The interconnected nature of these norms means that a significant weakening of one could lead to a cascade effect, jeopardizing the others.
+
+#### Key Findings
+
+1. Nuclear norms are interdependent, and a normative cascade can go both ways: While the norms are often represented as stand-alone pillars, these pillars are arranged like dominoes: if one falls, another could follow. Proliferation, for example, has historically been followed by testing, and it could undermine the credibility of not only the NPT and CTBT but also their associated norms. Similarly, any use of a nuclear weapon could call into question the entire nuclear order and its ability to restrain nuclear use.
+
+2. Norm cascades or reverse cascades are exacerbated by regional dynamics: For example, Russia’s suspension of arms control agreements, such as New START, correlates with its invasion of Ukraine. States’ decisions to observe norms, therefore, depend not only on the wider international security environment, but particularly on the regional security environment and perceptions of threats from neighbors.
+
+3. The norm against nuclear testing is strong, but the weakest of the three: The norm against nuclear testing faces the most active contestation, highlighted by North Korea’s ongoing testing over the past decade and Russia’s potential resumption of testing. Another challenge is coming from contestation of the CTBT. One point of contestation is the treaty’s delayed entry into force, which remains a distant and unlikely prospect both because of the security environment and because of domestic political polarization, particularly within the United States.
+
+4. Treating nuclear possessors as a monolith could undermine nuclear norms: Many international actors treat all nuclear possessors as norm contesters because of nuclear modernization programs and continued reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence. Overall, third-party responses have been strongly supportive of upholding all three norms. However, responses to potential nuclear use and nuclear threats have been less strong than the other two norms. The main example of this is the hesitant international response to Russia’s threats of nuclear use related to Ukraine.
+
+#### Policy Recommendations
+
+1. For Nuclear Possessors: Continue to uphold and reinforce nuclear norms through transparency, restraint, and collective efforts such as the P5 process (involving China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and the Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament (CEND) initiative. Specific activities might include reciprocal visits to test sites, along with incorporating risks of emerging technologies into multilateral dialogues. To strengthen the nonproliferation norm, the United States and United Kingdom can be more explicit about the historical nonproliferation benefits of extended nuclear deterrence. Additionally, states should refrain from explicit nuclear threats or escalatory language, such as threatening “World War III.”
+
+2. For the P3 (France, the United Kingdom, the United States): Lead efforts in risk reduction and norm reinforcement, engaging with both nuclear and non-nuclear states to address emerging threats and regional dynamics. These efforts might take place within the context of CEND, the initiative on irreversible nuclear disarmament (IND), or other new risk reduction efforts. This will require continuing to operate within the P5 process, but the P3 can also engage either bilaterally or multilaterally with a wider group of non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) to understand and strengthen norms at the regional level.
+
+3. For Non-Nuclear Possessors and Civil Society: Play an active role in norm enforcement, particularly in the context of the NPT. One specific area where NNWS and civil society can strengthen nuclear norms is to avoid treating nuclear possessors as a monolith. They should also continue to pressure the P5 to continue with their dialogues and to address the risks of weakening norms in the context of emerging technologies, transparency of doctrine, and risk reduction initiatives. This group should also play an important role in championing the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty and CTBT. A final point is that civil society can lead the way in public denouncements of norm violations.
+
+The paper is a call not only for nuclear weapon states (NWS) to uphold the nuclear norm network, but also for leadership by key states, such as the United Kingdom and United States, to engage with NNWS to strengthen norms and hold norm violators accountable.
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+On March 13, 2024, Russian president Vladimir Putin added to his list of nuclear threats, stating that Moscow was ready to use nuclear weapons in case of a threat to “the existence of the Russian state, our sovereignty and independence.” This statement was the latest in a string of challenges to nuclear institutions, including the breakdown of bilateral arms control dialogue and the failure to reach consensus in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), often cited as the cornerstone of the nuclear order. In a statement to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 2024, for example, UK ambassador James Kariuki cited the importance of the NPT in “preventing the erosion of non-proliferation.” Nuclear norms are being tested from multiple directions, and how the international community responds to these challenges will determine if the nuclear order can be stabilized through existing institutions or whether it faces an era of uncertainty.
+
+Examining the status of nuclear norms is not a purely academic exercise, although much of the thinking about norms is rooted in scholarship. The health of nuclear norms also has direct policy implications. Policy objectives for the international community, particularly for nuclear weapon states (NWS) with unique nuclear responsibilities, include upholding existing nuclear norms so as to avoid escalation to nuclear use or nuclear proliferation. The nuclear order, to include institutions and norms, is important because it provides stability and predictability on nuclear risks in a time of growing uncertainty. Treaties, norms, and other commonly observed practices inhibit potentially dangerous behaviors such as nuclear proliferation or testing, along with upholding the taboo against nuclear use. But a worsening security environment and new technologies, among other factors, threaten to undermine nuclear norms.
+
+___`Nuclear norms are being tested from multiple directions, and how the international community responds to these challenges will determine if the nuclear order can be stabilized through existing institutions or whether it faces an era of uncertainty.`___
+
+Three norms serve as the foundation of the nuclear order: nonproliferation, nonuse, and no testing. This study uses an analytical framework to assess the health of these three nuclear norms and to identify policy options for strengthening them. The research paints a picture of an increasingly contested network of nuclear norms. This contestation is led by a relatively small cast of characters, but growing friction within nuclear institutions from multiple directions and by a wide set of actors also challenges the existing nuclear order. Much of the current contestation is driven by regional and domestic factors — including individuals — rather than by major strategic shifts or great power competition. Norm development is frequently depicted as a cascade, yet this cascade can also operate in reverse should a norm experience significant weakening. Such a reverse normative cascade has the potential to make the nuclear order collapse like a house of cards, whereby the violation of a single nuclear norm, such as the norm against testing, could have knock-on effects potentially undermining other norms, such as the one against proliferation.
+
+This paper proceeds in three sections. First, it provides an overview of the three key nuclear norms. Second, it uses an analytical framework to assess the health of nuclear norms and identify which are strongest as well as which are being contested and by whom on the basis of concordance, third-party responses, compliance, and implementation. This framework is derived from robust scholarship on norm evolution and health, and it demonstrates the value of bridging the academic and policy communities on pressing nuclear issues. Finally, the paper summarizes the four main findings from the analytical framework and offers a series of policy recommendations for strengthening norms, such as greater transparency, cooperative efforts to reduce nuclear risks, and public denouncement of norm violations. The paper is a call not only for NWS to uphold the nuclear norm network, but also for leadership by key states, such as the United Kingdom and United States, to engage with non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) to strengthen norms and hold norm violators accountable.
+
+
+### Three Nuclear Norms
+
+_Nonproliferation, Nonuse, and No Testing_
+
+Michael Krepon, in his 2021 book Winning and Losing the Nuclear Peace, emphasized the importance of sustaining the norms against nuclear proliferation, the use of nuclear weapons in warfare, and further nuclear weapons testing. Krepon argued that arms control efforts should focus on upholding these norms. Like Krepon, this paper does not include norms of disarmament or deterrence in its analysis, given that disarmament and abolition “reflect aspirational standards that have been beyond reach for every generation that has lived uneasily with nuclear danger. . . . The human costs of continued warfare have been great, but not anywhere near as great as in wars fought before the Bomb was invented.” Similarly, it does not include disarmament as a norm because while disarmament is captured in NPT Article VI and nuclear arsenals have been reduced by approximately 88 percent since the height of the Cold War, progress toward disarmament has stagnated and is not a consistent practice. Additionally, scholarship by Jean-Baptiste Jeangene Vilmer and Lawrence Freedman has demonstrated that nuclear disarmament does not constitute a norm because it does not have a norm “entrepreneur” among nuclear possessors and may fail to fully emerge. Nuclear deterrence, conversely, remains a consistent practice among nuclear possessors and states covered by extended nuclear deterrence (such as within NATO), and it is also occasionally cited as consistent with the norm of nonuse. But nuclear deterrence remains widely contested among NNWS and much of civil society, and it has not reached the same widespread acceptance as the nuclear taboo, for example.
+
+At the outset, it is important to recognize the potential limits of focusing on norms as an indicator of the strength of the nuclear order and as a policy framework. Norms are intended to set rules of the road to shape broader behaviors. The hope is that a norm violation would inspire widespread condemnation and outrage. However, sometimes outrage is not enough to shape states’ behavior in the face of unprecedented security threats. Norms are neither valued nor observed symmetrically among states, possessors and non-possessors alike.
+
+The table below summarizes the three nuclear norms and their approximate years of origin.
+
+
+_▲ Table 1: Nuclear Norms_
+
+The nuclear nonproliferation norm is defined as a set of principles, agreements, and international efforts aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, fissionable material, and weapons-applicable nuclear technology and information. Koplow, for example, defines the nonproliferation regime as “the set of treaties, agreements, conventions, formal and informal groupings, rules, and norms that seek to limit the spread of nuclear weapons.” Despite four nuclear-armed countries remaining outside of the 1968 NPT, nuclear nonproliferation has been marked by the widespread international recognition that having more states with nuclear weapons would be destabilizing and could increase the risks of nuclear use. The treaty itself, supported by 191 countries, states that “the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war.”
+
+The present analysis focuses on the norm against horizontal proliferation: the spread of nuclear weapons and materials between states or other international actors. This paper does not include so-called vertical proliferation (i.e., nuclear modernization) as part of the norm. Established nuclear powers, including the United States, Russia, and China, continue to modernize, and in some cases expand, their arsenals, which challenges the emergence of a norm against vertical proliferation. Despite their commitments to nuclear disarmament, these states justify their proliferation efforts based on security imperatives, technological advancements, and the perceived necessity of maintaining credible deterrence.
+
+The norm against nuclear weapon use is largely based on the recognition of the potentially catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear detonations and the potential for escalation associated with the use of nuclear weapons. It dates back over seven decades, emerging after the United States used atomic weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. The norm endured the end of the nuclear monopoly with the development of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union, as well as the intense geopolitical rivalry of the Cold War era, when the threat of nuclear warfare loomed large. However, despite the temptation to employ nuclear weapons, both superpowers exhibited restraint, recognizing the immense consequences of nuclear conflict and the risk of mutual assured destruction. As Nina Tannenwald highlights, for example, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and Secretary of State Dean Rusk opposed the use of nuclear weapons during the Vietnam War because of the fallout risks and unacceptable destruction, reinforcing the taboo against nuclear use. Similarly, the Soviet Union chose to lose the war in Afghanistan rather than seek to achieve its objectives through “winning” with the use of nuclear weapons. Subsequent diplomatic efforts, international treaties, and various arms control agreements — such as the 1973 Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War — strengthened the norm.
+
+Lastly, the norm against nuclear testing refers to a shared understanding that states will refrain from conducting explosive nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, underwater, in outer space, underground, or anywhere on earth. The first nuclear test was conducted by the United States in July 1945. After that, nuclear testing quickly became a crucial aspect of the Cold War competition between Washington and Moscow. The United States conducted 1,032 tests and the Soviet Union conducted 715, with the Castle Bravo test being the worst radiological disaster in U.S. history due to its contamination of local civilians on the Marshall Islands. The subsequent arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union fueled an extensive period of testing in different domains. However, concerns over the environmental and humanitarian consequences led to international efforts to halt testing, beginning as early as 1954. After a testing moratorium was put in place between the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union between 1958 and 1961, as well as limited test ban agreements, a new test ban was proposed in 1990. The norm is now supported by various agreements and initiatives aimed at reducing the risks associated with nuclear testing. Major legal mechanisms to identify concordance with the norm are the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), which prohibited atmospheric testing, and its successor, the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which further restricted nuclear testing. The CTBT has not yet entered into force. Since it was opened for signature, none of the NPT’s NWS have engaged in nuclear testing; however, India and Pakistan tested in 1998, and North Korea continues to test or threaten to test nuclear weapons as part of its nuclear signaling.
+
+It is important to acknowledge at the outset a high degree of dynamism across the three norms, as evident in their evolution, interaction, and roles in shaping international relations. They essentially form a network of reinforcing mechanisms for nuclear stability. The norm against the use of nuclear weapons, for example, emerged amid Cold War rivalries, with both superpowers laying the groundwork for mutual restraint. Recognizing that any conflict between the two would have catastrophic consequences, President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev agreed at the Geneva Summit in 1985 that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. Since the emergence of these norms, their robustness has varied due to fluctuations in levels of enforcement, adherence, and the institutional strength of the United Nations and other international bodies. Despite varying degrees of strength over time, these norms, working in concert, serve as the foundation of the nuclear order, highlighting the dynamic interplay between policy, historical evolution, and contemporary challenges.
+
+
+### The Health of Nuclear Norms
+
+The following section assesses the robustness and health of the three nuclear norms. Informed by case studies in security and humanitarian law, an analytical framework from Nicole Deitelhoff and Lisbeth Zimmermann identifies conditions affecting the strength, resilience, and durability of global norms. While it can seem in the nuclear policy discourse that these nuclear norms are on the verge of disappearing, the framework shows that they tend to be much more robust than many others in international relations.
+
+There are four common critical indicators across norms in security studies: concordance, third-party responses, compliance, and implementation. The first two constitute discourse-based metrics of a norm’s strength, whereas the third and fourth components are practice-based and entail specific behaviors. The four indicators are equally weighted to evaluate a norm’s robustness.
+
+1. Concordance with the norm describes the acceptance of a norm’s legitimacy by a state or the general public. It is characterized by belief in norm-enforcing entities, including institutions tasked with monitoring or implementing the norm. Concordance is also measured by the absolute and relative number of ratifications and the standard and quality of opt-out clauses. High concordance, for example, would see universal or near-universal participation in international treaties, with few, if any, opt-out clauses. Low concordance, conversely, would be shown by the absence of international agreements capturing a norm.
+
+2. Third-party responses to norm violations can include discursive and material sanctioning. Strong third-party responses include universal sanctioning to noncompliance. Weak responses, such as ignoring or directly or indirectly endorsing violations, would rank low in third-party responses.
+
+3. Compliance indicates behavior consistent with norms. This is evaluated by how widespread or rare compliance is. All norms encounter a certain amount of noncompliance, often inadvertent, and compliance alone does not explain robustness.
+
+4. Implementation of a norm is critical and can help illustrate when norms withstand challenges. This is measured through the inclusion of norms in policy papers and protocols, the creation of institutions, or the adoption of norms into domestic law. Compliance and implementation are practice-based dimensions to measure the robustness of norms over time and across cases.
+
+The application of this framework offers insights into the robustness of international norms. Table 2 provides an overall assessment of the strength of the nuclear norms, evaluating them from moderate, to strong, to very strong. The table includes some nonexhaustive examples. Justification for the metrics of “Very Strong” to “Moderate” is explained below in greater detail.
+
+
+_▲ Table 2: Assessing Nuclear Norms_
+
+It is important to note, however, that this framework alone does not inherently capture dynamic factors, such as the mutually reinforcing nature of many of these norms. Nor does it capture the evolution of the norms over time, an important point of analysis given changing strategic and technological landscapes. Below is a more in-depth analysis, including consideration of dynamism across the norms, to better understand the health of the three nuclear norms and their relationships to each other.
+
+#### Nonproliferation
+
+The norm against nuclear proliferation has high concordance in policies and treaties, making the norm very robust. The NPT is a cornerstone of global cooperation against nuclear proliferation, with near-universal acceptance, from 191 UN members, creating a robust legal framework against nuclear proliferation. In addition to the NPT, UNSC Resolution 1540 further solidified efforts against proliferation by mandating member states to establish legal measures against the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The nuclear nonproliferation regime encompasses various formal agreements, institutions, and informal groupings beyond the NPT and UNSC resolution. These elements — including nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ), institutions such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and other informal efforts (e.g., the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zanger Committee, the four Nuclear Security Summits, the Six-Party Talks, and the Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament initiative) — contribute to the strengthening of the norm.
+
+The scope and number of institutions and groupings committed to nuclear nonproliferation signal a widespread third-party response to violations. Breaches of the norm prohibiting nuclear proliferation have prompted robust responses from numerous actors, eliciting international condemnation, economic sanctions, and diplomatic isolation. Whether from individual state actors, alliances such as the European Union, or the UNSC, there is a historical precedent of condemning norm violations by would-be proliferators. The UNSC Sanctions Committee on North Korea, for example, was created in 2006 to address North Korea’s nuclear testing and proliferation activities.
+
+With high acceptance rates, compliance with the norm against nuclear proliferation is nearly universal. The IAEA, through comprehensive safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol, plays a crucial role in verifying compliance. For instance, the agency conducted numerous inspections in Iran to ensure adherence to its nuclear obligations. Regional organizations also ensure adherence to specific treaties, emphasizing the multilevel implementation of the norm. For example, the compliance with the obligations of the Treaty of Tlatelolco is ensured by the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the African Commission on Nuclear Energy ensures the implementation of the Treaty of Pelindaba. Overall, the norm against nuclear proliferation exhibits high robustness due to its concordance, reactions to violations, and effective implementation mechanisms.
+
+Nonetheless, today the nonproliferation norm faces challenges from various actors. Iran’s nuclear program poses a major provocation, and while Iran claims that its activities are intended for peaceful purposes, Western nations and international organizations have raised concerns about the intent and extent of its nuclear endeavors. Similarly, North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT in 2003 and its development of nuclear weapons have been an ongoing challenge to the nonproliferation norm. Efforts to negotiate and redefine norms related to nuclear proliferation on the Korean Peninsula continue amid diplomatic tensions. Additionally, in March 2024, Russia vetoed the mandate of a UN Panel of Experts tasked with monitoring enforcement of the sanctions regime against North Korea. This not only weakens the implementation of the norm but also suggests a weakening in third-party responses to norm violation.
+
+___`Overall, the norm against nuclear proliferation exhibits high robustness due to its concordance, reactions to violations, and effective implementation mechanisms.`___
+
+But potential challenges to the nonproliferation norm are also coming from new directions. Given the threat from North Korea’s nuclear program, South Korea may contest the norm against nuclear proliferation, although the likelihood of this is hard to measure. However, polling data shows a gap in public and elite opinions on the issue of South Korea developing an independent nuclear program. A majority (71 percent) of the South Korean public supports an independent nuclear deterrent, while only one-third of the elite supports it (34 percent).
+
+In the Middle East, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has stated that if Iran did successfully develop a weapon, Saudia Arabia “will have to get one.” Of course, Iran’s ongoing nuclear program itself challenges the nonproliferation norm. While officially endorsing the NPT, concerns persist about Saudi Arabia’s potential interest in developing its nuclear capabilities, posing challenges to existing norms. Saudi Arabia pursuing a nuclear program would hold serious implications for regional stability and the integrity of nonproliferation efforts. Whether or not South Korea, Saudia Arabia, or other states pursue an independent nuclear weapons program will depend not only on regional security dynamics but also on the restraining power of institutions such as the NPT. At present, it is hard to imagine that South Korea, for example, would be the second state to withdraw from the NPT after North Korea. However, if the normative power of the NPT or other nuclear institutions weakens over time, that restraining power may diminish as well.
+
+#### Nonuse
+
+Generally, there is high concordance with the norm of nonuse, yet there are fewer legal mechanisms to enforce this norm compared to nonproliferation. While the NPT — the primary treaty for nonproliferation — does not explicitly prohibit nuclear use, norms regulating potential nuclear use (or nonuse) are directly and indirectly addressed through international humanitarian law. However, international humanitarian law refers to the use of force more broadly, rather than nuclear use specifically. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) explicitly refers to the prohibition of nuclear use, but the treaty is not universally accepted. Despite some reservations, the ratification of NWFZs contributes to increasing concordance regionally. For example, a basic party obligation in the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia is “not to allow in its territory: the production, acquisition, stationing, storage or use, of any nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device.”
+
+___`Generally, there is high concordance with the norm of nonuse, yet there are fewer legal mechanisms to enforce this norm compared to nonproliferation.`___
+
+__Third-party reactions__ to the use of nuclear weapons have been strong. Acting and former UN secretary-generals António Guterres and Kofi Annan both called out the U.S. atomic bombings of Japan in 1945 as a moment of unmatched horror for humanity. Reactions to the threat of use, however, have been fairly mixed, with condemnation by many Western states, but overall the responses have not been universal. Guterres told the UNSC in March 2024 that “nuclear saber-rattling must stop [and] threats to use nuclear weapons in any capacity are unacceptable.” Steen Hansen, minister counsellor of the European Union, similarly condemned Russian threats as dangerous and unacceptable. But many other international actors have remained largely silent about Russian nuclear threats amid the war in Ukraine.
+
+Third-party actors, including civil society groups and human rights organizations, bolster norm robustness by condemning nuclear use and emphasizing humanitarian and environmental effects. This ranges from the Hibakusha — people affected by the atomic bombings of Japan — to scientific groups such as the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War. For example, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons issued a statement in 2022 condemning “nuclear threats [as] unacceptable at any time, by anyone. Putin’s threats increase the risk of escalation to a nuclear conflict.” In 2023, Chinese president Xi Jinping emphasized the need for the international community to “jointly oppose the use of, or threats to use, nuclear weapons.” But not all actors were swift to condemn Russia’s nuclear saber-rattling. The first TPNW Meeting of States Parties, for example, failed to call out Russian nuclear threats, despite the treaty explicitly prohibiting the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons. Some nations with close economic or security ties to Russia, particularly in Central Asia, were hesitant to openly criticize Moscow.
+
+__Compliance__ with the norm is nearly universal, with few actors showing behavior that would suggest an intent to break the nearly 80-year tradition of nuclear nonuse. States have largely been dissuaded from using nuclear weapons in conflicts since the first use of atomic weapons in 1945. While nonuse has persisted, there have been nuclear threats. The United States and the Soviet Union issued nuclear threats during the Berlin Crisis (1958–61) and Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), North Korea has threatened South Korea and its allies multiple times over recent decades, and India and Pakistan have made veiled threats against each other in the past. More recently, nuclear threats have been an integral part of Putin’s strategy for deterring Western intervention in the ongoing war in Ukraine. In February 2024, for example, Putin stated that Western nations “must realise that we also have weapons that can hit targets on their territory.” The extent to which these threats have the potential to lower the threshold for nuclear use remains unclear, but they should not be discounted.
+
+__Implementation__ of the norm occurs at various levels, with regional enforcement through NWFZ agreements indicating high implementation — with the caveat that countries in NWFZs cannot use or threaten to use nuclear weapons and none of these states possess nuclear weapons. NWFZs are an example of the interconnectedness of the nuclear norms, with some institutions and actors encompassing all three nuclear norms. Some states include the norm against nuclear use in their domestic nuclear strategy through declared no-first-use policies, adding a level of implementation. Other domestic efforts such as law of war manuals subject nuclear use to the principles of proportionality and discrimination.
+
+#### No Testing
+
+__Concordance__ with the norm against nuclear testing is captured primarily in legal mechanisms such as the PTBT and CTBT. While the CTBT is considered the cornerstone of efforts to halt global nuclear testing, it has not yet entered into force due to reluctance by a key group of states to ratify or sign the treaty. Nevertheless, nuclear possessors, with the exception of North Korea, continue to refrain from nuclear testing. Although a significant number of countries have ratified the treaty, the absence of universal participation from nuclear states could diminish the robustness of concordance with the norm, according to the analytical framework.
+
+Violations of the norm have elicited strong __third-party reactions__ in recent years, including international condemnation and sanctions by individual states as well as the European Union and the UNSC. Civil society efforts by affected communities and organizations have also played a significant role in condemning nuclear testing, resulting in legislative measures such as the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act in the United States. Strong reactions are nearly universal and occur at various levels. For example, the UNSC has passed nearly a dozen sanctions on North Korea since 2006 because of the state’s nuclear program. This includes sanctions on military and arms trade, along with impacts on the financial assets of key individuals, in response to nuclear testing.
+
+Despite the norm against nuclear testing taking hold with the end of the Cold War, a handful of states have continued testing to develop their nuclear weapons programs. There have been 10 nuclear tests since the CTBT opened for signature in 1996: two by India (1998), two by Pakistan (1998), and six by North Korea (2006, 2009, 2013, two in 2016, and 2017). Compliance has been widespread over the past 30 years, although there have been concerns about low-yield testing, particularly by Russia, such as those raised by the U.S. State Department’s annual compliance report. Thus, while the nonproliferation norm is supported by an active treaty and the nuclear nonuse norm lacks a universally accepted treaty, the nuclear testing norm is upheld by a treaty that is not yet in force.
+
+___`While the nonproliferation norm is supported by an active treaty and the nuclear nonuse norm lacks a universally accepted treaty, the nuclear testing norm is upheld by a treaty that is not yet in force.`___
+
+__Implementation__ of the norm involves various verification methods, including monitoring stations and radionuclide laboratories operated by CTBT signatories. The treaty relies on data from monitoring stations around the world, which is collected and analyzed by the International Data Center. While all signatories have access to this data, only countries that have ratified the treaty are considered full participants. Regional enforcement mechanisms, such as those embedded in NWFZs, signal a high level of implementation in specific regional zones.
+
+Russia and the United States have engaged in extensive discussions regarding the interpretation of the CTBT. Although both countries have signed the treaty, they hold differing views on what constitutes a violation, illustrating applicatory contestation as they negotiate the scope and interpretation of the norm against nuclear testing. A key point of contention is the concept of zero-yield testing. The CTBT bans all nuclear explosions, but some argue that explosions with an immeasurably small yield are not truly nuclear tests and should be permissible. Putin’s remarks in October 2023 about Russia’s possible readiness to resume nuclear testing reflect this ongoing debate: “I am not ready to tell you right now whether we need or do not need to carry out these tests.” He framed Russia’s potential return to testing as contingent on whether the United States tests. Additionally, some officials in the Trump administration suggested that a return to nuclear testing might be an option. Most recent, Robert C. O’Brien, former national security adviser to Trump, reiterated this need to “test new nuclear weapons for reliability and safety.”
+
+Like others, the norm against nuclear testing is being contested by a small group of nuclear possessors. North Korea continues to defy the norm by testing or threatening to test nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. Despite international condemnation, Pyongyang argues that such tests are vital for its defensive capabilities. A public statement accompanying one of its 2016 tests emphasized North Korea’s right to self-defense and its intention to bolster its nuclear force against perceived threats, particularly from the United States. Additionally, Russia’s deratification of the CTBT in 2023 and Putin’s suggestion that Russia could return to testing also have the potential to undermine the norm.
+
+
+### Avoiding a Reverse Normative Cascade
+
+The normative framework presents both a positive but also a cautionary tale. Overall, the nuclear norms remain strong and are widely observed, despite contestation by a small group of actors and a worsening security environment. They are buttressed by widespread concordance with treaties and agreements, particularly the NPT and regional initiatives, such as NWFZs. And yet, despite the historical resilience and overall robustness of these norms, they face ongoing challenges and adaptations. The nonuse norm, for example, demonstrates considerable resilience and is widely recognized as “taboo.” And yet it is being contested by continued Russian and North Korean nuclear threats — some of which do not receive widespread international condemnation.
+
+To clarify, this paper’s intention is not to present an overly optimistic perspective, but rather to offer a word of caution. The network of nuclear norms could either be reinforced as a lasting foundation of nuclear order or it could collapse like a house of cards. The interconnected nature of nuclear norms is both their strength and their vulnerability when faced with concerted and persistent contestation.
+
+___`The network of nuclear norms could either be reinforced as a lasting foundation of nuclear order or it could collapse like a house of cards. The interconnected nature of nuclear norms is both their strength and their vulnerability when faced with concerted and persistent contestation.`___
+
+A key question from the analysis is who creates, upholds, and challenges norms. Norm establishment, to include normative cascades, typically requires norm entrepreneurs or key stakeholders that can build domestic and international consensus. Similarly, norm contestation also begins with individuals; the inverse of entrepreneurs are norm contesters. When it comes to nuclear decisionmaking, particularly in authoritarian countries such as North Korea, Iran, Russia, and China, individual leaders play an outsized role. Russia’s threats of nuclear use in the war in Ukraine have been seemingly driven by Putin. North Korea’s nuclear program is driven by Kim Jong-un and has been personalized to the Kim family. This finding aligns with other scholarship pointing to the importance of individuals in international security. Solingen, among others, has found that
+
+> . . . systematic differences in nuclear behavior can be observed between states whose leaders or ruling coalitions advocate integration in the global economy, and those whose leaders reject it. . . . Conversely, leaders and ruling coalitions rejecting internationalization incur fewer such costs and have greater incentives to exploit nuclear weapons as tools in nationalist platforms of political competition and for staying in power.
+
+Based on the normative framework and the present analysis, this report draws four main conclusions about the health of nuclear norms and the strength of the existing nuclear order. It then offers three sets of recommendations for strengthening nuclear norms, grouped by who should execute them: (1) nuclear possessors, including those in the P5 process (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States); (2) the P3 (France, the United Kingdom, and the United States); and (3) nuclear non-possessors, which includes civil society.
+
+#### Findings
+
+1. Finding 1: Nuclear norms are interdependent, and a normative cascade can go both ways.
+
+ While nuclear norms continue to benefit from widespread international support, particularly in comparison to other international norms, all three are being tested concurrently. This contestation reflects states’ responses to a dynamic and uncertain geopolitical and technological landscape. While the norms are often represented as stand-alone pillars, these pillars are arranged like dominoes: if one falls, another could follow. Norm development is often portrayed as a cascade, but this cascade could also work in reverse if one norm is significantly weakened.
+
+ On the one hand, this interconnectedness could contribute to strengthening norms. Third-party responses and compliance could speak to multiple norms at once. For example, the NWFZs contribute to strengthening all three norms. On the other hand, one norm’s breakdown could undermine the others. Proliferation, for example, has historically been followed by testing, and it could undermine the credibility of not only the NPT and CTBT but also their associated norms. Similarly, any use of a nuclear weapon would be a game changer and could call into question the entire nuclear order and its ability to restrain nuclear use.
+
+2. Finding 2: Norm cascades or reverse cascades are exacerbated by regional dynamics.
+
+ Norm contestation appears particularly linked to regional issues. For example, Russia’s suspension of arms control agreements, such as New START, correlates with its invasion of Ukraine. Similarly, Russia’s nuclear saber-rattling, which has the potential to undermine the norm against nuclear use, is tied to its illegal invasion of Ukraine. Early on, Putin blamed the United States and NATO for its overreach and expansion in Europe: “What the United States is doing in Ukraine is at our doorstep. . . . And they should understand that we have nowhere further to retreat to. Under [U.S.] protection, they are arming and urging on extremists from a neighbouring country at Russia.” For the Middle East, Saudi Arabia’s threat to pursue nuclear weapons is explicitly tied to regional proliferation and stability, namely whether or not Iran develops nuclear weapons. Similarly, in South Asia, violations are tied to the tensions between India and Pakistan. In response to India’s two nuclear tests in 1998, Pakistan announced its own tests only a few days later. States’ decisions to observe norms, therefore, depend not only on the wider international security environment, but particularly on the regional security environment and perceptions of threats from neighbors.
+
+3. Finding 3: The norm against nuclear testing is strong, but the weakest of the three.
+
+ The analytical framework indicates that the norm against nuclear testing is currently facing the most active contestation from multiple directions. The most recent violation of any of the three norms occurred due to North Korea’s 2017 test, not to mention its ongoing threats to test again, which all challenge the norm against testing. In 2022, for example, South Korean president Yoon Suk Yeol indicated that North Korea had completed preparations for a seventh nuclear test. One positive trend in the norm against testing has been the strong response to North Korea’s most recent nuclear tests, particularly by China. This is an important development compared to earlier nuclear tests; however, given Pyongyang and Moscow’s growing closeness, a future test may not receive consensus or UNSC condemnation. Senior officials from Russia and North Korea are meeting regularly to enhance collaboration across various domains such as the economy, science and technology, and culture. In September 2023, for example, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un traveled to Russia’s Far East to promote military and technological links with Russia. Only a few months later, in June 2024, President Putin made his way to North Korea, likely deepening the relationship.
+
+ ___`Given Pyongyang and Moscow’s growing closeness, a future test may not receive consensus or UNSC condemnation.`___
+
+ Another challenge is coming from contestation of the CTBT. One point of contestation is the treaty’s delayed entry into force, which remains a distant and unlikely prospect both because of the security environment and because of domestic political polarization, particularly within the United States. The CTBT is also contested by Russia’s deratification. Amid the increasing tensions in the international order, some nuclear-armed states may propose alternative normative frameworks prioritizing national sovereignty over disarmament efforts.
+
+4. Finding 4: Treating nuclear possessors as a monolith could undermine nuclear norms.
+
+ While this analysis points to a small group of norm contesters, many international actors treat all nuclear possessors as norm contesters because of nuclear modernization programs and continued reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence. Overall, third-party responses have been strongly supportive of upholding all three norms; however, responses to potential nuclear use and nuclear threats have been less strong than the other two norms. The obvious example of this is the muted international response to Russia’s threats of nuclear use related to Ukraine. While Western leaders, including NATO, explicitly and publicly called out Russian saber-rattling, for example, in the fall of 2022, others were more subdued in their responses. It is believed that Chinese and Indian leaders privately signaled to Putin to de-escalate tensions and nuclear threats in the fall of 2022, but the lack of public outcry does little to strengthen the norms. China and India can take on a more influential role in messaging to Putin the risk that his nuclear threats incur.
+
+#### Recommendations
+
+Based on these findings, the paper offers three sets of policy recommendations for nuclear possessors and nonpossessors to strengthen existing norms and their associated institutions.
+
+1. Recommendation Set 1: Nuclear Possessors and the P5 Process
+
+ First and foremost, nuclear possessors should continue to observe and uphold the three nuclear norms. This may be more complicated than it appears. For example, a historically successful tool of nonproliferation has been extended nuclear deterrence to allies and partners, which could require strong nuclear deterrence signaling. Francis Gavin points to NATO as an efficient example of this strategy. Another complication is the fine line between threatening nuclear use — which could undermine the norm against use — and policies of nuclear deterrence which hold at risk what an adversary values to prevent escalation. To reconcile these challenges, nuclear possessors, particularly the United States and United Kingdom, can be more explicit about the historical nonproliferation benefits of extended nuclear deterrence. Additionally, states should refrain from explicit nuclear threats or escalatory language, such as threatening “World War III.”
+
+ In addition to unilateral restraint and policies, nuclear possessors can also work collectively to uphold and strengthen nuclear norms through forums such as the P5 process as well as the Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament (CEND) and Irreversible Nuclear Disarmament (IND) initiatives. The P5 process is under pressure because of tension in the security environment, but it remains one of the best opportunities for reinforcing norms and reducing risk. Some recent proposals would contribute to strengthening norms against use and testing, such as reciprocal visits to former test sites, a joint statement on a continued testing moratorium, and transparency of doctrines and risk reduction efforts to avoid escalation to nuclear use. The CEND initiative continues to hold plenary meetings, including subgroup work on emerging technologies and risk reduction. One potential area of work would be for CEND participants to identify how emerging technologies, such as additive manufacturing, could undermine norms of nonproliferation. Likewise, the IND initiative is an important opportunity to explore the role of norms in making progress toward political, legal, and technical mechanisms to facilitate irreversible nuclear disarmament.
+
+2. Recommendation Set 2: France, the United Kingdom, and the United States (P3)
+
+ Nuclear possessors have unique responsibilities. Ideally, the P5 would act in concert in fulfilling those responsibilities by jointly pursuing many of these opportunities to strengthen nuclear norms. In the absence of P5 unity and consensus, however, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States might lead efforts to pursue these actions. Other opportunities include leading in CEND, IND, and new risk reduction efforts, such as inviting other NWS to join a “human-in-the-loop” commitment in nuclear decisionmaking. There are challenges and risks with this approach. The biggest risk is breaking the P5 process. Undermining the P5 process at a time when the NPT is under pressure could be dangerous. If the P5 process fails to yield substantive results in disarmament, arms control, risk reduction, and transparency, this would be met with deep dissatisfaction by many NNWS and continue to exacerbate polarization within the NPT while inhibiting its ability to serve as a foundation for the nuclear order.
+
+ Another area of opportunity for the P3 is to engage, either bilaterally or multilaterally, with members of the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the United Arab Emirates) and NNWS to work cooperatively to strengthen nuclear norms. This can include engaging with groupings to better understand risks to nuclear norms at the regional level, along with building consensus around norms against the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons.
+
+3. Recommendation Set 3: Non-Nuclear Possessors and Civil Society
+
+ States without nuclear weapons also have responsibilities for upholding nuclear norms, and this paper has demonstrated the importance of third-party responses in contributing to the health of nuclear norms — NWFZs, for example, have a cross-cutting effect on strengthening nuclear norms. But one specific area where NNWS and civil society can strengthen nuclear norms is to avoid treating nuclear possessors as a monolith. All NNWS, including in the context of the NPT review cycle, should call out norm-contesting behavior, such as nuclear threats and withdrawal from existing arms control agreements. These statements can be directed at various members of the P5 process, but they should be specific. They should also continue to pressure the P5 to continue with their dialogues and to address the risks of weakening norms in the context of emerging technologies, transparency of doctrine, and risk reduction initiatives.
+
+ One area ripe for NNWS and civil society to increase pressure on nuclear possessors and upholding norms is around fissile material. These groups often criticize the Conference on Disarmament (CD) for failing to make progress in recent years, such as progress toward a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). This approach, however, treats all CD members as the same, whereas lack of progress on an FMCT can be explicitly linked to two specific states: Pakistan and China. Pakistan continues to ask for a verifiable FMCT that addresses existing stockpiles of fissile material, not just future production, and China emphasizes the need for prioritizing disarmament by NWS, along with issues around verification. These concerns are understandable and grounds for dialogue, but they should not completely derail FMCT efforts.
+
+___`One area ripe for NNWS and civil society to increase pressure on nuclear possessors and upholding norms is around fissile material.`___
+
+NNWS can also play an important role in enforcing the CTBT. By ratifying the CTBT, they contribute to its global legitimacy and pressure NWS to comply. They can engage in diplomatic efforts to advocate for the treaty’s universal adoption and implementation. Additionally, NNWS can increasingly participate in the CTBT’s verification regime, providing data and support to the International Monitoring System, which enhances the treaty’s enforcement and helps detect and call out any illicit nuclear tests in these regions.
+
+#### A Call for Action
+
+Despite the current geopolitical climate, there are still positive developments in the nuclear norm landscape worth noting. No new nuclear states have emerged in two decades, and President John F. Kennedy’s fear of dozens of nuclear possessors has not come to fruition. Nuclear weapons have not been used in conflict since 1945. And while North Korea remains the only country continuing to test nuclear weapons, it has been widely condemned as an international pariah as a result. Overall, nuclear norms are healthy — for now.
+
+All three norms are being actively contested amid a worsening geopolitical landscape. For this reason, policymakers should not be complacent about the health of the nuclear order, thinking that it is safe while underpinned by these norms. Instead, they should consider the interconnectedness of nuclear norms, as emphasized in this paper. With the possibility of a reverse normative cascade on the table, where the weakening of one norm could have ripple effects on others and potentially topple the nuclear landscape as it exists today, the risk is too great for policymakers to do nothing.
+
+---
+
+__Heather Williams__ is the director of the Project on Nuclear Issues and a senior fellow in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
+
+__Doreen Horschig__ is an associate fellow with the Project on Nuclear Issues at CSIS. She is also a non-resident research associate at the School of Politics, Security, and International Affairs at the University of Central Florida (UCF).
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-18-ukraines-offensive-operations.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-18-ukraines-offensive-operations.md
new file mode 100644
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+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-18-ukraines-offensive-operations.md
@@ -0,0 +1,286 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Ukraine’s Offensive Operations
+author: Jack Watling, et al.
+date : 2024-07-18 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/3pEXkyq.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Preliminary Lessons from Ukraine’s Offensive Operations, 2022–23"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_The purpose of this report is to examine the causes of the failure of the Ukrainian offensive in 2023 to avoid the repetition of such errors in the future and to inform the regeneration of offensive combat power in NATO militaries._
+
+
+
+The original concept of operations for the Ukrainian offensive was sound. It required 12 armoured and mechanised brigades to achieve a breakthrough along 30 km of frontage, the isolation of Tokmak within seven days, and thereafter a breakout south towards Melitopol. Tempo was supposed to prevent Russia from bringing the majority of its forces to bear, so that the attacking force would need to overcome only six regiments in defence.
+
+This concept of operation was not implemented. This arose from operational errors made by both Ukraine and its international partners. Ukraine’s international partners missed two critical decision points prior to the offensive. First, whereas Russia began to transition to a war economy from May 2022 and began the mobilisation of troops from the autumn, Ukraine’s international partners did not take significant steps to address their industrial limitations. In consequence, while many nations gifted Ukraine a significant proportion of their national stocks, this did not amount to a sufficient volume of equipment to provide the doctrinal minimum of critical enablers required for the concept of operation to be executed.
+
+The second decision point missed was when that equipment needed to arrive in Ukraine. Ukraine’s international partners wasted four months in deciding to act, so that only a part of the pledged equipment arrived in Ukraine prior to the offensive, and the Ukrainian brigades did not have enough time to train on the equipment that did arrive. The brigades were, therefore, undertrained at the start of the offensive, which accounts for a significant proportion of the tactical mistakes made during the execution of the operation.
+
+Ukraine also made a series of errors. First, experienced troops were used to hold the line of contact and thereafter conduct fixing operations during the offensive, while the main force was for the most part newly raised. This left the lead elements with a dearth of combat experience, which led to tactical errors during the execution of the operation. Second, Ukrainian planners exacerbated their shortage of properly equipped forces by committing troops on multiple axes, which were then further resourced with ammunition and enablers, at the expense of the main effort. The combination of these two errors limited the ability of the force to operate at and maintain tempo.
+
+The most serious error made in planning by Ukraine appears to have been the basis on which it was determined that the main effort could succeed under these circumstances. Rather than using tempo and concentration to defeat six Russian regiments, it was hoped that shock action would cause Russian troops to break, as had occurred around Kharkiv in 2022. Insufficient planning was done to assess how the critical conditions for such a collapse in morale could be achieved, so that this proved an overly optimistic planning assumption. In the event, the initial attacks failed, and tempo was lost, such that Russia could fight the battle with the full 105,000 troops it had in the target sector.
+
+A lesson for both Ukraine and its international partners is that operational security was inadequate, such that Russia knew precisely where and approximately when the offensive was to take place. This problem was exacerbated by the fact that with only a couple of brigades properly equipped for offensive operations, Russia only had to track a small number of units to determine Ukrainian intent. Given that this lack of security partly stemmed from the multinational process of organising the offensive, this should be examined carefully by NATO, which relies on comparable processes.
+
+There are a great many tactical lessons identified in this paper. Some, however, raise questions about necessary adaptations to prevailing doctrine. First, there is a need to have an effective counter-reconnaissance capability to reduce sustained enemy observation of the intended axes of advance. The inability to screen axes of advance from enemy ISR risks sustained exposure to precision fires, producing an unacceptable rate of equipment loss.
+
+Second is the need for electronic protection, and a corresponding requirement for electromagnetic command and control. Fratricide in the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) is a major problem for controlling large-scale operations under modern conditions. Given the density of systems dependent on the EMS and the actively contested condition of the spectrum, it is not viable to simply deconflict frequencies at the divisional level.
+
+It was also evident during the offensive that while software-defined systems were critical to the competitiveness of the force, they were also susceptible to targeted electronic warfare interference. This was especially true in relation to precision strike. Over time, the enemy developed hard counters to a range of Ukrainian capabilities including Excalibur and GMLRS (guided multiple-launch rocket systems). It is therefore evident that retaining technological advantage requires the ability to rapidly update systems in the field.
+
+The combination of sustained enemy observation and long-range fires meant that once troops were committed to offensive operations, their ground lines of communication became predictable and targetable, collapsing tempo. Where operations required gap crossing, the issue of sustainment became insurmountable. The question of how enduring protection of crossing points to sustain a force across a wet gap can be established should be a critical area of capability focus for NATO forces.
+
+Finally, the density of precision effects, even at tactical echelons, has left prestige enablers, such as offensive breaching vehicles, exceedingly vulnerable. Without such assets, there is no mobility, and thus no scope for manoeuvre. NATO militaries should therefore carefully examine how the density of enablers can be increased without overburdening the force, or how enabling capabilities can augment other platforms, such as to improve the organic mobility of units. Dependence on small fleets of specialist enablers is increasingly non-viable when the enemy can discern and engage specific targets within a formation and will do so throughout the depth of an operation.
+
+For Ukraine, the lead times involved in regenerating offensive combat power mean that renewed offensive operations are not viable in the foreseeable future. To that end, Ukraine must now reprioritise inflicting as much damage as possible on the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to buy the necessary time. At the same time, Ukraine is likely to pursue trying to constrain Russian revenue generation through strikes on Russian revenue-generating infrastructure. Time can be bought, albeit at a heavy price. The question for Ukraine and its international partners is what is done with it.
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+In 2023, Ukraine launched an offensive operation in an attempt to break through Russian defence lines and sever the land corridor occupied by Russia at the neck of Crimea. The operation failed to achieve any of its objectives. Understanding why is vital to ensuring that future Ukrainian operations are properly planned and resourced, and to inform the way in which NATO land forces endeavour to rebuild their offensive combat power.
+
+Several reports on the Ukrainian offensive of 2023, including some contributions by the authors, emphasise tactical considerations in explaining its failure. This report does address tactical lessons, but it is primarily concerned with the operational shortcomings of the offensive, relating to planning, operational decisions, the absolute shortage of critical means, and the challenges of mobilisation, force generation and logistics. The report seeks to shed light on how much decision space the Ukrainian military had, and where decision points actually lay. For example, problems with the concentration of a critical mass of Ukrainian troops on the main effort, and with Ukrainian force quality at the beginning of the offensive, have been widely reported. This does explain why particular assaults failed. However, the factors leading to these limitations were the result of decisions made months earlier, and so correcting such vulnerabilities has a long lead time.
+
+This report was written in collaboration with the Ukrainian General Staff. The report is based on interviews with Ukrainian military personnel and commanders at tactical, operational and strategic echelons throughout 2023. It also draws on the operational data accumulated by the Ukrainian General Staff on troop strengths, casualties and equipment levels in units. The authors also worked closely with the lessons learned department of the Ukrainian General Staff, responsible for identifying adaptations to training, tactics and organisation for the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU). In addition, the authors engaged extensively with Ukraine’s international partners throughout the offensive. While observations from those interviews shaped the thinking in this report, no data from Ukraine’s international partners is used. The report builds on and extends a report written by the authors covering the first six months of the war, published in November 2022.
+
+This report has a range of methodological limitations that should be declared up front. This is not an impartial piece of analysis. Ukraine is fighting an ongoing war, meaning there are parts of the dataset examined that cannot be released. There are also topics – such as some of the details of the relationship between Ukraine and some of its international partners – that remain sensitive and cannot be addressed. This report also – while identifying a range of shortcomings in decision-making, planning and tactical execution – avoids allocating blame. The authors aim for lessons to be learned, rather than seeking to offer an exercise in accountability. It should also be noted that the data in this report is derived from figures declassified for release in Ukrainian General Staff assessments. Other assessments have been made at various times, which often cite different numbers. In some instances, these may be more precise; in others, they are less so. However, there are very few alternative open source datasets that are persistently available using a consistent methodology across the period under examination. Some of the more complete datasets in the public domain are either Ukrainian or Russian information operations. This report therefore generally uses the Ukrainian General Staff figures because the consistency in methodology allows for like-for-like comparisons over time.
+
+Very briefly, it is worth noting one topic that is conspicuous by its absence: airpower. Much has been written about the importance of airpower in NATO offensive operations. The reality, however, is that while Ukraine’s lack of airpower was undoubtedly a serious disadvantage, it would not have been possible to build Ukrainian airpower capabilities in a manner where Ukraine would have been capable of conducting effective close air support inside the threat envelope that prevailed and within the timeframe of the Ukrainian 2023 offensive being planned and executed. Airpower was used during the offensive, with the Russians launching dozens of glide bombs per day onto Ukrainian positions. But in this it was used more as an augmentation of artillery, rather than as a parallel campaign. It therefore affords limited data points to discuss the application of airpower. As such a discussion would be somewhat theoretical, it has been omitted from this report.
+
+The report is divided into four chapters. Chapter I describes the command decisions that shaped Ukrainian operations from September 2022 to the commencement of the offensive in June 2023. It establishes a baseline context and explains the correlation of forces. Chapter II describes the phases of the Ukrainian offensive, concluding in October 2023. Chapter III analyses the factors that contributed to Ukraine’s failure during the summer offensive, which are specific to this conflict. Chapter IV examines tactical and operational challenges that were new and are not accounted for in existing doctrine among Ukraine’s international partners, which are relevant for the regeneration of offensive combat power in NATO countries.
+
+
+### I. The Operational Context
+
+In July 2022, the AFU halted the advance of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (AFRF) in Donbas. There were three factors that caused the Russian offensive to culminate. Russia had suffered heavy attrition among its best units during the early phase of the conflict – which were, in any case, inappropriately organised for large-scale offensive operations – and was thus finding it difficult to sustain offensive momentum. The AFRF had been compensating for this shortcoming through the application of an overwhelming fires advantage. Ukraine’s use of long-range precision strikes destroying Russian logistical infrastructure in June and July 2022 denied Russian forces this advantage. After months of bruising defensive operations, this created the first opportunity for Ukraine to seize the initiative.
+
+For Ukraine’s political leadership, uncertainty as to the longevity of international support was the critical factor in planning. Ultimately, Ukraine could be defeated in two ways: the AFU could be broken on the battlefield, or the loss of international support could leave it without arms or ammunition. By summer 2022, Ukraine had exhausted its own stocks of most critical munition natures and therefore depended on the international community. It was also believed that the flurry of gifting of equipment would not last unless Ukraine’s international partners perceived a viable path towards favourable war termination. Thus, the political direction to the AFU was twofold. First, the AFU had to generate a plan for offensive operations that could be sold to Ukraine’s international partners, who would need to resource it. Second, successful offensive operations of symbolic significance had to take place imminently. A further drive towards an early offensive was the threat that Russia would annex, depopulate and thereafter entrench the boundaries of the occupied territories. Russian officials had openly discussed annexation prior to the invasion, as well as during its early stages, and it would mirror the Russian playbook in 2014.
+
+The majority of the AFU’s combat power in August 2022 was fixed defending the line of contact. Many units had been attrited, and so there was a relatively small number of brigades that had a sufficient level of readiness as a reserve to be used in offensive operations. With political direction to undertake offensive operations, the General Staff had to determine against which axes these forces would be committed. In terms of impact on the war if successful, the most attractive plan was to push south from Zaporizhzhia towards Melitopol and thereby sever the neck of Crimea, while simultaneously cutting the supply lines to Russian forces holding the right bank of the Dnipro River around Kherson. This axis was high risk. The consequence of the thrust would be a long and thin penetration with Russian forces on both sides. If the Russians responded aggressively this thrust could fail. The thrust would be close to the main concentrations of Russian forces in Ukraine at the time, who had been moved to the area to deny this very axis. Many of the Russian troops there had also not participated in the offensive in Donbas and had suffered fewer losses of equipment or personnel. The decision was therefore made to commit several brigades to attack the Russian forces on the right bank of the Dnipro to liberate Kherson, since the river would protect Ukrainian forces from any Russian attempt to counterattack.
+
+The operation to liberate Kherson began on 29 August 2022. The fight would prove challenging. The Russians had committed some of their best troops to the city. The fact that the Ukrainian political leadership needed to demonstrate a “win” to Western partners meant that the objective of the operation had been heavily signalled. The Russians knew what was coming and had prepared three defence lines around the city. Despite the rate of resupply for Russian forces being constrained by the need to move materiel across contested crossing points over the Dnipro, Ukrainian forces found themselves advancing into well-sited ATGM (anti-tank guided missile) ambushes and artillery killing areas. The Russians used the limited artillery support they had in the region effectively. The AFU made some initial gains, only for their tempo to diminish as equipment and personnel losses mounted. Nevertheless, Russian troops were in a vulnerable position and, given Ukrainian fire control over their supply lines, risked slowly losing many competent troops. This pressure on Russian supply lines eventually saw Moscow withdraw its forces from Kherson in an orderly manner in October and November 2022.
+
+The broader operational challenge faced by Russian forces in summer 2022 was that the initial invasion force was too small to maintain a sufficient concentration of troops across the breadth of the front. As the Kherson operation drew in Russian reserves, the question therefore arose as to whether the AFU could apply pressure elsewhere on the line.
+
+The best place to attack was assessed to be in Kharkiv Oblast, which had several attractions. First, the Russian army lacked forces there, with units having suffered heavily during Russia’s offensive in Donbas. Second, as things stood, Izium remained a launching point for further attacks on Donbas, while the Russians were in artillery range of Kharkiv’s suburbs. This latter point, given Kharkiv’s significance as a major population centre, made Kharkiv a priority axis. While Russian forces observed Ukraine’s build-up of troops on the Kharkiv axis, they lacked forces to respond, having committed them to the south. It is also reasonable to conclude that while Ukraine did not achieve surprise as regards their intentions, they did achieve surprise with the timing of the attack. The gains exceeded Ukrainian expectations, as the Russian Western Group of Forces collapsed. Ironically, although the liberation of Kherson had been prioritised because it was a notable objective, the unexpected speed and scale of the gains in Kharkiv had an outsized effect in convincing Ukraine’s international partners that resourcing offensive operations could bring about results, thereby achieving the political goals of the operations.
+
+Autumn 2022 was marked by notable successes on the part of the AFU. Nevertheless, the AFU entered 2023 facing several significant challenges. Over the course of 2022, the AFU had taken approximately 30,000 killed and missing, and a significant number of wounded. Most losses took place during the Russian offensive on Donbas in May and June 2022, and during the offensive to liberate Kherson. Many of these losses were concentrated among Ukraine’s professional military brigades, which had been on the frontline continuously since the beginning of the full-scale invasion. Besides killed and wounded, the AFU had also lost a large quantity of materiel. New units could be mobilised, but without equipment for them they could not be made suitable for offensive operations. The Territorial Defence Forces were left largely unmechanised.
+
+Another challenge was available commands. Although the AFU had capable brigade staffs, these were largely committed to managing defensive sectors. The expansion of the AFU after the invasion increased the number of troops, but there was not a proportional number of experienced brigade staffs so that brigades tended to be given more battalions under command. The limited number of brigade enablers made it difficult to rotate full brigades off the line of contact so that they could conduct exercises to prepare for brigade operations. The challenge of rotation was exacerbated by the risks involved, due to the congestion it caused on the roads. Given the persistent threat to Ukraine’s training areas from Russian long-range strikes, and the lack of ammunition, spares or platforms to equip new units, Ukraine could raise new units, but training and equipping them depended on support from the country’s partners. If the AFU was to conduct further successful offensive operations, it needed to build new brigades, appropriately equipped for the task.
+
+The main outlines of a plan for a major offensive were in place by September 2022. The successes of the Kherson and Kharkiv offensives created the political belief that liberating further territories held by Russia could be possible. This spurred the Ramstein process – in which Ukraine’s international partners pledged the provision of materiel and other support – to begin cohering donations of equipment from Ukraine’s allies. Unfortunately, the process of agreeing what equipment could be gifted took almost three months, with pledges only made in January 2023. This wasted time would come at a terrible price later in the year. The process also established a clear tension between the need to sell the plan and the requirements of operational security. Regrettably, both Ukrainian messaging and speculation by Western officials were already setting clear expectations of a Ukrainian spring offensive and its potential objectives as early as December 2022. These discussions were noted in Moscow.
+
+In response to Ukraine’s offensive operations, the AFRF adopted several measures to stabilise their front that would fundamentally alter the context for the future Ukrainian offensive. First, the AFRF had declared mobilisation to raise troop levels after the Ukrainian breakthrough in Kharkiv exposed how Russian forces were stretched. Second, the AFRF withdrew from the right bank of the Dnipro through Kherson, turning the river into a natural defensive barrier and securing their flank. Third, the Russians set about building deliberate defences across the approaches to the neck of Crimea in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Mobilisation did not rapidly produce well-trained soldiers. The defence lines would also take time to erect. Russia therefore embarked on an offensive in late January 2023, beginning in Vuhledar but rapidly spreading to most of the eastern front, with a particular emphasis on the city of Bakhmut. This ill-prepared offensive using under-trained troops was extremely costly for the Russians, but the command appears to have judged that it could trade lives for time.
+
+Russian mobilisation placed the AFU in a challenging position, where tactical successes could increasingly expose Ukraine to operational vulnerability over time. There has been a protracted debate about the efforts expended by the AFU in the defence of Bakhmut. Once depopulated by shelling, the city itself was of little value. However, the concern within the Ukrainian General Staff was that if Bakhmut fell without the AFRF culminating there, their next objective would be Chasiv Yar. Chasiv Yar not only straddles a ridge that would have facilitated further offensive operations, but if captured would also bring the rail and ground lines of communication from Kostyantynivka under Russian fire control and could bring Kramatorsk within range of Russian artillery, risking its depopulation. Furthermore, if the Russians did not culminate in Bakhmut they would force the AFU to fight for vital ground at a time when the intent was to be committing resources to offensive operations elsewhere.
+
+Given that Russia’s assault on the city offered the prospect of an urban defence where the AFU could inflict disproportionate losses, the decision was made to mount a determined defence of the city. Initially, this decision was vindicated by high Russian losses. However, Bakhmut was a highly unfavourable position to defend, situated in low ground. Russian gains around Bakhmut meant that by February the AFRF had established artillery control over the main ground lines of communication into the city along which Ukrainian troops were rotated. At this point, the disparity in losses became unfavourable for Ukraine. Overall, approximately 10,000 Ukrainian troops were killed or severely wounded during the fight for and around Bakhmut. Russian forces attacking the city were largely composed of Wagner Group troops and mobilised convicts, with support from the VDV (Russian Airborne Forces). In total, 19,547 Wagner fighters were killed in Bakhmut, with a similar number seriously wounded. In theory, this produced a 4:1 exchange ratio in favour of Ukraine. However, 88% of Wagner losses were of mobilised convicts, with the number of trained Wagner troops killed averaging between 40 and 60 per week. Thus, while Ukraine was losing experienced personnel, Russia was expending what it considered disposable untrained troops to fix the AFU, while inflicting heavy losses with its 5:1 advantage in artillery. Militarily, it is evident that the optimal tactical course of action would have been to withdraw to a new defence line once the AFRF had artillery control of the ground lines of communication into the city.
+
+Politically, however, the Ukrainian government believed that withdrawing from Bakhmut came with considerable risk. The decision point for the withdrawal coincided with several key decisions on the release of critical equipment, including tanks, munitions and enablers to Ukraine, mainly from Germany, for the planned offensive. The idea of the news from the front being Russia’s success against its main objective was, therefore, judged to endanger the speed with which Ukraine’s international partners would push materiel forward. Thus, the city was allowed to acquire a strategic symbolic significance that defied operational military logic.
+
+By February 2023, the scale of a Ukrainian offensive had been determined, based on the volume of equipment being supplied by Ukraine’s partners and the troops that had been raised to conduct it. Ukraine and its partners thereafter set about apportioning equipment and training to these units. The challenge that emerged from the fight for Bakhmut was that many of those lost were experienced troops who could have been seeded throughout new units to raise their tactical proficiency. Instead, while experienced forces held the Russians back, new units were prepared for the offensive.
+
+By March 2023, equipment deliveries were starting to arrive in Ukraine. Given the limitations of available equipment in NATO countries that had run down their own militaries for three decades, the donations of equipment represented a large proportion of national stocks. It is important here to reflect on the scale of the conflict, as it highlights the extent to which many of Ukraine’s international partners have come to depend on fleets of military equipment that are manifestly too small for the purpose for which the equipment was procured. Relative to Russian forces, the quantity of equipment provided to Ukraine has been small. The total number of tanks given to Ukraine as aid over the course of the war is 671. Only 150 of these are Western models, with the majority Soviet models. At the same time, Ukraine has captured 495 Russian tanks over the course of the war, which makes Russia its largest single supplier of tanks. Ukraine received 480 infantry fighting vehicles from its international partners, more than 300 of which were BMP-1s. Ukraine has also captured 424 Russian BMPs. And yet, Russian equipment levels in theatre have expanded over the course of the fighting, with Russia producing and refurbishing approximately 1,500 tanks per year.
+
+It could be argued that there was and to some extent is a significant cognitive dissonance between what Ukraine’s international partners gave to Ukraine and what they thought could be achieved. In essence, while what was gifted was a significant proportion of the national stocks of Ukraine’s partners, that did not make the volume of equipment commensurate with the task. The inability of Western officials to grasp the scale of the fighting sat behind a persistent misalignment of expectations and outcome that haunted the 2023 Ukrainian offensive. This hype was exacerbated by Ukrainian information operations.
+
+The commitment of experienced troops to blunt the Russian winter–spring offensive meant that the new units raised for the Ukrainian offensive were predominantly made up of fresh recruits. This was identified by commanders of these units in after-action reviews as a mistake, as it left an insufficient proportion of the force with combat experience during early engagements. These troops received basic training in the UK and Europe, and some subsequently received collective training. Other personnel received specialist training in operating donated equipment. This proved problematic. First, Ukraine received a vast range of equipment, and even within the same platform type it received multiple varieties. The result was that each formed Ukrainian brigade was fielding up to five different armoured vehicles. Moreover, while equipment that was to be donated had to be brought out of storage and either repaired or demodernised to remove sensitive systems, the equipment that many Ukrainian specialists trained on came from active military units in the donor nation. This meant that the vehicles on which Ukrainian troops trained differed in the workflow, capabilities and maintenance requirements from those that arrived in Ukraine, usually without manuals or spares. The result was that the units prepared for the offensive lacked combat experience among their junior leaders, had received accelerated tactical training on equipment that differed from the weapons with which they were to fight, and had a limited ability to maintain and operate the few platforms they received.
+
+More time was needed to build up the readiness of the brigades created for Ukraine’s offensive. However, time was also unavailable, as it would give Russia the opportunity to extend and deepen its defence lines and to raise and train more forces. With Russia’s force expansion proceeding faster than Ukraine’s, there was a point after which no offensive could have been possible. The key lesson for NATO leaders is that the preference of politicians to defer decisions is extremely costly in war. Just as Russia paid a heavy price for not mobilising in April 2022, Ukraine suffered for not expanding mobilisation, backed by an earlier commitment from its partners to train and equip its forces at scale, made in September 2022.
+
+In planning for the offensive, the Ukrainian General Staff had assessed five options for the axes of advance. First, there was the eastern direction around Bakhmut. This axis offered the greatest freedom of manoeuvre, but there were no objectives in this direction that would alter the logic of the conflict, unless Ukraine could surround or isolate a large body of Russian troops. This was deemed unlikely. All other options would aim to bring the neck of Crimea under physical control or fire control, complementing the roll back of the Black Sea Fleet to bring about the isolation of Crimea, thereby altering the dynamics of the war. The second axis would see amphibious operations across the Dnipro River. This would bypass much of the Russian defence line, but Ukrainian troops would face the same challenge of contested supply lines as had undermined the Russian defence of Kherson. There were three axes heading south. The westernmost axis would strike along a ridge line, parallel to the Dnipro, through Vasilyivka. This had some attractions. It would bypass the densest parts of Russia’s defence line, while a large stretch of the axis had been the basis for exercises in Ukrainian professional military education, such that many officers were familiar with the ground. There were drawbacks. First, it would involve two river crossings in the initial phases. Second, it would leave Ukrainian forces advancing on a narrow front, with the risk of being pinned against the Dnipro. Third, this axis would have brought fighting close to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant at Energodar, with the risk that it could be damaged or sabotaged.
+
+The final two axes ran from Orikhiv via Tokmak towards Melitopol, and through Velika Novosilka towards Berdyansk. The density of Russian defences was comparable on these axes, with a slightly greater concentration on the former. The latter, however, required much more ground to be covered to be successful. Considering all these factors, the Orikhiv–Tokmak axis was identified as the direction of the Ukrainian main effort. Fixing actions, meanwhile, would be undertaken towards Bakhmut and threatened across the Dnipro to reduce Russia’s lateral redeployment of forces to defend Tokmak. The subsequent blowing of the Nova Kakhovka dam by the AFRF during the first week of the offensive removed the possibility of a fixing operation being executed across the Dnipro.
+
+The AFRF was aware of the Ukrainian plan in detail. Between Ukrainian messaging, the leaking of highly classified information from the US, and terrain analysis, the Russians had concentrated their defences on the Orikhiv–Tokmak axis. Thus, by the time the offensive was to be executed, the correlation of forces was unfavourable to Ukraine.
+
+The offensive plan envisaged Ukraine fielding 12 brigades. As originally conceived, three brigades were to support a fixing operation against Russian forces in the east. Three armoured brigades would then be committed to breach the Russian defence line, with another three mechanised brigades echeloning through to defeat Russian forces defending Tokmak. The final three brigades were to function as an exploitation force. In principle, the breach was to be accomplished within seven days. Such a tempo would mean that the Ukrainian forces would need to defeat six AFRF regiments, producing a favourable local force ratio. In practice, the original plan could not be executed at the time when the offensive was launched because of the equipment and readiness of the brigades.
+
+The brigades for the offensive comprised three brigades of the National Guard of Ukraine (the 3rd, 14th and 15th Brigades) and three tactical groups of the AFU. The latter were called corps (the 9th Corps, the 10th Corps and the “Maroon” Corps), even though they were definitely not corps, by neither NATO nor Ukrainian standards, lacking corps echelon troops or the cohesion to function as formations. At best, they were division-sized units without divisional or adequate numbers of brigade enablers. Rather than being full armoured and mechanised brigades, the tactical groups consisted of two to three mechanised battalions each, with additional unmechanised units. The subordinate brigades fielded few critical enablers. The original scheme of manoeuvre had been for 9th Corps to be responsible for the initial break-in through the Russian disruption belt, for 10th Corps to penetrate to Tokmak, and for the Maroon Corps to then exploit towards Melitopol. Because these brigades lacked the equipment or readiness to execute a plan at the requisite tempo, the Russians would have time to bring to bear their forces throughout the area of the operation, which shifted the correlation of forces to unfavourable.
+
+In front of the Ukrainian forces were arrayed three defence lines comprising a disruption belt and forward defence line, a main defence line, and a reserve defence line, collectively straddling about 30 km of depth. These were defended by the 7th Airborne Division and the 42nd Motorised Rifle Division of the AFRF. For every 10 km of defence, the Russians thus had one motorised rifle regiment (70, 71 and 291 Regiments across the frontage of the axis) and one airborne regiment. In the second line were the 56th, 108th and 247 th Regiments. The 810th Naval Infantry Brigade of the Russian Federation and one of the battalions of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment were also deployed.
+
+In total, two motorised rifle divisions (19 and 42) and two airborne divisions (7 and 76, consisting of the 104, 234 and 347 Regiments) were available to be brought to the defence lines, under command of the 58th Combined Arms Army. Additional artillery units were also assigned, including the 439th Artillery Brigade, equipped with Tornado-S MLRS (multiple-launch rocket systems). At the beginning of the Ukrainian offensive, the Russians had cached 35 days’ worth of supplies of ammunition around their gun lines, amounting to three replenishments of a standard load per day. In addition, the Russians fielded about 60 combat helicopters.
+
+It should be noted that while the AFRF had reverted back to the divisional and regimental force structure from the battalion tactical group in 2022, the composition of its units at this time was somewhat irregular. Many battalions included Storm-Z companies, territorial units and other attachments, while also lacking some of the conventional elements of their order of battle. The unit designations above should not, therefore, be taken as proxies for the order of battle, but rather as the command and control (C2) elements of the Russian defensive echelons. In total, if the Ukrainian offensive had prosecuted its three phases, there were 105,000 Russian troops that were available to defend the Orikhiv–Tokmak–Melitopol axis. These troops fielded approximately 470 tanks, up to 1,410 armoured fighting vehicles, over 720 artillery systems, up to 230 MLRS, and 12 operational–tactical missile complexes. However, if the tempo envisaged in the original plan had been achieved, Ukrainian forces would only have had to contend with 30% of these forces.
+
+Lacking the units of action to execute the plan as originally intended, Ukrainian planners nevertheless felt that an offensive had to be attempted, and so began to hypothesise that if the initial attack applied enough pressure, they could advance into a numerically superior enemy by breaking its morale. The defeat mechanism of the Russian defence lines was premised on deep strike and shock action causing localised collapse. It was hoped that this would thereafter lead to a manoeuvre defence that would see Russian troops lose cohesion. These were very optimistic assumptions.
+
+Given that Ukraine fielded approximately 400,000 combat troops including the Territorial Defence Forces, the National Guard and State Border Guards at this time, there has been much discussion as to why more troops were not concentrated for the attack. First, many of these troops were not equipped or trained for breaching operations. But it is also important to note the broader context of the conflict to appreciate the risks that further concentration would have created elsewhere. Unlike in September 2022, when the Russian concentration in the south came at the expense of other parts of the line, mobilisation had allowed the AFRF to maintain significant forces across the front and to replenish losses. Thus, despite the losses suffered by Russia in early 2023, in July the number of Russian troops fielded in the Operational Group of Forces attacking Ukraine increased to about 450,000 personnel, fielding 2,200 tanks and 5,150 armoured combat vehicles.
+
+
+### II. The Ukrainian Offensive of 2023
+
+In mid-May, Ukraine initiated operations on the Bakhmut axis, intended to fix Russian forces ahead of the main effort in the south. The attack on the Orikhiv–Tokmak axis was opened on 3 June, with operations by supporting brigades to secure the flanks of the main axis. The intent was for artillery preparation and an assault to take place during the night of 3–4 June. During these opening phases, however, several tactical errors were made. First, deconfliction between the troops assigned to the main effort and those that had been holding the front prior to the offensive was inadequate. This led to several incidents of friendly fire and disruption caused by Ukrainian defensive obstacles, prior to the initiation of attacks. Second, this disruption led to a time lag between the initial fire preparation missions and the assault of approximately three hours, leading to the opening of the main effort commencing after dawn. These errors reflected the limited cohesion carried out at brigade level during training.
+
+Battalions of the 47th, 65th, and 33rd Brigades from 9th Corps opened the offensive with a series of attempted breaches by mechanised companies. MICLIC and UR-77 Meteorit explosive breaching lines were used to create lanes in the minefields, but these were often of insufficient depth to deliver a complete breach, while inexperienced vehicle crews deviated from the cleared path. A lack of demining equipment then became a problem. The corps had 10 demining vehicles, mainly Vincent-1s. These could clear ground but would overheat and shut down after ploughing for a sustained period. Russian units concentrated ATGMs, fired from infantry positions and from tanks stationed on high ground, against the demining equipment. Furthermore, a shortage of mine ploughs meant that usually only the leading vehicle had clearing equipment in each breach. The Ukrainian artillery also lacked smoke rounds to obscure their lines of advance.
+
+The result was that multiple company attacks suffered the same fate. They entered the narrow breaching lanes, only for the lead vehicle to be knocked out or immobilised. At this point, the cleared lane was too narrow for vehicles to turn, so that, when following vehicles, if either tried to turn around or to move around the destroyed leading vehicle, they would become immobilised by mines. This led to large concentrated groupings of immobilised Ukrainian armour, which would then be targeted by Russian artillery.
+
+Despite the blunting of initial armoured advances, the first Russian defensive positions were lightly held. Following the initial failed assaults, Ukrainian forces made a series of dismounted attacks drawing on troops from more experienced units, which managed to enter the first series of Russian fighting positions. Consistent with Russian doctrine, the first belt of defensive positions was a disruption zone, and thus Russian forces withdrew from some of their positions before Ukrainian troops entered them during the first two weeks of the offensive, only to counterattack before the enemy could consolidate. This was not conducted in an orderly manner, and so Russian forces took losses to Ukrainian artillery. There were two drivers of this disorder. First, Russian guns lacked the range to conduct effective counterbattery fire. Second, weeks of Ukrainian propaganda had convinced some Russian soldiers that they were about to face the brunt of NATO’s heavy equipment, and morale among some troops was low, although this phenomenon was uneven. Nevertheless, as the mechanised Ukrainian units began to accumulate losses and videos of these engagements spread among Russian troops, their confidence started to recover.
+
+Losses during the initial assaults had an impact on the morale of as yet uncommitted Ukrainian units. The Ukrainian troops’ confidence in both their equipment and training diminished, especially since the second echelon was largely mounted in BMPs that lacked the crew survivability offered by Western infantry fighting vehicles. As a result, Ukrainian commanders moved experienced troops from a range of unmechanised supporting brigades into the line to conduct assaults using dismounted assault group tactics. Because these units had not been prioritised for the provision of Western equipment, many of them lacked means to support their assaults. This led to the blending of units, with tanks or breaching equipment borrowed from one brigade to support the assault groups of another. The result was that in some instances a company attack might have supporting components from up to three brigades enabling the effort. This proved highly problematic. The Ukrainian brigades that were prepared for the offensive also had not previously practised working with the brigades protecting their flanks. For those troops lacking combat experience, with very short training courses in the West, control of direct fire was a serious problem, such that there were many cases of friendly fire between intermingled sub-units from different brigades. Despite these complications, the assault units did make some progress into the Russian defence lines.
+
+As Ukrainian forces got deeper into the defences, new challenges started to emerge. First, by late June, Russian troops started to counterattack. At first, this involved the use of their artillery, held out of range of the front, to destroy abandoned fighting positions once they were occupied by Ukrainian troops. Second, Russian troops began to use dismounted infantry supported by armour to attack the positions at night. Given that each Ukrainian battalion produces at best two platoons of fully capable assault troops, it was vital that Ukrainian forces replaced assault troops with line infantry on positions they occupied. In general, there were insufficient troops to conduct rotations. The tempo of Russian counterattacks also meant that troops would then need to be resupplied. Resupply at night through the narrow breaches in the minefields was extremely dangerous, especially given the limited availability of night vision equipment, and Russia’s use of artillery-deployed scatterable mines. Thus, Ukrainian units often had to resupply during the day, when Russian troops would begin to attack the resupply routes using FPV loitering munitions and barrel-launched ATGMs fired by tanks from hilltops, and attack aviation firing ATAKA and Vikhr ATGMs. Given the absolute shortage of demining equipment, this often had to be accomplished by hand, which was slow and dangerous. The overall effect was to prevent any build-up of tempo, such that Ukrainian units had to continually attack prepared positions.
+
+The loss of enablers in 9th Corps meant that this equipment had to be committed from 10th Corps to continue the attacks. Without these enablers, and without the C2 to conduct a large-scale forward passage of lines in a convoluted battlespace, 10th Corps began to be committed piecemeal, not only on the main axis, but also on the eastern axis around Bakhmut, and on the supporting Velika Novosilka axis.
+
+Eventually, Ukrainian troops managed to gain sufficient lodgements to push further into the defences in some sectors. These were, however, highly predictable for the Russians, so defensive means could be concentrated at these points. Moreover, because of the narrow width of the proposed axis of advance and the persistent threat from Lancet-3Ms hunting Ukrainian artillery, the guns could not be brought forwards. This meant that proportionally more Russian artillery could cover Ukrainian lines of advance without Ukrainian counterbattery fire being able to reach the Russian guns. Thus, for the second round of assaults, the resistance became harder. With most of the available demining equipment already lost, the proportion of breaching that needed to be conducted by hand increased. The units conducting it largely lacked dismounted breaching equipment. This time, Russian troops consistently held their positions, having often set up flanking ambushes from the tree lines while counterattacking aggressively with armour. During this phase, Ukrainian troops often took positions, only to lose them to counterattacks, such that assaults would need to be repeated several times. As a result, by late June, Ukrainian officers feared that the counteroffensive would not achieve its aims and paused while they debated where and how to commit additional units.
+
+The original plan had seen the 9th, 10th and Maroon Corps as distinct units of action. In practice, units of the 9th Corps had been expended in the first assaults, while 10th Corps had been committed piecemeal, exacerbated by the need to amalgamate breaching equipment. By July, Ukrainian commanders had to judge whether to commit units from the Maroon Corps to continuing the southern axis, or to call off the offensive. Politically, halting the offensive seemed unacceptable. Fears that there would not be another chance and hopes that the Russian resistance would falter if the attack were sustained led to the decision to continue pushing south, but with the revised objective of capturing Tokmak. The AFU, recognising that to use its exploitation force for the assault would prevent an exploitation after the breakthrough, also switched its prioritisation of fires towards a damage-centric strategy.
+
+Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign during the offensive deserves some discussion. More than 300 Storm Shadow and SCALP cruise missiles were delivered to Ukraine over the course of the offensive, although only small numbers could be launched at any given time. Despite some strikes on Russian C2 and logistics during the offensive, long-range fires had little impact on the fighting. Given the extent to which NATO militaries hope that precision and deep strike can offset volume of unguided artillery, it is worth examining the reason for these results. First, the priority of the precision strike campaign was to destroy the Russian Black Sea Fleet and to degrade defences on the Crimean Peninsula. Combined with the use of uncrewed surface vessels, long-range precision strikes degraded Russian sea control. This had the strategic effect of allowing Ukraine to resume exports from its ports. It also set the conditions for the isolation of Crimea from the sea, although this effect would only be felt if the neck of Crimea could be threatened. The long-range strike campaign was therefore successful against its primary objective, but the failure of the ground operation meant the success was not fully exploited.
+
+Strikes using Storm Shadow in support of the ground operation proved less successful. Several headquarters were destroyed, including the reserve command post of the 58th Combined Arms Army in Berdyansk, along with strikes on bridges at the neck of Crimea. Collectively, however, these strikes never reached the critical level of damage that would disorder the C2 or logistics system. Nor were the strikes themselves effectively synchronised with ground operations that would have caused pressure in tempo with disruption in the deep. This was partly because having effect in the land domain requires the simultaneous servicing of more targets than operations targeting naval forces. The damage to the Black Sea Fleet was absolute. Damaged command posts and bridges, by contrast, could be replaced and repaired.
+
+At the beginning of the offensive, GMLRS strikes had been prioritised in maximum depth, to disrupt Russian C2 and logistics and also to target air defence systems and other targets that could have improved the efficiency of loitering munitions raids on Crimea. Once the objective became more limited to Tokmak, the depth of the fires campaign also came back, with an emphasis on fires in shallow depth to assist with the attack. Thus, GMLRS in particular started to be reprioritised, from targeting high-value targets to striking Russian artillery. This was also driven by the inability to push Ukrainian guns forwards, as the breach was insufficiently wide, and scoured by Lancets. While many Russian guns were destroyed, with only approximately seven GMLRs (munitions, not launchers) per day to service the whole theatre, the rate of destruction was something Russian troops could absorb during the critical period when Ukraine had remaining offensive combat power.
+
+The impact of precision strike was further mitigated by Russian countermeasures. The munitions that were to deliver these precision effects had been employed for almost a year by the time the offensive began. Whereas Excalibur, for example, was achieving around 70% effectiveness at the beginning of the conflict, by August 2023, it was hitting the designated point only 6% of the time, a rate lower than non-precision munitions. This was because of exquisite electronic warfare (EW) countermeasures fielded by the AFRF. The impact on GMLRS was slightly different. The first challenge was that electronic protection systems were able to redirect entire salvos of GMLRS targeting specific areas. The second issue was that Russian air defences had been calibrated to be able to shoot down GMLRS. These problems could be overcome by layering effects. The use of other munition types such as HARMs, EW or decoys, or selecting the right time to engage, made GMLRS strikes highly effective. But these shaping requirements significantly reduced the tempo and scale at which strikes could be directed against operationally significant targets.
+
+The commitment of Maroon Corps units in July began to exert significant pressure on the 58th Combined Arms Army. Along with small numbers of strikes in depth using Storm Shadow, the attrition of artillery systems with GMLRS, and the fact that Russian troops had been in the line for two months of heavy fighting, Ukrainian units began to achieve results in small tactical actions, largely by narrowing the axis on which they were working from a 30 km frontage to a 10 km frontage. In one incident, for example, a Ukrainian assault group of 15 personnel managed to dislodge 88 Russian troops from a position. Despite these kinds of incidents, the pace of advance was extremely slow and always gave the Russians time to reset their defences, such that every attack had to be a deliberate assault action. The need to secure the flanks of any gains further slowed progress. Furthermore, Ukrainian advances began to be canalised between two pieces of high ground across an area 7 km wide. This left troops vulnerable to plunging fire from the flanks, further constraining the rate of advance. The commitment of the Maroon Corps, as the exploitation force, also removed any risk for the Russians that further Ukrainian axes could be prioritised. This freed up Russian troops to rotate the more damaged units of the 58th Combined Arms Army, such that Ukrainian forces found themselves fighting fresh troops.
+
+There has been persistent discussion about the Ukrainian decision to commit some of the troops prepared for the offensive towards the Bakhmut axis, rather than concentrating forces in the south. This is, to some extent, the wrong framing of the choice facing the AFU. The allocation of ammunition to the eastern axis certainly contributed to Ukraine having insufficient fires on the southern axis. Nevertheless, since Ukrainian artillery was being held back from advancing by Russian mines and Lancets, adding more artillery pieces to the southern axis would not have axiomatically increased Ukraine’s firepower where it mattered. The same can be said of committing more troops. Given the frontages involved, pushing more companies of assault troops southwards would not have vastly increased the scale of operations that could be carried out and thus the combat power applied. As it became clear, however, that the southern axis might at best reach Tokmak – and even this objective appeared in doubt – there was a strong political direction to demonstrate progress, so that more troops were committed to the Bakhmut axis. Without sufficient mechanised forces, however, these attacks could not achieve sufficient tempo to produce encirclements of Russian troops. The eastern direction therefore devolved into fights for treelines. The real trade-off decision, therefore, was not between the commitment of units between two axes or one, but rather whether these reserves should have been committed at all, or else preserved. In hindsight, the commitment of these forces appears to have been a mistake, as Ukraine is now short of cohered units.
+
+Russian attrition during the offensive arguably reached its height in early August. The use of counterattacks, and the provision of dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM) to Ukraine, which increased both the number of rounds that could be fired per day and the lethality of these fire missions, all drove up Russian casualties. Nevertheless, Russia continued to rotate its regiments under its divisions to ensure that there were fresh troops holding the defences. If a breakthrough to Tokmak was going to happen, this was most likely in early August. After that, the likelihood began to diminish. Ukrainian ammunition stocks meant that the rate of fire to support offensive operations could be continued until October at the latest. By mid-September, offensive actions were largely aimed at improving tactical positions, as commanders recognised that a breakthrough – even to Tokmak – was not going to occur.
+
+The offensive may have culminated, but one last operation was attempted, to cross the Dnipro and attack through Krynky. For this purpose, some 55 GMLRS were stockpiled, along with a large volume of other fires. The Ukrainian marines conducting the operation were attacking into their old training grounds and knew the terrain well. It was hoped that a surge of force across the river might turn the flank. When the crossing was made, Ukrainian forces managed to secure a lodgement on the eastern bank, and for approximately three days there was an opportunity to move a significant number of troops across. This was not attempted. The reason was simple. While a large body of troops might have been projected over the river, they could not be sustained, and the larger the force the less viable their sustainment would be. The Krynky operation does not need to be covered in detail as it was never fully carried out, but it does offer one salutary lesson to which observers should pay attention. Under modern battlefield conditions, the establishment and protection of a crossing on a wide wet gap against sustained observation and the indefinite threat of fires is a problem to which there is not yet a doctrinal answer. Given the number of these gaps in Eastern Europe, it is a problem set that deserves study.
+
+
+### III. Assessing the Causes of Failure
+
+Most analyses gravitate towards the conclusion that the reasons for the difference between the failure of Russian operations in 2022 and their comparative success in 2023 is that the Russians are learning and adapting, and are becoming more tactically proficient. Although Russia has adapted its tactics, the main reason for the striking difference in the effectiveness of Russian operations is that in the preparation of the invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin’s main effort was that of its Special Services, which were supposed to destabilise Ukraine and disorganise its system of state and military administration. The military invasion was not supposed to meet serious organised resistance, other than in Donbas. The defeats suffered by the AFRF in the battles of Kyiv, Kharkiv and Kherson were primarily the consequences of an initial miscalculation in the planning of the invasion, and the employment of forces improperly structured and commanded for conventional warfighting. After the failure of the initial coup de main, attempts were made to rectify the structural shortcomings, but without an uplift in mass, and because of the losses during the opening phase of the war, the Russian military failed to achieve its objectives. In 2023, Ukraine was dealing with an enemy that had completely changed its strategy. Russia began to take seriously the planning and conduct of military operations, moving from a blitzkrieg strategy to a protracted war, with the mobilisation necessary for this through its human and industrial resources. It placed its main bet on the fact that Western partners will tire of supporting Ukraine, allowing Russia to eventually gain the necessary advantage on the battlefield.
+
+The main reason for the AFRF’s operational failures in 2022 was the insufficient number of ground troops to conduct effective combat operations along multiple independent axes. In fact, the lack of the necessary forces and means for a successful full-scale invasion was one of the foremost reasons why many analysts, including in Ukrainian intelligence agencies, were sceptical about the probability of a Russian invasion in February 2022, predicting such an invasion later, in June or even September 2022, and only in the limited theatre of the south and east. Such sceptical assessments of the probability of a successful invasion allowed the Russians to achieve operational surprise, which explains the success in capturing the south of Ukraine, as well as the deep advance in the north, where the AFU did not have significant forces. The Russian plan came much closer to succeeding than is often acknowledged, but when the bet on speed failed, the plan was invalidated.
+
+Failure to defeat the AFU during its initial blitzkrieg and heavy losses in people and military equipment meant that Russia faced the problem of an acute lack of the troops necessary not only to continue the offensive, but also to hold territories in the east and especially in the south. It was the lack of adequate personnel that forced the Russians to withdraw from Kyiv, Chernihiv and Sumy, and prevented them from organising the proper density of defences near Kharkiv, enabling the AFU to carry out a successful breakthrough there and a further offensive almost to the borders of the Luhansk region. Although Ukrainian fire control of Russian lines of supply explains the tactical decision to withdraw from Kherson, the unwillingness of the AFRF to lose the quality troops deployed there reflected the shortages in personnel elsewhere on the front.
+
+As in many military conflicts before, including the First and Second World Wars, after the end of the first phase of the war, which was characterised by rapid manoeuvre by the first echelon, the second phase began, during which the skirmish line stabilised, the fighting became positional, and the parties concentrated on generating the reserves to win the war. As a result of the mobilisation that began in October 2022, Russia managed by May 2023 not only to replenish its losses, but also to increase the size of the group of forces in Ukraine to approximately 420,000 personnel (not counting the units of the Russian Guard and the police involved in running an occupation regime), as well as to establish the production of weapons and military equipment in the volumes necessary to support their operations. As a result, the Ukrainian offensive, which began in June 2023, was conducted in conditions that differed significantly from those that prevailed when the plan for the offensive was developed.
+
+In autumn 2022, the AFRF in Ukraine consisted of 130 battalion-tactical groups and separate units of the 1st and 2nd Army Corps with a total number of about 200,000 servicemen, about 930 tanks, more than 2,500 armoured combat vehicles, 1,350 artillery systems, 660 MLRS and 40 operational-tactical missile systems (OTMS). By the beginning of June 2023, Russian ground forces in Ukraine comprised about 420,000 personnel, 1,980 tanks, 4,450 armoured combat vehicles, 2,750 artillery systems, 860 MLRS and 46 OTMS. During this time, the AFRF abandoned the use of battalion-tactical groups and switched to the army management system, cohering 50 brigades, 128 regiments, 102 separate battalions and about 50 combined units.
+
+It is important to note that Russia’s group of forces in Ukraine, outlined above, constitutes its combat troops. These troops were not responsible for guarding the Russian border, a task undertaken by other parts of the AFRF. Nor were they primarily concerned with supporting the administration of the occupied territories. For this, the Russian Federation had deployed in Ukraine 25,000 servicemen of the Russian Guard, fielding their own 520 armoured combat vehicles, about 140 artillery systems and 22 helicopters. By contrast, the AFU’s combat power had to hold the entire Ukrainian border, stretching out AFU resources while the AFRF maintained freedom to commit resources on particular axes. The presence of AFRF units on the Russian–Ukrainian border, their constant shelling of Ukrainian territory with MLRS, artillery and mortars, airstrikes and the use of sabotage groups forced Ukraine to keep part of its troops in the north, making it impossible to transfer them to other directions. A further 50,000 troops of the AFU were committed to generating mobile air defence groups with their necessary support echelon to defeat a sustained Russian long-range strike campaign throughout Ukraine.
+
+The need to use artillery to compensate for the limited force density along much of the front limited the concentration of firepower on the main effort. The largest number of 155-calibre guns simultaneously operating on the Orikhiv–Tokmak axis was 55 units. Ammunition levels for Ukrainian artillery varied throughout the offensive. At its peak, these reached approximately 70 rounds per gun per day for those guns on the main effort. However, ammunition supplies were uneven and would peak and trough, so that for periods of the offensive, Ukrainian guns had as little as 10 rounds per day.
+
+Both at the beginning and during the conduct of the Ukrainian offensive operation, the AFU did not have a numerical advantage over the enemy in the number of personnel, combat systems and ammunition, or enablers necessary for successful offensive operations, especially against a well-organised and echeloned line of defence. At times, the AFU did establish localised superiority, but this could rarely be maintained as forces advanced. The balance of forces in many cases was not in favour of Ukraine, which forced Ukrainian units to storm the positions of a more numerous enemy. Conditions were especially unfavourable given the lack of air support. Against this, Ukraine had some qualitative advantages in both troops and equipment, but this did not provide a sufficient offset.
+
+Despite the lack of numerical advantage, the AFU counted on a moral advantage due to both the high level of motivation of the Ukrainian troops and the low morale of Russian troops observed during their winter offensive. To some extent, Ukraine repeated the mistake that Russia had made during the first stage of the war, counting on shock induced by offensive operations preventing the enemy from putting up an adequate resistance. This theory of success was a poor planning assumption.
+
+At the operational level, therefore, the Ukrainian offensive failed because the plan was not properly calibrated to the available resources. Nor were appropriate troops assigned to the tasks for which they were suited. Undertrained personnel spearheaded the main effort, while experienced troops were committed to diversionary or fixing axes. Ukraine’s international partners failed to mobilise industry early in the conflict, while over-optimistic planning assumptions by Ukrainian planners based on the conditions prevailing before Russian mobilisation had grave consequences. The reason to place such emphasis on this point is that Ukraine’s international partners missed their decision points for industrial mobilisation, while Ukraine missed its decision points for the mobilisation and adequate training of personnel. It is thus vital that for future operations Ukraine and its partners do not lull themselves into believing that an under-resourced operation has a strong likelihood of succeeding.
+
+Beyond this foremost operational point, numerous shortcomings of the preparation of the Ukrainian offensive can be identified.
+
+#### A Lack of Surprise
+
+One of the anticipated mechanisms enabling success during the Ukrainian offensive was the shock to Russian troops. In the initial plan, this was hoped to enable the 12 brigades to break six enemy regiments across 30 km of front. When planners realised that this was not possible, it was hoped that the violence of the initial attack would dislodge the defenders. Where tactical surprise was achieved during the war, as in the Kharkiv offensive in 2022, Ukrainian forces effectively dislocated Russian troops. Conversely, in both Kherson and on the Orikhiv–Tokmak axis, surprise was not achieved, and operational security failed. In the Kherson direction, the Ukrainian government signalled the intention to attack on this axis. The subsequent decision to attack Kherson was therefore made against a prepared defence and was neither particularly successful in terms of the ground assaults nor did it cause shock among Russian forces.
+
+On the Orikhiv–Tokmak axis, the failure of operational security occurred at multiple levels. At the strategic level, leaks of top secret information from Ukraine’s international partners (including terrain analysis and other materials) gave the Russians a precise picture of the Ukrainian assault force’s structure, anticipated capabilities, limitations and options for axes of advance. Furthermore, the public messaging from the Ukrainian government, and public discourse from partners, gave Russia a clear understanding of the timing of a likely assault and informed AFRF planning. Finally, Russian penetration of Ukrainian communications systems enabled capture of a range of materials. The result was that when the offensive started, Ukrainian efforts to compartmentalise planning often left friendly forces with less understanding of the wider plan than Russian commanders.
+
+The lesson is clear: future operations must be accompanied by appropriate deception and more effective operational security. For Ukraine, this means less public telegraphing of intentions. However, there are also lessons for Ukraine’s partners about the transparency of its political discourse on collective planning.
+
+#### Inadequate Force Generation
+
+Considering the greater human reserves of the Russian Federation, Ukraine must seek qualitative superiority among its forces. For situations in which the AFU are on the defensive, this has largely been achieved. For offensive operations, 2023 demonstrated that the system of training and force generation is not producing sufficient force quality to execute a high tempo of operations. There are several reasons for this. At the most basic level, the training is appropriate neither in duration nor content. There are differences of approach between AFU and NATO members on how battle inoculation should be carried out. Nevertheless, restrained use of BATSIM (battlefield simulation) and other techniques to habituate trainees to the felt effect of artillery manifested in a proportion of units performing poorly early in the offensive. A lack of familiarity and training with artillery for example saw troops unwilling to keep pace with close support fires.
+
+The other fundamental problem related to drill proficiency. With five weeks training at Operation Interflex, and perhaps a month of collective training before being committed, troops did not have a well-rehearsed repertoire of battlefield movements they could execute at pace. Tactical control of direct fires was also very limited, partly because safety constraints on training without sufficient time to lay strong foundations prevented fire and movement at platoon and company level from being adequately drilled. In consequence, fire discipline was largely poor.
+
+The method adopted by the Ukrainian military to make up for this force quality problem was to select a cadre of assault troops from within its units, such that a battalion might generate two platoons of assault troops, while the remainder of the battalion formed conventional companies. In practice, this meant that rather than being able to echelon through one another to maintain offensive momentum, each attack had to be deliberately planned and would culminate on completion. Furthermore, the loss of these assault troops would remove the offensive combat power of the battalion. This made commanders cautious, further impeding tempo. Although the approach adopted by the AFU made sense in the limited time available, the time for training was inadequate.
+
+Another problem was the training of brigades as a cohered formation. With most brigade staffs fixed on the front to manage defensive sectors, Ukraine has struggled to train brigades, or to exercise battalions beneath a brigade headquarters. The result was that when Ukrainian units reached the battle area, they tended to plan and execute separate company actions, managed by the brigade headquarters and supported by brigade fires, rather than conforming to a brigade scheme of manoeuvre.
+
+The need to raise force quality for offensive operations through a deliberate process taking approximately eight months, with up to 18 weeks of individual training and collective training thereafter, must be factored in to war planning. Planning by Ukraine or its international partners has rarely been conducted over such horizons, especially among the political echelon. But failure to plan in this way means that the available force will not be suited to the envisaged task. The largest attacks during the offensive were battalion attacks. This reflected the small cadre of trained staff officers able to synchronise larger operations. To overmatch Russian units, it is necessary to increase the scale at which Ukrainian units can operate.
+
+#### Deficiencies in Planning
+
+The original concept of operations, as previously described, envisaged a 12-brigade operation taking seven days to breach the defence lines along a 30 km frontage and isolate Tokmak. The evidence suggests that had this concentration of forces and tempo been achieved, a breakthrough to Tokmak was possible. However, this concept defining requirements was unburdened by the limitations of the actual force employed. The original concept was reasonable. But when the concept was turned into a plan, reflecting the limitations of the forces that had been generated, the time that had elapsed, and thus the disposition of the enemy, errors in planning emerged.
+
+First and foremost, the theory of success for the operation as executed depended on a collapse in Russian forces, but the forces and means were not concentrated sufficiently to achieve this effect. It is not evident on what basis planners thought this would be achieved. Instead, planning appears to have proceeded on the basis of significant optimism bias. This appears to have stemmed partly from a belief that Russia’s collapse around Kharkiv arose from a lack of morale, when in reality it arose from Russia’s lack of sufficient troops. This is not a new problem, but given the extent to which NATO members hope to offset the enemy’s numerical superiority, methodologies for more accurate assessments of the morale of an enemy seem worth developing. The UK, in particular, has for some time emphasised the importance of information manoeuvre and the cognitive dimension of war. It is evident, however, that planners did not correctly evaluate Russia’s mindset or vulnerabilities in this regard. Thus, it appears there are insufficient means for staffs to sense or conduct battle damage assessment on morale, to enable accurate planning for how a collapse might be induced.
+
+It is also evident that planners failed to properly apportion the right forces for the operation. Rather than being recovered from the front to form the core of new units, experienced troops were instead left with diminishing levels of mechanised equipment and were committed on various diversionary axes, such as Bakhmut, or in fixing actions on either side of the main effort. When troops from these units were thereafter pushed into the offensive force, the units lacked critical means, including demining equipment, to be able to succeed. The decline in equipment quality in follow-on forces was also pronounced, such that Ukrainian units began to have to attempt offensive breaching operations with MaxxPros and other vehicles unsuited to the task.
+
+Certain planning failures were made jointly between Ukraine and its international partners, for example, the weight given to effects of deep strikes, which were intended to disrupt the Russian defences. While the campaign targeting Crimea was well planned, the deep battle in support of the main effort employed too few munitions against too diverse an array of targets to ever deliver a critical scale of effect. Nor were the application of long-range precision fires synchronised with tactical actions that would best exploit the pressure placed on the Russian defensive system.
+
+Another curious element of the planning is the lack of mitigations in place to overcome identified Russian strengths. During wargames carried out with Ukraine’s international partners prior to the offensive, a number of Russian capabilities were identified as especially problematic. Russian aviation was one such capability. Yet the operation was launched without any means to counter the threat from Russian attack aviation. The US eventually approved the use of ATACMs in October to strike Russian helicopters at their airfields. This was all very well, but by October Russian attack aviation had already played its part in blunting Ukraine’s offensive. By then, the application of ATACMs merely contributed to an attritional writing down of Russian systems. It did not enable manoeuvre. The point here is not that ATACMs were the answer to aviation. Russia tactically adapted to mitigate the risk to its airfields within days of these strikes. The point is that nothing was done to mitigate the risk when it mattered. This problem was not limited to the issue of aviation. Minefields were similarly identified as a major problem. At the beginning of the offensive, Ukraine had significantly fewer demining vehicles than would be considered the minimum required in doctrine. This had predictable results, which had been identified by Ukraine and its partners during the pre-offensive wargames. Yet Ukraine’s partners continued to push demining vehicles into Ukraine as late as August, when the US provided M117s. The AFU took two months learning how to operate and maintain these vehicles so they were not ready to be used until October 2023, after the offensive had completely culminated.
+
+The interesting thing about this is that Ukraine’s international partners provided equipment in a manner that was completely inconsistent with NATO doctrine, such that Ukraine could not concentrate a critical mass of the relevant capabilities at the decisive point. Much of this failure was political. The US had recommended releasing DPICM to Ukraine in autumn 2022 and ATACMs early in 2023. The release of these systems was approved late. The question that NATO members must confront is whether their systems of government prompt leaders to make decisions when they must be made if they are to have their intended effect, or whether the system allows for delay beyond the point of relevance.
+
+
+### IV. Identifying Emerging Tactical Challenges
+
+The conduct of large-scale offensive breaching operations is one of the hardest tasks that land forces must be able to carry out. In the First World War, it took the Entente powers three years to develop the concepts and capabilities and generate the capacity to effectively breach German defences on the Western Front. Holding units that are equipped and trained for this operation represents the largest resource commitment in most armies. For example, while the UK has many units that have widespread utility, only 3 UK Division, which is by far the most expensive element of the Field Army, is expected to be able to conduct large-scale offensive breaching, and it is at present not equipped to do so.
+
+The doctrinal framework for offensive breaching has remained essentially unchanged since the formulation of AirLand Battle in the 1980s. The last time offensive breaching was conducted by Western forces at scale was in Operation Desert Storm in 1991, and this appeared to vindicate the equipment, formation structure, tactics and doctrine underpinning AirLand Battle. Prior to 2023, the only large-scale offensive breaching operation to have been conducted in a conventional war since 1991 was Azerbaijan’s operation to retake Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020. This operation was, however, carried out against an Armenian force that was barely modernised from the 1980s. Thus, the established formula once again proved successful. Breaching operations in Iraq during the war against Islamic State and in Afghanistan during fighting with the Taliban required clearing through complex fields of IEDs, but these were not covered by artillery, and so coalition forces dictated the tempo of manoeuvre. It is therefore reasonable to argue that Ukraine’s attempts to breach the Surovikin Line over summer 2023 were the first attempts at large-scale offensive breaching operations in 30 years.
+
+Over that timeframe, new technologies have had a considerable impact on how armies fight. It is therefore worth examining the experience of Ukrainian forces to assess the extent to which established doctrine remains valid and where it may need to be adapted or revised. These lessons are not only relevant for Ukraine’s forces, as they endeavour to recover and prepare for future offensive operations, but also for Ukraine’s international partners, who must be credible if they are to deter Russia from challenging Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty in the years ahead.
+
+The fighting in Ukraine during 2023 revealed several requirements and problem sets that have not widely confronted NATO forces and are not effectively accounted for in Western doctrine. These issues need to be thought through during the design of future forces and operations. Several of these challenges are unpacked in this chapter.
+
+#### Pervasive Observation and Precision Fires
+
+During the offensive, both sides made extensive use of UAVs to watch the battlefield over the frontline and into opposing rear areas. Russian troops made substantial use of Lancet-3M loitering munitions to deliver precision strikes against Ukrainian artillery and support elements. Ukrainian forces, meanwhile, used an expanding number of first-person-view UAVs as they moved onto the defensive, and as their own availability of artillery ammunition diminished. For both sides, these capabilities have proved more impactful for defensive than offensive operations. This is primarily because it is easier to deconflict these systems when one’s own forces are manoeuvring less, because using them in the close against advancing troops means they are in closer proximity to their control antennae than to enemy jamming, and because it is the attacking party that must increase its signature and will outrun its ability to use deception or decoys to protect itself, as the attacker must advance.
+
+The use of EW and low-altitude air defence for offensive operations did exist in older doctrine. Largely, however, this was a divisional responsibility, as it remains in US concepts. Today, the localised ability to generate precision fires means that all units require electronic protection. In concept, advancing formations must be able to create electronic barriers, and since sub-units are unlikely to have dedicated air defence, systems must be multifunctional, with the ability to engage small aerial targets. Electronic protection is too vulnerable if kept on a small number of dedicated platforms. Instead, while electronic protection modules must be programmable and relatively autonomous, they must be widely distributed. Antennae will become a crucial layer in a protection system, vulnerable to direct fire. They must therefore be replaceable, rather than integral to the unit generating the jamming frequencies. Projecting navigational interference is particularly important for providing area defence against precision fires.
+
+At the same time, there is the dilemma, noted above, of how a force that must create a time-limited snowdome of protection from precision fires can avoid increasing its exposure to statistical artillery (non-precision munitions). The old answer – to win the counterfires battle – is only a partial solution, because high-fidelity ISR now allows fewer guns to deliver more concentrated effects, thus raising the threshold of suppression needed to protect the force. Thus, alongside the requirement to protect the force from stand-in observation, it is also necessary to be able to defeat enemy longer-range UAVs, either at low altitude but stood off up to 10 km, or at medium altitude above the MANPADS ceiling. Combined with the fact that the targets being engaged will often be relatively inexpensive, this presents a key challenge for short-ranged air defence. There is also the requirement to shift the task from counterbattery kills to left-of-launch targeting of enemy artillery. This brings into the close battle concepts that had previously been more relevant to discussions of Integrated Air and Missile Defence.
+
+#### Electromagnetic Battlespace Management
+
+The force that can employ precision fires responsively is likely to be disproportionately efficient compared with their adversary. The ability to minimise concentration is simultaneously dependent on coordination of activities at reach or beyond line of sight. This depends on access to the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). The result is that even without enemy EW, the EMS is becoming crowded. The number of systems communicating is increasing. The volume of data being passed is increasing. And the advantages to be gained versus vulnerabilities ceded by not contesting the EMS are shifting to a point where although forces must be able to revert without their primary systems, this does not mean they should accept loss of communications.
+
+The contested nature of the EMS and its impact on the efficiency of fires and manoeuvre must be addressed. In the defence, runners, ground-laid cable and other reversionary methods can be used to limit traffic, signature and vulnerability. On the offence, these are not viable options. Without careful frequency management, forces are liable to engage in widespread fratricide in the EMS, including degrading the efficiency and survivability of their own UAVs. This was a serious problem in Ukraine, and often caused commanders to limit electronic protection to their forces, thus increasing their own situational awareness but also giving freedom to enemy ISR and fires. Russian forces would reset their frequencies every 24 hours, deconflicting UAV orbits, and would synchronise EW with manoeuvre, so that when precision coordinates needed to be generated, electronic protection would dip before being brought back up. This was achieved despite the AFRF distributing EW capabilities to the company echelon. For Ukraine, absolute shortage of systems reduced the complexity of the task, but most EW was nevertheless managed at the brigade echelon, and even then was often not maximally exploited, because of the difficulties it created for C2 and ISR.
+
+The need to allocate sufficient bandwidths for software-defined systems to avoid broad-band jamming, and yet have enough spectrum available for the range of systems in a modern force, is a serious problem. It is also one that most military personnel are not trained to manage. Yet this is becoming a key planning constraint at all echelons. There is a need for signallers to be trained differently to support these requirements down to brigade and battlegroup level. At the same time, commanders in the combat arms need to be better trained in how to use EW troops and how to plan manoeuvre in the EMS. Increasing the skills of signallers is of little value if the level of understanding among the other arms diverges rather than converges, leading to the capabilities being neglected or misapplied.
+
+#### Accelerated Capability Refresh Cycles
+
+It is not a new observation to say that innovative capabilities have their greatest impact when first fielded and then offer less advantage as the enemy adapts. This problem was well understood in the wake of the First World War. Today, however, software-defined systems are highly vulnerable to bespoke electronic countermeasures, while also being disproportionately effective when compared with non-software-defined capabilities. The result is that a force must use software-defined systems to be competitive, but the peak effectiveness of a software-defined capability is therefore operationally short-lived and, once the enemy has adapted, tactically volatile.
+
+This manifested in various ways during the 2023 offensive. First, Western planning assumptions about the effects deliverable by precision munitions proved exaggerated, owing to enemy countermeasures. Excalibur and GMLRS suffered from this. Second, Ukraine found that with systems such as UAVs, a rapid refresh rate of both software and radios was necessary to maintain their effectiveness. This impinged, however, on their ability to scale production and therefore to reap the rewards of their technical advantage. Instead, innovations would be tested at small scale and deployed at moderate scale when industry could begin supplying a solution. However, the adversary would develop exquisite countermeasures before production could be accelerated.
+
+It is evident that this interaction is going to be a feature of future conflict. It poses major challenges to how NATO militaries contract industry, how systems are tested and validated, and how training and safety of systems is managed. Other than for night-one capabilities, designed to open the door, it is clear that maintaining technological advantage, and thus a qualitative edge, must be premised on having software engineers in tactical formations empowered to interfere with systems, and the ability to rapidly swap out hardware components like radios without having to discard the platforms to which they were attached. Vendors must be incentivised to provide sub-systems and to understand that there will be repeat custom cyclically as they adapt their products, rather than refining a single product and endeavouring to lock the customer into keeping with it. In many states, this will require legislative changes to oversight. Within operational – rather than tactical – timeframes, however, this is crucial to maintaining tempo.
+
+#### Diversification of Last-Mile Resupply
+
+The persistence of surveillance over the frontline, combined with cheap and scalable precision strike using UAVs, poses a particular threat to the resupply of forces on the offence because the available ground lines of communication become constrained to established breaches and are therefore easy to monitor. Furthermore, deception and other methods aimed at keeping resupply vehicles alive are irrelevant once they are forced to traverse known routes, where the enemy will not have to deal with false positives. Moreover, the pressure put by the enemy on lead elements through counterattack means that they can impose when resupply and casualty evacuation is most critical, limiting the agency the offensive force has to shape conditions to enable last-mile resupply. Resupply vehicles must also be supported in breaching artillery-delivered scattered mines.
+
+One answer for this is that last-mile resupply becomes a combined arms endeavour requiring the layering of air defence, counterbattery fires, EW, engineering support and other measures to create windows of opportunity for movement. This is extremely resource intensive and, in Ukraine’s case, resources are lacking. In certain circumstances, resupply may have to become the main effort of a force’s supporting arms, but this is highly undesirable and, in any case, limits the number of resupplies that can be achieved. Although not directly related to last-mile resupply, the inability to advance less protected support platforms such as artillery and medical support, owing to the persistent threat of precision strike over the forward line of own troops (FLOT), is a further challenge that limits the ability to keep support and enablers moving forwards with the combat arms.
+
+Alternatively, methods must be found for diversifying last-mile resupply. The UK, in particular, has been experimenting extensively with uncrewed systems in this role. While helicopters are expensive to operate and vulnerable in the face of Russian air defences, UAVs may offer a means to move pallets of food, water and ammunition forwards. Using uncrewed ground vehicles for breaching similarly offers the opportunity to widen and multiply the lanes through which supplies can pass. Uncrewed ground vehicle technology is not currently ideally suited to offensive obstacle breaching, because it is easily knocked out through damage to key sensors and often depends on remote control, while such breaching must be done either from close proximity to the vehicle or via fixed cable. Once behind the FLOT, however, such systems have significant potential, and experimentation in this space could mature the capability until it is able to support offensive breaching operations. Increasing the throughput of materiel and thereby extending the reach and endurance of a given assault unit buys time for the breach to be expanded, for additional forces to echelon through and ultimately for the maintenance of momentum. Medical evacuation via UAV is more morally complex, but in many instances may improve the rate of survival considerably by allowing casualties to be recovered across complex or denied terrain to a medical facility in a hardened position where a better standard of care can be provided. Improving the rate of survival from injury also has a positive effect on morale, contributing to the maintenance of momentum.
+
+Perhaps the most important context in which NATO members should examine this problem is how it relates to gap crossing. Russia’s control of Kherson Oblast was ultimately rendered unsustainable because of Ukraine’s ability to interdict crossing points. Ukraine’s decision not to exploit its opportunity in Krynky was driven by the assessment that a force large enough to have any significant impact on the left bank of the Dnipro could not be supported across it. Any terrain analysis of NATO’s eastern flank shows that wet gaps are regular terrain features. How NATO members can develop capabilities for emplacing and protecting crossings is therefore a vital conceptual area for exploration.
+
+#### Vulnerability of Critical Enablers
+
+A final significant challenge that must be overcome conceptually is the vulnerability of critical enablers such as engineering vehicles. Historically, this has been addressed by heavily protecting these platforms and by having them covered by main battle tanks. The concept has been that although ATGM operators and hostile main battle tanks will seek to engage breaching vehicles, this will reveal their positions and allow them to be engaged and destroyed by overwatching direct fires. Psychologically, the threat of this rapid and lethal response has the effect of suppressing the scale at which threats manifest. Speed then reduces the time available for the enemy to safely execute engagements.
+
+Under modern conditions, this concept of overwatch is deeply flawed. The problem is that an increasing array of threat systems, from FPV drones to non-line-of-sight ATGMs and UAV-mounted laser designation for artillery munitions, can be launched and directed from concealed positions. This means that individual prestige equipment can be picked out. It also extends the timeframe within which it can be targeted, because those launching these munitions can fire multiple times and can concentrate on guiding their munition without concern about receiving fire. The result is a high probability of mission kill against key enabling equipment.
+
+Resolving this problem requires new approaches to offensive suppression and to the design of enabling equipment. For offensive suppression, the utilisation of loitering munitions, provided with target coordinates by EW baselines, could enable strikes on operators of threat systems that are otherwise safe beyond line of sight of their targets. An equivalent to the Lancet-3M would be very useful for this. It would also require an uplift in the density of Ukrainian EW baselines at brigade level to identify enemy UAV operators and engage them. For defensive measures, the utilisation of multispectral smoke would help, although not entirely alleviate, the problem.
+
+The critical line of effort, however, is that if these vehicles can be picked out then it follows that they will be attrited. More of them are therefore required. At present, these are often prestige assets and are heavily protected, able to carry out a range of functions. It seems likely that the number of vehicles in engineering units needs to increase, while their flexibility and complexity needs to decrease to make such an uplift in platforms affordable. Furthermore, the diversification of tasks that can be carried out with modules mounted on other armoured vehicles should be prioritised. If such systems are targetable, then the aim should be to make fewer targets single points of failure in the ability of the force to breach obstacles. It is notable that Israel, when entering Gaza, determined that it required 20 D9 armoured bulldozers per brigade to overcome the anticipated IED threat. D9s may not be ideally suited to combat in Ukraine, but the density of such vehicles is a good yardstick for what should be the aim. The requirement for such an uplift in the number of platforms speaks to a need to change the design priorities for the platforms dedicated to these tasks.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+The causes of the failure of Ukraine’s offensive operations in 2023 may be summarised as a lack of personnel and critical materiel, inadequate time to train and cohere the relevant forces, the misallocation of personnel to the identified axes, and a lack of solutions to several identified tactical problems. Ensuring that these mistakes are not repeated requires a more deliberate and longer force generation process, and for Ukraine’s international partners to calibrate equipment provision to the outcomes they have stated they want, rather than to what is politically convenient to provide in the short term. Given that addressing these challenges requires the industrial mobilisation of Europe, and that this has started late, it will take some time before Ukraine can recommence major offensive operations. Creating the conditions for the eventual termination of the war on favourable terms must be achieved through shaping in the intervening period. This has driven a change in how Ukraine looks to fight the war.
+
+During the current phase of the conflict, the AFU’s focus is on inflicting maximum damage on the Russian Federation, not on liberating Ukrainian territories at any cost. On the battlefield, the AFU is prioritising the destruction of those systems that the AFRF will struggle to replace or repair. The AFU is also building extensive defensive positions to try to maximise the AFRF rate of losses for any gains made on the battlefield. Such a damage-centric approach is intended to buy the maximum possible time, both for force generation and for damage to be inflicted in the deep. For Ukraine’s international partners, provision of artillery ammunition and long-range strike systems are most important in support of this effort.
+
+Russia’s capacity to continue its aggression against Ukraine is fundamentally a result of its large capital reserves. The ability to pay high salaries to contract soldiers is enabling Russia’s regeneration of forces, while money generated from petrochemical exports allows Russia to expand military equipment production, even as sanctions and supply chain disruption drive up the price. Ukraine is therefore targeting oil and gas infrastructure in Russia to initially reduce its reserves and thereafter the availability of liquid capital. Ukraine’s international partners can support this effort by targeting the manufacturing facilities of Russia’s defence industries, and the global supply chains that allow Russia to sustain the war, through rigorously enforced sanctions.
+
+Another line of effort for inflicting damage on Russia is the use of information operations to reduce Russian confidence in the rouble, and to take measures to drive up inflation. Creating a felt cost of the conflict for the Russian population, and ascribing blame for that feeling to local officials, increases the jeopardy for the Russian government as the war protracts.
+
+Buying time and slowing Russian force expansion are ways to support the regeneration of offensive combat power. To regenerate this power, Ukraine must levy troops that it does not immediately commit as battlefield replacements, but instead allows to train collectively until they are tactically proficient. This requires the opportunity to exercise headquarters to enable Ukrainian units to operate at scale. The combat arms officers leading such formations must also be familiar with using electronic protection, reconnaissance and attack so that they can protect their units once committed.
+
+Planning for the commitment of additional forces should not be fixed in relation to a timeline governed by political expectations. Instead, the AFU should plan a shaping operation to create the conditions for offensive operations to be possible. While critical conditions are being established, Ukraine’s international partners must work with these units to develop methods of overcoming the threat from Russian long-range fires. These include effective counter- reconnaissance capabilities, and the ability to protect the logistics routes in support of offensive operations and key enablers supporting offensive action. If these measures are not taken, Ukraine risks prolonging the conflict without shifting its trajectory, with tragic consequences for both the country and the security of Europe.
+
+---
+
+__Jack Watling__ is Senior Research Fellow for Land Warfare at RUSI. Jack works closely with the British military on the development of concepts of operation and assessments of the future operating environment, and conducts operational analysis of contemporary conflicts. He is a Global Fellow at the Wilson Center in Washington, DC.
+
+__Oleksandr V. Danylyuk__ closely cooperated for many years with the Ukrainian government structures in the defence, security and intelligence sectors. His main field of practical and academic expertise is Russian multidimensional warfare, active measures, and subversive activities of Russian and Soviet special services, as well as whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches to countering Russian hybrid aggression.
+
+__Nick Reynolds__ is Research Fellow for Land Warfare at RUSI. Nick’s research interests include land power, wargaming and simulation.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-19-small-eagle-big-dragon.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-19-small-eagle-big-dragon.md
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-19-small-eagle-big-dragon.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Small Eagle, Big Dragon
+author: Claude A Lambert
+date : 2024-07-19 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/h7R6fcy.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "China’s Expanding Role in UN Peacekeeping"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_In recent years, China has stepped up its contribution to UN peacekeeping operations, particularly in countries where doing so aligns with its strategic interests._ _The US must take action to reassert its leadership role in this space, not just to check Beijing’s growing influence, but to demonstrate that it is fully invested in bringing peace, security and stability to challenged regions._
+
+In the summer of 2021, to mark the 50th anniversary of China’s entry into the UN, Foreign Minister Wang Yi boasted of China’s peacekeeping efforts, highlighting that the country had fulfilled its pledge to establish an 8,000-member standby peacekeeping force, participated in 29 former and ongoing peacekeeping operations, and contributed more than 50,000 personnel. Wang declared, “China has met its responsibilities for upholding world peace. Over the past 50 years, China has taken the side of fairness, upholding equality and opposing interference in other countries’ internal affairs, power politics and hegemonism”. He emphasised that China’s active involvement was a major departure from its longstanding policy of not participating in UN peacekeeping missions, which – from Beijing’s point of view –strategists and policymakers had underappreciated for too many years.
+
+By most accounts, the international community widely appreciates China’s growing contribution due to the unprecedented demand for UN peacekeeping. Today’s peacekeeping missions are increasingly complex in terms of the scale and scope of their mandates. However, China’s expanding role in peace operations highlights its growing prominence within the UN. This development directly challenges the US’s strategic influence and its broader role as leader of the rules-based international order. It is essential to recognise that peacekeeping, stabilisation and large-scale combat operations are not mutually exclusive. Instead, peace operations should be viewed through the lens of strategic competition which the US government can use to its advantage while assisting populations in need.
+
+
+### Growth of Chinese Peacekeeping Activities
+
+Over the last 24 years, China has significantly expanded its participation in UN peacekeeping missions. In 2000, the country provided fewer than 100 personnel to all peace operations. Now, Beijing is the 10th largest troop and police contributor (2,274 personnel) of any country and the second largest financial supporter, providing nearly 19% of UN peacekeeping programme funding (see Figure 1). Moreover, China provides more peacekeepers to UN operations than all the other UN Security Council permanent members combined.
+
+
+_▲ Figure 1: Chinese Troop and Police Contributions to UN Missions, 2000–2023_
+
+While these contributions may appear positive for the overall UN peacekeeping agenda, China – like other countries – is motivated out of self-interest to advance its foreign policy objectives. Strong participation in UN peace operations is an ideal way for China to gain on-the-ground operational experience abroad, build multilateral cooperation, improve bilateral relations and advance a positive image domestically and worldwide. Also, China’s peacekeeping efforts appear to match its resource investments and economic interests, particularly in Africa, where more than three-quarters of Chinese nationals on UN missions are deployed. Beijing has progressively linked these deployments to protecting its interests and citizens on the continent.
+
+However, other significant factors may influence China’s peacekeeping activities apart from its economic interests, as suggested by data collected from 2012–2018 by Lucy Best. While China has disproportionately deployed peacekeepers in areas where it has commercial interests, investment levels do not necessarily lead to increased personnel counts. This implies that other factors could be at play in China’s decision to participate in peacekeeping missions.
+
+In addition to its growing troop and financial commitments, China established its Peacekeeping Affairs Centre in 2018 to coordinate international cooperation and manage its UN peacekeeping troop deployments, and is actively involved in leading peace training workshops and seminars. Through these efforts, China is gradually pressing for normative changes in UN peacekeeping that align with its more technocratic and state-centric vision.
+
+Most recently, China has been seeking to secure senior political and military peacekeeping leadership posts in the UN Department of Peace Operations (UNDPO), and it is alleged that Beijing wishes to supplant France as the head of the department – a position French diplomats have filled since 1966. To this end, China is building its depth of qualified personnel, as 13 of its military officers have held top UN operational peacekeeping positions, serving either as a force commander, deputy force commander, sector commander or deputy sector commander. If the assertions about Beijing’s ambitions prove correct, China could over time gain the experience and access needed to prioritise its interests to the detriment of US foreign policy objectives and Western peacekeeping norms.
+
+___`Strong participation in UN peace operations is an ideal way for China to gain on-the-ground operational experience abroad`___
+
+In June 2023, Beijing distributed a short English-language promotional film on its Ministry of National Defense website (and on YouTube) called “Here I Am”, depicting its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as a benevolent force that upholds justice and peace. The two-minute video combines live footage and animation highlighting the country’s military achievements in UN peacekeeping. While the video’s declarations may seem farfetched to some, it is undoubtedly good publicity. Chinese media and government officials portray these deployments as a positive investment in the country’s promise to support multilateral peace and stability missions. According to Courtney J Fung, China is seen by the UN community and beyond “as a committed peacekeeping state, one that recognises the value of peacekeeping for the UN and for its own discrete foreign policy goals.”
+
+
+### Current US Peacekeeping Efforts – Are They Enough?
+
+Since its inaugural mission in 1948, the US has consistently been the largest financial contributor to UN peacekeeping efforts. Despite maintaining its position as the top funder, the US ranks 84th out of 123 contributing countries regarding the number of peacekeeping personnel deployed. With only 24 peacekeepers participating across seven missions, the US troop and police contributions to UN peacekeeping operations have gradually decreased since 2000 (see Figure 2).
+
+Factors that have contributed to this decline include US military obligations in Afghanistan and Iraq, policy shifts in response to significant geopolitical events, and the domestic political environment. In addition to its financial and troop commitments, the US provides training and equipment to assist partner countries in developing key enabling capabilities to train and sustain peacekeeping proficiencies through efforts such as the US State Department-led Global Peace Operations Initiative and the African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership. With a total budget of more than $1.4 billion between fiscal years 2005–2022, these programmes provide a critical funding activity to prevent personnel readiness shortfalls in UN peace operations.
+
+
+_▲ Figure 2: US Troop and Police Contributions to UN Missions, 2000–2023_
+
+In 2015, at the Leaders’ Summit on Peacekeeping, President Barack Obama committed to expanding support for UN peace missions. He issued new presidential guidance, stating:
+
+> “We’ll work to double the number of US military officers serving in peacekeeping operations. We will offer logistical support, including our unrivaled network of air- and sea-lift. When there’s an urgent need…we’ll undertake engineering projects like building airfields and base camps for new missions. And we’ll step up our efforts to help build the UN’s capacity…”
+
+The summit was deemed a success, with 31 member states, including the US, committing to contribute over 40,000 troops and police, along with helicopters, engineering and naval units, and field hospitals. However, in the years that followed, the US’s commitment to enhancing UN peacekeeping operations seemed fleeting. Several initiatives have since stalled or been scaled down due to shifting US national security priorities.
+
+
+### Recommendations
+
+To prevent China from dominating UN peacekeeping and achieving its objectives in this mission space, the US should develop and implement several actions now to reassert its leadership role in authorising and shaping peace operations, limit Chinese influence, and demonstrate that it is fully invested in bringing peace, security and stability to challenged regions.
+
+At a minimum, the US should support building a bench of qualified military personnel to serve in senior UN billets as proposed in a 2021 Institute for National Strategic Studies report by Bryce Loidolt. Presently, UN headquarters and peace operations deployments are not viewed by the US military services as career-enhancing assignments. However, this attitude may change if senior officers are regularly nominated and selected to serve in key UN peacekeeping staff billets.
+
+In addition to filling UN peace mission mid-level general staff positions, the US should actively seek to fill key operational-level leadership positions such as Chief of Staff or Command Group Advisor. This would be an ideal way to make UN officer assignments more attractive within the US military and to demonstrate to all member states that the US has the requisite experience to compete for senior positions within UNDPO.
+
+A high-impact, low-cost initiative would be to appropriately staff and fund the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI). The institute serves as the military lead agent for joint advocacy of peace and stability operations. Additionally, PKSOI develops concepts, doctrine and training to ensure the US joint force, interagency and allies/partners have the requisite expertise to plan and execute peacekeeping and stability operations.
+
+Often, PKSOI actively participates with the UN on doctrine and concept development, ensuring that US values and peacekeeping norms are upheld. In a 2018 cost-cutting move, the Army decided to decrease PKSOI’s staff and budget dramatically. Restoring PKSOI’s staff and funding to pre-2018 levels (42 billets for $3 million per year) would go a long way in expanding its doctrinal reach inside the UN and signal to the military departments, interagency and the international community that the US values peacekeeping operations and understands that they are a critical conflict management tool, particularly in an era of great power competition.
+
+The US rarely makes public pronouncements or consistently touts its longstanding support for UN peacekeeping. So, the US government should develop a comprehensive and active engagement plan to communicate all the ways in which it contributes to UN peacekeeping operations. For example, the US Military Observer Group – the Department of Defense’s focal point for military members serving in the UN – does not have a social media presence, and the State Department has few articles announcing its achievements in support of UN peacekeeping. Frequently broadcasting these milestones on US government social media accounts and public-facing webpages would be a low-cost strategic investment that would enable the US to enhance its image and effectively use peacekeeping as a tool to advance its key foreign policy objectives.
+
+Moreover, formally published US peacekeeping themes and messages may encourage Combatant Commanders to develop complementary talking points in order to foster better relations and increase US credibility on the issue when they engage in bilateral discussions with major UN peacekeeping troop-contributing countries. The preponderance of these large troop contributors are in the Indo-Pacific and Africa – two strategically important regions to US security interests. Better messaging would assist in emphasising the importance of upholding Western-backed peacekeeping norms – protecting civilians, monitoring and preventing human rights violations, and pursuing governance and security sector reforms.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+While increasing US participation and visibility in UN peacekeeping operations offers benefits, it also entail risks. The US possesses substantial military capability and capacity, but these resources are finite and subject to ever-evolving foreign policy priorities. Despite these challenges, the US should capitalise on its contributions to UN peacekeeping by fostering relationships and securing access. This strategic approach would help to counter China’s influence, safeguard national security and advance the US’s foreign policy goals, ultimately enhancing its competitive edge.
+
+---
+
+__Claude A Lambert__ is a US Army Strategic Plans and Policy Officer. He is a US Army War College Fellow and a Visiting Scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-19-uk-on-israel-palestine.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-19-uk-on-israel-palestine.md
new file mode 100644
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-19-uk-on-israel-palestine.md
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : UK On Israel–Palestine
+author: H A Hellyer
+date : 2024-07-19 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/8ivKn7h.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Foreign Secretary Lammy’s “Balanced Position” on Israel–Palestine"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_The new UK government must act for a genuine and sustainable peace settlement in Israel–Palestine to be possible._
+
+
+
+As Sir Keir Starmer’s cabinet sets about establishing what Labour policies mean in government for the first time in more than 14 years, his ministers will find there are some issues that will prove as thorny in government as they did in opposition. When it comes to foreign policy, one such example would be the Middle East; and when it comes to the Middle East, one such example would be Israel and the Palestinians. Israel’s war on Gaza has gone on for more than nine months, following the Hamas-led attack on Israel in October 2023, with the UN Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, stating that civilians in Gaza are being pushed into, “ever deeper circles of hell”, due to the ensuing humanitarian situation arising from the Israeli campaign. On 7 July, David Lammy, the UK’s new foreign secretary, said that the UK seeks a “balanced position” on the current situation. How might that look on Israel–Gaza, and Israel–Palestine more generally?
+
+
+### The UK and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
+
+During the last Conservative period of government, from 2010 until this year, relations between Israel and the UK reached an apex of support signified by a 2030 roadmap agreement signed in 2023, establishing widespread cooperation in a variety of fields. At the same time, the British government’s official position on Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories remained transparent; repeated declarations by London indicated its view that international law considered East Jerusalem, Gaza and the West Bank to be occupied territory, and settlements therein illegal. (Indeed, a Conservative minister of state, Alan Duncan, spoke at RUSI in 2014 to make this point quite clear.)
+
+The last year has been a challenging one for British interests in the region; the 7 October attack on Israel, followed by Israel’s bombardment of Gaza, raised the threat of regional conflict, be it between Israel and Iran, Israel and Lebanon, as well as other theatres. As this author has mentioned with regard to Europe in another brief: a stable wider Arab world is in the UK’s ultimate interest; a wider Arab world and Middle East region in turmoil is precisely the opposite. Indeed, due to British interests being affected, the UK committed the use of force in the Red Sea against the Houthis, as a result of the latter’s escalation on international shipping lanes in the Red Sea – an escalation that would not have taken place had the war in Gaza been averted, or a ceasefire come to.
+
+Moreover, London’s diplomatic capital internationally is being impacted by the perception that the UK’s commitment to the “rules-based order” is not as absolute as it proclaims, because of the assessment that the UK has been lacking in balance vis-à-vis Israel–Palestine. As one G7 diplomat told the Financial Times months ago, “What we said about Ukraine has to apply to Gaza. Otherwise we lose all our credibility”. The UK stands in need of more, not less such diplomatic capital, with all the challenges on the horizon.
+
+
+### Immediate Future: Aid and Arms Sales
+
+In the immediate future, the restoration of UK funding to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), announced by the Foreign Secretary on Friday 19 July, is a welcome step that ought to be followed up by British moves to improve aid transfers to the Palestinian occupied territories. Criticisms by the former Conservative government about the difficulty to get aid into Gaza due to Israeli obstacles remain valid; restoration of support to UNRWA is necessary to reduce the humanitarian crisis, but there remain other difficulties to be addressed.
+
+Another near-term topic that is likely to come up again quite soon is that of arms sales to Israel by the UK. While it is true that such arms sales represent a small proportion of arms transfers to Israel, as the former foreign secretary Lord Cameron pointed out, such a point is immaterial to HMG’s legal obligations. Under the UK’s strategic export licensing criteria (SELC), London is required to prevent the transfer of military equipment where there is a clear or overriding risk that such equipment might be used to facilitate a serious violation of international law.
+
+___`While London is not in the business of telling the Israeli population how to vote, the British government should make clear to its ally what its own values are`___
+
+More than 130 parliamentarians in the last parliament argued this was already the case, joining many different human rights and aid organisations. Crucially, the Foreign Affairs Committee chair in the last parliament, Alicia Kearns, repeatedly raised the issue of whether or not export licence applications for Israel have been referred to ministers over the past year. If the UK were to take the step of suspending or restricting such export licences, they would be joining a number of their allies; Belgium, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Canada, Italy, and Spain have already done so.
+
+Additionally, it may be that HMG legal advice has already recommended such a step. When in opposition, Foreign Secretary Lammy criticised the then Conservative-led government for not publishing the legal advice provided; it would be prudent for him to do so now, in order to show that a page has been turned in this regard.
+
+Of the short-term decisions, this is perhaps the most difficult, because it would place the UK in a place different from its close allies in the US, France and Germany. Simultaneously, it is important to note that previous British governments, including those of David Cameron, Gordon Brown, Tony Blair, and Margaret Thatcher, all suspended arms sales to Israel on different occasions – the precedent has already been set.
+
+
+### Medium Term: the ICC and Palestine Recognition
+
+In the medium term, there are two critical areas that are likely to be raised. The first relates to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the ICC prosecutor general, Karim Khan. Prominent US Republican politicians, including the newly announced candidate for the US vice-presidency, J D Vance, have called for sanctions against and an investigation into Khan, as a result of the latter’s calling for arrest warrants against Israeli officials. The Biden administration has also confirmed it wants to work with Congress to penalise the ICC. As a signatory of the Rome Statute that established the ICC, in addition to the fact that Khan is a British citizen, the UK ought to vigorously defend the ICC and the prosecutor general. London’s discreet challenge against ICC jurisdiction over Israeli officials, lodged in the last weeks of the last government, should be withdrawn; its continuation, particularly given the weak legal basis and existing challenges against the ICC, would be viewed as lacklustre support for the ICC.
+
+The second medium-term issue pertains to immediate recognition of the State of Palestine, which was, until relatively recently, a Labour policy. Labour has now changed that policy to indicate that recognition will happen as part of a peace process, rather than at the conclusion of that process, and that Labour was committed to such recognition. The reluctance to immediately recognise the State of Palestine is primarily due to a desire to avoid a rift with US President Joe Biden, which is understandable given London’s overarching security architecture. But it is not a foregone conclusion that London’s recognition would create a rift of any consequence with Washington DC. A total of 144 of the 193 member states of the UN already recognise the State of Palestine, including a majority of European states – their relations with Washington DC have been unaffected.
+
+The question is: given the option of recognition, should the UK still resist it? British recognition of a Palestinian state would not immediately bring one into existence, so one could argue it is merely symbolic, and hardly consequential. The opposing argument is that recognition by the UK is qualitatively different than many other countries, given London’s historic role in the Israel–Palestine question. When Norway recognised a Palestinian state earlier this year, it was essentially stating that Oslo no longer believed in the Oslo Peace Process. The more such political messages are sent, the more pressure there is for a political process to be reinvigorated, rather than the continuation of an unstable status quo.
+
+
+### Long term: UK Political Convergence and Divergence on Israel–Palestine
+
+Finally, there are longer term issues that the UK will have to address. The developing nature of the Israeli political spectrum has seen over the past decade a widening and mainstreaming of the Israeli far-right, with not only attitudes hardening on the margins, but in the centre. The latest such example was the near-entirety of the Israeli Knesset voted against Palestinian statehood, and thus the two-state solution itself, on the 18th of July; a political settlement that the international community, including the UK, has rallied behind for decades. Extreme radical views are expressed not only by members of far-right political parties, but also within traditionally centre-right ones, such as Likud. While London is not in the business of telling the Israeli population how to vote, the British government should make clear to its ally what its own values are.
+
+___`London should consider re-evaluating the 2030 roadmap agreement that was signed with Israel in 2023`___
+
+To that end, the sanctions regime that the UK FCDO has, and which it instituted against two extremist groups in Israel in May, should be widened. The settlement movement in the West Bank has not been infiltrated by extremist elements that need to be isolated; rather, the settlement movement is in itself an illegal enterprise, supported by the Israeli government and military. British courts, British politicians and the British government have made it abundantly clear on numerous occasions that East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza are all occupied territories, and that the occupying power is the State of Israel. HMG policy should make it clear that settlement activity writ large ought to result in sanctions. Moreover, as the ICC and International Court of Justice (ICJ) investigations continue, it is likely that there will be Israeli, as well as Hamas figures, that are sanctioned or the subject of arrest warrants. London should prepare for this, as it is likely that highly senior figures in the Israeli government will be affected, and London ought to make it clear that it upholds the independence of both the ICC and the ICJ.
+
+London already has a strongly effective system of restrictions and sanctions with regard to Hamas and support for terrorism, via legal and political measures, and little more seems necessary in that regard. However, in coordination with particularly European allies, which has substantial leverage with regard to the Palestinian Authority owing to existing EU aid packages, the UK should focus on “more for more”; not by threatening a withdrawal of aid, particularly at a time of tremendous suffering, but by proposing increased access to European and British markets for Palestinian trade, in exchange for improvements in governance by Palestinian authorities.
+
+Given the ongoing widespread concerns around violations of international humanitarian law, London should furthermore consider re-evaluating the 2030 roadmap agreement that was signed with Israel in 2023. That agreement has significant impact on bilateral relations on military support and trade, among a wide variety of other fields. Given that Israel is currently in the dock at the ICJ for genocide charges, a suspension of the agreement until the outcome of the case at least, would seem prudent.
+
+Finally, the UK, while remaining aware and humble about its ability to directly impact the situation on the ground, should nonetheless recognise its tremendous indirect leveraging power. The UK enjoys a privileged relationship with the US, which has the most direct consequential impact on the Israel–Palestine question. London also has extensive and deep contacts with Arab states that are extremely important with regard to the conflict, particularly Egypt, Jordan, Qatar and the UAE. If the US were to use the leverage it has over the Israelis, and Arab states were to simultaneously use their leverage over the Palestinians, the prospects for a genuine and sustainable peace settlement in Israel–Palestine would be far easier to materialise.
+
+The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been ongoing for decades, and it is tempting to see it as an unsolvable foreign policy issue. But such defeatist thinking led to the political dynamic that eventually led to the terrible events of 7 October, and sent the region into a deeply dangerous spiral of escalation and violence. UK national security interests stipulate that London further prospects for a wider peace in the region, if only to hold back the possibility of wider escalation of violence, and corresponding impacts on British interests.
+
+---
+
+__H A Hellyer__ is the Senior Associate Fellow of RUSI. Specialising in geopolitics, security studies, political economy, and belief, he has more than 20 years of experience in governmental, corporate advisory, and academic environments in Europe, USA, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-22-russias-cyber-campaign.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-22-russias-cyber-campaign.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..5841b7e4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-22-russias-cyber-campaign.md
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Russia’s Cyber Campaign
+author: Dan Black
+date : 2024-07-22 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/V1V4uqF.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Russia’s Cyber Campaign Shifts to Ukraine’s Frontlines"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Russian intelligence services have now adapted their thinking about how to optimally integrate cyber and conventional capabilities._
+
+
+
+With the main thrust of Russia’s anticipated summer offensive underway, it is an opportune moment to take stock of the significant and underappreciated changes that have taken hold in Moscow’s approach to cyber operations in Ukraine.
+
+Much Western analysis to date has fixated on Russia’s highly visible opening cyber offensive, the merits of its approach, and the potential for a renewed destructive campaign of a similar nature against Ukrainian critical infrastructure. This focus is misplaced, however, and has anchored Western understanding of the war’s cyber dimensions to Russia’s countervalue strategy to amass societal pressure via the widespread sabotage of computer networks – an approach that has not seen primacy since the invasion’s first year when assumptions about a short war still guided Russia’s theory of victory.
+
+The harsher reality is that Russia’s intelligence services have adapted their posture in cyberspace to the demands of a long war. Mounting evidence, stretching back to the months preceding Ukraine’s counteroffensive in 2023, indicates that multiple Russian cyber units have shifted their sights away from strategic civilian targets toward soldiers’ computers and mobiles endpoints in order to enable tactical military objectives on Ukraine’s frontlines. This change in operational focus has been cross-cutting, with Russian military intelligence (GRU) and the domestic security service (FSB) – long renowned for rivalry and mistrust – unifying their earlier disjointed cyber efforts and systematising a series of tradecraft adaptations intended to increase their military effectiveness.
+
+This has been a relative shift in priorities rather than a complete overhaul of Russia’s wider strategy. There remain patterns of operational activity indicative of sustained interest in Ukrainian critical infrastructure objects that would hold no immediate intelligence value, and therefore likely represent preparations for future sabotage. What is clear, however, is that Moscow has rebalanced its overarching concept of operations to emphasise targets that can provide more direct and tangible battlefield advantages to its conventional forces.
+
+These adjustments are not solely a reflection of Russia’s scaled-down ambitions in Ukraine, nor how its wider perception of Kyiv’s centre of gravity have changed over the past two years as the conflict intensified into a war of attrition. They are also an important signal of how Russia’s intelligence services have adapted their thinking about how to optimally integrate cyber and conventional capabilities after two years of high-intensity engagement, and what the coming months may bring as Russia makes a new push in eastern Ukraine.
+
+
+### Russia’s Tactical Pivot
+
+The refocusing of Russia’s cyber campaign to meet what is almost certainly an increasing demand for tactical-relevant signals intelligence (SIGINT) has largely fallen into a few main lines of effort.
+
+___`Beyond targeted efforts to gain access to devices and systems used by Ukrainian soldiers, Russia has also reoriented its cyber forces to help locate Ukrainian military equipment and positions`___
+
+The first has been penetrating devices used by Ukrainian soldiers at the front. Not only has Kyiv’s emphasis on “data-driven combat” made smartphones an invaluable source of location data to establish patterns of movement and locate and target Ukrainian positions, but the military’s dependence on free encrypted messaging applications (EMAs), such as Signal for secure operational communication, has made the ability to eavesdrop on these devices of paramount importance for both the GRU and the FSB.
+
+The challenge for Moscow is that collecting these types of signals is not a trivial feat at scale. The cryptographic protocols used by popular EMAs have withstood rigorous public scrutiny, and it is unlikely Russia’s services are capable of quietly breaking them. Phones at the front are also unlikely to be connected to mobile networks where geolocation and other signals can be reliably collected upstream through compromised telecommunications infrastructure or by electronic warfare capabilities. This has driven the intelligence services to adopt a few operational concepts to fill this critical collection gap.
+
+One method has been conventional attempts at full-device compromise using malware, more often than not, disguised as applications used by the Ukrainian military. While this tradecraft is not altogether new – the GRU first altered a Ukrainian app to geolocate artillery units in 2016 – the masking of malware as versions of mobile applications has increased significantly in response to Kyiv’s suite of software-driven military innovations. These operations have generally relied on highly tailored social engineering, repurposing legitimate military communications, and directly interacting with targets over Signal and Telegram chats to build rapport before delivering the malicious applications.
+
+The other more novel method has been to siphon messages through the device-linking feature built into common EMAs. One Russian military-affiliated unit has dedicated its focus to social engineering Ukrainian soldiers into linking Russian-intelligence controlled instances of EMAs including Signal, Telegram and WhatsApp to their accounts. Similarly focused FSB operations have centred on exploiting systems already linked to Ukrainian soldiers’ phones. According to Microsoft, cyber operators linked to Center 16, the FSB’s main SIGINT unit, have shown a specific interest in stealing files containing messages from the Signal Desktop application, providing them access to the target’s private Signal conversations and attachments.
+
+In a similar vein, the GRU is also engaged in the close-access exploitation of mobile devices and other systems captured by Russian forces on the battlefield to achieve similar access. Here, cyber operators have begun to technically enable their counterparts within the Russian military to independently initiate the collection of intelligence from Ukrainian devices.
+
+For example, the author’s Mandiant research has highlighted how the GRU’s Main Center for Special Technologies (GTsST), commonly known as APT44 or Sandworm, has provided dedicated infrastructure and technical instructions to Russian ground forces so that they can exfiltrate Telegram and Signal communications from captured devices at the front. The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) has similarly reported on Sandworm using captured devices as a foothold to deliver malware known as Infamous Chisel to penetrate military networks and gather data on connected Starlink terminals and the suite of specialised applications used by the Ukrainian military.
+
+Another major line of effort has been to penetrate the digital systems used by the Ukrainian army for command and control, situational awareness and other operational needs. It is no secret that digitised battlefield management systems like Delta and Kropyva have been a critical enabler of information and combat advantages for the Ukrainian army. In fact, Moscow has perceived these systems to be so effective that it has undertaken efforts to develop exact replicas for the Russian military. Unlike attempts to deliver malware disguised as these applications to compromise endpoints, this category of operations has instead focused on tricking soldiers to give up their credentials, providing Russia’s services a surreptitious lens into Kyiv’s common operational picture.
+
+Beyond targeted efforts to gain access to devices and systems used by Ukrainian soldiers, Russia has also reoriented its cyber forces to help locate Ukrainian military equipment and positions. The SBU has warned of Russian efforts to control compromised webcams in population centres to locate Ukrainian air defences and other critical infrastructure objects and feed targeting data into its reconnaissance-strike complex. Dutch military intelligence has similarly alerted publics to the overall refocusing of Russia’s cyber campaign, highlighting operations designed to locate and map military positions and equipment for later physical seizure. Those providing assistance to Ukraine should factor in the potential risks of this cyber-enabled surveillance activity, as the intensifying campaign of sabotage across Europe strongly indicates that insight into Western military supply chains is a clear collection priority for Russia’s intelligence services at the moment.
+
+Notably, each of these new operational concepts point to a deepening two-way relationship between Russian cyber and conventional forces, and the extension of their early coordination efforts to now encompass both strategic and tactical objectives. What’s more, they signal that for specific operations, Russian cyber elements have likely also moved closer to the front to capitalise on the short-lived tactical intelligence that these mobile devices might provide. Looking forward, it is reasonable to expect further adaptations and operational concepts to arise from this closer relationship as the war continues.
+
+
+### Implications For Ukraine and NATO
+
+The main takeaway for Western policymakers is that mobile devices have become a critical centre of gravity for Russia’s cyber campaign in Ukraine. The war’s technology-dense and sensor-rich frontlines have placed a premium on the ability to collect signals from soldiers’ devices and the digital networks that connect them. With new technologies continuing to shape the battlefield and drive tactical innovations on the front lines, these types of operations are only likely to grow more common as the war continues.
+
+___`Ukraine’s impressive defensive feats aside, Russia’s adapted force employment demands renewed attention on how to best sustain international support for Ukraine’s cyber defences`___
+
+What is important to recognise is that this is a fundamentally different technology environment where earlier lessons about the capacity of governments and the private sector to support Ukrainian cyber defences are less likely to hold. Visibility into sensitive military networks and mobile devices is much more opaque, virtual incident response is more difficult, and fewer defensive partners are likely to have capabilities readied for this type of security assistance. Ukraine’s impressive defensive feats aside, Russia’s adapted force employment demands renewed attention on how to best sustain international support for Ukraine’s cyber defences. This is especially important now that other emerging threats are increasingly consuming limited intelligence resources and attention.
+
+Equally as important, we must begin to acknowledge that the second-order consequences of these espionage operations can be grave. Take, for example, the lethal strike on Ukraine’s 128th Mountain Assault Brigade in November 2023 that was traced back to the penetration of a soldier’s Signal account. At a time when conventional wisdom has grown dismissive about the military benefit that cyber operations have afforded Russia, it is important that we carefully consider the implications of this mission realignment and what it portends about cyber’s expanding role in kinetic, conventional operations now that attrition is the key element of Russia’s strategy.
+
+Malicious linked devices will continue to provide intercepts even when phones are disconnected, destroyed or otherwise inactive, as Signal messages do not need to route through the target’s phone to be delivered to a linked device. Communications will therefore still reach Russian operators even when they will not necessarily reach the intended Ukrainian recipient. As one Ukrainian expert puts it, if “a soldier from a battalion group gets captured or dies, his phone falls into the hands of the enemy, and the Russians read all the correspondence in this group for another month”. The long-tail impact of these operations can be severe.
+
+We should also be prepared for Russia’s new operational concepts to proliferate outside of Ukraine. Today, Signal and other EMAs have become standard practice for sensitive communications. These applications see ubiquitous use by Western militaries, politicians, civil-society groups, and other common targets of Russia’s intelligence services. Russia’s war-focused tactics could therefore reasonably see wider use to fulfil other urgent intelligence requirements, such as the collection of foreign political intelligence from Ukraine’s partners, or in potential efforts to influence one of the many consequential Western elections on the horizon. If history has taught us anything, it’s that Russian tradecraft rarely stays confined to Ukraine.
+
+---
+
+__Dan Black__ is a Manager of Cyber Espionage Analysis at Google Cloud’s Mandiant, overseeing analysis of government-backed cyber operations. He is also currently a senior researcher with the European Cyber Conflict Research Initiative (ECCRI).
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-23-orbital-dynamics.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-23-orbital-dynamics.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Orbital Dynamics
+author: Laura Delgado López
+date : 2024-07-23 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/nQlQiRu.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "The Domestic and Foreign Policy Forces Shaping Latin American Engagement in Space"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Today’s space activities in Latin America are built on decades of government activity and involve a variety of countries and nongovernmental actors._ _An understudied topic, these efforts have involved extensive international cooperation and largely focus on activities tied to societal benefits. China has been a leading partner in many Latin American space projects and the primary focus of U.S. interest in space activities in the region. While important in the context of U.S.-China competition, this approach proves limiting in understanding the real imperatives and constraints behind international space engagement in the region, whether with China or the many other nations with which Latin American countries collaborate in space. Understanding the complex domestic and foreign policy factors impacting these choices is essential for developing U.S. engagement strategies and policies that fully leverage the vital opportunities afforded by space activities in the context of U.S.–Latin American relations._
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+Space developments in Latin America remain relatively unknown to U.S. analysts and policymakers. One reason is that the outsized presence of China — responsible for the launch of over a dozen satellites on behalf of Latin American countries — is so often the focal point of English-language study of this topic. This analytical approach is typically framed as a chapter in the larger story of great power competition, with emphasis on strategic and security concerns given relative U.S. disengagement with the region. Yet it does little to explain why Latin American countries choose space-related partnerships with China — or, just as importantly, because the world has multiple spheres of influence and nations do not split cleanly into two sides, why they choose many other international partners.
+
+It is not just about great power politics. Latin American actors operate in space as they do in other domains, with complex moves in both the domestic and foreign policy realms. When placed in a broader context that considers domestic constraints, as well as international foreign policy objectives, the complex modalities of international space engagement in the region — featuring civil and defense actors, civil society, academia, and industry — start to make more sense. For example, extensive Chinese-Brazilian collaboration to develop and operate the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) program has not prevented Brazil from making its proposed contributions to the United States’ Moon exploration program Artemis or participating in space security exchanges with the U.S. military. Instead, these reflect Brazil’s “universalist” approach to space cooperation, which echoes a foreign policy tradition of active nonalignment to keep all avenues of collaboration open.
+
+
+
+It matters why and how Latin American space actors engage internationally. While Latin American countries’ choices in space partners are not simply an indication of attitudes toward the United States, these developments do have implications for U.S. strategic objectives, both in space and beyond. Oversimplifying these choices and failing to understand the drivers and constraints of space activities in the region risks the development of partnership strategies that fail to meet the needs of potential partners and are thus not seen as viable alternatives. It could also close the door on other opportunities beyond the realm of space. Efforts to advance U.S. objectives in the region would thus prove challenging and ineffective, with significant geopolitical implications.
+
+More broadly, space activities are linked to some of the most pressing issues facing decisionmakers today, from national security to agricultural production in the face of climate change. Latin American countries have observed the experience of actors such as India, which has successfully integrated space into its national development agenda, and thus see the potential for space to serve as a cross-cutting tool to address national priorities. The successful integration of space tools and applications is therefore pivotal in addressing the key Latin American issues of today, whether to support efforts to curb illegal fishing, understand the Venezuela-Guyana territorial border dispute, or assess recovery after Rio Grande do Sul’s devastating floods.
+
+This brief captures findings from a yearlong study of the international engagement efforts of a subset of Latin American space actors through the lens of both domestic and foreign policy. It draws on extensive reading of primary and secondary sources in English, Spanish, and Portuguese; analysis of presentations and public remarks; and not-for-attribution interviews with government officials and other experts. The study fills a gap in the literature by shedding light on the broader context of space development in Latin America, where international cooperation has been central. Ultimately, this work seeks to contribute to the development of U.S. engagement strategies and policies that fully leverage the vital opportunities afforded by space activities in U.S.–Latin American relations.
+
+The brief first paints a broad picture of space development and international space engagement in Latin America. It then examines three case studies that exemplify different types of international engagement, discussing the domestic and foreign policy drivers and constraints impacting these efforts. The brief then closes by assessing the implications for U.S. policymakers, offering several recommendations.
+
+
+### An “Emerging” Space Region
+
+Space activities are not new to Latin American countries. Space development in Latin America can be grouped into three general periods. The first began in the 1960s with Argentina and Brazil establishing space-focused entities and adopting a similar strategic approach to space as that of the United States, China, and the Soviet Union. Next, these early, largely military-led programs shifted to wholly civil or dual-use approaches in the 1990s amid the post–Cold War security landscape. The third and current phase exhibits important milestones across a wider set of countries and actors, such as universities and private companies.
+
+Stated priorities continue to focus on acquiring, leveraging, or developing space technologies for societal need, with a particular emphasis on telecommunications and Earth observation rather than human spaceflight. For instance, the head of the Brazilian Space Agency (AEB), commenting on potential Brazilian contributions to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)’s Artemis program, noted that while sending an astronaut to space “generates visibility,” it is “not the most important thing in the Brazilian space program. Its primary objective, from the beginning, is to generate benefits for society.”
+
+There is “profound heterogeneity” in the region’s space activities, which nevertheless share basic principles — such as support for the core international space treaties — and often retain an operational and leadership role for the military. A discussion of the space-related milestones achieved by the many Latin American countries is beyond the scope of this paper. It is important to note, however, that these have included activity across the technology, institutional, and international cooperation domains since the beginning — such as Ecuador ratifying the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (one of the core international space treaties) in 1972 and Costa Rica hosting the first Space Conference of the Americas in 1990. The diversity and breadth of activity in Latin America exhibits the limitations of simply describing it as an “emerging” space region, which implies that there has been very little activity and only very recently.
+
+
+
+Latin American countries’ international engagement on space issues has been a core tenet since the 1960s. As reflected in Brazil’s National Program for Space Activities, PNAE 2022–2031, international cooperation is both a means (to advance national space development) as well as an end (to strengthen strategic alliances). In addition, every one of the projects of Argentina’s National Space Activities Commission (CONAE) has been developed through international cooperation, according to its director.
+
+Whereas discussion of international cooperation tends to highlight joint projects or bilateral development efforts, Latin American space engagement has notably featured leadership in international coordination and cooperation bodies. Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico were among the 18 member states of the 1958 UN ad hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), which later become a permanent committee and remains central for information exchange and cooperation in the peaceful use of space. Via national subject-matter experts and through the UN Group of Latin American Countries, the region has had significant weight in multilateral space governance efforts. This includes Brazil chairing a 2019 COPUOS session at which members adopted a set of voluntary best practices for space activities and Chile chairing the 2022 UN-convened working group on space threats, which saw active engagement from several other countries in the region.
+
+Finally, today’s space activities in Latin America are increasingly spreading to the nongovernment realm, with new business ventures, including start-ups, being stood up even in countries with no national space programs. Presenting a new set of challenges for how to govern space activities, multiple civil society and advocacy organizations have formed to support the Latin American space industry and address the constraints on entry into the global space market. Worthy of future research, this is yet another dynamic that illustrates shared regional conditions and challenges. Taken as a whole, the Latin American space landscape is complex, full of energy, and hosts a diverse set of space actors who continue to advance international partnerships and engagement.
+
+
+### Three Looks at International Space Engagement in Latin America
+
+Foreign and domestic policy considerations motivate and constrain the space activities of Latin American nations in ways that impact the priorities and lines of effort (“what”), rationales (“why”), institutions involved (“who”), and implementation approaches (“how”) of such efforts. The following case studies examine different types of international engagement among several actors. Selected collaborations do not include China and cannot be explained by great power politics, thereby highlighting the complexities at play in Latin American space decisions beyond strategic rivalry. Additionally, while these efforts began with decisions made decades ago, they represent important developments shaping space activities today.
+
+#### Autonomy and Dependency in Chile’s National Satellites
+
+Unique among its neighbors, Chile opted to meet national security needs for data about its territory by sourcing Earth observation satellites commercially. The Chilean Air Force (FACh) used technology transfer contracts to procure its first national Earth observation satellites, FASat-Alpha and FASat-Bravo, from the United Kingdom’s Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd. (SSTL), then the lead manufacturer of commercial small satellites for international customers. In 1998, it successfully orbited FASat-Bravo after FASat-Alpha failed to deploy in 1995. The satellite’s successor, FASat-Charlie, was procured from Europe’s Astrium (now Airbus Defence and Space, which owns SSTL) and launched in 2011. Registered under the Chilean flag, the satellites added highly prized experience in satellite operations to Chile’s existing knowledge base on the interpretation and use of images and data from air- and space-borne remote sensing systems.
+
+In 2019, Chile announced a new national space effort. The National Satellite System (SNSat) would not just replace the aging FASat-Charlie but also include a national development component so that Chilean engineers would build the bulk of a new constellation of 10 small satellites. SNSat also includes plans to spread infrastructure and capacity more widely across Chile, helping address the development gap between Santiago and outer regions. Supported by an interministerial space council and a draft national space policy released for public comment in November 2023, SNSat attempts to address earlier calls for a national space program that meets national needs.
+
+The differing narratives behind these efforts, however, demonstrate the disconnects among the major Chilean institutions involved in space activities and the limitations of a program housed in a branch of the armed services. In August 2023, the Ministry of Defense, FACh, and Senate of Chile hosted a conference on “national space sovereignty.” While this makes sense from a military standpoint, this was criticized by several Chilean experts interviewed because speaking of “sovereignty” is at odds with international space law, which Chilean diplomats have long promoted and which explicitly prohibits sovereignty claims in space. Rather than a concerted shift in policy, inconsistencies such as this reflect domestic divides between operational/military voices and diplomatic voices speaking independently.
+
+The utilization of FASat-Charlie is also telling. A recent article found that Chile’s National Forestry Corporation (CONAF) did not use images from Charlie during the 2019–21 wildfire seasons, as had earlier been reported. Conversations with experts pointed to a combination of issues, including limited awareness of actual distribution channels, military restrictions on access, and the lack of a governance system to facilitate wider use. For example, FASat-Charlie was procured under a now-defunct law that allocated revenues from copper mining to purchases of materiel. With the satellite classified as a weapons system, it was required to remain within military control. In addition, the initial absence of guidelines to determine satellite tasking priority and distribution protocols for nonmilitary users frustrated civilians requesting imagery from FACh’s Aerophotogrammetric Service (SAF). Compounded by required user fees for SAF-processed data products, which added to both costs and delays, Chileans “turned elsewhere” to meet their satellite imagery needs, according to a former SAF official. Many governmental and private users turned to international sources of data, which could at times be acquired more quickly and cheaply. For example, Copernicus Chile, an imagery hub at the University of Chile, provides private and public institutions with data from the European satellite system Copernicus.
+
+This complicated landscape has shaped the approach to SNSat, which is built on a long-term ambition of increased technical autonomy, including access to assets that Chile does not develop independently. Before the June 2023 launch of FASat-Delta — the first microsatellite under SNSat — Chile celebrated the first successful download of images from a virtual constellation of 200 foreign satellites. Providing access to different data types (e.g., radar and multispectral images beyond the visible range), the arrangement provides continuity to FASat-Charlie while better serving nonmilitary applications such as scientific research.
+
+However, SNSat involves difficult trade-offs. In contrast to its predecessors, FASat-Delta is not operated by FACh but by its contractor, Israeli company ImageSat International. As co-owner, FACh has priority access to data from the satellite — but only through a service arrangement, rather than direct satellite tasking. Recent diplomatic tensions between Chile and Israel have raised concerns about potential impacts. In March 2024, President Gabriel Boric excluded Israel from participating in the International Air and Space Fair (FIDAE) in Santiago. This was consistent with the president’s criticisms of Israeli actions in Gaza, an issue that has drawn significant domestic attention in Chile, which has the largest Palestinian diaspora outside of the Middle East. Nevertheless, this move was widely criticized for risking the multidecadal alliance with Israel in the scientific and defense realm upon which Chile relies. “The government’s decision could leave Chile without its satellites, which is very serious from the point of view of controlling the country’s security,” said former officials in an interview. While the Chilean government confirmed that it had no intentions of severing relations, Israel pulled its military attaché from its embassy in Santiago.
+
+Beyond the diplomatic strife, FASat-Delta is already facing technical challenges. As of May 2024, 300 days after launch, Delta was not yet operational due to issues discovered during validation and testing. Furthermore, until a ground segment antenna is installed in Chilean territory, a required component for receiving signals from the satellite as it passes overhead, FACh will not be able to download images directly.
+
+For the time being, the delay in operations will increase users’ real and perceived reliance on external capabilities, complicating efforts to sustain the long-term political and resource investment required to execute the full vision for SNSat. In this landscape, leveraging frameworks such as the domestic space council to coordinate the apparently divergent national space communities will be essential for generating stakeholder buy-in. If successful at integrating space-related decisions into a larger national discourse, Chile’s experience will be helpful for other Latin American countries navigating the delicate balance between autonomy and dependency in space capabilities.
+
+#### SABIA-Mar: South-South Competition and Cooperation
+
+The relationship between Argentina and Brazil reflects broad waves of “advances and setbacks, comings and goings” as each country navigates its perceived regional and international standing and the dependencies of a shared border. Likewise, space is “a lagging (not leading) indicator of bilateral relations.”
+
+After a period of intense distrust over concerns that the other nation was developing nuclear weapons, Argentina and Brazil reached a landmark bilateral solution to the nuclear question that paved the way for other collaboration. In 1989, Argentina and Brazil (now both under civilian rule) issued a joint presidential declaration calling space cooperation a “multiplying factor” in sustainable development. In 1996, shortly after establishing their own civil space agencies, the parties signed a framework agreement that has been repeatedly expanded and still guides their overarching space cooperation. From early integration and testing of Argentina’s Science Application Satellites series in Brazilian facilities to the use of Argentinean industry components on Brazil’s first homegrown satellite, Amazonia-1, the partners’ increasingly complex technical cooperation efforts are now focused on a major shared priority: water. With Argentina’s CONAE marking over 30 years of “looking at Earth from space” and Brazil’s efforts to manage its strategic maritime territory known as the Blue Amazon, the ocean-focused effort is a “natural partnership.”
+
+During a state visit to Buenos Aires in 2008, Brazilian president Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva issued a joint statement with Argentinian president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner endorsing the satellite project and noting the “strategic” nature of the bilateral relationship. Having evolved from an initial concept in 1998 which was further fleshed out in subsequent agreements, the Satellite for Applications Based on Environmental Marine Information (SABIA-Mar) project kicked off with the goal of developing two identical satellites for ocean monitoring and mapping.
+
+Yet each side did not make progress at the same rate. Significant resource constraints in Brazil were exacerbated by setbacks such as the delayed development of the Multi-Mission Platform (MMP), the satellite bus Brazil was to contribute to the project, and the 2013 failure of CBERS-3, a satellite in the joint program with China. To ensure the continuous flow of data, China and Brazil accelerated development of CBERS-4 by one year, drawing resources away from other projects. Thus, despite healthy relations between AEB and CONAE, Brazil had little to show for its part in SABIA-Mar a decade in, and its role in the project was uncertain. Tellingly, in the PNAE, Brazil’s 10-year space plan released in late 2021, SABIA-Mar was listed as a “proposed project” that could potentially use “spare parts” from another satellite. According to an expert then working at AEB, the agency conducted an internal review in 2021 on what had happened with the project and came up with options for consideration, including formal withdrawal.
+
+A combination of technical and political factors turned the tide in 2023. One of these was the success of Brazil’s first fully domestic satellite, Amazonia-1, which launched in 2021 and demonstrated the maturity of the MMP. On the political side, President Lula’s return to power in January 2023 overlapped with the end of President Alberto Fernández’s term (and consequently Fernández de Kirchner’s term as vice president), prompting a quick warming of relations. Intent on reengaging with allies after the “radical departure” of President Jair Bolsonaro, Brazil hurried to strengthen ties through high-level engagements that included cooperation on science and space in advance of a similarly dramatic change in leadership in Argentina later that year. At last, with Brazil recommitting to its participation in the project, the partners are working to field two satellites: SABIA-Mar 1 will be fully developed by Argentina and SABIA-Mar 2 will be Brazil’s responsibility.
+
+Despite these encouraging steps, SABIA-Mar’s future is uncertain. Resource commitments are in no way a given in Brazil, which invested only about a third of the monies required to execute space activities envisioned in its previous 10-year plan. Now under President Javier Milei’s administration, Argentina has significantly slashed government spending as part of austerity measures and maintains a tense relationship with Brazil — making it uncertain whether Argentina’s satellite will complete development by the 2026 target launch date.
+
+Back in 2008, during his speech in Buenos Aires, President Lula spoke of the bilateral alliance being “indispensable” to each country’s national goals and to the need to emphasize areas of agreement over the differences he acknowledged would always exist. Today’s tensions between Brazil’s and Argentina’s leaders increase the risk that these differences, while unlikely to threaten long-standing strategic interests, may overtake cooperative efforts, especially if problems arise that require diverting already limited resources. Analysts have pointed to the risks carried by recent visible, petty fights among Latin American leaders, noting that “multiple presidents fighting with each other as if they’re trying to win a reality show means that governing and cooperation do not occur.” While space is not going to play a leading role in the bilateral Argentina-Brazil relationship, the latest dispute between Presidents Milei and Lula could mean projects such as SABIA-Mar get caught in the crossfire as the relationship ebbs and flows over the coming years. Ultimately, if SABIA-Mar is successful, it will indeed be Latin America’s “most significant example of South–South cooperation,” not just because of complex technical demands but also due to the interplay of forces involved in maintaining this collaboration through the decades.
+
+#### Latin America’s ESA?
+
+The Latin American and Caribbean Space Agency (ALCE) was launched in Mexico City in 2021 at a session of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) presided by Mexico. Co-championed by Argentina, which has proposed a regional space entity in its national space plans since 2000, ALCE’s roots can be traced back to the 1970s.
+
+While much has been written about Latin America’s expectations regarding the region’s long hoped-for counterpart to the European Space Agency (ESA), ALCE is just now on the cusp of beginning formal operations. Written into ALCE’s constitutive agreement is a requirement that at least 11 countries ratify it before it enters into force. Even as ALCE continues to garner signatories — 21 countries as of May 2024 — formal ratification has proven challenging. Reflecting on the challenges of clearing this “legal-diplomatic” hurdle, the Mexican representative to ALCE, Ambassador Gustavo Alonso Cabrera Rodríguez, lamented the confluence of institutional and political factors that has led to the significant delay. Speaking at FIDAE in April 2024, he wondered at the willingness of members to assign dedicated representatives, saying that without designated space institutions such issues default to the ministers of foreign relations and thus depend on “individual relationships.” This has meant that supporters have needed to actively promote the agency even among countries that have already committed to joining, making the formalization step lengthier and less certain. Nevertheless, with ratifications trickling in, reaching 10 as of May 2024, experts close to the effort confirmed that ALCE intends to launch formal operations by the end of the year.
+
+The issues Cabrera Rodríguez raised regarding the formalization of the agreement ironically point to a problem ALCE is itself intended to resolve: the absence of an entry point for sustained regional cooperation. Not unique to the space realm, the lack of sustained political integration has been a persistent challenge for Latin America, which hosts over 30 regional organizations and forums, all with varying degrees of legitimacy. In contrast with Africa, which has rallied around the African Union as the most legitimate regional voice on several issues, Latin America has no such central representative body. Regional and subregional groups such as the Pacific Alliance and the Union of South American Nations wax and wane in relevance and tend not to represent the region’s views consistently or speak for all countries. CELAC itself was arguably created “as a counterweight to U.S. influence in the region,” an alternative to the Organization of American States (OAS), which includes both Canada and the United States. Similarly, while the idea of a regional space agency is old, there has not been consensus on its membership. Analysts have faulted “political grievances” for the decades-long delay in establishing ALCE and note Brazil’s absence — blamed on political differences — as a major weakness. Although Brazilian officials have spoken positively of ALCE, Brazil has not agreed to join on the basis that it was not a member of CELAC when it was negotiated.
+
+Important questions regarding how ALCE will finance its activities remain tied to the problem of sustaining domestic political support for it within member countries. As Cabrera Rodríguez said, it will be difficult to make investment in the agency attractive in a “scenario of scarcity or apparent scarcity.” Related challenges, such as the asymmetries of national space capabilities in the region, reflect a circular situation: ALCE may need to exist to create the necessary domestic support to sustain it. In some ways, it could help coordinate a space community with widely disconnected pockets of expertise, but only if national governments provide consistent support. ALCE is by nature a political effort and subject to the broader dynamics that have made regional integration a challenge — such as polarization and staunch support for sovereignty driven by a history of interventionism. There are already ideological differences that are reputedly preventing certain space nations, including Colombia and Ecuador, from joining ALCE. It is likely no accident that ALCE has been given a “coordinator role for regional space activities instead of a more political role.”
+
+The interest ALCE has garnered from external partners is significant and only likely to increase as formal operations begin. The ESA and the Korea Aerospace Research Institute, among other space agencies, have already proposed collaboration with ALCE. In addition, “China is very interested,” said Cabrera Rodríguez in April and again in May during the first China-CELAC space forum, in Wuhan. ALCE has also been welcomed to the new Ibero-American Network of Aerospace Agencies, which is coordinated by the Organization of Ibero-American States and includes the Portuguese Space Agency. These nods of recognition, along with the persistent need for more stable institutions handling space topics, may continue to help boost the effort. ALCE is not Latin America’s ESA — but it could fill at least some of the need for integration on space issues in a region fraught with fragmentation.
+
+
+### Policy Implications and Recommendations
+
+These examples serve as a reminder that space activities do not exist in isolation. Chile’s experiences with FASat and SNSat demonstrate how domestic constraints can create international positions and relationships that do not necessarily result from a determined foreign policy direction. SABIA-Mar shows an alternate scenario, wherein a project supported by a stable relationship at the institutional level is alternately buffeted and aided by higher-order shifts between the country’s leaders. Finally, the journey to an operational regional space agency, ALCE, reflects Latin America’s tortuous relationship with political integration even as it opens new avenues of external engagement.
+
+With space activities thus naturally rooted in domestic and regional realities, the analysis of Latin American international space engagement benefits greatly from looking beyond great power politics. Overall, Latin American countries have many options to meet their space technology and application needs, and a mix of factors (e.g., eager partners, competing domestic stakeholders, and foreign policy strategies such as hedging) will continue to be reflected in space alliances.
+
+Why does this matter for the United States? U.S. national space policy highlights the need to expand the country’s space alliances. The bipartisan objectives articulated in the 2020 National Space Policy, the 2021 U.S. Space Priorities Framework, and the 2022 National Security Strategy include diversifying strategic partnerships with emerging and middle space powers and strengthening global governance of space activities in line with U.S. principles. But the United States should change the way it approaches these issues with potential new partners. It cannot be guided solely on the assumption that geopolitical imperatives drive Latin American space partnerships, rendering space as just a way for nations to pick sides in the U.S.-China rivalry. The United States needs to recognize that the complex space alliances prevalent in Latin America are not simply a function of its own actions but a reflection of the interplay of numerous countries’ domestic and foreign policy drivers.
+
+In light of this, U.S. space engagement in the region should:
+
+1. __Demonstrate a whole-of-government approach to bilateral engagement across Latin America.__ Due to impermanent roles surrounding space, a single, national point of contact often does not exist among Latin American actors. Coupled with patchwork institutional frameworks that exacerbate gaps among the communities involved in space, U.S. partners may find that there are many different, even contradictory positions on space issues and that no single decisionmaker is able to drive forward an effort. Moreover, there is a proliferation of dual-use programs that serve both civil and defense needs, reflecting the already blurred lines between civil, defense, and commercial space efforts.
+
+ Unfortunately, U.S. engagement with its Latin American counterparts tends to be siloed — with civil space visits on the one hand and military-only discussions on the other, even while both seek expanded collaboration. In nations such as Chile that lack a civil space agency comparable to NASA and that are pursuing dual-use programs involving civil and defense entities, limiting conversations to U.S. civil space agencies or to U.S. defense agencies is risky. This severely limits the effectiveness of relationship-building efforts intended to develop shared understanding on space issues and ultimately advance common priorities.
+
+ The somewhat fractured nature of some of the space communities in Latin America should not deter U.S. engagement but instead invite an integrated whole-of-government approach, as called for in the U.S. Strategic Framework for Space Diplomacy. The United States should build on existing successes — such as the Space Force’s bilateral data-sharing agreements on space situational awareness, as well as civil space agencies’ leadership in the regional Earth observation collaboration framework, AmeriGEO — to better integrate space issues into its broader relations with regional partners. This engagement could be modeled after the comprehensive dialogues the United States has held on space with important allies such as France and Japan. Even if it is not appropriate to elevate certain Latin American relationships to that level, this approach could inform engagement with key security partners such as Colombia or economic partners such as Mexico and Chile. In addition to facilitating collaboration across the U.S. agencies already engaged in Latin America, this would enable the United States to contribute subject-matter expertise and resources from across the government, modeling the kind of effective institutional coordination that strengthens the U.S. space program.
+
+2. __Expand engagement to other multilateral settings, even ones not dedicated to space.__ The United States should better leverage other regional forums and venues, such as the OAS and the Summit of the Americas, to create sustained engagement on space topics. Knowing that the opportunities and risks associated with space technology are not widely recognized across the different decisionmaking communities in Latin America, U.S. decisionmakers should not assume that space capabilities are being leveraged or even considered as part of collective efforts on issues such as cybersecurity, public health, or food insecurity. More consistent integration of space-related applications by U.S. agencies involved in these efforts can help foster important stakeholder connections on the Latin American side, drawing leaders’ attention to space and benefiting even communities with few or no dedicated space institutions.
+
+ A more intentional engagement strategy that takes space discussions beyond the usual venues also presents an opportunity to counter China’s extensive reach in formal and informal regional forums. For instance, China’s engagement with CELAC, an organization it prefers because it excludes the United States, includes a space element. The recently expanded BRICS alliance, which evolved from an economic-oriented grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa into a larger political and economic forum, has also gained relevance in the space domain. From coordination projects such as the BRICS Joint Committee on Space Cooperation, which was announced in 2021 and is intended to enable satellite data sharing, to statements on space sustainability and space security in the 2024 BRICS declaration, it is clear that members see the alliance as a legitimate forum to align on space issues. To enhance coordination and collaboration with like-minded Latin American space nations, the United States should adopt a more agile engagement strategy that consistently includes space on the regional agenda.
+
+3. __Expand collaboration on national space governance topics.__ Since security considerations mean technology transfer arrangements may not be on the table for U.S.–Latin America collaboration, the United States should expand efforts in other substantive areas informed by the unique dynamics of the region. This should include national governance — the combination of policy, law, and regulation, supported by institutional frameworks — of space activities. The inconsistencies and misalignments referenced in this report sometimes result from gaps in these areas and threaten both the successful implementation of national programs and efforts to elevate space in the list of priorities. Licensing regimes for commercial space efforts, the development of mechanisms for regular engagement with nongovernment actors, and research-to-operations strategies that enhance adoption of government-funded science are among the many governance topics ripe for bilateral and multilateral dialogue.
+
+ The United States can draw on its experience with Latin American nations but also involve partners such as Canada to share perspectives on adopting governance models tailored to a different government structure and that seek different goals. These topics — while not as headline-worthy as joint hardware development projects — are a natural extension of the region’s substantial support for important U.S.-led space-governance efforts such as the Artemis Accords. In elaborating on how such principles are put into practice in a way that can account for the unique challenges of countries in the region, such collaboration could help advance national governance in Latin America, thereby advancing space development.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+International space engagement in Latin America is not about apolitical calculations driven by technological needs, nor does it represent just another front in the U.S.-China great power rivalry. It is instead a landscape where complex domestic and foreign policy factors interact to both motivate and constrain the choices Latin American countries make about space activities.
+
+The challenges at hand for the space programs in Latin America do not correspond simply to a lack of funding or technical know-how. Ultimately, for space activities to help advance national priorities, they should be rooted in the domestic and international policy strategies of each nation. To be a strong ally and meet its own strategic objectives in space and in Latin America, the United States should shift how it approaches its regional space engagement. The considerations and recommendations in this brief can inform enhanced strategic partnerships, including cooperation on new areas such as developing institutional frameworks and bringing space discussions outside of traditional space forums.
+
+The Latin American space landscape is complex, but it is one that potential partners in the United States can navigate. As a leading regional expert argued recently, among the advantages the region presents for the United States is that it is both “far” from global conflicts and “near” U.S. markets. Space collaboration presents a valuable opportunity to bring the United States and Latin American partners closer — contributing to relationships that are stronger, more strategic, and better positioned to address the shared challenges of today and tomorrow.
+
+---
+
+__Laura Delgado López__ is a visiting fellow with the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., and a Council on Foreign Relations international affairs fellow.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-23-uk-sanctions-on-russia.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-23-uk-sanctions-on-russia.md
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-23-uk-sanctions-on-russia.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : UK Sanctions On Russia
+author: Jack Bell
+date : 2024-07-23 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/VLW8OmI.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "UK Sanctions Implementation and Strategy Taskforce: First Meeting Report"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Any strategy the UK may have been developing for the use of sanctions following the completion of the Brexit process was upended by the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and the subsequent imposition of sanctions on Russia._
+
+
+
+The Brexit vote in June 2016 and subsequent decision by then-Prime Minister Theresa May to invoke Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union in March 2017, formally starting the process through which the UK left the EU, triggered a range of consequences for the UK. In the sanctions arena, this decision created the need for the UK to develop the necessary legislation to maintain existing sanctions regimes – and have the capacity to impose further sanctions – outside the laws and regulations of the EU. This work needed to be done rapidly to ensure the UK maintained its ability to implement and enforce sanctions once the exit process was complete. At the same time, the decision to leave the EU also created the opportunity for the UK to develop its own independent sanctions policy, acting unilaterally and at a different pace from its European neighbours.
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+Reflecting the importance of the challenge and opportunity this presented, in May 2019, RUSI’s Centre for Finance and Security (CFS) created a taskforce on the “Future of UK Sanctions Policy”, which considered the post-Brexit design and coordination of sanctions, providing recommendations on how the UK should develop and implement its independent sanctions policy.
+
+Any strategy the UK may have been developing for the use of sanctions following the completion of the Brexit process was upended by the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the subsequent imposition of sanctions on Russia.
+
+Given the significant challenges posed by the need to design, implement and enforce sanctions on Russia and the recent publication of the UK government’s sanctions strategy, RUSI has established a new taskforce to consider how the UK has addressed these challenges and what its independent sanctions policy might be in this dramatically changed sanctions environment.
+
+Understanding the progress made, the challenges encountered and the lessons learned is vital for defining an effective future sanctions strategy for the UK to ensure the country is in the best possible position to create the desired impact of sanctions in an evolving threat landscape. This new UK Sanctions Implementation and Strategy Taskforce (the Taskforce), comprising 50 former government officials from the UK and elsewhere, senior sanctions executives from the financial sector and industry, and academics aims to evaluate the UK’s current sanctions policy and propose enhancements to its strategy.
+
+The Taskforce held its inaugural roundtable in June 2024 to discuss the evolution of the UK’s independent sanctions policies post-Brexit, the preparation and changes required and the early use of an independent sanctions strategy. It then discussed the challenges posed, and changes necessitated, by the sanctions regime imposed on Russia following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. A second roundtable is scheduled for October 2024 to explore opportunities for strengthening existing frameworks and ensuring the UK’s sanctions strategy is fit for the geopolitical and emerging threat environment it faces today.
+
+This report gathers the main findings from the June roundtable and assesses chronologically the establishment of the UK’s independent sanctions framework and the subsequent need to rapidly adapt in the face of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. None of the comments made by the Taskforce members are attributable.
+
+
+### The UK’s Post-Brexit Sanctions Response (2016–22)
+
+The roundtable discussion first sought to understand the overall impact of the transition from an EU-based sanctions regime to the post-Brexit era.
+
+#### Establishing an Independent Sanctions Framework
+
+Most Taskforce participants agreed that, while initially creating an atmosphere of uncertainty in the early stages of the process, Brexit had also given the UK government the flexibility and agility to shape its sanctions policy according to national priorities. After decades of implementing sanctions – apart from those relating to terrorism – as part of multi-country groupings within the UN and EU, the UK had the chance to introduce its own legal framework, leveraging the experience gathered while in the EU, as well as exploring the development of new sanctions regimes and accompanying narratives.
+
+Taskforce members from major financial institutions reported that the early days of the transition process were characterised by a sense of urgency among civil servants to establish the necessary legislation for imposing and implementing the UK’s own sanctions, due to a lack of certainty on the official departure date from the EU. The need for independent sanctions legislation resulted in the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 (SAMLA), which facilitated the roll-over of the existing EU sanctions regimes, their applicability in the UK and the future capacity of the UK to make new designations.
+
+Once the urgency of the transition was over, the UK’s sanctions policy evolved beyond merely replicating EU sanctions. Former government officials at the roundtable noted that the UK had been a leading player in the development of the EU’s sanctions policies. With newfound independence, the government was able to leverage this experience, and introduce new sanctions regimes such as the Global Human Rights (GHR) Sanctions regime and the Global Anti-Corruption (GAC) Sanctions regime, and act with greater agility.
+
+Taskforce members acknowledged some of strengths of the post-Brexit UK regime. A former US government official, for instance, praised the UK’s role in facilitating transatlantic coordination with the EU and commended the country’s “political bravery” in implementing sanctions regimes that had previously been hindered by disagreements among EU member states pre-Brexit.
+
+Participants from the UK also acknowledged the relative strength of the UK’s post-Brexit legal framework. For example, one representative from the private sector noted that the legal framework is “broadly sensible” and functional, with statutory requirements for guidance enhancing its effectiveness, and an evidentiary threshold that is more consistently applied now that the UK is not in the EU – making listing decisions more robust. Another significant success singled out by the Taskforce was the introduction of the power to grant general licences, which greatly enhanced the flexibility and responsiveness of the sanctions regime, despite not being much used before February 2022.
+
+While acknowledging the strength of the legal framework, some private sector representatives argued that the new independent regime created unease among businesses that now had to comply with yet another significant set of sanctions listings and implementation requirements and engage with new authorities such as the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI).
+
+OFSI was established in March 2016 and became operational in April 2017. Some participants mentioned that its slow start disappointed the private sector, contrasting its performance with the decades-old Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) in the US. Former US officials also stressed the differences in resourcing and behaviour between the US and the UK’s “sanctions machinery”, with the latter lacking the former’s size and “aggressiveness”.
+
+Despite this, Taskforce members agreed that in the immediate period after Brexit, the UK had developed an effective sanctions framework based on the new SAMLA legislation and had gradually built its capacity to implement new regimes.
+
+#### Introducing New Autonomous Sanctions Regimes
+
+The Taskforce explored one particular benefit of the UK’s independent sanctions policy – the autonomy to design and adopt new regimes. Although the UK now has 36 thematic and country regimes, the Taskforce discussion focused on two regimes in particular – the GHR sanctions regime of 2020 and the GAC sanctions regime of 2021.
+
+Most of the Taskforce participants agreed on the limited impact and scope of these two regimes. Overall, they described human rights and anti-corruption sanctions as “presentational”, with a strong messaging value at the international level, but limited impact on the targets or on UK businesses and their sanctions compliance obligations. Some recalled former Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab’s vision when establishing these regimes, as he sought to articulate the UK’s sanctions strategy as demonstrating “Global Britain’s commitment to acting as a force for good in the world”. However, they posited that these expectations have not been fully realised. The UK’s GAC and GHR sanctions have been underused, with only 42 and 123 designations respectively, in stark contrast to the proactive use by the US of its Global Magnitsky Sanctions, which includes 700 designations.
+
+The limited application of GAC and GHR sanctions is not merely about numbers. Participants highlighted a lack of clarity and transparency regarding the criteria and purpose for which sanctions are deployed – or the strategy for their use – concluding that they are mainly used for signalling, with little expectation of behaviour change or justice being delivered. According to civil society representatives attending the roundtable, the inconsistency and perceived arbitrariness in the use of GAC sanctions undermine the legitimacy of the regime.
+
+Participants also agreed that the deployment of thematic sanctions has been significantly hindered by the government’s focus on the Russia regime since February 2022. One Taskforce member suggested that without Russia’s invasion, the UK would have likely developed a clearer vision for its thematic regimes, citing the successful coordination with Canada and the US on Belarus’s GHR designations as an example of effective pre-2022 implementation.
+
+
+### The New Sanctions Reality After February 2022
+
+All participants recognised that the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia in February 2022 had fundamentally altered the sanctions landscape and had a dramatic impact on the operations of private sector compliance departments across the UK. The Taskforce recognised that the UK had found itself on a steep learning curve, rapidly scaling up efforts to match heightened global expectations, particularly from the US, to ensure the effectiveness of G7 coordinated sanctions efforts against Russia. Among the positive developments stemming from these efforts, participants highlighted the significant injection of funds and resources in key agencies such as OFSI, increased parliamentary scrutiny to monitor the government’s performance and ensure accountability, and a designation process with a more consistent application of the evidentiary threshold than before 2022.
+
+The statutory requirement for the government to provide guidance was, according to participants, another major advance, ensuring greater clarity on implementation as well as accountability and transparency from the regulator.
+
+Participants acknowledged the UK government’s efforts to engage with industry at different stages of the sanctions cycle, despite encountering a series of challenges. For instance, they argued that co-designing sanctions had proven to be difficult due to their national security nature, citing the oil price cap as a unique example of industry involvement in shaping specific measures. Meanwhile, in supporting sanctions implementation, sanctions had dominated public–private partnership meetings, almost matching the focus traditionally placed on anti-money laundering in these forums. However, after this positive initial public–private engagement, some industry representatives observed a shift from collaboration towards an enforcement-focused approach, prompting businesses to seek legal protection when engaging with authorities, which in the view of some participants has been a backwards step in terms of a cross-sector approach.
+
+Participants welcomed the increased use by the government of the power to grant general licences. This greatly enhanced the flexibility and responsiveness of the sanctions regime by allowing multiple parties to conduct certain restricted activities without the bureaucracy of obtaining individual licences. Prior to the invasion, OFSI granted only two general licences, while since February 2022 the number of general licences has reached more than 50.
+
+These features of the UK’s approach to sanctions post-February 2022, which were largely absent in the immediate post-Brexit period, have become central to the post-invasion sanctions landscape. Despite these advances, the Taskforce identified several deficiencies undermining the effectiveness and credibility of UK sanctions, which require government attention. These are set out in the following section.
+
+#### Limited Resourcing and Expertise
+
+Taskforce members discussed the shortage of resources and expertise in the relevant government sanctions departments. They described how the Russia regime required the hiring of new staff within government agencies, many of whom lacked the necessary sanctions knowledge. The urgency to address a backlog of licensing requests from businesses operating in the UK also led to a “conveyor belt” approach, which prioritised speed over development of expertise. This has prevented officials from developing a wider focus beyond UK domestic sanctions, resulting in many civil servants, who were working on sanctions, remaining too UK-centric in their approach, and consequently lacking in-depth knowledge about the regimes of G7 partners.
+
+Rapid staff turnover also exacerbated these challenges. Government officials who have developed their expertise in sanctions have frequently transitioned to the private sector, attracted by better opportunities and remuneration. As reported by private sector representatives, even secondment initiatives intended to bolster expertise in the civil service often result in permanent moves away from public service, contributing to a persistent shortage of skilled personnel.
+
+#### Lack of Maturity in the Non-Financial Sector
+
+The long-running experience of financial institutions in implementing sanctions facilitated their readiness to confront the new obligations presented by the Russia regime and engage with competent authorities. However, most Taskforce members agreed that the non-financial sector continues to display varying degrees of readiness and capability to comply with the new sanctions regime. Deficiencies in the sector often relate to a lack of the necessary technical knowledge, skills and resources, including basic awareness of sanctions risks, rather than wilful neglect. The non-financial sector is increasingly participating in public–private collaboration efforts and enhancing their expertise and capabilities, but the gap demands greater attention from the government.
+
+#### Quality of Guidance
+
+Most Taskforce members welcomed OFSI’s recent decision to publish an FAQs document and found it useful for understanding OFSI’s expectations. Yet, one participant suggested that clearer and more comprehensive guidance might eliminate the burden for regulators to provide FAQs.
+
+One participant highlighted that sanctions and related guidance still do not reflect the specific nuances of supply chains. This creates a substantial compliance burden for businesses to check whether listed small components or items are present in their supply chain. They gave as an example the requirements to comply with sanctions on materials such as titanium, which required businesses to trace the origins of small components, with uncertain benefits for the ultimate goals of sanctions. Despite the overall usefulness of guidance and complementary FAQs, a sanctions lawyer in the Taskforce also raised concerns about the legal standing of the guidance, highlighting recent UK court decisions which have emphasised the prioritisation of the statutory language of the sanctions regulations over any related guidance.
+
+#### Listing and Delisting Criteria
+
+Legal experts in the Taskforce criticised the current UK sanctions designation criteria for lacking clarity and rigorous standards, based on the low evidentiary threshold of “reasonable grounds to suspect”. Participants noted that UK courts have so far adopted an “arm’s length” approach when deliberating designation challenges, highlighting a prevailing trend in UK court rulings, viewing sanctions designations as a matter of government foreign policy with which they do not feel it is appropriate to engage, thus granting considerable leeway to the government in their sanctions decision-making.
+
+Most legal experts in the Taskforce highlighted the absence of an established delisting policy, leaving those sanctioned without recourse or explanation, further eroding the legitimacy of the sanctions regime. Some advocated for the introduction of clear, transparent criteria and procedures for lifting sanctions; these could include conditions such as divestment from problematic assets, cessation of activities linked to the Russian government, undergoing periodic independent audits, publicly supporting Ukraine, or criticising where possible Russia’s leadership.
+
+#### Combining Sanctions with Criminal Justice Tools
+
+Participants raised significant concerns about due process and the rule of law when combining sanctions with criminal justice tools, due to sanctions’ low evidentiary threshold and their basis in ministerial decisions. They noted a lack of differentiation between assets of individuals or businesses of Russian heritage and/or who have divested their assets from Russia, and individuals involved in illicit activities such as corruption, money laundering or sanctions evasion. Only the latter should be subject to asset confiscation, yet discussions often fail to make this distinction. Despite these challenges, Taskforce members recommended combining sanctions with other enforcement tools, particularly criminal investigations resulting in civil and criminal forfeitures. They suggested that this approach, if carefully implemented, could enhance the UK’s independent sanctions policy and global influence. A member of the legal sector recommended looking at the activities of the US Task Force KleptoCapture as a successful example of this model to prosecute illicit conduct.
+
+#### Alignment of Sanctions Regimes
+
+While G7 countries aim for a unified approach to Russian sanctions, the Taskforce concurred that implementation varies between nations, leading to inconsistencies and challenges for international businesses. Private sector members reported that discrepancies in licensing and regulatory practices still existed between the US, the UK and the EU, causing operational disruptions. They emphasised the importance of alignment with international partners for the effectiveness of sanctions, the need to harmonise licences to simplify operations and mitigate diverging economic impacts, and the need for close coordination to minimise differences in sanctions regimes to avoid undermining collective efforts.
+
+#### Lack of a Sustainable Vision
+
+Multiple Taskforce members highlighted their perception of the lack of a long-term vision in the UK sanctions strategy beyond the Russia regime. Most concurred that the current sanctions regime imposes a significant burden on businesses and regulators without necessarily achieving – or clearly evidencing – its intended objectives. For instance, despite its aim to disrupt Russian military trade flows, sanctions have not effectively curtailed Russia’s global procurement activities, but simply redirected them. Members from the private sector noted the challenge for the UK government of balancing competing political aims – for example, on the one hand, restricting finance and resources to Russia while on the other trying to maintain global energy supplies. This created a tension between political messaging of standing against Russia and the practical implementation of sanctions and licensing.
+
+Some participants suggested that the UK needs to reassess its strategy to ensure that sanctions are not only punitive but also effective and sustainable. They recommended the UK revisited or eliminated measures that create undue burdens without significant impact. This approach would allow the UK to focus on sanctions that genuinely hinder the targeted activities and adapt to a changing global landscape.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+After its departure from the EU, the UK embarked on an intensive journey to develop its independent sanctions policy. The full-scale invasion of Ukraine ushered in a new era, characterised by a rapid expansion and heightening of efforts, significant resource allocation, and a steep learning curve for government agencies. Despite these efforts, the Taskforce identified several deficiencies that the UK government must address to ensure the effectiveness and credibility of UK sanctions.
+
+In particular, the Taskforce highlighted as key issues: resources and expertise; engagement with industry; alignment with international partners; and a clear set of objectives for its sanctions policy. The Taskforce agreed that the UK will need to look beyond Russia sanctions to react to evolving geopolitical risks and emerging threats. The Taskforce will reconvene in October 2024 for an assessment of the future and vision of the UK and its sanctions regimes to ensure the effectiveness and sustainability of its sanctions strategy.
+
+---
+
+__Jack Bell__ is the Media Relations Manager at RUSI.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-24-israelis-and-palestinians-apart.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-24-israelis-and-palestinians-apart.md
new file mode 100644
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-24-israelis-and-palestinians-apart.md
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Israelis & Palestinians Apart
+author: Julie Norman
+date : 2024-07-24 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/uGnAduY.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Israelis and Palestinians Have Never Sounded So Alike Yet Been So Far Apart"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Israeli and Palestinian communities are currently traumatised, distrustful and defiant, with polls showing support for a two-state solution at an all-time low. Many in both communities feel that a peace process would simply allow the other side to buy time while pursuing more maximalist goals._
+
+
+
+If you mention a peace process in Israel or the West Bank these days, you risk sounding naive at best and borderline treacherous at worst. Both communities are reeling, polls show support for a two-state solution is at an all-time low, and the Israeli Knesset has just passed a resolution rejecting a Palestinian state.
+
+But the conflict isn’t going away and, at some point, engagement will again be necessary. When that time comes, the parameters cannot just snap back to the same issues that defined previous negotiations. Rather, they will need to take into account the sharply changed realities (and strikingly similar perceptions) in both communities. In my conversations with everyday Israelis and Palestinians on the ground, the same themes keep emerging – yet it’s clear that the two communities have never been further apart.
+
+
+### Trauma
+
+Both Israelis and Palestinians are (again) navigating unprecedented traumas, and “trauma” is the word I’ve heard the most here this summer. The Israel–Palestine conflict has long been described as one of dual victimhood, with the state of Israel emerging in the aftermath of the Holocaust, along with the mass displacement of indigenous Palestinians in the Nakba, or “catastrophe”. The intergenerational trauma of those events still deeply pervades both societies, but the events themselves are recognised as historical events that predate the lives of most members of both populations.
+
+The 7 October attacks and the subsequent war in Gaza have brought those prior traumas surging back for the current generation. For Israel, 7 October not only marked the single deadliest day for Jews since the Holocaust, but also reanimated a sense of existential dread not felt in decades. Several people have told me that their overwhelming thought on the morning of the attacks was: “They are coming for us”.
+
+The war in Gaza, meanwhile, is being experienced by Palestinians as the current generation’s Nakba: “What our grandparents experienced in 1948, it’s history. But what is going on now in Gaza is so shocking, because for us, it’s the first time to see this level of destruction, of ethnic cleansing, of mass killings”, one woman told me.
+
+___`As much as Israelis and Palestinians distrust their own leaders, they also distrust the other side’s, including the relative moderates who would be most likely to re-engage in a future peace process`___
+
+Not only are the twin traumas unfolding simultaneously, but each side has shrugged off the other’s suffering with a general response of “they deserved it”. “Even Palestinians who don’t support Hamas couldn’t help feeling a satisfaction on 7 October”, I’ve heard often, with polling reflecting the same sentiment. And most Israelis, across the political spectrum, support the war in Gaza. As one man told me, “There is a Jewish saying: if there are those who are coming to kill you, you kill them first. So what can we do?”
+
+
+### Distrust
+
+“Corrupt”. “Complicit”. “Selfish”. “Liars”. I haven’t met a single Israeli or Palestinian who trusts their current leadership – much less the other side’s.
+
+More than half of Israelis believe that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is prolonging the war for political reasons, and citizens across the ideological spectrum blame him for the failed policies and security lapses that, they believe, allowed the Hamas attacks to take place.
+
+Palestinians are equally frustrated with the ossifying Palestinian Authority (PA), which has long been seen as corrupt. But for most Palestinians I’ve spoken with, it is what they view as the PA’s complicity with Israel, via intelligence and security cooperation, that has most degraded any sense they might have of the body’s legitimacy. As one activist told me:
+
+“People feel oppressed, we don’t have the power of political parties, and we feel we cannot do what we should do to support Gaza. Everywhere around the world, we see actions in solidarity with Gaza, or for a ceasefire. But here we cannot write a Facebook post, we cannot organise demonstrations or sit-ins, even within our own cities.”
+
+As much as Israelis and Palestinians distrust their own leaders, they also distrust the other side’s, including the relative moderates who would be most likely to re-engage in a future peace process. Moreover, they distrust a peace process, believing such a process does little beyond allowing the other side to buy time while pursuing more maximalist goals.
+
+An open letter published by Palestinians in Mondoweiss put it bluntly: “Make no mistake. The offers of a Palestinian state are an illusion”. Israelis I have met expressed similar views: “No matter what [PA president] Abu Mazen says, or a piece of paper says, most Palestinians will still just want to kill Jews. And they won’t stop, even if there is a Palestinian state”.
+
+
+### Isolation
+
+Both Palestinians and Israelis feel wholly marginalised by the international community. Despite sympathy from world leaders directly after 7 October, Israelis have since perceived a world turned increasingly hostile, from widespread student protests and unexpected boycotts to legal actions in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court (ICC). “It’s like the whole world has forgotten the atrocities of 7 October”, I’m often told.
+
+There are also more pointed criticisms. A former IDF spokesperson I met was incredulous that the World Health Organization had not condemned Hamas’s infiltration of Gazan hospitals. In Tel Aviv, a main thoroughfare is lined with posters accusing UN Women of ignoring reports of widespread sexual violence on 7 October. When I asked women at the Hostages and Missing Persons Square why they thought that was, their answer was simple: “Because we’re Jews”.
+
+Palestinians have felt equally marginalised. While international solidarity protests for Palestine are appreciated, there is frustration that government leaders, especially in the US, have continued to support Israel: “How can they just sit back and let a genocide continue for nine months?”
+
+Even the ICJ and ICC actions, while welcome, are seen by many Palestinians as double-edged swords, because of the lack of enforcement mechanisms. “On the one hand, the legal steps make people hope that justice might prevail”, a Palestinian human rights lawyer told me. “At the same time, when nothing happens after that, and the end result on the ground is nothing, people lose faith, not just in the court, but in the whole international system”.
+
+
+### Defiance
+
+Both sides are also more dug in than ever before – and confident that they can wait each other out. The phrase “from the river to the sea” became well-known for its deployment in pro-Palestine demonstrations, but I hear it invoked by Israelis just as much as by Palestinians – referring to full control of the land between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River, including the West Bank.
+
+___`Despite sympathy from world leaders directly after 7 October, Israelis have since perceived a world turned increasingly hostile, from widespread student protests and unexpected boycotts to legal actions in international courts`___
+
+Such aspirations are not new, but they are more widespread and vocalised now than in previous years. Moreover, both sides are increasingly convinced that they can win in a long-game demographic stand-off. Palestinians have long embraced the concept of sumoud, roughly translated as “steadfastness”, or a sense of perseverance and rootedness in the land. I’m often told, “We outlasted the British and the Ottomans and centuries of other foreign occupiers. We can outlast Israel too”. Among Israelis, the word I’ve heard the most in the post-7 October context is “resilience”. Despite some reports of emigration in the context of the war, the main sentiment here was summed up by one Israeli as, “We’re not moving. We are resilient and we won’t be bullied anymore”.
+
+Extremists have, obviously, exploited those sentiments further. Far-right Israeli settlers, intent on retaking all of biblical Israel, have escalated campaigns of direct violence to expel Palestinians from more than a dozen West Bank villages since 7 October, attacks described to me by multiple Palestinians as “pogroms”. And many Palestinians support Hamas’s claim that the 7 October attack was “a necessary step and a normal response to confront all Israeli conspiracies against the Palestinian people”.
+
+There are, of course, still many individuals, NGOs and movements – including family members of hostages and victims – who are committed to a (fledgling) peace movement. As one activist said, “Everyone wants things black and white, but as humans, we should be able to have empathy for the hostages and their families and also for civilians in Gaza. People want revenge, and it’s understandable, but we cannot lose our identity and our humanity in search of revenge”.
+
+But most mainstream Israelis and Palestinians I’ve met do not see their hardened positions as motivated by revenge, so much as by survival. A new political vision, whenever it comes, will need to engage with these deeper fundamental realities if it’s going to stand a chance.
+
+---
+
+__Julie Norman__ is an Associate Professor in Politics and International Relations at University College London (UCL), where she teaches on Middle East politics, US foreign policy, and political violence.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-24-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-91.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-24-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-91.md
new file mode 100644
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-24-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-91.md
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【黎智英案・審訊第 91 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-07-24 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/LciFH41.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 辯方指黎智英對談節目就如市民在茶餐廳評論政府 從沒籲外國制裁 官押明早裁表證成立與否
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，控方早前舉證完畢，辯方今（24日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）作中段陳詞，要求法庭就黎面對的3項控罪裁定表證不成立。就串謀發布煽動刊物罪，辯方指涉案報導和評論僅為了引起公眾關注一些牽涉公眾利益的事情，這是一般報紙本來就會做的工作，而且言論和新聞自由均受憲法保障。就串謀勾結外國勢力罪，辯方指黎在網上對談節目中的確有提及制裁，但是不代表他正在呼籲外國實施制裁；黎與嘉賓僅評論國際事務，就如一般市民在茶餐廳裡評論時政，說香港政府有何不足、應該怎樣做等。法官押後至明日上午（25日）宣布裁定表證是否成立。
+
+#### 辯方：言論及新聞自由受憲法保障 涉案文章僅引公眾關注、為一般報紙工作
+
+代表黎智英的資深大律師彭耀鴻指，言論自由和新聞自由均受到憲法保障。控方的案情指稱黎利用《蘋果日報》作為平台發布煽動刊物，辯方形容指控「奇怪」，因他們發布的報導和評論均為了引起公眾關注一些牽涉公眾利益的事情，這是一般報紙本來就會做的工作，而且不同報紙本來就帶有光譜上不同的政治立場，不應被視為「煽動刊物」。
+
+
+▲ 資深大律師 彭耀鴻
+
+不過法官杜麗冰指，法庭判斷文章是否「煽動刊物」時，不單只要看文章內容，也要視乎發布的背景。
+
+#### 辯方：國安法生效後沒有新的犯罪協議 官：控方指稱犯罪協議持續
+
+就「串謀」這一項控罪元素，彭耀鴻指「串謀」涉及多於一人協議做非法事情，或者協議用非法手段去做合法事情。彭力陳，即使在《國安法》生效之前，黎與其他《蘋果》高層之間存在犯罪協議，但是在《國安法》生效之後，便再沒有新的犯罪協議，因此不存在「串謀」。
+
+法官李運騰則指，控方的案情是指稱犯罪協議在《國安法》生效之前形成，當2020年7月1日《國安法》生效之後，相關協議變得不合法，然而黎與其他被告繼續。李官又指，這個議題是一個事實判斷，而非如辯方所說是一個法律議題。
+
+#### 官質疑黎叫「撐住」意味繼續犯罪協議 辯方：僅籲同事繼續經營報紙
+
+彭耀鴻則重申，在《國安法》生效之前，黎與其他被告協議去做的是合法事情，當它在《國安法》生效之後變得不合法，他們便從根本上更改了整個協議。法官杜麗冰則質疑，辯方從沒有在盤問控方證人期間，向他們指出以上說法。
+
+法官李運騰又質疑，在沒有任何證據下，辯方基於什麼基礎而指稱被告的協議是合法，而且合法與否並非基於被告自己的意見，不是被告覺得是合法便是合法。彭耀鴻則重申，黎與其他被告之間的協議並不涉任何罪行，一向都是完全合法（perfectly lawful）。根據張劍虹和陳沛敏的證供，《國安法》生效之後，他們徵詢法律意見，以確保《蘋果》不觸犯任何法律，可見他們的協議並非觸犯法律。
+
+
+▲ 前《蘋果日報》社長 張劍虹
+
+不過法官李素蘭質疑，黎還柙後仍然叫同事繼續「撐住」。彭耀鴻則指，黎的意思是叫同事繼續營運《蘋果日報》，不代表叫同事繼續犯法。李素蘭回應指，須視乎相關證據去理解黎說「撐住」的意思是什麼。彭重申，黎的意思是叫同事繼續經營及出版《蘋果》，法庭不能以此說話來推論黎籲同事觸犯法律。法官杜麗冰和李素蘭聞言均指，這是一個牽涉事實裁定的議題。
+
+#### 辯方：黎智英對談節目確有提及制裁 但不代表呼籲制裁
+
+彭耀鴻指，黎曾經在2020年7月之前曾提倡外國制裁，但是這是在《國安法》生效之前發生，其時相關行為完全合法，然而黎在《國安法》生效之後便沒有繼續呼籲制裁。
+
+辯方指，黎在2020年7月開始製作網上對談節目「Live Chat with Jimmy Lai」，但是他在節目中從沒呼籲外國制裁中國和香港。黎與其私人助手 Mark Simon 之間的訊息僅表達黎的個人意見，並不構成任何證據顯示有犯罪協議。
+
+辯方指，即使黎在 Live Chat 節目中的確有提及制裁，但是不代表他正在呼籲外國實施制裁。惟法官杜麗冰指，假設有人說「制裁有幫助，能迫使政府為自己的行為負責」等言論，可以被視為等同於呼籲制裁，視乎說話者在怎樣的情況下說這番言論。彭耀鴻回應指，因此法庭需要將語境考慮在內，就本案而言，「Live Chat with Jimmy Lai」每集時間頗長，討論內容均圍繞國際事務，與呼籲制裁大相逕庭，不足以作出推論指犯罪協議存在。
+
+#### 辯方：黎智英節目僅討論國際局勢 正如市民在茶餐廳討論時政
+
+辯方續指，黎智英與不同嘉賓在對談節目中僅就國際事務表達意見、評論拜登政府應該怎樣做等等，就如一般市民在茶餐廳裡評論時政，說香港政府有何不足、應該怎樣做、美國政府及歐洲政府應怎樣做等，然而這不足以達至推論指黎有犯罪協議。
+
+就黎智英刊於專欄「成敗樂一笑」的文章，辯方指黎僅表達其個人見解，沒有任何內容可以被用來推論黎串謀呼籲制裁。
+
+#### 辯方指《蘋果》編採政策不變不代表黎同意犯法 官質疑「打擦邊球」
+
+控方案情指稱，在《國安法》生效之後，《蘋果》的編採政策沒有改變過。辯方則指，縱使證人供稱到獄中探訪還柙的黎時，黎寄語《蘋果》同事不要害怕、要繼續如常營運《蘋果》，亦沒有指示要改變編採政策，但是不代表黎同意干犯法律，他的意思只是叫同事繼續出版報紙。
+
+不過法官李素蘭則引述楊清奇的證供中「打擦邊球」說法，質疑《蘋果》冒險超越法律界線。彭耀鴻則強調《蘋果》高層想盡力維持在法律界線之內，就如打乒乓球般，雙方目標是令乒乓球留在界線內，而不是瞄準界線而來發球。
+
+#### 陳沛敏早前供稱黎智英提議製作制裁名單 辯方稱訊息非出自黎手筆
+
+前《蘋果》副社長陳沛敏曾供稱，2020年7月14日，時任美國總統特朗普簽署《香港自治法》的行政命令之後，黎智英以 WhatsApp 傳送相關行政命令內文，以及提出準備一份「Shit List」，陳理解黎的意思是要製作「制裁名單」。
+
+
+▲ 前《蘋果日報》執行總編輯 林文宗（左）、前《蘋果日報》副社長 陳沛敏（右）
+
+辯方今指稱，從 WhatsApp 訊息的字眼可見，黎當時只是將另一名美國人的訊息，連同行政命令內文和「Shit List」的提議，一併複製並傳送給陳沛敏。因為相關行政命令是很重要的新聞，而陳當時身為高層，所以黎立即傳送給陳，然而「Shit list」並非黎本人的提議。法官杜麗冰質疑辯方是在作出假設，而且相關訊息是否由黎智英撰寫、黎是否同意訊息內容，皆屬於事實爭議。
+
+#### 控方：有充份證據證明國安法生效後 黎智英仍然是犯罪協議的一份子
+
+控方代表、副刑事檢控專員周天行重申，控方一直以來都是指稱黎與其他被告在《國安法》之前達成犯罪協議，並在國安法生效之後繼續相關協議。而且案中有充份證據證明《國安法》生效之後，黎智英仍然是協議的一份子，包括其網上對談節目內容、Twitter 上有關「重光團隊」、IPAC和裴倫德的帖文等。
+
+
+▲ 副刑事檢控專員 周天行（左）、高級檢控官 陳穎琛（右）
+
+控方強調，法庭不能夠只著眼於《國安法》生效之後發生的事，而是要將黎智英在《國安法》之前所作的行為納入考慮，以全面地理解案情，因此控方從頭到尾、根據時序來顯示黎智英做過什麼。
+
+控方指，所有以從犯證人身份出庭作供的《蘋果》高層均供稱，在國安法生效之後，《蘋果》的編採政策沒有改變，他們繼續做一直以來的工作。當張劍虹對於黎邀請美國退休軍官 Jack Keane 出席對談節目表達關注，質疑會否過於敏感，黎則回應：「我一定去到盡㗎，我冇得褪㗎。」就另一項串謀勾結外國勢力罪，從犯證人陳梓華供稱在2020年6月16日赴壹傳媒大樓會見黎智英，當時黎要求陳繼續國際線工作，形容《國安法》「雷聲大，雨點小」。控方指以上均顯示《國安法》之後黎決定繼續涉案行為。
+
+控方指，只要有足夠證據顯示犯罪協議持續，而且參與者遵守相關協議，便可以滿足「串謀」這項控罪元素。控方又指，不只可以透過外在行為（overt acts），案中亦有來自從犯證人的直接證據，證明協議的內容、如何達成協議，以及在國安法前後如何執行相關協議。
+
+#### 官押後至明早宣布決定
+
+控辯雙方均陳詞完畢，法官杜麗冰押後至明日上午（25日）宣布決定。若然法庭裁定黎就控罪表證成立，黎需決定是否作供及傳召辯方證人；相反，若然法庭裁定表證不成立，黎則毋須答辯，可當庭釋放。
+
+首項「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全罪」指，黎智英、蘋果日報有限公司、蘋果日報印刷有限公司及蘋果互聯網有限公司，於2020年7月1日至2021年6月24日（包括首尾兩日），在香港與其他人一同串謀，請求外國或者境外機構、組織、人員實施對香港特別行政區或者中華人民共和國進行制裁、封鎖或者採取其他敵對行動。
+
+另一項「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全」罪，指黎智英於2020年7月1日至今年2月15日間，與 Mark Simon、陳梓華、李宇軒、劉祖廸及其他人串謀，請求外國或境外機構、組織、人員，實施對中國或香港進行制裁、封鎖或者採取其他敵對行動。
+
+「串謀刊印、發布、出售、要約出售、分發、展示或複製煽動刊物」罪指，黎智英、蘋果日報有限公司、蘋果日報印刷有限公司及蘋果互聯網有限公司於2019年4月1日至2021年6月24日（包括首尾兩日），在香港與其他人一同串謀刊印、發布、出售、要約出售、分發、展示及/或複製煽動刊物，具意圖：
+
+> a) 引起憎恨或藐視中央或香港特別行政區政府或激起對其離叛
+
+> b) 激起香港居民企圖不循合法途徑促致改變其他在香港的依法制定的事項
+
+> c) 引起對香港司法的憎恨、藐視或激起對其離叛
+
+> d) 引起香港居民間的不滿或離叛
+
+> e) 煽惑他人使用暴力
+
+> f) 慫使他人不守法或不服從合法命令。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC51/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-25-not-just-boots-on-the-beach.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-25-not-just-boots-on-the-beach.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..792e5f31
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-25-not-just-boots-on-the-beach.md
@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Not Just Boots On The Beach
+author: Jude Blanchette and Hal Brands
+date : 2024-07-25 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/NdKIii8.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "How China Can Use Deception, Confusion, and Incrementalism to Change the Status Quo on Taiwan"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_The paper explores four coercive approaches that Beijing could use to change the status quo around Taiwan short of outright invasion or blockade. It also highlights the serious challenges Washington and Taipei must address to have a ready response._
+
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+On September 18, 1931, a Japanese infantry regiment conducted a “false flag” attack on the Japanese-owned South Manchuria Railway, detonating an explosive near a stretch of the track and blaming the operation on Chinese troops nearby. The next day, in response to the alleged sabotage, Japanese troops attacked a Chinese military garrison. Within months, the Japanese army had conquered Manchuria and made it a puppet state. Although a commission formed by the League of Nations eventually unraveled the deception and concluded that Japan had illegally invaded China, the international community took no meaningful action, in part because the active period of crisis had settled into a new normal and political will had evaporated.
+
+More than 80 years later, in February 2014, soldiers wearing uniforms without insignias or other identifying information surrounded Ukrainian military bases and seized strategic points in Crimea. Although many observers immediately suspected that these “little green men” were Russian troops, Moscow claimed that they were “local self-defense units” acting on their own initiative. The Ukrainian government quickly lost control of Crimea, which was formally annexed to Russia. Meanwhile, Russian special operations forces began quasi-surreptitiously supporting separatist uprisings in Eastern Ukraine, an operation that eventually led to the full-scale Russo-Ukrainian war that is still underway.
+
+Today, the United States and its allies are focused on the threat of an even bigger war: a possible Chinese assault on Taiwan and the cataclysmic, world-changing conflict it could provoke. But in contemplating Chinese moves against Taiwan, it is worth keeping these earlier incidents in mind because they highlight an important if underappreciated fact: great powers pursuing revisionist aims often seek to disguise their actions, create a cloud of uncertainty around them, or achieve gains through a sequence of “salami slices” in order to increase the odds of a successful fait accompli that will decrease the costs they must pay for their aggression. As Washington ponders China’s next steps vis-à-vis Taiwan, it is vital to understand how Beijing might utilize subterfuge, “salami slicing” tactics, and wedge-driving strategies to isolate Taiwan and ultimately compel “reunification.”
+
+This paper does not take the position that China has abandoned or will abandon the possibility of a more dramatic, full-on invasion of Taiwan, should Chinese leader Xi Jinping conclude that the road to “peaceful” annexation is closed (although the two authors of this report do differ in their views on how likely this scenario is). The potential for an outright invasion is real, and the consequences of such a gambit would be dire. A Sino-American war over Taiwan would be a global catastrophe, and it is imperative for Washington and its allies to do all they can to deter such an attack.
+
+Yet China has more than one way of coercing Taiwan into political capitulation. Indeed, the more successful Washington and its friends are in deterring the “D-Day” scenario, the more Beijing may be incentivized to focus on lower-intensity, or less obvious, forms of aggression instead.
+
+This paper puts aside the prospect of an invasion or direct blockade and instead discusses four coercive approaches that Beijing could use to change the status quo: (1) a decapitation strike meant to exploit uncertainty in Taipei’s continuity of government arrangements; (2) a quasi-disguised maritime quarantine; (3) the taking, perhaps through ambiguous means, of one of Taiwan’s outlying islands; and (4) the staging of a catalytic incident in the Taiwan Strait. Each of these approaches would feature some degree of ambiguity and deception. Each would also target key vulnerabilities in Taiwan and in the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, not the least of which include Taiwanese political will and Taiwanese confidence in the availability of U.S. support.
+
+This is not to say that China will conduct any of these operations — each of which could fail and each of which would entail significant risks for Beijing. Nor is the argument here that a conflict with China over Taiwan is preordained. In the authors’ judgment, China would only dramatically increase its coercion of Taiwan — whether disguised or overt — if it believed it had a decent chance of success and it had run out of other, less violent options for shifting the status quo. Yet it is entirely possible that Beijing could arrive at this juncture sometime in the coming years. As is on display in Ukraine, dictators make decisions that often conflict with rationality. Thus, it is crucial to understand that the parameters of possible Chinese action vis-à-vis Taiwan are more expansive than is commonly understood, if only so that the United States and its allies can forge a comprehensive response. A complete deterrence strategy must keep Beijing from salami-slicing its way to victory in the Taiwan Strait, even as the United States also races to deter a deadly high-end fight.
+
+___`A complete deterrence strategy must keep Beijing from salami-slicing its way to victory in the Taiwan Strait, even as the United States also races to deter a deadly high-end fight.`___
+
+
+### Assumptions
+
+This analysis rests on several assumptions about Chinese preferences and behavior:
+
+- First, China wants to annex Taiwan or otherwise bring about its political capitulation to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This has been a consistent desire of Beijing’s since 1949. Although there is a lively debate about Xi’s sense of urgency in achieving this goal, there is no doubt that he — like generations of Chinese leaders before him — seeks to bring Taiwan to heel, or that China is developing the tools, from hard military power to disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks, to do so. The fact that China is actively seeking multiple ways of achieving its long-held goal of annexation or forced capitulation means that the United States, its allies, and most importantly Taiwan itself should be contemplating all potential angles of attack.
+
+- Second, Xi or any future Chinese leader would prefer to take Taiwan with minimal international blowback. That blowback could include immediate repercussions such as economic sanctions or war with the United States; it could also include longer-term costs, such as a region that rallies against Beijing after Taiwan falls. The more dramatic the action China takes against Taiwan, the stronger the regional and global reaction might be. Beijing’s grand strategy encompasses goals beyond taking Taiwan, and so it will seek to balance its global aspirations with the important objective of achieving “reunification.”
+
+- Third, and related, Beijing would prefer to take Taiwan in ways that make it harder for the United States to intervene effectively and rally regional and global support if it does get involved. This puts a premium on pursuing annexation in ways that mask Beijing’s intentions, or at the very least sow doubt about what is happening and who is at fault. Over the past 15 years, for instance, China has often blamed the Philippines or Japan for escalating tensions in the South and East China Seas — and then used the resulting crises to strengthen its presence around key hot spots. More recently, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) launched joint military exercises in the waters and airspace around Taiwan in response to a “provocative” inauguration speech by Taiwanese president William Lai. Decisions to use military force are ultimately political choices, and the more China can move in ways that complicate the politics and geopolitics of a U.S. response, the bigger the head start it will have toward achieving a fait accompli.
+
+- Fourth, Beijing would ideally like to avoid the most vexing governance and security challenges that could occur after a direct, full-bore assault. Put differently, Beijing would prefer to rule a Taiwan that is not ruined, physically and economically, by conflict or roiled by a raging insurgency. Coercing Taipei to accept a political settlement, even an unpopular one, minimizes the governance and security challenges in comparison to a post-invasion scenario. Assuming that Beijing cannot find a (coerced) political path forward, it may still prefer to use tools other than the PLA — such as the People’s Armed Police, the Chinese Coast Guard, or the intelligence services — to precipitate a change in the status quo. Of course, the realities of pursuing an annexation strategy may complicate Beijing’s desires; nonetheless, from a planning perspective, the cleaner and less violent the path to “reunification,” the easier the security and governance challenges that follow annexation will become.
+
+- Fifth, China does not necessarily have to pursue annexation in a single bite. It could try, instead, to coerce Taipei into formal political negotiations that would have unification as the eventual endpoint, on the assumption that those negotiations would be consummated after Taiwanese resolve and U.S. credibility are shattered. Again, recent experience is instructive: Beijing’s periodic assertiveness around Scarborough Reef and Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea is driven, in part, by the desire to put pressure on the U.S.-Philippines alliance by demonstrating that Washington can do little to help Manila uphold its economic rights and territorial claims in scenarios short of all-out war.
+
+With these assumptions in mind, some might look to Hong Kong’s recent experience as the model for Beijing’s preferred Taiwan strategy. Yet this analogy is both instructive and misleading. It is instructive in the sense that Beijing eventually achieved a decisive outcome — a significant blow to Hong Kong’s “one country, two systems” arrangement — but it did so through measures meant to minimize collateral damage to the city’s position as a global financial hub. China did not, for instance, send the PLA into the city’s streets — a step that likely would have provoked greater global blowback. Instead, it used local police forces to quell the demonstrations and then — utilizing bureaucratic and legal channels — pushed through a draconian national security law that dealt the critical strike to Hong Kong’s autonomy. Because Beijing used lawfare to achieve its aims, it was politically and diplomatically challenging for the United States, the United Kingdom, and other stakeholders to do much beyond symbolic sanctions. The Chinese leadership calculated that this combination of measures would achieve their desired result — breaking the back of independent politics — with minimal geopolitical cost. Rather than demonstrating Xi’s unbridled appetite for risk, the Hong Kong example demonstrates his preference for lawfare and salami-slicing as a means to fundamentally alter the strategic landscape.
+
+But the Hong Kong analogy also has limitations, the most important of which is that the city had been Chinese de jure territory for more than 20 years by the time the culminating actions came. This gave Beijing legal channels through which to constrict Hong Kong’s political liberties. It also meant that China could use non-military forces, such as the police, to suppress the popular response. Such options would not be available to China in a Taiwan scenario, so Beijing would need alternative ways of generating the leverage necessary to achieve a decisive outcome.
+
+Of course, just because Beijing might want to take Taiwan through actions short of invasion does not mean it can do so. It is possible that increased, but not immediately decisive, coercion of Taiwan could actually encourage a stronger U.S. commitment to the island or incentivize Taiwan to take stronger measures to defend itself. It should be remembered that Mao Zedong’s shelling of Taiwan’s offshore islands in 1954 encouraged President Dwight D. Eisenhower to push through a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan. Something similar has happened in recent years, as the PLA’s provocative military exercises have led to increased U.S. arms sales and more explicit promises of U.S. support by President Biden. Indeed, options beneath the threshold of outright war all suffer from this potential liability, which is why the notion that Chinese leaders might opt for dramatic, decisive military action meant to solve the Taiwan problem once and for all cannot be dismissed.
+
+But the extreme risks and potentially disastrous costs of invasion also must weigh heavily on Beijing’s calculus, which is why options short of invasion must be considered, too.
+
+
+### Scenario 1: Decapitation Strike
+
+On March 19, 2004, President Chen Shui-bian and Vice President Annette Lu were traveling in an open-top Jeep in the southwest city of Tainan for a campaign stop when two bullets tore through their vehicle, injuring both Chen and Lu. The pair won reelection the following day, but before the authorities could complete their investigation into the assassination attempt, two of the suspected gunmen died under mysterious circumstances. Although some, including Vice President Lu, blamed the PRC for the attack, no conclusive evidence was found to support this assertion.
+
+In 2017, an assailant carrying a stolen Japanese sword attacked a military police officer outside of the Presidential Office Building. According to police reports, the man, surnamed Lu, had a PRC flag in his possession at the time of the attack. More recently, a member of the Presidential Office’s Department of Security Affairs and an officer from the National Security Bureau’s Special Service Center were convicted of leaking information to Chinese intelligence about then-president Tsai Ing-wen’s itinerary. According to media reporting, the intelligence included a “hand-drawn organizational chart of the Special Service Center,” as well as “the names, titles and work phone numbers of senior security officers guarding the Presidential Office and Tsai’s residence in the heart of Taipei.”
+
+These incidents highlight two underappreciated risks to Taiwan’s political resiliency: there is insufficient security around Taiwan’s elected leadership, and perhaps more worryingly, there is insufficient legal clarity on the line of succession.
+
+Although Taiwan reportedly has an internal plan for leadership transition, Article 49 of its constitution merely stipulates
+
+> “In case the office of the President should become vacant, the Vice President shall succeed until the expiration of the original presidential term. In case the office of both the President and the Vice President should become vacant, the President of the Executive Yuan shall act for the President; and, in accordance with the provisions of Article 30 of this Constitution, an extraordinary session of the National Assembly shall be convoked for the election of a new President and a new Vice President, who shall hold office until the completion of the term left unfinished by the preceding President.”
+
+This language raises several worrying questions: What is the timeline for the convocation of the National Assembly? Hours? Days? Months? Article 30 stipulates that the president of the Legislative Yuan (LY) “shall issue the notice of convocation,” but it does not clarify under what timeline and what occurs should the president of the LY fail to issue the notice in a timely manner. Furthermore, what happens if all three individuals listed are incapacitated or killed? How can the National Assembly be convoked?
+
+Beijing may consider exploiting these vulnerabilities to create a sharp constitutional crisis, and it could use the resulting chaos to alter Taiwan’s political orientation. It might do so if years of accumulating political trends in Taiwan — such as continued Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) dominance of the presidency — convince Chinese officials that inaction would be the greater risk. Alternatively, Beijing might act if it believes that a dramatic change in cross-Strait dynamics — such as a formal declaration of de jure independence or the reestablishment of the U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty — was highly likely to occur. In other words, an assassination attempt on Taiwan’s political leadership would be intended to serve as a substitute for a full-on invasion, carried out in a way that is designed to create confusion for the Taiwanese people and the United States. And it would not come out of the blue; it would instead follow a progression of political and diplomatic developments that Beijing considered to pose a near-existential risk to its cross-Strait strategy.
+
+As in 2004, Beijing would be the early and obvious target of recrimination, but the key question is how or if Taiwan and the United States would be able to formulate an effective response. In the absence of clear proof, accusations would remain just that. And as was the case in Crimea in 2014, or Manchuria in 1931, even after the truth becomes apparent, the window of opportunity to take effective action might well have closed.
+
+How might this scenario play out? A successful attack on Taiwan’s president and vice president, perhaps during a presidential inauguration or during the president’s annual National Day address on October 10, would immediately throw the island into turmoil. If the president of the LY were unharmed, this individual would bear enormous responsibility for bringing political order to a badly shaken nation. Such an effort would be difficult even in the most mature of democracies. In this early chaos, Beijing would have ample opportunities to stoke fear and uncertainty through disinformation and covert political meddling. If the LY president were killed, Taiwan would face an even graver crisis due to the acute leadership vacuum. Even if Taiwan had an internal line of succession, the absence of a publicly and constitutionally recognized process for transferring political power would call into question how legitimate that transfer is in the eyes of a shell-shocked public. Turning again to current events, the current fractious nature of Taiwan’s legislative politics, owing to an extraordinarily divisive partisan political environment, should put a damper on how likely the prospect of the three main political parties “coming together” is.
+
+How might Beijing take advantage of the ensuing chaos? There is the prospect of Beijing unilaterally sending “security assistance” to help stabilize the situation, but even as Taiwan’s people reel, this might be seen as too direct an effort. A more realistic path is for pro-Beijing voices in Taiwan’s political system to seek to utilize the confusion and constitutional crisis to seize political power or otherwise open up space for a dramatically transformed political leadership on Taiwan. Success would not be guaranteed, of course, and Beijing would only consider such a move if it saw the cross-Strait situation as dire and felt the need to take drastic steps to reorient the status quo.
+
+As such, this type of brazen attack would be a huge gamble. Any assassination attempt may fail, exposing Beijing’s complicity in the process. Even if the attack were successful, there is no guarantee that a post-decapitation strike plan would be carried out with any precision. Moreover, if Beijing intended to send “security assistance” to Taiwan following an assassination, it would presumably have to build up its forces opposite the island beforehand, which might give the game away. And any attack on Taiwan’s leadership would likely be seen by many in Taiwan and the international community as obvious Chinese aggression, calling forth a punitive response.
+
+Beijing’s bet, in other words, would have to be that this option nonetheless carries less risk than either allowing Taiwan to drift further away from the mainland or taking more overt military action to change its trajectory.
+
+
+### Scenario 2: Quarantine
+
+In August 2022, Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan, making her the first speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives to do so in a quarter-century. Beijing responded with military exercises meant to show off the PLA’s improving capabilities to conduct a blockade, bombardment, or invasion of Taiwan. Chinese missiles overflew Taiwan (albeit through outer space) and splashed down in its surrounding waters — a clear demonstration of Beijing’s ability to choke off vital sea lanes. In May, just after the inauguration speech of President William Lai, Beijing again launched massive military exercises encircling Taiwan, including “comprehensive law enforcement operations” by the Chinese Coast Guard.
+
+The most recent exercises highlight an option available to Beijing short of invasion and formal blockade: a quarantine meant to probe Washington’s risk tolerance and potentially strain its relationship with Taipei while sending a clear signal to the people on Taiwan that they are isolated. As a recent CSIS report on the prospect of a PRC quarantine of Taiwan concluded, “The purpose of a quarantine is not to completely seal Taiwan off from the world but to assert China’s control over Taiwan by setting the terms for traffic in and out of the island.”
+
+Beijing might seize on any variety of potential pretexts: a “provocative” statement or policy departure from Taiwan’s president, Lai Ching-te; a trip to the island by another high-ranking U.S. official; or a U.S. arms sale that, from Beijing’s perspective, threatens the status quo in the strait. A quarantine would be meant to mimic the effects of a more traditional naval blockade, without necessarily emulating its forms.
+
+For example, Beijing could announce that the Chinese Coast Guard, rather than the PLA Navy, would conduct customs inspections of shipping headed to and from Taiwan. It could further disrupt maritime traffic into Taiwan by conducting missile tests that terminate in frequently used shipping lanes in the international waters off the island’s major ports. Related, the PLA could announce a series of air and sea exercises in international waters off of Taiwan’s major western ports with no indication of duration, disrupting maritime trade under the pretext of “normal” military training. China could also ratchet up the pressure by having the PLA Air Force “escort” traffic into Taiwan’s air space, as some observers feared it might do at the time of Speaker Pelosi’s visit.
+
+China certainly has the capabilities for any of these scenarios. Its coast guard is the world’s largest; it features significant surface combatants and is, in essence, a second Chinese navy. Beijing also boasts the world’s largest conventional missile force, with a deep magazine of short-range missiles that can target the waters around Taiwan. Its inventory of fighter aircraft dwarfs Taiwan’s and whatever contingent the United States has available in the Western Pacific.
+
+What might make this option even more attractive is the dilemmas it would create for the United States, its regional allies, and Taiwan. Of the 193 UN member states, only 11 (plus the Holy See) diplomatically recognize Taiwan. So even though Washington and its allies would strenuously object to Chinese actions, a customs quarantine would be a less clear-cut act of international aggression than an invasion or even a conventional naval blockade of a fully sovereign state. By relying primarily on the Chinese Coast Guard and shore-based assets, this option would also reduce the danger of high-seas encounters between war-fighting navies (at the outset, at least). Similarly, this approach offers China the ability to achieve some effects of a blockade without crossing into what Taiwan deems as its territorial waters; missiles splashing down just outside of that limit could scare off shipping or at least drive insurance rates skyward.
+
+___`The soft quarantine would thus highlight, in a very public way, Taiwan’s inherent vulnerability as an island nation dependent on imports of food, energy, and other vital resources.`___
+
+The soft quarantine would thus highlight, in a very public way, Taiwan’s inherent vulnerability as an island nation dependent on imports of food, energy, and other vital resources. Even if a quarantine were only enforced selectively or intermittently, it would remind Taiwan of the economic noose Beijing can cinch tight around its neck. The United States and other friendly countries might try to defeat the quarantine by organizing a relief expedition and escorting planes and ships into Taiwan. But Washington might struggle to do so indefinitely, especially if this crisis happened when U.S. naval assets were already stretched thin by other commitments — for example, threats to freedom of navigation in the narrow waterways around the Arabian Peninsula. Indeed, the true goal of this strategy might be to expose the limits of U.S. support of Taiwan — and thereby soften the island up for further pressures meant, eventually, to cause its capitulation. There is also the possibility that the voices calling for “restraint” in the United States and other Western capitals would win out, after debate on whether Washington really wants to risk a conflict with China over some ships being boarded in waters thousands of miles away.
+
+That is not to say this approach is risk-free for Beijing. A limited quarantine would still be seen as aggression by Washington, Tokyo, Canberra, Manilla, and Seoul, to say nothing of Taipei, and so while it may “succeed” in the short term, it might also strengthen international support for Taipei, just as Beijing’s firing of rockets into Japan’s exclusive economic zone in August 2022 helped galvanize a more assertive Japanese approach vis-à-vis China. This approach could still turn into a high-stakes game of chicken, if U.S. warships and aircraft escort relief shipments into Taiwan and dare Beijing to get in the way. If China does not blink, in that scenario, it could have a war on its hands; if it falters, that could undermine the credibility of its coercive threats. Moreover, blockades and quarantines have a poor record of convincing countries to give up their independence; just as often, the suffering they cause strengthens, at least for a time, the will to resist. But a quarantine might still appeal to Xi, not least because it would also force the United States to decide if it wants to escalate to a full-blown crisis — and to sustain Taiwan indefinitely — in a situation where the PLA has not yet fired a shot.
+
+
+### Scenario 3: Offshore Island Seizure
+
+Several of Taiwan’s outer islands already live in the shadow of U.S. ambiguity, as the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act — which directs the president and congress to consider “appropriate action” in response to “threats to the security or the social or economic system of the people of Taiwan” — covers only “the islands of Taiwan and the Pescadores [‘Penghu’].” This means that one of the only legally binding commitments the United States has to Taiwan does not extend to its outlying islands — Pratas, Kinmen, Itu Aba, the Wuchiu Islands, and Matsu. As a result, these islands are potential targets for a Chinese takeover, not necessarily as a stepping stone for a full invasion of Taiwan, but as a way of probing U.S. and Taiwanese risk appetite and exposing the limits of American commitment and credibility.
+
+This calculus has been demonstrated to exist in modern U.S.-China relations. During the two Taiwan Strait crises of the 1950s (1954 and 1958), Mao Zedong repeatedly used the shelling of Taiwan’s offshore islands as a way to probe the United States and test its relationship with Taipei. As Mao stated in August 1958 meeting of the Politburo, “although we have fired dozens of thousands or rounds on Jinmen [Kinmen], we only mean to probe [America’s intention].” He added, “we need to see if the Americans want to carry these islands on their back.”
+
+An appealing target might be Pratas Island, which is sparsely populated with only a small contingent of Taiwanese coast guard and military personnel. The island is of little inherent strategic value to Taiwan, and its seizure might not provoke any substantial military response from either Taiwan or the United States, assuming casualties are low to zero. At a minimum, the takeover of the island would force the United States to confront the dilemma of whether it wants to risk major war with China over a small island of just 430 total acres that sits in the middle of the South China Sea.
+
+Indeed, Beijing has multiple options for taking Pratas Island. It could announce military exercises in the waters and airspace surrounding the island that would have the functional effect of cutting Pratas off from its regular shipments of water, food, and other supplies from Taiwan’s main island. Beijing might then signal through lower-tier diplomatic channels that Taiwan can rotate existing military and coast guard off the island, but it cannot bring new troops and coast guard on.
+
+Alternatively, a more confrontational — and riskier — approach would be simply to directly overpower the tiny contingent of coast guard and marines stationed on the island. This would, of course, invite condemnation from Taipei, Washington, Tokyo, Manila, and other capitals that would see such a move as naked aggression. But it is not at all clear that any of these countries, including the United States, would be able and willing to muster a proportionate punitive response. For the United States, the challenge would be explaining to the American people why a tiny island nearly 300 miles from Taiwan, and which is not covered by the Taiwan Relations Act, is worth a possible conflict with China, the world’s second-largest economy.
+
+In any of these scenarios, geography would severely constrain the response from Taipei and Washington, who would have to decide whether to tolerate the loss of a small, geopolitically insignificant chunk of Taiwan’s territory or risk a much bigger fight just a few miles from China’s shores. As Lancaster University’s Andrew Chubb has written, an outer island seizure “would offer Beijing greater flexibility and escalation control, lower risk of civilian casualties, and less likelihood of sparking a strong Taiwanese response or U.S. intervention.”
+
+A common objection to such scenarios holds that the capture of an outer island yields China little to no strategic benefit if the goal is the full annexation of Taiwan, as it would still need to attempt a direct attack on the main island of Taiwan, which would presumably be on high alert. Further, even if the PLA were to cleanly seize Pratas, it would simply confirm the fears of many countries in the region — its initial gain of Taiwan territory would have come at the expense of “tripping the alarm” and therefore galvanizing action in Tokyo, Manilla, and Canberra.
+
+But such objections are premised on the idea that Beijing’s immediate goal in undertaking such actions would be “reunification.” A more plausible objective for Beijing would be to cut a slice of salami that the United States and Taiwan will not be willing or able to defend. Here, the main goal would be a clear provocation that is met with an underwhelming response, for it would publicly demonstrate that Washington’s bark is worse than its bite when it comes to defending Taiwan. This strategy could thereby erode Taiwan’s confidence in U.S. support — to say nothing of its confidence in its ability to protect itself — while also provoking anxiety in U.S. allies and partners over Washington’s inability to credibly defend against incremental Chinese aggression. And at the point that Beijing is willing to undertake such a gambit, it may already be pricing in the erosion of its remaining goodwill in the region.
+
+
+### Scenario 4: False Flag
+
+A final scenario involves a false flag operation — akin to what Japan perpetrated in Manchuria in 1931 — meant to justify subsequent military action against Taiwan. The current situation offers plenty of possibilities. Chinese aircraft regularly fly across the center line of the strait or into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone, where they are tracked by Taiwanese air defenses or intercepted by Taiwanese fighters. Run-ins between Taiwan’s coast guard and Chinese civilian vessels have occasionally turned deadly. Chinese drones overfly Taiwanese territory; Chinese forces intercept — and dangerously crowd — planes and ships belonging to Taiwan’s friends. The air and waters of the Western Pacific are becoming crowded, dangerous, and primed for some catalytic incident.
+
+China could concoct a Taiwanese “provocation” — a collision between Taiwanese and Chinese ships or aircraft, or perhaps even an alleged Taiwanese attack on Chinese forces operating in or around the strait. It could then use full-throated propaganda and disinformation to pin the blame on Taipei and exploit the incident to obliterate the status quo.
+
+One option would be to use the incident as justification for a large-scale, potentially decisive attack on Taiwan, in which case the point of the subterfuge would be simply to complicate the domestic and coalition politics of the U.S. response. Or Beijing could use the incident as pretext for something more limited, such as “retaliatory” strikes on Taiwanese bases and military assets. Likewise, the PLA Air Force could simply conduct large-scale, persistent intrusions into Taiwan’s airspace, meant to assert its ability to overfly the island at will — forcing Taipei to choose between submitting to this confidence-crushing humiliation or contesting these intrusions at the risk of war.
+
+This approach offers many benefits for Beijing. It would showcase China’s overwhelming escalation dominance in the area around Taiwan, which leaves Taipei with few good options for responding to limited strikes or stepped-up military pressure. It would exploit the ability of China’s state-directed propaganda apparatus to rapidly disseminate a false or misleading narrative, as officials and media outlets in the United States, Taiwan, and other nations would struggle to respond. It could also strain the U.S.-Taiwan relationship by forcing Washington to decide how much risk to run in pushing back against limited Chinese aggression — a real dilemma, given that U.S. officials would presumably not wish to see matters escalate further.
+
+Even if a false flag incident led to more dramatic forms of aggression, this approach could — by sowing ambiguity and confusion — slow U.S. decisionmaking and exacerbate the severe time pressures a distant United States faces, even in the most favorable circumstances, in rushing to Taiwan’s aid. A false flag operation does not have to fool everyone forever. It just has to foul up the international response long enough for Beijing to create new facts on the ground.
+
+The downsides are also considerable. The United States has shown, during the war in Ukraine, that it can sometimes detect and reveal false flag operations before they occur (although this may hinge on remarkable intelligence penetration of the sort Washington seems to have achieved in the Kremlin). Even if a false flag operation created momentary confusion, any further use of force against Taiwan could quickly bring clarity to the debate in Washington and other capitals. And if the false flag were merely a prelude to more limited military actions, the United States could still respond in ways that would make Taiwan a tougher nut to crack — by deploying larger numbers of troops on Taiwanese territory, for example. If this was the case, the outcome might actually be to increase Taiwan’s resilience by strengthening its faith in U.S. support.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+None of these options is a silver bullet for Beijing. Deceptions can be unraveled. Coercion, even when clouded by confusion, can invite strategic blowback. To return to an earlier example, Russia’s ambiguous aggression in Crimea gave it control of that peninsula, but at the same time, Kyiv responded to the loss of Crimea by accelerating its alignment with the transatlantic community — and thereby confronted Putin with the dilemma he tried to solve, disastrously, with a full-on invasion in 2022. Yet China might still consider limited options — both because the near-term risks associated with them remain lower than the risks associated with a large-scale, overt aggression such as a direct invasion, and because these options could create significant political dilemmas for Taiwan and the United States.
+
+Each of the scenarios reveals a weakness China could try to exploit: from Taiwan’s deficient continuity-of-government procedures, to its inherent economic vulnerabilities, to uncertainties around how the United States would respond in crises short of all-out conflict. Most fundamentally, these approaches would target Taiwan’s political will to resist and its confidence in U.S. support — the two vital, interrelated intangibles that Beijing must weaken to achieve unification without a brutal fight.
+
+If these scenarios illustrate how Beijing might try to thread that needle, they also highlight some of the challenges Washington and Taipei must address. Taiwan’s survival may hinge as much on its internal security and continuity-of-government procedures as on its stockpile of anti-ship missiles and sea mines. The United States, for its part, needs to be developing contingency plans for cases of limited aggression. The specifics of those plans will vary according to the contingency. But the crucial point is that they must include sharp, non-kinetic punishments that allow the United States to inflict damage on China without sparking a larger military confrontation in places where the escalation dynamics are unfavorable — as well as measures that defeat the intended Chinese political effect of ambiguous aggression by significantly deepening U.S. military, diplomatic, and economic support for Taiwan.
+
+The United States might communicate to Beijing that any significant coercive change in the status quo would render the norms and agreements governing U.S.-Taiwan-China relations a dead letter — thereby clearing the way for, among other things, a thicker, more robust military-to-military relationship between Washington and Taipei, and perhaps even a larger, more capable, and more visible U.S. troop presence in Taiwan. Or it could indicate that aggression against outlying islands is likely to lead to more explicit U.S. security guarantees for the Taiwanese territory that remains. The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act already sets the groundwork for such messages.
+
+Similarly, the United States might — in coordination with allies and partners — preload packages of economic sanctions that could be applied in cases of ambiguous aggression. The challenge here is that the magnitude of sanctions needed, and the importance of signaling them credibly and early, are all difficult to pull together, especially under scenarios where Beijing’s actions are in the gray zone, and therefore not always seen as sufficiently provocative to risk a possible global recession. It would also be useful to wargame scenarios short of outright conflict with Taiwan and other friendly countries, if only to form a stronger shared understanding of the difficulties those scenarios might create in the capitals whose combined effort would be needed to forge an effective response.
+
+___`In a contest short of war, the center of gravity is Taiwan’s confidence in its relationship with Washington and in its own ability to resist.`___
+
+In a contest short of war, the center of gravity is Taiwan’s confidence in its relationship with Washington and in its own ability to resist. The goal should thus be to convince Beijing that violent half-measures will backfire strategically even if they succeed tactically, as they would strengthen U.S. and international support for Taiwan and thereby harden Taipei’s hostility to unification at the point of a gun.
+
+Most broadly, the upshot of this analysis is that Washington needs to expand its conception of deterrence in the Taiwan Strait. If the United States prepares only for incremental or ambiguous aggression, it risks making a full-scale invasion more attractive for Beijing. But if it focuses only on high-end deterrence, it could lose on the installment plan as China uses creative tactics that erode Taiwan’s sovereignty and its confidence in the United States. Beijing has many ways to change the status quo in a sensitive area. The United States will need a holistic deterrence strategy to match.
+
+---
+
+__Jude Blanchette__ holds the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
+
+__Hal Brands__ is Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-25-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-92.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-25-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-92.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : 【黎智英案・審訊第 92 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-07-25 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/LciFH41.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 官裁3控罪表證成立 黎智英選擇親自作供 押後至11.20續審
+
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+【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，控方早前舉證完畢，辯方昨日作中段陳詞，要求法庭就黎面對的3項控罪裁定表證不成立。3名國安法指定法官今（25日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）宣布，裁定黎所面對的3項控罪表證成立，需要答辯。經30分鐘休庭，辯方指給予法律意見後，黎選擇親自作供，另擬傳召一名專家證人就社交軟件 Signal 作供。由於3名法官在8至10月均有其他案件要處理，未能立即聽取黎的證供。經商討後，最終押後至11月20日續審，屆時黎將出庭作供。
+
+#### 3罪表證成立 黎智英選擇親自作供
+
+首被告黎智英（76歲）由懲教人員押解往法院應訊。法官杜麗冰宣布，黎所面對的3項控罪均表證成立，需要答辯。辯方隨即申請休庭30分鐘以向黎索取法律指示。
+
+再次開庭之後，辯方代表、資深大律師彭耀鴻指，已給予黎法律意見，而黎選擇在本案親自作供。另外，辯方擬傳召一名專家證人，就社交軟件 Signal 作供，預料證供內容圍繞技術層面。
+
+
+▲ 資深大律師 彭耀鴻
+
+#### 3法官均另有案件處理 控辯雙方商討後 押後至11月
+
+法官杜麗冰指，就時間而言，法官李運騰下周有個人事務，難以出席本案；另外，3名法官在8月有其他案件要審理，直至8月29日之前都未能處理本案。至於10月，法官杜麗冰表示有一宗高院案件需要續審，料需時3星期，而該案已經押後多時，不能再調動。法官李運騰則關注，黎已還柙一段時間，案件應盡快續審。
+
+控方問及黎智英的證供需時多久。辯方指，預計主問需時5日。法官李運騰聞言則指，本案涉及文章數量眾多，預料控方會以雙倍時間作盤問，因此主問連同盤問應該合共需時3至4星期。
+
+經休庭商討，控辯雙方最早可以出席續審的日子為今年11月20日，這樣黎作供可以一氣呵成，而毋須打斷。辯方表示，辯方案情需時約30個工作天。最終法官杜麗冰押後至11月20日續審。
+
+#### 辯方中段陳詞：黎網上節目提及制裁 不等於呼籲外國制裁
+
+就串謀發布煽動刊物罪，辯方的中段陳詞指，涉案報導和評論牽涉公眾利益，發布僅為了引起公眾關注，這是一般報紙本來就會做的工作，而且言論和新聞自由均受憲法保障。
+
+就串謀勾結外國勢力罪，辯方指黎在2020年7月起的網上對談節目「Live Chat with Jimmy Lai」中，的確有提及制裁，但是不代表他正在呼籲外國實施制裁；黎與嘉賓僅評論國際事務，就如一般市民在茶餐廳裡評論時政，說香港政府有何不足、應該怎樣做等。
+
+#### 辯方：國安法前協議均為合法 國安法後便沒有達成新協議
+
+就「串謀」這一項控罪元素，辯方指在《國安法》生效之前，黎與其他被告協議做的事，包括「一人一信救香港」、國際登報計劃等行為，均是合法；即使在《國安法》生效之後，上述行為變得不合法，但是黎與他人再沒有新的犯罪協議，因此不存在「串謀」。惟法官質疑，控方的說法是指稱黎在《國安法》生效之後，相關協議仍然繼續。
+
+首項「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全罪」指，黎智英、蘋果日報有限公司、蘋果日報印刷有限公司及蘋果互聯網有限公司，於2020年7月1日至2021年6月24日（包括首尾兩日），在香港與其他人一同串謀，請求外國或者境外機構、組織、人員實施對香港特別行政區或者中華人民共和國進行制裁、封鎖或者採取其他敵對行動。
+
+另一項「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全」罪，指黎智英於2020年7月1日至今年2月15日間，與 Mark Simon、陳梓華、李宇軒、劉祖廸及其他人串謀，請求外國或境外機構、組織、人員，實施對中國或香港進行制裁、封鎖或者採取其他敵對行動。
+
+「串謀刊印、發布、出售、要約出售、分發、展示或複製煽動刊物」罪指，黎智英、蘋果日報有限公司、蘋果日報印刷有限公司及蘋果互聯網有限公司於2019年4月1日至2021年6月24日（包括首尾兩日），在香港與其他人一同串謀刊印、發布、出售、要約出售、分發、展示及/或複製煽動刊物，具意圖：
+
+> a) 引起憎恨或藐視中央或香港特別行政區政府或激起對其離叛
+
+> b) 激起香港居民企圖不循合法途徑促致改變其他在香港的依法制定的事項
+
+> c) 引起對香港司法的憎恨、藐視或激起對其離叛
+
+> d) 引起香港居民間的不滿或離叛
+
+> e) 煽惑他人使用暴力
+
+> f) 慫使他人不守法或不服從合法命令。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC51/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-26-jordans-stability-is-critical.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-26-jordans-stability-is-critical.md
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-26-jordans-stability-is-critical.md
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Jordan’s Stability Is Critical
+author: Urban Coningham
+date : 2024-07-26 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/Qo5c4cW.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "What Can the UK Do to Help?"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_The current crisis in the Middle East is presenting the Hashemite Kingdom with mounting challenges that it will need international support to overcome._
+
+
+
+In the UK, Jordan is rarely spoken about in politics or in the media as much more than an anchor of stability in an increasingly fragmented Levant region. To its north lies southern Syria, where Assad has managed to wrestle back nominal control of provinces by striking deals with warlords who collect rent from drugs production. Iraq and Lebanon, two of Jordan’s close neighbours, are captured states, where non-state actors supported by Iran have taken control, and strengthen their grip on power every day through normalising corruption and dispensing patronage to their supporters. To Jordan’s west are the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Israel, where Israel’s war on Gaza continues.
+
+Jordan, in comparison, maintains an air of stability, with a stable monarchy and democratic elections. Despite this, Jordan is in a uniquely difficult position due to instability caused by Israel’s war in Gaza and the worsening economic conditions within the Kingdom. Before the 7 October attack, Jordan already struggled with high unemployment, particularly among young people (aged 15–24), at over 40%. Since the conflict began, this problem has been exacerbated by a catastrophic drop in tourism and trade. Tour guides and tourist businesspeople this author spoke to reported almost endemic booking cancellations, with no promise of future work. Jordan’s economic model relies heavily on tourism, and the collapse of that market leaves thousands more unemployed or without income. Jordan’s economy also relies on foreign aid and support, much of which comes from multilateral institutions such as the UN. The withdrawal of US support for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) is a sobering prospect for Jordanian policymakers, who rely on the work of UNRWA to support the two million registered Palestinian refugees currently in Jordan. In this way, UNRWA, UNHCR and the myriad NGOs within Jordan cover gaps in welfare that the Jordanian civil service simply does not have the money or capacity to provide.
+
+Socially, Jordan is in similar disarray. There have been almost daily protests in Amman and other major cities regarding the country’s close relationship with Israel. There have also been specific cases where protestors have targeted government buildings, a recent example being a protest attempting to storm the Israeli embassy in March 2024. At the heart of these protests is the long-established Palestinian community. Palestinians make up over half of the Jordanian population, and feel frustrated that Jordan continues to cooperate with Israel politically and militarily. Particularly incendiary was Jordan’s participation in the Middle East Air Defence Alliance response to Iran’s strikes on Israel in April 2024. The Jordanian foreign minister, Ayman Safadi, replied to accusations by explaining that the motivation was simply to defend Jordanian airspace, but many within Jordan continue to interpret the intervention as a stance in defence of Israel. In an era of unprecedented social media use, Jordanians are consistently confronted with harrowing images and videos from inside Gaza, further inflaming tensions. Antisemitism is also widespread in the country.
+
+___`As a pivotal UK ally in the region, Jordan and its stability should be of paramount concern for UK policymakers`___
+
+The existence of an anti-Israeli sentiment in Jordan or the wider Middle East is hardly a novel phenomenon, and neither is Jordan relying on foreign aid to stave off economic collapse. However, the region’s fragmentation brings a set of novel and unique challenges to Jordan. One of these challenges is that Iran and its proxies are increasingly identifying Jordan as a potential vector for their shadow war with Israel and the West. Iran has excelled in its policy of establishing a network of dissident groups across the region, whether in Lebanon with Hezbollah, Iraq with Shiite Militia Groups, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza, the Houthis in Yemen or Polisario in the Maghreb. Iran has continued this opportunistic support of groups in Jordan. Examples of this include weapons- and drugs-smuggling across the vast Iraqi and Syrian borders; hacking support targeting the Jordanian government; rhetorical support of dissident groups; and criticism of the monarchy.
+
+In an era of increased great power competition, Keir Starmer and his ministers have stressed at every opportunity that their focus and priority is European security. While the UK has clear economic and energy security dependencies on the Gulf, the same is not true of the Levant region. It is clear that there is very unlikely to be new funding from the UK in the region, and we can also rule out interventionism of the kind we saw under past Labour governments, as the US looks set to concentrate resources around China. The combination of a lack of resources and the fact that what limited resources are available are focused on Europe leaves UK policy on the region at an inflection point.
+
+
+### Securing Jordan: Actions for the UK and International Partners
+
+Jordan’s long-term economic weakness, coupled with an increasingly fragmented regional security landscape, poses an increasing threat to the only stable country in the Levant. As a pivotal UK ally in the region, Jordan and its stability should be of paramount concern for UK policymakers. A weak Levant region directly impacts the UK through migrationary pressures, the export of terrorism, and the disruption of key supply lines and international trade. So what can the UK and its allies do to mitigate Jordan’s instability and support Jordanians in their struggle for a better future?
+
+First, ending the conflict in Gaza would significantly alleviate pressure on Jordan. David Lammy began his tenure as Foreign Secretary by correctly pointing out that the UK has limited influence in bringing this about, then visited Israel, and the OPT, and called for an immediate ceasefire. Realistically, the UK has very limited scope for unilaterally bringing about an immediate ceasefire, though Lammy may feel that calling for one will begin to tip the pressure dial in Washington. The UK government should instead concentrate on supporting the US in its negotiating efforts and ensuring that post-conflict initiatives include steps towards establishing a Palestinian state. Still, while the UK has limited prospects for singlehandedly bringing about an immediate ceasefire, it has enduring credibility that can be leveraged with future Israeli governments. UK officials should emphasise to future Israeli governments the dangers of allowing internal political struggles to lead to breaches of conventions regarding the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound and settler activity in the West Bank. Additionally, the UK should maintain and expand its policy of identifying and sanctioning those involved in illegal settler activities in the West Bank.
+
+Second, the UK must persist in providing direct support to Jordan, particularly through government projects aimed at capacity building. Historically, UK spending in Jordan has largely been directed towards military training and democratisation. A shift in focus towards enhancing the capabilities of increasingly strained Jordanian government departments is essential.
+
+Third, the UK should advocate for sustained regional and international support for Jordan. This includes ensuring the continued operation of multilateral aid agencies in Jordan, especially given the critical gaps left by the US withdrawal of support for UN organisations like UNRWA and UNESCO. If direct economic aid from the UK is not feasible, diplomatic efforts in the Gulf should prioritise generating and coordinating regional aid for Jordan. This could include bilateral aid packages as well as multilateral regional and international agencies.
+
+___`Jordan stands at a critical juncture amid regional turmoil, grappling with economic fragility exacerbated by external conflicts and internal dissent`___
+
+Finally, the UK should engage in regional and international discussions on addressing Iran’s influence. Since the collapse of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – otherwise known as the Iran nuclear deal – there has been a lack of coherent strategy, contributing to tensions on the Israel–Lebanon border, the security vacuum in Yemen, and instability in Iraq. Acknowledging this issue is crucial for any UK efforts aimed at regional stability. The new government should prioritise convening and supporting regional initiatives, in collaboration with the US and European allies, to prevent Iran from perpetuating instability. Iran’s threat to regional peace and security must be taken seriously and acknowledged for what it is.
+
+Jordan stands at a critical juncture amid regional turmoil, grappling with economic fragility exacerbated by external conflicts and internal dissent. The country’s stability remains pivotal for the broader Levant region, making it imperative for the UK and its allies to take proactive measures. Addressing the conflict in Gaza, advocating for Palestinian statehood, and maintaining diplomatic pressure on Israel are immediate steps, but the UK government needs to delineate a coherent strategy. While Jordan currently outperforms its troubled neighbours, complacency will not ensure sustained stability unless proactive measures are taken.
+
+---
+
+__Urban Coningham__ is Research Fellow and Course Lead. He coordinates the activities of the RUSI Leadership Centre, which designs and delivers bespoke training programmes for government officials and security professionals. His further research interests centre on the security and geopolitics of the Middle East, particularly in the Levant and on the intersection between heritage and conflict.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-26-the-black-and-red-sea-lessons.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-26-the-black-and-red-sea-lessons.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..346e81be
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-07-26-the-black-and-red-sea-lessons.md
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : The Black & Red Sea Lessons
+author: Sidharth Kaushal
+date : 2024-07-26 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/gGctaks.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Lessons for the Royal Navy’s Future Operations from the Black and Red Sea"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_What lessons can the Royal Navy draw from the conflicts in the Red Sea and Black Sea?_
+
+
+
+Over the last two years, warfare at sea has been conducted at a higher level of intensity than has been seen for decades. The conflict in Ukraine, in which the Russian Black Sea Fleet was rendered “functionally inactive” by a country without a surface fleet, and the ongoing battle in the Red Sea have provided analysts and practitioners of naval warfare with a wealth of empirical evidence. It is thus germane to consider what lessons the Royal Navy might draw from these conflicts as the force continues a process of recapitalisation which will extend into the 2030s.
+
+
+### The Anti-Access/Area Denial Threat: A Challenge to be Contextualised
+
+The remarkable success enjoyed by an overmatched Ukrainian Navy and the country’s security service against Russia’s Black Sea Fleet has, understandably, led some to ponder the question of whether we are approaching a tipping point in the conduct of warfare at sea. The ability of the Ukrainians to combine anti-ship cruise missiles, uncrewed surface vessels and land attack missiles such as Storm Shadow into a layered anti-access area denial threat that has partially forced the Russian Navy out of Sevastopol raises important questions regarding the risks which surface vessels face, particularly in confined waters. The proliferation of these capabilities, many of which are now employed by weaker states and indeed non-state actors, will mean that what would have been largely uncontested deployments at sea in the past will involve contested theatre entry.
+
+However, claims regarding the risk to surface combatants themselves should be scrutinised. In the Black Sea, despite high losses in aggregate, the Russian fleet has not endured a historically high loss rate. Over the course of the two and a half year conflict, Russia has lost 22 vessels, which amounts to a loss rate of 0.03 per 100 ship days in theatre. For reference, the US loss rate against Japanese Kamikazes off Okinawa was roughly 0.2 per 100 ship days (with vessels sustaining damaging hits at a rate of 0.44 per 100 ship days), and the UK task force in the Falklands endured 1.35 damaging hits per 100 ship days – despite which both navies prevailed. In effect, then, it is not clear that the vulnerability of vessels to the anti-access threats of yesteryear, be they crewed suicide aircraft or Exocet missiles, was less acute than is the case now. The importance of not overstating the risks to surface vessels has been reinforced in the Red Sea, where the Houthis have thus far failed to successfully engage a coalition surface combatant and where UK and US vessels have enjoyed tactical successes against complex salvos incorporating capabilities such as C-802 anti-ship missiles, Samad-3 UAVs and Asef anti-ship ballistic missiles.
+
+Even so, a limited loss rate can have crippling cumulative effects on a fleet over time, as it has had on the Russian Navy. This is true of all forces, but the risk is especially acute in maritime warfare as vessels are increasingly difficult to replace. This in many ways reinforces a classical principle: if a navy has a choice between seeking decision early (even at some risk to its forces) or conserving capability, it should generally opt for the former option. A conservative approach creates false efficiencies, reducing loss rates at any given time but raising the risks of a long war which many navies may not be able to sustain, irrespective of how low they can keep their loss rates. Of course, a navy cannot always force a decision in war – in truth, there was no way the Russian navy could have shortened the conflict. However, its losses in a long war still reinforce the lesson.
+
+___`If a navy has a choice between seeking decision early (even at some risk to its forces) or conserving capability, it should generally opt for the former option`___
+
+While in both the Black Sea and the Red Sea large surface combatants have been relatively safe, the same cannot be said for less heavily armed vessels and the fixed infrastructure that supports the fleet. Many of Ukraine’s successes have been achieved against platforms such as the Ropucha-class landing ship (which serves as a logistical workhorse for the Russian army) as well as minesweepers and patrol boats. In the Red Sea, the Houthis have enjoyed a comparatively high hit rate against merchant shipping. While warships themselves may not be more vulnerable, the threat that anti-access systems pose will be most acute for the lightly armed (or unarmed) oilers and solid support vessels that enable the Royal Navy’s operations. The effect of this will be significant when limited numbers of support vessels are available. Additionally, while tasks such as mine countermeasures have always had to be conducted under some risk of an air threat, the UK’s (Royal Fleet Auxiliary-operated) mine countermeasures vessels will face an increasingly multilayered anti-access challenge, incentivising uncrewed solutions which can be employed from greater distances and multiple vessel types.
+
+Fixed infrastructure has also proven vulnerable even under optimal conditions. The ability of Ukraine’s armed forces to progressively target both vessels and structures in Sevastopol, which is defended by a robust integrated air defence system, illustrates that over time even relatively well-defended fixed bastions will be challenged by cruise and ballistic missiles, among other threats. For the UK, home ports such as Portsmouth are relatively safe. In the absence of a Russian intermediate-range ballistic threat, the primary threat is posed by cruise missiles, which – if launched from the eastern flank – would have to traverse a considerable amount of territory. There is a real threat posed by cruise missiles launched from Russian bombers, surface vessels and submarines from the northern flank, although even in this case, once an Allied maritime component command is stood up, the vulnerability could only be exploited if Russia was willing to risk losing key strategic assets. At home, the risk is likely to be most acute in the early stages of a conflict. That said, key seaports of disembarkation on which elements of the Royal Navy (and the wider UK joint force) would depend in an expeditionary context are far more vulnerable by dint of proximity to likely theatres of combat. Examples include Duqm in Oman and Gothenburg in Sweden. The latter, as Scandinavia’s largest port, has been an important logistical lynchpin of exercises such as Trident Juncture, which included the Royal Navy and Marines.
+
+The way in which Russia had to eventually defend Sevastopol with not just air defences but also helicopters and barriers (to respectively slow and engage UAVs) also carries more tactical lessons. Of note is the important role played by Russian helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft against unmanned surface vehicles (USVs), which are able to remain below a surface vessel’s radar horizon for extended periods, but which are vulnerable to air attack. This could have ramifications for the Royal Navy’s Merlin and Wildcat fleet, which will also be needed to support other functions such as anti-submarine warfare (ASW), among other tasks. The addition of roles for an already stretched helicopter force might be avoided through the use of autonomous systems, and engaging surface targets in clutter may be an area where machine learning and computer vision – as well as the non-lethality of the engagement – can allow autonomy to be exploited quickly (as contrasted with more complex tasks such as ASW).
+
+The risk to logistical nodes will reinforce another challenge: the difficulty of achieving magazine depth. This is partially a function of cost, since interceptors such as the Aster-15 and 30 cost much more than many of the missiles they may have to intercept. It is also, however, a function of the fact that vertical launching systems (VLS) cannot be safely replenished at sea in even moderate sea states. The likelihood that vessels will expend their VLS loadout, coupled with a risk to any allied or sovereign forward bases on which they may have planned to rely, could – in extremis – force the rotation of Royal Navy vessels to home ports, significantly impacting their operational tempo. Fleet sustainment, rather than protection, may be the biggest challenge in contested theatres.
+
+A final notable feature in both the Black and Red Sea has been the role of third-party ISR provision. While the extent of the Allied role in providing ISR to Ukraine in the Black Sea cannot be known, it is understood that the US is providing data from space-based ISR to Ukraine 32 times per day, and that Western surveillance platforms have conducted patrols over the Black Sea. In the Red Sea, Iranian special-purpose vessels such as the Behshad have provided cueing to Houthi missile batteries ashore, a role also performed by the Iranian vessel Saviz during the Saudi-led coalition’s campaign. A sub-peer opponent backed by a state source of adversary ISR that cannot be targeted for political reasons will pose a challenge to many concepts for countering anti-access/area denial (A2AD) which depend on destroying or crippling an opponent’s sensors (which may not be an option in indirect conflict). A range of options of varying complexity and risk – from jamming and cyber attacks to covert sabotage (likely conducted against the Saviz by Israel) – are available to navies, but the risks and costs of these options need to be weighed ahead of time as do the cross-service and cross-government dependencies they create.
+
+
+### Lessons Regarding the Pacing Opponent
+
+The two conflicts have also illustrated a number of things about putative opponents that the Royal Navy may face, most notably Russia.
+
+Russia’s failures in engaging dynamic targets at sea over the course of the Ukraine conflict have been considerable. To use one example, the Russian navy and air force failed to fix and engage the Ukrainian navy’s last surface vessel – the Yuriy Olefirenko – for months, even when it was deployed at relatively close proximity to Kherson to provide naval gunfire support. The inability to engage the vessel at sea (it was eventually sunk in port), despite Russia enjoying air and naval superiority in the Black Sea during 2022, would appear illustrative of broader problems with aggregating data from multiple sensors and tasking platforms dynamically. This may reflect challenges in the stated desire to aggregate information from multiple service branches without reaching back to a higher headquarters or involving multiple separate command chains. While the failure to track a relatively conspicuous amphibious vessel was likely a failure of organisational structures rather than sensors, Russia will struggle in the latter regard as well. Though it aspired to replace the Soviet-era Tselina and Legenda constellations with a robust network of Pion-NK, Lotos and Persona satellites equipped with ELINT, COMINT and EO sensors, it had by 2021 launched only one Pion-NKS satellite, and fields a very limited EO capability. In the absence of a space-based ISR capability, Russia’s ability to track dynamic targets at long distances (except through very non-granular tools such as the Polsodnukh-E OTH radar) will be limited.
+
+In this context, the methods which NATO has used to employ maritime power as an asymmetrical competitive tool vis Russia – including the deployment of ELINT spoofing on islets in the Aegean during the Haystack exercises and Ocean Venture, which saw emissions-dark carrier operations in Norway (where terrain added an additional layer of complexity to air-based tracking) – may be tactically feasible vis a Russia that does not employ the sophisticated A2AD capability that China does. Towards the end of the Cold War, an inability to perform dynamic tracking led the commander of the Soviet Northern Fleet to request a trebling of his budget, and was a major factor in Soviet assessments of the conventional balance. This is, in principle, good news for a Royal Navy that will be built around aircraft carriers for the foreseeable future. However, the ability to perform these actions during the Cold War depended in great measure on US aircraft carriers and was, moreover, a product of sustained training in complex waters such as those on the Norwegian coastline where operating large vessels requires considerable skill. Any European effort to replicate this (of which the Royal Navy could be an important part) would need to account for fewer available US capabilities in the event that the Indo-Pacific absorbs more capacity. Munitions sustainment and enablement will have to be accounted for, particularly given the small numbers of munitions capable of suppression of enemy air defences, such as SPEAR-3, that are likely to be available. In effect, then, Cold War concepts for employing forces forward to impose multiple dilemmas on a continental power remain tactically valid, but this will only be true if they can be resourced.
+
+___`Many of the challenges of greatest significance relate to generating the capacity to leverage existing capabilities and competencies effectively`___
+
+Another major lesson regarding the Russian navy as an opponent, which became particularly stark after the loss of the Moskva, is that the Russian navy is designed to have strategic effects from relative proximity to its ports. From positions in Crimea, the Russian fleet – which is the only service equipped with the 3M-14 Kalibr cruise missile – has been a key component in Russia’s strike campaign against Ukrainian civilian infrastructure which is fixed and easier for Russia to target with complex salvos. Ukraine has progressively degraded this threat, but at a likely considerable cost in missiles. While it is not known exactly how many Storm Shadow/SCALP and Neptune missiles have been used against Russian ports, it is understood that 300 missiles were provided to Ukraine and that striking the Black Sea Fleet was a priority line of effort for Ukraine’s strike campaign. Moreover, each reported cruise missile strike appears to have been preceded by days of attacks using UAVs, possibly alongside other shaping activity. For navies such as the Royal Navy (and indeed the UK joint force), the challenge is not that sinking the Russian surface fleet will be inherently difficult, but rather that if the fleet opts to launch cruise missiles against civilian infrastructure from positions close to air defence networks in Kaliningrad and the northern bastion, there will be a political demand to engage it (irrespective of the military value of doing so) and the task will be a burden in terms of both planning and munitions expended. Given the likely demand for standoff munitions elsewhere in the theatre, this is of importance. Surface strike, then, is a priority line of effort even if the Russian surface fleet is a decrepit force. The requirement to engage targets within well-defended bastions while accounting for limited VLS capacity into the 2030s, even after vessels such as the Type 26 and Type 31 enter service, will make it of particular importance that weapons such as FC/ASW are able to achieve a high Single Shot Probability of Kill in defended airspace, since the smaller a salvo, the more important penetration and successful engagement becomes. Though Russia’s nuclear-powered submarines are its most potent capability, the Russian naval threat is not just a submarine threat.
+
+
+### Conclusions
+
+The conflicts in the Red Sea and Black Sea carry a number of important lessons which might inform the Royal Navy’s efforts to generate its future fleet. In many ways, the technological dimensions of these conflicts – though the most heavily studied – have been less important than the fundamental lessons that they carry regarding how a fleet must structure and prioritise tasks to prepare for major contingencies. The lessons learned from these conflicts, then, have an evolutionary quality where many of the challenges of greatest significance relate to generating the capacity to leverage existing capabilities and competencies effectively. Technology can be an important enabler in this regard, but is not a solution in itself.
+
+---
+
+__Sidharth Kaushal__ is Research Fellow for Sea Power at RUSI. His research at RUSI covers the impact of technology on maritime doctrine in the 21st century, and the role of sea power in a state’s grand strategy.
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+---
+layout: post
+title : UK’s Procurement Reform
+author: Julian Brazier and Ryan Shea
+date : 2024-07-29 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/Iy16dQK.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Procurement Reform Starts with Requirement Formulation and the Supply Chain"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_The pace of change today leaves the UK facing formidable threats and remarkable opportunities. However, it is critical to develop and buy the right equipment due to extremely tight defence budget._
+
+
+
+Cheap, widely available equipment, from drones to laptops propagating viruses, present asymmetric opportunities to terrorists. At the same time, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has restored the threat of peer-on-peer warfare. A range of new technologies, from cyber to artificial intelligence to biological weaponry and, soon, quantum computing, threaten a sudden leap forward in conventional warfare.
+
+This matters, as an example from as far back as 1982 reminds us. In an attack on Syrian surface-to-air missile sites in the Beqaa Valley, the Israeli Air Force destroyed all 19 sites, together with an astonishing 64 Syrian fighters, without a single loss. With aerodynamically comparable aircraft – and highly motivated pilots – on both sides, it was a single Hawkeye airborne early warning and control system and superior avionics which turned a battle into a turkey shoot. Yet today’s attrition rates in Ukraine emphasise the importance of quantity as well as quality.
+
+Acquisition reform is critical, but also a well-trodden area of discussion. While improving defence procurement is a classic “wicked problem” with no easy solutions, we believe there are two areas that the new government needs to focus on. The first is how requirements are generated, and what organisational reforms can improve this process. The second is supply chain management, to enable the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to take advantage of the innovation ecosystem that the UK has to offer.
+
+
+### Defining Procurement Requirements
+
+Bernard Gray’s seminal report of 2009 on defence procurement had a major impact on the operation of Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S), the sharp end of defence procurement, and he was subsequently put in charge of that organisation. But Gray also had some trenchant analysis on the confused arrangements by which elements of the MoD acted as the “customer” for DE&S. He recommended:
+
+- a) DCDS(Capability) to be responsible for the creation and control of requirements, and required to control the budget of the agreed EP as a single point of MoD contact with DE&S for equipment.
+
+- b) Clear ownership of each project/requirement to be allocated to a single individual within DCDS(Capability) team, including business case formulation.
+
+___`The average timeline and onerousness of MoD procurement rules out a large proportion of companies with which Defence would benefit from engaging`___
+
+In the early 1980s, when the UK produced world-class equipment across many categories, the operational requirements branch of each service (as capability directorates were then called) had a cross-section of military officers. These branches included the head at each level, scientists, engineers and finance staff and – crucially – controlled their own budgets, up to certain limits. Ironically, the same period when the sharp end of procurement was greatly improved through the Levene Reforms, with the setting up of the Procurement Executive (now DE&S), the highly effective operational requirements branches, which acted as the “supervising customers” for the Procurement Executive and its predecessor organisations were broken up. In the quotation above, Gray effectively recommended the reintroduction of that original structure for operational requirements. This was ignored.
+
+A complication was that Lord Levene’s second batch of reforms in 2011 involved delegating more powers to the four relevant top-level budget-holders (TLBs) – the Royal Navy, the Army, RAF and StratCom – but each simply took over its share of each central function, capability, technical and financial, replicating the same stove pipe approach with military, technical and financial staff brigaded separately.
+
+Today, each capability function continues to be composed almost entirely of uniformed staff, commissioning work from scientists and engineers concentrated in the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL), or in a separate part of their individual service branches, while the budget and – crucially – the authority to spend is held by a third body, such as, in the case of the Army, D Resources.
+
+A series of innovation units has been set up in each of the four TLBs, starting with JHub in StratCom. Early evidence is that these are getting some small projects from conception to fruition with commendable speed. Helping to take forward their work, and innovation more generally, is the Defence and Security Accelerator. These innovation hubs seem to be structured and to operate in a remarkably similar fashion to the old cross-disciplinary operational requirements branches, but they are effectively operating in parallel with the main capability departments; it would seem to make more sense to fix those structures.
+
+The scientists from DSTL and the individual services, and relevant financial staff, should be reintegrated, and authority returned for smaller projects. This should empower and motivate staffs, and having technical capability in-house and part of each team’s culture should temper any temptation to go for the first shiny offering from an existing contractor. A further point is that all the uniformed officers are regulars, so there is only reserve input when they choose to ask for it. We believe that this has two serious disadvantages. First, reservists may identify opportunities early in the process of designing a capability so as to make it easier to integrate citizen elements – as the Russians did with the simple and robust T34C, and the Germans failed to do with their excellent but over-complex Panzers. Second, civilians often bring knowledge of civilian tech alternatives (from simulation, to communications, to the software lifecycle) more advanced than military equivalents. So reservist officers should be included in the capability function, on the usual part-time basis as on other staffs.
+
+One area where the MoD has made remarkable progress is breaking down the traditional structures by which personnel train and upskilled. PUBLIC delivered an innovation programme called the Percy Hobart Fellowship, where Royal Navy personnel were exposed to business, digital, and innovation skills, provided a short secondment into a technology startup, and asked to develop an innovation project predicated around a problem that they had experienced. One of these, the development of a mobile onboard operating theatre, has been taken into the formal procurement process, and is projected to save the Royal Navy £8 million per year against the retrofitting of a standard ship’s medical centre. Although a small example in the grand scheme of defence spending, this illustrates that an empowered individual, with the support of a cross-functional team, can develop requirements that help the MoD buy fit-for-purpose equipment that saves money and delivers what is required to the warfighter.
+
+It also shows that, in the upstream identification of requirements, key MoD decision-makers would benefit from secondments and a general exposure to the innovation, science, and technology world outside Defence. The MoD should provide additional structures and opportunities to encourage networking and knowledge-sharing across different units within Defence, leading to a diffusion of ideas and cooperative networks that can help drive better requirement development.
+
+
+### Broadening the Supply Chain
+
+A consistent concern that arises from both defence suppliers and investors is the so-called “valley of death”: the gap between the capital available for small-scale pilots and the funding required to develop a production-ready capability. As a result, defence technology is largely seen as an un-investable market for start-ups, given the level of risk capital required to build the competition and supply chain needed to deliver benefits to MoD.
+
+A few factors drive this. The first is the disappointing level of market engagement with a diverse set of suppliers. This is partly caused by strict rules around market engagement, many of them rolled over from EU regulations. However, efforts such as Digital Exploitation for Defence (DX4D) aim to increase the touchpoints with digital solution providers. This is important because the best solutions to a problem have often been identified in adjacent markets. Let us not forget that the genesis of Silicon Valley was the defence industry, with Hewlett Packard selling microprocessors to the US Navy. Hewlett Packard selling audio oscillators to the US military To truly take advantage of dual-use technologies and bring a more diverse set of suppliers into the defence market, the MoD must look to expand its market engagement activities beyond the typical avenues.
+
+The second factor is the length of procurement timelines for defence. Particularly for specific technology or software applications, as opposed to platforms, the average timeline and onerousness of MoD procurement rules out a large proportion of companies with which Defence would benefit from engaging. The MoD announced in July 2023 that it intends to reduce the maximum timeline for digital acquisition programmes to three years. However, this remains well outside the typical lifespan of a typical early-stage digital start-up.
+
+Related to the procurement length is the typical size and structure of MoD procurements. The fact that requirements all too often focus on platforms rather than the weapons and capabilities they carry often means that the MoD misses out on applications, tooling or software that might impact specific, well understood opportunities. This leads to a disproportionate amount of spend going through prime contractors. 2022/2023 MoD spend with SMEs totalled only 5%, well below central government’s target of 25%, which shows the degree to which primes and large businesses dominate this market. This compares to 25% of prime contracting value for the US Department of Defence going to SMEs in 2022. While primes have SMEs and innovative businesses in their supply chains, UK primes are under no obligation to produce figures around how much spend makes its way to SMEs. That power differential is felt by companies in Defence; many start-ups in this space report a reticence to engage with primes because of their ability to dictate terms around important issues, such as intellectual property ownership and transfer of risk, that are disadvantageous or even threatening.
+
+Finally, if we want to bring greater diversity, competition, and therefore quality into defence supply chains, we must incentivise the risk capital required to scale disruptive digital and technology businesses. Equity investing in defence companies in the UK from 2021–2023 was 0.6% of that in the US. Investors note the availability of small funding sources for pilots, as well as later stage private equity, but a lack of venture investment in mid-tier funding to carry promising businesses through that “valley of death” to implementation. Therefore, the current route to market is to sell early to a prime, or hopefully gain enough traction in adjacent markets that the challenges mentioned above can be mitigated. This is not an effective way of stimulating a market that delivers good value for money.
+
+___`By reshaping the formulation of requirements and the cultivation of the defence supply chain, the UK could bring British innovation back into the heart of its armed forces`___
+
+There are several approaches that the MoD can adopt to address these challenges. There should be central guidance to dramatically increase the pace of acquisition for digital programmes. One approach is to use a procurement method known as a Challenge Programme, which allows departments to demonstrate multiple solutions around a particular problem space, allowing them to see what the market has to offer and create a clear pathway to procurement for successful suppliers. The Home Office Accelerated Capability Environment has been a successful example of this.
+
+To increase the clarity and attractiveness of the defence market to start-ups and innovative SMEs, we would like to see greater pre-market engagement, accompanied by a genuine dialogue with the proposed reconstituted integrated capability staffs, to help define requirements and detailed specifications. Primes should be required to make public their spend with SMEs. This will both make the attractiveness of the market clear, and help government hold these suppliers to account for SME spend targets. A greater effort to break down platform procurements into smaller lots would attract more businesses and increase competition and value for money.
+
+Finally, we have seen positive efforts from NATO’s DIANA accelerator programme to create not only funding, but also paths to market for leading defence startups. But this is not enough if we want to build a world-beating domestic defence innovation ecosystem. Investors need to be brought into the dialogue to understand and feed into MoD priorities, changing the rules of market engagement where necessary. This would provide valuable insight on the state of the art technologically for government, as well as where spending priorities are for the MoD. A funding mechanism, possibly following structures pioneered by the Enterprise Capital Funds programme at the British Business Bank, to incentivise the creation of funds that focus on mid-stage rather than early-stage growth would go a step further.
+
+The UK used to be a shining example of innovation across the G7 and NATO, from Frank Whittle and Percy Hobart to Alan Turing. There are still points of light, like today’s Government Digital Service. Our warfighters and defence staff deserve the very best that the market has to offer. By reshaping the formulation of requirements and the cultivation of the defence supply chain, the UK could bring British innovation back into the heart of its armed forces.
+
+---
+
+__Julian Brazier__ is a former MP and government minister. As a scholar in maths and philosophy at BNC, Oxford, he worked in the City and in management consulting, co-authoring a major study comparing defence procurement in six NATO nations and Sweden.
+
+__Ryan Shea__ is Managing Director at PUBLIC UK, where he leads the Transformation advisory and Ventures function, advising governments and private sector organisations with public sector footprints on how to utilise technology to achieve their goals.
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