diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-05-19-the-hongkongers-journey-of-the-heart-emigrating-to-the-uk.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-05-19-the-hongkongers-journey-of-the-heart-emigrating-to-the-uk.md
new file mode 100644
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+---
+layout: post
+title : "港人移英心路歷程"
+author: "困兒"
+date : 2023-05-19 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/kpjJP7w.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+我到英國的確離開了自己的安舒區，但離開後更發覺原先的安舒區原來不是太安舒。這世界，或許到處也很可怕，但轉念一看，心想事事可怕的心情，比做起事情來得可怕多了。
+
+
+
+### 這幾個月事實上經歷了什麼：
+
+由上一年9月來英國，到現在已約8個月了。
+
+我本來在香港是做marketing的，在香港時已預計自己沒什麼可能在英國找到相關的工作，因為marketing也是一個相當要求localization的行業，但是來到後又心想何不試試找找，可能找到相關的工作也不錯吧。
+
+就第二個月那時開始，我就不停的找相關的工作，因為在那行業也停留了一定的日子，所以都有不少的面試機會，而且有不少也到了最終的面試，但是，總是有一些更適合的人，最後都沒有結果。
+
+如果大家有在英國找指定行業且有管理相關的經驗，您就會明白，英國的面試對面試者的誠意相當有要求，他們會要求您對他們的整個品牌已有一定的了解，大約明白他們的需要，且能提供一定的建議。所以在見工的時候，每一次的準備時間也相當長，您可以想像，一份工作可能有1-4個面試，而每一個也要充分預備的話，那三個月真的是一件很累的事情。
+
+當一個機會是這樣，再來十個機會都是這樣，我就明白了那不是剛好不合，而是我的做法真的有問題。
+
+我反問自己，如果有一個人是在英國到香港，且想在香港做marketing，即使有完全相關的經驗，我要考慮的因素都很多，而且是在一些decision-making的角色上，既然是針對本地市場，所以都是應先考慮有本地經驗的人。
+
+
+### 再者，我問了一個核心問題，我是為什麼來英國的？
+
+我是想找一個工作上更加努力的地方嗎？如是那樣，我根本不用離開，因為本來在香港已經不錯，且香港稅率低，是一個賺錢的好地方，只是賺錢不是用來生活用而已。
+
+我是想重新擁有自己愛的自己，不是做一個自己都不愛的自己。
+
+就是希望過得輕鬆一點，隨性一點，打打不同的工作，體驗一下不同的生活，那不是一件很有趣的事情嗎？我的生活根本不是很需要大量的物質，也不是以不斷向上爬為人生的目標。其實有些花草，有些書，有些食物，去到近近的地方便宜地去去旅行，其實我已經很快樂。那為何每一次在緊張的時候，在不知不覺間就會回到了原點，找一些熟悉的東西來找回安全感？我可以做的東西，真的不一定是我想做的東西，明明知道那一個角色是一個會易有緊張和壓力的角色，做出來的東西我也不是特別利害，那為何我要向著那一個方向前進？
+
+
+### 反思生活的各個面向和盲點：
+
+先是工作吧：
+
+- 其實我不是喜歡marketing，特別是我的性格其實和marketing不太合拍。
+
+- 我愛安靜和有深度的交流，但有時工作上有太多要去處理人的事情，有太多人際關係要處理，要裝成一個外向的人不是不可以，但我清晰知道那不是自己。所以，每一次活動後，都用不少時間去令自己回復。
+
+- 再加上，我個人其實不是太受宣傳內容影響的，不少時候，我會覺得廣告愈多的地方愈是假，如果是集中在branding我還可以，但是如果是集中在performance marketing上的話，壓力真的很大，且覺得自己做的東西很假很無聊，且不長久。聽著聽著，我都覺得自己很不marketing。
+
+再來是社交需要：
+
+- 因為在英國好像突然沒有了朋友，心態上好想立刻有一班新的朋友，感覺上新的地方中完全沒有任何關係很奇怪。所以那時找工作，好像是想立即找一班朋友一樣，所以沒有工作就沒有朋友了。那是多麼撞牆的概念！
+
+- 好吧，朋友是朋友，同事是同事，找朋友的話用找朋友的方式吧，找點興趣，做做義工，朋友就會存在了。可能是因為自己對朋友比較有要求，所以小心翼翼的我真的有很多年沒有主動出去找朋友了，這實在是有些奇特的感覺。
+
+追逐目標的能力：
+
+- 其實在決定不找marketing的工作後，第一個想法是找些其它的專業來學學，再來些part-time來玩玩。我希望我未來的工作是多樣的，由不同的工作拼合而成（slash），而不是一份單一的工作，所以我想到了一些可以接案子的工作，那我就有可能達到work from home，且可以移居到那兒都可以的能力，ux/ui/front-end都是我愛且覺得有可能做到的。
+
+- 但是我這個人的問題是當定下了目標後，就會立刻要求自己全程投入，要不然就是太懶惰。我經常忘了自己是一個有血有肉的人，除了認知，情緒上的感受，還有身體上的限制，我是一個忘了自己是一個生物的人，不尊重自己有任何生理上的需要，理解不到累，渴，餓，一切就是在自動程序中完成，少了一點思考和理解。
+
+- 所以好像有任何休息的時間都是懶惰的時候，不停地投訴自己沒有能力和恆心。但是，真的不用這樣的吧？那樣的追逐目標，結果就是一切，把旅途上的一切都省略了。如果慢一點，是否可以燒久一點呢？這問到最後，我發現是自己的安全感出現了問題。
+
+安全感的考驗：
+
+- 我發現如果我的收入是零的話，我就會很不安，令自己要脫離零的感覺。明明經濟沒有危機，但個人的心態就快要崩潰了，我到底在崩潰什麼？那一種要自己全副精神的努力，要求自己時時刻刻都破釜沉舟是什麼樣的把戲？
+
+- 我發現了自己經常用過往和未來去鞭策自己，在腦海中經常重播過往的不小心或是自己定義的失敗，又經常創造了一個充滿危機感的未來去讓自己害怕，到最後發現自己裹足不前，生怕自己現在的決定會令未來的自己無比後悔，那一種幻想令到現在的我卡在了一個前進不能的情況。
+
+- 但是這種活在過往或是期盼未來的情況都是相當不健康，與其把精力留在未來的無限可能性，或是過往的悔恨當中，何不着眼現在每一刻的生活？
+
+> 到這兒，我思想上的圍牆開始崩塌，我開始數算自己現在的擁有，和現在這一刻我可以把握住的可能性。
+
+
+▲ 小小的花園，還可以加一個bird feeder!!!
+
+
+### 現在的擁有：
+
+1. 我有一個小小的花園，可以讓我種植，達成了我由20歲就有的夢想。
+
+2. 我喜歡煮食，這兒的食材新鮮，乾淨，可以令我有時間和空間去煮食，更有空去做我最喜愛的甜品。
+
+3. 學習全新的領域很刺激。
+
+4. 有一份令我沒有負擔和壓力的工作，不用在工餘時間回覆一些上司說很重要，對不起要用您工餘時間，但您可以⋯⋯（下省三千字）的whatsapp。
+
+5. 文化上的開明，不是只討論行街食飯買野，拍拖結婚生仔，這兒的人比較有喜好，有討論和交流的感覺，沒有主流且必需跟從的價值觀。
+
+6. 再一次感受到大自然的力量，春夏秋冬，四季分明。
+
+7. 人生重新開始沒有包袱的感覺。
+
+
+感恩自己能有這種決心，但繼續下來的是恆心，一步一步，行出生活，那路程就已是一個又一個的景點。
+
+希望，由此，我不要再讓我的人生自動導航，拿回人生的掌控權。
+
+即使到或不到自己的目標，都能欣賞到沿途的美景。
+
+反正真的沒有人知道自己什麼時候會死去，惟有現在才能創造過往和未來。
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-05-27-imitation-of-the-spirit.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-05-27-imitation-of-the-spirit.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..1bc9cd0e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-05-27-imitation-of-the-spirit.md
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "精神的模仿"
+author: "Terence"
+date : 2023-05-27 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/jsnTXD5.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+徐中约在《中国近代史》的开头写到：这场持续了约三十五年的运动，是一种浮于表面的近代化尝试；它只采纳了西方文明中那些具有直接实用价值的东西，而另一些更为可取的方面——如政治体制、经济制度、哲学、文学和艺术等——却完全被忽略了。即使是这个时期中较进步的中国人也确信，除了坚船利器之外，中国从西方没有多少东西可学。
+
+
+
+模仿是一切学习的开始，虽然「学会」的最后一个步骤又是亲手拆掉这层模仿的脚手架。但无论对于体制的学习还是领域的学习，仅仅是模仿「行为」本身可能是完全不够的，甚至还必须模仿其精神。
+
+黑客文化如同数学文化一般，表面看起来无关紧要（或许对于真正的大师来讲是这样的），但对于有严肃意愿进入到这个圈子的普通人来讲则极其重要。如果无法理解背后的精神内核、只是在行为上同其他人做着同样的事情，你根本无法感受到同样的乐趣和精神共鸣，也就无法“坚持”那些看似极端的行径。
+
+> “As with all creative arts, the most effective way to become a master is to imitate the mind-set of masters, not just intellectually but emotionally as well.”
+
+> by Eric S. Raymond
+
+最开始看到hacker的相关材料时非常奇怪，为什么要将hacker spirit搞得那么宽泛，比如，hacker是喜欢解决问题的人、是喜欢创造和共享的人，且不仅仅限于计算机。他们想要弄清楚背后的工作原理，解除所有的限制，将成果自由地分享给所有人。
+
+没有hacker spirit的coding无异于做苦力，如同一名「画家」变成「画师」不断地在为一个个的「订件」而工作，却体会不到任何的自主性，也无从找到源自「自我」的乐趣，顶多不过是从完成订件的「推理游戏」和「集中力所构筑的心流」中获取些许慰藉。
+
+但coding本身最大的乐趣，其实应该是：这是一款你可以创造游戏的游戏，追求自由并表达自我。并且，这个创造与表达的过程并不是随意的空想，而是愿意付出大量艰辛的前期劳动去研究已有事物的工作原理（如：在制造blue box之前，乔布斯和沃兹花费了6个月的时间研究电话系统；为了构建出spacewar游戏的上古计算机时期，MIT的hacker花费大量时间去研究宇宙星系位置及引力相关的知识）。然后在这些「已知」上，注入自己的改进与组合，即：创造。
+
+事实上，如果你对「弄清事物的原理」没有足够的好奇心、对于「接受由他人创造的『现实』」毫无叛逆之心、对自我的独立性和表达毫不关心，你根本不可能有耐心去完成如此繁复和艰辛的劳动。特别是，如果最后的作品充满不确定性、其出发点不过是一个微小的类似于玩笑的诉求，当你在研究过程中发现了越来越多需要去完成的工作时，你根本不可能有任何继续的冲动和能量。
+
+这种情形非常类似于对数学的研究，当你发现某个数学分支需要你越来越多的全身心的投入、需要的逻辑复杂性和知识的储备越来越多、需要付出的劳动与思考远远多过其他行业，而最后的回报仅仅存在于形而上的「乐趣」而毫无现实物质回报可言时，你会不可避免地面对那个终极问题：你前进的理由是什么？
+
+答案只能是一种完全脱离于物质世界的精神追求，对某种理念的绝对信仰。
+
+- 自己「拆开」眼前的东西，而不是必须依赖/寻求教科书（因为有时候并没有这样的东西，且自己动手更为有趣）。
+
+- 了解、搞清楚「工作原理」，而不是一味地瞎猜（重点是理解，而不是妥协于玄学，摒弃神秘/神奇/光环崇拜，根除由「崇拜」导致的放弃独立思考）。
+
+- 进一步继续创造，而不满足于仅仅对「现存」知识的理解和接受。有意愿/勇气/自信做出进一步的改进，让「现存」变得更好。相信自己具备这种影响现实世界的能力，而不是单向接受由他人创造的「现实」。
+
+某种意义上，hacker和mathematician在本质上都是对「独立性」和「自由」的极端追求，而这种极端追求的直接且极端的推论便是对「自我」的无限肯定和肆意妄为，对「价值」的终极评价标准是它是否拥有「我」的贡献。所以为什么要去造轮子？为什么无法接受现成的「存在」？为什么就不能按照其他人铺就的story生活？为什么要反抗他人对「概念」的定义，非得自己定义一遍？因为它们缺乏「我」的贡献。在这个意义上来讲，这群人是最为自大和孤傲的存在，他们的创造源自「愤怒」，一种没有「我」的参与的愤怒，于是要拆解存在之物，即便研究的东西繁复无比、需要耗费大量的精力和劳动也在所不惜，彻底弄懂背后的原理与机制，然后按照自己的品味开始组合与创造，将「自我」注入其中。
+
+当然，可能当事人并不总是如此显式地在完成这一极端的过程。对于拥有好奇心、想要动手的人来讲，大部分时候都只是开始于一个小小的改进诉求，但发现并没有直接可以做到的途径。对他们来讲，这显然不可接受。于是，带着「凭什么」的潜在愤怒开始透彻研究眼前的这个顽固问题。越是研究可能发现需要了解的细节和工作量就会越多。此时，对普通人来讲需要停止的艰辛旅程，会因为「自由」和「好奇心」这些狂热信仰的PUA而让这群人更加疯狂地全力以赴。这是一种犹如迷幻剂一般的信仰上瘾：逼近身体极限的工作强度，以及绝无仅有的高效和集中力。
+
+（显然，这种信仰狂热的另一个好处是能够让很多枯燥乏味知识的学习变得兴趣十足。那些通常不会去研读的枯燥材料如：细致介绍协议标准的手册、代码/产品的机制设计手册、某个专业方向的理论专著，会在这一过程中得以饶有兴致地高效吸收。）
+
+在一大堆了解工作原理及反复尝试的艰苦劳动之后，可能会蓦然发现原来自己在这件事上可以拥有更多的自由度，于是不仅那个一开始的「改进诉求」被完全满足了，并顺带发现了更多可供改进与创造的地方，以至于最后得到了一个远超初衷的结果。当然，也并非每一次尝试都能获得意外的收获。但这也无关紧要，因为根本来讲，做这件事就是为了追求「自由」和注入「自我」，而这一点总是能够在艰辛的劳动之后得以实现。
+
+这样的创造方式，同样适用于没有充分想象力的分析者：不是依靠直觉和丰富的情感凭空构建出什么新的东西，而是不断分析、拆解现有之物，将表现异常的部分给予修复。这种「修复」本身对于外界来讲，即是一种有价值的创造。
+
+
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diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-06-09-china-and-the-censorship-of-science-fiction.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-06-09-china-and-the-censorship-of-science-fiction.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..539439f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-06-09-china-and-the-censorship-of-science-fiction.md
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "「某国」与科幻审查"
+author: "游虫斜会"
+date : 2023-06-09 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/PeIiGlt.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+最近在读《意识上传中》——格雷格·伊根（Greg Egan）的一个汉语版短篇集。在读到其中《看见》这篇时，我注意到一个不协调之处：
+
+
+
+> 整个世界都在底下供我凝视，从最近的苏丹饥荒到某国内战，从纽约的人体彩绘时尚游行到英国议会遭炸弹袭击的血腥结果。
+
+不用说也能看出，在一群具体的地名之中出现了一个「某国」，而就我读到的，这篇小说中并不存在一个叫「某国」的国家。于是我搜了下原文，找到了对应的文本：
+
+> The whole world is there to gaze upon, from the latest Sudanese famine to the Chinese civil war, from a body paint fashion parade in New York to the bloody aftermath of the bombing of the British parliament.
+
+不出意外，这所谓的「某国」正是中国。
+
+之后我回想起前面也似乎有个「某国」，于是在《百光年日记》中找到了它（注意还有个「某地」）：
+
+> 2079年7月8日，某国军队进入某地“稳定地区局势”（通过毁灭分离主义者在其国境内的供给线），当时我几乎没有多想什么。
+
+其对应的原文为：
+
+> On 8 July, 2079, when Chinese troops moved into Kashmir to “stabilise the region” — by wiping out the supply lines to the separatists within their own borders — I hardly gave it a second thought.
+
+这一篇中还有一段：
+
+> 她说：“我们当然在资助对方，和欧洲、日本还有美国一起。由于暴乱后的贸易禁运，当地政府现在没有战争无人机了，他们只能派人类士兵和过时装备去对抗最高级的越南机器人。四十万士兵和十万平民将会丧生，而盟军待在柏林玩他们的唯我论电子游戏。”
+
+原文为：
+
+> She said, “We’re helping to fund it, of course. Along with Europe, Japan, and the States. Thanks to the embargo after the Hong Kong riots, the Chinese have no war drones; they’re pitting human soldiers with obsolete equipment against the best Vietnamese robots. Four hundred thousand troops and a hundred thousand civilians will die — while the Allies sit in Berlin playing their solipsist video games.”
+
+这不禁让人疑虑：这本书中究竟有多少内容被审查了。我没有时间和意愿进行调查，但我在豆瓣上找到一篇书评提到了其中至少一部分，而且数量不少——数数这篇短短的书评中的「和谐」个数便能知道。
+
+要知道，中国的审查者们向来对引进的作品更加宽松一些，毕竟这部作品要是被别有用心之人发现其中竟描述了「中国内战」，恐怕便会冠以「辱华」大帽，大力贬斥，也就不可能被引进中国了。
+
+写到这里时，我的头脑里不禁回想起鲁迅先生曾写过的一句话：「惨象，已使我目不忍视。」
+
+或许有人会觉得过于夸张，这何以算作是惨象，其实早就已是日常。难道说我们的日常便是一种惨象么？
+
+但我不能否定。
+
+在中国，写科幻面临的审查几乎就和描写现实一样严重，而绝大多数人都明白真实地描写现实在这里几乎已要成为一种罪行。
+
+为什么会这样呢？原因很容易理解，许多科幻作品属于推测性的小说，即会假定世界是怎样的或出现了某种新型科技，然后进行推演；也因此，许多科幻作品都是着眼于未来的，而这就带来了一个问题：未来的中国是怎样？
+
+用科幻作家韩松的话来说：「共产党在哪里呢？」他还写道：「任何一种梦想的实现仍然要靠党来举大旗。」这大概就足以概括了。
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-06-11-indo-pacific-new-framework-of-security.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-06-11-indo-pacific-new-framework-of-security.md
new file mode 100644
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-06-11-indo-pacific-new-framework-of-security.md
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "印太安全新架构"
+author: "王臻明"
+date : 2023-06-11 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/OetaNdv.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "北约再东扩，或组建印太版小北约？"
+---
+
+5月7日，印度与东协国家举行为期两天的“东协－印度海上演习”（ASEAN－India Maritime Exercise, AIME 2023），包括越南、泰国、马来西亚、菲律宾、新加坡、汶莱、印尼都派兵参加，共有九艘舰艇与1400人参与。
+
+
+
+不过，参与演习的多国海军舰艇在越南专属经济海域活动时，中国派出海上民兵刻意干扰，有五艘民兵船闯入演习区，甚至出现短暂的对峙。虽然双方在事后都刻意淡化这次事件，不愿正面回应，甚至强调双方船舰和平通过，未发生紧张对峙。但此举已显示，中国对于东协的态度，可能正转趋强硬。
+
+关键的原因在于中国对南海的野心正逐日扩大，近年来与菲律宾因南海主权争议而爆发的海上冲突，有越演越烈的趋势。菲律宾积极寻求反制的方式，不只罕见地开始强化军备，并宣示国防战略将大幅转向，从肃清国内叛军转为关注国外威胁。新总统小马可仕（Ferdinand Marcos Jr.）更一改过去杜特蒂（Rodrigo Duterte）较为亲中的态度，除了再开放四处基地供美军使用，才刚结束的美菲肩并肩（Balikatan 2023）联合演习，也是历年来规模最大的一次。美国还直接表明，如果菲律宾在南海受到攻击，将会启动美菲共同防御条约，不排除派遣美军以武力反制。
+
+
+▲ 参与AIME 2023演习的多国海军舰艇，在越南的专属经济海域活动时，中国派出五艘民兵船闯入演习区。Ray Powell@twitter
+
+
+### 印太地区组建全新安全架构？
+
+南海情势的快速升温，也让周边国家有所警觉。事实上，除了中国、台湾与菲律宾，还有越南、汶莱、印尼与马来西亚等国，都对南海有过不同程度的主权声索。这些国家虽然在经济上与中国有紧密的关系，却又担心中国势力在南海持续扩张，会影响到自己的国家利益。印度则从1991年开始，积极推动“东向政策”，希望扩大印度与东南亚国家的往来，进一步投资这个超过六亿人口的新兴市场，并强化自己的区域影响力。再加上近年来印度又与美国、日本、澳大利亚组成四方安全对话（Quad），企图牵制中国，于是让印度与东协一拍即合，首度催生了这场海上联合演习。
+
+所以AIME 2023演习的规模虽然不大，对中国而言却有如芒刺在背，若不在第一次演习时，就展现中国的反对态度，未来可能演变成定期活动，慢慢唤起东协过去的军事功能。虽然今日的东协已蜕变成一个经济合作架构，甚至与中国签署“中国－东协自由贸易区（ACFTA）”，也就是俗称的“东协加一”，并以此为基础，与日、韩、澳、纽等国建立“区域全面经济伙伴（RCEP）”协定，成为最受瞩目的自由市场。但东协一开始成立的目的，是在冷战时期围堵共产势力的入侵，等同于亚洲版的北大西洋公约组织。
+
+不过东协并没有像北约一样，不断扩大，北约在冷战结束后，还逐步吸纳前华沙公约组织国家与前苏联加盟共和国，变成一个超大型的区域安全架构。相反的，东协不断淡化军事色彩，反而以经贸合作为主要目标，在冷战结束后还接纳共产国家，如越南、柬埔寨与寮国加入，由于这些国家到今日为止仍然奉行共产主义，反而进一步淡化了东协的反共立场。可以这么说，东协做为一个区域安全组织，因各成员国的立场差异、外在环境、历史恩怨等，而未能扮演重要的角色，但转形成经济组织后，却是相对成功的。
+
+不过东协这样的发展方向，接下来可能会面临挑战，因为随着印太地区局势的风起云涌，让原本印太地区松散的安全架构，已经难以因应未来的情势。美国是否应该筹组印太版小北约的讨论，开始成为热门话题。而在此同时，北约成员国相继发表自己的印太政策，并派遣军舰至印太地区巡弋，北约甚至首度在东京设立连络办公室，显示北约也想插手印太事务，并扮演一定的角色。美国更暗示北约应对全球安全做出更大贡献，这让中国官方媒体撰文痛批，指控全球版的北约，反将危害世界安全。
+
+中国担心东协与北约成为美国围堵策略的新工具，所以对东协的演习与北约的扩张，采取激烈反应。就目前的情势看来，并非杞人忧天，美国若要在印太地区筹组全新的安全架构，这是两个极有可能的方案。除此之外，韩国近期积极与日本修补关系，并强化美韩同盟，还同意让三国的雷达系统共同连线，以分享情报，说明美国已逐步整合在东北亚地区的传统盟邦。因此另外一个选择是强化目前美日安保条约与美韩共同防御条约，再加四方安全对话，组成印太地区全新安全架构的基础。
+
+
+▲ 2017年5月25日，比利时布鲁塞尔，北约成员国旗帜在总部飘扬。
+
+
+### 东协、北约东扩及现有架构优缺分析
+
+这三个方案各有利弊，首先东协的优势，在于这个组织早已存在，不需要另起炉灶，重头开始。而且东协各国幅员广大，人口众多，是近年来最受瞩目的新兴地区，在美中贸易战开打后，不少在中国设厂的大型企业，纷纷南迁到东协国家，使东协可望成为取代中国的下一个世界工厂。同时，美国与多个东协国家都拥有长期军事合作关系，除菲律宾外，每年还与泰国、马来西亚、新加坡与印尼，定期举行联合演习。最后，东协主要国家分布在南海周边地区，美国如果能成功整合东协，在南海与中国的竞争，将占上风。
+
+但东协也有不少的缺点，首先是许多东协国家与中国都有牵扯不断的经济合作关系，现阶段仍不希望卷入美中竞争之中。不少国家想要左右逢源，一方面与美国结盟以获得安全保障，另一方面继续从中国取得经济利益，甚至认为美国对中国的围堵，是霸权心态，并不赞同。而且东协内部的寮国与柬埔寨，极为依赖中国，在采取共识决的国际组织中，可以轻易阻挠东协与美国合作。最后是东协在冷战时期没有发展成一个大型安全组织的背后因素仍然存在，今天再试一次，可能也是相同的结果。
+
+而北约继续东扩，进入印太地区的优点，在于北约国家长期进行联合演习，从装备补给到指挥通讯都已完成整合，可立即与美国协同作战。其次是北约成员国多数是富裕国家，虽然承平时期的国防预算偏低，在优渥的社会福利下，艰难维持最低的军备水准，但真正需要时，还是具备充沛的国力可以支援。以俄乌战争为例，乌克兰能抵挡俄罗斯的入侵，北约在背后支援武器弹药，是最关键的因素。而且英、法、德等国，在印太地区有许多经济投资，法国更有残留的殖民地，都是欧洲国家介入印太事务的动机。
+
+
+▲ 2022年5月10日，德国，北约反应部队的国际联合军事演习。
+
+但北约继续东扩的问题，在于欧洲国家必需绕过大半个地球，才能够抵达印太地区，距离是难以克服的天然障碍。即使是北大西洋彼岸的北约成员国，如美国与加拿大，也要横越太平洋，非常的遥远。同时许多欧洲国家认为，欧洲应该把焦点放在自身事务上，不应随美国起舞，法国总统马克龙（Emmanuel Macron，台译马克宏）访问中国时的争议发言，就代表了一部份欧洲人的看法。甚至有不少学者认为，北约东扩是俄罗斯侵略乌克兰的原因之一，北约如果毫无节制的扩大，一定会造成灾难性的结果，这些都是影响北约插手印太事务的不利因素。
+
+至于维持目前的架构，在美国与日、韩、菲、澳等国的共同防御条约上，增强彼此合作，再加上四方安全对话，逐步建立一个更紧密的同盟，是目前美国已在推动的方向。这最大的优点是利用现有的条约，不必重新磋商谈判，避免旷日废时。而且在这个架构下，美国已经营半个多世纪，拥有许多现成的设施与充足的运作经验，有事半功倍的效果。而且整个架构是建立在美国与各国的共同防御条约上，最为单纯，不像北约是一个集体组织，要顾及各成员国的不同立场，可最大程度避开东亚各国之间的历史恩怨与竞争矛盾。
+
+不过采行现有架构的最大缺点，在於单靠美国与各国间的共同防御条约，无法形成一个紧密的组织。未来某个地区若爆发冲突，各别国家是否要介入，或允许美国使用境内的军事基地来执行作战任务，都需要各别谈判，有太多不确定的因素。中国也可以运用经济影响力，对各别国家施压，来阻止这些国家介入冲突。因此采行现有架构，将缺少足够的吓阻力。这个缺点也是目前许多专家认为，美国需要筹建印太版小北约的关键原因，因为印太地区的新情势，已经不是这个旧有架构，所能应付的了。
+
+毕竟除了中国的野心扩张外，朝鲜近期也不断试射各式飞弹，并举行大规模军事演习，不断恫吓韩国与日本。俄罗斯虽在俄乌战争中失利，却很有可能在西进受阻后，转而朝向远东地区发展。近期俄罗斯的太平洋舰队动作不断，除了与中国进行多场联合操演，绕行日本群岛，更远航至太平洋中心地带，还无预警提升战备层级，在库页岛进行登陆演习。中国、俄罗斯、朝鲜如果汇集成一股新的力量，同时在西太平洋挑起冲突，将会是非常严峻的挑战，印太地区的国家无一能置身事外。
+
+
+▲ 2023年5月10日，印尼东努沙登加拉省举行第42届东协峰会期间，东协各国领袖坐在传统的皮尼西船上观赏日落。
+
+
+### 南海的危机，东协的转机
+
+目前整个印太地区里，最有危机感的首推日本、韩国与澳大利亚。日本与中、俄两国都有领土争议，中、俄两国的战机、军舰不断出现在日本周边海域，进行针对性十足的演训，早已不是新闻。朝鲜对韩国的威胁越演越烈，近日甚至上升至核武恫吓。澳大利亚则是美国的重要盟邦，双方的合作关系密切，英、美两国还决定转移核动力攻击潜舰技术给澳大利亚，以强化澳大利亚介入南海争端的战力。相较之下，东协国家多数仍维持平衡策略，理由不难理解，只是在区域局势快速变动的情况下，这样的策略可能让东协各国失去先机。
+
+因为印太版小北约如何组建，一定会大幅影响整个区域的未来发展。如果最后美国选择以现有架构为基础，进行强化，那接下来很长的一段时间里，东亚的重心仍会以日、韩为主，菲律宾的重要性可能会有所提升，但东协所能扮演的角色将会很有限。虽然这是地缘政治与区域安全的问题，却无疑会影响东协发展成下一个世界工厂的愿景。最坏的情况，可能是东协的部份国家还是免不了被卷入南海冲突中，却未能在经济或国际地位上取得补偿。平衡策略最后的结果是未得其利，而先蒙其弊。
+
+如果最后的结果是北约继续东扩，真的成为全球性的安全组织，东协国家各自加入或成为战略合作伙伴，东协将更被边缘化。毕竟北约多数的成员国都是欧洲国家，主要的关注焦点还是在欧洲事务上，北约的利益不一定等同于东协的利益。举例来说，马来西亚、新加坡与汶莱仍是大英国协成员，其中马来西亚与新加坡，跟英国、澳大利亚、纽西兰签署过五国联防协议（FPDA）。随着英国积极重返印太地区，并派遣航空母舰到访，这个协议也越来越受重视。只是这个联防协议如果继续扩大，有可能会排挤东协推动军事合作的可能性，形成由欧洲国家主导南海或麻六甲海峡安全事务的现象。
+
+但南海的危机对东协而言，可能也是新的转机。毕竟美国为了抗衡中国的一带一路与亚投行，也携手七大工业国组织（G7），推出全球基础建设与投资伙伴计划，争取开发中国家的支持，对东协来说或许是更为可靠的经济诱因。
+
+虽然现在全世界的目光都放在台海问题上，不过台湾是历史问题，双方已长期对峙数十年，南海却是现实的开发利益，中国的蚕食鲸吞，一步快过一步，从南海的北端，逐步向南发展，只是时间早晚的问题。许多学者也认为，南海的情势也许比台海更不稳定，紧邻南海的东协国家，必需即早思考因应之道。
+
+（王臻明，军事专栏作家，国防与地缘战略议题）
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-06-12-the-34th-anniversary-of-8964-the-day-in-those-years.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-06-12-the-34th-anniversary-of-8964-the-day-in-those-years.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..0109ee58
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-06-12-the-34th-anniversary-of-8964-the-day-in-those-years.md
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "【六四・34周年】那些年這一日"
+author: "葉啟俊"
+date : 2023-06-12 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/QC3xMoG.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+今年，這平凡不過的日子，這空地的燭光悼念，驟然變成「家鄉」市集。
+
+
+
+漫不經心的食客，一臉滿足地說：「幾好呀，好多嘢返大陸先見到，而家喺度就有得食。」加上人山人海排隊搶食的畫面，一切都好你好香港開心香港：有好嘢食，點會重唔開心？
+
+定過神來細想，用家鄉市集去掩蓋過去卅年此時此地發生的事（市集的海報寫「6月3日-5日」，把中間的一日既正當又完美無瑕地略過了），其實並非那麼突兀。燭光晚會和家鄉市集，至少還有以下相通之處：
+
+（一）人很多（雖然不太可能重覆）；
+
+（二）人都不計較人多，還有點喜歡人多；
+
+（三）也能忍耐日曬雨淋，風吹雨打；
+
+（四）同樣心繫中國；
+
+（五）雖然心繫中國，最終與香港命運攸關。
+
+
+而家鄉市集比燭光集會，更加值得香港警察去守護。
+
+*
+
+怎麼四年前好像是那麼久的事？
+
+四年前，在這平凡不過的日子，我如常地 — 當然是當年的「如常」— 到達維園。每年不是太熱就是太大雨，那一日竟然感覺剛剛好，大概是不知還有無下次，所以格外忍耐。在反送中的陰霾下，這次集會有種同病相鄰的沈重。聽着年復一年的歌曲，還是會雙眼通紅，只是這次既是為1989年的北京，也是為2019年的香港。
+
+*
+
+(寫這篇文章時的四年前此時此刻，我還在和一百萬人在酷熱之下邊行去中環邊打鼓 — 怎麼四年前好像是那麼久的事？）
+
+*
+
+今年，在這平凡不過的日子，我用了不自由賦予的時間，做了很多不值得寫進日記的事。可是，正當我好好享受這平凡不過的星期日時，我猛然想起往年此時此刻我在做的事，慵懶的偽裝𣊬間崩解，變成空洞的泥沼。
+
+*
+
+三十四年前，我五歲，讀高班，這平凡不過的日子慘劇發生時在做甚麼，想甚麼，沒有絲毫印象。再大幾年，我也只能依稀意識到，這是個和新年和中秋節等一樣，化成另一組背誦如流的數字、有特別習俗的大日子。
+
+今年，與一個在香港長大的美國人，談起這個平凡不過的日子。三十四年前，她只有幾歲，但記得媽媽拿着報紙在哭，然後她和父母上街。好些日子，她不時發了同一個惡夢，夢裹坦克車被那個人擋住了，坦克車發了一炮，打中學校正中央的操場，穿了一個大洞；接着，她的牀下底多了副骸骨，骸骨沒有血，是和那大洞有關的。她在夢中沒有傷心，只有深深的無力感。這個惡夢說到最後，她的雙眼也紅了起來。
+
+夢的記憶，比起新聞和史實更加精確。
+
+*
+
+在湖南長沙看到一家餐廳酒吧，名為「六八酒肆」。它好像提醒我，縱然多麼罕見，在更高壓的地方，記憶還是好像野草一樣，在出奇不意的地方，以出奇不意的方式待着。內地尚且如此，香港更該如是。
+
+*
+
+這平凡不過的日子，自從變成被人極力記住（和抹去）的日子開始，就不是「鄰近地區」的事，而是實實在在的香港之事。香港人知道這平凡不過的日子有何意義。
+
+在香港的記憶移除進入由治及興的新階段之際，本年今日，同樣屬於香港的記憶練習又悄然開始，一組一組難以忘記的數字靜侯，仿如咒語一樣喚起從未瘉合的傷痛。
+
+（二零二三零六一二）
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-06-12-water-revolution-4th-anniversary-the-arrested-protesters-in-limbo.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-06-12-water-revolution-4th-anniversary-the-arrested-protesters-in-limbo.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..fdd6afc3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-06-12-water-revolution-4th-anniversary-the-arrested-protesters-in-limbo.md
@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "如水革命四周年・被捕者悬而未决"
+author: "李慧筠、杨雨晴"
+date : 2023-06-12 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/aH3WNAu.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "反修例运动四年，被捕者悬而未决：其实没有结束这回事"
+---
+
+反修例运动过去四年，逾6000人仍有一个疑惑：我会再次被捕吗？我会被正式起诉吗？
+
+
+
+阿祺（化名）在2020年的一场游行中被捕，罪名是非法集结。保释后不久，他在警署报到时踢保——即拒绝续保，警方并没有即时起诉他，他暂时回复自由身。但是，踢保并不代表警方往后一定不会作出起诉。阿祺一直觉得这件事缠绕着他，当要规划人生的时候，不时在思绪中回来找他。
+
+尤其当他看到电话屏幕不断弹出被捕朋友的喜讯——警方通知他们取回证物了。第一个月，阿祺不敢错过任何来电，即便是推销电话，生怕警署找他，“我expect会等到自己，但始终没有。”第二、三个月，他觉得“没我的事了”。第四个月，“就是没了这回事啰。”
+
+在香港，因反修例运动被捕的人共有10279人，其中约有7369人的案件未获处理。近月，警方公布这些案件中800多人涉严重案情会继续调查，余下6500多人被捕后未被落案起诉；他们指会尽快交代未结案件情况，但目前仍未作相关公布。近四年过去，像阿祺这样的被捕人，未有再次被捕，也没有收到警方通知取回证物、或不予起诉。
+
+阿祺形容，他们四年来处于in limbo（悬而未决）的状态。在2019年因暴动罪被捕的子琛（化名）则觉得，能够明白想尽快结束事件的渴望，但他心里更倾向相信，这是一个永远不会完结的过程。这些人的头上，都悬着一把剑。
+
+
+### 被捕后踢保，in limbo的人
+
+2020年，大学生阿祺在某一次游行中被捕。当时警察从四面八方围捕，着人们举高双手，以非法集结的名义拘捕、锁手铐，带上警车送往警署。阿祺当时脑里想着：“死了。”“最麻烦是要怎样跟家人解释？”他想想后又说：“无得解释㗎㖞。”
+
+48小时内，阿祺的保释批准了，要求他定期报到。对当时的他来说，“我身边有些朋友上庭、坐监，所以上庭不是一个很远的想像。”他判断自己被起诉的机会很低，“一开始会觉得无奈，但后来都算接受了现实，我深信这件事不是很严重。”
+
+“因为我深知我是没有做任何事情的，”他说。
+
+
+▲ 2019年10月5日，两名戴着口罩的示威者被警察攻击。
+
+不久，阿祺回到警署踢保。踢保是指被捕后获保释，按要求定期去警署报到时，拒绝继续保释。如果警方没有证据正式落案起诉，被捕人毋须再报到。但踢保不代表案件完结，由于刑事案件没有起诉期限，警方可以继续调查案件，亦可随时落案起诉。“我不想不断去续保，很麻烦。而如果我真的有什么问题，我踢保，他便捉我入去（正式起诉）。”他想快点有一个答案，“要不踢保，要不被扣留，留在被保释的状态并没有任何好处。”
+
+踢保成功后，他走出警署，觉得整个人放松了一点。当时疫情来袭，心神又很快被分散。
+
+但踢保像身上挂着的一条隐形的线，阿祺感觉随时会被扯走。“对于这班in Limbo的人来说，怎样判断case closed呢？就是当警察打电话告诉你，哦，你可以拿回自己的（证物），就代表你的case closed，19年的事就跟你再无关了。”身边朋友一年前陆续收到电话，“而我还在等。我还在等。”
+
+阿祺觉得最大的心理压力，来源于不知何时被告。“看到身边的朋友没事，而你还处于一个卡在这里、不知干嘛的状态，这非常的不舒服……”他想像，如果被落案起诉就辞工，一边做自由工作者一边应对官司。但这三年多以来，他又未被正式起诉。“可能你somehow忘记了被捕的事，但当突然收到朋友讯息说可拿回证物，就会trigger自己想，几时到我？又返回这种状态。In limbo的状态是被trigger的。”他说。
+
+踢保后，阿祺继续在大学读书，毕业后做普通的上班族。他的生活确没被影响太多，但每次出境，“都会想一想是不是可以离开。”当他不时看到有人回港被捕、或离港时被捕的新闻，他也紧张起来。“出境过关，入境处人员看着你的护照，嘟一嘟闸机，你会怕他跟你说：等一等，警察要过来。出境旅行、申请回乡证、良民证什么的，普通人会觉得很正常，都会令我感受到我的状态跟他们不同。”
+
+近年，他觉得毕竟要规划人生，是时候去面对这条无形的线了。“你要负面就根本规划不到任何事，我现在一定要有人生规划，不能被它拖着脚步。”他找寻法律意见，希望评估目前状况，但仍未有一个明确答案。
+
+
+### 四年后，仍有逾6000名被捕者等待答案
+
+像阿祺的个案并不少，目前，约有7369人的反修例运动案件仍未处理。近年，有不少案件事隔一段时间才被正式起诉，例如2019年11月香港理工大学的冲突，事隔两年，有一名20岁男学生在去年入境回港时被拘捕，并起诉暴动罪。
+
+
+▲ 2019年11月12日，警方进入香港中文大学，与示威者对峙。
+
+据香港警务处回复，从2019年6月9日至2022年12月31日，反修例运动中共有10279人被捕，近四成为学生；2910人已被检控，其中四成亦是学生。1754名被捕人年龄为18岁以下，其中520人被检控。他们的罪名包括参与暴动、非法集结、伤人、纵火、袭警等。
+
+被捕人士当中有2928人已经或正在司法程序，有1789人被定罪或签保守行为等等。387人审讯后无罪释放，57人获撤销控罪，670人的司法程序仍在进行中，25人经警司警诫后被释放。
+
+警务处处长萧泽颐曾于2023年二月表示，就逾6000宗未结案件，警方调查已进入最后阶段，会务求该月公布情况。不久，警方再交代有800多人涉及较严重罪行会继续调查，近6500人未被落案起诉。三月中，萧再指警方需时认真调查，称最初期望二月或三月完成相关工作，将会密锣紧鼓于一至两个月里完成。
+
+五月，行政长官李家超被问到何时交代全部案件时，他指警方会按个别案件的证据和实际情况以及案情的需要处理，“订一个所谓的不基于任何证据考虑的时间表亦都是不切实际，亦都未必符合我们法治精神。”
+
+近日律政司回复《明报》查询指，“特别职务组”去年就警方提交运动中的公众秩序个案作指示，如今只余数宗案件须跟进。立法会议员张欣宇则受访表示，手上约170个案已取回证物，认为不大机会再开案。他在另一访问提到，有约20人于四、五月收到通知指暂时不会起诉，亦可取回证物。他指明白逐一通知被捕者需时，但运动将近四年，期望警方增加资源、交代目前进展。
+
+这个问题，政府早于2020年就曾经被问过。时任立法会议员陈志全查询运动的拘捕和检控安排，时任保安局局长李家超回复，如果被捕人拒绝保释，或在接受保释后回到警署报到时拒绝续保，而调查工作尚未完成，警方会考虑释放当事人。然而，释放被捕人并不代表警方不会起诉他。如果调查后决定起诉，警方会再次作出拘捕。
+
+被问及警方会否在作出不检控成功踢保人士的决定后，尽快作相关通知，让他们放下心理负担？李家超指个别案件的调查详情是保密的，以免影响调查及搜证工作，不会对涉案人士公开。对于拒绝保释被释放候查的被捕人，基于上述保密原则，不会被告知调查进展。若日后警方有足够证据，会再次作拘捕及起诉。
+
+
+▲ 2019年8月24日，一名警员在黄大仙制服一名示威者。
+
+
+### “其实没有结束这回事”
+
+2019年，子琛在一场示威中涉嫌暴动罪被捕。被捕后，警方并未正式起诉他。“那阵时我也有少少开心，会觉得少件事担心啰。”
+
+子琛性格谨慎，他知道理论上调查工作仍在进行，他可能再次被拘捕及起诉，“会不会早上拍门夹我走？”他也读过一些人回港后被捕的新闻，被捕至今，他曾经去旅行，起飞前一晚，他跟家人交代好如果自己被捕，要怎样处理、怎样到最近警署找自己。从外国回境的时候，他又再提醒家人一次。
+
+至今，子琛没有收到任何警方的来电，也未取回案件证物，“这就是不知道会否再次被捕的关键点。”他知道，一些2020年因非法集结被捕的朋友，很快就取回了证物。得知消息，他为朋友松一口气，又不免有所比较，感到有点担心。
+
+回想在警署得悉自己暂未被起诉时，他脑袋空空，“少少觉得是但（随便）。”
+
+他知道不少人经历拘捕或检控，需要见辅导员。而他在案件暂告一段落后，很快就回复状态，专注读书。“没事好做了，然后就正常生活。”他说，“你有时搭车会经过一些地方，想到过去的经历会有少少不开心，但只是少少。现在我已经没什么了。”
+
+子琛说话较慢，习惯思考一回再回答，语调平静而淡薄。“我应该是逃避派，”他笑笑说，自己这种被捕后又未结案的状态，“我甚至觉得不需要处理？跟别人说几句就可以了。”看到警方指会尽快交代未结案件的新闻，“这样去保证或者提醒你，我们仍然在处理你啊。”
+
+在子琛心中，案件并没有真正完结的一天。“其实我觉得没有结束这一回事。他可能找到证据再拘捕你，可以一直持续发生，发生了就没能回头。我觉得避不到。”
+
+他似乎已经接受这个现实。起初，子琛比现在更紧张、更害怕。这几年，他对韩国历史产生兴趣，从光州事件到民主化的历程，他读了许多相关历史。“熟悉了别人国家的事情如何发展，会觉得一个宏大的过程中必然会发生……这样说好像很有问题，但政治运动中有人坐牢是随处可见的。”他说，“但当然，人（身处其中）一定会不开心的。”
+
+一边是宏大的历史图景，一边是自身的困境，子琛也会想到自己。他会看释囚分享的故事，“我会想像（在狱中）怎样过。”
+
+逐渐，来自警署的来电对他也不太重要，分别只有“很少很少”。“作为一个不起诉你的仪式吗？我想这件事不太重要了。这是一个永远不会完结的过程。”但他也能够理解，“对其他人来说是一件好事。”
+
+一名曾处理社会运动案件的大律师A（化名）表示，其接触不少被捕者选择踢保，“通常都想快啲踢，唔想有嘢喺头顶。（不想头顶一直有东西）”但是，也有不少人在踢保的半年至一年后再次被捕。
+
+A解释，“这归结香港的刑事案没有追溯期（编按：除某些条例另订追溯期），如果有一天找到足够证据落案起诉，不能说当时已踢保，不可以再起诉。”但A补充，案发时间距离愈远愈模糊，当事人可能不记得、知情人士可能不在香港，所以理论上应尽快处理个案，否则对被捕人不公。
+
+即便一个人从未被捕，若警方找到证据，也可以拘捕及起诉。踢保或无条件释放的被捕者，“好不幸地，可否说他们永远不会有事？理论上是没有的。”但A仍然认为，成功踢保、被无条件释放，或可以领回证物的通知仍然重要，“至少警方基于已有资料进行的调查中，已经close file，起码可代表这个调查阶段告一段落。”
+
+对一些被捕者而言，“坐监不是最可怕，有些人宁愿有个了断，好过无日无之的担忧。”
+
+
+### “摆脱激进思想”的监狱计划、支援平台解散
+
+四年过去，香港的政治形势急剧转变。除了未知结果的被捕者，被检控罪成的人，在不同的监狱中服刑，他们身处的囚室同样迎来变化。
+
+《华盛顿邮报》于6月8日透过访问十名青少年释囚、前惩教署职员等，报导香港21岁以下青少年在囚者接受的“去激进化”计划。在囚者每天都要练习中式步操，另参与国家宣传演讲和心理辅导，使囚犯承认过去观点极端，辅以监控和惩罚系统，包括单独监禁。报导引述受访者指计划是24小时的“洗脑”。
+
+据报导，香港惩教署指截至4月30日，共有871名青年囚犯参与计划，其中约七成因“反修例运动”而被起诉，当中有人年仅14岁。
+
+
+▲ 2019年10月20日，九龙区游行演变成冲突，示威者在旺角架设防线。
+
+惩教署回复自由亚洲电台，批评该报导是“颠倒是非和污蔑抹黑本署工作的偏颇及失实报道”。署方曾表示，于2021年推出“沿途有‘理’”计划，为思想激进、涉暴力的违法者提供特殊更生，“以逐步摆脱激进思想及暴力行为”，重点是认识中国历史及加强国民教育、心理及价值观重整、生涯规划及家庭关系重修。计划并非“洗脑”，属自愿参与性质。
+
+2022年初，第五波疫情来袭，惩教署指为减低监狱内感染风险，实施“锁仓”管理，暂停亲友探访、暂停安排还押人士出庭应讯，一些律师的公务探访亦被停止。
+
+一度因袭警罪在港服刑的美籍律师Samuel Bickett曾发文，忆述年初在狱中经历疫情下的状况。他表示当时食物及药物供应不稳，与外界书信往来断续。他又指，期间一名患哮喘的囚友死于囚仓，医院人员不敢接触尸体，囚友只能挤于墙边等数小时，待尸体移走。
+
+时至今天，不少以往支援社会运动在囚人士的组织被打散。2021年，曾提供法律支援的“612人道支援基金”停止运作，提供物质支援、情绪辅导等的“石墙花”已经解散。“石墙花”曾于2021年六月收集10万人联署，要求改善监狱酷热环境。当时署方回复，一直有改善狱内环境，包括更换风扇、安装窗户，并会按计划加装滚筒扇等。
+
+2023年6月6日，国安处以涉嫌“串谋伪造”拘捕六名男女，其中两名被捕人为“探监师”，即经常前往探望在囚示威者的市民。保安局局长邓炳强曾批评探监师灌输反政府讯息，若有证据涉及危害国家安全，会进行拘捕和检控。
+
+
+### 海水一样，潮涨潮退的不安感
+
+阿祺想像，如果没有被捕的经历，香港没有这么大的变化，他可能会当一个区议员。他以前对未来的想像，“基本上都是在香港内。”他喜欢社区工作，对民生事务有兴趣，“可惜未有机会试，就发生了2019年。”
+
+回到后雨伞时期，街头运动虽然相对沉寂，但其时网络爆发的各种二次创作、政治讽刺内容，是阿祺的政治启蒙。他因此开始注意香港的民主化进程、主权问题。
+
+他一度想过离开香港。大学的许多同学已经移民或计划储钱离开，多半准备去加拿大读书。他觉得香港的社会、经济状态使他喘不过气，不再适合他居住。他习惯每天读财经新闻，得悉许很多欧美公司想离开香港，缩小香港公司规模，“你感到自己跟住一架sinking ship。”他又觉得管治和法律收紧，香港冰球协会和国泰航空争议的迅速升级亦抓住他的眼球。他挪出手掌压向面前的桌面，“扁平的，真的平了。”
+
+平常的日子，他喜欢见朋友、打游戏机。有时跟朋友做运动，有时踩深夜单车去看日出，“拼命地过一个正常的日子。”阿祺很少跟朋友提起被捕后的奇异状态，家人也大抵以为他的案件已经结束。有时他宁愿朋友忘记关心他，“不断提又会令我想起，我们的关系也不应由这件事define。”他和周边的人相处也变得更加谨慎，会先在心里判断他的价值观，再决定要跟对方说什么。
+
+他说，“很多时候，这些想法都会自然被时间冲淡。它就像海水一样，会潮退不见了，然后又突然出现。”
+
+
+▲ 2019年11月18日凌晨，示威者与警察对峙期间，香港理工大学校园内多处起火。
+
+去求职面试前，子琛担心对方查到自己曾经被捕，在网上搜索自己的名字。除此之外，他自觉工作并未因被捕遭受太多影响。但他觉得，几年来跟家人的关系改变了，“发现就算是家人都不能讲太多，就算差不多想法。有些事你跟他们讲，他们未必会明白……他们的用心就是关心你的个人幸福，有没有受伤受苦。但正因为他们担心你，你才不想跟他们讲。”
+
+移民问题上，子琛和家人偶有争论。家人想全家离开香港，但子琛想要留下，立场很坚定。“我觉得去一个外国地方，比香港更难生活。”他说，离港后只有两种路径，一是成为政治难民，二是作为普通人重新生活。“政治难民不用说怎样难过了。普通人的生活也很难适应。”被捕后获释，他也曾急躁，“好强烈的感觉，啊，一定要走。但现在……”现在的他着重移居后的难处，多于自己被捕的风险。
+
+毕业后，子琛默默地工作，“好像正常人说的：返工、找自己的事做、在自己擅长的事情上贡献。”虽然他说还没找到擅长的事，但确实感受到自己的转变。在各种爆炸性的新闻面前，“我反而学会怎样面对这些对社会大众造成阴影的事件。”他提到早前的钻石山凶案，许多人分享事发新闻，而他觉得分享自卫术资讯更加实在。
+
+另一方面，他看事物更抽离了。像去留问题，别人吵得脸红耳赤，他却说：“走不走都一样，都是对的。真的好小事。”四年时间让子琛沉淀了很多，“有时人生经验丰富的人会讲好多教训，但你会发现自己观察得更好。”
+
+五、六岁的时候，子琛就跟着家人参与六四集会、七一游行，游行对他而言最深刻，“因为很累，有时中途走了。”雨伞运动时他曾到金钟现场，也曾构想罢课。现在回想，家人对于引领自己接触政治可能有点自责，但他不确定，彼此也没有讨论过。
+
+假如一切没有发生，他说自己会是一个“社畜”。“打一世工，工作几年找人结婚、买楼生仔，一直到退休，像我的家人一样。”现在他觉得一切太难预测，“见步行步吧，规划永远赶不上变化。”
+
+子琛喜欢一个人散步，在九龙、港岛，走过公共屋邨和街市，放空自己。最近他觉得，香港人好像更加重视“自己有什么”。“文化层面、城市里有什么做，还有什么特别的？”于是他也常常去郊外和海傍，看岛屿、渔船和大楼。“香港人已经习惯了这里的风景，但我之前去完旅行，真的一回来就去看海。”对他来说，香港还有很多地方尚待发掘。
+
+
+▲ 2019年6月12日，警方在夏悫道清场期间，遗下一把雨伞。
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-06-14-reflecting-on-contemporary-gender-ideology.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-06-14-reflecting-on-contemporary-gender-ideology.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..98057b2c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-06-14-reflecting-on-contemporary-gender-ideology.md
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "反思当代性别意识形态"
+author: "齐泽克"
+date : 2023-06-14 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/8iLwqvz.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "一个思想激进的人的告白"
+---
+
+我不但在政治上活跃，还经常被认为在政治上激进。然而，批评我反“觉醒”立场的，经常复制我所争论的意识形态结构本身。一路下来，他们有意无意间揭示了觉醒左翼的破产。
+
+
+
+这些批判——无论它们是要为#MeToo、种族觉醒主义还是当代性别意识形态辩护——的基本结论是，批评与这些运动相关的压迫性的规范，代表着某种倒退，是在试图压制近来取得的进步成果，我们既不能、也不应该希望“又退回去”。对此，我严重不同意。
+
+从#MeToo批判开始。在写这场运动的时候，我经常引用那个热搜运动的发起人塔拉那·伯克的话来证明，在运动开始后的几年里，它种下了一种对施害者的执念，这种牢不可移的执念形成了一个指控和轻率定罪的循环。早在2018年，伯克就总结说：
+
+> 我们正在努力使关于#MeToo的叙事偏离原意。我们必须改变这种偏离原意的叙事，即认为#MeToo是一场性别战争，它反男性，搞男女对立，只服务一种人，那就是白人、顺性、异性恋的知名女性。
+
+简言之，伯克指出，斗争应聚焦于数百万普通工作女性和家庭主妇的日常苦难。可我的一些批评者却指控说，我主张不要去关注行为和语言中的骚扰，而要去关注“真正的”社会经济问题。他们（正确地）指出，行为和说话方式的厚重组织（thick texture）恰是意识形态再生产的媒介。他们还说，“真正的问题”绝对不是直接就看得出来的，而总是由符号网络来定义的，也就是说，它是为霸权而进行斗争的结果。
+
+可这就是我一直在说的呀：几十年来，我一直坚持，不成文规则构成的组织，是种族主义和性别主义自我再生产的媒介。或者，更理论的说法是，（从列维-施特劳斯和阿尔都塞到拉康的）“结构主义”理论的重大意义就在于，意识形态上层结构有它自己的下层建筑，有它自己的（无意识的）规则和实践网络，而正是这许许多多的规则和实践，维持着它的运作。唯一有意义的问题——或真正值得争论的点——在于，新的规范是不是真的质问和禁止了性别主义（或其他形式的支配），或者说，新的规范有没有事与愿违地，又反过来起到了复制它们的作用。只咬住“它们达到了它们所谓的解放目标”这点不放，就是在回避真正的问题，就是在背叛一个严肃左翼所应该代表的一切。
+
+或者说，以那些控诉我为那个可以打着“自由”的旗号乱用种族蔑称的世界招魂的批评者为例。我常讲这样一则与使用对黑人的蔑称有关的轶事：有一次，两个黑人朋友在听完我说的话后是如此激动，以至于其中一个在和我拥抱后感叹说，“现在你可以叫我[黑鬼]了！”对此，抖音上的一个批评者称，赞同我的人怕不是“疯了”：
+
+> 这里的问题是，齐贼的论证以他使用种族歧视语的自由为前提。齐贼用对黑人的蔑称来反对政治正确，意思是不想让你用种族歧视语来称呼他们的黑人是政治正确的，并因此而是不讲道理的。当然了，也许和他说话的那个人根本就不在乎这些。但身为一个非黑人，你能不能说对黑人的蔑称的依据不应该是发现某个个体的黑人“允许”你说，而应该是你对那个词的含义的理解——那个词在过去可是被用来直接为一个种族对另一个种族的所有权正名的。
+
+和聊天机器人一模一样，我的批评者无视了我的例子显而易见的语境。我没有——也从来不会——在交流中使用对黑人的蔑称，而显然，那个跟我说“现在你可以叫我[黑鬼]了！”的黑人哥们的意思也不是我真的应该去那么做。这是在表达友爱，秉持的精神是，黑人之间会以友好的方式，用这个词来称呼彼此。我很确定，要是我真用那个蔑称来称呼他，他在最好的情况下，也会做出愤怒的回应，就像我听不懂人话一样。我朋友跟我说的话遵从的是“提议就是拿来拒绝的”的逻辑，就像我在跟人说，“你帮我做的事情太贴心了（我太感动了）你杀了我都行！”显然，我不会预期那个人说“好呀！”然后掏出刀子。
+
+可（对一些人来说），我的这些“成问题的”立场恰恰说明，在过去几十年里，我的基本政治取向发生了变化。最近，一个批评我的人坚持认为，我20世纪90年代的著作，和我“最近向一个后左翼人物的转变”形成了鲜明对照。他先是赞许地引用、转述了我在《幻想的瘟疫》（1997）中的一段话：
+
+> 如果种族主义的态度对主流意识形态-政治话语来说变得可以接受的话，那么，这将从根本上改变整个意识形态霸权的平衡。……今天，在新兴的新种族主义和性别主义面前，我们应该采取的策略是，让这样的话变得难以启齿，这样任何依仗这些话术的人都会自动失格（就像在大学里正面谈论法西斯主义的人那样）。我们绝对不应该讨论“奥斯维辛集中营实际上死了多少人”、“奴隶制”有哪些“好的方面”，“削减工人集体权力的必要性”等等；在这里应该采取一种相当坦然的“教条主义”和“恐怖主义”的立场；这些事情不容“开放、理性、民主的讨论”。
+
+然后，我的批评者加上了自己的评论：“说得好。就像比如说，我们不应该参与关于跨性女是不是‘真’女人的讨论那样。”他接着说，我想要质疑性别意识形态这件事情不就是一种“意识形态-政治上的倒退”吗？因为我对性别意识形态的信条提出了公开的质疑。“[我]会因此而把过去的我看作这种倒退的症候吗？”
+
+在这里，我的反驳是直白的：觉醒的要求真算得上是进步的成就吗？我们日常语言中的变革——比如说，优先使用（性别不明的）复数代词等等——真是反性别主义和其他形式压迫的漫长斗争的下一步吗？我的回答是一个大大的不：性别和觉醒意识形态倡导和推行的这些变革本身就在很大程度上是“倒退的”。它们代表着统治意识形态在试图挪用新的抗议运动（并磨去其批判的棱角）。再一次，这些指控只是在回避真正的问题，它们根本就站不住脚。
+
+关于意识形态对解放要求的挪用，想象让-克洛德·米尔纳在最近一篇论文中提出的主张就够了。他说，今天，我们所谓的“西方”是美国霸权下的一个联盟：美国不但在经济和军事上，也在智识上统治着我们。但在这里，米尔纳说，“我们必须接受一个矛盾：美国在智识领域的支配本身，是通过异见和抗议的话语，而非秩序的话语来表达的。”
+
+不过，这里还有一个进一步的矛盾：美国领导的西方意识形态话语模式——一种对现在这种不平等形式的抗议——因为削弱了自己的基础故而是自毁的，因此也就不能把自己呈现为一个推动积极的全球变革的计划：“正因为西方的文化遗产无法把自己从使它得以存在的不平等中解放出来”，米尔纳说，“所以，过去谴责不平等的人本身也被认为是以往不被承认的这样或那样的不平等的受益者”并且“现在所有革命运动和革命观念本身都变得可以了，而这仅仅是因为，它们是那一长串的死白男搞出来的。”
+
+西方的反西方话语和来自外部的反西方话语区别就在于此。米尔纳写道：
+
+> 一种反西方话语在西方内部（西方还以此为荣），另一种反西方话语则在西方外部。只是第一种反西方话语认为不平等是一种错，在道德上，任何人都没有权利去利用它；而相反，第二种反西方话语则在方向对自己有利（译注：即在自己是不平等受害者的时候这个不平等在道德上是有利的，有助于抢占道德高地）的不平等中看到了一种美德。结果，第二种反西方话语的支持者把第一种反西方话语看作敌人衰落的迹象。他们不掩饰自己的轻蔑。
+
+而他们的轻蔑也是完全合理的：西方的反西方话语的结果是可以预期的。就像我在之前已经写到过的那样，比如说，西方的自由左翼越是深究自己的罪责，穆斯林原教旨主义者就越是能够谴责他们虚伪，说他们试图掩饰自己对伊斯兰的仇恨。这个矛盾完美地复刻了超我的矛盾：你越是服从那个伪-道德能动者对你的要求，你就越是有罪：就好像你越是宽容伊斯兰，它对你的压力就越大。对难民涌入来说也如此：西欧越是对他们开放，在未能接受更多难民的时候，它也就越为之而感到愧疚——而从定义上说，这件事情上就没有足够一说。你越是宽容非西方的生活方式，你也就越会为不够宽容而感到愧疚。
+
+在这里，觉醒佬会回应说，非西方的批评者说得对呀：西方的自我羞辱就是假的，非西方的批评者有权利认为，无论西方做出怎样的退让，它不还是占据支配位置并期待他们融入吗——可他们为什么要融入呢？当然，问题是，非西方批评者期待的——我就直说了——是西方放弃它的生活方式。结果只会出现以下两种情况中的一种：作为西方的反西方批评立场的最终结果，要么西方成功地（在社会上、经济上）摧毁作为文明的自己，要么西方成功地把其自我挫败的意识形态和在经济和军事上的优越性结合起来。
+
+米尔纳是对的：这个事实并不矛盾，即对西方来说，自我贬低的批评模式是最好的意识形态立场，它能够确保现有的秩序不会面临任何革命的威胁。不过，我们应该用新民粹主义右翼的革命立场（这个革命立场是假的但又是实打实的）的复兴来对他的说法加以补充：新民粹主义右翼的整个修辞都建立在这样一个“革命”要求的基础之上，即要摧毁新的精英——大公司、学界和文化界的达官贵人、政府机构——如有必要，可以使用暴力。作为对像希腊的扬尼斯·瓦鲁法基斯那样的左翼政客的响应，右翼民粹主义提议对我们的封建主子发动一场阶级战争。这里又出现了一个进一步的威胁：西方的民粹主义右翼有可能会和反西方的威权主义者联手，这将是最可怕的噩梦。
+
+为更清楚地理解这一切，我们应该克服客观真相和历史主义相对主义之间的对立。的确，我们可以动员不同的真相观。我们大多数人都熟知《好人寥寥》中高潮的一幕，汤姆·克鲁斯饰演的凯菲中尉对杰克·尼科尔森饰演的杰瑟普上校大喊，“我要真相！”尼科尔森回吼说，“你承受不了真相！”这个回答比它看上去的更含糊：不应简单地认为它是在说，我们大多数人都太过于弱小以至于无法承受事物残酷的现实。
+
+我们必须摆脱那种认为“真/实在”是现实的硬核的隐喻，即认为事物“真实自在”，我们只能通过各种镜头（即我们把现实符号化、我们通过我们的幻想和认知成见来建构现实的方式）来理解它们。相反，在现实（“硬的事实”）和幻想（幻象、符号的建构）之间的对立中，“真/实在”在幻象和幻想那边：从定义上说，“真/实在”当然不会被完全符号化，它同时又是符号化这个过程本身生成的一种“过度”。没有符号化，就没有“真/实在”——有的，就只会是“在那里”的平白无奇的愚蠢了。
+
+另一个（也许是终极的）例子是：如果有人问见证者大屠杀的真相是什么而见证者说“你承受不了真相！”，我们不应该认为，这只是在说，我们大多数人没能力应对大屠杀的恐怖。在一个更深的层面上，不能承受真相的，反而是施害的纳粹自己：他们没能力承受自己社会被一种全方位的对抗所贯穿的真相，为回避这点，他们把矛头指向犹太人，就好像他们相信杀了犹太人就能重新建立一个和谐社会那样。
+
+使问题变得甚至更加复杂的是，尼科尔森所说的“真相”不只是事情的现实状况，而是一个更加精确的事实，即，我们的权力（不只是军方）必须遵从非法的、不成文的规则和实践（电影中的“红色准则”），它的法律系统就是靠这些规则和实践来维持的：这就是软自由派没有能力承受的真相。这种真相观涉及一个矛盾的时间结构。就像尤雷·西莫尼提（在和我私下交流时）说的那样：
+
+> 传统上说，真相看起来是一个关于某种直接一致状态的调节性概念。不过，之后用来补偿这种被渴盼的直接性的，又是对实现它的无限延迟。因此，也许，是时候逆转这个公式了：在直接性的框架内构想真相，然后让它充分发生于此时此刻。只要改变视角，我们就能发现一种截然不同的“真生活”。与把“真相”构想为对某个理想化的完满状态的无限接近相反，我们应该把注意力转向真相在某个具特殊的历史现实中实际出现的实例，后者要么引出具有不可逆转的时间性的重大事件，要么在日常生活中产出不容置疑的、无法解决的“结”和过度，要么在言语的巧合和裂缝中制造意料之外的剩余。真相看似不可能，同时又不可避免；它给自己这样的外表——躲避我们，却又突然出现，让我们参与到它的话语约束力、它的强制性的不可避免的影响、它的政治力量和历史的迫切要求以及（也许）它的逻辑必然性中去。
+
+因此，真相就像乐子（雅克-阿兰·米勒曾说真相是乐子的妹妹）：既不可能，又不可避免。关于真相，我们可以做的最糟糕的事情，就是把它设想为某种东西，某个未知的X，认为我们可以在无限的接近中逐渐靠近，却永远不能企及它。这和我们如何最终总是错过最后的真相的缺憾诗意无关。拉康在后期一篇论文《电视》（Television）的开头说“我总在说真相。不是全部真相，因为无法把它完全说出来。把它完全说出来是不可能的：言语失败。但正是通过这个不可能，真相才保住了‘真/实在’”的时候说的肯定不是这个。我们压抑真相，真相躲避我们，但它正如被部分说出来那样，总是已经影响到现在了——比如说，作为一个破坏我们符号空间的霸权结构的症候。我们不但不可能讲出全部真相，甚至更不可能彻底地说谎：真相总会在我们谎言的裂缝和错位中追上我们。
+
+这种真正辩证的真相观使我们能够驳斥这种指控认为，拉康依然陷入了性差异的“二元对立”逻辑：他不是把“男性的”和“女性的”本原的二元性（这个二元性从阴-阳起就一直支撑着整个前现代传统）最后的痕迹从精神分析中清除出去了吗？拉康没有做人们预期一位精神分析家在解读哲学时会做的事情：他没有把哲学“性化”——相反，他使哲学去性化了，而在他之前，哲学是被秘密地性化的。
+
+拉康派精神分析的这一激进操作可以在谢赫祖拜尔的《麦克白》中找到适当表达。当麦克白夫人怀疑自己丈夫没有准备好做自己让他做的事情（杀邓肯取而代之）——因为他看起来被道德上的怀疑所困——的时候，她暴怒了：“来呀，你们这些/看管凡人思想的灵，在此去了我的性/把最可怕的残忍从头到脚/注入我（来，注视着人类恶念的魔鬼们！解除我的女性的柔弱，用最凶恶的残忍自顶至踵贯注在我的全身）”在这里，“去（了我的）性”显然意味着走出女性与人为善有同情心的陈词滥调——但这绝不等同于放弃女性的立场：毕竟，无情、算计的女人也是一种关于女人的陈词滥调。这里需要注意的主要是，以一种相似（但不对称）的方式，对男人来说也如此；两性都以各自的方式“去性”。理由是，“女性”和“男性”并不代表一套固定的属性：它们都指一种只有在一系列不连贯甚至自我矛盾的特征中才能得到表达的僵局，在这些特征中，被压抑的真相回归了。
+
+与此形成鲜明对照的是，今天的性别意识形态并没有这样的成就。它的运作反倒更像蜜蜂的世界，大多数蜜蜂是去性化的“工蜂”（生殖器官退化了，却依然处在性生殖的生物矩阵中）。一家公司的养蜂人告诉我：
+
+> 只有蜂后和雄峰有发育完全的生殖系统。工蜂有一个萎缩的生殖系统。在孵化七天后，蜂后飞出蜂巢，雄峰在那里集聚，在下午的几个小时里，她会在空中与大约八到十二个雄峰交配——就像电影《黄昏之恋》的名称所说的那样，午后真爱。在交配期间，雄峰的生殖器会倒转伸出体外，随腹部肌肉的收缩射精。然后蜂后会切下他的生殖器致其死亡，然后下一只雄峰进入……蜂后把全部精子储存在经囊中，从腺体分泌出可供近七百万精子生存的营养。在产卵期间，蜂后选择是否让每一个通过她的输卵管的卵子受精；她产下两种卵，受精卵和非受精卵。非受精卵发育为雄峰，而受精卵则成长为雌性个体——这个决定被称为性别决定。然后，雌性个体可以发育为蜂后或工蜂，取决于她们在幼虫阶段的营养状态——这个决定被称为级型决定。
+
+如果我们从人的立场来读这段描述，它看起来不就是一个古怪的母系种姓社会吗？所有工作都由被正确地称作“工蜂”的蜜蜂来完成。她们是雌性，生殖器管欠发育，故而没有性化，当真算得上是跨性蜂。蜂后和雄峰之间的性交（受孕）一生只发生一次：在交配后，雄峰死亡，蜂后收集到够她一辈子用的精子。那么，如果蜂后是女，雄峰是男，那确切来说，工蜂是什么？蜜蜂因此而组成了已知的唯一一个大多数成员是“（性别不定的）他们”，而作为男性的雄峰将面临最可怕命运的社会。
+
+今天我们之中很多人的奋斗目标——他们追求的那个模范社会——的真相不就在于此吗？
+
+Slavoj Zizek, [“Confessions of a Radioactive Mind”](https://compactmag.com/article/confessions-of-a-radioactive-mind), Compact Magazine, June 13, 2023. 翻译：王立秋。
+
+
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+---
+layout: post
+title : "香港民主派47人初選案審訊第十八周"
+author: "《獨媒》"
+date : 2023-06-18 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/9pPUPeB.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+#### 辯方案情展開 首名作供被告鄭達鴻供述與公民黨分歧
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，16人否認「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，進入審訊第十八周。辯方案情本周正式展開，其中吳政亨選擇不作供，辯方傳召證人將吳受訪錄音等呈堂，當中吳提及在「攬炒書」（指「墨落無悔」聲明）和初選二選一，會寧願初選先成事，辯方確認知悉相關證物有機會對被告不利。
+
+鄭達鴻為本案首名作供被告，他談及與公民黨的分歧，稱曾反對以否決所有議案為籌碼爭五大訴求，惟楊岳橋和譚文豪仍「一意孤行」，召記者會表明否決所有議案；又指曾反對黨簽署「墨落無悔」但不果。
+
+鄭又強調，當時無意當選後無差別否決預算案，他相信政府是理性，即使不回應「五大訴求」也會在預算案「抛出橄欖枝」，若對市民益處多於缺失，不可能不同意。鄭又指若公民黨仍堅持否決，他會申請豁免跟隨黨立場投票，「最壞情況係可以退黨」。
+
+
+▲ 吳政亨
+
+
+### 官准吳政亨受訪錄音呈堂 辯方確認知悉或涉「牽連罪責」風險
+
+踏入審訊第十八周，正式開展辯方案情。其中吳政亨選擇不作供，辯方傳召3名證人，以將吳的電郵和錄音呈堂。當中包括吳2020年6月接受前《蘋果日報》記者訪問的錄音，吳提及得悉戴耀廷與參選人談判不順利感「心傷」，望發起「三投三不投」聯署向候選人施壓、團結民主陣營；又稱如果在「攬炒書」（「墨落無悔」聲明）和初選只能二擇其一，會寧願「至少初選成事先」。
+
+而代表吳的律師和律師樓文員則供稱，曾按吳指示擷取「李伯盧」（吳政亨網名）於2020年4月發出的電郵，李曾提及望聯署就否決所有議案保持中立，並指35+用處之一是預備2022年「奪取特首之位，讓泛黃真正執政」，但「不代表我個人支持或反對泛黃議員聯合否決任何議案」。
+
+法官質疑相關錄音和電郵屬「傳聞證據」，若只為被告開脫罪責，無基礎呈堂，只有涉對被告不利的招認方可呈堂；又提醒吳政亨受訪談及望協助戴耀廷「35+計劃」，或涉「牽連罪責」（inculpatory）。辯方解釋僅望顯示吳當時的「思想狀態」（state of mind），並接受證物作為「混合式陳述」（mixed statement）呈堂，即同時包含被告涉嫌罪責和開脫罪責的部分，確認知道相關風險。法官終批准相關證物呈堂。
+
+
+### 鄭達鴻稱反對否決所有議案惟楊岳橋、譚文豪「一意孤行」 稱黨團凌駕執委會
+
+余慧明沒有辯方案情。其後由前公民黨區議員、參選港島區的鄭達鴻作供，是本案首名作供的被告。鄭談及從政背景，稱2012年加入公民黨，2015年連任兩屆區議員，曾支持建制派的區議會撥款，及於2019年11月獲警方允許進入理大勸學生離開。
+
+鄭作供重點談及就否決預算案與公民黨的分歧，以及對公民黨決策過程的不滿。曾任執委的鄭表示，公民黨立法會黨團凌駕執委會，執委會功能「好似橡皮圖章」；即使有強烈意見，「永遠說服唔到最高權力嘅決策者」，只能不情願地跟從，不會形容為「民主」。鄭亦因無法接觸真正決策核心，故2016至2018年任副秘書長後無續任，但因他當時已望參選立法會，需得到黨的支持，故接受委派任政策倡議。不過鄭指其倡議無一被接納，最終於2020年12月發文宣布退黨。
+
+
+▲ 2020年3月25日公民黨記者會（資料圖片）
+
+控方本案對鄭的指控，包括他曾出席3月25日公民黨記者會，時任黨魁楊岳橋稱若政府不回應五大訴求，公民黨將否決政府每個法案、撥款申請和預算案。鄭稱召記者會的決定源於3月一次立法會選舉籌備會議，會上譚文豪稱坊間有人提出以否決預算案為爭取五大訴求的籌碼，「與其遲早都畀人夾，不如自己衝出嚟去得盡啲」，遂提議否決所有議案為籌碼爭「五大訴求」，獲楊岳橋贊成。
+
+鄭指當時三度表達反對，稱該黨支持者為「理性中產」，「有乜理由衝出嚟，分一塊本土派嘅餅」，亦指自己在區議會支持醫院擴建撥款，若最後在立法會反對說不過去；會上林瑞華和郭家麒助理也表達反對。惟鄭形容譚文豪和楊岳橋「一意孤行」，最終仍決定於3月25日召記者會表明否決所有政府議案。法官一度問公民黨是否與其「畀人夾」，寧願先「夾人哋」，鄭指譚意思是若站在該位置就「點都唔驚畀人夾」。
+
+鄭表示，籌備會議上公民黨無就否決議案形成「統一立場」，而記者會無經執委會同意、其他黨員不知情。雖然他獲楊岳橋邀請出席記者會，但只是舉紙牌、沒有發言，他不同意楊岳橋和譚文豪稱會否決所有議案的說法，亦認為楊說法僅代表當屆黨團，屬「政治語言」。法官追問是「潛在的謊言」、「修辭的言辭」？鄭答「有機會係」。
+
+
+### 鄭稱曾反對黨簽「墨落」、信政府會抛橄欖枝 若與黨立場相違或退黨
+
+那鄭達鴻個人對否決預算案有何立場？鄭認為要視乎預算案內容決定，又稱相信政府是理性，即使不回應「五大訴求」，也會在預算案「抛出橄欖枝」或甜頭；而議員平衡檢視後，若認為對市民益處多於不落實五大訴求的「缺失」，不可能不同意。鄭又強調，當時無意在當選後無差別否決預算案，而若公民黨立場要否決，他會申請「議員豁免跟隨黨立場投票機制」，「最壞情況係可以退黨」。
+
+公民黨亦曾以黨名義簽署「墨落無悔」聲明書，鄭解釋當時有人質疑公民黨為何不簽，有議助和黨工認為「快快脆簽咗，個矛頭就會指向第二個冇簽嘅政黨」。鄭曾兩度反對，指若公民黨自視為民主派較大政黨，就不應「話簽就簽」坊間聯署，否則「黨格何在」，又稱該黨受眾為理性溫和中產；楊岳橋與譚文豪亦曾反對指不想簽「無窮無盡」聲明。惟鄭的意見不獲接納，公民黨終以黨名義簽署，只是「刻意同其他簽署者（以個人名義簽署）唔同，保留一啲彈性」。
+
+鄭達鴻2020年5月獲會員大會通過提名參選立法會港島區，並解釋因當時有民調指民主派支持者只會支持勝出初選者，而他是取態溫和的新人，故要靠黨參加初選才有勝算。鄭表示只曾與戴耀廷私下聯絡兩次，戴詢問他是否有機會代表公民黨參選港島區及詢問票站事宜，而港島協調會議上，司馬文曾反對戴耀廷提否決預算案，但只討論過幾句且無達成共識。鄭又稱無收過任何港島協調文件，不獲解釋提名表格上「共識」的意思，亦認為在比例代表制及功能組別制度下，35+的目標是「十分之不可能」。
+
+
+▲ 左起：楊岳橋、鄭達鴻、李予信（資料圖片）
+
+鄭作供時亦就自己於多個不同場合的發言解釋，就他曾於電台節目稱35+共同目標是「撼動政權」，鄭稱僅沿用主持吳志森的說法，認為立會過半可改變政治版圖，令立法機關不只當作橡皮圖章。至於曾在街站受訪提及會否決財案，他稱僅按楊岳橋指示帶出公民黨立場。就其FB專頁發文提及會否決預算案逼特首下台，鄭稱是助理跟隨公民黨「Line To Take」（統一口徑）發帖，他於發文半年後被捕才知悉，感到愕然。
+
+案件周一（19日）續審。
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
+
+
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diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-06-19-will-artificial-intelligence-lead-to-human-extinction.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-06-19-will-artificial-intelligence-lead-to-human-extinction.md
new file mode 100644
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--- /dev/null
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@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "人工智能会让人类灭绝吗？"
+author: "布犁"
+date : 2023-06-19 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/IzgKwLE.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+ChatGPT发布后，连续几个月来，到处都是讨论人工智能的声音。5月30日，英国大小报纸的头条，是一份由超过300位各界人士参与的“AI可能导致人类灭绝”的联署声明。签署者也包括了大量AI科学家和前沿研发人士。
+
+
+
+AI的缔造者们开始担心AI毁灭人类了？这份声明很短，只有一句话，翻译过来就是：“降低人工智能导致人类灭绝的风险，应该与大流行及核战争等其他社会风险一样作为全球优先事项”。
+
+
+### 我们将面临哪些AI风险？
+
+牵头起草这份声明的，是一个位于美国的非盈利机构，叫做“AI安全中心”（Center for AI Safety）。他们的主要工作是研究、讨论和倡导AI安全问题，促进相关监管和立法。
+
+他们的主页上列举了AI将可能带来的一些最严重的安全威胁。有些看起来似乎有些危言耸听，但更多的则让人紧张：
+
+列于首位的风险，是AI的军事化——这倒不是说会像科幻片里那样，出现一个超级AI大脑要灭绝人类。这样的风险暂时不大。但颇为可能出现的情况，是各国都可能用AI参与武器研发和军备升级，并将AI装入一些武器系统，人工智能将被拿来服务于政治野心和战争。
+
+另一件较为人知的风险是AI大模型将制造和传播更多虚假信息。目前，ChatGPT的问答中就已经显示，AI会在交谈中产生不少和事实不符的内容，比如让它解释一位人物时，AI有机会虚构人物的一些生平细节。有一些最新的研究就指出，AI其实能做到“表里不一”和主动“撒谎”。甚至在大数据模型给我们编造一个不存在的错误答案时，它可能自己对正确答案有一定的理解。
+
+但这只是虚假信息的其中一面，进一步发展的大模型还可能被用来自动生成容易让人们相信的政治谣言或政治宣传，从而更深地影响社会和政治。
+
+
+▲ 2023年3月22日，在CloudFest展会上，背景萤幕上显示“此标志不是由ChatGBT编写的”。
+
+其他主要的AI风险，还包括对AI的依赖将导致人类的个体思考和行为能力大幅衰落；以及谁可以享受或者购买到AI资源，谁无法触及AI资源，这造成的结果会是围绕着AI生产力，人类社会的进一步贫富分化。总而言之，在通用的大模型AI出现后，相关的风险也可以说是渗透到了人类社会的各个方面。
+
+像“AI安全中心”这样的机构聚焦于推动人们认识AI风险，并寻求管控风险的方式——尤其是让立法者和执法者留意到这一点。可以预见，这样的倡导机构在未来会变得更多。
+
+
+### 立法者如何讨论通用AI大模型？
+
+AI大模型不同于普通AI，规管起来并不容易。欧盟先前计划中对AI的规划方式，是将不同种类的AI归为不同的风险等级。但这样的模式并不能适应通用大模型带来的挑战。
+
+在这方面，美国参议院可以说是走在了各国立法机构的最前。他们在五月份举行的一场超过三小时的听证会值得一听。这场听证会的全文也可以在科技政策媒体TechPolicyPress上找到。
+
+听证会上，三位接受参议员质询的业界人士分别是开发ChatGPT的OpenAI的CEO阿特曼（Samuel Altman）、IBM的首席隐私和信任官蒙哥马利（Christina Montgomery）以及纽约大学的认知科学教授马库斯（Gary Marcus）。
+
+相比之前对TikTok的听证会上很多中老年议员聚焦于程式“带坏年轻人”，这次针对AI的听证会中，列席的参议员们更有备而来，提问深度也更亮眼。开场的参议员布卢门撒（Richard Blumenthal）甚至开了个与时俱进的玩笑，他用ChatGPT生成的演讲稿和AI语言合成读了一段“他自己”的开场白，“你们能听出来这不是我吗？”
+
+在这场听证会上，开发人工智能的头部企业发表忧心忡忡的言论，也许更多是为了在未来遇到事情的时候撇清责任——你看我都提前跟大家预警了！不过，听证会上包括阿特曼在内的人也确实提到了AI可能会在未来导致的巨大问题——比如ChatGPT的接口有机会帮助犯罪分子模拟人类去实施诱骗和欺瞒行为；又比如大模型的政治操控能力可以预测选民倾向和引领舆论；又比如AI显然会对就业市场有巨大影响；再比如通用AI将可能带来全球范围内语言之间的不平等——一个例子是，冰岛语这样的语言是不是会变得更边缘？阿特曼等人也直白承认这些问题都会存在——看起来他并不是一个技术乐观主义者。
+
+概而言之，马库斯教授在听证会上的一个类比可能是恰当的，他说我们已经“创造了一头在瓷器店里的公牛”。尤其是，从AlphaGo开始，就有很多人提到过AI的思考过程其实是一个“黑箱”，我们很难确定AI到底是怎么具体“思考”的，因此我们对于AI到底有多安全，其实无法说真的有把握。
+
+面对这样的风险，目前我们有什么可以采取的措施呢？
+
+
+### 我们在加速冲向风险吗？
+
+在美国参议院的听证会上，人们讨论到是否要让AI发展“减速”下来。在舆论场上，马斯克等人先前也通过联名信提出暂时停止训练通用AI。
+
+最近，获得过2018年图灵奖的加拿大科学家本希奥（Yoshua Bengio）有另一个建议，那就是在暂停超过GPT-4等级的AI的开发之外，还要禁止开发所谓的“智能主体”（intelligent agent）。所谓智能主体，是AI大模型接入了一个可以以语言之外的多种方式（比如行走、行动、制造等等）和世界互动的实体上。本希奥和不少人都认为智能主体一旦产生，其对现实的影响将比单纯的语言大模型更加巨大，且变得极为不可控。
+
+但是，从听证会到公开信到调查研究机构，人们也意识到要“减缓”或者真正管控AI风险是非常困难的。
+
+首先的困难就是，当下的全球竞争——中美之间，又或者商业竞争——各大公司之间，都在鼓励更快、更大规模的通用AI开发。OpenAI的CEO阿特曼也指出，除非全球合作，否则很难实现有效的对人工智能领域的监管。这就回到了那封声明的问题——假如AI真的和原子能一样，是一件既可以造福人类又可以毁灭人类的技术，那么全球是否要有类似《不扩散核武器条约》一样的，针对人工智能的条约和国际组织呢？
+
+当前，各国政府显然没有觉得问题有这么严重。
+
+也有不少AI乐观论者，比如Meta的首席AI科学家杨立昆（Yann LeCun）就不同意“AI可能导致人类灭绝”的看法。他的论据之一是AI的发展还没有到真的构成威胁的程度，当前的通用AI的水平也相当初级。
+
+不过，通用人工智能的发展正在逐渐加速。2015年的时候，还有业界专家指出，担忧AI对人类的威胁就像“担心火星上人口过剩”。但八年之后，这个威胁确实变得更明显了。我们可以猜测，真正构成严重威胁的通用AI还需要几年时间才能产生？马库斯在听证会上暗示可能要20年——也并不是一个很远的时间点。我也拿这个问题询问了在人工智能领域工作的朋友，对方的回复是：如果要期待一个具有创造力的，在一些专业工作领域上能够开始超越人类的通用人工智能模型，也许在未来两三年就会有些眉目了。当然，这也只是一种估计。
+
+相比通用AI的发展加速度，尽管各国现在都说要开始监管，但是所做的还是远远不够。美国参议院的听证会上讨论了一些可能手法，比如类似食品标签那样为AI增加“计分卡”——这个模式大概就是当我们在用AI产品时，会跳出来一个提醒：“ChatGPT，有时候会撒谎，ta说的话不能作为事实使用”。其他的再讨论之中的监管措施也包括了要成立一个专门监管AI的机构、在AI产品上标注大模型接受训练的来源等等。
+
+监管速度很可能跟不上AI发展的速度，尤其是像美国这样的，非常依赖“打官司”来厘清法律责任的系统，速度就更慢了。况且，还有很多基础问题没有解决：比如厘清AI责任时，是否要修改美国《通讯规范法案》（CDA）的230条？（网络服务供应商无需为第三方使用者的言行负法律责任。）
+
+相比之下，欧盟的人工智能监管法案已经进入了落实阶段。6月14日，欧洲议会通过了新修改的《欧盟人工智能法案》（EU AI Act），这意味着欧盟接下来将在机构和机制设计层面去执行超过300页内容的人工智能监管办法。其中包括了对人工智能训练资料、训练范畴、算法公开等方面的要求。据相关报道，法案也针对新出现的大模型进行了修订。这其中值得注意的一点是，加强人工智能监管，意味着这一领域领先的美国公司和欧洲监管当局之间的冲突可能在未来几年加深——欧洲的法案在何种程度上能够“管住”人工智能的负面属性，对硅谷又能否带来实质性的影响？
+
+
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diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-06-20-anthropocene-carbon-sink-trade.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-06-20-anthropocene-carbon-sink-trade.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..eb9de165
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-06-20-anthropocene-carbon-sink-trade.md
@@ -0,0 +1,235 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "人类世・碳汇交易"
+author: "Frank﹑松亚"
+date : 2023-06-20 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/7Na94Mi.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "长久以来试图与自然共存后，人类活动撼动了大自然，从早期的农业革命到工业革命，再到现代的全球化和信息时代，每个时代都对地球造成了独特且深远的影响。有学者给这个地质年代一个极富争议的称号：“人类世”。人类作为年轻物种主导了环境变化，但即便认为人类与别不同，我们从来没有脱离过我们的“物种起源”；自然的故事，仍然是人的故事。"
+---
+
+福建村民把“空气”变成证券，给女儿做嫁妆；贵州农民想靠卖“空气”脱贫；浙江村民质押“空气”拿到37万元银行贷款。
+
+
+
+一系列“空气卖钱”的故事正在中国农村不胫而走。这些消息并非民间骗局，说辞全都来自官媒之口，甚至人民网上有一期两会新闻节目是“空气都可以卖钱了”。
+
+不过，此处的“卖空气”并非真要把空气收集售卖。这是官方在宣传“林业碳汇”这一近年来时兴的概念时，所使用的一个笼统且有误导性的手法。
+
+林业碳汇指的是森林透过光合作用，吸收并固定大气中的二氧化碳，以达到减少温室气体的效果。由于可以用特定的计算方法来得到一个以吨为单位的“减排量”，林业碳汇如今作为一种减排方式存在。全球各地都有林业碳汇的开发专案，它也以“碳抵消”的形式在市场交易。简单而言，购买通过林业碳汇产生的“减排量”的公司可以以此“抵消”其自身的部分温室气体排放量，但此“抵消”仅存在于统计层面，并不意味着购买方的排放量在实际中下降了。
+
+在中国，林业碳汇正成为极受政府关注的一种“生态产品”，相应的方法学和交易方式不断推出，使其得以成为“货币化的产品”。用中国绿色碳汇基金会创始人李怒云的话来说，林业碳汇是“实现‘绿水青山就是金山银山’的有效途径”，而“绿水青山金山银山”又是中共中央总书记习近平提出的口号，也是中国生态文明建设的主要理论。
+
+基于减碳的产业被中国商人看作一个“新蓝海”，即未知的市场空间。一部分看中了林业碳汇的企业，正把手伸向农村，用的正是“卖空气”的故事。
+
+
+### 碳资产公司的“圈地”运动
+
+在广东从化北部农村居民的眼中，空气是他们最有价值的“资本”，也是一个被挂在嘴边的词。60多岁的老者总是重复一个论调，山区农村最好的就是空气；40出头的新晋民宿老板看好旅游的前景，因为城市人需要来吸新鲜空气。
+
+去年夏天，一宗新奇的生意似乎印证了他们的观念：有公司来村里谈合作，想要和村民一起“卖空气”。
+
+这些公司口中的“空气”，和前述的政府文宣一样，只是一个具有误导性的符号，却易于在基层推广。
+
+现隶属于广东省广州市的从化，位于广州的东北部，地处珠江三角洲与粤北山区的过渡地带。从化的森林覆盖率达到69.1%，重要的饮用水源流溪河发源于此。近年十年来，地方政府积极开发生态旅游业，但山区农村鲜有大型投资项目，农村多以自然村和保育地的形式续存。
+
+
+▲ 2016年11月3日，中国内蒙古，一名工人在休息时抽烟。
+
+如此地理条件使得这些村落被碳资产开发公司相中，从化多个自然村的村干部均表示，在三年内，有两至三家不同的公司想来合作开发林业碳汇。
+
+根据广东发改委提出的《碳排放管理体系要求及使用指南》，碳资产的定义为在应对气候变化领域内、具有价值属性的有形或无形资产，如排放权或减排量额度。记者在企业信息查询工具“企查查”中搜索，发现名称中包含“碳资产”这一关键词的企业有328家；至于含有“碳汇”关键词的企业则有1722家。
+
+据受访者讲述，这些碳资产开发公司希望与村中林权所有人签订一份委托开发协定，从而取得林地的碳汇开发权，并由公司主导林地的碳汇专案开发，最后分成交易收益。
+
+记者取得的一份合作协定细则显示，在碳汇交易成功后，碳资产公司将获得50%的收益，且签订协定后，林权所有人不能独立或再委托他人开发和出售碳汇量，约定期限为20年。
+
+谭家明是从化A村的村干部，A村位于从化北部山区，有超过三万亩林地。他告诉记者，大约在2017年前后，A村与一家碳资产公司签订过一份林业碳汇开发协定，但专案以夭折告终。到了2022年7月，另一家碳资产公司又到村中开林业碳汇的宣讲会，他形容两家公司的介绍说辞几乎一模一样。
+
+经过上一轮的合作失败，谭家明对这类合作更为审慎，他从网路上搜索发现，这家公司不曾有过成功开发的先例，便断定其没有开发能力。“他们（碳资产公司）就是拿我们的资源去跟交易所合作，再中间抽佣金。”谭家明认为，这类公司是想先借村的林地资源，凑够能开发的数量，再到交易平台开户。
+
+一名旁听了该碳资产公司整场宣讲会的A村居民表示，在宣讲现场，她一直在追问碳汇开发的细节，对方只能给出由“专人负责”和根据“国家规定”的含糊回复，使得她觉得对方只是想先签下协议，毕竟这对公司来说是没有成本的。“对村里来说，好像一旦把合同签下去，后面会发生什么，就不由村民。”
+
+这名居民形容宣讲会的观感像极了“圈地”运动。
+
+“跑马圈地”在2022年成为与碳汇项目频繁搭配出现的热门词，意思是企业在有具体开发计划前，就先把有潜力的资源盘下。某林业碳汇开发公司的业务员透露，去年已经听说过三个相似的案例，且都发生在广东；四川省林草局在2022年6月发布的针对该省林草碳汇发展推进方案的解读中称，前期林草碳汇专案“圈地囤地现象突出”。
+
+
+▲ 2008年12月02日，一名牧羊人，在燃煤发电厂外放羊。
+
+但这些林地最终能否真的达成交易则还是一个未知数。
+
+阿德尔菲咨询公司（Adelphi）的高级经理陈志斌指出，目前全国碳市场关于抵消减排量的市场机制还没有正式公布，很多公司到林场提前签订开发合同，是在储备专案，形成了圈地的局面。但是最后能成功开发和收成的数额，都无法清晰预估。
+
+“林业碳汇整体处于“雷声大雨点小”的状态。森林通过光合作用形成的减排量可以卖钱，但需要有人来买它，而目前埋单的机制还不是很顺畅。”陈志斌分析。
+
+然而，值得注意的一个背景是，中国正在创造出国内独有的林业碳汇交易机制。
+
+目前，在国际自愿性市场上，林业碳汇专案常常采用Verra、Gold Standard等碳信用认证机构所开发的标准认证，取得认证的专案可以直接与企业交易，也能在交易所与全球投资者交易。
+
+而在中国，林业碳汇交易方式主要有三大类，分别是中国核证自愿减排量（CCER）专案、地方创设的林业碳汇机制和华东林权交易所的林业碳汇交易试点，它们有着相互独立的运作体系，其计算碳抵消量和交易的方式都各不相同。
+
+在官方媒体的宣传里，一些山区农民靠林业碳汇赚钱的开发案例被作为成功的示范样本，受到大肆宣传。但仔细辨认会发现，这些项目多为农村小面积的林地，有的甚至只有几百亩，完全不同于常见的林业碳汇项目。
+
+其实，农村林地往往难以开发成CCER专案，但是在地方政府的主导下，它们可以沿用当地的碳抵消机制，发展出带有扶贫色彩，更直接的目标是令山区村民增收的碳汇项目；中国绿色碳汇基金会更特地针对农村林地的特点，正在推进一项农户森林经营碳汇减排交易体系。目前农村林地专案往往局限于地方内的市场或特定试点交易，不足以进入全国乃至海外市场，但已然被视为农村林地能够开发成碳汇的证据，以及政府鼓励此类开发的信号。
+
+实际上，探讨多年的全国性CCER市场至今仍未正式开始运行，交易机制也尚未明确，但这些信号和“前景”仍刺激着商人涌入，争相在农村中“跑马圈地”。
+
+
+▲ 2008年12月2日，中国内蒙古，多座燃煤发电厂在民居前释出浓烟。
+
+
+### 饭桌上的掮客
+
+2023年1月，在镇中心的粤菜酒楼里，从化B村的六名社长围坐在餐桌前，“空气”就像是这一顿饭的暗号，不断被提及。其中一名社长笑称，大家都想要“装一桶空气”——每个人都想在林地碳汇的交易中分一杯羹。
+
+这场饭局的组织者叫钟洪兵，正是他把林业碳汇等于“卖空气”的概念教给了他们。今年53岁的钟洪兵是从化C村的村干部，2022年年中开始，他和一家碳资产公司合作，牵头在从化推广碳汇，试图拿下各村的碳汇开发权。
+
+钟洪兵自称并不曾从合作公司中收钱，甚至在自掏腰包来牵线，不过对方承诺成功开发后，将与他分成利润。实质上，他是这场碳汇开发权“圈地”活动中的掮客。
+
+王文伟是从化北部另一个村的村书记。据他介绍，每当村中有潜在的开发专案时，总会有公司想来“圈地”，例如此前有过一波5G网路推广，各家公司都想垄断村中业务。因为农村内部关系复杂，如果这些公司无法说服村委会，他们便会找村民做掮客，也有村民为了赚钱主动自荐。
+
+钟洪兵算得上是一个在农村关系网络中有分量的掮客，他曾在村委任职书记多年，现在退到村委普通职位，但仍被别人称为书记。他可以凭人脉关系，召集起不同村里的干部和社长开宣讲会，他更相信自己懂得村中推广的逻辑，那就是讲实际的利益。
+
+记者取得了一段30多分钟的钟洪兵宣讲录音，大部分的时间里，他都在向村民讲解碳汇专案的收益计算和分成方式，至于开发流程和交易机制则鲜有提及。他更把碳汇减排量的计算方式，错误地解释为测量林地释放的氧气量。
+
+钟洪兵还提供了一个资料，十万亩的林地一年可以有600万收益。他的计算方式是，一亩树林散发出来的氧气量在0.8吨至1.2吨不等，而交易平台的一般交易价格是每吨58元，约等于一亩地“产值”为60元。至于0.8吨至1.2吨的数值来源，他声称是国家指定的权威单位测量出来的，数值有波动是因为“每一种树散发出来的氧气量都不一样”。
+
+
+▲ 2019年3月27日，中国武威市，当地居民在沙漠上为新种的植物浇水。
+
+当记者询问交易价格来源时，钟洪兵打开了一个名为“全国碳交易”的微信公众号，它每天下午都会发布当日的碳市场成交资料，这些交易资料构成了他对碳汇交易的理解。其实这是碳市场上的排放权交易资料，与碳汇交易并非同一概念，钟洪兵的交易收益估算方式更是没事实依据。
+
+即便离开了宣讲环境，钟洪兵也无法解释清楚碳中和与碳汇的作用机制，只能模糊地重复着一些概念名词，并将这些名词和减排划等号。然而，他仍然自豪于自己的推广话术，“你说碳中和，别人都不知道你在说什么，卖空气就不同”。钟洪兵自认为，把林业碳汇和碳中和等概念，简化成卖出林地产生的空气量，是一种巧妙的宣传方式，因为村民天然能理解清新空气的价值。
+
+更吊诡的是，不论是钟洪兵自己还是台下的听众，其实都并不关心碳汇的减排原理和市场现状。一名来听宣讲的社长告诉记者，在他看来，碳汇开发能否成功，只有一个影响因素，“上面的人（掌权者）是不是要推，只要推，这事就能成”。
+
+钟洪兵的思维模式亦是如此——只要项目符合国家大趋势，便是有利可图的。相比起科学的测量方法和真实的市场行情，他更在意二十大报告里有否提及“碳中和”三个字。
+
+“我是吃过亏的。”钟洪兵在几年前曾经在惠州投资工厂，但是因为环保手续不合规，还未投产就被政府拆掉了，此后，他领会到环保是发展的大方向。近期，他还承包了一片地，准备建光伏发电站。
+
+在宣讲会上，“国家”是钟洪兵反复提到的词，他不断强调碳汇项目是回应国家实现碳中和的目标，并且提供有优惠政策，其收益是“国家给我们红利”。这套话术逻辑其实来源自地方政府和宣传机构，它们在农村推广碳汇专案时，时常搭配着扶贫和让林农增收的说辞，更会开发出地方独有的交易模式。
+
+宣讲会结束后，标配的活动是一场饭局，这也是村中办事的方式。饭局上，支持开发碳汇的社长反复说着，“有钱不赚就是傻”，有疑虑的则拐弯抹角地打探所谓“卖空气”的可行性。吃饱喝足后，钟洪兵见有两个社长还犹豫不决，便招呼他们到外面单独细谈，直到饭局结束离席时，社长们才从钟洪兵手中拿到开发合作协议的正式文件，即此前他们发表议论时，都不曾看过一眼文件。
+
+过去的大半年时间里，钟洪兵在从化七八条村子里开过宣讲活动，不过最终能签下开发合作协定的村并不多。这一天晚上，钟洪兵对推广结果很满意，他盘算着可签下三万亩左右的林地，加上他之前签好的两万亩，便能达到五万亩的“最低开发标准”。
+
+钟洪兵直言，做掮客的动机就是钱。
+
+他记得在2018年前后，第一次遇到有人来谈合作开发碳汇，但因为能签约的林地太少，便搁置了。自此之后，他对碳汇有了最初的印象，偶尔也会琢磨是否能做下去。直到2022年，他声称见过三家“朋友介绍”的碳资产管理公司。
+
+
+▲ 2015年11月27日，中国北京，俩男孩在燃煤发电厂前使用智能手机。
+
+最终与其合作的碳资产公司承诺，碳汇专案成功交易后，他能分到1.5%的收益，如果按照他的计算方式，整个专案计划开发的五万亩林地能让他赚到4.5万元，但他更看重长期回报——每个周期可以交易一次，而且只要有成功案例，还在观望的村都会参与。他盘算着，碳汇开发只要符合政策方向，便是一宗能长期滚利的生意。
+
+过去的大半年里，钟洪兵光是请客吃饭便花掉了一万八千元，不过他也只是把碳汇开发看作众多项投资的一种，同时也是经营关系的方式。“亏了就当跟大家吃饭，我也没有什么可以被（碳资产）公司骗的。”他说道。
+
+
+### 复杂的开发流程
+
+农村的林地是否真的具有开发成碳汇专案，并且最终达成交易，实现一种如钟洪兵所描述的“生态换钱”路径？
+
+首先明确的一点，林业碳汇的开发远比钟洪兵想像的复杂。长期从事碳汇专案分析工作的陈志斌介绍，在CCER框架的林业碳汇项目，可以分为三个步骤：
+
+第一是撰写及提交专案报告，一般会请咨询公司或了解政策的协力厂商、开发公司来执行，报告会基于官方出台的方法学测算林地产生的减排量；第二是审定和核证，由国家认可的审定机构审定专案是否符合方法学条件，通过后，专案就可以录入到国家的资源库里，也即注册成功；第三是申请协力厂商机构认证，检查过去或接下来会产生的减排量，通过认证后，国家就可以签发这笔减排量。
+
+这三个步骤的流程走完，一个林业碳汇专案的开发成本大约在30万元至50万元之间。
+
+然而，最终的交易价格却不一定有预期的好。陈志斌分析，全国性的CCER机制处于完全停止的状态，诸如北京、福建等地有本土机制，但它们只能在本地市场交易，且目前地方市场的配额比较富余，对减排量的需求也没有那么大，那么价格自然不会太高。
+
+广州碳排放权交易中心提供的每周碳价资料显示，5月在广州碳排放权交易中心以CCER方式交易的自愿减排量价格可以达到每吨74元；而北京市碳排放权电子交易平台的资料显示，5月里CCER方式交易的自愿减排量价格最低为每吨47元，最高可以达到每吨109元。
+
+可是，多数农村林地并无法达到CCER开发的标准，在广东，农村林地的碳汇专案多以碳普惠方式开发，这是广东当地创设的一种减排量核准机制，而碳普惠专案的市场交易价格远低于CCER专案。在今年5月以来，广东碳排放权交易所只有一周发生过碳普惠方式的自愿减排量交易，其平均价格是每吨19.8元。记者翻查了过去五年内，多个广东农村地区以碳普惠方式交易的林业碳汇专案，其最终交易价格在每吨16.32元至36.00元不等，数额和钟洪兵预估的每吨60元相距甚远。
+
+此外，林地面积是另一个重要的影响因素。
+
+“理想的话一亩地一年一吨碳，根据方法学，看你可以开发多少年的碳汇量，加上开发成本，综合算下来，可能要几十亩上百亩地，才可能到一个赚钱的点。”陈志斌说。
+
+
+▲ 中国广州从化区的村庄。
+
+在钟洪兵游走的从化村落里，每条村的林地面积都只有两三万亩，目前与他合作的碳资产管理公司表示，达到五万亩林地就能开发。钟洪兵也透露，他还见过另外两家碳资产管理公司，这两家公司都需要十万亩以上的林地，才能成立专案开发。
+
+记者以村民身份联系了一家在中国有成功开发林业碳汇的公司，该公司的工作人员表示，林地面积对碳汇开发的前期投入影响不大，硬性成本不会因为地少而降低，但林地面积直接影响收益。因而通常需要有十万亩以上的林地，才具有开发价值——否则最终交易额太少，利润微薄。
+
+他更透露，中国现实情况中，以村集体为主体的专案基本上很难做成，这类专案往往需要政府牵头，网上看到的一些村集体开发林业碳汇的新闻，其实大多是地方试点的特例，对普遍意义的CCER项目没有参考价值。
+
+
+### 以保护生态换取“伙食费”
+
+从化的农村里，碳汇仍然是一个陌生的名词，但是如果问及“卖空气”，村民们大多有所耳闻。
+
+“好像小孩子玩泥沙一样，很搞笑。”李丽娇说道。她是A村的村民，从社长群发的通知中得知了“卖空气”的事情，她觉得把本地流通的空气装运到外地是不可能的。
+
+然而，掮客钟洪兵所在的C村的村干部，则有截然相反的态度，他反问说：“太阳都可以发电，为什么空气不能卖钱？”他更一本正经地提出，可以用一个大气球来装空气，然后整个气球称重量。
+
+卖空气像是村中的趣闻轶事，李丽娇记得消息刚传出时，有的村民第一反应是，企业抽光了村里的空气，那么村民怎么活。
+
+尽管不相信卖空气的真实性，李丽娇却相信“换钱”的真实。她揣测，在政府部门有一笔环保的钱花不出去，所以设立出一个“卖空气”的名目来花钱。另一名村民也提出相似的观点，他把“卖空气”理解为“套”政府的钱，即以满足一项环保指标来赚补贴。
+
+
+▲ 2017年6月2日，中国河北，一名居民骑着拖拉机。
+
+这种推测缘于他们的生活经验。村民们对空气卖钱将信将疑，但是对“生态换钱”却毫不陌生，它不仅出现在“绿水青山是金山银山”的政府宣传中，更是每年进到村民账上的生态补偿金。
+
+在上世纪90年代，中国森林管理系统逐步建立起公益林的管理方式，根据1995年印发的《林业经济体制改革总体纲要》，公益林以满足国土保安和改善生态环境的公益事业需要为主，一般只进行抚育和更新性质的采伐，列入社会公益事业。现行的《广州市生态公益林条例》明令禁止擅自采伐、损害树木、采脂、采砂土、开垦等行为。简单来说，当一片林地被划归为公益林后，它基本上丧失了营利的可能。
+
+随之建成的，则是生态补偿制度，广东省作为这一机制的试点地，在1999年便开始从财政拨款，给予林农补偿金，A村村民记得，这笔补偿金从最初大约每亩地五元，慢慢地涨到了现在80多甚至100多元。而A村地处从化北部的山区，村民的聚居地被山林环绕，林地占了全村面积的88%，其中有超过2.7万亩的林地被划定为生态公益林。
+
+66岁的A村村民杨志强把生态补偿金叫作“伙食费”，在人生的前40多年，他都过着靠山吃山的传统生活——孩提时在山林中刮下松脂来点灯；成年后在集体林场砍树干活；在山上种药材卖钱。
+
+“我们就是靠山吃山，现在不让吃山了，那么政府就给‘伙食费’。”杨志强每年能拿到1800元的生态补偿金。
+
+根据杨志强回忆，在70年代，村中有集体林场，包括他在内，很多村民被组织到上山砍树，他们把松树砍成两米长的木材，再把木材放到河里，它会顺着河水漂流到十多公里外的山脚，木材都由国家统一收购，收入也是归集体所有。集体经济时期结束后，村民也会上山砍柴卖，有住在周边村落的人或者饭店老板，会来到这边山多的村中买柴。
+
+从山上砍下的大木头，沿着河水，漂流到山下，是不少村民的共同回忆。随着公益林管理机制的铺开，这一场景消失于上世纪90年代末期。
+
+取而代之的，则是以保护生态换取“伙食费”的新时期。
+
+
+▲ 2019年1月16日，一名男子在燃煤发电厂前种植蔬菜。
+
+40多岁的A村护林员陈茂东的谋生方式，便是跟着这一变化走的。他介绍，在90年代，农村的收入来源不外乎养猪牛、耕地和砍树。村中的林地曾经有很多林场，他最初有六七年时间，是当司机拉货，把木头运到工厂做家具；后来，多数的林地都严禁砍伐，他转而为装修工程拉沙石，这样也干了快十年；近几年，周边已经很少新的建筑工程，他把大货车换成皮卡，接零碎的送货单，两年前为了更稳定的收入，他便当上了护林员。
+
+在陈茂东的理解里，从卖木材到保育的转变，最关键的因素就是钱。他说，当补偿金只有每亩十几元的时候，大家为了生计，还是会上山砍树，后面随着补偿金上涨，加上政府管理更严，大概在十年前，砍伐行为才完全停止。
+
+“水源林不能动，一动的话，政府就不给补贴。”现在谈及到上山砍树，陈茂东的第一反应就是补贴。
+
+现行的广州市公益林补偿机制分为三个级别，每一亩地每年的补偿金额分别是85元、106元和159元，并且以平均每年1.2%增长幅度计算，五年调增一次。切换到村民和村干部的视角里，则是村中的公益林以三个级别“标价”。
+
+保育山林可以换取金钱的经验，也直接影响着村中干部和社长对林业碳汇的理解。
+
+“（开发碳汇）想就肯定想啦，如果它（碳资产公司）有实力办到就最好，对村民是只有收益没损害，为什么不好阿？”A村的村干部谭家明认为，对于村集体来说，用生态林来开发碳汇是一项“零成本”的事，林地养护和经营的部分本身就由林业局承担，林地本身一直在山上，无需额外投入就能多一份收益。
+
+D村的社长郭强也认为，林地本身是零成本的，甚至直言即便发生火灾，烧了一些树，也只是收益变少。
+
+而生态林，以及水源保育的规定所带来的开发限制，也促使他们对碳汇开发更有兴趣。不是每一个人都对生态补偿满意，一名支持开发碳汇的社长抱怨说，以前村民还能上山砍树，再拿去做家具赚钱，林地保育之后，收入的渠道更少了，“农村很惨，现在如果不出去打工，没什么收入来源。政府管理得太严格，养猪搭个棚就说违建。生态林都不能开发，生态补贴一家人就几千元，根本不够。”
+
+谭家明也觉得，在政府严格的管理下，村中八成的林地都是“动不了”的资源，并没有太多开发空间。他正在尝试做生态旅游，在社交媒体发推广文，但是即便紧邻广州市区，进村还需要走一段30分钟的山路，全是陡坡和急弯，山区地势使得其交通十分不便。
+
+
+▲ 2017年2月7日，中国六盘水市，村民站在燃煤发电厂前。
+
+目前A村的青壮年大多在外打工，或是在市区定居，常住人口大约只有300人，不到户籍人口的三分之一，人口外流自然是因为村里缺乏营生途径。这一情况在周边的村子中也十分普遍。
+
+不过，钟洪兵的碳汇开发推广却没能吸引得到A村的村干部和社长们。
+
+一名社长表示，空气不像房子，它看不见摸不着，没有一个固定的面积，他无法估计林地的“空气量”，更难以推算收益，最后很可能是白忙一场。在社长们看来，这场合作的前提是有明确价格，而且在签订合同时，碳资产公司就应该支付一笔费用，他们无法接受集体的资源被零成本地“圈起”。
+
+面对碳汇这个“新角色”，A村的人们似乎更倾向于保持距离，并且满足于原有的生态补偿机制。不过，林地保育和补偿的机制，也已经改变了村民和林地关系。
+
+杨志强拒绝用好或不好来评价这种改变，他只会肯定一点——如果政府停发“伙食费”，那么村民就会重复过去砍柴、种药材的生活。即使是现在，村民仍然保留着烧柴做饭的习惯，他们会上山捡被林业工作人员处理的树木，家家户户门口都堆着柴。
+
+然而，这种关系其实仅存于老一辈人的生活中。不少村民已经在从化市区买了房，包括杨志强的儿子，在杨志强眼中，那是一种出门便是大型购物商场的都市生活，也是他所不乐意过的生活——钢筋水泥建筑都很难看，他只想每天看着“好靓”的树。
+
+上山的路口就在杨志强房子的侧面，每天中午饭后，他便独自上山散步，走到傍晚才回家，没有固定的路线，走在山上时，他什么都不会想，只是看着树的样子和变化。这片林地自他出生以来，便是差不多的模样，他不认为需要特别的保护，当然也不会刻意破坏。
+
+“顺其自然就是最好。”他指着房子旁边一棵倒在院子里的树发出了感叹。这棵树在几年前被大风吹断，只剩下50公分左右的树桩，断掉的树干已经枯死，他也没有清理它，他相信剩下的树桩会自己长回来。“不用理的，好神奇。”
+
+
+▲ 2022年11月20日，一对情侣望向被被雾霾笼罩的高楼大厦。
+
+（文中除陈志斌外，均为化名。）
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-06-25-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk19.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-06-25-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk19.md
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@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "香港民主派47人初選案審訊第十九周"
+author: "《獨媒》"
+date : 2023-06-25 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/pB9JpyN.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+#### 鄭達鴻稱公民黨因《國安法》改政綱、否決財案僅「籌碼」不致癱瘓政府
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，16人否認「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，進入審訊第十九周。前公民黨區議員鄭達鴻繼續作供，談及公民黨因應《國安法》的立場變化及對初選合法性的看法。鄭稱黨曾就《國安法》生效召緊急會議，決定不再否決一切議案，其後亦修改政綱和選舉單張，包括將以「否決權」促政府落實五大訴求改為爭立會「主導權」，不再綑綁否決預算案。法官質疑新政綱最終未有公布，鄭稱相信是「公關考慮」，指黨擔心《國安法》後予人印象「縮得好勁」，影響初選勝算。
+
+本案指控被告協議無差別否決預算案，以圖顛覆國家政權，鄭本周引時任黨主席梁家傑稱，否決預算案只是爭取五大訴求的「籌碼」，絕非癱瘓政府；鄭亦曾自行研究《基本法》，認為即使立法會因否決預算案而解散，特首亦可批准臨時短期撥款，故不認為否決會造成癱瘓政府，當時也不認為屬違法。
+
+鄭作供時亦多次強調，與公民黨立場雖不同，但選舉期間要跟隨黨立場以獲支持參選。法官一度形容他想做黨的「反叛者」，又問有否想過加入其他政黨如街工，鄭指當時公民黨是他「最大機會、最有勝算嘅一個身位」。
+
+此外，鄭亦供稱李予信原排其港島名單第二，但6月12日參與街頭活動「被邀請入警署」後，獲黨徵召出選超級區議會，解釋公民黨當時擔心在街頭「貢獻」不足，想被攻擊時「可以有呢樣嘢講出嚟」。
+
+
+▲ 鄭達鴻
+
+
+### 鄭稱公民黨因《國安法》緊急開會改政策 視否決權為「籌碼」絕非癱瘓政府
+
+鄭達鴻本周完成主問，並進入盤問，累計已作供6天。鄭上周已提及，曾反對否決所有議案，惟楊岳橋和譚文豪仍「一意孤行」召記者會，又指曾反對黨簽署「墨落無悔」不果。鄭本周則主要談及公民黨《國安法》生效前後的立場變化，及就初選合法性的評估；亦繼續強調與黨立場的分歧。
+
+鄭本周供稱，3月記者會楊岳橋稱政府不回應五大訴求便會否決所有議案後，黨6月撰「論壇天書」，「Line to take（統一口徑）」是入立會後「會運用基本法賦予立法會的權力，包括否決財政預算案，迫使特首回應五大訴求」，鄭於論壇亦有提及。鄭指他個人不認為要綑綁否決預算案爭五大訴求，但選舉期間要跟隨黨立場，以獲黨支持參選。
+
+《國安法》於6月30日晚公布及實施，鄭達鴻稱黨因應新法有多項應對，包括於當晚緊急開會，經討論後仍認為否決預算案合法，但達成3點共識：（一）由原則性反對《國安法》，改為承認《國安法》已在香港實施，只是望能否以《基本法》修訂；（二）以後不再與外國或外國領事有任何聯繫，立法會小組與建制派定期外訪除外；（三）不再以否決一切議案作為籌碼爭五大訴求。
+
+鄭指會上梁家傑亦稱，否決財案只是爭取五大訴求的「籌碼」，絕非癱瘓政府；又指如以往泛民的「關鍵少數否決權」，重點並非否決，而是「對方知道你可以否決」，雙方為避免否決會進入政治談判。鄭形容黨視否決權為「威脅」和「策略」，不一定實行，亦有機會否決一次預算案令政府提出更好版本。
+
+法官一度質疑，公民黨主張特首下台和反對任命終院首席法官，就是有意癱瘓政府，鄭不同意，並強調若政府寸步不讓，仍會嘗試合法表達意見並按實際情況考慮預算案。
+
+
+▲ 2020年3月25日公民黨記者會（資料圖片）
+
+
+### 鄭稱新政綱不綑綁否決權惟無公布 因憂予人印象「縮得好緊」影響初選勝算
+
+除了緊急會議，公民黨政綱亦因應《國安法》有改動。其中鄭達鴻的選舉單張刪去「力抗《國安法》」，將「全力連結國際戰線」改為「把香港現況訴諸國際」，及將「積極參與跟外國政府的溝通」改為「積極將香港的實況訴諸國際」。
+
+而提交民動的初選政綱，原寫有「以關鍵否決權促使政府落實『五大訴求』」等9點，但公民黨初選前要求改為只寫有「以言入罪 無字政綱 SPEECH CRIMES ARE AGAINST FREEDOM」的臨時政綱。其後當屆立法會議員再討論出新的9點政綱，包括改為「爭取立法會主導權」促政府落實五大訴求，不再與否決預算案綑綁；但因公民黨候選人被DQ、正式選舉延後而從沒公布。
+
+法官質疑公民黨改政綱是「搬龍門」，鄭同意立場有變，但稱新法例有很多變數，政綱要符合當時條件。法官亦屢關注為何不通知公眾改了政綱，鄭稱相信是「公關嘅考慮」，黨擔心《國安法》後予人印象立場「縮得好勁」，影響初選勝算，因參與初選投票的是「最黃」或「偏黃」選民。至於新舊政綱均保留「彈劾及罷免林鄭」，鄭稱該黨一向認為政府應就社運問責，又指是《基本法》賦予的權力。
+
+經修訂後的單張，仍保留「鄭達鴻承諾」入議會後否決預算案迫政府回應五大訴求的字句，並於7月初派出。被問為何黨正擬定新政綱時仍派該單張，鄭稱楊岳橋和郭榮鏗檢視認為無問題，亦獲郵局審批成功。法官一度質疑是要求郵差判斷是否合法，鄭稱郵局會審視並拒寄不合法郵件，2016年便曾拒寄羅冠聰的單張。
+
+此外，鄭稱公民黨宣傳初選投票的片段，亦因應《國安法》刪去「否決所有議案」中的「所有」，也不再提否決預算案會造成政府「財政懸崖」。法官質疑公眾或未察覺到改變，鄭承認未必人人可見，而黨是想讓公眾知道有改變，但又怕改變太大造成反效果。不過李予信一方盤問則指，該片段講稿早於《國安法》生效前已作出修訂，鄭達鴻同意有可能。
+
+
+
+
+### 鄭稱按《基本法》否決財案不會致癱瘓政府、公民黨僅倡正確用憲法權力
+
+那鄭達鴻和公民黨於《國安法》後，認為初選或否決財案是非法嗎？鄭表示不認為是違法，指公民黨於7月曾三度向戴耀廷查詢，均獲覆無違法，他信任作為法律系副教授和《基本法》諮詢委員會委員的戴，而黨內法律界人士亦認為無問題。修讀法律的鄭亦曾自行研究《基本法》第50至52條，認為條文起草時已預備好如何應對財案被否決，包括要求特首透過協商解決分歧，而立法會解散後特首亦可批准臨時短期撥款，因此就算否決財案也不會造成癱瘓政府。
+
+鄭達鴻於港島初選排第四，7月22日報名參與正式選舉，3日後收到選舉主任就否決預算案等立場如何符合擁護《基本法》查詢。鄭稱當時回覆公民黨只是「倡議正確使用憲法賦予的權力」，屬「合情、合理、合法」的做法，認為政府和議員均應尊重和回應港人聲音；又指若港人有其他合法訴求獲政府同意，他們都可接受。
+
+鄭終於7月30日被裁定提名無效，他稱其後淡出黨務，同年底宣布退黨，解釋因任立會議員的夢想無法實現，而成為區議員和取實習大律師資格後，意見仍未獲黨接納，心灰意冷遂退黨。鄭表明從無與任何人協議無差別否決，亦無意顛覆國家政權及癱瘓政府。
+
+
+### 鄭稱李予信原排其名單第二 6.12入警署後方獲徵召選超區
+
+原料主問1天的鄭達鴻，最終3.5天才完成；而除控方外，同參與港島區初選的彭卓棋，及同屬東區區議員、參選超區的前黨友李予信均有盤問。就李予信，鄭達鴻指他2020年3至5月曾有機會排在自己港島名單第二位，但無對外公布，4月亦擬定二人的港島立會選舉工程前期工作計劃，曾一起派單張；惟二人至5月中有「拗撬」，李不想參與派傳單的「機械性工作」、想專注地區事務，遂不再出現在其名單。
+
+鄭續指，黨內特別會員大會5月30日通過的初步出選名單，並不包括李予信，但會上授權執委會就選舉實際情況行「徵召機制」，李終獲楊岳橋和譚文豪「徵召」。鄭引述楊稱6月12日李參與一次街頭活動「被邀請入警署」後，黨才討論找他參選超區，因黨當時擔心在街頭「貢獻」不足，想被攻擊時「可以有呢樣嘢講出嚟」。法官李運騰問，所以一個曾被邀請入警署的人會對公民黨有幫助，而且最好他曾被捕？鄭答「係」。
+
+李予信最終於超區初選落敗，並在7月30日報名參選港島區。鄭稱李報名前沒人問過他，他7月31日中午才獲助理通知。被問李是否鄭的「Plan B」，鄭強調「我畀人DQ咗之後個決定權已經交返畀個黨」，他亦沒提名其他人任其「Plan B」，也不記得黨內有否討論。
+
+不過李予信一方則指，李從不是鄭達鴻名單第二，而辯方立場是李最早於6月19日才加入「35+計劃」，公民黨簽署「墨落無悔」與李無關。
+
+
+▲ 公民黨2020年6月19日街站，左起：譚文豪、鄭達鴻、李予信、楊岳橋、郭家麒、余若薇（資料圖片）
+
+
+### 控方質疑公民黨就否決財案一直有統一立場、「墨落」對鄭有約束力
+
+至於控方盤問的方向，主要是質疑公民黨立場一向是否決預算案迫政府回應五大訴求，而鄭達鴻均知悉並同意。鄭在盤問下，不同意黨就否決財案一直有「統一立場」，但同意知悉。而對控方引彭卓棋選舉單張，指寫有民主派願景是否決預算案迫當權者回應五大訴求，而公民黨是民主派一分子，因此彭是談及公民黨的立場、亦反映參與者均知道公民黨立場；鄭稱民主派是很大的團體，上述是彭對民主派的理解，但不清楚彭所指。
+
+鄭供述與黨的分歧時亦屢遭控方和法官質疑。其中鄭稱在黨內反對簽「墨落無悔」後，曾告知選舉經理自己當選後若未能改變，有意申請豁免跟隨黨立場投票。法官質疑為何不擔心對方泄密，鄭解釋對方是較疏離的黨員，選舉期間亦是他「最親密嘅人」、「議辦係同一條船」；又指當時沒向黨坦承想法，是因競選資源和宣傳均需黨幫忙，他亦要當選後才有議價能力。控方質疑鄭說法屬虛構，鄭否認。
+
+而就選舉單張提「鄭達鴻承諾」入議會否決財案，鄭稱是黨立場，批准設計時無留意字眼；就控方質疑「墨落無悔」對他有約束力，他亦重申屬黨而非個人立場，同意法官指是「空頭支票」，雖會有批評但黨要保留彈性。法官質疑如何保留彈性，鄭稱可申豁免跟黨投票，惟法官即質疑鄭會看來「講一套做一套」、影響誠信，鄭續指可退黨或待黨解散。
+
+法官陳慶偉不止一次指，鄭達鴻供稱自初選開始已有自己的議程，是黨內的「反叛者（rebel, black sheep）」，問他有否想過加入其他政黨如街工，鄭指當時「公民黨係我最大機會、最有勝算嘅一個身位」，又指對黨既有感激亦有不快，其意見不被接納便會跟黨立場。
+
+此外，就協調會議，鄭重申港島首次會議後無再討論過否決財案，而公民黨各候選人就會議討論內容無溝通，他亦在參選九西的譚文豪簽署共同綱領並發出群組後，始知有該份文件，不同意控方指他早知各區已就否決預算案達成協議。鄭又指，戴耀廷當時不想參選人簽署、以免被DQ的協議，只是「贏咗先有得選」的協議，與否決預算案無關，解釋戴當時主要擔心被指「操縱選舉」。
+
+案件明（26日）續審，鄭達鴻將繼續接受盤問。
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-07-03-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk20.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-07-03-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk20.md
new file mode 100644
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-07-03-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk20.md
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "香港民主派47人初選案審訊第二十周"
+author: "《獨媒》"
+date : 2023-07-03 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/2wEOgCg.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+#### 曾被嘲「大灣棋」 彭卓棋認「扮黃」爭支持、國安法後棄政綱
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，16人否認「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，進入審訊第二十周，第二名作供被告、前南區區議員彭卓棋完成作供，供述參選的「心路歷程」。
+
+彭作供時提及，曾創立「香港青年創業聯盟」推廣粵港澳大灣區創業，初選期間被笑為「大灣棋」；而他參選立會初心是推動青年創業，亦不關心民主派是否取得「35+」，只關心自己勝算，但為取悅「深黃」選民「扮黃」，於政綱和論壇使用「攬炒」等「選舉語言」。法官問他為何不加入民建聯，彭稱當時選舉氣氛下民建聯會輸，又承認現時回看是「策略錯誤」，他最終亦於初選「大敗」。
+
+彭又形容，「墨落無悔」為「鬥黃嘅書」，沒細看下簽署是為免「輸陣勢」。而他《國安法》後撕毀選舉單張，又要求民主動力移除初選政綱已「做盡咗」，「我放棄政綱，我真係萬估不到，都係會出事」，惟法官和控方質疑他無公開撤回主張。
+
+彭又指，戴耀廷協調會上指否決權「可用可不用」，視乎政府「做得好唔好」，無提迫政府回應五大訴求；而他若知「35+」是迫首下台，他不會同意，他亦是至被捕始知「攬炒十步曲」由戴提倡。
+
+另外，上一位作供的公民黨鄭達鴻，被問黨魁楊岳橋否決財案的「莊嚴承諾」是否「用完即棄」，鄭稱《國安法》生效後環境改變，不一定要實踐。
+
+
+### 彭稱想於內地營商曾被笑「大灣棋」 不會無差別否決財案
+
+前公民黨區議員鄭達鴻上周完成7天作供後，續由同參選港島的前南區區議員彭卓棋作供。彭卓棋供稱，自中學喜愛中國文化，大學時創業，2017年成立「香港青年創業聯盟」，曾推廣粵港澳大灣區創業，其公司亦曾於內地註冊19個商標。彭解釋大灣區創業優惠和機遇較香港大，想在內地做生意，並自言初選期間「畀人笑我係『大灣棋』」。法官指彭似乎想告知法庭他不反政府、不反共，彭回應望讓法庭全面知道其心路歷程。
+
+彭於2019年當選南區區議員，翌年報名參加立法會初選，解釋任區議員後發現很多問題不能在區議會層面解決，又指參選立會「初心」是望在政策上推動香港青年創業。彭又指因其區議會倡議需預算案通過，故當選後不會無差別否決，會一併考慮財案優劣。
+
+
+▲ 彭卓棋（資料圖片）
+
+
+### 彭稱戴耀廷提否決權「可用可不用」、被捕始知戴倡「攬炒十步曲」
+
+就參加初選的經過，彭卓棋稱2020年3月在前灣仔區議員李永財邀請下，首次與戴耀廷和區諾軒見面談及初選，會上戴無提運用否決權迫政府回應五大訴求，但有提目標立會過半。惟彭自言「冇特別有興趣理會民主派係咪攞到35+議席」，「我只關注自己攞唔攞到議席」。
+
+彭其後獲李邀請出席協調會，指首次會上戴耀廷提及否決預算案是《基本法》權力，司馬文反對，戴回應否決權是「可用可不用」，視乎政府做得「好唔好」，但無提無差別否決迫政府回應五大訴求。彭稱雖戴無解釋何謂「好」，但他同意其說法，認為議員對「不公義」的議案，不論政治立場或有否35+都應秉公行事。
+
+彭卓棋作供時，對於多個初選記者會及戴耀廷主張均不知情。他稱初選時從無看過戴耀廷和區諾軒有關「35+」的文章和帖文，而其選舉單張草稿列出「攬炒十步曲」是由兼職同事準備，他看到後要求刪去、不知十步曲內容或由誰提倡，至被捕時獲警員展示才知道。
+
+彭又指，不知道「35+計劃」是有關無差別否決預算案，「墨落無悔」亦沒提及「無差別」，惟法官質疑他「捉字蝨」，指該字眼是於公訴書才首次出現。彭又指自己從無提特首下台，若知「35+」是要迫特首下台和顛覆國家政權，他不會同意。
+
+
+▲ 彭卓棋
+
+
+### 彭卓棋認為取悅選民「扮黃」官屢質疑 彭認是策略錯誤致選票低
+
+彭卓棋在法官追問下，指視自己為泛民主派，而5、6月時就自視為本土派。他指自己是土生土長香港人、想香港好，故是本土派，而當時本土派較流行，是讓選民知道他的「標籤」。彭亦自視為「抗爭派」，指「抗爭」可解作「據理力爭」，爭取政綱落實。
+
+彭解釋，其初心是重振香港品牌等，但當時社會氣氛無人理；而由於初選目標選民是「深黃」、「最黃的一群」，故他於政綱和論壇使用很多激進的「選舉語言」以爭取支持，如「攬炒」、「重組警隊」，又以「誇張手法」指政府是不義政權、採用「對抗極權」的流行選舉用語，論壇亦提「敵人係共產黨」和入議會「不惜以肢體抗爭、癱瘓政府、否決財政預算案」。
+
+彭形容當時氣氛「要講呢啲先至有機會贏」，「選舉策略同做廣告一樣」。惟法官質疑，彭想表示自己不憎恨內地政府、擁抱大灣區，初選卻使用或激起憎恨政府的語言；彭重申是「選舉策略」、要用選舉語言取得「深黃」陣營支持。法官指初選非必須，彭回應是「試水溫」，又指「如果我仲講大灣區，我應該即刻畀人foul走咗」，承認為取悅選民「扮黃」。
+
+法官陳慶偉問他為何不加入民建聯，笑指該黨有協調機制亦談及大灣區發展，「你很適合民建聯」，彭指在當時選舉氣氛民建聯會輸，又承認自己是2019年社會氣氛造就素人從政的「浪潮得益者」。
+
+就論壇的發言，彭承認是自己不相信的選舉語言，亦無深究何謂「肢體抗爭」，重申「用呢啲語言先至有機會贏」。法官質疑他為達目的不擇手段，彭承認有「唔啱」，重看論壇片段亦「好尷尬」；法官亦質疑他與團隊串謀作出虛假陳述，彭同意，但指自己無意欺騙選民，並承認當時「我係鬥黃嘅」。
+
+法官質疑，彭沒打算履行承諾是當選民「盲」？彭稱相信選民「眼睛雪亮」，「所以我咁低票」，自言「成績實在太難睇」、「市民唔鍾意我哋」；又指現時回看是「策略錯誤」和「自傲的代價」，「因此我今日喺度。」
+
+
+### 彭稱「墨落無悔」為「鬥黃書」 因梁晃維已簽為免「輸陣勢」
+
+就彭卓棋簽署的「墨落無悔」，他指僅「䁽過」便簽，因看到同擬於港島參選的梁晃維已簽署，「唔簽會輸陣勢」，「簽咗就唔使畀人夾」。彭又指被捕後才細看「墨落」，發現提及港島沒有的共同綱領，但直言就算當時有細看仍會簽，「因為依一份係鬥黃嘅書嚟」。
+
+控方盤問時播放發起「墨落無悔」的梁晃維於論壇的發言，梁提及初選協調內容無人知道，既然各人認同便應作公開承諾，彭稱這是梁的說法，但他當時不知道聲明內容。控方亦引述彭於論壇提「昂首拒默沉，吶喊聲響透，盼自由歸於這裏」，指是《願榮光歸香港》歌詞，與反修例示威相關，法官李運騰質疑相關性，又說「我從來沒聽過那首歌」，陳慶偉亦指他們並非審理該示威是否合法。
+
+此外，彭亦承認參選名單有4人，與港島協調會議不得多於3人的共識相違。他指該規矩不利其勝算，故刻意違反共識，認為「跟返我哋個心去做先啱」。
+
+
+### 彭卓棋稱《國安法》後放棄政綱「已做盡」：真係萬估不到都係會出事
+
+與鄭達鴻一樣，彭卓棋亦談及因應《國安法》落實的應對。他表示新法生效前，團隊曾開會討論會否「中招」，但因「根本唔理解」何謂合法，決定銷毀所有政綱，並於《國安法》後將撕掉政綱的選舉單張派發，及向查詢的市民表示已放棄政綱。彭亦曾要求民主動力將所有政綱移除，稱因應《國安法》不會落實政綱倡議。
+
+法官多次質疑彭沒用其他方法告知公眾，如於社交平台公開撤回政綱或公開撕爛單張；控方亦質疑彭要求移除政綱不等於撤回主張。彭承認有更好的做法，但當時以為已經足夠，強調無政綱即「放棄政綱」；他亦沒想過退選，形容自己在「空洞」情況下參選，以為自己「好安全」，不覺得會犯法。
+
+
+▲ （資料圖片）
+
+彭又指曾於IG發布手持爛單張的相片，代表放棄政綱，惟法官質疑相片無文字說明，選民或有不同解讀，又形容彭在相片握拳意味「抵抗」、看來不喜歡《國安法》。彭承認有「鬥」的心態，但重申當時認為已足夠：「其實po一張爛嘢……明眼人都知我哋縮咗㗎喇。」彭又一度稱不肯定當時IG是否公開，後改稱肯定記得是公開，官質疑「為何我現在要相信你？」
+
+彭在盤問下，指知道初選組織者於《國安法》生效後舉辦記者會，但專注拉票，故不知道內容，亦沒看過戴耀廷談初選合法性的文章。彭解釋自己已撕毀政綱等、「已做盡」，雖不知《國安法》具體法律含意，但「我放棄政綱，我真係萬估不到，都係會出事」，而行會成員葉劉淑儀稱初選合法又令他更放心。
+
+控方盤問亦質疑彭有意實踐初選作出的承諾，彭稱《國安法》後連同選舉語言亦放棄，但就青年創業等到今日也沒改變。彭又指，他無與其他被告同意無差別否決，亦無意顛覆國家政權：「初選期間我都繼續搞大灣區嘅商標，咁樣係矛盾嘅。」法官一度問，彭初選後無需再用政治語言，可回復「真我」，為何被捕當天辦公室仍保有「連儂牆」，彭稱無特別意思，牆上亦無違《國安法》內容。
+
+
+### 官問楊岳橋否決財案「莊嚴承諾」是否「用完即棄」 鄭達鴻：環境有變未必要實踐
+
+此外，鄭達鴻上周一接受盤問時被問及，時任公民黨黨魁楊岳橋曾提及否決預算案是「莊嚴承諾」，但對鄭達鴻來說是否「用完即棄」？鄭稱是「選舉嘅承諾」，又指《國安法》生效後實際環境改變，黨亦「盡量做一啲事情令到自己成個主張係合法」，環境有變時不一定要實踐承諾。
+
+法官追問政綱提及罷免特首如何合法，又指《基本法》雖賦予權力，但不代表可以任意或無差別使用，鄭重申是要求特首就社運問責。鄭亦同意，「墨落無悔」提及的否決權並非港島協調會議共識，就提名表格稱支持區諾軒有份主導的協調共識，他沒有向區查詢，認為沒需要。
+
+就庭上早前披露區諾軒曾寫信予鄭達鴻，法官關注為何區這樣做，且明顯向鄭提供法律意見，鄭表示不清楚，與區諾軒亦不算好友，在被捕後無與區以書信聯絡。
+
+案件今續審。
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-07-06-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-the-wagner-mutiny.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-07-06-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-the-wagner-mutiny.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..62f8e255
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-07-06-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-the-wagner-mutiny.md
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "俄乌战争・瓦格纳兵变"
+author: "当代张敬轩"
+date : 2023-07-06 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/SzrHW1R.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "俄罗斯对乌克兰的侵略战争，目的是把作为德、法等帝国主义国家附属国的乌克兰的全部或局部重新纳入俄罗斯帝国主义的控制下，乃至于进一步变成殖民地。"
+---
+
+瓦格纳兵变已过去10天了，形势已经比较明朗。总的来看，这是一场统治集团内部的“政变”。兵变的目标当然不是为了推翻俄联邦现有统治阶级，甚至也不是为了推翻俄联邦现有统治集团，而是试图在统治集团内部进行洗牌。简单地说，瓦格纳集团老板普里戈任及其幕后的支持者们试图通过这次兵变夺取俄军的指挥权，控制住（而不是取代）普京，进而改组整个统治集团。
+
+
+
+### 瓦格纳集团
+
+普里戈任本来是苏联末期的一个游民无产者。1990年代，他在混乱的时局中作为圣彼得堡个体户通过灰色生意发家致富成为餐饮业、零售业和赌博业的老板，从而结识了圣彼得堡副市长普京。2000年普京成为俄联邦总统后，他也鸡犬升天，依靠承接政府合同，从一个普通资本家变成了食品业、媒体业为中心的垄断大资本家。2014年，在普京的支持下，他创立了私人雇佣兵组织瓦格纳集团，核心力量是一批极右翼的俄军情报机关、特种部队军官。显然，普京从当时斯特列科夫的活跃中，意识到了由国家机器在幕后操纵的私人雇佣兵组织在国际政治上的某种使用灵活性；同时，他又对斯特列科夫等政治上不完全依靠自己、具有某种独立性乃至不同意识形态的私人雇佣兵组织领袖产生了忌惮；因此，普京决定支持在政治、经济上依附于自己的普里戈任建立私人雇佣兵组织来为其服务。另一方面，普京这样做可能也是出于建立一种准私兵组织以制衡俄罗斯军部的考虑。在普京的支持下，瓦格纳很快发展为数千人的规模，在欧亚、非洲等地进行了一系列新殖民主义性质的帝国主义争霸战争，在驱逐英、法、美等帝国主义影响力并为俄帝谋取利益方面成功发挥了作用。
+
+虽然很早就卷入了俄乌之间的冲突（据称在2014年就有一个营的瓦格纳加入了乌克兰东部的分离主义暴动），不过2022年俄罗斯帝国主义侵略乌克兰的战争开始后，瓦格纳集团在初期的表现并不显眼。2022年夏天，随着俄军在前线的停滞，瓦格纳开始发挥更大作用。一方面，对于俄联邦军部失望的普京开始对瓦格纳集团给予更大的希望和支持；另一方面，瓦格纳集团也具有当时俄联邦正规军所不具备的一系列法律上的便利条件，比如说可以任意雇佣监狱内的囚犯为兵源。在普京的支持下，把法律约束较小的瓦格纳集团扩充为一支战场救火队迅速成了俄帝国家机器的一个选项。瓦格纳随之膨胀，从数千人的精锐部队迅速扩充为一支拥有数万兵力和坦克、重炮、防空导弹、直升机乃至战斗机的集团军级战役军团。到了2022年9月俄军在前线失利后，这一趋势变得愈加明显。瓦格纳集团开始承担起对巴赫穆特发起战役进攻的重任。
+
+随着旷日持久的巴赫穆特战役（长达10个月之久）的发展，瓦格纳集团的军事声望日益提高。到了2023年5月，瓦格纳集团以阵亡超过9000人（自报，通过讣告确认6000多人）的代价，夺取了巴赫穆特市大部分区域的控制权，然而其同国防部的矛盾也发展到顶点。伴随着瓦格纳的扩军，俄国国内各垄断资本也纷纷成立自己的私兵组织，严重威胁了俄联邦国防部的统一指挥能力，也带来了俄联邦国家机器四分五裂的风险，显然并不利于俄帝统治集团的整体利益；随着俄联邦逐步进入战时状态，这一现状更不能适应总体战的现实要求。2023年5月20日，瓦格纳宣布夺取巴赫穆特（其实始终有部分城区未能稳固控制）后离开前线转入休整，俄国防部趁机推出了整编计划，普里戈任和瓦格纳集团对国防部高层的批判也与日俱增。6月11日，俄国防部长绍伊古宣布要在7月1日以前彻底收编瓦格纳加入俄军，引起普里戈任和瓦格纳集团的激烈反弹。
+
+普里戈任面前的参照物是俄军2014—2017年强行整编乌克兰东部傀儡政权武装时那些被杀死的当地亲俄土豪小军阀，比如博洛托夫、莫兹戈沃伊等人，所以他绝不愿意放弃自己的私兵。在俄乌战争中不满绍伊古等人拙劣指挥的大批俄军军官，也成为普里戈任的支持者和内应。在此种情况下，普里戈任决定发动兵变。
+
+
+### 兵变
+
+2023年6月23日，普里戈任跟俄联邦国防部的矛盾发展到顶点。普里戈任公开宣布双方决裂，破口大骂俄战争借口站不住脚、二伪腐败、宣布战争是既得利益集团误导普京导致的，同时宣布俄军用导弹袭击瓦格纳营地、自己要起兵上莫斯科清君侧。俄当局宣布对普里戈任展开司法调查。
+
+2023年6月23日夜间，普里戈任开始兵变计划。6月24日凌晨，普里戈任率部完全控制了俄帝侵乌战争前线指挥中枢——南方军区司令部所在地——顿河畔罗斯托夫，占领了南方军区司令部和空军基地等军事设施。同时，瓦格纳集团的其他部队在沃罗涅日、利佩茨克州境内也发动了军事行动，占领了一些军事设施。其他的瓦格纳集团部队也离开乌克兰（俄占区）境内的基地，向俄联邦境内移动。瓦格纳集团基本上是兵不血刃就完成了这些军事行动，可见其在俄军内部有着大量的内应和支持者。
+
+俄当局一方，普京出面定性普里戈任的行动是军事叛乱和“犯罪”，并且吹起了1917年革命的狗哨。同时，俄当局开始动员俄联邦安全局（FSB，国家安全机关）和国民近卫军（相当于武警）麾下的武装以保卫莫斯科。瓦格纳随即作出了本题中的反应。
+
+随后，瓦格纳主力1500人开始向北进军，目标是莫斯科。沿途不断有原先已在沃罗涅日等地起兵的瓦格纳部队，甚至是俄军中的支持者，加入瓦格纳的队伍。而反观俄当局方面，除在沃罗涅日有小股的俄军空降兵部队、俄联邦安全局特种部队同瓦格纳部队交火外，就只是出动了直升机尝试打击瓦格纳部队，以及派遣民间人员挖断高速公路以拖延瓦格纳部队的速度。但是，瓦格纳部队未受什么影响，在高速公路上一路飙车，中午时分占领了沃罗涅日，随后继续北上利佩茨克、图拉，黄昏时分抵达莫斯科，此时兵力已达4000人左右。如上所述，瓦格纳部队沿途几乎未受抵抗，只是击落了7架俄军直升机/固定翼飞机，造成了俄军20余人伤亡。
+
+黄昏时分，瓦格纳部队前锋渡过了奥卡河，进逼莫斯科城郊。俄联邦当局匆忙调集车臣藩兵从乌克兰俄占区向顿河畔罗斯托夫进军，以围魏救赵，然而卡家军到了塔甘罗格后即被瓦格纳布设的地雷所阻止。俄联邦当局又调集了以国民近卫军为主的3万人防御莫斯科、圣彼得堡，然而此时军心民心都陷入了极为混乱的境地。不过，普里戈任期待中群起响应的局面也未发生，似乎偌大的俄国、上亿官民都陷入了“是老吏也，坐观成败”的境地。
+
+
+### 妥协
+
+莫斯科时间2023年6月24日晚20时30分左右，普里戈任宣布已经在白俄罗斯总统卢卡申科的斡旋下同普京当成协议，“为避免俄罗斯人流血”，下令停止向莫斯科进军，“重返兵营”。此时瓦格纳部队已经抵达了莫斯科的郊区。
+
+不过，此后几天内，博弈并未完全结束：
+
+2023年6月25日，瓦格纳部队从顿河畔罗斯托夫、沃罗涅日等此前占据的大城市撤出，但继续控制此前占据的部分军事基地。瓦格纳集团更宣布自己在6月24日的行动是“粉碎了试图把总统（即普京）赶下台的绍伊古—格拉西莫夫—佐洛托夫（大将，俄国民近卫军总司令）—基里延科（俄前总理，现任普京总统办公室第一副主任）叛国集团”。
+
+俄当局方面也还以颜色：以俄联邦总理米舒斯京为首的大批高官纷纷出面宣誓效忠普京、谴责瓦格纳兵变。俄罗斯最高检察院宣布没有停止调查普里戈津的叛国罪行。俄当局宣布罪犯只能跟国防部订立合同，不能再跟雇佣军（PMC）订立合同。国防部长绍伊古等人也重新出现在俄官方电视台的画面中，显示其地位依然稳固。
+
+2023年6月26日，普里戈任在白俄罗斯发表谈话，不再谈论推翻普京或者罢免四公敌了，宣布自己起兵的原因只是因为瓦格纳7月1日就要被强制关门，再加上瓦格纳对此前的一系列“不公”不满，所以跟西乡私学校一样要去莫斯科“告御状”；“没想到”沿途又受到迫害、攻击，不得已反击造成一些飞行员伤亡，他对此表示“遗憾”，宣布赔偿损失；最后，他为了“避免俄国人流血”决定从可以炮击莫斯科的位置上撤离，同时也是因为卢卡申科给了瓦格纳在白俄罗斯继续经营的机会。
+
+普京也发表公开讲话，宣布兵变已被镇压、普里戈津等组织者背叛了人民、有境外势力（乌克兰、北约）黑手；瓦格纳战士是忠诚勇敢的，但“不明真相、遭人利用”了；不过也因为他们战功赫赫，所以不会追究瓦格纳的责任；瓦格纳士兵可以选择被国防部收编或者前往白俄罗斯。
+
+2023年6月27日，形势基本明朗。
+
+俄当局停止了对普里戈任的政变罪行调查，理由是“犯罪中止”。
+
+白俄罗斯向瓦格纳集团提供了一个可以容纳8000人的兵营。瓦格纳部队的精锐骨干也在交出部分重武器后，开始向白俄罗斯有序转移。瓦格纳甚至还能在6月份的最后几天内继续在俄联邦境内招兵买马。未来瓦格纳作为一个实体似乎还能在白俄罗斯继续运转下去。
+
+另一方面，绍伊古出现在了普京对俄军“平叛”士兵的奖励现场，似乎稳固了自己的权势。另一位瓦格纳口中的四公敌之一、国民近卫军负责人佐洛托夫大将更是宣布国民近卫军粉碎了普里戈任的兵变，开始自吹自擂。其他俄当局要人如总理米舒斯京也纷纷露面怒斥瓦格纳的行为是叛乱，背后有西方势力策动。
+
+从这一过程来看，普里戈任之所以中途停止兵变，其实是在发觉俄军内自己的盟友未能如约响应自己并控制普京、判断瓦格纳部队就算进入莫斯科也无法控制局势的情况下，选择在俄当局满足瓦格纳集团最低要求（保留骨干、在白俄罗斯继续运营）后出卖同伙而独自求生。
+
+
+### 后续
+
+2023年7月初，随着普里戈任和瓦格纳集团的核心骨干前往白俄罗斯，瓦格纳集团在俄境内的招兵处被关闭。这样，在俄境内煊赫一时的“第二武装”瓦格纳集团，除骨干前往白俄罗斯继续经营其在俄境外的业务外，剩余力量（约2万名囚犯兵）多被俄军收编，算是宣告其落下了帷幕。
+
+经此一役，普里戈任虽然保存了力量，但其在俄联邦赖以起家的官商业务显然是做不下去了。俄国防部取消了后勤部门同普里戈任麾下企业的一系列承包合同，普里戈任被迫解散了其在国内的部分企业，业已导致数千人失业。后续普里戈任在俄国的官商帝国，显然会被进一步清算。
+
+虽然佐洛托夫大将等人宣布提前2天就掌握了瓦格纳兵变的消息，然而瓦格纳部队起兵后沿途畅通无阻、直抵莫斯科城下，显然是受到俄军内部相当一部分力量的支持、鼓励，甚至是早有预谋。既然定性此次兵变是军事叛乱、绍伊古等人也保住了权势，那么普里戈任固然暂时逃过一劫，但是俄军内的这些普里戈任支持者（乃至幕后黑手）就难免被俄当局一一秋后算账了。无论空天军总司令苏洛维金大奖等人是否在此之列，俄军内部的清洗显然正在紧锣密鼓的进行，而这又必然会对前线的战局造成不利影响。
+
+另一方面，虽然策划颠覆绍伊古、格拉西莫夫等旧军部的新军部势力因普里戈任退缩而失败，不过旧军部势力作为众矢之的也未必能够避免追责。第三方的新锐将领可能反而因此获得提拔。
+
+当然，兵变最大的影响还是打击了普京政权的权威。虽然兵变以闹剧收场，俄联邦得以用较小的代价完成对私兵的收编工作，重新统一军令，阻止国家机器的瓦解；然而普里戈任轻易起兵、沿途毫无阻拦，本身就向外暴露了国家机器的内部矛盾乃至失能。这对于普京政权而言，当然是一个巨大的打击。不过正如兵变最终失败所证明的那样，普京政权依然是“腐而不朽，垂而不死”，扫帚不到、灰尘不会自己跑掉，短期内依然具有巨大的惯性力量，是不会轻易被推翻的。
+
+
+### 外部影响
+
+普里戈任兵变发起时，正逢乌军发起反攻而又进展缓慢之际。这对于普里戈任来说，当然是选择了较好的时机。而对于乌克兰和西方来说，自然也是普里戈任给他们提供了一个机会。兵变发生后，乌克兰和西方列强一方面表示两方面（瓦格纳集团和俄当局）都是自己的敌人、同时对俄帝自陷困局加以嘲讽，另一方面也利用这个机会加强了自己的军事攻势。虽然没有取得什么大的突破，但也算取得了一些进展。
+
+伊朗、土耳其等国在政变中宣布支持俄当局，鼓吹要出兵平叛。其余一些大国和中亚等国则宣布这是俄国的内政。
+
+白俄罗斯的卢卡申科政权在兵变中发挥了自己独特的作用，得以收获瓦格纳集团这一支力量，得以在一定程度上制衡俄军，从而恢复了自身的部分自主性，可谓相当之大。
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-07-09-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk21.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-07-09-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk21.md
new file mode 100644
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-07-09-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk21.md
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "香港民主派47人初選案審訊第廿一周"
+author: "《獨媒》"
+date : 2023-07-09 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/zbWhmoh.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+#### 何啟明稱簽「墨落」仍可選是否否決財案 劉偉聰從不知初選綑綁當選後行為
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，16人否認「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，進入審訊第廿一周，參選九龍西的前深水埗區議員何啟明及劉偉聰均作供完畢，同參選九西的黃碧雲則不作供。
+
+其中何啟明表明支持並簽署「墨落無悔」聲明，認為聲明中「會運用基本法賦予立法會的權力」是指「一系列權力」，不限於否決財案，簽署者有選擇空間；而他本人無意無差別否決預算案。
+
+何又解釋選舉單張和論壇上「反抗極權」、「打倒共產黨」等，強調無意推翻政府，但信鄧小平說「共產黨是罵不倒的」。對於黨友施德來論壇提否決預算案，他指不代表民協立場，無澄清因「冇諗過會咁大鑊」。
+
+劉偉聰則表示他只曾出席首次九西會議，從不知初選要綑綁當選後行為。而他無簽署也無授權人簽署「墨落無悔」，不解名字為何出現於聲明上，他不認同亦沒提倡五大訴求。劉亦指自己不用WhatsApp，無收過組織者訊息，一度遭官質疑方便開脫。
+
+此外，兩人均表示無收過九西協調機制文件，無看過戴耀廷文章，理解計劃目標只是爭取立會過半。而何啟明接受盤問期間，法官陳慶偉一度表示法庭對政治無興趣，着控方毋須深究政治。
+
+
+▲ 劉偉聰（左）、何啟明（右）
+
+
+### 何啟明稱「墨落無悔」可選是否否決財案、支持聲明但無意無差別否決
+
+本周兩名參選九西的不認罪被告均完成作供，而黃碧雲則選擇不作供，意味該區案情完結。前民協副主席兼前深水埗區議員何啟明先作供，他2015年成為民協黨員並當選區議員，2016年成為副主席，形容民協是溫和民主的民生派政黨。
+
+控方對何啟明最主要的指控，是他曾簽署「墨落無悔」聲明，及其選舉單張和論壇有提及「打倒共產黨」、「反暴政」等字眼。何本周表示，民協讓候選人自行決定是否簽署「墨落」，他看過聲明內容後支持並簽署。
+
+何解釋，理解聲明提及的「共識」指辦初選、辦選舉論壇、以靈童制為替補機制、議席數目4點，並非否決預算案；而「我會運用基本法賦予立法會的權力」指「一系列權力」，如調動議程、修訂議案等，不限於否決預算案，簽署者有空間選擇是否用。何又指所有參選人當時「最大公因數」為用權迫特首回應五大訴求，但就否決財案有立場差異，故聲明旨在「求同存異」。
+
+何強調雖簽署了聲明，但他不會無差別否決預算案，仍要據預算案內容決定。法官和控方質疑其理解，又問他為何不另發聲明。何指民協支持者都不會支持無差別否決，「我有我嘅理解，我又明白民協嘅支持者會明白我嘅理解」，故不覺得需再澄清，他事後亦贏得初選。法官質疑何最終勝出或因簽署了聲明，何說：「我只能夠話呢個係你嘅分析，因為選民投票可以基於好多原因。」對法官質疑不寫「溫和派」聲明，何亦指是沿用聲明標題，又認為「溫和係做出嚟嘅，唔係自己講，民協係溫和係有往續可尋」。
+
+
+▲ 何啟明
+
+
+### 何解釋「反暴政」、「打倒共產黨」等言論 稱無意推翻政府、武裝革命始為推翻門檻
+
+何啟明本周亦花不少時間解釋選舉單張和論壇言論。就「反暴政 衛我城」單張，他指「暴政」是指政府不理會人民聲音，一意孤行實施《逃犯條例》，由得警察放催淚彈、用水炮車，港人面對強權要跨階層「Full counter」反擊；而「議會過半 民生革命」單張提「凡推倒政府的執政模式，都可謂之革命」，何稱無意推翻政府，僅推翻林鄭月娥執政模式，指林鄭政府疫情紓困措施不足，故意「撳低」港人生活、要靠政府過活。
+
+對於論壇提「打倒共產黨」，何啟明指是「憤慨之言」、對中共無兌現《基本法》承諾的批評，又指當時很多人講了數十年，《國安法》亦未實施，他相信鄧小平稱「共產黨是罵不倒的」。何又指他無意「打倒」，解釋如憤慨時講粗口，亦屬選舉語言。而何《國安法》後沒有收回言論，因理解《國安法》前的言行不會被追究。
+
+何亦曾指民協「唔會同呢個極權有咩嘢好傾」，何指「極權」是指港府而非中央，「中央政府唔會同我哋傾」；又解釋民協被罵「又傾又砌」多年，他要展示堅定民主派的形象，但認為政治本質仍避不了「傾」。不過何否認是表現得比實際上黃，指是「做返自己」。何亦曾提及要令立會成為政府及保皇黨「地獄」，解釋以往民主派是少數，被「熄咪、趕出會議廳」，望「建制派經歷返民主派經歷過嘅嘢」，但無意癱瘓政府。
+
+此外，何《國安法》後受訪提及「反抗極權」，他解釋認為不聽市民聲音的政府是「極權」，而抗爭是望香港成為「更公平公義社會」、制度更回應人民聲音；抗爭方法包括支持黃店等，但他無提過要「肢體衝突」和「推翻政府」，取得民主也不代表推翻政府。法官問，兩次否決預算案導致立會解散、迫特首下台不是推翻政府？何不認同，認為「武裝革命」才是推翻政府的門檻。
+
+何作供期間，法官陳慶偉一度表示法庭對政治無興趣，又在控方盤問時打斷指，法庭是決定法律問題而非政治議題對錯，雖案件涉政治，但不代表要深究政治。陳亦指，自己不認同何稱不聽人民聲音就是極權，但他沒有反駁何說的每句話。
+
+何亦承認，民協曾建議使用的「立會過半、光復香港」口號是他構思，解釋民協曾在深水埗區議會過半，知道過半功用，望將區議會經驗在立會實踐；又指「我係希望回復返香港以往嘅價值：自由、法治」。
+
+
+### 何指施德來稱否決財案不代表民協立場 無澄清因「冇諗過咁大鑊」
+
+而就何啟明的黨友、前民協主席施德來於九東論壇提到民協會兩次否決預算案、「攬炒政府」等，何表明不認同，認為是施個人看法，不代表他和民協立場；又指兩個選舉隊伍「各自運作」，論壇前無討論。何承認事後沒有問施為何這樣說、亦沒公開指其說法不代表黨，解釋當時忙於競選工作，也知道支持者理解民協往績、「心水清」分得清二人，而且「當時真係冇諗過會咁大鑊㗎嘛」。
+
+那民協有否討論否決預算案迫政府回應五大訴求？何表示民協重視民生，每次均據預算案內容討論，不會無差別否決，或因「老奉」而「冇認真討論都唔出奇」。他亦曾向助理指，民協不會隨便否決預算案。
+
+
+▲ 施德來（資料圖片）
+
+
+### 劉偉聰稱無簽「墨落無悔」無提倡五大訴求 無要求除名因免「選舉自殺」
+
+至於同為前深水埗區議員、本身是大律師的劉偉聰則表示，他對2019年的反修例運動同情、不滿《逃犯條例》修訂草案，在朋友邀請下參選區議會。他翌年年初收到不少鼓勵，開始考慮會否參選立會，並出席3月首次九西協調會議。至4月底，劉為2016年旺角衝突暴動罪成被告盧建民上訴失敗，令他更堅定參選，因認為《公安條例》的暴動和非法集結罪頗嚴苛，望入議會修訂法例。而劉原認為初選不民主，但兩名支持他的區議員改為支持另一人，他為免被視為「鬼」而決定參與。
+
+對於名字出現在「墨落無悔」聲明書，劉指他於九西論壇前數日才得悉，但他無簽署亦無授權人簽署，至今仍不知原因，他亦不同意聲明內容。劉又認為，聲明僅指當選後會運用憲制權力，但無說明必須用哪種權力；而本土派在聲明中較平時溫和，表明只會運用《基本法》賦予的權力，或想重塑理性合法的形象，爭取更廣闊光譜的支持。
+
+劉亦表示，他不認同也沒提倡五大訴求，指有些事是他可接受但不會參與。劉解釋對誰任特首不關心；要求撤銷控罪是邀請行政干預司法；亦認為要求特赦示威者同時要求追究警暴令他「不舒服」，應效法南非「真相與和解委員會」，讓雙方說出真相但不檢控追究；不反對雙普選但太遙遠。盤問時法官澄清，劉的立場是既不認同也不反對五大訴求。
+
+劉最終沒有要求名字從聲明移除，解釋不想被誤以為反對五大訴求，形同「選舉自殺」，但他競選期間也沒提倡五大訴求或表示支持聲明。劉又指，事後回看當然應要求除名，但引何啟明證供稱「我哋都唔知咁大鑊㗎嘛」，主控周天行表示：「那你現在知道了。」
+
+至於單張提「威權壓力」，劉稱是指特區政府和中央無維護一國兩制，但不是指整個政權、而是某些政策，他亦需正常運作的立法會才能修改法例。而就警方在他辦公室搜出初選論壇筆記，劉稱不知由誰準備、當時亦不知悉；就筆記提「法治已死」，劉表明「我從來不說『法治已死』」。
+
+劉並表示《國安法》頒布後，他任國安法首被告唐英傑代表律師，亦曾研讀條文，惟檢視選舉材料後認為沒有違法，故無改變立場並繼續參選，惟他唯一沒考慮自己會干犯串謀：「因當時我只是認為自己參與初選。」
+
+
+▲ 劉偉聰
+
+
+### 兩人均無收過協調文件、理解計劃目標僅爭立會過半 不綑綁當選後行為
+
+本案指控被告協議無差別否決預算案，以圖顛覆國家政權，不過何啟明和劉偉聰均供稱，理解否決預算案並非計劃目標，目標只是立會過半，他們無讀過戴耀廷有關「35+」的文章，也無收過九西協調機制初稿和協議文件及戴耀廷的相關訊息。
+
+其中劉偉聰稱他不看《蘋果日報》亦不看別人Facebook，直至收到控方文件夾才知道〈真攬炒十步〉一文，對戴耀廷倡「大殺傷力憲制武器」感意外；劉亦稱自己不用WhatsApp、無收過組織者訊息，由助理聯絡，遭官質疑是「方便的開脫理由」，劉覆問時明言這是他選擇的生活方式。
+
+就首次協調會議，二人均指戴耀廷有介紹運用否決權，劉並指戴提及要策略性投票才能勝出、亦提及九西目標議席，但肯定無提初選要綑綁當選後行為。至於有否傳閱文件，何啟明稱無，劉偉聰則沒有印象。劉亦指他會上曾表示初選可能不民主，但無人感興趣，離開時看不到任何共識達成，更像是「簡介」。
+
+至於第二次會議，劉偉聰指他並不知情，何啟明則指會上戴耀廷曾應張崑陽要求介紹「攬炒十步」文章，提及運用否決權，岑子杰表明反對，戴就解釋「會積極運用」是「可用可不用」。惟何指戴一直主張「攬炒」，故不信其解釋，他個人理解「會積極運用」比「會運用」更積極。何又確認會議無任何書面紀錄，指初選機制等事項簡單，無需文件也可討論。
+
+那兩人如何理解提名表格的意思？就「確認支持和認同由戴耀廷及區諾軒主導之協調會議共識，包括「『民主派35+公民投票計劃』及其目標」的條款，何啟明認為共識只是辦初選等4點，目標則是民主派立會過半，之後才爭取五大訴求。何亦指他不會用「任何」權力爭取，而是透過35+的「制衡」令政府與民主派商討。控方質疑實要用否決權的「共同武器」才能迫政府回應，何認為「唔一定」。
+
+至於劉偉聰則曾問助理「共識」指什麼，助理稱曾問民主動力，指共識是目標議席數量、初選後再決定派多少隊出選、用電子和實體票，及要求參選人幫忙找票站。劉並理解計劃目標只是策略性投票助民主派爭立會過半，不綑綁當選後行為。法官屢質疑劉為何沒有再確認，劉強調他當時只是認為自己參與初選，最重要的是目標議席和參選名單數。
+
+二人本周作供完畢後，原表示擬作供、同參選九龍西的黃碧雲決定不作供，料下周一由參選九龍東的前民協主席施德來作供。
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-07-16-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk22.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-07-16-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk22.md
new file mode 100644
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+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-07-16-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk22.md
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "香港民主派47人初選案審訊第廿二周"
+author: "《獨媒》"
+date : 2023-07-16 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/PmDeaOT.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+#### 施德來：論壇提否決財案為顯民協「進取」、要特首回應五大訴求為否決恰當原因
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，16人否認「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，進入審訊第廿二周，參選九東的民協前主席施德來作供完畢，下周將由參選新東的何桂藍作供。
+
+施表示，參選是望立會有重視民生聲音，但承認「冇乜勝算」，故參選亦是為增個人知名度和改善民協「騎牆、弱勢」的形象。而施原無想過否決預算案，直至6月「墨落無悔」出現令初選集中在政治議題，他為顯得進取而簽署「墨落」並附在提名表格政綱，並於初選論壇表明否決兩次預算案及「攬炒」林鄭和政府。
+
+施同意「墨落」騎劫了其他參選人，他受壓下表態，但認為聲明並無綑綁一定要否決預算案；又指雖多次稱會否決財案，但實際會跟隨民協審視內容才決定。法官質疑他欺騙選民，施否認，強調否決權僅談判籌碼，他不會說出底牌，而選民是望政府回應五大訴求，非真的想否決預算案，若看到他盡力爭取便不算欺騙。
+
+法官一度問以林鄭性格，她會否回應五大訴求，施指「就算佢對於五大訴求冇一樣應承都好，我認為佢最少欠香港人一個道歉」。施重提選舉論壇上曾數度說「我好鍾意香港」時，亦語帶哽咽。
+
+此外，施承認收到協調文件，雖否決權非共識仍「默許」，因他認同爭取五大訴求，亦真心相信否決權是《基本法》賦予。施引時任全國人大常委譚耀宗談《基本法》立法原意，指理解當立會與特首出現嚴重分歧，否決財案後解散立會重選便是解決憲政危機的機制，讓選民決定哪方合理。施亦認為《基本法》無寫明須基於財案內容才能否決，而要求特首回應五大訴求是否決財案的恰當原因。
+
+
+### 施稱民協宗旨包括擁護中國主權、參選望增個人知名度和改善民協形象
+
+本周九東唯一一名不認罪被告施德來作供完畢。施德來供稱，2005年進入民協工作，3年後加入民協，自2015年起當選兩屆黃大仙區議員，2016年成為民協主席，而民協宗旨包括擁護中國主權和落實一國兩制、促進民主和改善民生，及透過社會資源再分配改善基層生活。
+
+施指任區議員時一直與政府部門溝通協作，雖不滿時任特首林鄭月娥處理2019年社運的手法，但認為「民生好重要」，仍會與她聯絡反映民生意見；民協亦曾在2019年社運衝突變劇烈前聯署籲雙方冷靜。施在法官追問下指不知道2020年與政府理性溝通是否仍可行，但會盡力做。
+
+就參選的原因，施指2016年民協失去所有立法會議席，他望為民協「贏得返一個議席」，冀立會內有重視民生的聲音。但施亦承認自己「冇乜勝算」，故參選是望增加個人知名度和改善民協「騎牆」和「弱勢」的形象。
+
+
+### 施稱無印象會議討論否決財案、協調文件非共識但理解不綑綁否決
+
+就施德來出席的3次九東協調會議，他均無印象有討論否決預算案，並理解「五大訴求」並非初選最初目標，只是用來界定誰可參選的口號或界線。施並指無印象3月首次會議上有傳閱文件，而會後有收到協調文件初稿，但無運用否決權一點；直至第三次會議後於5月收到的最終版本，才提及「會積極運用基本法賦予立法會的權力，包括否決財政預算案，迫使特首回應五大訴求」，但他不知道是如何加入，亦不認為該點是共識。施是首名表明收到協調文件的被告。
+
+法官問戴耀廷是否在協議上「僭建」，施稱當時認為戴做法可商榷，但因他認同爭取五大訴求、認為是解決政府和市民矛盾很重要的癥結，亦認為「積極運用」無綑綁一定要否決的意思、真心相信是《基本法》賦予的權力，故「默許」該條款。
+
+施亦承認有讀過戴耀廷4月的〈真攬炒十步 這是香港宿命〉，但認為戴推論「好錯」，因不信中央和港府會大規模DQ議員和武力鎮壓。法官問他會否響起警號，戴利用初選實現自己的議程、跟隨戴會帶來危險，施指一直認為否決權只是談判策略和籌碼，而他個人對35+的願景，是望民主派立會過半，特首回應五大訴求紓緩政府與市民矛盾，亦看重民生項目。
+
+施強調，自己3月到6月中「完全冇」想過否決預算案，單張和橫額亦是宣傳失業援助金等民生議題，直至6月「墨落無悔」出現令初選集中在政治議題，並令包括運用否決權的討論「公眾層面化咗」，其部署也受到影響——由於予人保守感覺的民協在「政治浪潮」湧起時難獲支持，故他為選舉需要，要刻意營造「進取」形象引公眾關注討論和增加曝光，承認「企得硬咗」、參與了「鬥黃」，包括簽署「墨落無悔」和在選舉論壇使用選舉語言。
+
+
+### 施稱免被指輸打贏要受壓下簽「墨落」 放政綱顯進取、民動要求始交共同綱領
+
+與黨友何啟明一樣，施德來有簽署「墨落無悔」，不過施更進一步，多次在選舉論壇表明否決財案和「攬炒」、將「墨落」內容放在提名表格政綱，亦將九東「共同綱領」附在表格，均表明會或會積極運用否決權。
+
+就「墨落無悔」，施同意其否決權條款與九東協議文件相似，並將「會積極運用」改為較進取肯定的「會運用」，但他仍認為無綑綁一定要否決；施亦認同落敗要停止選舉工程。施解釋簽署聲明，因有指傳統民主派「輸打贏要」、初選落敗仍出選；而他事後將聲明放在政綱，是想常被指「左搖右擺」的民協形象顯得「進取一啲」。
+
+施盤問下進一步指，聲明目的是推動參選人「做一啲表態」，「逼緊我哋要好明確表示贏咗就選、輸咗就要停止選舉工程」，感覺受壓下簽署；他不認為聲明是初選參與者的共識，同意法官指聲明「騎劫」其他參選人。而與何啟明一樣，施稱民協交候選人自行決定是否簽署，施同意若兩人取態不一「會令人好困惑」，但「最終冇發生，亦都冇處理到」。
+
+施亦於提名表附上額外簽署的「共同綱領」，他指6月黃大仙區議員尤漢邦曾向他指要製作一份涉贏輸機制和五大訴求的公開聲明，要求參選人同意，他同意後獲提供文件；而他交表時原無附上，但在民主動力黎敬輝要求下簽名補交，他認為文件運用否決權條款非會上共識。
+
+
+▲ （資料圖片）
+
+
+### 施稱論壇提否決所有議案為「爆肚」、基層亦不滿政府提「有得談判」為政治自殺
+
+此外，施在《國安法》實施前和後的兩個九東選舉論壇上，亦曾提及民協會兩次否決預算案和要「攬炒」林鄭和政府等。他解釋當時初選集中在政治議題，故事前準備了熱門政治詞語如DQ和攬炒等，並有計劃地提否決預算案爭取五大訴求，表現得很強硬，令民協顯得更進取，但他事前無告訴何啟明或黨會這樣說。
+
+惟施稱提及要否決政府所有議案和撥款並非原有計劃，是因聽到胡志偉和譚得志發言後，認為要表現得更進取，臨場壓力下才「爆肚」，他事後看認為不合理，因他會爭取失業援助金等，「冇理由否決所有嘢」。
+
+而就論壇上否認「又傾又砌」、稱與中共無談判餘地，施指「我哋會做，但係唔會咁講」，強調他認同民協的談判手法，只是在當時社會氣氛，基層溫和的民主派也對政府不滿，民協表現也要接近民情，若他提「有得談判」如「政治自殺」，民協亦難以維持。法官問故他為保民協和其形象，說話時選擇不誠實？施同意，指當時相信這樣才可改善民協形象，他事後亦覺得成功顯得進取。
+
+至於「攬炒」，施指該字眼非戴耀廷「獨家」，不肯定其定義與戴是否相同，但他理解其意思是透過《基本法》50至53條的憲制程序，兩次否決預算案爭五大訴求，而「攬炒」雙方為民主派和林鄭：民主派在否決財案和立會被解散後會失去所有議席，不獲支薪半年並要花費搞選舉，損失很大；但若重選後仍否決預算案原案，特首便要辭職。
+
+施德來亦曾拍片介紹《香港革新論II》一書，以加泰隆尼亞為例，稱港人也「慢慢趨向爭取獨立」，不想北京和中共管治香港。施強調他和民協也反對港獨、亦非攻擊中央政府，只是談及港人在高壓打壓下萌獨立想法、以誇張表達港人憂慮民主自由空間收窄；而他想守護一國兩制的初衷，不想由北京「一國一制」直接管治香港。
+
+
+### 施指無意無差別否決遭質疑 稱僅屬談判籌碼不亮底牌、盡力爭五大訴求便不算欺騙
+
+雖然在多個場合表示會否決預算案，不過施德來表明，最終仍會跟隨民協機制，審視預算案內容和對民生影響再決定投票立場。法官質疑若施不預期勝出，便毋須用選舉語言，施指選舉很多時是政黨塑造形象的機會，會以選舉語言配合選舉處境，且若只講民生議題，傳媒不會報導。法官亦多番問民協只是表面抑或實際上也有改變，施強調民協的目標和宗旨，即重視溝通和與政府協作爭取的立場不變，只是想讓公眾覺得「進取咗」，同意其發言與民協和自己一貫做法不吻合。
+
+法官和控方亦屢質疑施所說的與實際會做的不符。施強調否決本身不能達致五大訴求，否決權屬爭取五大訴求的談判策略和籌碼，而選民是望政府回應五大訴求，並非真的想否決預算案，他不會向時任特首林鄭月娥說出底牌。
+
+法官質疑他欺騙選民、控方亦指他向公眾「講大話」，施不同意，指即使不否決財案也會與林鄭商討爭取五大訴求和民生議題，若選民看到他「盡咗力」就不算欺騙；又指預算案對香港整體重要，相信香港人有一定理性看待。法官陳慶偉問以林鄭性格，施認為她會回應五大訴求嗎？施表示：「就算佢對於五大訴求冇一樣應承都好，我認為佢最少欠香港人一個道歉。」
+
+而被問到論壇的發言是否均事前準備，施稱很多題目無法預料，是臨場應對，但「喺呢一個論壇我最主要講一句說話，喺呢度講咗幾次嘅，無論開頭結尾中間我都有，就係我好鍾意香港」。施說「我好鍾意香港」時語帶哽咽。
+
+
+### 施引譚耀宗談立法原意 稱《基本法》賦權否決、解散立會重選為解決憲政危機機制
+
+本周重點，亦落在施德來如何理解否決權為《基本法》賦予，他是至今為止就這方面闡釋最詳細的被告。施解釋對九東協調文件理解時，表示認為「基於不同原因」否決預算案是《基本法》賦予的權力，惟法官陳慶偉質疑，《基本法》無提可迫特首回應五大訴求，又問可否以不恰當的原因否決，並以議員受賄否決為例。施直言受賄已犯法，又指《基本法》無寫明議員須基於預算案內容才能否決。
+
+陳慶偉指，《基本法》賦予的權力須恰當及合法地運用，若否決原因不恰當便非恰當運用權力，正如法官有很多權力但不能隨意判人有罪無罪，施則稱認為要求特首回應五大訴求是恰當的原因。不過當辯方翌日追問五大訴求有否違法，法官陳仲衡即指本案非關乎五大訴求是否合法，而是爭取訴求的手段是否合法，法官李運騰亦指五大訴求是否不合法或無理也可開放辯論。
+
+施續解釋他對《基本法》賦予立法會否決權的理解，是源自時任全國人大常委譚耀宗2020年3月專訪，及戴耀廷5月兩篇文章。施指譚曾任《基本法》起草委員，會明白條文起草原意，而就否決財案後特首可解散立會、立會重選後仍拒通過特首便須辭職的條文，譚於訪問稱原意是讓選民透過重選決定特首抑或議員合理。
+
+施指理解到當立法會與特首出現嚴重分歧，《基本法》第50到53條就是一個解決憲政危機的機制，透過重選立法會解決憲政危機，「由選民決定係特首啱、定係當時嘅泛民立法會議員啱，邊一邊比較合理」。施亦引曾任《基本法》諮詢委員的戴耀廷提及，《基本法》列出否決財案後的安排是預先設計了立會與特首嚴重分歧的解決方法，即交由選民決定，而即使解散立會，特首仍可批准臨時撥款維持政府一般運作，《基本法》亦無規定只能基於預算案內容否決。
+
+
+▲ 施德來作供完畢後，與民協主席廖成利（右）步出法院。
+
+
+### 施稱初選後停選舉工程、唯一承諾為「贏輸機制」 官關注發帖撐出線者或推動串謀
+
+就《國安法》頒布後的情況，施德來稱新法頒布當晚閱畢條文，審視後認為民協會章和初選言論均無牴觸法例，他亦有諮詢黨內律師廖成利、及收到戴耀廷訊息，相信戴稱初選和否決預算案不違法，亦看不到戴有顛覆國家意圖。施亦有看時任政制及內地事務局局長曾國衞7月9日訪問稱初選或違國安法，但同日戴耀廷召記招及發聲明回應，施認為戴稱初選合法的說法合理，亦信從事選舉實務十多年的趙家賢稱初選是合法公民權利，指認識趙是「穩陣嘅人」。
+
+施最終於初選落敗，承認自己「落選亦都好低票」，並發「感謝文」稱停止選舉工程和全力支持勝出者。施確認落敗便停止選舉工程是「墨落無悔」和協調文件的共識，而初選由頭到尾只有「贏輸機制」一個承諾。至於稱支持他人，施形容是「客氣說話」、「想顯得好睇」，法官關注其帖文促進35+計劃目的，施指落敗不參選的確有助民主派立會過半，但發帖時無此想法，而九東勝出者亦無找他助選，「可能我低票得滯啦」。
+
+法官陳慶偉並關注，施《國安法》後的帖文和論壇言論或屬「共謀者原則」下推動串謀的言行，在共謀者原則的應用下或有影響。
+
+施德來作供完畢後，將展開新東辯方案情，由何桂藍先作供，該區另涉5名不認罪被告，依次為人民力量陳志全、「墨落無悔」發起人鄒家成、民主黨林卓廷、社民連梁國雄及區政聯盟柯耀林。
+
+此外，法官本周亦表示料所有辯方案情能於8月底完成，辯方提出預留9月最後兩星期進行結案陳詞。
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_heros/2006-03-01-CNT-AIT-a1_l-anarcho-syndicalist-tactics.md b/_collections/_heros/2006-03-01-CNT-AIT-a1_l-anarcho-syndicalist-tactics.md
new file mode 100644
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+++ b/_collections/_heros/2006-03-01-CNT-AIT-a1_l-anarcho-syndicalist-tactics.md
@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title: "无治工团主义者策略"
+author: "CNT-AIT"
+date: 2023-03-01 12:00:00 +0800
+image: https://i.imgur.com/OEHXE5a.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+position: left
+---
+
+任何一场战斗，都必须从几个关键思想开始。以下文字是帮助人们发现、提醒自己或普及各种工团主义的斗争方法：
+
+
+
+___比敌人更狠地打击敌人，令他们无法还击则更好。___
+
+___分析力量平衡：___
+
+- 我们有多少人
+
+- 其他工人和普通民众有多少会同情或拒绝我们的斗争
+
+- 我们的财务限制是什么：可用于继续战斗的财力和物力资源
+
+___要避免劳累。___
+
+一开始就拼命斗争可能是一个错误，因为雇主可以准备通过转移生产、异地恢复生产、维持库存、使用工贼、资金储备等方式来克服短期困难。
+
+___要知道如何停止战斗。___
+
+在不利的情况下尽可能避免战斗到最后。在企业中持续的少部分人占主导最终会为老板提供可以反对罢工者的不满的人。在此期间失去的薪水数量变得如此之大，以至于恢复斗争变得困难。部分工人对于幻想的破灭使动员工人更加困难。
+
+___要回归斗争或诉求。___
+
+___分析参与力量的历史、战略和目标：___
+
+- 老板–工人：温和或强硬的雇主，好斗或被动的雇员
+
+- 组织–斗争：工会是软弱还是激进，斗争是否受益于自主经验等
+
+
+### 斗争由工种、地域或内容定义
+
+工种：非技术工人、技术工人、邮政工人或护士、白领、教师、技术人员等的斗争……称为部门斗争。如果斗争涉及整个公司或机构并处理所有员工的索赔，则斗争是工业性的。
+
+地域：如果斗争发生在企业的一个特定地点，那就是局部斗争。例如，伟世通。团体级别的战斗发生在多个地方，但在同一家公司内，例如，邮政罢工。斗争可能发生在一个部门或行业，例如，卫生部门或教育部门。斗争可以发生在所有业务线和站点。
+
+内容：斗争可以是物质的（工资、养老金、工作条件、时长、健康和安全）、政治的（修改法律、批评反社会政策、获得新的工会权利、形成公司内工人反抗力量……）。当然也可以将两方面结合起来，例如对给定行业的等级和资格的简化和标准化。这种物质要求使同一行业的工人团结起来，从而开启了更大斗争的前景。
+
+战斗也可以简单结合其他斗争进行。
+
+
+### 斗争的不同类型
+
+口头抗议：这种斗争是最简单的。
+
+请愿：书面谴责、投诉、表达愿望、不赞成。有时，请愿可以通过向社会施加影响以获得一系列利益，但是内容或口号通常是虚幻的、虚无的或煽动性的（通过诉诸言论来获得政治权力）。一些已经或希望几乎不做事或什么都不做的工会为了选举或避免良心不安而参与请愿。
+
+快闪罢工：最多停止活动几个小时。停工表达更大的不满，促成某种激进主义的诞生。停工被用作就短期或小额索赔进行谈判的压力。例如，缺乏通风或供暖、休息、奖金问题、安全设备问题等。
+
+局部罢工：工人轮流停工。优势：在公司实际上处于瘫痪状态并且公司仍然向现在生产力较低或确实闲置的员工支付工资的情况下，个人的工资损失最小。雇主尽量让不罢工的员工、主管、机构工作人员或承包商投入工作，如被证明还是不够，可能会关闭公司一段时间，将工人拒之门外，而不是付钱请人赋闲。
+
+怠工：降低速度或努力使工作变得尽可能低效。
+
+按章办事：过分严格遵守指示和规定，妨碍工作的正常运作。
+
+有限罢工：工人停止工作一段时间。
+
+无限期罢工：员工停止工作，直到资本家解决冲突中的问题（或以其他方式决定返回）。
+
+- 优势：表达一定程度的激进化，参与斗争，阻止全部或部分生产。
+
+- 缺点：罢工工人的工资损失很大。公司可能会继续使用非罢工工人、合同工进行生产，或者他们可能会将生产转移到另一个地点。
+
+纠察警戒：设置障碍以防止非罢工工人进入工作场所。纠察队的物质条件往往很糟糕——没有庇护所，受天气影响。一些非罢工工人有时设法进入场所或留在里面以确保继续生产。
+
+占领：罢工工人占领工作场所并疏散所有非罢工工人，控制会议室、食堂、宿舍、复印机、电话和车辆。
+
+- 内部行动：仅限于公司内部，仅限于机构内部。
+
+- 外部行动：侵入并占领有利于雇主的机构、建制、行政或政府部门——劳动和养老金部、法院、市政厅、本地政治办公室、报社总部、商会、管理层的生活区，或生产已转移到的公司或与冲突有关的公司。
+
+斗争应寻求获得公众的支持和串联，解释诉求，并尽可能避免打扰其他工人和公众。
+
+本地示威：宣传冲突，普及斗争，保持压力，帮助评估力量平衡。
+
+全国或国际示威：遵循与本地示威相同的规则，但规模较大。
+
+谣传：散布谣言和各种信息以削弱敌人。
+
+毁誉：公开批评企业产品或设施的质量。
+
+破坏：这种古老的战斗方法快速而直接。它仍被实践，但没有公开化。它应该由意识到风险的人来处理。灾难性的破坏甚至可能导致公司倒闭。也许采取一定规模的行动可以避免重大问题。破坏对罢工者来说非常有效，成本低，但对雇主的伤害很大。永远记住，该行动必须对雇主有害，而不是对用户有害。例如，公用事业、交通、电力、医疗保健、食品……
+
+重新占有：工人收回和控制公司生产的产品——即工人自己生产的产品。
+
+出售库存：（未经授权）出售公司库存以建立战争基金并补偿工人。
+
+自治生产：罢工者使用公司的机器生产可以以较低成本直接出售给人民的商品。这将使每个人都满意，并为罢工者带来资金。
+
+自主工作：罢工者（未经授权）使用自己的工具修理、制造或向个人收费提供服务。所得款项将投入罢工基金。（例如，雷恩的理发师，在公共广场为人们剪头发。在澳大利亚，电车司机为民众免费运行电车。）
+
+抵制：响应斗争工人的诉求，人们不购买该公司提供的产品或服务。
+
+公民不服从：拒绝遵守国家法律。例如，支持和帮助受压迫的人。拒绝纳税、拒绝出示身份证明等。
+
+全面罢工：影响一个地区、国家或多个国家的一个或多个生产（或商业）部门的罢工情况。
+
+总罢工：跨越地区、国家或国际部门的罢工。这是一种有意识的、协调一致的行动，与普遍罢工不同。它是无治工团主义者渴望和捍卫的武器。这是群众、民众的行动，无论他们是否理解，他们都成为了无治工团主义者。事实上，在这个阶段，人们想要并准备与他们的对手作战和挑战。他们不依赖政府选举或对未来的承诺来实现改革。人民斗争，此时此地，依靠直接行动，打算解决他们的诉求。总罢工清楚地表达了对立阶级的冲突。如果它很大，则力量平衡是有利的，可能会出现新的选择。
+
+起义总罢工：罢工者出于各种原因形成路障，制造混乱和骚乱。到处都是人民武装起来，开辟了消灭资本家的前景。
+
+没收生产资料总罢工：罢工者，街头的主人，夺取生产、交换和通讯的资料。企业、商业、政府都在斗争委员会的控制之下。这是一场深刻的社会变革的前奏，在我们看来，这将导致无治共产主义（自由的共产主义）。
+
+
+### 一些忠告
+
+工团主义历史和实践中提出了许多斗争技巧。每个人都有必要判断它们的用处。每种手段都必须与投入相匹配。没有必要为了小利而动用沉重的手段。例如，对于一场小规模的斗争，快闪罢工、局部罢工、怠工和按章办事就足够了。
+
+应用技术后，对其进行评估。如果它被证明是不够激进的，应当转变成一个更激进的方法。始终保持施加压力。从太高水平开始并后退可能会暴露或被认为是敌人可以利用的弱点。
+
+谨防虚假激进分子：考虑那些传播激进主义的人是否真诚（即使他们当时所说的话是正确的）。有些人挺身而出，推动不合适的冲突，他们努力宣传以坚持并赢得罢工者的信任，最终取消运动或扼杀战斗，或者他们知道失败是肯定的，他们希望利用他们在选举中获得的信任来欺骗工人。如果他们与敌人勾结，工人将开始一场艰苦且最终注定失败的斗争，这将在老板稍后攻击（重组，裁员等）时变得沉重，因为之前的失败将使工人难以还击。
+
+分析权力关系：例如，即将举行的工会或政治选举将迫使各方避免冲突。
+
+分析公众的不满程度，以及罢工行动所在公司的财务和经济状况。
+
+分析公司持有的库存状况，如果有大量库存，雇主将继续出售产品，同时因罢工而减少工人工资。相比之下，低水平的库存或易腐烂的库存将对雇主造成很大的不利影响。请注意，罢工后雇主可能会试图强制增加加班时间，以弥补罢工期间遭受的损失并赶上延迟的订单。
+
+查看即将到来的订单的状态、财务储备的范围、将生产转移到其他地点的可能性。我们可以通过结合使用各种手段来为战斗打下基础，例如，放慢速度、有限罢工、破坏活动、按规定工作或旷工以减少生产。
+
+确保采取行动的人的身份仍然未暴露，避免报复。确保雇主尽可能少地知道谁是谁，谁做了什么。模糊参与冲突的人数，以及会议的日期和地点。同意在最后一刻采取行动以避免披露。
+
+选择一个比工会分支机构更广泛的罢工委员会。罢工委员会必须由罢工者大会产生并受其领导。
+
+倍增你的行动基础：媒体、宣传、金融、独立制作和未经授权的支持工作。此举迫使敌人利用更多的资源来打击罢工。
+
+在大会上实行直接民主，避免小团体为大会决定以外的目的而夺取控制权。当人们提倡先锋党或工会时，需要密切关注：即使合法也不能为人民利益服务。如果怀疑有阴谋或闭门会议，请记录并报告。
+
+派人去跟老板、董事或者董事会谈判是没有用的。派工作人员代表或“专家”参与谈判也无济于事。他们除了让你相信他们，并赋予你责任，说服人们相信改革派工会的必要性之外，没有任何用处。资产阶级知道如何使用工具来分析动乱。例如，生产放缓或质量下降、旷工和破坏行动增加。雇主很快就会明白工人不高兴，即使他们试图否认或隐藏这一点。管理层知道申诉以及它将向工人提出什么建议，派代表是无用的。
+
+向新闻界、民众和雇主发送一份由罢工委员会签署的诉求清单。
+
+如果雇主想谈判或提出满足某些诉求，他们可以通过媒体公布他们的建议，在报刊上发表，通过张贴通知或在集会上与工人交谈。委员会将以书面形式作出回应。没有必要派代表参加谈判，他们可能会对财富的诱惑感到满意，或者会捍卫自己的想法，而不是停留在诉求的议程上，特别是如果他们是改革派工会的代表。
+
+迫使对手签署协议，在冲突后不进行镇压。要求为罢工日支付工资。尽量减少冲突对员工的财务影响，这样如果管理层决定反击，员工不会被削弱，而且可以带来新一次冲突。
+
+举一反三，筹集资金，举办音乐会和节庆日，以获得对战斗的财政支持。采取行动为战斗寻求物质支持。
+
+
+### 合法主义–非法主义
+
+应该尽可能地规避法律以避免压制。但我们应该注意到，法律并不支持我们的利益。很快，工人为了实现他们的目标不得不采取非法行动——纠察队、占领、独立生产。但我们需要冷静分析其优势和影响。很快就会发现，被国家合法化的法律不是中立的，首先是为资产阶级的利益服务的。
+
+基于巴枯宁“法律只是反映以武力为后盾的现状”的思想，我们强加的将会成为合法的。
+
+
+### 暴力–非暴力
+
+情况并不一定非此即彼，它可能是大型的非暴力斗争伴随着偶尔发生的暴力事件，反之亦然。
+
+有时，一个非暴力的坚决的冲突可能是有效的，有时则不是。一场行为良好的大型抗议可能会很有效，但吵闹的抗议可以更加有效。这是一个情景和斗争参与者选择的问题。
+
+但是，要小心暴力和挑起暴力的人（无论是罢工者还是他们的对手）。
+
+无治工团主义者支持一个没有暴力、没有武器的世界——这是我们的目标。但我们也看到，员工的积极抵抗可能是对资产阶级暴力的合法暴力——镇压、监狱、剥削、裁员、战争、污染……
+
+
+### 自我组织
+
+我们现在必须考虑适合战斗的组织类型。工会主义者左派是捍卫工人的利益还是其他利益？它是否在不引入有利于资产阶级的和解和调解模式的情况下为斗争做准备，为斗争辩护？它能平息斗争吗？可以激进化吗？工会代表的法律保护有效吗？公认的工会能保证工会成员的保护吗？
+
+显然，考虑到成千上万的工会成员被解雇，答案是：不。在任何情况下，无论是否被认可、是否受到法律保护，参与非法行动都会使您面临裁员风险。因此，法律保护在这种情况下是无用的。
+
+更糟糕的是，试图通过法律手段保护自己导致这些方法的支持者遵守有利于雇主的法律，不参与法律框架之外的斗争，从而捍卫资产阶级合法性成为反革命。
+
+进行双重谈判：合法面目却非法行事是不可持续的，因为工会官员将有义务自觉或不自觉地捍卫法律框架，在加强自己的同时削弱批评者，以维持他们享有的法律保护。此外，当法律框架保护某些个人时，很难被拒绝。
+
+而且不要怀疑：如果斗争威胁到资产阶级的地位，他们将无视法律，工会官员将不得不反思他们在法律下的所谓权利。
diff --git a/_collections/_heros/2023-06-10-SamAltman-a1_r-artificial-intelligences-safety-and-alignment.md b/_collections/_heros/2023-06-10-SamAltman-a1_r-artificial-intelligences-safety-and-alignment.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..5eb5a2f4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_heros/2023-06-10-SamAltman-a1_r-artificial-intelligences-safety-and-alignment.md
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title: "人工智能安全与对齐"
+author: "Sam Altman"
+date: 2023-06-10 12:00:00 +0800
+image: https://i.imgur.com/scxsBgP.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "编译自2023年6月10日OpenAI创始人Sam Altman首次对中国观众发表视频连线演讲。"
+position: right
+---
+
+随着人工智能日益强大，全球合作从未如此重要。我们需要共同努力，寻找共性来推进通用人工智能（AGI）安全。
+
+
+
+如果我们不小心，一个旨在改善公共卫生结果的错位的人工智能系统，可能会提供没有根据的建议，从而扰乱整个医疗保健系统。同样，为优化农业生产而设计的人工智能系统，可能会因为缺乏对影响粮食生产的长期可持续性这种环境平衡的考虑，无意中耗尽自然资源或破坏生态系统。
+
+
+### AGI治理
+
+AGI从根本上成为了改变我们文明的强大力量，突显出有意义的国际合作和协调的必要性。每个人都会从合作治理方法中受益。如果我们安全、负责任地驾驭这条道路，AGI系统可以为全球经济创造无与伦比的经济繁荣，解决气候变化和全球健康安全等共同挑战，并提高社会福祉。
+
+我也深深地相信在未来，我们需要在AGI安全方面进行投资，才能到达所想要达到的地方，并在那里享受它。
+
+要做到这样我们需要认真协调。这是一项具有全球影响力的全球技术。不计后果的开发和部署所造成的事故成本将影响到我们所有人。
+
+国际合作中，我认为有两个关键领域是最重要的。
+
+首先，我们需要建立国际规范和标准，并注意过程中注重包容性。在任何国家使用AGI系统，都应平等而一致地遵循这样的国际标准和规范。在这些安全护栏内，我们相信人们有足够的机会做出自己的选择。
+
+其次，我们需要国际合作，以可核查的方式建立对安全开发日益强大的AI系统的国际间信任。我并不妄想这是一件容易的事，这需要投入大量和持续的关注。
+
+《道德经》：千里之行，始于足下。我们认为，在这方面最具建设性的第一步是与国际科学和技术界合作。
+
+需要强调的是，我们应该在推动技术进步这一方面增加透明度和知识共享的机制。在AGI安全方面，发现新出现的安全问题的研究人员们应该为了更大的利益分享他们的见解。
+
+我们需要认真思考如何在鼓励这种规范的同时，也尊重和保护知识产权。如果我们这样做，那么，它将为我们深化合作打开新的大门。
+
+
+### AI对齐和安全研究
+
+更广泛地来讲，我们应该投资于促进和引导对AI对齐和安全的研究。
+
+在OpenAI，我们今天的研究主要集中在技术问题上，让AI在我们目前的系统中充当一个有帮助且更安全的角色。这可能也意味着，我们训练ChatGPT的方式，使其不做出暴力威胁或协助用户进行有害活动的举措。
+
+但随着我们日益接近AGI的时代，没有对齐的AI系统的潜在影响力和影响规模将成倍增长。现在积极主动地解决这些挑战，能将未来出现灾难性结果的风险降到最低。
+
+对于目前的系统，我们主要利用人类反馈进行强化学习来训练模型，使其成为一个有帮助的安全助手。这只是各种训练后调整技术中的一个例子。而且我们也在努力研究新的技术，其中需要很多艰苦的工程工作。
+
+从GPT-4完成预培训到部署，我们专门花了8个月的时间来进行对齐方面的工作。总的来说，我们认为我们在这方面做得很好。GPT-4比我们以前的任何模型都更加与人类对齐。
+
+然而，对于更先进的系统，对齐仍是个未解决的问题，我们认为这需要新的技术方法，同时增强治理和监督。
+
+未来的AGI系统，可能会有10万行二进制代码。人类监督者不太可能发现这样的模型是否在做一些邪恶的事情。所以我们正在投资一些新的、互补的研究方向，希望能够实现突破。
+
+一个是可扩展监督。我们可以尝试使用人工智能系统来协助人类监督其他人工智能系统。例如，我们可以训练一个模型来帮助人类监督发现其他模型的输出中的缺陷。
+
+另一个是解释能力。我们想尝试更好地了解这些模型内部发生了什么。我们最近发表了一篇论文，使用GPT-4来解释GPT-2中的神经元。在另一篇论文中，我们使用Model Internals来检测一个模型何时在说谎。我们还有很长的路要走。我们相信，先进的机器学习技术可以进一步提高我们解释的能力。
+
+最终，我们的目标是训练AI系统来帮助进行对齐研究。这种方法的好处是可以随着AI的发展速度而扩展。
+
+获得AGI带来的非凡好处，并同时降低风险，是我们这个时代的开创性挑战之一。我们看到中国、美国以及世界各地的研究人员有很大的潜力来共同实现同一个目标，并致力于努力解决AGI对齐带来的技术挑战。
+
+如果我们这样做，我相信我们将能够利用AGI来解决世界上最重要的问题，并极大地改善人类的生活质量。
+
+
diff --git a/_collections/_heros/2023-06-16-SlavojZizek-a1_c-we-are-already-in-the-middle-of-the-apocalypse.md b/_collections/_heros/2023-06-16-SlavojZizek-a1_c-we-are-already-in-the-middle-of-the-apocalypse.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..84e1768d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_heros/2023-06-16-SlavojZizek-a1_c-we-are-already-in-the-middle-of-the-apocalypse.md
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title: "我们已在末日中"
+author: "Slavoj Zizek"
+date: 2023-06-16 12:00:00 +0800
+image: https://i.imgur.com/MiyQ3Qr.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "迈克尔·赫斯（Michael Hesse）：齐泽克先生，世界快完蛋了，我们还在只谈不做。我们是不是需要更多美德，才能拯救自然？"
+position: center
+---
+
+卡尔·马克思写过：他们不知道自己在做什么，但他们还是做了。彼得·斯洛特戴克《犬儒理性批判》中也改写道：他们很清楚自己在做什么，但他们还是做了。今天，我们正在经历某种恋物癖式的否认：言不由衷地说一些东西。
+
+
+
+我不喜欢威尼斯双年展或卡塞尔文献展上的各种项目。你能在那里发现所有种类的政治正确：啊我们反欧洲中心主义，啊我们反殖民主义，啊我们都是资本的奴隶。但这意味着什么呢？没有任何意义，身份政治和取消文化是排除机制。确切来说，这些双年展恰恰代表着我们今天正在经历的事情：人们只说不做。
+
+我是强迫症的典型。我想避免一些事情，不让它发生。我做过一次精神分析，一共和分析师见了五、六次。我疯狂地说话，表现得极为亢奋，为的只是不给分析师时间向我提出真正的问题。我说话的目的，是为了确保什么事情也不会发生。2021年在格拉斯哥举行的气候变化大会的情况，那是一模一样。说得很厉害，却什么也没变，我们在不做出任何改变的情况下大说特说。甚至最激进的自我批评，也成了一张免费门票：只要你骂自己几句，那你就可以和以前一样该干嘛干嘛。
+
+我们正走向一场全球性的灾难。我看到了末日四骑士：AI、移民、全球变暖、战争会带来什么？我的悖论就在于此：面对末日的正确方式不是说我们还有选择，而是把末日当作事实来接受，因为如果我们只是观望、等待的话，那我们就输了。所以，我们应该行动。
+
+我在历史中看不到进步。我们不能再随波而流了，我们要踩刹车。达成目标的方式不是反资本主义，但必须有控制，就像在战时资本主义中那样。
+
+大国在以错误的方式做正确的事情。在一代之后，人们对资本主义的活力充满热情，但（它可能带来的）社会动荡让人望而却步。怎样才能把活力和稳定结合起来呢？二代相信，他找到了答案。但许多人说，他从共走向了法。在二代垂死时，有人问他：你最大的成就是什么？他说，是那个事情，党派必须掌权。他就是这么干的。大国能挺过金融危机因为它不完全民主。五代下，大国变成了新极权主义。但对于问题，他们看得比我们更清楚。今天的主要任务，是以一种非法西斯主义的方式控制资本主义。
+
+我不再相信多党制了。我们需要更多的公权力来摆脱气候陷阱。
+
+“自由的敌人不配有自由。”我很欣赏罗伯斯庇尔。令人惊奇的是，在上断头台前两个月，他就知道自己完蛋了。我最近读到，实际上丹东真像罗伯斯庇尔一直声称的那样被英国佬收买了。这惊到我了。
+
+（海德格尔把人描述为灾难。）黑格尔也想到了灾难。在猿猴发展的过程中，有什么东西搞错了，这才有了我们？那是一场意外。不过，在这点上，我依然是一名老派的马克思主义者：我认为真正的出路是灾难。对我来说，灾难依然具有某种净化作用，它把我们归零，还原至某种零状态。与其说改变我们的行为，不如说改变我们自身。
+
+有时候什么也不做会更好，但有时候，你得用尽全力，这时，小的、精确执行的行动才是最好的。会带来奇迹。把目光转向美国，我欣赏伯尼·桑德斯。他代表包容的观念，他通过自己的政治获得人心。相较之下，取消文化和认同政治/身份政治在排除人。但我们需要更加激进的措施。看看伊朗，女性的起义，那是个奇迹。那里爆发了某种非常特别的东西。这是真正的女性主义，不是那种使我们极化对立的女性主义。伊朗的例子说明了我们可以做什么。
+
+（我不断呼吁要建立全球制度。）我称之为战时共产主义。别误会！我们不需要新的中央委员会。不应该搞鼓励腐败的全球性世界国家，我们需要真正的全球合作。在美加，气温升到了50度以上，不是因为在那里生活的人，而是因为不受这些国家直接影响的，极地漩涡的干扰。我们必须控制市场，就像我们在紧急状态下在其他领域做的那样。在英国，有鉴于该国的医保紧急状况，据说，应该像对待战争一样来应对这个危机。应该使用市场，但要有所管制，在国家的控制下用。
+
+（可能有一个充满恶意的精灵，有一个恶灵一直在欺骗我们，通过伪装组织我们行动。）像笛卡尔在谈到他的根本怀疑的时候说的那样，我怎么知道不是一个恶灵在欺骗我呢？我们在世界上的处境就是这样：我们怀疑大他者、科学、智慧、宗教。我们需要一种象征性的集体自杀。当黑格尔描述主体性最深处的内容的时候，他说到了世界之夜，意思是神秘主义。末日的威胁一直伴随着我们。黑格尔说，精神一开始是在空无之中。我们的理性绝望地试图把握真理之核。黑格尔的推测就是我们的现实。对他来说，是疯狂，在基本的本体论层面上构成了每个人的精神。今天我们到处都可以体验到这样的疯狂。我们必须直面失去理智的危险，跨过零点。我们必须继续走到头，因为为了活下去，我们必须从根本上改变迄今为止一直美丽的生活。
+
+几年前斯洛特戴克创造了一个奇妙的词：客观的社会民主。在被问到在他看来，二战后的最大成就是什么的时候，他回答说：客观的社会民主。这意味着以某种社会契约的形式确立的成就——社会民主的规范变成了我们宪政现实的一部分，比如说，医保系统或自由教育、福利国家。没人能挣脱它。我和斯洛特戴克关系不错，我们道不同，但他真不像某些人说的那样是个右翼思想家。我记得在瑞典的社会民主党败给奥洛夫·帕尔梅领导的右翼党后的几年里，基本上什么也没变。右翼依然在这条客观的社会民主道路上走，依然采取同样的福利国家政策。民主需要社会契约。问题是，在一个反民主的时代，怎样拯救这些成就。你们危险了。
+
+川普说的相当清楚了，要是他输了以后的选举，他是不会认的。他公开使用内战的语言。还记得布什跟戈尔在弗洛里达州计票后的争端么？当时每个人都接受重新计票后的结果，而在今天，这种情况不再可能了。意识形态家班农想从右翼那边突破美国体制，他把自己描述为今天的列宁。大政治场域中的边界也在变化。莎拉·瓦根克內希特为普京的行动正名，然后，AfD很快就邀请她加入了。如果你认为风马牛不相干的就凑不到一处的话，那你就错了，因为他们就是凑到了一起。不管怎么说，我是不太理解。
+
+人们声称自己有权利为了自己祖国所谓的利益而把灵魂卖给恶魔。川普说选举是非法的，我们有权利拯救宪法。如果以后选举的结果不合他的意，他就不想承认。普京也知道自己在做什么，他认为为了赢得战争，必须做好实施暴行的准备。
+
+我们已经在末日中了。等待末日也是末日的一部分，因为它让我们动弹不得。末日这个术语本身就与启示概念相关。末日会迎来真相，知识中的启示。有些人说，东欧阵营的崩溃是末日，因为现在真相大白了：社会主义行不通，但自由主义可以。在冷战期间，哲学家君特·安德斯在面对核战威胁时谈到光秃秃的末日。和战后不会有新的帝国出现。那是纯粹的毁灭。有的只是我们自己和我们的世界的湮灭。等待我们的不再是福山的信条，历史的终结。
+
+
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Deal or No Deal?
+author: Simon Rynn and Michael Jones
+date : 2023-06-12 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/r8IsoKy.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "An Appraisal of UK Engagement in Sudan"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_This paper sets out research findings on the UK’s development, defence and diplomacy engagements in Sudan from 2015 to the present. It also tests common assertions around the effects of Brexit, reductions in the UK aid budget, and the merger of two government departments, the Department for International Development and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office._
+
+
+
+### Executive Summary
+
+Since 2016, successive British governments have sought to emphasise that a post-Brexit UK would be outward looking, collaborative and influential. A series of speeches and policy statements emphasised that the UK would pursue future prosperity through overseas engagements built upon investments in diplomacy, trade, defence and development aid. In March 2021, the UK government published its Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy. The document reiterated these themes and referenced Eastern Africa as a part of the world where the UK would increase its engagement.
+
+Against this backdrop, a RUSI research team set out to examine how the UK has deployed its development, defence and diplomacy toolkit in four countries in Eastern Africa since 2015. The project, entitled “Furthering Global Britain? Reviewing the Foreign Policy Effect of UK Engagement in East Africa”, seeks to identify the factors that have helped or hindered the UK in pursuing a “Global Britain” agenda in four countries in the region: Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan. The research tested some common assertions around the effects of Brexit, reductions in the UK aid budget, and the merger of two government departments: the Department for International Development (DFID) and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO).
+
+This paper sets out findings on the UK’s relevant engagements in one of the four focus countries, Sudan, from 2015 to the present. It finds that, despite a chequered past, the UK has had significant leverage at key moments, building on a long history of engagement. There have been some successes in recent years. Examples include careful use of diplomacy and development aid in support of conflict resolution and humanitarian relief. The UK has also worked to support inclusion of civilians in government and to help Sudan manage economic and political crises from 2019 to the present. While the Sudanese may be disappointed by the record of Sudan’s hybrid civilian–military government of 2019–20, the UK is still well regarded overall.
+
+Regarding an “integrated approach” to UK foreign policy, Sudan has provided few opportunities to pursue defence engagement or promote trade since 2016. Use of development aid and diplomacy have, however, become more integrated over the period, as envisaged by UK government policy. The unplanned merger of DFID and the FCO, though time-consuming and frustrating, has also offered benefits.
+
+UK relationships in Sudan have weathered Brexit well. The UK enjoys substantial depth and quality of partnerships both in Sudan and with regional actors. Its ability to operate in multiple forums, from New York to Khartoum and the immediate region, via a combination of envoys, ambassadors, political and aid specialists and multilateral bodies, is significant. The UK has been particularly effective in two groupings: the UK–US–Norwegian “Troika” and the “Quad” (the US, the UK, Saudi Arabia and the UAE – also at times referred to as “the Quartet”). Astute UK involvement here has helped to compensate for a post-Brexit loss of influence over EU policy and expenditure. Linked to Brexit, however, the paralysis that characterised British politics during 2019–20 has been detrimental. It drew the attention of ministers and senior decision-makers away from Sudan at a critical moment in Sudan’s history and contributed to perceptions of declining UK influence in Sudan.
+
+Sudan has not been prioritised as the 2021 Integrated Review suggested it would be. The lingering effects of the Covid-19 pandemic response, Brexit, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine have all diverted the UK’s attention and resources. After a brief increase linked to a 2019 political transition in Sudan, the UK aid budget has levelled off. Although aid agencies in receipt of UK aid have been alarmed, the real-world impact of this is hard to gauge, given the fragile state of Sudan’s economy. Reductions also coincided with an overall decline in humanitarian aid contributions from other donors. Nevertheless, a solid reputation and substantial influence that the UK has earned within the aid sector in Sudan is now seen as being at risk.
+
+Overall, the research finds that commentators expect UK influence in Sudan to wane in the years ahead. Brexit has played a part in this, but aid cuts and the visible rise of competitors such as China are more salient factors. In the research for this paper, interviews revealed a general sense of frustration that the former colonial power would not commit further resources to Sudan, along with a feeling that the UK appears too willing to back a compromise with military actors amid a contested political “transition”. Interviews also show that many pro-democracy campaigners expect the UK and Western allies to play a conservative hand in future: that, despite clear evidence of the Sudanese military’s role in driving disorder, they will seek stability through a compromise.
+
+Notwithstanding its many problems, Sudan represents what practitioners might call a “medium-sized” challenge. If senior decision-makers were willing, the UK might help shape the country’s trajectory through technical leadership, financial assistance and support to political coalition-building. Alongside humanitarian relief and reform, other areas of traditional UK expertise, from stabilisation to governance and security sector reform to economic development, will be critical to Sudan’s future. The UK could plausibly convene others around these topics. It might also play a useful role facilitating much-needed dialogue among disparate pro-democracy groups. To maximise its effectiveness, the UK should, however, work alongside others to identify the lessons of recent years and to forge coalitions and strategies that might in time lead towards a fully democratised Sudan.
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+Following the June 2016 Brexit vote, successive UK prime ministers Theresa May and Boris Johnson repeatedly made reference to “Global Britain”. The phrase attracted widespread commentary, much of it quizzical or critical. It was, however, an attempt to signal a sense that the UK would remain an outward-looking country.
+
+In March 2021, the UK government published the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy. The document recognised a more competitive global context than in 2016 but reiterated now-familiar “Global Britain” themes. It signalled a wish to play a proactive role in global affairs; to work in partnership with others, particularly “like-minded bilateral and multilateral partners”; and to better integrate foreign policy, defence, trade and international development efforts. Africa was referenced in terms of forging problem-solving partnerships and pursuing shared goals such as prosperity, democracy and security. The policy referenced overseas aid, while leaning strongly towards promoting trade, economic resilience and the alignment of international development with wider foreign policy. Specific references were made to Eastern Africa, in the case of Sudan to support for “conflict resolution and stabilisation efforts”.
+
+In March 2023, the Integrated Review Refresh was published to provide an update of the government’s policy priorities amid a changing global context since the Integrated Review of 2021. Although no longer using the language of “Global Britain”, the key themes remain unchanged. Africa is again flagged a region where the UK government would deepen relationships. More emphasis than before was placed on pursuing international development alongside “the full range of UK strengths and expertise”. Against this backdrop, a RUSI research team has set out to examine how the UK has deployed its development, defence and diplomacy toolkit in Eastern Africa in support of the UK government’s agenda for a more integrated, proactive foreign policy in the region. The team looked at how the government sought to bring about positive change in the countries in which it is working while also securing secondary, largely geopolitical, benefits in its national interest at a time of domestic and international change.
+
+A two-year research project has sought to test some of the assertions that have been made around Brexit, the reduction in the UK aid budget from 0.7% to 0.5% of Gross National Income (GNI), the increases in the defence budget, and the creation of the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) from a merger of the Department for International Development (DFID) with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). The project, entitled “Furthering Global Britain? Reviewing the Foreign Policy Effect of UK Engagement in East Africa”, asks whether these structural changes have helped or hindered the progress of recent UK governments’ “Global Britain” policy agendas in the region, while seeking to identify factors that may have contributed to or limited the UK’s ability to project influence. It aims to answer the following research questions:
+
+- How effective has the UK been in making a positive difference in relation to “Global Britain” objectives in the region in recent years, particularly through its development aid, diplomacy and defence engagement?
+
+- What impact have recent structural and policy changes such as Brexit, aid cuts and the merger of DFID and the FCO had on “Global Britain” outcomes?
+
+- How does the UK’s approach and impact differ from those of others?
+
+- How do UK aid priorities for Eastern Africa align with those of East African governments, and what are those governments’ expectations of and recommendations for the UK?
+
+The research methodology consisted of a review of selected policy literature and semi-structured expert interviews (see Table 1). Interviews were used to identify factors that recurrently enabled or constrained UK actions, particularly with reference to positive outcomes to which the UK was thought to have contributed. Data on UK aid, defence and diplomatic engagement in the four focal countries from 2015 to 2022 is used as a reference point to identify UK policy objectives and trends over time. The intention is to provide an overview of the realities of UK engagement in each country over this six-year period, and to identify the factors that were most salient in driving outcomes.
+
+This paper provides findings on the UK’s engagement in Sudan. It is based on a review of key secondary sources and 51 interviews carried out between November 2021 and October 2022 with current and former government officials, staff from multilateral organisations, academics, and civil society and business figures, a substantial number of them based in Sudan (see Table 1). Research concluded prior to the outbreak of fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in April 2023 (see Chapter I below).
+
+
+_▲ __Table 1: Interview Breakdown._ Source: Author.__
+
+Chapter I provides background on Sudan–UK relations and summarises the UK’s major policy interests and its main investments in international development, diplomatic and defence engagement in recent years. From within this broad portfolio of work, Chapter II highlights several examples of UK action that have contributed positively to outcomes in Sudan. Chapter III identifies key factors that have constrained or enabled UK action.
+
+This publication should be read in conjunction with accompanying papers on the UK in Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia, and an earlier publication that sets out the project methodology and offers more detail on UK investments in the region. A synthesis paper that combines findings from the four focus countries will follow.
+
+
+### I. Background
+
+The UK has longstanding ties with the Republic of Sudan, a former colony. The long period from 1881 to 1899, termed the “Mahdist War”, saw British and allied Egyptian forces pitted against the Mahdi (Muhammad Ahmad – an Islamic puritan, reformer and military leader) in a series of bloody confrontations. From 1899 to 1956 Britain had de facto control of the country, although “Anglo-Egyptian Sudan” was legally a joint condominium. Following independence in 1956, relations with the UK were maintained through historical ties, trade and aid. The UK is now home to a significant and longstanding Sudanese diaspora of around 20,000 people, and attracts additional migrants and refugees each year.
+
+Post-independence, from 1956 to 1972, Sudan experienced the first of two civil wars. An imperfect peace ended in 1983 as the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) fought the Sudanese government and its various southern Sudanese rivals. The second war ended in 2005 with a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) brokered via the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The UK, the US and Norway were strong supporters. Although the three governments held somewhat different positions (for example, the UK was seen by Khartoum as more sympathetic to its position; Norway and the US were seen as leaning towards the SPLM/A), all three worked together as a “Troika”. Linked to the Troika, the UK played a notable role in the CPA negotiations, among other things pushing the parties to meet a 31 December 2004 deadline for completing talks. The UK remained active in the follow-on period. The entire process that led to eventual South Sudanese independence in 2011, including peace negotiations, a referendum and elections, was only possible with the active participation of the north. Throughout the period to 2011, the US was the leading international actor in dealings with the government of Sudan. UK aid and diplomatic contributions were prominent, however, and included seconding a senior diplomat, Derek Plumbly, to head the Assessment and Evaluation Commission established to monitor implementation of the CPA. As many in the government of Sudan came to recognise, the UK was able to moderate and influence the US on occasion. According to interviewees, it also took on tasks such as defence cooperation that, due to domestic pressure, the US could not.
+
+Through most of this period the Sudanese Republic was a military-influenced autocracy led by President Omar Al-Bashir and the Islamic National Front, the Islamist movement that had formed the National Congress Party (NCP) in the late 1990s. The UK’s relationship with Sudan proved difficult throughout Al-Bashir’s 30-year rule. Large-scale atrocities across the Darfur region in the early 2000s led to a 2007 UN Security Council Resolution authorising a Chapter VII peacekeeping mission – what was to become the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) – against Al-Bashir’s wishes, with strong public statements from then UK prime minister Gordon Brown. The UK acted as the lead P5 Security Council member during subsequent peacekeeping mission mandate negotiations. London also subscribed to a suite of UN and EU sanctions and later supported International Criminal Court (ICC) indictments against key government officials, including Al-Bashir.
+
+The CPA, however, offered a framework for UK re-engagement. From 2008 until the mid-2010s, the UK provided key technical and diplomatic support to the linked African Union High Level Implementation Panel for Sudan (AUHIP) forum. As respondents pointed out, it was the principal donor to AUHIP and, among other things, paid for technical advisers to support the forum. The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) organised trainings and exchange visits for Sudanese security officials, and at one point a UK defence attaché was seconded as a military adviser. A few interviewees credited the UK’s support with helping to avert war between north and south during the tense post-independence period, and with strengthening the AU.
+
+By 2014 the UK and Sudan were participants in an EU–Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative – the so-called Khartoum Process. A response to increased outward migration to Europe and the UK, it led to funding and capacity building for Sudanese security bodies. These included the notorious Janjaweed militia. The initiative proved highly controversial. Many questioned the wisdom of engaging with what they saw as a pariah government, and there were allegations of hypocrisy and the compromising of professed Western values. Critics pointed to evidence that the government of Sudan was displacing people through violence in its periphery, while in some cases facilitating the onward transit of Eritrean, Somali and Ethiopian migrants. The programme underscored the fact that, despite public condemnations, the UK and the EU were prepared to work closely with the Sudanese government in response to domestic policy pressures.
+
+In March 2016 a UK–Sudan Strategic Dialogue was established – a contact forum in which senior officials discussed such issues as sanctions, trade and migration. But with sanctions still in place and an ICC arrest warrant out against the head of state, the Dialogue proved difficult and controversial. UK officials were unable to meet with Al-Bashir himself and began talking through intermediaries. Interviewees pointed out that establishing a dialogue framework fuelled allegations that the UK government had accepted Sudan’s price for cooperation on the outward migration that its own human rights abuses had generated. Nevertheless, the forum provided a vehicle for discussing challenging issues, including those associated with the secession of the south. Although activity in the forum was halted due to an outbreak of violence over north– south borders and oil in 2012, early progress was made on the important question of Sudanese debt relief, as discussed below.
+
+By 2018, conditions were changing. Al-Bashir had lost oil revenues following the independence of South Sudan in 2011 and could no longer finance his patronage budget, nor imports of food and fuel. He ramped up the export production of crops, livestock and gold by printing local currency to pay above-market rates. This fed inflation. Import costs rose and urban living standards plummeted. Large-scale protests took off in December 2018, coalescing into nationwide resistance. Al-Bashir’s former political allies eventually launched a coup against him in April 2019, establishing a Transitional Military Council (TMC) that brought the once-peripheral RSF and its leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) to the centre of power.
+
+After further demonstrations, and the massacre on 3 June 2019 of more than 120 civilians outside the headquarters of the military in Khartoum, the TMC bowed to domestic and international pressure, signing a July 2019 Constitutional Charter with the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), a coalition of political, professional and civic groups. Interviews found that, alongside the AU and IGAD, the UK and the US were key players influencing the process, doing so via the informal grouping known as the Quad, crucially convincing the UAE and Saudi Arabia, which both have strong connections to the SAF, to pressure Sudan’s security elite to compromise. The Constitutional Charter put in place a civilian–military transitional government with a civilian prime minister and cabinet staffed almost entirely by technocrats. This included diaspora figures such as incoming prime minister Abdalla Hamdok, alongside an executive Sovereign Council comprising five military and five civilian figures and chaired by the head of the military General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, with RSF leader Hemedti as his deputy. There was to be a 39-month transitional period during which, among other things, a new legislature would be appointed, a constitution drafted and transitional justice measures introduced prior to elections. In the interim the Sovereign Council was to be chaired by the military for the first 21 months and by civilians for the final 18 months.
+
+In October 2019, soon after the transitional government took office, peace talks started with the Sudan Revolutionary Front, a composite of rebel groups, to bring these groups into the military and transitional government and to redress a historical power imbalance between Sudan’s centre and its long-neglected peripheries. The resulting October 2020 Juba Peace Agreement provided a wealth-sharing formula, or “payroll peace”. In February 2021 armed group representatives joined Hamdok’s government, many replacing technocrats as part of a larger reshuffle.
+
+The attempted transition away from armed conflict was accompanied by high-stakes economic reforms to address a rapidly deteriorating economy with serious structural flaws. To control inflation and reduce debt, Hamdok cut subsidies on many staples. The inflationary impact was immediate, with a knock-on effect on food security in the months following. A social safety net programme called the Family Support Programme ( Thamarat) was to be implemented simultaneously to soften the economic impact. At the same time, efforts were made to catalogue and regulate parastatal companies owned or run by the military, and to investigate cronyism via a new Elimination, Empowerment, Anti-Corruption and Funds Recovery Committee. The increasingly successful impact of these reforms and investigations sparked a backlash, however: to preserve their power and commercial interests, and fearing moves to hold them accountable for past abuses, the RSF and the SAF launched a coup in October 2021. Hamdok was arrested and civilian institutions were dissolved.
+
+Amid international condemnation, Western and multilateral foreign aid totalling approximately $4.6 billion and planned debt relief worth $56 billion were suspended. Most Western countries, including the UK, condemned the coup, but opted not to reimpose sanctions. The military regime established in October 2021 remains in place to date. Despite repression, activists linked to both the FFC and neighbourhood “resistance committees” have continued to protest and demand a fully civilian-led government.
+
+These events have compounded an ongoing food crisis – in December 2022, around 11.7 million people were assessed as facing crisis-level food insecurity; a marked increase from the period to summer 2019. Against this backdrop, political negotiations have made slow progress. A “Tripartite Mechanism” led by the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), the AU and IGAD has struggled to broker a compromise. Both military and civilian groupings are riven with internal divisions. On 5 December 2022, the FFC and the military signed a framework agreement providing for eventual elections and a civilian-headed administration. Rather than providing a route out of instability, the agreement proved to be a harbinger of fresh conflict. Unable to resolve differences over command and control, fighting broke out in Khartoum on 15 April 2023 between the SAF and the RSF. At the time of writing hundreds of casualties had been reported. With violence spreading, scenarios could include an all-out war. Foreign governments have raced to evacuate their nationals while calling for calm. With tensions between the SAF and the RSF well-documented, the approach that external actors from the UN to the US and UK have taken towards deal-making and democratisation is being scrutinised. While they hold some basic “red lines” in common, what is referred to as the Sudanese “street” – an amorphous collection of youth and student movements, unions, civic initiatives, ordinary citizens and neighbourhood resistance committees – is also fragmented. Many Sudanese pro-democracy voices have been fiercely critical of the December 2022 framework agreement, the recent violence and external responses to it. It remains to be seen whether this broad set of actors, including politicians, professionals, unions, local resistance committees and students, can coalesce around a common vision.
+
+#### UK Policy Priorities and Engagements
+
+The UK government has publicly stated that a more peaceful, democratic and economically resilient Sudan is in the UK’s interest, as this would reduce the need for UK aid, lessen outward migration and provide opportunities for UK businesses to invest in the country. In 2021 it committed to continue supporting “conflict resolution and stabilisation efforts”.
+
+This chapter offers a summary of the UK’s engagements in recent years in the areas of development, humanitarian aid, diplomacy and defence.
+
+__Development and Humanitarian Engagements__
+
+UK bilateral aid commitments to Sudan averaged around £90 million per annum between 2016 and 2020. Recent programmes funded by UK official development assistance (ODA) have contributed to humanitarian relief and humanitarian system reform; economic reform via the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank; programmes to reduce female genital mutilation and child marriage; schemes to improve access to water and sanitation; civil society support; and targeted support for the Juba Peace Agreement. The highest expenditure items have been humanitarian relief, social safety net support and, briefly, economic reform (see Figure 2). The UK played a leading role in supporting Sudan to obtain Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) status in 2021. This arrangement, now on hold following the coup, would have enabled relief on around 90% of the country’s $50-billion IMF and World Bank debts in 2024.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 1: Top Five OECD–DAC Contributing Donors to Sudan, 2012–21.__ Source: OECD–DAC (Creditor Reporting System)._
+
+_Recent Trends_
+
+UK bilateral aid spending increased from £93 million in 2019 to £139 million in 2020, an increase linked to the political transition. Most of this increase was due to a one-off contribution to the Sudan Family Support Project, as discussed further below. This briefly made Sudan the 10th-largest recipient of UK aid globally. While humanitarian assistance still accounted for around 37.8% of UK bilateral funding, support for “government and civil society”, and “social infrastructure and services” increased after the appointment of the 2019 transitional government (increases of 9.5% to 23.4%, and 3.1% to 14.5%, respectively). UK bilateral ODA funding for Sudan then dropped back to £93 million by the end of 2021. The reduction – due both to global UK aid cuts and the suspension of development programming following the October 2021 military coup – still left Sudan as the ninth-largest recipient of UK bilateral ODA worldwide. Following the coup, however, the UK, together with the US, the World Bank and other major donors, suspended all non-humanitarian aid.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 2: Sector Allocation of UK ODA Spend in Sudan, 2012–21.__ Source: OECD–DAC (Creditor Reporting System)._
+
+__Diplomacy__
+
+British diplomatic engagement with Sudan has historically focused on a range of issues, from regional stability to counterterrorism, humanitarian relief, governance, security and migration. The emphasis among these themes has varied according to the changing local and global context. Important diplomatic initiatives have over the years included a leading role in the negotiations that led to the CPA, subsequent support to the AUHIP process, the establishment of the UK–Sudan Dialogue and acting as Penholder for UN missions designed to mitigate conflict. The UK maintains a permanent ambassadorial presence in Sudan, backed by an envoy for Sudan and South Sudan. Since the CPA years, a London-based “Sudans” Unit’ has existed to coordinate and cohere elements of UK policy on north and South Sudan. Ambassadors, particularly Irfan Siddiq (in post 2018–21), have been prominent voices in support of democratic transition and civilian rule since 2018, often working within the Troika. UK diplomacy played an important role in the June–July 2019 “Quad” negotiations that produced the civilian-led transitional government following the ousting of Al-Bashir, as discussed below. The level of attention that UK ministers pay to Sudan fluctuates considerably, however. In a show of support for Hamdok, Dominic Raab visited Sudan as foreign secretary in January 2021. No senior minister has visited since.
+
+_Recent Trends_
+
+The main UK diplomatic objectives at present appear to be to encourage a transition towards civilian rule while helping to maintain stability and mitigate humanitarian crisis. As detailed below, the UK provided strong diplomatic, financial and technical support to the transitional government until October 2021. Since that time, the UK has had ongoing contact with Sudan’s officials, including the chair of the now military government, General Al-Burhan, while stating that it is striving to prevent the normalisation of military rule. UK diplomats have lobbied to block Sudan’s access to international assistance and debt relief until a civilian-led government is restored.
+
+__Defence Engagement__
+
+Given Sudan’s long period of military rule and the existence of UK, UN and EU sanctions regimes, opportunities for defence engagement have been few. Interviewees noted that from 2005 to the mid-2010s the UK MoD did establish a close working relationship with SAF officers through trainings, exchange visits and technical support up the level of Chief of Defence Staff. The AUHIP, active from 2009 to 2013, also provided a framework for UK engagement on defence matters. Respondents point out that it allowed for a UK defence attaché to be seconded to it, and enabled language training to be provided to Sudanese officers as an entry point for diplomacy at what was in other ways a difficult time for UK–Sudan relations. In comparison, however, South Sudan received a larger UK investment in its nascent military, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (as it then was).
+
+_Recent Trends_
+
+UK–Sudan defence engagement was suspended after the October 2021 coup. The MoD withdrew its in-country defence attaché from Khartoum in 2022.
+
+
+### II. Overview of Selected Outcomes
+
+This chapter highlights a number of outcomes that UK action has contributed towards in Sudan, whether through international development cooperation, defence engagement or diplomacy. The chapter draws on interviews to identify examples from among the UK’s wider portfolio of work as set out in Chapter I. While seen as broadly successful by interlocutors, the examples are used to identify and analyse key factors that have enabled or constrained UK attempts to further its “Global Britain” agenda, for example by showing leadership, responding quickly, cultivating partnerships or linking development, defence, diplomacy and trade.
+
+#### Debt Relief and Economic Reform
+
+By early 2019, Sudan’s long-running economic difficulties had precipitated a political crisis. Catapulted to power in August, the civilian-led transitional government faced an enormous debt burden, inflation and a weak currency. Decades of economic mismanagement had created fiscal and current account deficits, sustained by excessive monetisation of the budget. The country was close to hyperinflation and experiencing acute shortages of essential commodities. The new civilian leaders attempted to leverage Western capitals’ hope that they would introduce rapid reforms to access debt relief, loans and grants as they embarked on economic reforms. A programme was agreed with the IMF which, it was assumed, would increase foreign currency income, settle the currency and eventually secure debt relief. In return, donors and international financial institutions (IFIs) required drastic fiscal measures. It was made clear to the transitional government that eliminating fuel and wheat subsidies costing around 12% of GDP would be key to securing debt relief. The programme was also designed to enable a sixfold public sector wage increase and the establishment of a “social safety net” programme. Despite opposition from elements of the “street” and some political parties (for example, the Communist Party), IFIs and Western donors were strongly supportive.
+
+Building on technical work carried out in 2011 under AUHIP auspices with support from British economic advisers, the UK played an important role in building consensus among international partners around proposed economic reforms and debt relief. As interviewees noted, the Friends of Sudan group initially displayed divergent positions – helping Sudan to re-engage with IFIs was not a priority for everyone. The UK helped to get agreement among donors on ensuring fiscal and political space for the reform agenda and encouraged others to engage early with the transitional government. Germany sponsored a Sudan Partnership Conference in Berlin in June 2020, at which around €1.6 billion was pledged. This in turn allowed the IMF to agree a 12-month Staff-Monitored Program, tied to a macroeconomic and structural reform agenda, to release future loans. A multi-country effort was then led by the UK under its G7 presidency to fund clearance of Sudan’s longstanding debt arrears to the IMF, the World Bank and the African Development Bank (ADB), which according to interview sources totalled $2.9 billion.
+
+UK aid was used to simultaneously embed experts within Sudan’s Finance and National Economy Ministry and provide support to the government’s strategic communications (of which more below). The immediate results were in many ways remarkable. As interviews pointed out, the obstacles to progress on debt relief were more political than technical and Sudan met IMF requirements in record time and in 2020, concessional IFI finance of up to $2.5 billion was unlocked for the first time in 30 years. By June 2021, Sudan had qualified for Stage One debt relief under the HIPC debt relief scheme. It had qualified in historically short time. Respondents felt this was due in large part to the UK’s combined diplomatic and technical assistance. It was also noted that as part of this process, UK ministers agreed to provide a bridging loan so that Sudan could begin to clear its debts to the ADB through the debt relief process.
+
+The UK became the largest bilateral donor to a restructured World Bank trust fund (close to £80 million was allocated over two years, second to the EU’s contribution in terms of size), earmarking its support for a “Family Support” (cash transfer) project. The stated purpose of this project was to mitigate the political and economic fallouts from the structural economic adjustments required for debt relief, and address concerns raised by the Sudanese “street” about possible negative effects on public services or the cost of living. But the success seen on debt relief was not mirrored here. Envisaged as a rolling project funded by donors but delivered via Sudan’s finance ministry working in tandem with the World Food Programme, it was designed to provide an initial cash transfer worth $5 per person to 80% of Sudanese households (around 8 million families). By September 2021, however, only around 1 million households were recorded as having received payments. Interviewees pointed to a combination of IFI institutional bureaucracy, the limited bureaucratic capacity of the finance ministry and a slow response by donors as leading to project funding falling below initial expectations, arriving late and under-delivered. The Family Support Project had been conceived as a way of mitigating the negative effects of removing the fuel and wheat subsidies that were draining the country’s budget. It was also seen as helping to rebuild the social contract between government and population that had been so damaged by previous governments. In reality, the finance ministry did not have the societal reach nor capacity to deliver as envisaged. Respondents felt that in spite of donor funding for strategic communications, the civilian-led government performed poorly on communicating the linked issues of budgeting, family support, currency and subsidy reforms to a weary public.
+
+The above problems might have been mitigated by better strategic coordination among donors. But a few respondents argued that more forceful dealings with IFI institutions at points – realistically, this would have required US leadership – could have ensured that multi-donor disbursement mechanisms worked better and quicker. They noted that the project was largely shelved following the October 2021 coup, with $350 million left unspent.
+
+Although there were disagreements between the office of the prime minister and the finance ministry on the pace of reform, respondents felt that painful fiscal measures had nevertheless been enacted by mid-2021 prior to the coup. As subsidies on key commodities such as fuel were lifted, prices spiked. By December, year-on-year inflation stood at 318%, driven both by subsidy removal and by the changing exchange rate. The price of wheat tripled in the year to September 2021. A few respondents suggested that the Sudanese pound showed some indications that it might stabilise, but it was no easier to borrow on international markets nor to purchase commodities. Hoped-for international loans and grants were also not arriving at scale – in the first three quarters of 2021, Sudan’s central bank reported that grants and loans fell to $80 million, around a quarter of the 2020 total. The reforms did reduce Sudan’s overall balance-of-payments deficit. Consumer prices also began to fall, around seven months after the fuel subsidy removal. But while the subsidy removal had likely reduced the printing of money, the fall may largely be attributable to lower imports of now unaffordable wheat and fuel.
+
+The consensus among Western donors, IFIs and elements in the transitional government that emerged between 2019 and 2021 on key economic reforms, principally currency flotation, subsidy removal and public sector wage adjustments, did not extend to the “street” or to a number of political figures. Support from military elements for what were in practice a set of medium-term austerity measures was probably situation-specific. With civilians fronting the reforms, the military elements within government could stand somewhat aloof and allow the civilian technocrats to take most of the political flak. As the reforms further eroded living standards, ongoing tensions between different governmental factions had increased. In hindsight, interviews suggested that by pushing the reforms through, finance minister Gibril Ibrahim, chair of the Islamist Justice and Equality Movement armed group, which had entered government via the Juba Peace Agreement, helped to craft a narrative around a failing civilian transition prior to the 2021 coup.
+
+This example of UK engagement with Sudan’s debt relief and economic reform raises a number of issues. On the one hand, it shows the UK demonstrating leadership, working with allies and multilaterals, and combining technical expertise with diplomacy. Yet it also raises very difficult questions about close donor alignment with a contentious – if economically orthodox – set of policies that many in Sudan opposed, including the “street”. While planning for reforms was underway, the UK supported the government of Sudan to design and deliver a nationwide awareness campaign to sensitise its citizens to the economic situation and prepare people for the proposed reforms. Respondents noted that, along with others, the UK also funded roundtable discussions, a conference and training for a number of Sudanese journalists to discuss the economic reform agenda. Respondents pointed out, however, that such inputs could not have forged anything like a public consensus in the time available, while the benefits of unlocking international finance were not realised prior to the military takeover.
+
+As interviewees noted, a key assumption of all donor support to Sudan’s transition in those years that now appears questionable was that what was in fact a weak political centre could successfully enact these far-reaching changes. To do so would have meant securing support from stronger institutions (the SAF, the RSF, armed groups, the Native Administration), oligarchs and regional powers, and what respondents pointed out was a notoriously dysfunctional civil service charged with delivering the accompanying social safety net programme. The post-October 2021 military government did not reverse the fuel subsidy cut or currency liberalisation introduced by their civilian predecessors. They also sought to restart talks on IFI loans and debt relief. But the extent to which the immediate societal costs of reforms enacted under the civilian-led government provided military actors with a narrative around civilian incompetence seems to respondents to have been underappreciated. In hindsight, timing was also a crucial factor. Had fiscal and debt relief efforts been initiated earlier, or changes introduced at a different tempo, the politics might have been easier. The US insistence on a quid pro quo for debt relief and loans linked to the Abraham Accords meant, however, that the pace of events was not within the control of most donors, including the UK. (Under the Trump administration, the US required Sudan to normalise relations with Israel in return for removal from its State Sponsors of Terrorism list and to progress debt relief and World Bank loans.) Nevertheless, respondents argued that in this case donors focused too single-mindedly on fiscal issues, to the detriment of a wider set of linked political questions.
+
+#### Humanitarian Relief
+
+UK support for humanitarian relief has been a longstanding commitment in Sudan dating back to the second civil war of 1983–2005. Some of the achievements reported by the UK from its humanitarian work in Sudan in recent years include: 1.2 million people with sustainable access to clean water and/or sanitation by 2018; 589,000 children under five, women and adolescent girls reached through food- and nutrition-related interventions; and more than 500,000 vulnerable children provided with free school meals in 2021.
+
+Financial commitments have been substantial. The most recent large-scale UK aid programme, Responding to Protracted Crisis in Sudan: Humanitarian Reform, Assistance and Resilience Programme (HRAR), cost approximately £250 million from 2017 to 2022. It reached more than 2 million people, providing food aid, cash and voucher transfers, education, primary healthcare and water access, while attempting to strengthen the long-term resilience of more than 890,000 people.76 The programme also helped to fund a “conflict sensitivity facility”, intended as a resource for the wider humanitarian community.
+
+HRAR’s overarching objectives on reform of humanitarian relief are based on the UN-led “Grand Bargain” agreement to which the UK is a signatory, and include greater transparency, better needs assessments and localisation of support. The end-of-term FCDO programme review of HRAR reported “good” or “partial” progress on these objectives. Improvements on information management and agency transparency have been marked, and substantial progress recorded towards localisation targets, on increasing cash transfers, and on humanitarian agencies conducting joint needs assessments. More specifically, transparency has improved, with the online publication of data by the UN Sudan Humanitarian Fund, and better-quality reporting by bilateral donors. Progress on more timely and effective humanitarian responses has been slower, partly attributed by interviewees to a restrictive operating context. To the regret of some implementing partners, objectives for linking humanitarian relief to longer-term development work will not be met, since the embassy has deprioritised the issue.
+
+HRAR also funded technical advisers and programme officers within the UN system to work on nutrition, water, sanitation and hygiene, physical protection (including from gender-based violence) and cash grants, and to play technical or coordination roles within the UN Resident Coordinator’s office. Respondents see this as having added capacity to the wider system and enhanced the UK’s profile.
+
+As respondents noted, the majority of UK humanitarian work is carried out day to day by technical staff who, for example, administer funding or try to support the humanitarian “cluster system” and implementing partners. Meanwhile, higher-level influencing work falls to the UK development director, who seeks to influence other donor and agency leads from the UN Humanitarian Country Team to the office of the UN’s humanitarian and “resident” coordinators, who are in charge of overall system coordination, and international humanitarian non-governmental organisations. Together with the Netherlands, the UK also chairs the humanitarian donor group. UK diplomatic staff, including those in New York and Geneva, have long supported these efforts. Interviewees, however, point to diplomats in-country now feeling increased ownership of humanitarian issues following the creation of the merged FCDO.
+
+An issue that UK diplomats and development staff at different levels report having grappled with continuously is improving humanitarian “access”. Sudanese governments have long frustrated aid delivery through a complex web of permits, bureaucratic delays, security protocols and financial demands via their – security-influenced – Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC). At the time of writing, the Dutch and UK co-chairs of the humanitarian donor group were said by respondents to be making representations to the government of Sudan on behalf of donors in an attempt to resolve key issues. The UK, among others, was credited with injecting realism into what can at times be overly theoretical donor discussion on such questions. HAC requirements and other impediments to humanitarian access were somewhat relaxed during the transitional government’s tenure, but interviews point to them having returned in force quickly after the 2021 coup, as figures from the Al-Bashir era were swiftly returned to their former posts and revived previous policies. In the meantime, no major combined effort had been mounted in the interim by donors or the UN to address deeper issues of government and security forces’ interference with humanitarian access.
+
+The example of humanitarian relief shows the UK working effectively and showing leadership on challenging issues with partners and multilaterals in Sudan. Some targets have not been met, and opportunities to adopt a new approach towards access restrictions may have been missed. Yet the embassy has been effective in linking together programme funding, technical assistance and diplomacy. There are no indications that past UK engagement on defence has provided an entry point for access discussions. Interviewees felt that the UK’s prominence on humanitarian issues has, however, given it influence and offered entry points for wider discussions on aid and political and security matters. Whether influence can be maintained at current levels is an open question. Many suspect not – interviewees note that implementing partners are less inclined to approach embassy staff than in the past, due to uncertainties over funding. The UK has traditionally been the largest donor to the UN-run Sudan Humanitarian Fund, at points contributing more than 50% of funds. While the UK remains on the Fund’s advisory board, currently the US, Germany and the Netherlands make larger contributions.
+
+#### Crisis Response: 2019 Coup and 2021 Counter-Coup
+
+Just prior to the coup of October 2021, the Sudanese military hoarded commodities and fomented unrest. A street “protest” calling for a military takeover was organised in Khartoum on 16 October, presumably to test the resolve of international actors. At this point, the UK embassy moved into “crisis watch” mode, in line with its crisis management plan. This was one step below “crisis mode”, indicating that embassy priorities had shifted away from business as usual and were focused on unfolding political events. After two days with no further events to respond to and the transitional government still apparently in charge, the embassy stepped out of crisis watch mode and reverted to business as usual.
+
+The coup of 25 October first unfolded on social media. The embassy was alerted by London 30 minutes prior to a communications blackout in Khartoum. This was enough time, however, to allow the local crisis team to convene, for roles to be assigned and for initial measures ranging from a telephone tree to regular situation reports to be put in place. Over the subsequent days and weeks, the crisis team handled a variety of operational, programmatic and diplomatic questions ranging from staff and family welfare to updating travel advice for UK citizens, amending programme spend and agreeing messaging towards the de facto government. Scenarios under which UK non-essential staff would “draw down” to the UK were considered and prepared for, but not enacted. After a six-week public internet blackout the situation in-country became more routine. The embassy stayed in full crisis mode for around a month, before reducing the response level to “crisis watch” until April 2022. A lessons identification exercise was then carried out which praised the response, noting the value of the “whole-of-mission approach” that had been adopted, and the swift actions taken.
+
+In contrast, the UK’s response to the changes of spring 2019 drew some criticism. Western embassies did not act early in advance of Al-Bashir’s ousting, despite a build-up of tension. Viewed from today, his removal in mid-2019 may have an air of inevitability, coming as it did after years of mounting political and economic pressure. At the time, however, there was anything but a consensus among observers in general or Western embassies in particular, who had seen protests many times before. The then UK ambassador has been credited with warning both London and diplomatic colleagues that the wave of protests could be consequential.
+
+Despite coordination efforts among donors, some observers felt that multilateral and Western donors’ efforts to hurriedly mount programmes of support for the incoming transitional administration in 2019 and 2020 were either ineffective or duplicative. According to interviewees, the EU and the UK gave strategic communications support to the office of the prime minister, while the UN provided equipment. Yet for reasons explored earlier, the civilian government leadership was chaotic, divided and indecisive on some critical and difficult issues. From this perspective it is far from clear that improved donor offerings on communications support would have remedied the situation. Respondents pointed to the limited quantity of UK technical and programmatic assistance, which appeared modest in comparison to the scale of the challenge and Western rhetoric at the time. The extent of economic bailout required by this point was truly daunting, requiring both IFI and bilateral financing, and for the US leadership to lift its sanctions regime and Saudi Arabia and the UAE to provide bridging loans. Unfortunately, in the case of the UK, although it was possible to advance the debt relief agenda, especially work on the Paris Club and IFI engagement, political turmoil at home linked to Brexit, among other things, resulted in little attention for Sudan.
+
+Interview findings point to the UK having played a critical political role in spring and summer 2019, managing to combine public pro-democracy messaging from the ambassador with acting as a bridge to the US, and bringing the Gulf states, the AU and IGAD into broad agreement on a transitional arrangement. This meant marshalling the Quad to ensure that the Sudanese military, having taken over control from the National Congress Party in April 2019, handed over to a fresh (transitional) administration as set out in what became a Constitutional Charter. Although IGAD and the AU took credit for the handover, the UK’s role was said to have been significant in bringing the Quad powers to a shared position.
+
+A few respondents questioned the fundamental approach that Western actors took to economic reform. In practice, this involved aligning with a relatively small number of FFC coalition ministers and advisers and providing technical support to the finance ministry and the prime minister’s office in relation to milestones for macroeconomic reform and institution building. The politics of the economic reforms were apparently discussed among donors, and attempts – such as the Family Support Project – were made to manage the anticipated impact on households. Yet serious questions remain about the effectiveness of these measures, the speed with which the reforms were pursued, and the way that divergent opinions about them were managed. Alternative approaches might, for example, have been to prioritise developing a nuanced understanding of different political constituencies’ calculations, contradictions and weaknesses. A few respondents argued that foregrounding the politics of reform over the (technical) economic questions might have helped donors to navigate a protracted political struggle and gradually develop a long-term democratisation strategy. More fundamentally, many international and Sudanese analysts believe that the diplomatic community made a mistake in urging the FFC to accept a hybrid civilian–military government. In this view, civilian campaigners should have pursued the sidelining of military actors, particularly after the 3 June massacre. How these alternative approaches might have affected attempts to secure debt relief and IFI loan access for Sudan, and whether they would eventually have led to civilian control of military–economic assets or not, are unanswered questions.
+
+
+### III. Enablers and Constraints: Key Findings
+
+This chapter explores the role of six factors that either enabled or constrained UK action in Sudan in recent years: operating context; resourcing; structures; strategy; leadership; and relationships. These have been identified through interviews and by exploring the nature of the UK’s contribution to the above outcomes.
+
+#### Operating Context
+
+Sudan has presented a challenging context for external actors for decades. It has seen intercommunal conflict, displacement and insurgencies, accusations of support for terrorism, genocide and war crimes, and widespread hunger. The UK’s responses have included participation in a framework of economic sanctions against key government figures that made the bilateral relationship more difficult. In turn, the government of Sudan has sought to limit the movement of Western diplomats within the country and curtailed humanitarian aid delivery, which it sees as political.
+
+The period since 2019 has, however, been unusually turbulent. The political revolution of spring 2019 and the massacre in June of civilians by security forces was followed by only nine months of relative normality, before the Covid-19 pandemic and later resumption of street protests and government crackdowns culminated in the military coup of October 2021. Since then, violence, hunger and displacement have unfortunately spread to new parts of the country.
+
+Clearly, this is a highly challenging context in which to pursue objectives around poverty reduction, humanitarian relief, development, stability and migration. The political environment is now one in which constitutional provisions are unclear, government-to-government relations cannot easily be formalised, and popular movements, regional powers and the use of force play a key role. Changes in Sudan occurred while Ethiopia, South Sudan and Somalia were also experiencing instability, alongside the common experience of Covid-19 and, more recently, rising food and fuel prices associated with the Ukraine war. Interviews indicate that these wider events have tested the UK government’s plans and resources. Any assessment of the UK’s overall effectiveness and progress with the “Global Britain” agenda needs to be made against this unusually challenging backdrop.
+
+#### Resourcing
+
+Given the particularities of UK–Sudan relations, with fraught diplomatic relations and a limited trading relationship, ODA has been the main resource at the UK’s disposal. However, interviewees felt that cuts to the UK’s aid budget had not yet been seriously detrimental. One explanation for this could be that Sudan tends to receive smaller aid allocations in absolute terms than neighbouring Kenya, Ethiopia or Somalia. Moreover, the leading budget item – humanitarian aid contributions – though reduced, has been better protected than development spending, which was paused following the October 2021 coup. The picture is also complicated by the UK bilateral aid budget having been temporarily increased (by £80 million) to fund the Family Support Project, prior to the October 2021 coup. The UK’s humanitarian implementing partners are of a different view, however, as interviews suggested that they expect UK influence to wane as the country “brings less to the table”, and some feel this is already happening.
+
+The announcement of a move down to 0.5% GNI aid targets in 2019 also ushered in a period of ongoing uncertainty about aid budgets. By mid-March 2022, the FCDO’s budget for the financial year 2022–23 for Sudan was not set, making it difficult to plan and maintain good external relations. As respondents pointed out, predictability means that partners’ expectations cannot easily be managed, and long-term planning is impossible. A few interviewees stated that uncertainty over funding allocations has given the UK a reputation as an unreliable donor in Sudan. A number of humanitarian implementing partners are now said to be deprioritising the UK as a donor and seeking funds elsewhere
+
+Uncertainty around UK aid cuts affected not only bilateral but also discretionary multi-donor programmes. The EU delegation to Sudan reported during interviews that it had to scale back delivery and delay long-awaited additional work in light of announced UK cuts. Since 2019 the military has followed the National Congress Party government’s practice of using cash loans from the Gulf to maintain power, but, as informed respondents pointed out, these do not compare in scale to the large-scale grants, loans and debt relief that Western influence can secure from IFIs.
+
+One positive resourcing issue is that FCDO staffing levels, although low, have been maintained in spite of programme cuts. This has been good not only for delivery but also reputation – externals who were intervieweed still consider UK technical expertise and political analysis a strong asset. An exception is the departure in late 2022 of the permanent UK defence attaché to Sudan. The MoD concluded, after months of waiting, that without any moves to reintroduce civilians into government, it could no longer justify maintaining the position permanently following the October 2021 coup, as that event represented a block to meaningful UK cooperation with the SAF.
+
+The Khartoum embassy was not immune to the “process” fatigue that afflicted FCDO globally as a result of the DFID-FCO merger. A carefully managed local merger process does appear, however, to have taken the edge off this. The UK’s relatively small staff footprint in Sudan probably facilitated the merger, with few pre-existing teams and “silos”.
+
+#### Strategy
+
+Interviews suggested that Sudanese who are familiar with the UK’s day-to-day diplomatic, defence and development engagement tend to see it as broadly coherent, and often give the UK credit for navigating the turbulent waters since 2018 with some success. But interviewees remarked that it is increasingly common to hear complaints about a lack of clear vision for Sudan beyond “transition”. Some reflected that the UK is struggling to play a decisive leadership role as it remains torn between different assumptions and strategies. In this view, the UK’s vocal support for a political transition is positive but not sufficient, and better articulation is needed of the relationship between restoring stability, achieving democratisation and reducing conflict.
+
+At the same time, it can be argued that a desire for stability in Sudan has shaped a UK policy that pursues elite settlements (for example, the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement and the 2005 CPA) that have been in tension with wider democratisation. Core elements of Sudan’s military, security and pro-Islamist establishment are intransigent and pitted in a zero-sum game against democratisation. Respondents noted that Western interests include a desire to be seen as working with and through a region (IGAD members and Gulf states) that includes governments that are not necessarily keen to promote democratisation. If the UK lacks a consistent strategy and vision here, it is, however, in company with arguably all Western states and multilaterals. These criticisms would extend to many others, including the UNITAMS “Trilateral Mechanism”, which is geared towards compromise. Yet given recent events, even a minimalist “pro-stability” agenda must now grapple with accruing evidence that military rule and associated economic predation is in fact the principal source of Sudan’s instability. From this perspective, as critical respondents argued, continuity will not bring stability. Rather, any future compromise settlement between military and civilian reformers will ultimately fail. In turn, this implies that Western actors should therefore develop red lines and strategies to help Sudan navigate potential future transitions or uprisings, at the same time exploring options to influence regional actors and build coherence among bottom-up social forces that might eventually shift power dynamics.
+
+#### Structures
+
+As interviewees pointed out, in Whitehall, legacy DFID and FCO Africa departments were gradually merged into one shared structure in 2021–22. Creating new structures and working relationships has apparently been less difficult than adjusting other business processes. Across the FCDO, existing business processes have had to be revised repeatedly as merger activities have run concurrently with a series of ministerial and leadership changes, restructuring in London, and iterative aid cuts. Respondents cited the successive changes as having slowed down delivery and decision-making and testing staff morale.
+
+Following the 2020 merger announcement, the Khartoum embassy began scoping out issues and options for delivering the merger of separate FCO and DFID teams and processes. According to interviews, by early 2021, a change-management process was underway, led by the deputy head of mission. The merger was felt to be disruptive by many, and a good many former DFID staff are said to have been demotivated by its prospect. Running a self-conscious change-management process in Khartoum may, however, have limited staff frustration and increased buy-in. Embassy staff were eventually structured into two “joint” teams, one focused on intra-Sudan issues, the other on external issues. Interviewees reported that corporate messaging is more unified now, and dealings with government easier to coordinate. Others reported that ambassadorial oversight of the UK’s portfolio of work in the country has improved.
+
+Interviews showed that Sudanese with close ties to the UK – for example, aid workers, sections of academia, business people and journalists – were very aware of DFID’s closure and the creation of the FCDO. Among this constituency, most did not expect the UK’s reputation to suffer as a result of the merger. In contrast to countries such as Ethiopia and Kenya, it appears from interviews that people in Sudan have more of a connection with the “UK” brand than with “DFID” specifically, perhaps as a result of the UK’s independent profile on peace mediation linked to its role in the Troika.
+
+Some observers felt that, following the merger, the UK’s development work was increasingly being seen through the lens of Sudan’s politics – an appropriate approach for the country. On the other hand, external partners noted a reduced focus by the FCDO on linking humanitarian relief efforts to development, once a prominent concern for DFID. It was unclear from the interviews, however, whether this is a consequence of the DFID–FCO merger, aid cuts, or other pressures.
+
+#### Leadership
+
+Interviews suggest that political instability in the UK, with high rates of ministerial turnover and questions around integrity, has left many Sudanese doubtful about UK leadership. Periodic clampdowns on African migration to the UK, the recent proposed arrangement to send asylum applicants to be processed and resettled in Rwanda, work permit restrictions and reports of worsening living conditions in the West are also negatively influencing attitudes towards the UK and the West. UK ministerial attention to Sudan has reduced from previous years, with no senior ministers visiting since 2021. This has been noticed in Sudan. Although there is a large constituency in favour of increased UK–Sudan engagement, the sense from interviews was that many expect UK engagement to diminish further as a result of a difficult economic situation in the UK and other concerns, including the war in Ukraine.
+
+#### Relationships
+
+As the examples above illustrate, the UK has built a range of useful relationships in Sudan, with multilateral organisations, like-minded bilaterals, regional powers and some elements in government, the military and civil society.
+
+The UK won both praise and blame for its coordination efforts during the transition period. On the positive side, UK officials played to the strengths of different partners in support of the transitional government, combining the UK’s own technical expertise with EU budgets and US leverage. The UK also influenced and supported the World Bank and the IMF around debt relief and reform. But as the examples above show, there were significant challenges associated with the overall approach taken by Western governments and IFIs during the 2019–21 transition period.
+
+Aside from larger strategic questions, a few respondents recalled the UK’s attempts to establish a common framework for day-to-day donor interaction with the government of Sudan. Having taken ownership of this agenda prior to summer 2019, they felt that the UK failed to make any progress with this agenda, ultimately yielding to Sweden. Apparently limited progress was being made just prior to the October 2021 coup, when the issue was dropped.
+
+Interviewees suggested that a minority of Sudanese observers feel that the UK has lost traction as a result of leaving the EU. Most see the issue as being of marginal importance. Interviewees reported no insurmountable operational changes flowing from Brexit. UK officials no longer attend routine EU cooperation meetings (such as the EU Heads of Mission, Political Council, and Heads of Development Cooperation meetings), but are finding workarounds. Although UK influence over EU activity is now diminished, there are alternative coordination structures with which the UK has long worked successfully, including the Friends of Sudan, Troika and Quad groupings. According to interviewees, the UK has a reputation for collaborative working with all of these, but with the Troika and Quad in particular. Indeed, respondents felt that the UK has been able to move more quickly diplomatically, and to demonstrate sharper messaging, since Brexit. It is also true, however, that Brexit itself – alongside other political difficulties – consumed an unwelcome amount of the UK government’s time, particularly for the FCDO and ministers, at exactly the point when increased attention to Sudan’s political transition was needed.
+
+Sudanese reflections on Western international engagement tend to focus on either the Troika countries or the UNITAMS mission. Views differ between urban elites (professionals, FFC-affiliated political parties) on the one hand and the “street” and resistance committees on the other. A range of interviewees indicated that the former, for example, perceive UNITAMS as confused and ineffective, and although concerned that they may be too willing to countenance compromise with the military, see the Troika and other Western countries as allies. The “street”, however, is cynical about all international involvement in Sudan, and apparently expects the West to restore the military via a hybrid government in pursuit of stability. Interviewees consider Western influence to be in decline relative to that of states in the wider region. Sudan’s ruling elite now seems little concerned about Western governments’ opinions – the October 2021 coup came just days after the chair of the Sovereign Council, General Al-Burhan, assured the British ambassador, the UK special envoy for Sudan, the Africa minister, and the US envoy of his commitment to the hybrid transitional government.
+
+At the same time, the UK is credited by respondents for its ongoing attempts to engage with regional and emerging powers, countries that past experience shows can decisively shape Sudan’s political direction. Egypt, the UAE and Saudi Arabia are seen as the country’s most influential neighbours. Egypt has deep connections with the Sudanese military and Saudi Arabia has relied on substantial RSF troops to fight in Yemen. As interviewees pointed out, Saudi Arabia and the UAE also have close economic ties with Sudan that include investments in land and productive industries, while the UAE is a major exporter to the country. They also note that the UAE and Saudi Arabia are particularly known for chequebook diplomacy, having provided cash loans to past Sudanese governments. All three countries prefer dealing with the Sudanese military to Islamist rule or democratisation – largely a reflection of their domestic politics.
+
+The fact that the UK also enjoys strong ties to the US at a time when the Abraham Accords coloured diplomacy with Gulf and Middle Eastern partners is also significant. The US recently appointed a new ambassador to Sudan, the first in many years. While still regarded as important, a visible donor and a sometimes strident political player, various interviewees saw the US as having declined in influence relative to others, including not only Gulf states but also Russia and China. For example, the Russian paramilitary organisation the Wagner Group has reportedly trained the RSF in exchange for gold. RSF leader General Hemedti has visited Moscow to discuss security cooperation – Russia being keen to secure a naval base in Sudan. A friendly Russia can influence UN mandates and voting on Sudanese affairs; likewise, Sudan abstained in March 2022 on UN votes on the Ukraine war. For its part, China maintains a stake in South Sudanese oil production and supplies cheap consumer goods to Sudan. Its investments overall are limited, however, and it is primarily concerned with regional stability.
+
+The UK’s consistent use of envoys to Sudan since the time of the CPA negotiations in the early 2000s has contributed to successful UK diplomacy. Individuals have come and gone, but the post is seen as important by allies and Sudanese interlocutors. While also working on South Sudan, respondents noted that the role of the current UK Envoy to Sudan maintains a broad set of relationships with government, opposition, armed groups and external partners, and is seen as coordinating well with peers.
+
+But with animosities driven by sanctions and mutual condemnations, interviewees underscored that UK relations with the government of Sudan have often been strained, and contacts difficult to cultivate. At times, including following the October 2021 coup, London would not countenance formal government-to-government contact between UK and Sudanese officials. The level of UK access and influence in Sudan has fluctuated from cooperation on specific initiatives (for example, HIPC and the Khartoum Process) to close alignment with elements of the recent transitional government and periods of outright hostility under the NCP. Western influence in Sudan has varied according to the strength of the military. The Friends of Sudan and Troika groups both condemned the October coup, leaving them with reduced influence with the military. The stridency of the UK ambassador in condemning the 2021 coup – initially alone – was remarked upon by more than one interviewee. While the UK may enjoy decent relations with a hybrid or civilian government, it was suggested by interviewees that the Sudanese military now sees it as antagonistic. Perhaps it is no surprise then that accusations of UK hyprocisy surface periodically, and diplomats have long faced movement restrictions and bureaucratic hurdles.
+
+In spite of all this, a range of interviewees assessed that the UK has, overall, succeeded in maintaining access to Sudanese governments, even while being critical of current and previous regimes. Despite difficulties and criticisms, it seems from this research that a majority of Sudanese still view the UK as a supportive partner with a positive track record. A few respondents, Sudanese and international, who have observed the UK at work over time considered the government-to-government relationship to have been inescapably difficult but managed with some skill. Respondents underscored that, with some exceptions, Sudanese are on the whole affectionate towards the UK, believing there to be a special, albeit neglected, relationship between the two countries that has huge untapped potential. This creates a two-way expectation that the UK can and should “do more”. A key question in the months and years ahead will be whether the UK and like-minded actors are prepared to go beyond established relationships with political parties and the military, to embrace the messy but necessary business of interacting regularly with “the street”. From this perspective, understanding how to engage and, where possible, support pro-democracy campaigners, whether through, for example, small capacity-building initiatives, encouraging dialogue or strategising among campaign groups, should be more of a priority.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+This paper has summarised findings on how the UK has sought to deliver positive change for Sudan as well as progress its “Global Britain” agenda through the use of development aid, defence engagement and diplomacy. It has looked in particular at the years since Brexit, during which the UK has made aid cuts and seen a brief fall in GDP and wider political and institutional changes.
+
+The UK generally enjoys a good reputation in Sudan. This derives partly from diaspora and cultural ties and, for some, positive memories of the colonial era. It also, however, comes from the UK’s fairly consistent championing of civilian rule, conflict resolution and humanitarianism, which has led to it still being regarded in Sudan as a relevant actor, with worthwhile capabilities from skilled personnel to valuable aid contributions, and some measure of influence.
+
+The UK can claim substantial depth and quality of relationships both in Sudan and with regional actors. Its ability to operate in multiple forums, from New York to Khartoum and the region, including through the use of envoys, ambassadors, and political and aid specialists, is significant. Leaving the EU has had a marginal effect on the UK’s standing in Sudan. The merger of DFID and the FCO has absorbed time and energy, but the benefits of joined-up working are identifiable. The end of DFID does not appear to have had a marked effect, unlike cuts to the aid budget. These are most noticeable in relation to humanitarian delivery and partner confidence.
+
+In the face of ongoing budget cuts and the rise of competitors, however, doubts now exist about the durability of UK influence. Interviewees expected UK influence to wane in the years ahead. Some expressed confusion or frustration that the former colonial power will not commit further resources. It is true that in resource terms – barring a brief increase in the 2019–20 UK aid budget linked to economic reform – the country has not been prioritised as suggested in the 2021 Integrated Review. The Ukraine war, the Covid-19 pandemic, budget cuts and turbulent UK politics have drawn time and money away from Sudan. As interviewees noted, the contemporary issue for many pro-democracy actors in Sudan, however, is a suspicion that the UK and Western allies will play a conservative hand in future, opting for political compromise in the hope of achieving stability. This would be despite the UK’s professed values and in the face of increasing evidence that the military grip is a key driver of Sudan’s instability.
+
+Looking ahead, despite its many problems, Sudan presents challenges that the UK could help to address if ministers were prepared to offer a combination of technical leadership, targeted financing and support for political coalition-building. Alongside humanitarian relief and reform, areas of traditional UK expertise, from stabilisation to improving governance, security sector reform and economic development, will all be critical. The UK might, for example, find opportunities to convene like-minded actors interested in these issues, or it might seek to facilitate dialogue among disparate pro-democracy groups in the hope of avoiding the mistakes of the previous transitional government. To maximise its effectiveness, the UK should reflect on the significance of the enabling and constraining factors identified in this paper and identify gaps and lessons to be learned around its recent strategies and vision for a future Sudan.
+
+---
+
+__Simon Rynn__ is Senior Research Fellow for Africa at the International Security Studies department at RUSI. His experience covers conflict prevention and peacebuilding, stabilisation, security and justice, de-mining, humanitarian, governance and small arms control. His main research focus is on the security of East Africa and the Horn, particularly the security sector, external engagement with stabilisation and peace support operations, as well as economic security and the relationship between security and international development.
+
+__Michael Jones__ is a Research Fellow in the Terrorism and Conflict team examining political violence, governance by non/pseudo-state armed groups, and the convergence of violent extremism and insurgent militancy in East and sub-Saharan Africa. He has led investigative fieldwork across various countries including Sudan, Kenya and Lebanon; managed conflict focused projects looking into Darfur and Somalia; and worked in RUSI’s Nairobi Office on a range of projects related to the EU’s STRIVE Horn of Africa and STRIVE II programming.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-12-talibans-counter-terrorism.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-12-talibans-counter-terrorism.md
new file mode 100644
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-12-talibans-counter-terrorism.md
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Taliban’s Counter-terrorism
+author: Antonio Giustozzi
+date : 2023-06-12 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/OkTbxvb.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "The Islamic State and the Taliban’s Counter-terrorism"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_As the Taliban develops its state and governance apparatus in Afghanistan, it is also confronted with the unexpected task of developing a counter-terrorism strategy. As Antonio Giustozzi explains, the Islamic State in Khorasan has now turned on the Taliban, drawing attention to the complexity of extreme right-wing terrorism, deeply entrenched as it is in the social fabric of Afghanistan._
+
+
+
+In August 2021, the Taliban suddenly went from being an insurgent organisation, not alien to deploying terrorist tactics, to being a government, even if not recognised by anybody as such as yet. The Taliban themselves were shocked by their faster-than-anticipated rise to power, and were caught unprepared. They had to move quickly, and figure out how to (re)organise the state apparatus.
+
+If capturing the state had always been their aim, more unexpected was the fact that they also had to come up with a counter-terrorism strategy. This was because the competing insurgents of the Islamic State (IS) in Khorasan did not wither away, contrary to what many Taliban had expected, who were seeing it largely as a proxy of the previous government, and hence imagined that it would melt away. Instead, after a lull of a few weeks, the IS was back with a renewed campaign of terrorist attacks in the cities, more intense and widespread than the Taliban’s own in earlier years. After initially targeting religious minorities almost exclusively (as it had done before August 2021), the IS gradually widened its targets to include Taliban state institutions and pro-Taliban clerics; eventually, it would start targeting individual Taliban officials.
+
+Indeed, the IS in Khorasan has embarked on a transformation, from being primarily an insurgent organisation which deployed terrorist tactics in urban environments to one almost entirely focused on terrorist campaign. By 2022, it had given up on a half-hearted attempt to wage a guerrilla war in the east, and went completely underground, forming secret cells and abandoning all fixed bases. Once a very centralised organisation willing to challenge its enemies and especially the Taliban on the open battlefield, the IS had to change its modus operandi and adopt a much more decentralised structure.
+
+In order to run a structure based on hundreds of small cells, the IS became dependent on producing a steady flow of reliable cadres. Its original character of being a coalition of disparate hardline Taliban, Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Central Asian splinter groups had already been changing over the years. The in-flow of former Taliban and TTP members had largely dried up by 2017 and casualties wore down the original nuclei (which in 2014–15 had come together in the so-called “Wilayah Khorasan” (Khorasan province)). The IS had to rely more and more on other sources of recruits, and found them in the Salafi community and in various radical Islamist groups such as Hizb ut Tahrir, whose ideologies had some contiguity with that of the IS and were mostly active among university students. With that, the ideological unity and “quality” of the IS in Khorasan’s rank and file improved, but the bulk of the new recruits were still poorly educated villagers, typically brought into the organisation by community elders who felt the community was threatened.
+
+After August 2021, Salafi madrasas and university graduates became even more important because of this need for ideologically dependable, even fanatically committed, cadres to staff the small cells that had become the mainstay of the organisation. The Taliban, now the de facto government, cracked down on Salafi madrasas, closing down any that they suspected of supplying recruits to the IS. As a result, the importance of universities as a source of recruits increased further.
+
+The IS in Khorasan managed to establish a strong presence in the universities of Kabul and Nangarhar quite rapidly once it started focusing more on the Salafi community and pious individuals leaning towards Salafism. They were helped by the fact that, in order to stem the influence of the Taliban in the Islamic Law Faculty of Kabul University, the Afghan authorities had encouraged the appointment of Salafi professors, several of whom were later accused of helping the IS recruit among students.
+
+The Taliban did not waste much time in cracking down on IS recruitment in the universities, imposing a strict security regime. Recruitment became harder for the IS, but not impossible, especially as it moved much of its recruitment activity online. My recently published report discusses in detail the adaptation of the IS in Afghanistan’s university campuses, and how it developed a sophisticated system to attract new recruits without taking excessive risks.
+
+In brief, the IS formed specialised cells, each tasked to focus on a particular phase of the recruitment process. A team would identify suitable recruits among Salafi or Salafi-leaning students, known to have poor relations with Taliban security staff, with non-Salafi teachers, or with Hanafi and Shi’a students. These individuals would then be targeted for recruitment, first by a dedicated team inviting them to social media accounts sharing strict Salafist literature and videos. Then, depending on their response, another team would step in, sharing with them more political, pro-IS material via private chats. Finally, assuming the targeted recruit does not bail out, a third team would start face-to-face contact.
+
+The Taliban’s security regime has been limiting the ability of the IS to recruit in university campuses to somewhere between 100-200 students per year, according to IS sources that appear quite credible (given also that it seems a relatively modest claim). This number may indeed appear modest, but these recruits then mostly turn into cadres, whom the IS deems of essential importance for maintaining and reinforcing the ideological strength of the organisation. Few of these recruits turn into regular fighters or even commanders; instead, they staff the terror cells or take up the job of trainer/indoctrinator, an increasingly essential role in an organisation that needs to stiffen the ideological conformity of its members. Whereas in the past it was common to recruit members of the Salafi community, even villagers, and induce them into the organisation without much indoctrination, now the three-month-long ideological/religious training courses are much more important, so more trainers are required.
+
+The Taliban have of course noticed the shift towards online activities and have tried to disrupt them with some success. But social media propaganda and recruitment does not need to be carried out locally, at least not entirely, and indeed a growing number of propagandists of the IS in Khorasan are based in Europe and other locations outside Afghanistan. The Taliban are trying to infiltrate their private chats, in order to identify the cells based inside Afghanistan. So far, the IS has been able to maintain the bulk of its social media operations, despite some losses. Overall, the Taliban have been quicker at taking on the mantle of counter-terrorism than many thought they would, but the IS remains a highly adaptive organisation that will likely defy attempts to destroy it.
+
+---
+
+__Antonio Giustozzi__ is Visiting Fellow at the LSE South Asia Centre and Senior Research Fellow at Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), London. He is author, most recently, of “Jihadism in Pakistan: Al-Qaeda, Islamic State and the Local Militants” (2023), among others.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-12-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-65.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-12-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-65.md
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-12-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-65.md
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第 65 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-06-12 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 原定今開展辯方案情 惟因法官陳慶偉不適押後
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（12日）踏入審訊第65天。法官上周裁定16名不認罪被告全部表證成立，其中除吳政亨、余慧明和楊雪盈3人暫時料不作供外，其餘13人擬作供，原定今開展辯方案情。
+
+惟今甫開庭，只有法官李運騰和陳仲衡兩人步入法庭，陳慶偉則缺席。李運騰表示其中一名法官感不適，今天將不會繼續聆訊，並會於今午4時前通知各方明天是否續審，聆訊不足30秒結束。多名被告面露無奈，有人說「噢」，鄭達鴻和陳志全等苦笑，鄒家成一度頭挨向後方的牆，散庭時眾人議論紛紛，有懲教人員大喊：「肅靜！」
+
+司法機構傍晚回覆查詢，表示案件明天繼續休庭，明將再通知後天是否續審。
+
+
+▲ 何啟明、劉偉聰
+
+本案開審逾4個月，曾因被告和法官身體不適而押後審訊。其中李予信3月1日因打泰拳受傷留院，法官認為不能在被告缺席下繼續審訊，決定押後，並指法庭每天開支不菲，着被告勿參與危險運動；而趙家賢原定3月28日作供，但因法官陳仲衡身體不適押後。另施德來和彭卓棋於5月初相繼確診新冠病毒，審訊一度押後3天。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-13-defence-industry-in-northern-ireland.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-13-defence-industry-in-northern-ireland.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..a4bb0293
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-13-defence-industry-in-northern-ireland.md
@@ -0,0 +1,365 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Defence Industry In N. Ireland
+author: Isabella Antinozzi and Trevor Taylor
+date : 2023-06-13 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/kFPM1Lr.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Leveraging Untapped Potential"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_In light of UK policy pledges to give defence a more regional footprint, this paper explores the extent of defence activity in Northern Ireland, a region that exhibits considerable defence potential yet has benefited only marginally from defence expenditure in recent years._
+
+
+
+### Executive Summary
+
+Since 2015, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has been explicitly directed to contribute to UK prosperity and, since then, it has consistently emphasised that the whole of the country should benefit from defence spending. The defence industry is economically important to many areas of the UK, and defence policy must be consistent with an industrial strategy that promotes jobs and skills throughout the UK’s regions and nations. In light of these policy pledges to give defence a more regional footprint, this paper explores the extent of defence activity in Northern Ireland (NI), a region that exhibits considerable defence potential yet has benefited only marginally from defence expenditure in recent years.
+
+The paper finds that:
+
+- NI is a long-contested region of the UK and experienced decades of violent sectarian conflict between the late 1960s and the late 1990s. The shadow of this conflict, some local political parties’ antipathy to the defence industry and a historical trend towards unequal regional MoD spending have considerably affected the defence demographics of NI today, resulting in little work being located there. However, a series of contextual and business changes are underway involving three prominent businesses with considerable defence potential: Thales, an experienced defence-focused business unit; Harland & Wolff, a heavy engineering firm at the centre of the National Shipbuilding Strategy’s aim of regenerating the shipbuilding sector; and Spirit AeroSystems, a high-technology aerospace company looking to expand into the defence space.
+
+- In addition to these three larger companies, the NI defence sector comprises many small to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) operating predominantly in the digital manufacturing and technology sectors. Despite the customer focus and agility that they add throughout the defence supply chain, these smaller companies still feel that defence is a particularly difficult market to access. They experience several difficulties, some largely common to small firms across the country and others peculiar to the NI context.
+
+- Another key industrial asset in NI is its civilian aerospace legacy. The relevance of this sector is enhanced by the growing inter-relationships between the civil and military sectors. In an era where information capture and analysis are central to defence capability, surveillance and communications systems are often deployed on and in civil aircraft. In the uncrewed air systems domain, such systems are increasingly used for civil and military purposes. Thus, NI suppliers with certified qualities should explore and be considered for work in both the defence and civil sectors.
+
+- In addition to a strong civilian aerospace pedigree in the region, defence can also leverage NI’s vibrant cyber security sector. In the years since the Good Friday Agreement, NI has become a hotspot for cyber-security innovation, with cities such as Belfast and Derry/Londonderry exhibiting high technology specialists and consistently attracting domestic as well as overseas investment. Through its cyber-security clusters and academic centres of excellence, NI has developed beyond the average UK science and technology capabilities, nurtured science, technology, engineering and mathematics skills and established leading R&D programmes. These activities are the basis for generating military and security capabilities and other tangible and intangible assets, which are themselves levers of national power and influence.
+
+In all, NI exhibits considerable defence potential, with three prominent businesses at the top of the supply chain that can, together with the extensive range of SMEs in the region, create an opportunity to promote NI, not as part of the problem set of UK defence and security, but as a valued contributor to its management and solution. The MoD should be monitoring the situation and looking for further opportunities to support local stakeholders, as the current UK government ambition that the whole of the UK should benefit from defence activity is clearly not being met. This should be a particular concern of those in the MoD focused on prosperity and also be in the consciousness of all involved with defence spending with the private sector.
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+There is a growing interest in the place of defence, especially the defence industry, in the UK economy. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) has been directed to contribute to national prosperity since the 2015 National Security Review. A study on defence in the economy by former defence procurement minister Philip Dunne was published in 2018. Recognised data limits in turn prompted the creation of the Joint Economic Data Hub (JEDHub) within the Defence Solutions Centre, whose initial report was published in 2022. The government’s 2021 Defence and Security Industrial Strategy (DSIS) included economic considerations among a range of wider factors.
+
+There has long been awareness of regional variations in the economic impact of defence work, but a parliamentary exchange in 2020 between Dunne and Secretary of State for Defence Ben Wallace made clear that the government is aware of local and regional considerations and aspires to see benefits for the whole of the UK.
+
+> The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Ben Wallace): The MOD makes procurement decisions based on security, capability requirement, cost, supply chain and other social value considerations and will continue to do so. The November 2020 changes to the Green Book will ensure that there is an increased focus on setting clear objectives and consideration of location-based impacts. MOD footprint and spend is widely distributed across the UK and future procurement will continue to reflect this.
+
+> …
+
+> While the end-of-year rules were not changed, the recent £24.1 billion multi-year settlement with the Treasury will now allow the MOD to invest in next generation military capability across the whole United Kingdom.
+
+In Parliament, the Scottish Affairs Committee has devoted extended attention to defence in Scotland, but there has been little systematic information about the defence industry in Northern Ireland (NI), a gap that this paper seeks to fill.
+
+#### Aims and Objectives
+
+This paper examines the main challenges related to conducting defence business in NI as well as the key players in the region’s defence industrial landscape. It explores this landscape with a focus on three objectives:
+
+1. To collect, digest and explain information on the current position regarding spending on defence industry in NI.
+
+2. To assess the ambition and potential of businesses in NI to do more in and for the defence sector.
+
+3. To generate suggestions for government action to facilitate the ambition that the whole of the UK should benefit from the defence budget.
+
+The paper focuses primarily on the defence sector and on traditional defence players in NI. The security industry in NI is diversified, offering products and services to numerous government departments and organisations, as well as a broad spectrum of clients in the private sector. In contrast, the MoD is frequently the only buyer of specialised defence goods. Although it has thousands of suppliers for a wide range of products and services, many of which are not naturally associated with military capability, it typically purchases defence equipment from a limited number of much larger prime contractors who are able to handle the complex financial, technological and engineering requirements of delivering highly complex systems. These suppliers are the focus of this research. Government policy shapes the UK defence industry’s market much more than that of the security industry. Due to the MoD’s special relationship and ability to shape the market, this paper primarily focuses on the defence sector in NI and on the activities of Tier 1 and 2 suppliers therein. The extent and importance of the security sector in NI, and particularly cyber, is nonetheless addressed in Chapter IV.
+
+#### Methodology
+
+The research for this paper included a targeted review of academic literature on regional defence spending, as well as of grey literature (for example, reports from industry associations, defence company websites, UK government websites, innovation organisations and independent research organisations) in order to provide a considered, well-referenced analysis. The researchers also spent a week in NI speaking to industry associations, and industry prime and lower-tier suppliers. “Lower tier” refers to mid-tier, mid-sized and small SMEs – that is, non-prime defence contractors. Interviewees within these companies were selected on the basis of their knowledge of the topic, with a snowball sampling drawing from a network of defence companies in the region provided by Aerospace, Defence, Security & Space (ADS), a UK-wide industrial association. A list of the organisations and stakeholders whose insights have informed this research are in the Annex. Where possible, interview data was triangulated with open source references. The identities of those providing information and the organisations they work for have been kept confidential to facilitate their ability to speak freely, with exceptions related to those who explicitly agreed to be identified.
+
+
+### I. Defence Procurement and the Levelling-Up Agenda
+
+Equipping the armed forces to deliver their outputs is one of the most critical, demanding and complex tasks faced by the UK government. The procurement of military equipment has never been a simple matter of seeking to buy the “best kit” for the military, as defence procurement can be an important factor in a nation’s economic strength, making contributions beyond the pure military instrument. Defence spending often plays a key role in anchoring regional economies, including providing opportunities to communities in otherwise economically deprived areas by, for instance, promoting employment and the development of specialist knowledge, skills and expertise, or by promoting regional investment opportunities through defence-related exports. As such, procurement decisions can have ramifications for the dynamism of regional ecosystems.
+
+Since 2015 and even before, the UK government has sought to include many of these considerations in explicit policy frameworks such as sector strategies, most prominently the DSIS. Since 2015, the MoD has been centrally directed to use its funding, in part, to promote national prosperity. Dunne’s report in 2018 argued that procurement decisions should not rest on cost alone, and that consideration should also be given to the prosperity impact on local economies when making procurement decisions. The Defence in a Competitive Age 2021 paper stressed how defence benefited the whole of the UK, including employment, publishing numbers that aggregated the benefits in Scotland, Wales and NI. The DSIS further reinforced the multiple benefits linked to defence procurement.
+
+In 2023, the government aims to use defence procurement for the pursuit of multiple objectives that were well summarised in the Land Industrial Strategy published in 2022 (see Figure 1).
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 1: Elements of the Land Industrial Strategy Objectives Framework.__ Source: [MoD, “Land Industrial Strategy: Fusing Our Capability and Industrial Objectives”, 2022](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1076392/Land_Industrial_Strategy.pdf), p. 27._
+
+The economic impact of defence spending can be negative when expenditure is excessive, but it clearly generates employment and can involve the generation of skills for the civil economy. Defence spending on R&D can yield technologies that are valuable in both the military and civil sectors. And a not-trivial consideration is the significant proportion of defence funds spent in country that are returned to the Treasury in the form of income and other taxes. Long-term defence projects also encourage participating firms to invest in manufacturing facilities that can then have civil uses. In 2023, very few of these benefits apply in NI, a situation that this paper attempts to analyse.
+
+
+### II. The Defence Business in Northern Ireland: Background
+
+This chapter discusses the macroeconomic situation in NI and reasons for the limited defence spending in the region.
+
+#### Economic Background and NI Defence Share
+
+Across a broad range of economic and social metrics, geographic differences in the UK are large in absolute terms and have widened over recent decades. NI is a region of just over 1.9 million people, and accounts for 2.8% of the UK’s population. It was once well known for shipbuilding and the linen industry, but these industries have experienced a severe decline. NI is the poorest performing UK region for productivity, almost 20% below the UK level, and is falling behind, with a lower level of productivity growth relative to the UK average.
+
+Mirroring these disparities, the UK defence sector has historically been characterised as exhibiting a north–south divide, with southern regions of the UK receiving the major share of defence expenditure and employment. This trend continues, and throughout the 21st century NI has benefited minimally from defence spending. According to the Office for National Statistics, total annual MoD expenditure with UK industry was just over £21 billion in 2021/22, with NI receiving 0.5% of the total (see Table 1).
+
+
+_▲ __Table 1: MoD Total Spending with UK Industry and NI Share: 2013/14 to 2021/22 (in Current Prices).__ Source: [MoD, “Finance–Economics: Annual Statistical Bulletin: Regional Expenditure”, “Table 2: MOD Expenditure with UK Industry in Current Prices by Region”](https://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=https%3A%2F%2Fassets.publishing.service.gov.uk%2Fgovernment%2Fuploads%2Fsystem%2Fuploads%2Fattachment_data%2Ffile%2F1130991%2FData_tables_relating_to_Finance__Economics_Annual_Statistical_Bulletin_-_Regional_Expenditure_-_2122.ods&wdOrigin=BROWSELINK)._
+
+In terms of MoD spending per head in a region, the NI figure for the year 2021/22 was £60, while the national average was £310 (see Table 2).
+
+
+_▲ __Table 2: MoD Spending with UK Industry Per Person: UK Average and NI Figures, 2013/14 to 2021/22 (in Constant Prices).__ Source: [MoD, “Finance–Economics: Annual Statistical Bulletin: Regional Expenditure”, “Table 5: MoD Expenditure Per Person with UK Industry in Constant 2020/21 Prices by Region”](https://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=https%3A%2F%2Fassets.publishing.service.gov.uk%2Fgovernment%2Fuploads%2Fsystem%2Fuploads%2Fattachment_data%2Ffile%2F1130991%2FData_tables_relating_to_Finance__Economics_Annual_Statistical_Bulletin_-_Regional_Expenditure_-_2122.ods&wdOrigin=BROWSELINK)._
+
+With a population of over 1.9 million, the latest (2023) report by the MoD’s JEDHub shows that Northern Ireland accounted for 0.8% of national defence private sector employment. A report by the MoD in 2022 showed that in terms of direct defence-related employment, in 2020/21, for every 100,000 people in full-time employment in NI, just 60 of these jobs were UK defence related. The equivalent number for Scotland was 640 and for the southwest of England it was 2,060. The January 2023 edition of the same government report did not include the figures on this topic. While recent new streams of work for Thales and Harland & Wolff for missiles and Fleet Solid Support ships work are likely to boost direct employment associated with MoD spending, the figures for 2019/20 show that Northern Ireland only accounted for 500 of the 125,000 jobs supported by UK defence in total.
+
+#### Reasons for Low NI Defence Expenditure
+
+There are a number of reasons why the NI defence industry is not as vigorous as that of other regions. These include the commercial failings of past defence establishments (leaving a minimal presence of defence primes in the province), sensitivities linked to the region’s past, and a historical trend towards unequal regional MoD spending.
+
+NI is a long-contested region of the UK, which experienced decades of violent sectarian conflict between the late 1960s and the late 1990s. This period, known as the Troubles, came to an end in 1998 with the creation of a power-sharing government that included political forces aligned with armed groups. As part of this settlement, known as the Good Friday Agreement, the British government committed to reducing the number and role of the armed forces deployed in NI, as well as to the removal of security installations and defence bases. Due to the extremely complex and sensitive legacy of NI’s past and the demilitarisation efforts envisaged by the Good Friday Agreement, conducting defence business in the region has not been easy.
+
+These difficulties, peculiar to NI, are also exacerbated by a trend of unequal regional MoD spending. This, coupled with the shadow of 30 years of conflict as well as some local political parties’ antipathy to the defence industry, has considerably affected the defence demographics of NI, resulting in little work located there. But a series of contextual and business changes are underway, and it is on these that this paper now focuses.
+
+
+### III. Surveying the Potential of the NI Defence Industry
+
+This chapter outlines the activities of key Tier 1 and 2 suppliers in NI, as well as the opportunities and challenges faced by suppliers down the supply chain.
+
+#### Key NI Defence Industrial Players
+
+NI exhibits a vibrant industrial panorama with some key companies, including the US-owned aerospace company Rockwell Collins, whose NI subsidiary is focused on making seats for commercial aircraft, and Schrader Electronics, a US-owned electronics firm. Three firms with defence potential stand out: Harland & Wolff (H&W); Thales; and Spirit AeroSystems.
+
+__H&W__
+
+In August 2019, H&W in Belfast went into liquidation with 79 employees. While having had a notable and extensive history in shipbuilding, including construction of the Titanic, it had been in a sustained decline. The last vessel it built for the Royal Navy was a Leander-class frigate completed in 1968. The last ship it built was Anvil Point, a roll-on roll-off ferry under an MoD Private Finance Initiative, which was delivered in 2003.
+
+Soon after liquidation, the firm was bought by a strategic infrastructure company, previously known as InfraStrata plc, for the modest sum of £6 million, under which it acquired a very large infrastructure in Belfast covering 81 acres that included drydock facilities able to take the largest military ships, including the UK’s aircraft carriers. There are other docking areas and two historic Samson and Goliath cranes. In terms of buildings, there are two enormous fabrication halls that were and could again be used to build whole ships and certainly ship blocks under cover, so long as investment in manufacturing plant was available.
+
+It is easy to be impressed by the entrepreneurial spirit of the new owners who have restored the H&W name, invested in new capabilities and found work that could take advantage of their infrastructure. In February 2023, a large tanker was in drydock to be painted and for other repairs, a Royal Fleet Auxiliary vessel was moored awaiting some attention, and one of the large halls had an installed computerised welding machine involved in the building of two dozen barges for the waste and recycling firm Cory. On occasion, large cruise ships come in for maintenance work. The workforce at the yard had grown significantly by February 2023 and there is an active recruitment programme in place, especially for apprentices. In April 2023, the firm had 65 apprentices working on site.
+
+Under the new ownership H&W has also grown by acquisition. In 2020, it bought the Appledore yard in Devon, which had been abandoned by its owner Babcock after its work on the Queen Elizabeth-class had been completed, along with an order from the Republic of Ireland for four patrol craft. When H&W took over Appledore in 2019 there was one employee, the site manager. In 2021, H&W also bought facilities on the east and west coasts of Scotland at Methil and Arnish, for which it had plans for offshore energy and defence work.
+
+H&W also shared in the confidence in the regeneration of the UK shipbuilding industry that was a feature of the government’s National Shipbuilding Strategy of 2017 and the refresh of that document that was published in 2022.
+
+In autumn 2022, H&W was a key element of the Team Resolute consortium that was named as the preferred bidder for the £1.6-billion contract to build three Fleet Solid Support (FSS) ships. The consortium was led by Navantia of Spain, which will provide the design (supported by BMT of the UK) and do some (possibly most) of the construction. Navantia is the prime contractor with ultimate (financial) responsibility for delivery of the vessels. H&W will begin by building at least the bow block of the ship in Belfast and other work will take place at Appledore. Capturing and enhancing the shipbuilding expertise that was formerly at Appledore, rebuilding capability in Belfast and building a positive relationship between the Appledore and Belfast sites will be important for both those sites and the FSS programme. Final assembly of the component blocks is planned for Belfast. Some sense of the weight of the work to be done by the H&W group (Belfast and Appledore) can be gleaned from the £700–800-million manufacturing contract that H&W signed with Navantia in early 2023.
+
+Overall, the choice of Team Resolute to deliver the FSS indicates that the MoD sought to tick the levelling up and prosperity boxes by providing opportunities to H&W but, at the same time, passed financial risk to Navantia in Spain by making it the prime contractor.
+
+In an uncomfortable session for the MoD, Vice Admiral Paul Marshall provided two pieces of reassurance for the Defence Committee. First, he specified how a workforce was to be generated for Belfast:
+
+> The mobilisation of the workforce is absolutely a key risk for the programme; it is probably the most significant risk that I see going forwards. There is a plan, first, to recruit workers into the yards. They will then go to Spain to be trained and upskilled before returning to the UK. Then, in a “train the trainer” kind of way, Spanish shipbuilders will help to train the UK workforce in the UK yards. On reducing that further, the procurement strategy of integration in a UK yard is a significant mitigation of the risk overall: we know exactly what our obligations are in the contract when it comes to not only producing the ship but how it is ultimately integrated and brought together at Harland & Wolff.
+
+Second, he stressed that delivery of social value elements was a contractual obligation in the contract with Navantia:
+
+> the threshold social value within the FSS contract is 10%—that is an obligation within the contract and it will be managed through the usual contract governance.
+
+Members of the Defence Committee expressed fears that H&W will be unable to acquire the skills and capability to deliver much work on the FSS, which will then result in most of the manufacturing taking place in Spain. Moreover, such a development could appear to be in Navantia’s commercial interest and seemingly limit its incentives to help out H&W. Another scenario is that H&W might generate a workforce by bringing workers from other parts of Europe.
+
+The owners of H&W cannot be criticised for their entrepreneurial spirit and ambition but, if things do not go well, those responsible for the selection and implementation of the procurement strategy should expect to be held to account for their choices. However, should the FSS project proceed on schedule, the MoD will have made a significant contribution to turning what had become an industrial wasteland near the centre of Belfast into a hive of activity with longer-term prospects. Indeed, if H&W can deliver to time and budget, technology and expertise will be transferred from Spain, and the company will be well placed to win fabrication and support work on other vessels, including defence ships.
+
+__Thales__
+
+The Thales plant in Belfast has gone from relative neglect by government to near centre stage.
+
+Originally this plant was part of Short Brothers and was focused on missiles. By 1989, Short Brothers was a government-controlled, struggling company. With the government agreeing to take over Short Brothers’ debts, Bombardier of Canada agreed to buy the business for £30 million in 1989. The business also included aircraft development and production in a separate but relatively nearby site that today is owned and operated by Spirit AeroSystems in the US (see section on Spirit AeroSystems below).
+
+In 1993, Bombardier formed a missile 50–50 joint venture with Thomson-CSF of France (which was subsequently renamed Thales). Next, Bombardier strategically opted out of the defence sector and sold its share of the missile joint venture to its French partner Thales in 2000. Since then, Thales has run the Belfast plant along with a final assembly unit in the NI countryside which completes the missiles with propellant and explosive elements.
+
+Thales Belfast has three main products: Starstreak; Lightweight Multirole Missile (LMM) systems; and the Next Generation Light Anti-Armour Weapon (NLAW). Starstreak is a short-range, high-speed, ground-to-air missile system (which can also be steered to hit surface targets over three miles away) and can be fired from land or sea platforms. LMM is a lightweight, precision-strike multirole missile designed to be fired from a variety of tactical platforms on land, sea and air. LMM development began in 2008, building on technology from Starstreak. Qualification testing and initial production commenced in late 2011, following an initial contract by the MoD in April 2011, but progress was slow. It was integrated on to the Wildcat helicopter and fired from that platform in the early 2020s.
+
+The NLAW is a man-portable, anti-armour, tube-launched missile. This is a joint effort with Saab of Sweden, which produces many of the weapon’s internal components with Thales doing final assembly as well as some production work. The weapon came into service with the British Army in 2009.
+
+While government provision was made for the assured UK production of small arms ammunition, most recently in the Next Generation Munitions Solutions contract with BAE Systems, and for the development and production of a range of complex weapons (in the Complex Weapons Portfolio with MBDA in the lead), there was no commitment between 2013 and 2020 about sustaining the UK development, production and support capabilities of the munitions produced by Thales. Instead, there were just a number of individual contracts. The last reported MoD order for new Starstreak missiles was in 2013, although Thales received availability and upgrade contracts in 2018 (£98 million) and 2021 (almost £100 million). However, Thales was successful in winning exports, particularly in Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia, and South Africa. Thales’ Paris headquarters gave the support, including in its move to diversify its capabilities into directed energy systems and electric power for space systems.
+
+Then, in 2022, Thales Belfast’s products became a vital asset for UK supplies to Ukraine. The Russian invasion of Ukraine showed once again what 21st-century conventional inter-state war could look like. It underlined the value of inexpensive weapons that could bring down helicopters and low-flying, fixed-wing aircraft (Starstreak) and anti-tank weapons (including NLAWs), which played an important role in denying Russian hopes of a quick victory. The operational value of both weapons has been reliably reported, with Wallace observing: “These next generation light anti-tank weapons have played a decisive role in supporting Ukraine’s army to drive back Russia’s illegal invading forces”.
+
+But in such a war, very large numbers of these weapons are needed. As a result of UK NLAW supply to Ukraine from British stock, the UK has needed to replace and perhaps enhance its own holdings and will also likely want to send more supplies to Ukraine. In April 2022, the MoD contracted for 500 weapons to be delivered in 2023 and in December 2022 it placed a £224-million contract with Thales and Saab for many more NLAWs for delivery in two and three years’ time. Wallace said:
+
+> Secured through Defence Equipment and Support – the MoD’s procurement arm – today’s agreement will see several thousand units delivered to UK Armed Forces across 2024–2026, in addition to around 500 being delivered in 2023 through a separate procurement.
+
+While the experience of the Ukraine war has much enhanced recognition of Thales Belfast’s strategic significance, its economic impact should not be overlooked. In 2023, the company, by now with over 600 employees, pointed out that:
+
+> Thales contributes £35 million to Northern Ireland’s GDP with Thales Belfast’s staff average pay in the top 10% of all employees in Northern Ireland. Thales Belfast also supports an ecosystem of suppliers and 91% of our local procurement in Northern Ireland is with small to medium enterprises (SMEs).
+
+Thales Belfast’s future seems assured while the Ukraine war lasts, but thereafter much hinges on how the MoD and the Army decide to prioritise defence funds. Will they emphasise the sort of modest-cost munitions which are the focus in NI and look to build larger stocks than before, justified by deterrence arguments and the value of capabilities for sustained warfighting? Might they also look to Thales for capabilities to surge production rates in times of crisis? Will they fund work so that the munition performance can be regularly improved, enabling the company to sustain a capacity for R&D? What place will international collaboration play in such matters? Alternatively, will complacency be restored with peace in Ukraine and neglect of mid-range munitions return as a feature of UK defence procurement?
+
+In 2023, the signs are at least promising: Thales is developing and producing its next generation multi-role missile to be mounted on UK ships, land vehicles and helicopters and in 2021, Thales Belfast was a significant part of the consortium awarded a contract to work on the development of laser weapons, which the company said would protect 140 jobs and allow the creation of 40 more. With support from Thales headquarters, Thales Belfast is also investing in space technologies, dealing particularly with electric propulsion, and has prompted the establishment of a regional special interest group of some 30 smaller companies.
+
+__Spirit AeroSystems__
+
+Spirit is a US-based company that was formed when Boeing sold off its factory in Wichita and its Oklahoma operations in 2005. In the US, Spirit is a major supplier of structures for the 737 and Boeing remains Spirit’s main customer.
+
+Things went awry in March 2019 when the latest version of this aircraft, the 737 Max, was grounded for 20 months after two crashes, and even in 2021 some doubts remained about its safety. Then in 2020, the Covid-19 pandemic virtually stopped the civil aviation business in its tracks with, at that time, no date visible for its recovery.
+
+These developments prompted Spirit to decide both to reduce its reliance on Boeing and to diversify its products to include defence. In the US, it has won work designing and producing aerostructures on militarised civil aircraft, notably the KC-46 and the P-8A, but also on the CH-53K and V-280 helicopter and tilt rotor and the B-21 bomber. It has invested in composites capable of high-temperature operations and with potential for hypersonic flight.
+
+Spirit bought BAE Systems’ aerostructures business in Prestwick in Scotland in 2006, and a key step in the move to a wider customer base was the purchase of Bombardier’s businesses in NI in 2020.
+
+Today the core of Spirit’s work in Belfast is construction of the fuselage and other structures for Bombardier business jets and advanced composite wings for the Airbus 220. This aircraft has proved a strong commercial success, and by January 2022, there had been 680 orders and 194 deliveries, yielding an order backlog of 486.
+
+Spirit Belfast’s production of Airbus 220 wings, which are largely made from composite materials, has benefited from extensive capital investment in production machinery including autoclaves and is a large and impressive facility. The factory uses a Spirit-owned resin injection technique which supports the creation of complex one-piece, highly loaded structures. These technologies have potential for wider defence applications.
+
+Spirit’s aim to become a defence supplier also to the UK had initial success when in 2021, it led a team including Northrop Grumman UK and Callen–Lenz, a small UK UAV firm, in winning a £30-million MoD contract to design and produce a prototype of the Spirit-led Mosquito project, the envisaged Lightweight Affordable Novel Combat Aircraft, a “loyal wingman” system which would serve as an uncrewed platform to work with the planned Tempest manned aircraft. A first flight was envisaged by the government for 2023. However, the government ended the project at the design stage, having concluded that “more beneficial capability and cost-effectiveness appears achievable through exploration of smaller, less costly, but still highly capable additive capabilities”.
+
+However, Spirit’s UK defence ambitions have not been abandoned and its interest in uncrewed aircraft remains very positive. Reflecting its commitment, it has seconded staff to the Defence Solutions Centre and joined the club of companies associated with the Future Combat Air System, the Tempest-plus concept which includes adjunct platforms. Spirit, with its composites expertise in defence missionised structures (such as SAAB GlobalEye), is also a member of the Airbus-led team bidding for the New Medium Helicopter, a replacement for the Puma and other platforms.
+
+In the US, the Spirit AeroSystems company has extensive engineering expertise focused on composites but not restricted to them. Where appropriate, and subject to the International Traffic in Armaments Regulations (ITAR) and government-to-government discussions, transfer of such capabilities to the UK may be possible. Obviously, the US export control machinery covering dual-use goods and the ITAR will need to be carefully navigated, but in general, that regulatory system does not cover the management expertise that a company can bring to its subsidiaries. Also, the company has a set of growth aspirations around their defence and space strategies for unmanned, next-generation aircraft, effects, space and hypersonics.
+
+Spirit’s interest in uncrewed air systems (UAS) remains strong and the role played by such vehicles in the Ukraine war has been striking. A large variety of UAS have been and are being developed for multiple functions and the potential for strong, lightweight and affordable composite structures in this domain is apparent. Composites might also be associated with low-maintenance stealth features in future air systems. As can be seen in the Ukraine conflict, UAS are prompting multiple efforts in counter-drone technologies and systems which threaten to reduce the viability of many of the simpler UAS on the market. A “drone–counter drone” competition is underway. It is in their capacity to navigate through these long-term issues that larger companies such as Spirit have an advantage over smaller firms that are focused on specific platforms that can be generated relatively quickly but whose utility may be of short duration. The target should be to link small-firm agility with the resources and wider perspective of larger businesses.
+
+#### An SME-Dominated Economy
+
+NI is marked by the predominance of small businesses with no easy geographic links with major defence or other large manufacturing entities outside the region. The latest NI business activity, size, location and ownership statistics, released by the Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency for 2022, show that NI remains “predominantly a micro-business economy, with almost 90% of businesses having less than 10 employees. Just over one-quarter of businesses in NI had turnover of less than £50,000, whilst 70% had turnover of less than £250,000”. These are similar to the ratios found in the UK economy as a whole, but what makes NI unusual is the relative absence of large manufacturing companies to serve as SME customers and the recent growth in SMEs sufficiently interested in the defence and security sector to have joined ADS.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 2: Percentage of Businesses Operating in NI by Employee Size Bands, 2022.__ Note: The majority of businesses (89%, 70,510) in NI were micro-businesses (fewer than 10 employees). Just over 2% (1,640) of businesses had 50 or more employees. Source: [Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, “Northern Ireland Business; Activity, Size, Location and Ownership, 2022”](https://www.nisra.gov.uk/system/files/statistics/IDBR-Publication-2022_0.pdf), p. 3._
+
+Indeed, the predominance of small businesses characterises the NI defence sector, where the majority of the local defence supply chain is made up of SMEs. For instance, Thales Belfast, the major defence prime which supports an ecosystem of suppliers, reports that 91% of its local procurement in NI is with SMEs.
+
+In the British government’s view, SMEs bring a unique customer focus and agility that add value throughout the defence supply chain, contributing to its diversity and resilience. Across the UK in 2019–20 “they contributed work worth over £4.5 billion to defence projects, accounting for over 21% of Defence’s total spend with industry”.
+
+This importance is reflected in the DSIS, which sets out an ambitious vision for the future of MoD’s relations with industry. By recognising the UK’s defence industry is a strategic capability “in its own right”, the DSIS placed particular emphasis on the need to maximise opportunities for SMEs to do business with the MoD given their key role in enabling technology pull through and guaranteeing supply chain resilience. However, particularly in NI, these smaller businesses face real challenges in trying to move into defence. To assess them, interviews were conducted with individual companies and industrial bodies, and wider information was collected. The points below reflect those interviews, but many of the difficulties noted are common to small firms across NI.
+
+- __Difficulties in outreach beyond their region.__ Geography and travel costs still matter, particularly for smaller businesses. One of the recurring difficulties reported by NI SMEs is linked to the distance of the region from London and southeast England, and the consequent difficulties in carrying out a straightforward personal conversation with figures in the MoD and Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) without travelling to London, which can imply what are seen as significant financial costs. Similarly, the costs of getting to meet-the-buyer events and trade shows, which often but not always take place in the southeast of the UK, put a financial burden on these companies. This factor should be seen in perspective – while there are plenty of return airfares from Belfast to London that cost less than some second-class train fares within the UK mainland, a sense of distance has a psychological dimension, in addition to further costs such as hotel bills. Moreover, literature on the benefits of industrial clusters of cooperating firms suggests that geographical proximity matters, especially when the clusters are concentrated near large firms. Clustering is important for the competitiveness of smaller companies because of the advantage it creates in the value chain. According to Ebru Caymaz:
+
+> Clusters offer SMEs advantages for innovation through communication networks and strategic partnerships, increase their competitiveness at the international level, enable them to benefit from the input pool of large enterprises, develop new strategies and production techniques, and increase workforce skills.
+
+ In terms of formal meetings, online participation can be a substitute, but it does not enable the informal, lunch and coffee break discussions that can be so useful. Thus, geographic separation from the commands, the MoD and the DE&S, as well as from most defence industrial events, is a real consideration for NI’s defence SMEs.
+
+- __Meeting security standards and classifications.__ Across the UK, for those SMEs that are not yet in the defence space but aspire to pursue defence-related contracts, a key challenge is obtaining security clearances for people and facilities. Corporate and individual applicants for security clearances need a sponsor that is already qualified. However, most briefings on emerging defence projects are classified, so a non-traditional defence supplier can find itself in a chicken-and-egg situation in which it would need to access the content of the briefing to see how its organisation could contribute yet cannot get access without a security clearance.
+
+- __Lack of awareness of the opportunities and support available for innovation and R&D.__ SMEs often do not have the capacity to research the opportunities for defence work, such as those offered by the Defence and Security Accelerator (DASA) and the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL). Defence is a complicated, multi-faceted sector and it takes effort to understand customer and supplier structures. Even understanding how to present bids to the MoD requires knowledge and experience. While it is true that DASA awards grants to NI companies and its support has been transformative for some, DASA covers NI from Scotland. This means that it can lack the local knowledge necessary to tailor funding calls to actual needs in NI. As a result, some SMEs have noted that many calls for R&D projects seem to be for blue-sky research, rather than being clearly market driven. Importantly, SMEs are drawn to market-focused projects so that they can achieve a faster return on their investment.
+
+- __Lack of ownership and limited capacity to commercialise technology solutions.__ Local stakeholders reported that DASA funding can have a transformative effect on their business and engaging with DASA provides a valuable front door to defence. The difficulty lies, however, beyond the DASA phase, in finding product champions committed to scaling up their solution, which can lead to stilted adoption and limited enablement. Many SMEs in NI operate in the Internet of Things space, and the problem they encounter with defence is that there is no focus on continuous improvement, an inconsistent feedback loop and no interest in driving return on investment, which is unusual in the digital solutions space and might disincentivise such businesses from pursuing defence work. Although transformative, DASA contracts are only the beginning of the journey, and it is difficult for SMEs to promote the appetite for their solutions, both in the services and in the primes, once the DASA phase is completed.
+
+All the above leads to an overall reluctance from SMEs to pursue defence work. Further, there are several other generic aspects of governmental procurement in defence that do not favour SMEs. Government contract terms can require bidders to accept major liabilities in the event of implementation problems and these can potentially kill a business. SMEs are sometimes backed by venture capitalists who are looking for high profit rates on those firms in their portfolios which are successful, but high profits are not associated with government contracts. When the MoD proceeds without formal competition, the Single Source Regulations apply, restricting profit rates to around 10%.
+
+It is important to note that although these challenges were highlighted in author conversations with NI SMEs, many apply to all parts of the UK. The MoD also points out that many were addressed in its 2019 SME Action Plan and that it has taken a series of steps to facilitate and improve SMEs’ access to UK defence. A follow-up to the 2019 commitments was issued in January 2022.
+
+Thus, the apparent situation is that, despite the efforts of the MoD at ministerial level to improve its exploitation of what SMEs could bring, many companies in NI still feel that defence is a particularly difficult market to access.
+
+
+### IV. Beyond Traditional Defence Players
+
+As discussed in previous chapters, NI has one Tier 1 defence firm (Thales), a large Tier 1 aerospace supplier (Spirit AeroSystems) and an aspiring Tier 2 defence shipbuilding firm (H&W). Each of these larger companies has the potential to mobilise smaller companies and/or non-traditional defence suppliers down the supply chain. The level of proximity and cohesion in the region means that more than 100 firms are within one hour’s drive of each other – a high density of suppliers across all elements of the aerospace supply chain, from design and manufacture (including capabilities in machining, composites and polymers), to coatings, assembly, certification and testing.
+
+#### Civil Aerospace
+
+NI enjoys an important civil aerospace legacy. Indeed, its aerospace and defence sector is a £1.5 billion industry employing an estimated 7,000 workers directly. According to media, “there are 60 firms in Northern Ireland whose manufacturing and systems already produce structures, components and services for nearly every commercial aircraft programme in the world”. The region also manufactures over one-third of all aeroplane seats and is a “global leader in survival technology”. Notably, in a region with less than 3% of the population of the UK, NI businesses won “one-third of the prestigious SC21 (Supply Chains for the 21st Century) Business Excellence Awards and 70% of the SC21 Gold Awards at the Farnborough International Airshow”. To achieve a gold award, a company must register a higher than 99% on-time delivery performance and 99.9% quality performance, as well as scoring more than 500 points in business, manufacturing and relationship excellence. Importantly, not only did Northern Irish companies such as Moyola Precision Engineering, Denroy and IPC Mouldings Ltd retain coveted SC21 Gold Standard status throughout the Covid-19 pandemic, but NI actually saw an increase in the number of companies attaining this standard during the crisis.
+
+These capabilities reflect the fact that NI was the first region in the UK to develop a bespoke strategy for aerospace, following the launch of Lifting Off in 2014, under the theme Northern Ireland – Partnering for Growth. The strategy was designed to establish the required supply chain structure and develop the capabilities of NI companies through supply chain excellence to increase productivity and competitiveness. To support these efforts, a key regional innovation hub was established, the Northern Ireland Advanced Composites and Engineering Centre (NIACE). Opened in January 2012, NIACE currently has 12 participating companies from a variety of sectors, including aerospace, automotive, defence, environmental and marine. The participating companies regularly collaborate with Queen’s University Belfast and Ulster University on joint research projects and on de-risking of research and development activities. Other initiatives, such as the National Aerospace Technology Exploitation Programme, encourage SMEs to collaborate with original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) in the industry to develop new technological capabilities.
+
+The relevance of this is enhanced by the growing inter-relationships between the civil and military sectors. In an era where information capture and analysis are central to defence capability, surveillance and communications systems are often deployed on and in civil aircraft. In the UAS domain, such systems are increasingly used for both civil and military purposes. Thus, NI suppliers with certified qualities should explore and be considered for work in both the defence and civil sectors.
+
+#### The Security Sector and the Role of Education
+
+In addition to a strong civilian aerospace pedigree in the region, defence could also make use of NI’s vibrant cyber-security sector. In the years since the Good Friday Agreement, NI has become a hotspot for cyber-security innovation, with cities such as Belfast and Derry/Londonderry exhibiting high technology specialism, consistently attracting domestic and overseas investment.
+
+The current cyber-security ecosystem in NI consists of more than 120 businesses that provide cyber-security goods and services. The Belfast city area is home to 84% of all NI cyber firms, which highlights the city’s status as a UK cyber hub with emerging technology specialists, ranked second in the UK and ninth globally in the top 25 Tech Cities of the Future for 2020/21. Belfast is “Europe’s leading foreign direct investment destination for new software development”.
+
+A recent study estimates that there are 2,299 cyber security employees currently within NI’s cyber sector, with an average income of £48,400 in 2020. This indicates that the sector currently contributes more than £110 million in yearly wages to the NI economy. This is significant since NI has long struggled with private sector productivity and wage levels. Cyber security is a big economic opportunity for the region, with salaries much exceeding the NI private sector median levels and offering a solid foundation for growing NI private sector productivity.
+
+This has attracted considerable investment, both domestically and overseas. The UK government has recently announced an £18.9-million investment in NI’s cyber security industry, including £11 million in government funding through the New Deal for NI, to establish a pipeline of cyber-security specialists in NI while also assisting firms and start-ups in developing new prospects. This surge of momentum behind cyber security in NI is helping to attract significant foreign investment, particularly from the US, a key investment partner, with 37 firms employing 1,432 cyber-security professionals (62% of NI-based cyber-security employment). This employment is significant as it has the ability to encourage skill development, increase investment in NI and have a positive impact on the larger ecosystem, not least in the defence space. Thanks to its vibrant cyber-security landscape, NI was recently appointed the new location for the next government-backed Digital Catapult Centre, with the aim of better showcasing NI’s tech capacity in areas such as advanced sensors, analytics and cyber security.
+
+Key to this success was the region’s promotion of strong connections between industry and education, championed by local institutions such as Queen’s University Belfast and Ulster University. Both are pivotal in nurturing a talent pipeline of trained security professionals and in producing industry engagement by embedding academic staff in industry and embracing an “open innovation model”. The aim of this model is to enable “research to translate to industry in an agile way, ensuring demonstrable technology is in the hands of end users quickly”. While more frequent in the security space, this collaboration model is now unfolding in relation to the defence sector too. For instance, the Centre for Secure Information Technologies (CSIT) at Queen’s University Belfast has recently partnered with BAE Systems on video-based semantic analysis of crowd behaviour, while Thales has used CSIT novel Physical Unclonable Functions technology in a demonstrator for electronic component anti-counterfeiting. The private sector must play its part in promoting the opportunities it offers, and emerging regional defence players such as H&W might wish to fill any awareness gaps there may be about, for instance, the scale of BAE Systems’ work with young people in Barrow, aimed at meeting its submarine-building skills needs.
+
+Advances in information technology and modifications to existing weapons with ISR systems means that the cyber and defence sectors are now deeply interrelated, as are the innovation challenges and skillsets required by both industries. Through its cyber-security clusters and academic centres of excellence, NI has developed beyond UK average science and technology capabilities, nurtured science, technology, engineering and mathematics skills, and established leading R&D programmes. These activities are the basis for generating military and security capabilities and other tangible and intangible assets which are themselves levers of national power and influence.
+
+
+### Conclusions and Recommendations
+
+The research for this paper found considerable NI corporate interest in securing more work in defence. There are three different but complementary prominent businesses in the region: Thales, an experienced defence-focused business unit; H&W, a heavy-engineering firm at the centre of the National Shipbuilding Strategy’s aim of regenerating the shipbuilding sector; and Spirit AeroSystems, a high-technology aerospace company looking to expand into the defence space. Together with the extensive range of SMEs in the region, there is an opportunity to promote NI, not as part of the problem set of UK defence and security, but as a valued contributor to its management and solution.
+
+This paper has also identified the main challenges related to conducting defence business in NI. Understanding and mitigating these challenges and leveraging the capabilities of local defence establishments is key to improving NI productivity and prosperity, ensuring national resilience, and ensuring that the UK’s industrial base remains capable of delivering high-quality capabilities. This chapter presents conclusions and recommendations for possible next steps for UK defence to help tackle these challenges.
+
+#### Defence Spending Across the UK
+
+__Conclusion__
+
+- It is axiomatic but not assured that behaviour within government should match the directions set in governmental policy. As noted early, the MoD direction is that the whole of the UK should benefit from defence spending. Until very recently, gain for NI was minimal and, even with the contracts with Thales and the FSS contract involving H&W, the immediate future will not be much different.
+
+__Recommendations__
+
+- It would be beneficial to have a small team from the MoD tasked with understanding the business environment in the NI context and, in particular to gather data on the extent and complexity of regional supply chains and how to better integrate them in the broader UK defence industrial base. The intent would be to ensure that opportunities for securing useful work from NI firms are not overlooked.
+
+- This is a matter on which the House of Commons Defence Committee could keep a weather eye. To date, NI has received only modest attention from the Defence Committee in Parliament. Some members visited Belfast in February 2023, but this was not part of a formal evidence session and was primarily prompted by the need to look at the industrial agility of Thales for the delivery of NLAWs. Had Russia not invaded Ukraine and had Thales not been at the forefront of NLAWs supply, there would have been little interest in the defence enterprise in NI. The last Defence Committee visit to NI took place in 2016. The Committee has little hard power, but when it identifies and publicises an issue it can prompt the MoD to direct attention to it.
+
+#### The Three Major Defence Opportunity Firms
+
+__Conclusion__
+
+- The three major defence-related firms in NI find themselves in a new situation, although the nature of each situation is different. Thales’ factory is emerging as a clear player in the munitions issues that have been exposed by the conflict in Ukraine. H&W faces the challenges of re-establishing an industrial shipbuilding capability that will require the recruitment and training of a workforce and the modernisation of its infrastructure. Spirit AeroSystems is seeking to break into further defence activity using its expertise in composite materials and aerospace.
+
+__Recommendations__
+
+- While Thales has been awarded a contract to replace weapons supplied to Ukraine, its plant in Belfast needs to be recognised as a key element in the UK position on defence capability, operational independence and military sustainability. While longer-term munitions measures dealing with enhanced stock levels, production surge capabilities and international cooperation are emerging as matters for urgent attention, the MoD needs to recognise that the Thales plant will require a long-term drumbeat of development and production work to maintain it as a thriving entity.
+
+- For H&W, the DE&S and National Shipbuilding Office should not stand back, adopt a hands-off stance and simply see what happens with the FSS project. With the FSS contract, the DE&S has pursued its normal practice of passing as much financial risk as possible to the contractor. However, Navantia could seek to reduce its financial risk by bringing as much work as possible into Spain. Commercially that could be a rational stance. Members of the Defence Committee have already made clear their concerns that Navantia would not be unhappy to keep H&W in a junior role and do most of the work in Spain. But from a UK government perspective, the FSS contract signals a wider aim of increasing prosperity and social value in NI as well as generating additional industrial shipbuilding options for the future. By judging the Navantia bid to have been the best, the MoD has put its own reputation on the line. Thus, the UK governmental bodies should be both monitoring closely how H&W are progressing in Belfast (and Appledore) and looking to see what support and guidance they can provide to H&W.
+
+- Spirit AeroSystems UK is the UK entity of a much larger US parent which actively supports the defence development of its UK business. Its capabilities and strategic direction, including its stated readiness to grow by investment in the UK, are noteworthy. Its expertise in the development and production of composite structures means that it should be studied in detail by technical experts in government and the private sector. In order to make sense of Spirit’s potential, the MoD will likely have to rely not just on DSTL and DASA but also on its QinetiQ-led Aurora contract. The MoD should also recognise the need to protect any intellectual property that Spirit shares. One issue for government is whether Spirit should be operated as a competitor to GKN Aerospace and its partners in composite development for aerospace, or whether they should be encouraged to collaborate.
+
+- A specific issue relates to the UK government direction in the DSIS that its forces should enjoy operational independence and that British society should enjoy economic benefits from defence procurement. UK reliance on US systems for surveillance and intelligence (the P-8A, Wedgetail, Reaper and Rivet Joint) makes clear the limitations on these ambitions. Working with Spirit on defence applications should not deepen UK vulnerability to export restrictions, especially the International Trade in Armaments Regulations, but the import of Spirit management and generic technology exploitation for defence could mean significant levelling up and prosperity benefits for NI. It could also support the export of specialist defence sub-systems to the US.
+
+#### Improving the Regional Representation Mechanism
+
+__Conclusion__
+
+- There are now few military units in NI, but each of the three services have senior military leads (SMLs) in each of the four nations of the UK. Their current role encompasses a series of representational and stakeholder engagement duties, mostly service related.
+
+__Recommendation__
+
+- Since it is the services who are placing the requirements against which the DE&S and the Defence Infrastructure Organisation are delivering and designing the tendering process, there is value in industry having access to the SMLs, who could at least point them in the right directions in service headquarters and the DE&S. Additionally, local representative officers from the Royal Navy and the Army should establish familiarity with the progress and challenges of the FSS project and, in the case of the Army, with Thales’ missile capability.
+
+#### NI SMEs
+
+__Conclusion__
+
+- Most firms interested in defence in NI are SMEs, which clearly have similar problems to similarly sized companies across the UK in seeking success in the defence sector. As discussed earlier, MoD attitudes to financial and technical risk, its required contracting terms and preference for time-consuming and costly formal competitive tendering are likely obstacles for many firms. However, the MoD’s own figures show that SMEs across the country are in receipt of more than 20% of government defence spending, whether directly through contracts from government or through primes, so the situation is far from hopeless.
+
+__Recommendation__
+
+- MoD strategies for SME engagement overall are beyond the scope of this paper, but nonetheless it is suggested that the MoD keeps its practices under constant review. If it wants to better leverage the potential of SMEs for technology “pull through”, it must think more about what it needs to do to be an attractive customer.
+
+__Conclusion__
+
+- In NI, the SME community stated that its difficulties associated with winning defence business for NI are partly linked to the location of the region and the costs of travel for small firms.
+
+__Recommendation__
+
+- While NI firms must recognise that reaching out to customers is a necessary business expense, the MoD could endeavour to minimise the costs to aspiring suppliers. Possible steps could include holding industry briefing days in locations near a major airport or in Belfast, and starting such gatherings in the late morning, helping firms to avoid hotel costs.
+
+__Conclusion__
+
+- The ADS director in NI discussed the number of NI SMEs involved in industry and stressed how the number had increased rapidly in recent years. Thus, there is a new situation in the province which could have been overlooked by UK authorities. The ADS team in NI are vocal and energetic promoters of the region’s SME potential, and ADS remains the leading trade organisation there. However, elsewhere in the UK, in England and Wales, the main body representing SMEs has emerged as Make UK Defence, within the wider manufacturing body Make UK. Historically, this came about because the aerospace and defence industrial bodies (ADS and before that the Society of British Aerospace Companies – SBAC) were considered to be dominated by the large primes. When the SBAC and the Defence Manufacturers Association merged to form ADS, there was a perceived need for a more SME-focused body, which is met in 2023 by Make UK Defence. These industrial bodies are collaborators, but also competitors for members.
+
+__Recommendation__
+
+- Given that Make UK Defence is the prominent body for SMEs in England and Wales, and ADS has that role in NI, it would be sensible for them to work together to secure the best deals for SMEs across the UK. If two bodies do not send coherent and compatible messages, both are less likely to have an impact.
+
+#### Defence in NI
+
+__Conclusion__
+
+- While NI hosts a plethora of innovative SMEs and micro-businesses, further support is needed to enable a cohesive regional defence and security sector to collaborate, overcome barriers to entry and help supply chains to compete and realise new technologies. The maritime and aerospace sectors, for instance, both prominent in NI, tend to operate in silos, leaving considerable space for further synergies between businesses operating in different sectors.
+
+__Recommendation__
+
+- ADS and Make UK Defence should support the development of more and active clusters of SMEs in the region with defence interests. Such semi-formal groupings could focus on the three obvious defence sectors (aircraft, ships and munitions) but could also address the defence and wider security sector as a whole. In the UK, as observed earlier, the MoD has supported the advance of a defence-wide cluster for the southwest of England. An NI defence and security cluster could build on existing arrangements such as the NI Cyber Security Cluster and the Belfast Maritime Consortium, which could exploit the existence of well-established technology hubs such as the NIACE.
+
+- Such clusters work best when the member organisations have access to and can share awareness of the key problems facing potential customers. Given the proliferating interest in UASs, a cluster linking Spirit with information-focused SMEs in NI would have potential. Informational inputs from the MoD and the services would lubricate regional industrial thinking and initiative.
+
+__Conclusion__
+
+- The military situation in Ukraine, the MoD’s readiness to react through private investment in H&W by issuing the FSS contract, Spirit’s enthusiasm to do more in the defence space and the growth in the number of SMEs joining ADS all point to a multi-faceted resurgence of interest in the defence sector in NI. The national political context is such that the UK government is concerned to capture the economic and social value attributes of defence spending and to see that all regions of the country benefit.
+
+__Recommendations__
+
+- The MoD should have a specified target for an increased amount of defence work in NI. This is not to suggest that defence spending per head should rise to the levels in Scotland or even the national average, but that there should be a focused exploration of possibilities of raising it above the trivial amount at which it currently stands. This effort should involve initiatives from across the UK defence acquisition community in the MoD, the armed services, the various procurement bodies in governmental defence, especially the DE&S, Defence Digital, and the Defence Infrastructure Organisation, and the private sector. Such an effort would be highly compatible with the MoD’s levelling-up and prosperity agendas.
+
+- There is a need finally to consider the wider impact of an increased defence industrial effort in NI. While some nationalists might resent such direct support for UK military power, the authors’ conversations with local stakeholders suggest that change that brings well-paid and secure jobs, and that requires people to work with others regardless of their sectarian origin, would have an integrating and conciliatory impact on society.
+
+
+### Annex: List of Participants
+
+This supporting annex lists the government and industry experts who contributed their insights to the research for this paper. Participants included representatives from the following organisations:
+
+- __ADS Northern Ireland__ – a trade organisation representing the aerospace, defence, security and space industries in the region.
+- __Angoka__ – an Internet of Things security company, whose mission is to ensure the safety and resilience of Smart Cities and Smart Mobility by providing high-grade, quantum-secure solutions.
+- __Cooneen Defence__ – a provider of clothing for military and police personnel across the world – combat, patrol and operational garments.
+- __Harland & Wolff (Belfast)__ – shipbuilding company operating in the maritime and offshore industry.
+- __House of Commons Defence Committee__.
+- __Invest Northern Ireland__ – the economic development agency for Northern Ireland.
+- __Kinsetsu__ – an SME providing intelligent tracking solutions.
+- __Ministry of Defence__ – industrial strategy and exports.
+- __Spirit AeroSystems UK__ – a large UK Tier 1 aerospace manufacturer.
+- __Survitec__ – a manufacturer of personal survival equipment for the maritime, defence and government, aerospace and energy sectors.
+- __Thales Air Defence Limited__ – a defence manufacturer producing short-range air defence missiles.
+
+---
+
+__Isabella Antinozzi__ is a Research Analyst in the Defence, Industries and Society Research Group at RUSI. Her research interests include UK defence and security, post-Brexit UK-EU relations, the European security architecture and transatlantic cooperation. Prior to joining RUSI, she worked as a researcher at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) where she analysed the European Union’s (EU) defence and security policies, intra-European defence industrial cooperation as well as cooperation between the EU and third states in this field.
+
+__Trevor Taylor__ is Director of the Defence, Industries & Society Programme and Professorial Fellow in Defence management at RUSI where he has worked since 2009. He has more than 30 years’ experience of working with government and business in the defence and security area as an academic and consultant. In contrasting roles, he has been an assessor in the national research evaluation exercises, Chairman of the British International Studies Association, and an elected Council Member of the former Defence Manufacturers Association. He currently serves on the Advisory Board of Make UK Defence, an association particularly serving small & medium sized entities.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-13-how-ukraine-can-win.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-13-how-ukraine-can-win.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..223d5b1e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-13-how-ukraine-can-win.md
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : How Ukraine Can Win
+author: Greg Mills
+date : 2023-06-13 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/wmYlqQw.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "David Fells Goliath, Then There’ll be Talks: How Ukraine Can Win"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Ukraine has outwardly changed through three stages following the Russian invasion on 24 February 2022: hanging on against the Russian onslaught, getting organised and better armed, and now – at the advent of the much-anticipated counteroffensive – confidently fighting back._ _It has proven resilient, innovative and adaptable, offering a model for enabling capacity through external cooperation. Russia, on the other hand, has shown that quantity – to use the old expression attributed to Stalin – does not have a quality all its own. While this war will end at the negotiating table, only the outcome of the military battle will get the two sides there, writes Greg Mills from Kyiv._
+
+Deep in the Dorset countryside is a private UK company refurbishing 50-year-old Sea King helicopters for use by the Ukrainian defence forces. Some of these warbirds have seen service in the Falklands, Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan, though they have been given a complete overhaul before heading to the Ukrainian battlefield. There they are rendering sterling service, once more, in extracting the wounded and bringing in supplies.
+
+This programme is a good example of how old equipment can be repurposed at minimal cost. It’s an illustration, too, of how the training of pilots and engineers must parallel any equipment offer – one that has in this case been properly implemented. The procurement of more such Sea Kings in this way can only add considerably to Ukrainian capabilities.
+
+But the programme is also an illustration of the fact that the Ukrainians are getting only as much as donors are willing to provide, rather than what will meet their immediate needs. For comparatively little extra outlay, the Sea Kings could be fitted with stand-off Brimstone missiles, rather than go into combat zones unarmed.
+
+RUSI’s Nick Reynolds says that the performance of Kyiv’s armed forces to date shows that “it can win” with “consistent supply, standardisation, sufficient spare parts and maintenance and the type of equipment, including air defence and offence and electro-magnetic protection” that Ukraine needs. “We should not base our support of Ukraine on the basis of what we can give,” he says, “but rather what they need”, and nor “should we base our support for Ukraine on the result of each and every phase of this military campaign”.
+
+Whatever the downsides of integrating multiple equipment types and managing complicated logistics and training schedules for disparate types, Western equipment has been critical in turning the tide on the battlefield in Kyiv’s favour. And yet, the Ukrainians’ technical prowess has highlighted that, while equipment is necessary, without the required motivation and skills it is never going to be enough. Afghanistan serves as a painful reminder of this lesson.
+
+Here the Ukrainians have, if nothing else, demonstrated their capability and capacity for success against a foe superior in numbers and once regarded as a superpower.
+
+The manner in which older kit has been integrated with new systems and deployed is an illustration of how motivated the Ukrainian forces are to repel the Russian invasion, and to ensure that it never happens again.
+
+The most notable feature of this war has been the fighting ability of the Ukrainians, set against the poor performance of the Russian forces.
+
+The Russian forces have been depleted by heavy losses. Many have been in combat for more than a year. They are not especially well-disciplined or particularly well-led; are badly equipped in key areas such as communications; and are dependent on a strictly hierarchical command-and-control structure, consequently absent the type of small unit cohesion necessary to instil fighting confidence and ability – especially under the sort of military pressure which they are about to experience.
+
+The surge in Ukrainian capacity is not just about Western equipment, but how Kyiv’s forces have deployed it, added to it, displayed initiative (and allowed their tactical-level commanders to do so), and trained hard.
+
+While the Ukrainians have been short of certain equipment, including modern aircraft capable of challenging fifth-generation Russian fighters and bombers like the Sukhoi Su-34 and 35, the way in which the Ukrainians have adapted civilian technologies, including meshing AI with intelligence, has given them an edge.
+
+But in other respects, it’s a war that looks similar to the trench combat of the First World War; the great rolling plains of Ukraine are perfect tank territory too.
+
+___`Without certain weapon types supplied by the West, it will be hard to push the Russians out of Ukraine altogether`___
+
+The delivery of newer Western tanks such as the M1 Abrams, the Leopard II and the UK’s Challenger will make a difference, as has the deployment of long-range HIMARS and Storm Shadow missile systems capable of striking deep-set Russian supply and command-and-control bases. So too has the use of Western 155mm artillery, more sophisticated and accurate than the Soviet-era equipment previously employed by Kyiv.
+
+The usefulness of this support depends on the steady supply of Western ammunition and equipment, which might not continue in certain circumstances. One threat is political – especially the US appetite for continuing support for the Ukrainian cause, which can be relied upon only so long as the Democrats remain in the White House.
+
+Another threat lies in the incremental assistance the West has so far preferred to supply to Ukraine, presumably out of fear that Kyiv will become too powerful and risk a radical response from Moscow or a change in tack from Beijing “if Putin was cornered and humiliated”, as suggested by Gregory Nemyrin, the deputy chair of the foreign relations committee in the Ukrainian parliament.
+
+This fear of catastrophic success is apparently founded on a belief that a cornered Putin could be very dangerous. After all, there are no prizes for second place in Russian politics.
+
+Without certain weapon types, it will be hard to push the Russians out of Ukraine altogether. While the Russians have proven comparatively hapless on the battlefield, it is unrealistic – and possibly foolhardy – to expect or risk their complete disintegration. It is certainly, however, a measure of the disorganisation and destruction of Russian forces that Kyiv will have to achieve to end the conflict. While the Ukrainians are short of certain weapon types, they only have to be better than the Russians – and that looks likely.
+
+Kyiv’s aim for its much-anticipated offensive is for Ukraine to arrive at the negotiating table in a position of strength. After all, this table is where “every war ends”, says Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba, “and our task is to bring Ukraine to the table in the strongest position possible”.
+
+The sheer rate of consumption of shells in the conflict – at peak, according to Western military estimates, amounting to 20,000 daily by the Russians – represents a further threat. Given that the largest facility worldwide, in Scranton produces 11,000 per month (though there are plans to increase this to 85,000 by 2028), there is a looming deficit in NATO stocks. Already, the US has given Ukraine “more than 1.5 million rounds of 155mm ammunition” as part of Washington’s $38 billion in military assistance.
+
+A final threat lies in the continued ability of the Ukrainians to win on the battlefield, without which Western fatigue might set in – a trait that could be compounded by any failure on Kyiv’s part to develop a narrative beyond victimhood. Everyone loves a winner, not a whinger, and war is no different.
+
+The narrative battle is ongoing, demanding considerable dedication of resources. Contending with the Russian version of the war – given Moscow’s comparative strengths of resources and news outlets including RT and Sputnik – is challenging. This demands countering disinformation, on which a Ukrainian government unit works full-time, and promoting a positive image of Ukraine based – says Myhailo Podoliak, the head of the presidential office – on “its internal core strength, its rapid transformation, sincerity, and its ability to understand and manage complexity”. In this, he notes, “leadership allows us to have a global role and to be the subject”.
+
+So far, the Ukrainians continue to surprise and are alert to these challenges. Their ingenuity can also be seen in the refurbishment of vehicles left behind on the battlefield by the Russians. Around the eastern city of Kharkiv, for example, according to Ukrainian sources, the Russians abandoned nearly 400 armoured vehicles – now known, in Ukrainian humour and in reference to the US Second World War programme, as “Russian lend-lease”.
+
+Industriousness is present in other ways. The mayor of Kharkiv, Ihor Terekhov, notes that some 4,000 homes in the city – Ukraine’s second largest, which lies just 30 km from the Russian border – were destroyed in the early days of the war. This has mostly been cleaned up, though the city remains under artillery and missile fire and many of its shops and offices are boarded up.
+
+The same is true for the areas around Kyiv, notably in the suburbs of Bucha, Irpin and Borodynka. Today they are all being rebuilt, even though the bitter memories will remain – not least the massacre of 458 civilians in Bucha, later buried in a pit behind the back of the local Orthodox church.
+
+___`From a Ukrainian perspective, the war has to be finished quickly, before Russia manages to get its industry behind its war effort`___
+
+The eastern city of Izyum, too, has been scarred by the deaths of an estimated one thousand civilians out of an original pre-war population of 45,000. The city was liberated on 14 September. After liberation, according to the Izyum authorities, a mass grave of 440 bodies was found in the woods to the north of the town, while an estimated 80% of housing was destroyed.
+
+Today, much of the town has been cleaned up. The secretary of the local municipality, Constantine Petrov, says a “horrible picture” greeted his team when they returned after the Russian retreat on 14 September. “Only a few houses on the outskirts had gas, and no-one had electricity”. We chatted in the only municipal building left standing, new windows fitted where the old ones had been blown out by the constant shellfire which characterised the fortnight-long struggle for the town in February–March last year.
+
+Similar conditions were created in Kharkiv. The governor of the Kharkiv region, Dr Oleh Synyehubov, counts the cost at 30,000 damaged and destroyed buildings, including 8,500 private households, 4,000 multi-story complexes, 800 educational establishments, 300 hospitals and clinics, and 100 government buildings. He puts the number of dead at some 2,000 civilians, including 75 children. Dr Synyehubov estimates the cost of destruction at around $15 billion “so far”, since there are more than 20 towns in his oblast which continue to be shelled on a daily basis. He praises international benefactors who have come forward to assist, singling out Howard Buffet, who donated DNA kits to enable the identification of victims and has “rebuilt 15 bridges”. He acknowledges, however, than salvation will come from inside, stating that “peace will only come about through a strong Ukraine and a strong military”. He adds: “We have to count on our own strength, not that of international agreements”.
+
+It’s tempting to be fascinated by the impact of hi-tech weaponry on the battlefield, including Russian hypersonic Kinzhal (or “danger”) missiles capable of striking targets at Mach 10, and the widespread use of Iranian Shahed drones (known locally as “scooters” due to the noise they make) as a terror weapon. The police station in Izyum was hit with one such drone two days before we visited, putting the officers a bit on edge.
+
+For military strategists, this war raises questions about how future armies might be structured and equipped. It stresses training, equipment, intelligence and the ability to quickly scale up in partnership with others. It also poses tough questions about the performance of the West in deterring Russia before the conflict, thus potentially avoiding it altogether. The West’s abject performance in Afghanistan would have led the Russians to believe it was weak. Deterrence was further undermined by President Joe Biden’s statement before the war that putting US troops on the ground in Ukraine was “not on the table”. By removing this card, and by not saying clearly that the US would supply Ukraine with modern equipment – as it has subsequently done – deterrence was undermined.
+
+The more things change, the more they stay the same. Wars are won by stamina, skill, logistics and leadership. Ukraine has these in spades, alongside its moral advantage: it is the victim of Russian aggression, the David delivering hammer blows to the Russian Goliath.
+
+The Ukrainians have excelled at organisation. The first days of the war were characterised by the chaos of refugee movements, as more than five million Ukrainian women and children fled westwards, many to camps and homes elsewhere in Central and Western Europe. There were fuel and other shortages in the first few months, but the Ukrainians quickly got organised. Visiting today – approaching 500 days into the war – Ukrainians are going about their lives despite daily Russian terror attacks on the country’s urban centres. Cities are notable for the number of men now in uniform.
+
+Kharkiv, for instance, which had been reduced to 500,000 people from its pre-war population of two million, is now back to the one million mark, according to Colonel Yevhen Vasylenko of Kharkiv’s Rescue and Emergency Services. The roads to the south – leading towards Izyum and other towns – are open, though the heavy security presence reminds one of the dangers. Electricity was restored in Izyum a week after the Russian withdrawal, while heating has been restored to more than 90 apartment blocks.
+
+Already, the authorities are rapidly pursuing a stabilisation, normalisation and reconstruction agenda. In the Kharkiv oblast alone, 69,000 mines have been lifted, roads are being repaired and electricity is being restored.
+
+The counteroffensive will be won – or lost – by the ability to achieve what military strategists describe as the “combined arms effect”. This type of battle involves the close integration of artillery, air defence and offence, and well-drilled and mobile ground forces. The Ukrainians now possess the surface-to-air missile cover to keep Russian aircraft and helicopters at bay, the ability to jam crude Russian comms, offensive drone (and some jet) capability, and – with the delivery of Storm Shadow and HIMARS, among other systems – the guided missile technology to force Russian headquarters and supply dumps far to the rear. In addition, they have proven short- and longer-range foreign and local anti-tank weapons; sophisticated heavy tanks including the Leopard, Abrams and Challenger; as well as Western infantry fighting vehicles. This approach also requires the integration of engineer units to clear obstacles, including the multi-layered minefields dug by the Russians. And then the organisation has to keep the offensive going, maintaining supply lines and operational tempo – something the Russians proved incapable of doing, in part because they chose February to invade and their convoys were strung out on paved roads, becoming easy prey for Ukrainian anti-tank units and drones.
+
+As David Petraeus, the retired US general, has put it, such a combined operation is “very complex … it’s a bit like a symphony. You have to have all of the different pieces play their part”. He believes the Ukrainians now have this capability.
+
+Whatever happens, from a Ukrainian perspective, the war has to be finished quickly, before Russia manages to get its industry behind its war effort. Russia has so far done an exceptional job of shoring up its economy, even though it has taken a hammering from Western sanctions. It seems now to be gearing itself up for a long war – although Putin will have to explain why even greater numbers of Russian boys are dying in this war, when the Ukrainians were supposed to have greeted them as liberators. Ukrainian estimates have the number of Russian dead at over 210,000; Western estimates suggest the overall number of casualties, including wounded, is around that number. Bakhmut alone cost the Wagner Group 17,000 dead, and perhaps as many as five times that number wounded.
+
+Those thinking of making peace in this neighbourhood will not only have to think of questions of international law, sovereignty, human rights, and moral legitimacy in seeking compromise, but also about putting in place the conditions that will prevent a return to conflict. As Karina, who spent the six months of Russian occupation in hiding in Izyum and who now runs a small restaurant in the town with her friend, pleads: “I just want peace, and silence”.
+
+How the war ends will, critically, shape the manner of the peace.
+
+---
+
+__Greg Mills__ heads the Johannesburg-based Brenthurst Foundation, established in 2005 by the Oppenheimer family to strengthen African economic performance. With Brenthurst, Greg has directed numerous reform projects with African heads of government, and almost continuously at various levels of government in South Africa from the Foundation’s outset.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-14-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-66.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-14-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-66.md
new file mode 100644
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-14-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-66.md
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第 66 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-06-14 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 吳政亨受訪錄音稱相比「攬炒書」更望初選成事 官質疑屬傳聞證供不能呈堂
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今踏入審訊第66天，展開辯方案情。吳政亨選擇不作供，辯方傳召3名證人，以將吳的電郵和錄音呈堂。庭上播放吳政亨受訪錄音，吳曾稱發起「三投三不投」聯署是望團結民主陣營，令初選順利，而如在「攬炒書」（指「墨落無悔」聲明書）和初選之間只能擇其一，會寧願「初選成事先」，指「我哋光復咗議會先，其他細節可以再傾」。而代表吳的律師則供稱，曾按吳指示擷取「李伯盧」（吳政亨網名）電郵，顯示李伯盧提及望聯署就否決議案保持中立。
+
+法官質疑相關錄音和電郵屬「傳聞證據」，除非涉對被告不利的招認，否則不能呈堂；並着辯方就證據呈堂性提交案例和書面陳詞，明早再作口頭陳詞。料法官明作出裁定後，鄭達鴻或作供。
+
+#### 案件因法官陳慶偉不適押後兩天 陳今戴口罩出庭
+
+案件原定周一（12日）開展辯方案情，惟因法官陳慶偉身體不適押後至周三（14日）。陳慶偉和陳仲衡今戴口罩步入法庭，李運騰則沒有戴口罩，延伸庭有被告稱：「噢！」。另岑敖暉於上周日（11日）渡過30歲生日，有旁聽人士向他稱：「生日快樂！」
+
+#### 律師樓文員就「李伯盧」電郵作供 李稱望「三投三不投」就否決議案中立
+
+代表吳政亨的大律師石書銘表示，向吳政亨解釋過其權利後，吳決定不作供，並會傳召3名辯方證人，包括吳的代表事務律師陳奕勤，陳的下屬、律師樓文員韋均曉，以及曾任《蘋果日報》記者的李俊杰。前兩者涉吳政亨的 Gmail 帳戶電郵內容，李俊杰則涉訪問錄音內容。
+
+謝延豐律師行的法律文員韋均曉供稱，今年5月31日獲陳奕勤指示，登入名為「李伯盧」、電郵地址為「leebaklou@gmail.com」的帳戶，於「已發送」版面擷取2020年4月9日、題為「一點意見分享」的4封電郵內容，該電郵由「Anthony Yau」發出，「李伯盧」回應，韋並將電郵截圖燒錄成光碟。
+
+庭上顯示，Anthony Yau 就「三投三不投」和初選提出意見，認為泛民須承諾當選後否決所有議案，而李伯盧則回應「希望聯署在這議題上保持中立」，又指35+其中一個用處是在2022年「奪取特首之位，讓泛黃真正執政」，但「這並不代表我個人支持或反對泛黃議員聯合否決任何議案，我只希望帶出，無論支持或反對，其實都可以有合理的原因」。
+
+
+▲ 吳政亨
+
+#### 辯方欲將電郵呈堂 法官質疑屬傳聞證據及與案不相關
+
+石書銘欲將相關電郵呈堂，惟法官李運騰質疑欠缺基礎，指雖然知道吳政亨網名為「李伯盧」，但辯方須證吳為該帳戶持有人才能將電郵呈堂，否則屬「傳聞證據（hearsay evidence）」，又指「我也可以開設『李伯盧』的帳戶，但不代表我是第五被告（吳政亨）」，並強調即使並非傳聞證據，也需與案相關才能呈堂。
+
+陳慶偉又問，假設該些電郵可呈堂，辯方最終希望以此作出什麼陳詞？石回應由於控方依賴吳在案發前的言行指證他，故吳案發時的所有言行能完整反映其思想狀態（state of mind）。惟法官陳仲衡指，共謀者之間的討論，不一定與外人（outsider）的討論一樣，就如吳政亨與 Anthony Yau 的討論，與吳和戴耀廷的也可能不同。李運騰亦笑着舉例，若A曾向他人聲稱與X友好，但其後被控謀殺X，又能否將A事前聲稱與X友好的證據呈堂？
+
+李運騰又指，辯方現時依賴吳與一名法庭甚至不知道存在的「Anthony Yau」於完全不同場合的對話，質疑沒有基礎呈堂；又指法庭開放被游說，但辯方做法須穩妥，問辯方有否相關案例。此時吳站起要求向律師發指示，陳慶偉下令休庭。
+
+#### 律師稱本年5月獲吳政亨告知電郵帳戶密碼
+
+早休後，辯方將該些電郵列為臨時證物。控方其後進行盤問，韋指她獲告知吳政亨是該帳戶持有人，但對此沒個人認知，亦不知道「Anthony Yau」是否存在。
+
+辯方其後傳召陳奕勤作供，陳確認處理案件期間獲吳告知「leebaklou@gmail.com」為他的電郵，吳將密碼交給他並指示他登入帳戶找尋電郵，他遂向韋均曉發指示。陳不記得吳指示他的確實日子，「但可以話係燒碟嗰日（今年5月31日）嘅前一兩日之內」，他不知道李伯盧和「Anthony Yau」還有否其他對話。
+
+#### 辯方呈吳政亨2020年6月專訪 由時任《蘋果日報》記者撰寫
+
+辯方其後傳召李俊杰作供。他供稱2019至2021年於《蘋果日報》任中國組記者，並與中學同學 Jojo Chan 於2020年6月17日與「李伯盧」做訪問。二人6月27日以「祖神」筆名，在 Facebook 群組「良心經濟圈認證中心（絕無內容農場）」發布題為〈【本谷專訪】以公民之名 初選的民間推手——李伯盧（更新版）〉的文章，並由「街頭議會」專頁轉載。
+
+李供稱，因二人對當時社會運動有些關注，而民間就初選有贊成和反對的不同聲音，故 Jojo 提議就此一起「寫吓嘢」。李運騰一度問是否需要知道這些細節，辯方指望提供寫文章的背景。李續確認，當時並不知道「李伯盧」真名是吳政亨，並確認當日是與庭上的吳政亨做訪問。
+
+
+▲ 證人 李俊杰
+
+#### 吳政亨受訪稱若初選及「墨落無悔」擇其一 寧願初選先成事
+
+李俊杰確認訪問時曾在吳政亨知悉下錄音，庭上其後播放該段約27分鐘的錄音。被問「三投三不投」的構思從何而來，吳解釋3月中戴耀廷接觸參選人商討初選，但得悉有人不願意談判、似乎很不順利，他感到「好心傷」，望找辦法令民主派合作，靠選民壓力令參與者遵循規則，令初選順利並取得35+。
+
+被問會否擔心民主黨不遵從協議，吳指理解民主黨無簽的「墨落無悔」並非關於初選落敗便不參選，而是關於取得35+後會否積極否決預算案；並指對他來說，在「攬炒書（「墨落無悔」聲明書）」和初選之間如只能選一樣，他絕對希望大家選初選，「因為有民主陣營候選人嘅議員，總好過保皇黨」，「我會寧願希望大家至少初選成事先。」吳又指，簽與不簽「墨落無悔」各有原因，「未必係真係一個背叛」，「希望大家都團結，令到我哋光復咗議會先，其他細節可以再傾。」
+
+#### 吳引「攬炒巴」稱議會、街頭、國際戰線缺一不可、靠DQ令國際勢力「出師有名」
+
+吳又強調，民主陣營的團結是整個光譜所有人的共同利益，「大家團結到，係對大家都好」，「大家唔需要去懷疑35+係咪一件好事⋯⋯一定好過35-。」至於會否擔心有激進本土派對選舉懷「焦土」或「犬儒」心態，吳則引「攬炒巴」提到「議會、街頭、國際」是缺一不可的「鐵三角」，指歷史上極權國家到民主國家的歷程均可見上述「鐵三角」存在。
+
+吳又指激進派不一定在議會否決，而是明知35+都會被DQ（取消資格），「我哋咪靠呢個DQ製造一個國際新聞，去令到國際上支持民主陣營嘅勢力出師有名囉。」吳又指，聯署定位為「民主陣營的中立團體」，雖支持初選，但不打算為任何候選人和政黨宣傳，又指有候選人主動聯絡他表示支持，但他不會公開致謝。
+
+#### 吳稱曾參與「雷動計劃」 形容初選屬「百花齊放」但要「願賭服輸」
+
+吳又提到，曾參與雨傘革命，亦曾任「雷動計劃」義工，「幫戴耀廷教授。」被問當年計劃失敗的原因，庭上鄒家成與吳政亨對視而笑，吳承認該計劃有「唔完美」，於臨選前才做調動或迫候選人退選製造混亂，但始終是當時「退而求其次」的選擇；並指初選定比雷動計劃更好，而這次環境下辦初選的誘因確實存在，望初選能成事。
+
+吳又提到，初選「百花齊放」，望所有光譜候選人都可參與，「真心地希望大家都係投返畀自己最鍾意嗰個人」；惟強調初選的「百花齊放」出現完後，「大家就願賭服輸啦」，在之後的大選就要集中票源。
+
+#### 李俊杰表示訪問前有告訴吳政亨訪問目的及或發布文章
+
+錄音播畢後，李俊杰確認訪問前有告訴吳訪問目的及文章有機會發布在什麼平台。李運騰追問有否告知吳訪問題目，李稱他們有「skeleton（框架）」，想了解公民在初選中的角色，故當時有告訴吳將問及「三投三不投」的效果，以及他對初選有何期望；又指當日抵達街站後吳正派發傳單，二人待吳回來告訴他訪問角度及內容，並於約半小時後進行訪問。
+
+法官李運騰其後提醒，除非屬損害被告利益（against self interest）的招認，否則一般未經宣誓的庭外陳述屬傳聞證據，不可呈堂；並問辯方是否認為上述錄音同時包含有利和不利吳政亨的證據，並着辯方午休後回應。
+
+#### 法官稱傳聞證供涉被告招認方可呈堂 着辯方明就呈堂性陳詞
+
+午休後，石書銘引述吳政亨於訪問稱「攬炒書」和初選之間會選初選等，問李俊杰所寫的文章是否包括該訊息。惟李運騰質疑相關性，陳仲衡亦指對辯方證人如何理解吳的說法無興趣。石書銘再問文章就「攬炒」等想傳遞什麼訊息，惟李運騰即皺眉並不耐煩問，為何要關注這名證人的說法。
+
+李運騰續指，若訪問內容並不能呈堂，李俊杰如何撰寫訪問便與案無關。他又重申，所有未經宣誓的庭外陳述、即使由被告親述都屬「傳聞證供」，一般不能呈堂，但涉被告招認則除外；而若辯方指錄音只屬「開脫罪責的陳述（exculpatory statement）」、即只對被告有利的陳述，則看不到有任何基礎可呈堂。
+
+李再次問，在辯方立場，該訪問究竟是包含被告招認的混合陳述（mixed statement），抑或是為被告開脫罪責的陳述？石書銘重申只是反映吳政亨當時的思想狀態。李着辯方提供案例，以支持不屬被告招認的庭外陳述也可呈堂；陳仲衡並指，若錄音可呈堂才會考慮其內容，但強調證人如何撰寫訪問或理解吳的說法並非要考慮的內容。
+
+控方表示沒有盤問，並保留質疑辯方將相關電郵和錄音呈堂的權利，石遂將錄音標為臨時證物，證人作供完畢。
+
+法官陳慶偉最後要求辯方明早就證據呈堂性作口頭陳詞，並於今晚6時前提交陳詞。石書銘指或有困難，陳指「現時只是3點，你有3小時」，石稱但控方有一整晚處理。陳慶偉提高聲線說：「當然！那是事情運作的方式！（“Of course! That is how things work!”）」李運騰提議7點，石亦望有更多時間準備，陳終下令辯方須於今晚7時前提交陳詞，法庭會於下一名被告開展案情前作裁定。
+
+案件於約2時50分散庭，明早續審。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-15-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-67.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-15-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-67.md
new file mode 100644
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-15-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-67.md
@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第 67 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-06-15 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 官准吳政亨受訪錄音呈堂 惟稱或涉「牽連罪責」
+- 鄭達鴻作供 指公民黨黨團凌駕執委 不會形容為民主
+- 鄭達鴻稱譚文豪為免「畀人夾」提否決所有議案 惟公民黨就否決無「統一立場」
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（15日）踏入審訊第67天。代表吳政亨的大律師石書銘昨欲將吳的受訪錄音和電郵呈堂，遭法官質疑屬傳聞證據。石書銘今重申望以證據反映吳當時的思想狀態，法官李運騰提醒，吳政亨受訪談及望協助戴耀廷的「35+計劃」的部分，性質或涉「牽連罪責」（inculpatory），若容許呈堂法庭便會視為「混合式」陳述，即同時包含被告涉嫌罪責和開脫罪責的部分。辯方確認屬知情決定、知道相關風險，法官終批准將相關證物呈堂。
+
+#### 辯方稱電郵和錄音反映吳政亨思想狀態 法官稱或涉「牽連罪責」部分
+
+代表吳政亨的大律師石書銘昨傳召3名辯方證人，要求將吳政亨與另一人來往的4封電郵、和吳受訪的錄音呈堂，惟法官質疑屬傳聞證據，除非涉對被告不利的招認，否則不能呈堂，並要求辯方今早就此陳詞。
+
+石書銘今同意，兩項證據性質均屬「傳聞證據」，望以此顯示吳的思想狀態（state of mind）。法官李運騰問是反映整個控罪期間、抑或某一日的思想狀態，石指至少是由串謀形成至吳2020年6月17日受訪的時間。惟李運騰即指，吳政亨於7月1日也在《蘋果日報》刊登頭版廣告。
+
+李運騰又指，即使訪問的確能顯示吳在某段時間的思想狀態，但吳在訪問中亦有表示望協助戴耀廷的「35+計劃」，向潛在參選人施壓令他們遵守初選機制。李指該部分證據性質或涉「牽連罪責」（inculpatory），若容許呈堂，法庭便會視之為「混合式」陳述（mixed statement），即同時包含被告涉嫌罪責和開脫罪責（exculpatroy）的部分，石表示明白。
+
+#### 法官准吳政亨錄音及電郵作為「混合陳述」呈堂 辯方確認屬知情決定
+
+李運騰續問，故辯方認為即使該訪問錄音以「混合式陳述」呈堂，並只是用以顯示被告於某段時間、而非全段控罪時間的思想狀態，也沒有問題？石表示明白，並稱相信法庭會全盤考慮證據。李運騰指那當然，並再次向辯方確認這是否知情的決定（informed decision）、並知道相關風險，此時在被告欄的吳政亨不住點頭，石書銘確認。
+
+主控萬德豪表示，若辯方立場是接受證據作為「混合式陳述」呈堂，便不會反對，但關注辯方稱反映的思想狀態與案何關。法官陳慶偉指尚未知如何反映其思想狀態，留待結案陳詞處理，李運騰亦指之後會裁定證據是否相關，及如相關會佔多少比重。
+
+至於就吳政亨是「李伯盧」電郵帳戶的持有人，控方指沒有基礎同意，由法庭推斷。陳慶偉指即控方不反對，亦不認為需花更多時間，「這是常識（common sense）的問題。」法庭最終容許辯方將相關電郵截圖及錄音以「混合式陳述」形式呈堂。吳政亨案情完結，續由鄭達鴻作供。
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（15日）踏入審訊第67天。前公民黨區議員鄭達鴻開始作供，供述於2012年後入黨的工作，稱曾支持建制派提出的區議會撥款，及於2019年11月獲警方允許進入理大勸學生離開。鄭又曾任公民黨執委，惟認為在決策上，由立法會議員組成的黨團「凌駕咗執委會」，執委會功能「好似橡皮圖章」，只是象徵式通過黨團已討論的事項；即使有強烈不同意見，但「永遠說服唔到最高權力嘅決策者」，只能不情願地跟從，不會形容該過程為「民主」。鄭又稱，因無法接觸真正決策核心，故2016至2018年任副秘書長後無續任，改為任政策倡議執委，惟其倡議無一被接納。鄭2020年12月退黨時發文對此表達不滿，指無論就公民黨的內事和外事「慚愧地我改變不了任何一件事」。
+
+#### 鄭達鴻開始作供 曾修讀社會政策及法律博士、赴內地交流
+
+法官今早准吳政亨一方將吳的受訪錄音和電郵呈堂，吳政亨案情完結，其後由前公民黨黨員鄭達鴻作供。身穿西裝的鄭達鴻確認，他1988年於香港出生，2007年在香港大學專業進修學院修讀社會科學副學士，2009至2012年在理工大學修讀社會政策及行政學系，2016至2018年在城市大學修讀法律博士，2019年獲認可為調解員，並於2020年完成法學專業證書（PCLL）課程。
+
+鄭表示，在理大期間曾於2011和2012年到南京和內蒙做交換生，解釋香港與內地關係密切，故當時想了解多些內地，及「睇吓我讀嘅社會政策同行政，可以點樣喺內地實施好啲」。
+
+
+▲ 鄭達鴻
+
+#### 鄭稱感公民黨無投放足夠時間服務基層 故入黨後由草根地區做起
+
+鄭又指，他2011年在課程要求下，到公民黨九龍西支部做實習，解釋當時認同該黨理念，即在一國兩制之下為港人服務，及「好堅持專業嘅價值」。鄭續指，當時正值區議會選舉前夕，其角色是協助該屆候選人，惟經過兩三個月感覺「公民黨嘅候選人有協定，冇擺足夠嘅時間同心機去服務最基層嘅街坊」。
+
+鄭其後於2012年尾加入公民黨，並指上述經驗令他加入後，「由最基層嘅草根地區出發」，望藉做多些地區工作「為個黨提供更加多貼地嘅聲音」。鄭入黨後任地區發展主任，主要負責居民生活問題，包括法律福利及地區配套如交通黑點的改善。鄭於2015年當選北角（丹拿）區議員，於2019年成功連任，但沒有完成任期，於2021年5月11日辭職。
+
+#### 鄭稱區議會曾支持建制派撥款、曾獲警方允許入理大勸學生離開
+
+鄭達鴻表示，任區議員除改善居民生活和地區配套，亦處理規劃問題，如擴建東區醫院、建共融遊樂場，及一些活動的撥款審核。他曾加入多個委員會和工作小組，包括規劃工程及房屋事務委員會主席。
+
+鄭指，於區議會有機會與建制派合作，形容彼此「政治上針鋒相對，但係民生上就互相合作」，如在地區無障礙設施和東區醫院擴建上合作；他亦曾支持建制陣營撥款，包括「一帶一路」的學校申請、青年京劇活動和東區足球隊，解釋投票時是「審視返嗰個項目對東區居民嘅利弊」。
+
+鄭亦確認，任議員需與警察合作，指除地區治安問題，最特別是2019年11月25日他是五名獲警方允許進入理工大學的當選區議員之一，「去勸嗰陣時啲學生出返嚟。」法官陳仲衡指這是因為他是理大舊生，多於因他是區議員，鄭指兩者「相輔相成」，認為是因他同是理大校友和新當選區議員，故警察同意此人選，亦同意辯方指他熟悉理大內環境。
+
+
+▲ （資料圖片）
+
+#### 鄭達鴻指公民黨決策由執委會及黨團負責、曾任執委但無加入黨團
+
+就公民黨的決策，鄭達鴻表示主要由執委會及黨團負責，前者的功能理論上是就着當時的政治形勢作出政治決定，以及處理行政工作。鄭稱案發時的執委會任期由2018年12月開始，直至2020年11月，通常逢星期二晚開會。
+
+辯方展示2020年7月執委會的架構圖，鄭表示本案被告之一的楊岳橋為公民黨黨魁，譚文豪是地區發展執委，被指為共謀者的郭榮鏗是黨務發展執委，而郭家麒非當屆執委會成員。鄭入黨後亦曾任執委會成員，包括2014至2016年擔任青年公民主席，2016年12月至2018年11月任副秘書長，後於2018年12月至2020年11月任政策倡議執委。
+
+至於黨團方面，鄭指成員包括當屆立法會議員及其議員助理、黨顧問，另外若有需要會邀請一些元老，而黨魁是領導黨團的人。鄭指自己於2020年1月至11月期間並非黨團成員，而楊岳橋、譚文豪、郭家麒、郭榮鏗、陳淑莊以及他們的議員助理，均為成員之一。就黨團的功能，鄭表示他們會就着立法會最前線的政策及決策，與跨黨派接觸聯繫。
+
+#### 鄭指執委會遭黨團凌駕變「橡皮圖章」 不會形容黨內決策過程為民主
+
+被問到黨團與執委會的關係，鄭表示「黨團凌駕咗執委會，執委會功能好似橡皮圖章咁」。他解釋指：「公民黨傳統係由立法會議員起家，黨嘅架構唔係咁穩陣，所以向來都係立法會議員話事。」他又指立法會議員「經常認為自己喺立法會最前線工作，有最前線嘅資訊，所以做決定係理所當然」，而且黨團成員與執委會成員高度重疊，「所以有啲嘢黨團已經傾好咗，先至去執委會象徵式咁通過。」
+
+法官李運騰即問，鄭是否有時不同意黨團所作的決定？他指「有時係我喺執委會表達過反對」。李續問如何解決分歧，是否由投票處理，鄭否認，並指「點解我會形容係橡皮圖章，就係因為最後都係黨嘅最高層話事」。李指他不明白，問即使執委會上有不同意見，主席仍會做最終決定？鄭指基本上是由主席和立法會議員決定，而他們在執委會並非大多數。
+
+#### 鄭稱公民黨雖自稱「雙頭馬車」 惟大部分由黨魁決定
+
+李再問，即有意見分歧時，是少數人意見優先？鄭表示：「我會話係當嗰個最高層嘅決策核心，有一個取態嘅時候，其他人就會慢慢去由唔同意見轉為跟從。」李問是否即逐漸被游說，鄭答：「其實有時嘅情況係，即使有啲人好強烈嘅表達意見，最後都永遠說服唔到最高權力嘅決策者，然後就係跟隨黨嘅最高決策者嘅決定。」李追問即不情願地（reluctantly）跟隨？鄭答「係」，李再問那鄭會否形容這過程為民主？鄭答「唔會」，旁聽席傳來輕聲驚嘆。
+
+鄭在法官陳慶偉詢問下，指當時楊岳橋為黨魁，梁家傑為主席。陳慶偉問，即誰的權力較大（“Who is bigger than the other?”）？被告席傳來笑聲。鄭表示公民黨有立法會議席後，稱為「雙頭馬車」方式，但事實上黨魁在執委會時已經過黨團一輪討論，「大部分都係黨魁決定」，而黨魁有需要可邀請主席參與。鄭確認，案發時梁家傑並非立法會議員，並非黨團常設成員。
+
+
+▲ 梁家傑（左）、楊岳橋（右）
+
+#### 鄭稱2016至18年任副秘書長發覺無法接觸決策核心 後改任政策倡議執委
+
+資深大律師潘熙其後再問，為何鄭達鴻稱黨團凌駕執委會，鄭解釋，他2016至2018年任黨副秘書長，該職位是新增，原本設計為未來接任秘書長，在執委會角色算重要；惟該兩年間，「我會發覺好多重要嘅決定，其實都係由黨團討論完，黨魁嚟匯報，我接觸唔到真正決策嘅核心」，故之後他沒有再做副秘書長，黨找了一名曾任黨團的成員接任，他並獲時任副主席賴仁彪委派接任執委會政策倡議一職，由黨員於大會投票通過。
+
+法官李運騰問他為何沒有拒絕，問他不是覺得執委會是橡皮圖章嗎？鄭解釋，「因為我要打算喺未來參選（2020年）立法會，我需要得到黨嘅支持」，亦望得到黨支持。李續問，即在2018年，鄭已望參選兩年後的立法會選舉？鄭答「有咁嘅意思」，因他2016年立會選舉時已排在港島陳淑莊名單的第二位。
+
+#### 鄭稱倡議不獲公民黨接納 2020年12月退黨
+
+鄭確認，於2018至2020年在執委會任政策倡議，負責做研究再提出政策倡議，包括曾倡議設立發言人制度及成立獨立的網媒部門，但無一被接納。潘熙問他有否公開表示不滿，鄭指「去到我退黨嗰一刻有」，即2020年12月15日，他透過臉書個人專頁發布一則帖文。庭上展示該帖文，鄭達鴻並讀出相關段落：
+
+> 「決心選入黨執委，期望可以帶入改變。這些年來，曾有前輩對我說，『阿達你就係黨嘅下一代』。就為著這句說話，哪怕並不討好，我一直努力就黨務發表意見。知識不足，我半工讀到實習大律師資格。經驗不夠，我從地區開始在北角選區議員。然而成為區議員後，即使曾為副秘書長，無論內事如改革青年部，創意媒體部，發言人制度，涉足秘書處事務等，外事如提議私人檢控，去留的條件問題等，慚愧地我改變不了任何一件事。」
+
+案件下午續審。
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（15日）踏入審訊第67天。鄭達鴻繼續作供，表示公民黨2020年3月曾舉行立會選舉籌備會議，譚文豪稱坊間有人提出以否決預算案為爭取五大訴求的籌碼，「與其遲早都畀人夾，不如自己衝出嚟去得盡啲」，遂提議否決所有議案，並獲楊岳橋贊成。鄭指當時表達反對，稱該黨支持者為「理性中產」，「有乜理由衝出嚟，分一塊本土派嘅餅」，惟二人「一意孤行」，最終仍決定於3月25日召記者會表明否決所有政府議案。法官一度問公民黨是否與其「畀人夾」，寧願先「夾人哋」，鄭指譚意思是若站在該位置就「點都唔驚畀人夾」。
+
+鄭續指，會議上公民黨無就否決議案形成「統一立場」，而記者會無經執委會同意、其他黨員不知情，理解會上看法對黨員無約束力。鄭又指雖然他有出席記者會，但不同意楊岳橋和譚文豪的說法；並稱該黨設「議員豁免跟隨黨立場投票機制」，容許黨員申請豁免跟隨黨立場投票。
+
+#### 鄭達鴻：楊岳橋、譚文豪曾問參選立會意向 着「攞啲成績出嚟」
+
+前公民黨區議員鄭達鴻今早出庭作供，講述入黨後的工作，又指公民黨黨團凌駕執委會，不會形容為民主。辯方資深大律師潘熙其後就鄭參選立法會發問，鄭解釋參選港島是因自己是港島區議員，而2016年立會選舉亦排在港島區陳淑莊名單之後，後陳因涉案未能連任，他更打算參選該區。
+
+鄭續指，2019年10月楊岳橋與譚文豪曾叫他上立法會，問他有否參選意向，並指如要他們支持「就要攞啲成績出嚟畀佢哋睇」。鄭指二人沒指明是什麼成績，他遂稱可留意2019年區議會選舉中他個人、助理及其他盟友的表現。鄭指他們最終扭轉北角炮台山區形勢，於7席取得6席，而楊和譚後於2020年1月再與他會面，「算係認可我嘅成績」，但稱尚要看其他表現，惟無指明是什麼，鄭遂「繼續努力」。
+
+#### 鄭達鴻稱2020年5月獲會員大會通過參選立會
+
+鄭達鴻續解釋，黨內有兩個程序供黨員出選，傳統程序為先由地區支部提名通過，執委會做背景審查和提名通過，再於特別會員大會讓全體黨員通過；另一程序則為「徵召機制」，由黨內立法會議員和元老如余若薇、梁家傑，就政治形勢在選前任何時間徵召黨員出選一個位置。
+
+鄭確認他當時循傳統程序出選，於2020年先獲港島支部提名，4月尾5月頭獲執委通過，並於5月30日在特別會員大會通過初步公民黨參選名單，確定會派他出選。法官李運騰一度指，同年3月25日已舉行公民黨記者會，鄭達鴻和李予信有出席，似乎他們當時已獲黨支持參選，辯方稱之後會處理。
+
+#### 鄭稱黨內另設「徵召機制」 參與初選前仍擔憂未能代表公民黨出選
+
+鄭續同意，雖然會員大會通過參選名單，但在「徵召機制」下可再作更改。他指獲通過參選後曾擔心無法出選，因他作為新人，而過去港島區均有公民黨議員且該區議席「十分重要」，加上當時公民黨面對很大壓力、形勢較緊張，故有消息稱參選名單可能更改，或由郭榮鏗或梁家傑取代他出選。鄭指該擔心至他同年6月中正式宣布參與初選才停止；但在法官追問下，指當時黨內元老無直接表示或取代他參選，僅關心其選情，他亦沒主動問。
+
+李運騰追問若郭榮鏗不參選法律界，會由誰參選，又笑指以往除了吳靄儀外，一直都是由郭榮鏗出任法律界議員。鄭指他不清楚，只知道後來郭被DQ時要周圍找黨內黨外人士參選，而郭的助理、事務律師 Janet Pang 或為人選。
+
+
+▲ 郭榮鏗（資料圖片）
+
+#### 鄭稱屬取態溫和新人、民調顯示只支持參與初選者 參加初選才有勝算
+
+潘熙其後就整個初選的過程發問。被問為何參與初選，鄭稱因當時坊間已有初選的概念，亦有民調指民主派支持者只會支持勝出初選者；加上他當時是公民黨和民主黨兩大黨唯一並非爭取連任的新人，取態亦較溫和，故要靠黨參加初選才有勝算。
+
+鄭在法官追問下，指該民調並非「三投三不投」、應由香港民意研究所進行，但不記得確實時間，而他於3月25日記者會已決定參與初選。陳慶偉一度質疑，區諾軒作供時從沒提過相關民調，問是否真的有這個民調，鄭重申有，只是不記得何時。
+
+#### 鄭稱直至收到區諾軒口供 始知區和戴耀廷曾與公民黨會面
+
+潘熙續引述區諾軒供稱，曾於2020年2月與戴耀廷、李永達、李卓人一起與梁家傑會面，並於同年3月與戴在公民黨總部，與公民黨執委會會面商討初選。鄭達鴻指他雖然是執委，但不知道上述兩次會面，只是於2021年9月收到本案文件後，才在區諾軒的口供中得悉。陳慶偉追問為何他被隱瞞，鄭表示「唔清楚」。
+
+#### 鄭指譚文豪稱「遲早都畀人夾」故提議否決所有議案 官：是否想夾人哋先？
+
+公民黨同年3月25日舉行記者會，時任黨魁楊岳橋承諾若政府不回應五大訴求，會否決所有政府議案及預算案致特首下台。鄭表示召開記招的決定是於3月中一個2020年立法會選舉籌備會議作出，稱當初應是譚文豪提出要舉行籌備會議，指「有好重要嘅事」想和大家溝通，鄭亦受邀出席。
+
+
+▲ 譚文豪（左上）（資料圖片）
+
+鄭表示，會議出席者包括黨內立法會議員及助理，其中楊岳橋及譚文豪親自出席，而郭榮鏗、郭家麒及不會連任的陳淑莊則派助理出席；會上另有潛在候選人，即他和林瑞華，其中他打算參選港島區，且據他所知只有他對該區有興趣，林則打算參選飲食界，但忘記李予信有否出席。
+
+鄭指譚文豪於會上稱，知悉坊間有些人開始用否決財政預算案作為籌碼，以爭取五大訴求，「與其遲早都畀人夾，不如自己衝出嚟去得盡啲，用否決所有議案作為籌碼，爭取五大訴求」，林卓廷聞言說「嘩」。陳慶偉遂問：「與其『畀人夾」，公民黨是否想先『夾人哋』？（“Instead of being pressurised、畀人夾，the Civic Party wants to 夾人哋 first, right?”）」多人發笑。
+
+鄭指當時譚的意思是「佢企咗咁嘅立場嘅時候，就點都唔驚畀人夾啦」，旁聽席再傳來笑聲。陳追問，鄭是指公民黨被逼至牆角，較為可取的做法是反擊？又指這與該黨原意完全不同，是由被施壓一方轉為向他人施壓（from being forced, to being the one who initiates more force）。鄭澄清指當時「冇話係要夾返人哋，但係佢嘅意思係如果企咗喺呢個位置，就點都唔會再畀人夾」，但他不清楚為何譚文豪有此擔心。
+
+#### 鄭稱自己、林瑞華及郭家麒助理曾反對否決財案 曾着譚文豪等「唔好去到咁盡」
+
+不過陳慶偉卻指，鄭達鴻的說法與區諾軒證供有別，指區曾稱會面時陳淑莊反對否決財政預算案，因對功能組別感到擔心，最後公民黨亦無作任何承諾。鄭續解釋，當譚文豪提出要否決所有議案後，雖然楊岳橋及譚文豪助理同意，但亦有人反對，當中包括鄭自己、林瑞華及郭家麒助理。陳仲衡問鄭有沒有表達，鄭指有並分為3個階段——首先在譚文豪開始發言時，鄭表示「明明我哋嘅支持者係一班理性中產，有乜理由衝出嚟，分一塊係本土派嘅餅」。鄒家成聞言以口型說「哇」並微笑。
+
+
+▲ 郭家麒（左）、譚文豪（右）（資料圖片）
+
+鄭續說，其後郭家麒助理談及大嶼山醫院的議題，鄭亦表示自己曾在東區區議會提出擴建東區醫院，即將洗衣房遷往大嶼山綜合大樓，並用該地作醫院第二期擴建。鄭指自己作為動議人和規劃工程及房屋事務委員會主席，且「極罕有地得到醫管局同埋政府部門嘅同意」，但若他最後在立法會反對相關議案的話「咁樣講唔過去」。鄭並指，最後是當楊岳橋及譚文豪「一意孤行」的時候，曾提醒他們「可唔可以唔好去到咁盡」。
+
+至於同樣反對的林瑞華，鄭指他會上提出很注重業界利益，如果是有關抗疫基金的撥款「佢冇可能反對」。而郭家麒的助理亦表示，如果是有關大嶼山醫院的撥款，他們不可以反對。
+
+#### 鄭稱公民黨無就否決財案有統一立場 記者會未經執委會批准、對成員無約束力
+
+鄭達鴻續稱，楊岳橋及譚文豪最後在他人反對下，仍決定繼續召開3月25日的記者會；而會議上沒有就否決預算案和所有政府議案形成公民黨的「統一立場」，沒決定誰會出席3月25日的記招，會議前黨內亦沒有就否決預算案作過任何討論。
+
+
+▲ 2020年3月25日公民黨記者會（資料圖片）
+
+法官李運騰關注，黨內有程序需要跟從，不論執委會是否「橡皮圖章」，黨的決定也需要先經執委會通過。鄭表示召開記者會的決定沒有經過執委會批准，陳仲衡即問，鄭認為出席未經批准的記者會是沒有問題？鄭指「程序上有問題」，但過往很多記者會都沒有經執委會同意。陳仲衡兩度指即使如此，鄭達鴻仍出席了記者會，鄭確認。
+
+潘熙續問，會議上有否提過公民黨部分成員在記者會上表達的立場，會對個別成員有約束力？鄭指沒有，並指據其理解，記者會表達的看法對個別黨員無約束力，因當時各議員發言不同，「講緊唔同嘅嘢。」
+
+#### 鄭稱除出席籌備會議者 其他黨員對3月記招不知情 會上無發言僅舉牌
+
+鄭後在李運騰詢問下確認，該籌備會議大約在3月25日記者會前約一星期至10日舉行，但期間黨內沒有就會議的決定、即舉行記者會的事宜作任何公告或諮詢。李運騰提高聲線略驚訝問，即除了出席籌備會議的人，其他黨員對此並不知情（in the dark）？鄭答「係」，並指不清楚當時黨團有否討論過該記者會，但籌備會議上黨團內每個議辦都有派人出席；不過有部分執委則沒有出席，亦對記者會不知情。
+
+李問既然如此，為何鄭又會出席該記招。鄭表示他由楊岳橋邀請，以區議員和潛在立法會選舉候選人身分出席，但楊沒告知他為何要出席。庭上展示記者會相片，鄭確認除時任立法會議員楊岳橋、譚文豪、郭家麒、郭榮鏗，還包括有意參選九龍西的余德寶、有意參選超區的黃文萱、有意參選飲食界的林瑞華、和有機會與楊岳橋參選同一名單的梁嘉善。
+
+鄭表示，他不清楚誰決定誰可出席記者會，自己會上亦沒有發言，其角色「就係好似相咁樣舉牌」，牌上載有選民登記的二維碼。鄭重申，以他理解會上發言者就否決預算案「沒有統一立場」，潘熙問有哪位講者的說法他不同意，鄭答：「楊岳橋同埋譚文豪嘅說話。」辯方遂展示記者會錄音謄本，惟法官陳仲衡提議播片，案件明早續審。
+
+
+▲ 林瑞華（左）、楊岳橋（右）
+
+#### 鄭稱公民黨設議員豁免跟隨黨立場機制 郭榮鏗曾使用
+
+此外，鄭達鴻今提及黨內有「議員豁免跟隨黨立場投票機制」，以解決執委會和黨團的分歧。鄭指該機制由2016年執委會參考英國和愛爾蘭的「良心投票機制（conscientious voting）」而設，緣於時任公民黨議員毛孟靜因就許多議題的立場與黨不同而選擇退黨，當時黨「唔想純粹因為立場唔同，就令到一個立法會議員退黨」。
+
+鄭指該機制由議員向黨團提出豁免，並由黨團同意，例子包括2020年6月中，郭榮鏗就張舉能法官任命首席法官的議案使用此機制。翻查資料，郭當時投贊成票，其他公民黨員則投棄權票。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-16-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-68.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-16-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-68.md
new file mode 100644
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@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第 68 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-06-16 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 官問記者會上楊岳橋稱否決財案是「潛在謊言」、「修飾言辭」？ 鄭達鴻：有機會係
+- 鄭達鴻：曾反對公民黨簽「墨落無悔」 指大黨話簽就簽「黨格何在」
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（16日）踏入審訊第68天。鄭達鴻今繼續作供，表示不同意楊岳橋和譚文豪在公民黨記者會上，表明政府不回應五大訴求便否決所有議案的說法，又認為楊的說法僅代表當屆黨團。法官陳慶偉一度稱楊提出「空頭支票」，鄭指是「政治語言」，法官再追問是「潛在的謊言」、「修辭的言辭」？鄭答「有機會係」。
+
+鄭達鴻又稱，要視乎預算案內容才決定是否否決，指雖做不到五大訴求是政府缺失，但若政府有「抛出橄欖枝」或「派糖」，而「派出嚟對市民有益嘅地方係多過缺失」，不可能不同意預算案；又認為若民意一面倒要求政府回應五大訴求，相信理性政府會回應。鄭又指，當時無意在當選後否決預算案，若公民黨立場要否決，「最壞情況係可以退黨。」
+
+#### 鄭達鴻稱不同意楊岳橋提否決所有議案
+
+鄭達鴻昨供稱，譚文豪於公民黨選舉籌備會議曾倡以否決所有政府議案為籌碼，爭取五大訴求，並與楊岳橋「一意孤行」召開3月25日的記者會。鄭今補充，有出席記者會的余德寶亦應有出席籌備會議，但重申不記得李予信有否出席。
+
+
+▲ 2020年3月25日公民黨記者會（資料圖片）
+
+鄭昨稱不同意楊岳橋和譚文豪記者會上的說法。辯方資深大律師潘熙遂播放片段，楊岳橋提及「我負責代表黨團講講」，指民主派若取得35+，而特首在施政報告不回應五大訴求，「公民黨係會同佢唔客氣⋯⋯以後政府每一個法案、財政撥款申請，我哋都會否決，呢個亦都係一個莊嚴嘅承諾」，而政府若到了3月財政財預算案仍不願退讓，他們都會「義無反顧」否決預算案。
+
+鄭達鴻表示，不同意楊岳橋指特首如未能回應五大訴求就會「否決所有嘢」，亦在李運騰詢問下認為楊代表「黨團」和代表「公民黨」說話有分別。鄭解釋，黨團是作為一個立法會最前線政策制定的架構，而若代表公民黨，「理應係經過執委會同意嘅一個決定。」
+
+
+▲ 鄭達鴻
+
+#### 鄭稱楊岳橋說法僅代表當屆黨團 官稱即提「空頭支票」
+
+法官陳仲衡指，但楊是談及公民黨立會議員當選後的行為，而鄭望參選立會議員；陳慶偉補充，即若鄭成功當選並成為黨團一分子，楊便是代表他說話。鄭回應，認為楊的說法是代表當屆黨團，「實際未來黨團嘅一啲決定，應該由嗰一屆嘅黨團嘅人再決定。」
+
+陳慶偉指，即楊是在提出「空頭支票（empty promise）」？鄭答「我認為係政治語言」，陳指即是「一個潛在的謊言（a potential lie）」，又問「這就是你說的？政治語言」，多人發笑；李運騰亦問是否「修飾的言辭（dress-up speech）」，鄭答「有機會係」。
+
+#### 鄭稱若預算案抛出橄欖枝多於缺失 不可能不同意
+
+鄭達鴻在法官陳慶偉詢問下，亦指不同意要否決預算案，認為「要睇返實際財政預算案（內容）再決定」。被問是考慮什麼，他指認為「五大訴求做唔到，固然可能係政府嘅一啲缺失」，但同時政府必然會提出財政預算，「我哋冇可能唔睇當中嘅內容。」鄭續指：「到時候就係睇究竟個財政預算案入面，有幾多政府可以抛出嘅橄欖枝或者一啲派糖嘅措施，成件事再作一個平衡嘅檢視。如果佢派出嚟對市民有益嘅地方係多過缺失嘅，到時冇可能唔同意。」
+
+陳仲衡問，所以鄭其實已準備好以五大訴求與「一些橄欖枝和糖果」作交換（trade）？鄭答「係」。陳仲衡續指，但在能審視預算案前，鄭需先獲黨的支持才可當選，鄭同意，並同意他是想借助黨的支持。
+
+#### 楊岳橋先後稱代表黨團及公民黨發言 鄭不清楚是否代表黨立場
+
+辯方其後再播放楊岳橋的英語發言，楊指他不能代表民主派說話，但能代表公民黨說話，並指目標是不惜任何代價（at all costs）爭取五大訴求，若政府不回應五大訴求會否決所有議案和撥款。鄭重申不同意楊的說法，並同意李運騰指此處楊稱代表「公民黨」，與早前稱代表「黨團」發言不同。李指時任黨主席梁家傑坐在楊身旁，問楊岳橋說法是否代表黨立場，鄭稱不清楚，因不清楚楊與梁家傑有否對話。
+
+
+▲ 資料圖片：梁家傑（左）、楊岳橋（右）
+
+辯方其後播放譚文豪的發言，譚強調政府若沒有落實五大訴求，將「否決晒所有法案，否決晒所有撥款直至回應」，並指否決預算案後可解散立法會，若再否決特首便必須下台，「你問我下一步會繼續點，就係繼續否決。佢搵邊一個特首上嚟，佢一日唔落實五大訴求，我哋一日反對落去。」鄭同樣不同意譚說法。陳仲衡指即使如此，鄭仍望代表公民黨參選，鄭答「係」。
+
+#### 鄭稱同意郭家麒發言 若有好預算案會同意、差撥款才否決
+
+辯方其後播放郭家麒發言，郭稱《基本法》容許議員否決政府不合理做法，以讓政府有約制、受監管，但「最終如果政府拎出嚟嘅政策，包括佢嘅財政預算，所有嘅政策係得到市民嘅接納，坐喺度嘅立法會議員，哪怕佢哋三十五個四十個，點解唔係投票支持呀？」，並指相反若撥款是胡亂增加警察開支，作為民選代表一定有責任反映民意，直至政府交出合理的預算和政策。
+
+鄭達鴻表示同意郭家麒的發言，指他強調如有好的財政預算案和撥款，「無論立法會有35定40人，佢哋都會同意；只係話有一啲差嘅撥款，咁先會否決」，確認他投票前是考慮預算案的優劣。
+
+
+▲ 資料圖片：郭家麒（左）、譚文豪（右）
+
+#### 鄭稱若民意一面倒促五大訴求 相信理性政府會回應 沒預期入議會用否決權
+
+鄭達鴻在李運騰詢問下，指楊岳橋和譚文豪說法與早前的籌備會議沒有偏離，他亦預視二人說法，只是在籌備會議時他們沒表明一入立法會，由行政長官不同意回應五大訴求便開始否決。
+
+鄭並重申，不同意會上較資深的黨員表明政府不回應五大訴求，便會否決所有議案和預算案；而當時若他當選，亦不會預期運用否決權否決所有議案，解釋因當時「距離真係審議財政預算案仲有一段好長時間」。
+
+鄭續指，「我深信政府會一直檢視民意同選舉結果去同民主派傾」，而當中有很多次檢視民意的機會，包括民主派初選投票人數、實際選舉民主派取得的議席數量，以及施政報告和財政預算案的諮詢，「如果民意係一面倒要求政府回應五大訴求嘅，我相信理性嘅政府係會作出回應。」
+
+陳仲衡問，那鄭認為當時政府是理性嗎？鄭答「我相信佢會係理性嘅」。陳追問即鄭認為當時政府是否事實上是理性，鄭答「係」，並指相信政府即使不是回應五大訴求本身，「都會喺財政預算案抛出一啲橄欖枝同埋一啲甜頭，等立法會議員去檢視實際嘅草案再作決定。」
+
+#### 鄭稱若當選後公民黨要否決預算案 最壞情況可退黨
+
+鄭又同意，他區議員的工作會影響其投票立場，指若他在區議會旳一些民生主張放到立法會審議，會增加他投票支持議案的機會。辯方其後展示鄭參選區議會的選舉單張，寫有「專業用心 據理力爭」，陳仲衡一度問，鄭在單張上有沒有用任何「政治語言」，陳慶偉指即是「空頭支票」，鄭答：「描述嗰時嘅政治環境嘅時候有講，但民生嘅事項係好確實嘅事項。」
+
+潘熙續問，在2020年3月時，鄭達鴻有沒有想過若他當選立法會議員，而政府拒絕回應五大訴求，公民黨立場是要運用否決權，他會怎樣做？鄭指有想過，並表示「如果入到黨團改變唔到黨嘅立場，會申請議員豁免跟隨黨立場投票機制」。鄭昨提及該機制是容許議員向黨團申請，豁免跟隨黨立場投票，郭榮鏗亦曾使用。
+
+潘熙續問，若其申請不被通過會怎樣做？鄭答「最壞嘅情況係可以退黨」。鄭最後重申，他2020年3月時無意在當選後否決預算案，直至2020年7月尾亦抱有同樣立場。
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（16日）踏入審訊第68天。鄭達鴻繼續作供，對於公民黨以黨名義簽署「墨落無悔」，鄭解釋當時有人質疑該黨為何不簽，而黨內議助和黨工認為「快快脆簽咗，個矛頭就會指向第二個冇簽嘅政黨」。鄭稱曾兩度表達反對，指若公民黨自視為民主派較大政黨，就不應「話簽就簽」坊間聯署，否則「黨格何在」，又重申支持者為理性溫和中產；而楊岳橋與譚文豪亦曾反對指不想簽「無窮無盡」聲明。鄭指其意見不獲接納，而公民黨終以黨名義簽署，「刻意同其他簽署者（以個人名義簽署）唔同，保留一啲彈性。」
+
+此外，鄭達鴻稱港島協調會議就否決預算案只討論過「幾句」且無達成共識，他無收過任何協調文件，亦認為35+的目標是「十分之不可能」。對於曾於初選前的街站提及否決財案，他稱僅按楊岳橋指示帶出公民黨立場。
+
+#### 鄭達鴻稱只曾就「35+計劃」與戴耀廷個別討論兩次 涉參選意向及票站
+
+鄭達鴻今繼續作供，表示與戴耀廷只曾就「35+計劃」個別討論兩次。第一次是在2020年3月中後旬，戴 WhatsApp 問他是否有機會代表公民黨於港島出選，他忘記如何回答，但「將個 message 拎去黨度問個黨」，後黨派了副主席賴仁彪與他一同出席首次會議。
+
+另一次則是在6月尾，戴耀廷問鄭達鴻公民黨港島區議員有什麼票站，鄭同樣轉告黨，最後由黨總部回覆戴。陳仲衡問他有否保留與戴耀廷的記錄，鄭稱「警察沒收咗部電話」，亦不記得有否將記錄刪除。
+
+#### 鄭達鴻稱民主派港島6席取4席「幾乎不可能」
+
+辯方續問及協調會議情況。就港島區協調會議，區諾軒曾供稱初選前有3次，初選後有一次。鄭指不記得初選前有3抑或4次會議，但「我知道嘅有出席晒」，包括初選後的一次，而首兩次會議賴仁彪均與他一同出席。
+
+就3月26日的首次會議，會上討論於港島6席目標取4席，惟鄭稱認為「幾乎不可能」，解釋該目標緣於2019年區議會選舉大勝，但區選是「單議席單票制」，立法會選舉是「比例代表制」。鄭指要在比例代表制下取4席須有一個「接近完美嘅分票機制」，但民主派「從來冇一個咁科學嘅機制可以處理到」；加上當時民主派得票增加，但建制派得票亦多了很多，且2016年葉劉淑儀才是港島區獲最高票者，民主派要取4席是「接近不可能」。
+
+鄭在法官陳仲衡詢問下，指會上沒有表達此意見，稱因為與會者「要有一個目標」，而現時民主派有3席，「佢哋就必然想更進一步。」
+
+鄭指會上亦有討論投票數目，司馬文提出因目標議席是4席，望選民能投4票。鄭有表達同意，指因公民黨在港島區傳統上有議席，但他是知名度不高的新人，「如果投一票，我未必係港島選民嘅首選，但如果投4票，我深信公民黨一定會係其中一席之中。」
+
+#### 鄭稱港島首次會議 司馬文反對否決財案後未有再討論
+
+此外，鄭達鴻亦確認，首次會議上曾傳閱有關初選機制、由戴耀廷草擬的「35+計劃」文件；並指談及文件的實際操作時，戴耀廷突然提及否決預算案，提出「積極運用《基本法》」的概念，即「可以否決，可以唔否決，到時睇實際情況」。
+
+鄭指當時只有司馬文回應，稱反對任何關於否決預算案的想法，「反對用呢樣嘢約束任何候選人」，而戴耀廷聞言後「都冇再講嘢」。鄭指因為二人屬「根本性分歧」，故當時不認為有需要表達反對，該討論亦只有「幾句」、很快就結束，在之後的協調會議亦沒有提及。鄭在會議外亦沒有與其他參與者討論否決預算案的事宜。
+
+
+▲ 司馬文（資料圖片）
+
+#### 鄭稱港島無就否決財案達共識、無收過港島協調文件、無人解釋提名表格「共識」意思
+
+鄭達鴻表示，港島協調會議最終達成的共識有6點，包括舉辦初選、舉行選舉論壇、「贏咗先有得選，輸咗冇得選」、目標議席為4席、以「靈童制」為替補機制；至於投票數目，因最後投票系統不容許投4票，最終共識轉為投一票。而會上沒有就否決預算案達成共識。
+
+此外，鄭表示會上也曾討論過要否簽一份關於「贏咗先有得選，輸咗冇得選」的文件，他記不清楚在哪次會議討論，當刻亦沒有最終決定，而最後也沒有相關協議或草稿出現。
+
+辯方其後展示「35+立法會過半計劃 民主派港島協調機制（初稿）」，以及「35+立法會過半計劃 民主派港島區協調機制協議」，該兩份文件均提及積極運用《基本法》權力，包括否決財政預算案。辯方問鄭被控前有沒有收過，鄭指沒有，解釋因文件提到以「全票制」選出四張名單，即投4票，與協調會議共識的投一票不同，若他當時看到應至少會向主辦方詢問。鄭亦不知道戴耀廷有設立港島區WhatsApp的「廣播列表」。
+
+至於所有參選人均有簽署的提名表格上，列明「確認支持和認同由戴耀廷及區諾軒主導之協調會議共識，包括『民主派 35+ 公民投票計劃』及其目標」。鄭稱在2020年6月至7月期間，沒有人向他解釋過「共識」代表什麼，重申當時理解共識就是上述提及的6點。
+
+#### 鄭稱反對簽墨落無悔 大黨不應話簽就簽 否則「黨格何在」
+
+公民黨曾以黨名義簽署「墨落無悔」聲明，辯方續展示公民黨6月11日帖文，提及「公民黨已加入聯署【墨落無悔 堅定抗爭】聲明書」，又指早於3月25日召開記招，承諾尊重民主派初選機制，及「立會過半後政府必須落實五大訴求，否則公民黨將行使《基本法》賦予的否決權，否決包括財政預算案在內的政府議案、法案及撥款」。
+
+被問公民黨何時首次討論「墨落無悔」，鄭表示是6月10日，指當時有議員助理和資深黨工發覺該聲明開始在網上廣傳，同時有人發訊息問公民黨「點解唔簽」，故議助和黨工遂在包含所有初選參與者、有約20至30人、用來籌備立會選舉的黨內 WhatsApp 群組，提出問要否簽署。有份發聲明的鄒家成聞言微笑。
+
+鄭續指，該些議員助理和資深黨工認為「呢啲咁嘅聲明，你快快脆簽咗，個矛頭就會指向第二個冇簽嘅政黨，因為呢個都係講緊選舉期間嘅公關舉動」，林卓廷和黃碧雲等發笑。鄭在陳仲衡詢問下表示，當時在群組兩次表達反對，稱「坊間呢啲咁嘅聯署，如果我哋覺得（公民黨）係民主派其中一個比較大嘅政黨，就唔應該話簽就簽，（否則）黨格何在」，林卓廷一度大聲說「吓？」。鄭續指，其後群組內成員討論了很久，「我就提醒佢哋都係要諗返我哋嘅 target audience，係一班理性溫和中產。」
+
+#### 鄭稱楊岳橋譚文豪亦曾反對簽「墨落」 公民黨終以黨名義簽以保留彈性
+
+李運騰問鄭有否表明不會簽署，鄭稱「我嘅意見係黨都唔應該簽個聲明」，當時亦有表達，但其意見不被其他人接受。鄭亦指，除他以外，楊岳橋與譚文豪一開始亦表達反對，稱「唔想再簽一啲咁嘅聲明，因為會開咗一個無窮無盡嘅聲明要我哋簽（的先例）」；但此外沒有人表示該聲明未能反映協調會議內容。
+
+潘熙續問，為何聲明最終是由公民黨名義、而非個別成員簽署，鄭解釋當時討論從6月10日晚延續至翌日中午，不同人有不同意見，「去到最後佢哋就提出用公民黨嘅名義簽署，刻意同其他簽署者（以個人名義簽）唔同，保留一啲彈性。」
+
+法官李運騰問鄭是否仍有相關 WhatsApp 紀錄，陳仲衡問還是他已刪除了？鄭答「可能有（刪除）」，指選舉時會定期刪除記錄。陳問他為何要定期刪除，鄭稱記憶中初選完結後群組無再起作用，「就叫我哋 delete」，在法官質疑下同意他說錯。
+
+#### 鄭達鴻網台稱共同目標「撼動政權」 解釋35+可改政治版圖令立法機關制衡
+
+辯方亦多次就鄭達鴻於不同場合的發言，如帖文、電台節目訪問等，問他對當時言論的回應。其中2020年6月15日的D100節目《風波裡的茶杯》，控方指鄭於節目的發言提及簽協議與否不會破壞共同目標。辯方播放片段，有聽眾問為何35+計劃候選人不需簽「生死狀」以表達共同目標，主持吳志森回應時提及35+目的是望「撼動呢個政權」。
+
+鄭達鴻續回應：「其實唔係話冇共同目標，共同目標就係撼動個政權、去用 35plus」，又指「其實一開始都講過簽唔簽呢樣嘢」，只是戴耀廷有一個「良好願望」，擔心《國安法》來時會影響很多人，想留「走盞位」才沒簽署。鄭續指，「咁當然有啲人想繼續有一啲共同嘅願望，咁所以之前有個聯署喺度，譬如公民黨都簽咗嘅。咁呢個就等每一個政團自己去考慮啦，呢個都好難去規限得到。」
+
+潘熙問鄭為何提「撼動政權」，鄭指只是沿用吳志森的說法，解釋認為「攞到議會過半，就可以改變以往嘅政治版圖，立法機關就唔會淨係被當作橡皮圖章，可以去返一個 checks and balances（制衡）嘅狀態」。
+
+#### 鄭稱協調會曾討論簽署「贏咗先有得選」文件 官質疑控方證人無提過
+
+至於鄭提及「一開始都講過簽唔簽呢樣嘢」，鄭稱是港島會議上曾討論、但最終沒達成的「贏咗先有得選，輸咗冇得選」文件。陳慶偉質疑，3名控方證人作供時均無提及過有關文件，現在才首次聽聞。李運騰追問有否討論過要簽該文件、又問是何時討論，鄭稱有，是在初選前的第三或四次會議上。鄭又指忘記由誰提出，但過往的初選都有表格列明「贏咗先有得選，輸咗冇得選」。
+
+至於為何提及「良好願望」及「走盞位」，鄭解釋因當時有新聞指初選會被指為操縱選舉，這是為免有機會被人追究。
+
+#### 公民黨6月辦街站 鄭達鴻獲余若薇及陳淑莊推薦
+
+辯方後播放公民黨2020年6月19日街站片段，出席者包括鄭達鴻、余德寶、余若薇、陳淑莊、楊岳橋、譚文豪、郭家麒及李予信。鄭表示街站主要目的是宣布參選及造勢，及介紹兩個新人包括他及李予信。
+
+
+▲ （資料圖片）
+
+街站片段顯示，余若薇發言介紹鄭達鴻，指他非常努力取得法律博士學位，望用法律背景為香港人服務，是「不可多得、勇敢、有承擔嘅後生仔」，籲選民支持。陳淑莊則提及鄭2016年與她「同一條名單」，為人努力上進；又指自己因佔中案判刑未能參選，但望通過初選爭取35+，落實「港人治港」及一國兩制。陳之後亦有介紹李予信，指他在「超紅」的錦屏區勝出。
+
+#### 鄭回應記者時提否決財案 解釋指遭楊岳橋「拉埋一邊」要求帶出黨立場
+
+片段顯示街站完結後鄭達鴻接受記者訪問，被問現時「選舉主任大兜亂」，對其參選資格有何影響，鄭回答：「《國安法》嚟臨，相信政權都會用唔同方式打壓參選人嘅參選資格⋯⋯無論揸刀嗰個人係邊個，呢把刀係一定會邁向所有民主派候選人當中，所以民主派必定要團結去力爭35+，可以喺嚟緊立法會度否決財政預算案，同埋可以為香港人爭取落實五大訴求。」
+
+
+▲ 左起：楊岳橋、鄭達鴻、李予信（資料圖片）
+
+潘熙問為何記者問及參選資格，但鄭回答時卻談及否決預算案。鄭解釋在造勢大會前，「楊岳橋拉埋咗我喺一邊」，稱「今日個焦點就係聚焦介紹你」，故著鄭負責回答記者問題。鄭指楊提醒他要帶出黨「否決財政預算案爭取五大訴求」的立場，因此即使記者問題未必相關，「我都係拉咗去講否決財政預算案。」鄭同意陳仲衡所指，他只是依照楊岳橋的指示說明該黨立場。
+
+#### FB帖文提否決預算案逼特首下台 鄭稱由助理發布 被捕後才發覺感愕然
+
+辯方其後展示鄭達鴻專頁6月23日的公開帖文，提及「我哋會透過否決唔同方案，包括否決財政預算案，逼令特首下台，從而去爭取五大訴求」，控方指控帖文顯示鄭會否決預算案，支持串謀。鄭指該專頁由他和6至7個議員助理管理，而他2021年1月被捕後查閱自己的記錄，才首次留意到該帖文，發現是由助理所寫。鄭指助理發文前沒告訴他，而鄭於2021年2月至3月的截圖，顯示帖文由「Bear Pui」發布。
+
+李運騰說，故鄭是說其助理背着他做事？鄭重申他當刻沒留意到該帖文。李再問他發現時是否驚訝，鄭稱「有愕然，因為佢寫嘅呢個說法同我（專頁）其他 post 都唔同」，形容「有幾大分別」。李問鄭有否其他帖文可展示，鄭稱沒有，指已按《國安法》保釋要求關閉臉書專頁。
+
+#### 鄭稱6月中已出現公民黨統一口徑
+
+潘熙其後問為何其助理如此撰寫，鄭稱不知道，但覺得助理當時是跟隨了黨在3月25日記者會的立場，並確認助理是由黨支薪。陳仲衡問鄭有否告訴助理自己反對無差別否決預算案，鄭指有，李運騰遂問故當時助理刻意違反他的指示？鄭稱當時已出現黨的「line to take」，有「統一口徑」。鄭在李運騰詢問下，指該「統一口徑」在6月中出現，代表公民黨立場。辯方稱就此有文件要展示，押至下周一（19日）續審。
+
+#### 鄭稱民主派達35+「十分之不可能」
+
+此外，鄭達鴻稱民主派要達到35+是「十分之不可能」，因比例代表制加上票數不足，地方選區很難取得「6 6 4 4 3」議席；而功能組別分為團體票及個人票，前者本身有很多指定團體，「民主派根本完全無機會」，很多界別亦很難登記做個人選民，像體育、演藝、文化及出版界、進出口界、批發及零售界等，雖民主派有派人參選，「但完全冇諗過係可以當選。」
+
+陳仲衡續指，但3月25日公民黨記者會上鄭亦有舉紙牌宣傳選民登記，問他是否以行動令更多人支持民主派？鄭同意，但指即使如此，「新嘅選民登記都不能夠翻轉嗰幾個界別。」
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-19-russias-theatre-missile-coercion.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-19-russias-theatre-missile-coercion.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : RU’s Theatre Missile Coercion
+author: Sidharth Kaushal and Matthew Harries
+date : 2023-06-19 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/dJWYGbM.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Intercepts of Russian missiles in Ukraine suggest that, although it still has a broad range of nuclear options, Moscow’s ability to carry out theatre-level conventional and nuclear coercion may face complications – particularly if NATO is able to implement a more robust integrated air and missile defence capability._
+
+
+
+Recent claims by Ukrainian authorities that six Russian KH-47M2 Kinzhal missiles were intercepted by a Patriot missile defence system in an attack on Kyiv led to a flurry of excitable commentary about the potential implications for Russia’s nuclear forces. Much of this is overblown. Russia has many options to conduct a limited nuclear strike if it so wishes, and neither Ukraine nor NATO’s missile defence capabilities could be confidently expected to simply prevent a Russian attack.
+
+Nevertheless, the successful intercept of at least one Kinzhal, alongside the larger number of verifiable interceptions of Russian cruise missiles such as the 3M-14 Kalibr, does pose interesting questions for Russia’s approaches to both conventional and nuclear coercion at the theatre level. In particular, it suggests that better integrated air and missile defence (IAMD) could allow NATO to complicate Russia’s ability to use conventional precision strike and non-strategic nuclear weapons to manage escalation and compensate for conventional military weaknesses.
+
+
+### What We Know
+
+To be sure, we should be cautious about overstating the significance of the intercept. Though described as a hypersonic missile, the Kinzhal does not meet the standard of manoeuvrability at hypersonic speeds that has led other systems – such as the Chinese DF-17 – to be seen as qualitatively new capabilities. The missile is of the same family as the 9M723 aero-ballistic missile which is launched from the Iskander system. However, it still represents a challenging target for missile defence systems. In contrast to traditional ballistic missiles which fly on a parabolic trajectory, Kinzhal’s quasi-ballistic trajectory represents a more complex target for air and missile defence systems to track. Early in the conflict, it became apparent that the 9M723 is capable of deploying six decoys, which complicate the task of target discrimination in the missile’s terminal phase, including by mimicking things such as the radar return of the missile’s warhead. Given that the two missiles are nearly identical, this could be true of the KH-47M2, although the air-launched Kinzhal may also exploit its greater velocity to carry a larger conventional warhead, which uses up more space.
+
+The likely intercept of at least one Kinzhal by a Patriot battery is thus noteworthy in certain regards. Though PAC-3 has demonstrated considerable effectiveness against short-range ballistic missiles in recent conflicts, achieving a very high intercept rate against ballistic missiles fired by the Houthis against Saudi Arabia, questions have remained regarding its effectiveness against more complex targets. In particular, doubts remain regarding its ability to achieve effective target discrimination when performing terminal-phase intercepts. Failed intercept attempts against Houthi Burkan 2H missiles during the war in Yemen were presumed to be a consequence of the failure of the system’s radar and the seekers on its interceptors to discriminate the missile’s separating warhead from the debris of its body. If the Kinzhals intercepted deployed decoys, as similar missiles such as the 9M723 have, this would suggest the effectiveness of the millimetric wave seeker on the PAC-3 interceptor at discriminating targets from clutter. Moreover, in its terminal phase, the family of missiles is claimed to have a speed of 2.1 km/s – well over Mach 5. Of course, if not carrying decoys then in certain ways a missile like the 9M723, which does not have a separating warhead, is a simpler target for interception for a system like Patriot.
+
+There are caveats to bear in mind, however. First, the Patriots defending Kyiv were performing point defence over a target which it was known the Russians would prioritise – the city itself. Point defence against a missile like the Kinzhal in its terminal phase, though far from easy, is somewhat simpler than performing an intercept in its midcourse phase, when it is manoeuvring on a quasi-ballistic trajectory. As such, the ability to defend a specific target from the Kinzhal may not be illustrative of the ability of air and missile defence systems to provide wide-area coverage against such systems. In a conflict against Russia, some likely targets for Russian missiles will be well known – for example, major airbases and combined air operation centres. Other targets, however, such as command posts for ground units or components of national energy grids, will be more geographically distributed, and if a strike was not for purely tactical-operational purposes but had broader aims in mind – as could be the case in the event of nuclear use – Russia would have a broad range of targets to choose from. Moreover, we are still working with a small empirical base, and will require more reliable evidence that the Patriot is consistently effective against missiles based on the 9M723.
+
+Nonetheless, the event is particularly notable in conjunction with what we know about Ukraine’s intercept rates against Russian cruise missiles such as the 3M-14 Kalibr. While they struggled initially, by the end of 2022, Ukrainian air defenders were intercepting 70–80% of the cruise missiles fired by Russia. This is despite the fact that cruise missiles were used against a relatively wide range of targets and were manoeuvring in flight to confound assessments of their ultimate destination. If air and missile defences can deliver high intercept rates against Russian cruise and ballistic missiles, many of which are dual-use – and especially if these rates differ significantly from pre-war Russian expectations – this could have significant ramifications for both conventional and nuclear coercive strikes.
+
+
+### Implications for Russia
+
+This could have considerable impacts on both Russia’s planning for strategic conventional strike operations (otherwise known as “strategic operations for the destruction of critically important targets”, or SODCIT) and its low-yield nuclear options – two things that are closely interrelated in Russian thinking. Russian strategists show a preference for the use of conventional precision strike assets such as cruise missiles to deliver calibrated damage against an opponent, with nuclear weapons playing a passive enabling role by constraining an opponent’s retaliatory options. There is a body of Russian literature on the use of limited numbers of nuclear weapons to deliver “dosed” damage against an opponent if this fails. To the extent that this model of use and subcomponent objectives such as demonstration and intimidation are predicated on the assumption that relatively limited numbers of strike assets would be needed to achieve each mission – which is of particular salience with respect to nuclear use – this assumption will now come into question.
+
+It could, of course, be argued that little has changed for Russia. The costs of layered IAMD remain prohibitive; one expert at the 2023 Air and Missile Defence Conference estimated that the costs to the US of protecting Guam alone would be in the range of $5 billion. While it is possible to erect a missile shield over a specific area such as Kyiv, scaling missile defence across a theatre will be much more difficult, and Russia has a variety of targets that it can strike for demonstrative purposes. Furthermore, given the scale of the missile threat faced by the US in the Indo-Pacific, it is unclear that large numbers of US systems – currently the backbone of alliance IAMD – will be available to NATO in the medium term. Ukraine, moreover, operated 250 surface-to-air missile systems at the war’s outset – the largest air and missile defence force in Europe, and one which was augmented by Western systems.
+
+___`Air and missile defences capable of intercepting single targets across the European theatre create requirements for Russian planners which militate against the logic of limited nuclear use`___
+
+That being said, there are potential lessons regarding the implications of a more robust European IAMD capability. The evidence from Ukraine does not necessarily suggest that point defence is the only achievable option. Missiles such as the Kalibr have been used against a wide variety of targets, and Ukraine’s ability to achieve relatively high intercept rates against them in a fairly large theatre is noteworthy – especially since cruise missiles carry the bulk of Russia’s low-yield throw weight. Defending a large theatre against ballistic missiles like the 9M723 and the Kinzhal would prove much more challenging, of course, but these missiles are fewer in number. Moreover, the relative success of Saudi air defenders against Houthi short-range ballistic missiles illustrates that ballistic missile defence (BMD) over a large theatre is achievable.
+
+To be sure, realism should inform our assessments. There is no plausible and affordable NATO IAMD system which can defend every inch of alliance territory against Russia. Moreover, if Russia intended to use low-yield nuclear weapons to play on fears of subsequent escalation in order to achieve a peace on its terms, then it would not be constrained to attacking targets of military or strategic value; a demonstration almost anywhere would have the desired effect, and striking at some distance from anything of significance might be useful as a means of signalling restraint.
+
+However, there are two important ways in which Russia’s strategic posture – including elements of its approach to nuclear use – would be impacted by more credible NATO IAMD.
+
+First, air and missile defences capable of intercepting single targets across the European theatre create requirements for Russian planners which militate against the logic of limited nuclear use. The question is not one of whether Russia can be prevented from striking targets with low-yield nuclear weapons, but whether it can be prevented from doing so in a way that allows it to credibly signal limited intent. To signal this and thus avoid unintended escalation, Russia can only mate a limited number of warheads to their missiles and, moreover, must launch limited salvos.
+
+Second, Russia also intends to use low-yield nuclear weapons on a much greater scale when a conflict escalates to the level of a large-scale war. For example, one of the performance criteria set for the Russian Navy by the country’s 2017 Naval Doctrine is the ability to do critical damage to an opposing fleet using non-strategic nuclear weapons. Such weapons would also likely be used in a regional war to target critical infrastructure such as airbases, which are difficult to shut down permanently using conventional capabilities. To the extent that Russia believes it needs larger numbers of missiles to achieve its aims at this level of warfare, this imposes constraints on the Russian system when a conflict is in its conventional phase. Every missile used for a conventional mission is one that will not be available for non-strategic nuclear use, and the production rates of ballistic missiles like the Iskander – roughly six a month – suggest this will be a major constraint. To be useful, NATO IAMD does not need to deny Russia the capacity to conduct low-yield strikes, but rather it needs to increase the number of missiles Russia requires in order to conduct these strikes, thus constraining its options for conventional targeting.
+
+While it is highly likely that Russia will remain capable of saturating the air and missile defences of well-defended targets, it can be compelled to do so in ways which will require expending ever-greater numbers of dual-use missiles. This would particularly be the case in a potential conflict with NATO. While it might be noted that systems such as Patriot provide fairly limited coverage, for many longer-range air and missile defence platforms, a major limiting factor is not the range of interceptors but that of radar. Networking maritime IAMD platforms or even systems like Patriot with the F-35 – as the US has in recent experiments – can readily increase their range. Maritime BMD capabilities such as the Aster-30 Block 1NT have a theoretical range of 600 km. If combined with external sensors – be it F-35 or a space-based sensor layer along the lines envisioned under the PESCO Timely Warning and Interception with Space-based TheatER surveillance (TWISTER) project – such interceptors could provide wide-area coverage against manoeuvring ballistic and quasi-ballistic threats. Though unsuited for defence against Russia (something they were not built for), the European Phased Adaptive Approach sites at Deveselu and Redzikowo could theoretically be modified to control a larger number of vertical launching systems and to contain a different mix of interceptors, much in the way an Arleigh Burke destroyer at sea would.
+
+To be sure, this is predicated on a level of capacity and integration that does not currently exist within the alliance, particularly in the case of its European members. Several points are salient here. First, the eventual success of projects such as TWISTER remains to be seen. Second, the level of integration needed to deliver results comparable to those achieved by F-35 and Patriot working in tandem may or may not be viable across an alliance which fields a number of air defence systems. Finally, achieving a level of rationalisation across air forces that would allow some to prioritise missions such as defensive counter air – while a prerequisite to any credible IAMD – may not be politically feasible.
+
+While the process of overcoming these barriers exceeds the remit of this article, the important point here is that strategic effects can be achieved by improvements in IAMD well short of a preclusive defence of Europe against Russian missiles.
+
+
+### The Impact of Better IAMD on Russian Strategy
+
+To be clear, there is no plausibly affordable air and missile defence system that can cover Europe against Russian attack. However, an effective IAMD system capable of raising the number of missiles Russia needs to use to strike any given target could hinder elements of Russia’s strategy for missile use.
+
+___`Improvements in European IAMD could potentially require Russian plans for limited nuclear use to involve greater numbers of weapons, complicating assumptions about escalation management`___
+
+First, if larger numbers of missiles are needed to strike assets that are likely to be on NATO’s critical asset list and defended asset list, then Russia will need to consider whether the operational utility of striking a target with conventional options – its preference – exceeds the cost imposed in terms of running down capabilities needed to maintain Russia’s nuclear credibility at the theatre level.
+
+Second, Russia could lose some confidence in the idea of a nuclear “shot across the bows” as a tool to manipulate escalation in a reasonably controllable way. The premise of such an attack would have been that striking a high-value target with a missile precise enough to be detonated above the fallout threshold would enable nuclear demonstration at relatively low cost to civilians, thus limiting the risk of escalation. If, however, multiple missiles are needed to saturate a given target, then controlling escalation becomes considerably more difficult. For example, if NATO IAMD can draw data from a space-based sensor layer, then in order to use short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, Russia first has to neutralise the satellites associated with projects such as TWISTER. In all likelihood, Russia might also believe it has to suppress any maritime BMD capabilities that NATO has at its disposal. Russia has struggled to replace the Soviet-era Tselina and Legenda satellite clusters, which used electronic signals intelligence and radar respectively to track carrier battle groups. Moreover, even China, which maintains a much more robust space-based ISR network, would have a difficult task tracking mobile maritime targets at very long ranges to the degree needed to enable conventional targeting. Finally, very large numbers of missiles would be needed to sink well-defended air defence destroyers. Russia could turn to the old Soviet palliative – the use of nuclear missiles at sea. Anti-ship missiles like the SSN-19 Shipwreck were built to be nuclear-armed, reducing the need for granular targeting and requiring fewer missiles to leak through to destroy high-value targets. The challenge, however, is that if nuclear missiles are needed to destroy or incapacitate targets such as air defence destroyers, this necessitates nuclear use on a larger scale.
+
+Finally, if penetrating credible air and missile defences necessitated larger salvos, this could in turn require larger numbers of warheads to be mated to missiles, something likely to be noted by NATO intelligence. Unless Russia was willing to run the risk of failure, leading not only to embarrassment but also likely to serious consequences, these steps would defeat one of the prerequisites of calibrated nuclear use: the ability to communicate intent clearly to an opponent. Attacks on space-based assets would create some ambiguity regarding whether Russia was intent on destroying or disrupting early warning capabilities and thus preparing for a larger strike. Russia could mitigate this risk by targeting systems like the US’s planned hypersonic and ballistic tracking system or a comparable future European system in low Earth orbit, while avoiding early warning systems in geosynchronous orbit. The effectiveness of this distinction would depend on Western interpretation, however – something the Russians could not count on given how uncertain such assessments can be. We might think of how Western adversaries, real and simulated, responded in unanticipated ways during exercises such as Proud Prophet and Able Archer.
+
+This problem is compounded for Russia by two factors. First, the majority of the delivery systems for low-yield nuclear weapons are cruise missiles, against which interception rates have been especially high. The exceptions to this rule – the 9M723 and the Kinzhal – are available in more limited numbers. For example, it is estimated that Russia’s monthly production rate for the 9M723 is around six per month. Moreover, of the two missiles, only the Kinzhal is capable of striking targets beyond 500 km. Second, many of the launch platforms for low-yield delivery systems like the Kalibr are surface vessels which are vulnerable to early destruction. This is also potentially true of Russia’s strategic bombers, which can be targeted on the ground at the few airbases from which they operate – though this would certainly not be easy, given the dense air defences around these bases.
+
+Russia can use submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) such as the Sineva to conduct low-yield strikes, and it has apparently developed low-yield warheads for the Sineva. The speed of an SLBM on a depressed trajectory means it is all but certain to be effective. However, at this point it becomes all but impossible to signal strategic restraint, or to ensure that an opponent can discriminate a Sineva carrying a low-yield warhead from a loadout of strategic warheads. Moreover, using SLBMs for non-strategic missions means eroding Russia’s strategic deterrent vis-á-vis the US.
+
+
+### Russia’s Options
+
+None of this should be taken to suggest that Russia cannot conduct low-yield strikes in Europe – the country’s arsenal of low-yield capabilities is too large and robust, and the range of potential targets is too broad. But improvements in European IAMD could potentially require Russian plans for limited nuclear use to involve greater numbers of weapons, complicating their assumptions regarding escalation management. The assumption that nuclear weapons can be coordinated artfully with diplomacy is likely to be increasingly problematised.
+
+Additionally, Russia would need to be more judicious in its use of dual-use missiles for conventional strike missions, if a larger number of missiles are needed for many sub-strategic nuclear missions. This, in turn, would constrain Russia’s options for conventional countervalue targeting. Cumulatively, this could have the effect of pushing Russia towards the nuclear doctrine it espoused in 1999, when that year’s Zapad exercises involved the early and large-scale use of low-yield nuclear weapons against a putative opponent (likely NATO). The balance depends, of course, on whether the success rate differs from what Russia, NATO and Ukraine would reasonably have expected, a question which cannot be definitively answered based on open sources. But it should at least give cause to question some of the assumptions about what a Russian conventional missile campaign or “limited” nuclear strike might look like, which have been common in public discourse since the beginning of the war. In particular, a Russian attempt at “limited” nuclear use against NATO might be more complicated than feared, but – were it to occur – it would be more escalatory and even more potentially damaging than is sometimes hoped.
+
+---
+
+__Sidharth Kaushal__ is the Research Fellow of Sea Power in RUSI. His research covers the impact of technology on maritime doctrine in the 21st century and the role of sea power in a state’s grand strategy. Sidharth holds a doctorate in International Relations from the London School of Economics, where his research examined the ways in which strategic culture shapes the contours of a nation’s grand strategy.
+
+__Matthew Harries__ is Director of Proliferation and Nuclear Policy at RUSI, where he leads the institute’s programme of research on WMD issues. His own research interests include deterrence, arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament, and UK nuclear policy.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-19-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-69.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-19-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-69.md
new file mode 100644
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+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-19-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-69.md
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第 69 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-06-19 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 鄭達鴻稱否決財案為Line to take 不認同惟須跟黨立場以獲支持
+- 鄭達鴻稱公民黨國安法後改政綱 不提否決權 惟未公開發布
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（19日）踏入審訊第69天。鄭達鴻今繼續作供，就他在初選論壇提及要否決財案迫使特首落實五大訴求，鄭指是跟隨黨的「Line to take（統一口徑）」，以獲黨支持參與初選，惟他個人不認為要綑綁否決以爭五大訴求。
+
+鄭又稱，公民黨內部曾在《國安法》生效當晚緊急開會，會上決定不再與外國領事聯繫，及不再倡否決一切議案等，但仍然相信否決預算案合法。鄭引述梁家傑稱，否決財案只是爭取五大訴求的「籌碼」，如以往泛民的「關鍵少數否決權」，絕非癱瘓政府；鄭亦理解是作為「威脅」，最終不一定會否決。惟法官陳慶偉一度質疑，公民黨曾主張特首下台和反對任命終院首席法官是有意癱瘓政府，鄭表明不同意，並重申若政府寸步不讓，仍會嘗試合法表達意見並按實際情況考慮預算案。
+
+#### 「論壇天書」提否決預算案爭五大訴求 鄭達鴻稱為黨統一口徑 僅採「最低立場」
+
+鄭達鴻今繼續作供，辯方就他在選舉論壇的主張及政綱發問。對他被捕後被搜得「論壇天書」，提到「入到立法會會做啲咩？會運用基本法賦予立法會的權力，包括否決財政預算案，迫使特首回應五大訴求，撤銷所有抗爭者控罪，令相關人士為警暴問責，並重啟政改達致雙普選」。鄭指，天書由其選舉經理和數個助理跟隨黨的「Line to take（統一口徑）」為他貼身訂造，涉及黨在政策上的立場取態，於6月20日最後更新，而他須在選舉論壇上跟隨上述立場。
+
+法官李運騰關注，公民黨記者會提及否決所有議案，但天書卻僅提及否決預算案。鄭稱以其理解，公民黨選舉期間「最低要求」只是否決預算案，沒有否決所有議案的統一口徑；當中有其他區的人會提及否決所有議案，但他則採用「最低立場」。
+
+#### 鄭稱公民黨統一口徑由楊岳橋議辦擬定 須跟從以獲黨支持參選
+
+李運騰亦關注誰要求鄭跟隨該口徑，鄭解釋黨的統一口徑是由楊岳橋議辦負責擬定，楊岳橋的角色應是給予意見，再由楊的助理 Fung 和 Ashley 與受聘於黨的顧問 Masun 商討擬定，後經選舉經理人會議告知其選舉經理 Catherine。
+
+辯方其後展示兩份選舉經理會議紀錄，顯示政綱問答和黨的「line to take」於5月31日已完成，而論壇「line to take」則於6月13日差不多完成，鄭解釋前者屬理論層面，後者則是按選舉論壇的模式和黨立場草擬，而他同樣被要求遵守論壇的「line to take」。李運騰問，鄭當時認為他須跟從該「line to take」，以得到公民黨支持參與初選？鄭答「係」。
+
+資深大律師潘熙續展示天書「說話技巧」一欄，寫有「不用有邏輯結構」。潘熙問這技巧背後有什麼邏輯？李運騰笑問：「這算是一個技巧嗎？（“Is it a skill at all?”）」，多人發笑，鄭笑着回應「係一個技巧」。法官陳仲衡追問，如何能刻意地沒有邏輯結構地說話，鄭解釋是「選舉期間講嘅嘢唔需要追根究底住，去到選舉期完啦，先至按實際情況處理」。
+
+#### 論壇提否決財案迫特首回應五大訴求 鄭稱跟黨立場惟不認為應綑綁否決
+
+辯方其後播放6月27日的港島選舉論壇片段，顯示鄭達鴻曾提及「希望咁多位選民出嚟投票，因為真正去到35+，我哋達成議會過半呢⋯⋯民主派先可以用選票去迫使行政長官要落實五大訴求，我哋用否決財政預算⋯⋯迫使行政長官落實五大訴求」。
+
+鄭表示當時是「跟返論壇天書去講」。李運騰問，即他是說自己不相信的話？鄭重申「我喺選舉期間係要跟黨嘅立場」。李指他知道，但再問他是否相信他說的話？鄭回答如他之前所述，「我一直都唔認為一定要綑綁否決財政預算案去爭取五大訴求。」
+
+法官陳仲衡追問，即鄭相信一回事，但在論壇上卻說另一回事？鄭答「係」，重申他要跟隨黨立場。陳追問，而鄭想選民相信他在論壇說的話？鄭指「嗰一刻嘅諗法係要跟返黨」，陳續嚴厲說了兩次「請回答我的問題」，鄭遂答「係」，並同意即是要選民相信一些他不相信的事。
+
+
+▲ 鄭達鴻
+
+#### 鄭稱《國安法》實施晚公民黨召緊急會議 決定不再與外國聯繫、不再倡否決所有議案
+
+《國安法》於2020年6月30日晚實施，鄭達鴻表示公民黨於當日約5至6時已得悉，並緊急約見當晚10時會面，等待11時有條文出來時作討論。鄭指會議有20至30人出席，有元老余若薇、梁家傑、吳靄儀；時任立法會議員楊岳橋、郭榮鏗、郭家麒、譚文豪；及潛在出選人包括他、李予信、林瑞華，以及他們的選舉經理和助理、黨秘書處及部分執委。
+
+鄭指會議歷時近3小時，是應對《國安法》實施後「睇完條文睇吓有乜嘢要更改同符合返法例嘅要求」。鄭指，會議最終達成三個範疇的決定，首先是公民黨由「原則性反對《國安法》」，改為承認《國安法》已在香港實施，只是希望能否在《基本法》18條下於未來作出修訂；其次是關於外國聯繫，除了立法會議會聯絡小組會與建制派定期外訪外，「決定以後唔會再同外國或者外國領事有任何聯繫」；最後是「由原本否決一切嘅議案作為籌碼爭取五大訴求，改為唔再否決一切（議案）」。
+
+#### 鄭稱梁家傑曾提否決財案只是籌碼與政府談判 非癱瘓政府
+
+鄭達鴻續指，即使《國安法》落實，會上仍然認為否決預算案是合法。陳仲衡指關鍵應是「無差別」否決預算案是否合法，鄭指不記得討論詳情，但當時梁家傑提及兩個重點，首先是否決預算案「從來只係籌碼去爭取五大訴求，絕對唔係癱瘓政府」；其次是否決權就如民主派一直在議會擁有的「關鍵少數否決權」，「重點唔係否決，而係當你話會否決，對方知道你可以否決」，而為了避免此情況出現，雙方便會進入一個政治談判階段，「攞出好嘅方案去避免否決，呢個先係 good 嘅 governance（良好管治）。」鄭後在法官追問下重申，在不癱瘓政府及以否決預算案作為「籌碼」的語境下，公民黨認為「無差別」否決預算案是合法。
+
+李運騰續問，「籌碼」的意思是一個最終不會動用的「威脅」，抑或若政府對五大訴求寸步不讓，公民黨仍可能否決？鄭指會議無討論，但理解可以當成是一個威脅（threat），「而之後可能否決或者可能唔否決。」
+
+#### 官質疑公民黨不認為政府良好願談判 鄭稱雖有批評但信選舉結果可改印象
+
+陳慶偉續質疑，梁家傑稱政府願意談判的前提，是它是一個良好的政府（good government），但他不認為公民黨覺得當時特區政府是良好政府。鄭稱「我哋對政府有批評」，但很相信透過選舉結果可扭轉雙方印象，因選舉是真正民意的反映。惟陳仲衡即指公民黨口號是「越打壓越頑強」，李運騰亦指鄭達鴻政綱曾提及要令特首下台、公民黨記者會亦似乎顯示他們認為五大訴求是不可妥協的，問該立場是否一夜之間改變？
+
+
+▲ 梁家傑（資料圖片）
+
+鄭回應沒有一夜之間改變，又稱其個人立場「五大訴求只不過係其中一個考慮」。李運騰問即五大訴求都是可以妥協的？鄭答「我哋會盡量爭取」，惟李即笑着打斷問為何說「我哋」，問公民黨立場不是應與鄭不同嗎？鄭改稱「我會盡量爭取」。
+
+#### 官關注若政府寸步不讓如何回應 鄭重申會嘗試游說、平衡審視預算案
+
+陳慶偉其後問，若政府對五大訴求寸步不讓，鄭會如何做？鄭指視乎選舉結果，若取得35+有主動權，就可有其他策略談判。陳問若取得35+政府仍寸步不讓呢？鄭先稱「我係深信佢（政府）係隨住民意結果去回應」，惟陳打斷指不要有前設政府會讓步。鄭續指他會在合法的權限下表達，並會按實際情況考慮預算案，「我一定要睇埋入面嘅內容，睇吓政府面對咁強烈嘅民意，即使冇五大訴求，會唔會有其他嘅一啲措施去令個民意同意呢份財政預算案」；並重申指要做「平衡」，視乎好的措施能否彌補沒回應五大訴求的缺失。
+
+#### 官質疑要特首下台及反對終院法官任命屬癱瘓 鄭不同意
+
+陳慶偉問，所以論壇天書或「Line to take」都是多餘的？鄭仍是如普通議員般行使職責，會考慮預算案優劣來決定是否行使否決權？鄭同意，並指若政府寸步不讓，他仍會嘗試游說政府回應。陳慶偉續指，香港只有三個權力單位，而公民黨記者會主張若政府不回應五大訴求，會要求特首下台和否決終審法院首席法官的任命，是否想癱瘓政府？鄭不同意。
+
+此外，鄭達鴻上周曾稱相信當時的政府是「理性」，潘熙今問及例子，鄭稱「至少最尾政府係撤回咗逃犯條例」。法官陳仲衡質疑一兩個例子是否有幫助，陳慶偉亦指政府是於2019年9月撤回，但初選飯局於2020年1月開始，不認為會有多少比重，因鄭不能因此說所有政府做的事都是合理的，潘熙遂指會留待陳詞。
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（19日）踏入審訊第69天。鄭達鴻今繼續作供，供稱公民黨於《國安法》實施後曾將初選政綱改為「以言入罪 無字政綱 SPEECH CRIMES ARE AGAINST FREEDOM」，並於7月擬定新政綱，包括將「以關鍵否決權」促政府落實五大訴求改為「爭取立法會主導權」，但因正式選舉延後而沒公開。法官問為何提「以言入罪」，鄭稱屬「政治語言」，指《國安法》後「有啲嘢可能唔講得」；法官亦質疑公民黨初選後才改政綱是「搬龍門」，鄭同意立場有變，但稱新法例有很多變數，政綱要符合當時條件。
+
+鄭亦承認《國安法》後曾修改選舉單張，包括刪去「力抗《國安法》」等字眼，經楊岳橋和郭榮鏗檢視，及郵政審批認為無問題。法官李運騰一度質疑公民黨有成員是律師，卻要求郵差判斷是否合法，鄭稱郵局會審視並拒寄不合法郵件，如2016年便曾拒寄羅冠聰寫有自決主張的單張。
+
+#### 《國安法》後單張刪「力抗《國安法》」及與外國政府溝通 惟保留否決財案
+
+鄭達鴻今早供稱，公民黨於6月30日晚就《國安法》實施緊急開會，會上決定不會再與外國聯繫、不會倡否決所有議案為籌碼等。鄭在法官陳仲衡詢問下，指該次會議沒有會議紀錄，但公民黨7月1日凌晨曾發布 Facebook 帖文，表示已連夜審視《國安法》 條文，並有一些「鼓勵嘅說話」。李運騰關注公民黨有否向公眾通知其立場的改變，笑言在選舉中重要的不是政黨閉門的決定，而是公眾是否知情。鄭稱會議上沒有討論，但之後就政綱有作修改。
+
+鄭達鴻續解釋其政綱分為兩種，分別是選舉單張，以及報名初選時呈交民主動力的政綱方格表；前者會以通函形式寄予選民，後者則會於初選票站展示。
+
+其中選舉單張有鄭達鴻和陳淑莊的相片，寫有「逆轉紅地 不離不棄」，鄭稱因應《國安法》有兩個版本，其中6月30日才設計的新單張，刪掉舊單張上「力抗《國安法》」字句，並將「全力連結國際戰線 Rally for international support to Hong Kong」改為「把香港現況訴諸國際 Reflect Hong Kong human rights situation」。另「我積極參與跟外國政府的溝通」亦改為「我會積極將香港的實況訴諸國際」，鄭解釋後者只限於立法會議會聯絡小組、和立法會對《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》在港運作的定期會議兩渠道作溝通。
+
+鄭亦同意新舊兩款單張均寫有：「35+ 反制政府 實現五大訴求／進入議會行使基本法賦予的否決權，否決財政預算案，迫使政府回應五大訴求」，控方開案陳詞指控此顯示鄭會否決預算案。鄭確認這是黨的立場，而且無論《國安法》前後亦認為說法合法。
+
+#### 鄭：《國安法》後改臨時政綱為「以言入罪 無字政綱」 爭時間討論實際政綱
+
+至於另一份方格表的政綱，印有鄭達鴻、余若薇和陳淑莊的相片，寫有「越打壓越頑強」及9點政綱，包括「以關鍵否決權促使政府落實『五大訴求』」。鄭指政綱於6月中設計，惟因《國安法》通過後望符合新法律，而他7月3日獲悉當天是民主動力容許修改政綱的限期，遂於黨內選舉 WhatsApp 群組提出要否改政綱。鄭指其他人提出以「以言入罪 無字政綱」做臨時政綱，至於正式選舉使用的實際政綱則待之後有多些時間再討論，公民黨秘書處職員並於當晚將無字政綱發給民主動力。
+
+庭上顯示無字政綱以灰色為底色，正中有一小行黑字寫上：「以言入罪 無字政綱 SPEECH CRIMES ARE AGAINST FREEDOM」。陳仲衡問何謂「以言入罪」，鄭稱這是「政治語言」，「講緊《國安法》生效之後有啲嘢可能唔講得，但係個法例未必好清晰。」鄭指原期望民主動力將新政綱貼在票站，「唔會有進一步嘅解釋」，惟7月11日的初選投票首日，民動誤將原有政綱張貼，公民黨職員通知民動後，民動不遲於翌日更改。
+
+#### 鄭稱公民黨7月定正選新政綱 將以「否決權」爭五大訴求改「爭主導權」
+
+鄭達鴻續指，遞交無字政綱後，所有當屆立法會議員，包括楊岳橋、譚文豪、郭榮鏗、陳淑莊和郭家麒，一同就新政綱作討論並得出9點，交7月4日的選舉經理會議再討論。辯方展示該9點政綱，法官李運騰指新舊政綱內容類似，如同樣提及「彈劾及罷免林鄭月娥」等。鄭同意相似，但舉例新政綱將「以關鍵否決權促使政府落實『五大訴求』」，改為「爭取立法會主導權促使政府落實『五大訴求』」，即不再與否決預算案綑綁，是為符合《國安法》要求和避免被取消資格。
+
+陳慶偉再問為何無字政綱提「以言入罪」，鄭稱無特別關係，只是當時需時商討新政綱，故用政治用語表達當時情況。陳追問公民黨是想到什麼言論罪行？是《國安法》哪條條文？鄭稱在7月1日至3日，有很多黃店或小店「好擔心佢哋嗰啲標語係被人話觸犯《國安法》」，而鄭達鴻等人曾幫他們「搣咗啲單張」。
+
+#### 官關注若認為政綱違法為何不即通知公眾 鄭重申相信合法只是望有更多彈性
+
+鄭續指，該新9點政綱由楊岳橋助理負責修改，助理在7月4日會議後數天發出選舉群組，無人反對，遂正式由黨所採納。鄭指同意新政綱，因他一直主張爭五大訴求不需與否決預算案綑綁，認為新政綱更有彈性；而新政綱原預計在正式選舉使用，但實際沒公開，因他們後來已被DQ、選舉亦延後。李運騰問，那他們有否告訴公眾改了政綱？鄭指沒有，因當時以為正式選舉尚有很多機會。
+
+惟李續指，當時《國安法》已通過，如鄭認為此前的政綱已違法，為何不立即通知公眾他們改了政綱？鄭重申，因公民黨一直相信以否決權爭五大訴求是合法，直至《國安法》生效後亦同樣。李指既然如此則無需改政綱了，鄭重申認為更改寫法是對「否決或者唔否決」有更多彈性，至於為何突然需要彈性「佢哋冇詳細講」。
+
+鄭其後亦指，當時即使是前黨友、行政會議成員、資深大律師湯家驊也認為否決預算案或參與初選是合法。陳仲衡問湯有否說過不予區別（indiscriminately）否決預算案是合法，鄭稱以其記憶湯無使用這用字。
+
+#### 官質疑初選後改政綱「搬龍門」 鄭認立場有變 稱政綱要符合新法條件
+
+李運騰續關注，故鄭認為可以在初選後更改政綱？鄭答「可以」。惟陳仲衡即指，選民是因鄭在初選的政綱而投票給他，但他正選卻打算更改政綱。鄭同意，指因「隨住時間唔同，政綱要符合返當時嘅條件」。陳慶偉問，所以鄭是說他時常在「搬龍門」？鄭稱不認為是「轉嚟轉去」，但就新法例有很多變數，故會這樣處理。陳慶偉追問即他不認為是搬龍門？鄭承認是有轉過。
+
+陳慶偉遂拿起手中的筆代入選民的角色：「我支持你，我投票給你是因為你會否決預算案，但兩星期後，你說我們不會否決了，因為通過了《國安法》。」鄭重申，認為支持者會就「嗰個事項喺嗰個時空究竟係咪合法，去作出正式選舉嘅投票取向」，陳追問因此鄭期望選民像他們一樣「搬龍門」？鄭重申要視乎當時的條件。
+
+#### 鄭稱續印選舉單張因審視後認為合法 亦獲郵局審批成功
+
+就選舉單張的印製，鄭達鴻確認於7月1日和5日曾分別印刷7萬份及1萬份更新版選舉單張，當中69,957用作通函郵寄。潘熙問為何《國安法》通過，而公民黨亦正擬定新政綱，鄭達鴻仍於7月5日印製選舉單張、且於7月6日及7日全發出？鄭解釋因6月30日緊急會議後，「我認為成份單張係合法嘅」，而且當時新政綱未討論完畢，故沿用舊政綱，又指楊岳橋和郭榮鏗於7月3日檢閱他們的單張也認為無問題，單張亦於同日獲香港郵政審批成功。
+
+
+▲ （資料圖片）
+
+李運騰質疑，故鄭是叫一個郵差決定他們的郵件是否合法，即使他們黨內有經驗豐富的律師？鄭重申，黨內律師如楊岳橋和郭榮鏗審視後均認為合法，而之所以認為郵局的審批代表合法，是因通函郵寄條款寫明不允許投寄任何違法郵件，而過往就選舉郵件或工作報告，郵局都會審核或予相關部門審核是否合法，如2016年港島立法會選舉，郵政局便拒絕寄出羅冠聰提及自決主張的選舉郵件。
+
+翻查資料，2016年8月前香港眾志主席羅冠聰參選立法會港島區，向郵政署遞交的單張有「自決」、「自主」，須修訂才獲寄出。羅引述郵政署和選舉事務處回覆指，原版單張字眼有機會顯示他違反《基本法》第1及第12條，及擁護《基本法》的聲明內容，故拒絕寄出。
+
+#### 官警告記者咀嚼食物或藐視法庭
+
+此外，審訊期間，李運騰一度望向旁聽席，指看到有人咀嚼食物，並請她站立。李問她是否記者，又指法庭不准許飲食，該女士確認為電視台記者。李問該記者是否欠法庭一個道歉，她致歉，李續凝視記者近10秒，並問她打算如何處理口中物，記者覆稱會使用紙巾，李續指「你最好盡快處理，否視視你藐視法庭」。
+
+案件明早續審。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-20-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-70.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-20-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-70.md
new file mode 100644
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-20-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-70.md
@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第 70 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-06-20 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 鄭達鴻：《基本法》訂預算案被否決後程序 不會癱瘓政府
+- 鄭達鴻稱李予信原或排其名單第二 後獲徵召選超區
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（20日）踏入審訊第70天。鄭達鴻今繼續作供，表示2020年7月時認為初選和以否決預算案要求政府回應五大訴求並無違法，因公民黨曾三度向戴耀廷查詢均獲覆無違法，黨內法律界人士亦認為無問題；而修讀法律的他曾做資料搜集，認為《基本法》起草時已預備好如何應對財案被否決，包括要求特首透過協商解決分歧，立法會解散後特首亦可批准臨時短期撥款，因此否決財案也不會造成癱瘓政府。鄭又供稱，《國安法》後公民黨宣傳片段刪去「否決所有議案」中的「所有」，法官質疑公眾或未察覺到改變，鄭承認未必人人可見，但黨怕改變太大造成反效果。
+
+此外，鄭供稱被裁定提名無效後淡出黨務，同年底宣布退黨，解釋因任立會議員的夢想無法實現，而成為區議員和取實習大律師資格後，意見仍未獲黨接納，無法與其他人平起平坐，心灰意冷遂退黨。他並表明，從無與人協議無差別否決，亦無意顛覆國家政權及癱瘓政府。
+
+#### 鄭達鴻稱初選投票片講稿因《國安法》刪否決「所有」議案 認為有彈性符合法例
+
+鄭達鴻今繼續作供。就公民黨2020年7月10日在 Facebook 發布「【7.11 7.12 初選】兩分鐘睇初選點投票」影片，控方指控片段提及即使有《國安法》仍無阻對抗極權的決心，並宣傳初選投票。
+
+辯方今展示公民黨選舉經理會議紀錄，鄭確認6月13日時提及相關「教投票片」目標於7月3日推出，但最終延至7月10日發布，解釋是因應《國安法》落實而更改了片段講稿。辯方展示原有講稿，鄭稱由秘書處職員撰寫，「唔到我決定」說話內容。法官陳仲衡問他是否自願參與，鄭答：「我沒有選擇，因為（片段）係囊括晒所有出選初選嘅參選人」，同意因他決定參選要獲黨的支持。陳仲衡追問：「故是你的選擇令你陷入這個處境？」鄭同意。
+
+根據原本講稿，郭家麒原定表明公民黨3月曾承諾若議席過半，而特首尚未於施政報告落實五大訴求，「我哋嘅議員就會否決所有政府議案法案及撥款，包括終審法院首席法官任命」，鄭則會說：「如到3月財政預算案推出時仍然未落實五大訴求，將會否決財政預算案，造成政府『財政懸崖』。」
+
+鄭供稱，舊的講稿從來沒有拍成影片發布，上述內容並作修改。根據7月10日的片段謄本，改由楊岳橋提及若林鄭月娥未能在施政報告落實五大訴求，「我哋公民黨嘅議員將會動用《基本法》賦予我哋嘅權力，喺未來嘅日子否決政府嘅法案同埋預算，呢個係我哋向大家莊嚴嘅承諾」，當中只提否決議案，而非「所有」議案。
+
+陳仲衡問，鄭當時認為刪去「所有」一字就能符合《國安法》？鄭指當時認為若在某些條件下否決預算案便符合法例要求，「因為否決財政預算案係不能癱瘓政府」，並認為刪去否決「所有」議案的用字後，「係有個彈性喺度，係符合嗰時嘅法例。」他亦認為新講稿指在「未來的日子」否決，非如舊講稿般稱「將會否決」。法官陳慶偉一度質疑兩者沒有不同，惟其後在陳仲衡提醒下得悉新講稿刪除了「所有」一字。
+
+
+▲ （資料圖片）
+
+#### 官問修改片段與公民黨6月帖文分別 鄭稱有分別惟未必每個人看到 以免適得其反
+
+李運騰之後主動提起公民黨6月11日發布帖文，提及於3月25日召記者會，承諾若政府不落實五大訴求，「公民黨將行使《基本法》賦予的否決權，否決包括財政預算案在內的政府議案、法案及撥款」。李指當中同樣無提「所有」，問與新片段中楊岳橋的說法有什麼分別。鄭稱認為新片段涵蓋的內容更少，只提及否決預算案及法案，但帖文則提及否決預算案、法案及撥款。陳仲衡質疑他是計算字數，不是意思（counting the words, not the meaning），鄭否認，重申6月帖文有「涵蓋一切」的意味。
+
+李運騰續指，那鄭認為該片段的內容，是顯示公民黨的立場有重大改變嗎？鄭稱認為有改變，但「可能個改變未必每個人都睇得到」。李追問，鄭是否同意只是單單比較6月的帖文和7月的片段內容，一個人可能認為公民黨在《國安法》前和後的立場事實上沒有改變？鄭同意，稱「有啲人可能會咁睇」。陳仲衡問，那究竟公民黨是想還是不想公眾知道其立場改變？鄭指「佢哋係想畀公眾知道有改變，但同時佢唔想個改變係好大，令到有任何 backfire（適得其反）機會」。
+
+#### 鄭不認為初選違《國安法》指資深大律師於會議上稱合法
+
+辯方續就初選合法性發問，問鄭達鴻於《國安法》生效後的7月，有否想過辦初選及否決預算案要求政府回應五大訴求，兩者均會違反《國安法》，鄭表示「冇認為係違法」。鄭並解釋有此觀點，是因6月30日晚公民黨召開的緊急會議上，資深大律師、大律師，及法律界前及現任功能組別議員均有出席，他們均認為初選及使用否決權是合法，而梁家傑亦稱否決目的純粹作為籌碼去爭取五大訴求，並非癱瘓政府。
+
+#### 鄭稱公民黨曾三問戴耀廷初選及否決財案爭五大訴求是否合法
+
+鄭續指，戴耀廷亦稱是合法。他解釋，公民黨7月曾三次問戴耀廷，有關初選和以否決預算案要求政府回應五大訴求是否合法。第一次是7月1或2日，秘書處職員問戴耀廷並獲 WhatsApp 回覆，職員轉述戴說「冇問題」。鄭同意，就問題和答案的詳細字眼不清楚，但知道當時主要環繞初選是否合法，及否決預算案爭取五大訴求是否合法發問。
+
+李運騰續問鄭是法律博士，他有否興趣知道戴是如何理解這問題，以及他的分析是否合理，抑或只是滿足於秘書處轉述只有「yes」或「no」的二手答案？鄭稱當時的確沒要求秘書處提供詳情，但公民黨於7月9日時任政制及內地事務局長曾國衞質疑初選違法後，第二次向戴耀廷查詢時，戴有清楚回覆有關《國安法》第22條和29條的分析，庭上早前曾展示相關訊息。
+
+
+▲ 戴耀廷（資料圖片）
+
+#### 鄭稱信戴耀廷稱合法因任法律系教授、研究《基本法》多年
+
+法官其後多番追問鄭有否看過戴於首次查詢的回覆，李運騰一度稱「相信這個問題對持有法學博士的你來說不會很困難」。鄭重申透過秘書處收到，沒看過細詳回覆，亦不清楚黨是有多正式地向戴索取法律意見。陳仲衡一度問：「你不會覺得應該向獨立人士徵詢意見？」鄭重申當時認為，6月30日黨會議的律師及法律界議員必有其人脈，如認為有任何法律問題應會通知公民黨，但他們無收過。
+
+鄭續指，公民黨第三次向戴耀廷查詢是7月10日香港民意研究所被警察上門搜查後，獲戴回覆「睇唔到有犯法嘅可能」，而他相信戴的意見，因他是法律系副教授，加上「佢不斷講話自己已經研究咗《基本法》廿幾年」，亦是《基本法》諮詢委員會委員。陳仲衡問，故鄭是因為一個人的資歷而相信他，而不是因為他意見是否成立？鄭稱背景是一部分，但當時亦有看戴7月9日的回覆。
+
+#### 鄭稱有就初選合法性做資料搜集 包括研究《基本法》
+
+李運騰續問，鄭在3月至7月期間，有否就初選合法性做過資料搜集，抑或只是依賴他人的意見？鄭稱有做個人資料搜集，並研究《基本法》第50至52條，認為條文「已經預備好」一旦財案被否決的應對情況。
+
+鄭續引第50條提到，當財政預算案第一次被否決，經協商仍不能達一致意見，特首可解散立法會，認為是要求特首透過協商解決當中分歧，體現基本法行政與立法互相制衡的關係。鄭又指，條文起草時除想有制衡，亦想繼續保持行政主導的精神，故特首可在徵詢行政會議後解散立法會一次。
+
+#### 鄭稱條文預視縱否決財案也不會癱瘓政府 指「財政懸崖」說法誇張
+
+鄭續指據第51條，一旦財政預算案被否決，特首便可立即向立法會申請臨時撥款，即使不獲通過，特首在解散立法會後也可用上屆財政年度開支標準，批准短期臨時撥款，直至選出新一屆立法會。鄭表示：「所以我認為整個條文係基本上預視咗，就算否決財政預算案，都不會造成癱瘓整個政府嘅效果。」
+
+陳慶偉質疑鄭的說法與上述片段原定講稿稱，否決預算案會造成政府「財政懸崖」有矛盾。鄭解釋講稿由秘書處職員所撰，最終無被採用，他亦不認為否決預算案會造成「財政懸崖」。
+
+李運騰問，「所以《國安法》事實上令公民黨免於發布與《基本法》相違的言論？」鄭稱《國安法》是其中一個考慮更改的原因。李續問，但《基本法》一直存在，故原有講稿也與鄭對《基本法》的理解相違？鄭重申「財政懸崖」一詞「都係一個誇張嘅講法」。李問即誤導公眾？鄭重申：「我認為係誇張。」
+
+#### 鄭覆選舉主任稱否決財案只是倡正確使用憲法權力 屬合情合理合法
+
+鄭達鴻其後確認，他於港島區初選排名第四，並報名參與立法會正式選舉。他於7月25日收到選舉主任查詢，被要求翌日中午回應，當中問及公民黨3月25日及6月11日表示特首若不在施政報告回應五大訴求，將否決所有政府議案、法案及撥款，包括終院首席法官的任命，如至預算案提出時仍未落實便會否決預算案。選舉主任要求鄭解釋上述立場如何符合擁護《基本法》和保證效忠特區的要求。
+
+鄭稱他、楊岳橋、郭榮鏗和郭家麒4人當天收到信並召記者會後，他、梁嘉善和郭榮鏗助理彭皓昕同留下商討，有初稿後再交郭榮鏗檢查，作出回覆。他稱4人收到的問題略有不同，但就否決預算案問題一樣，答覆亦一樣。鄭續解釋，當時回覆表示公民黨「只不過係去倡議正確使用憲法賦予嘅權力，係一個合情、合理、合法嘅做法（“simply advocating for the proper exercise of these constitutional powers as set out in the Basic Law, if and when it is considered right to do so”）」，並強調不能揣測香港政府究竟會否回應五大訴求或其他港人提出的合法訴求。
+
+陳仲衡即質疑，公民黨是談及政府不回應五大訴求的情況，鄭指即使如此，他們亦只是倡議正確使用憲制權力，又指回覆提及無論政府和立法會議員「都應該尊重同回應香港人嘅聲音」。鄭又強調，若港人有其他合法訴求而政府同意，他們都可接受，並會考慮財政預算案內容。鄭同意，上述內容是黨當時的立場。
+
+公民黨回覆續提及，該回答應與基本法起草委員會主任委員姬鵬飛1990年3月於全國人大的發言一同審視。鄭解釋，姬提及行政與立法機關應是互相制衡和配合，為保香港穩定和行政效率，特首應有實權亦要受制約；而草案規定預算案遭否決後，特首可解散立法會，重選後仍遭否決則須辭職。鄭解釋正反映條文起草時已預料有需要時使用，體現行政立法機關的制衡。
+
+#### 官追問李予信是否鄭達鴻「Plan B」 鄭稱被DQ後決定權已交黨
+
+鄭達鴻續確認，於7月30日被裁定提名無效，而他之後沒有參與任何選舉活動，「慢慢淡出」並專注地區工作，並籌備未來成為實習大律師的志向。李運騰問，那他知道李予信雖在超級區議會選舉初選落敗，但之後報名參選港島區嗎？鄭稱於7月31日中午才獲助理通知。
+
+李運騰追問李予信是否鄭的「Plan B」，鄭未有正面回應，稱他被DQ後「呢個決定已經去返個黨度」，又指「佢報名參選嘅時候冇人問過我」。陳仲衡和李運騰再追問，但李予信是鄭的「Plan B」嗎？鄭重申只知道最後公民黨提出由李予信出選港島。
+
+潘熙遂問鄭有否提名其「Plan B」，鄭稱沒有，重申「因為我畀人 DQ 咗之後個決定權已經交返畀個黨，其實我嘅存在本身已經係陳淑莊嘅 Plan B」。鄭又指，被DQ後曾於專頁發布影片談感想，但沒提及任何關於「Plan B」的事。
+
+
+▲ 資料圖片：鄭達鴻（左）、李予信（右）
+
+鄭其後同意，當時已擔心公民黨成員有被DQ的風險。李運騰問，那3月至6月的港島協調會議有討論過要找「Plan B」嗎？鄭指有討論過該機制，李續問那公民黨內部有討論過嗎？鄭答不記得。李運騰面露驚訝說：「wow，但那是挺重要的一個議題。」鄭終指，只知道彭皓昕（Janet Pang）是郭榮鏗「Plan B」的其中一個人選。
+
+#### 鄭達鴻稱因心灰意冷退黨 辯方引區諾軒私函發問官質疑不相關
+
+鄭達鴻2020年12月15日於 Facebook 發文宣布退黨，他解釋是因一直以來志向都是做立法會議員幫助市民，「當呢個夢想不能夠實現，我就退黨。」鄭又指，因他一直以來都想意見被黨聽到，「我先好努力去做區議員，去攞實習大律師嘅資格，希望可以得到佢哋認同接納我意見」，惟一直未能如願。鄭續指，成為立法會議員是他可以與其他人達至「level ground（平起平坐）」的唯一最後願望，「當呢個做法都做唔到嘅時候，我心灰意冷，所以退黨。」
+
+辯方其後展示區諾軒2023年1月獄中發給鄭達鴻的信件，當中部分被遮蓋，上款為「達仔」，內文提及「港島的狀況幸好較其他區好，但始終主要關鍵，是個人的行為、言論……我猜，你的關口是黨的活動行為連累吧」。潘熙問鄭是否同意區的說法，鄭同意。惟李運騰即質疑：「他（區）是教你怎樣說辯方案情嗎？（“Is he telling you how to run your case?”）」鄭表示，認為區是從一個熟悉港島協調會議的人出發，故會說港島狀況比其他區好，因從來沒有否決的協議，區亦指出他問題最主要是黨的立場，他也同意。
+
+潘熙其後展示信件另一部分時，遭主控萬德豪質疑，指看不到相關性，李運騰亦指辯方現時要求鄭就他人對他的評論作回應，不認為能幫助辯方，強調鄭的案情應由他親口說出，而非來自第三者的角度，陳仲衡亦着辯方關掉螢幕。法官陳慶偉終指，看不到要求鄭確認區的看法有何相關性。
+
+#### 鄭稱無與公民黨內外人士達成協議 將於當選後否決財案
+
+潘熙最後問到，鄭有否與公民黨內外任何人達成協議，會在當選立法會議員後無差別否決預算案；另若政府拒絕落實五大訴求，將會否決財政預算案，鄭一律稱沒有。鄭亦指，他無意圖顛覆國家政權及癱瘓政府。
+
+辯方完成主問。
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（20日）踏入審訊第70天。鄭達鴻今午開始接受其他辯方律師盤問，提及李予信於2020年3月至5月曾有機會排在其港島參選名單的第二位，後來獲時任立會議員楊岳橋和譚文豪「徵召」，於6月才出選超級區議會。鄭在法官和辯方大狀盤問下多次稱，不記得李予信退出港島名單的原因，遭李予信的大律師質疑，李若排在鄭達鴻第二位，鄭應記得原因。
+
+#### 鄭達鴻不同意協調會無討論簽具約束力文件
+
+鄭達鴻的主問下午完成，其後進入盤問，由代表彭卓棋的大律師盧敏儀開始。鄭盤問下同意就會上討論的事項，沒有人明確指出是共識，故他稱達成的辦初選等6點共識均是他個人的理解。盧敏儀續指出，就鄭早前供稱會上曾討論簽署「贏咗有得選，輸咗冇得選」的文件，事實上並沒有相關討論，鄭不同意，指有討論過，但討論比較短促。
+
+
+▲ 彭卓棋（資料圖片）
+
+#### 鄭稱原由黃文萱參選超區惟後退出 余德寶亦未獲黨支持
+
+其後由代表李予信的大律師關文渭盤問，李案發時與鄭達鴻同為公民黨東區區議員。鄭達鴻確認，2020年5月30日公民黨特別會員大會通過立法會選舉初步出選名單，只涉4個地區直選和2個功能組別，包括參選港島區的他、新界西的郭家麒和冼豪輝、新界東的楊岳橋和梁嘉善、九龍東的譚文豪、法律界的郭榮鏗及飲食界的林瑞華，但名單不包括超級區議會，也沒提及李予信。關續展示6月13日的公民黨選舉經理會議紀錄，出席者包括上述6個選區和界別的選舉經理，但同樣沒有超級區議會。
+
+鄭達鴻續確認，曾出席3月25日公民黨記者會的前沙田區議員黃文萱，原打算代表公民黨參選超級區議會。關文渭指，黃5至6月時與其選舉經理有重大的意見不合遂退選，鄭指他不清楚，只知道黃於5月30日通知執委退出。至於同出席記者會的前油尖旺區議員余德寶，鄭確認他原打算出選九龍西，但因得不到黨的支持和評估勝算後退出，確認5月30日名單上的人是獲黨的支持。
+
+
+▲ 2020年3月25日公民黨記者會（資料圖片）
+
+#### 鄭稱李予信一度有機會「排我名單第二位」
+
+陳慶偉問到，那為何李予信會出席3月25日的公民黨記者會，鄭達鴻表示不清楚。關問是否因李為新當選的區議員，以及他與公民黨有連繫，鄭僅稱「佢嗰日喺度唔係我邀請」，但他確認李為公民黨成員。
+
+陳慶偉其後重覆問，李予信現身記者會，是否因他為公民黨成員及新當選區議員？鄭同意，但補充指曾有一段時間李予信「有機會排我名單第二位」，但不記得是哪段時間。陳慶偉追問李予信是否與鄭達鴻同參加港島區初選，鄭表示「嗰一刻只係探討可能性」、「有一段時間係，但之後冇咗」。陳再追問時間，鄭思考約5秒稱應是3月至5月考慮，但最終其名單上沒有李的名字。
+
+#### 辯方及法官追問李予信不在名單原因 鄭稱不記得
+
+鄭續指，沒有正式文件顯示李排第二位，但在其審訊文件夾中有一張紙寫着「鄭達鴻李予信團隊」，該紙張由選舉經理準備。鄭亦確認，就李予信是否其名單的第二位沒有最終決定，但在法官兩度追問下，均稱不記得李的名字為何不再出現在名單上。
+
+關文渭質疑，若李真的是鄭的第二位或「Plan B」，鄭理應記得為何他最後不在名單上，鄭表示：「第一佢唔係我嘅替代人選，佢原本係排我名單第二位。」關再重申若李是第二位，鄭應記得原因，但鄭堅稱：「實際原因我真係唔記得」。關最後指出，鄭之所以不記得，是因李從來並非其名單的第二位，鄭不同意，並確認在李以外，沒有其他人排在他的第二位。
+
+
+▲ 李予信（資料圖片）
+
+#### 鄭稱李予信獲楊岳橋及譚文豪提議 經「徵召機制」參選
+
+鄭確認李予信參選超級區議會的初選，而5月30日的初步出選名單沒有李的名字。陳慶偉指，即使李當時不獲會員大會支持參與初選，但也有可能獲資深成員「拍膊頭」支持（tapping his shoulder）；李運騰並問，李予信到底何時獲支持參選超級區議會？
+
+鄭回應指公民黨於5月30日通過決議，授權執委會就選舉實際情況去做「徵召機制」，陳慶偉即表示「這就是我所說的拍膊頭」。鄭早前曾供稱，相關機制容許黨內議員和元老就政治形勢在選前任何時間徵召黨員出選。被問徵召何時執行，鄭表示其認知是5月30日通過決議至李參選期間的兩個星期內，但不記得是否在6月13日前。
+
+陳仲衡問到會否有相關的書面記錄，鄭表示沒有，因相隔數天後李與他們也一同宣佈參選。被問李予信獲甚麼資深成員支持，鄭表示以其理解是楊岳橋及譚文豪，並確認徵召機制執行者包括前立法會議員余若薇，吳靄儀則不屬其中。鄭又指，資深成員會於提議該人後告知執委會，但不會透露由哪些成員提議。關文渭續問，故鄭稱李予信由楊岳橋及譚文豪支持，是否只是鄭的猜測？鄭指兩人於執委會會議上曾提出李的名字並獲接納，但不記得該會議何時舉行，亦忘記是否6月13日之前。
+
+
+▲ 左起：譚文豪、鄭達鴻、李予信、楊岳橋、郭家麒、余若薇（資料圖片）
+
+#### 鄭稱李予信應於6.19前被徵召、投票片或於6.20拍攝
+
+鄭達鴻今早供稱，公民黨宣傳初選投票的片段原定7月3日發布，惟因應《國安法》，講稿將否決「所有」議案改為僅提否決議案，亦無提「財政懸崖」，片段並延至7月10日發布。
+
+關文渭盤問時指，該片段實際上在6月20日拍攝，鄭不同意，稱是6月尾7月頭，並同意有機會是7月1日前拍攝。關續展示選舉經理會議紀錄，提及先預留6月20日時間拍片，問是否當天拍攝，鄭表示不清楚記得但有可能。陳仲衡指，若然如此，則片段是根據原稿拍攝？李運騰亦問，講稿是否於《國安法》前已經修訂？但當時他們未知相關條文，如何知道修改後會符合法例？鄭重申，只就新講稿拍攝一次，但不記得確實時間。
+
+關文渭續指，全國人大於5月28日通過有關建立《國安法》的決定，當時亦有很多關於《國安法》字眼及條文內容的討論，問講稿的修訂是否因應社會相關討論？鄭指並非純粹因坊間討論，因6月尾後已有非正式條文出現，例如透過媒體轉述官方機構。
+
+鄭最後在李運騰詢問下確認，李予信於6月20日遞交初選提名表格，而6月19日已有公開的街站參選活動，故就李的徵召應該是於6月19日之前。
+
+案件明早續審。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-21-surveillance-for-sale.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-21-surveillance-for-sale.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..dc0867d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-21-surveillance-for-sale.md
@@ -0,0 +1,358 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Surveillance For Sale
+author: Caitlin Chin
+date : 2023-06-21 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/si2Gtvi.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "The Underregulated Relationship between U.S. Data Brokers and Domestic and Foreign Government Agencies"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_U.S. and foreign government agencies can acquire sensitive personal information, like smartphone geolocation records, from data brokers. Stricter privacy protections are necessary to strengthen U.S. national security, human rights, and economic interests._
+
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+Ten years ago, when whistleblower Edward Snowden revealed that U.S. government agencies had intercepted bulk telephone and internet communications from numerous individuals around the world, President Barack Obama acknowledged a long-standing yet unsettled dilemma: “You can’t have 100 percent security and also then have 100 percent privacy and zero inconvenience. . . . There are trade-offs involved.”
+
+Snowden’s disclosures reignited robust debates over the appropriate balance between an individual’s right to privacy and the state’s interest in protecting economic and national security — in particular, where to place limitations on the U.S. government’s ability to compel access to signals intelligence held by private companies. These debates continue today, but the internet landscape — and subsequently, the relationship between the U.S. government and private sector — has evolved substantially since 2013. U.S. government agencies still routinely mandate private companies like Verizon and Google hand over customers’ personal information and issue nondisclosure orders to prevent these companies from informing individuals about such access. But the volume and technical complexity of the data ecosystem have exploded over the past decade, spurred by the rising ubiquity of algorithmic profiling in the U.S. private sector. As a result, U.S. government agencies have increasingly turned to “voluntary” mechanisms to access data from private companies, such as purchasing smartphone geolocation history from third-party data brokers and deriving insights from publicly available social media posts, without the formal use of a warrant, subpoena, or court order.
+
+In June 2023, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) declassified a report from January 2022 — one of the first public efforts to examine the “large amount” of commercially available information that federal national security agencies purchase. In this report, ODNI recognizes that sensitive personal information both “clearly provides intelligence value” but also increases the risk of harmful outcomes like blackmail or harassment. Despite the potential for abuse, the declassified report reveals that some intelligence community elements have not established proper privacy and civil liberties guardrails for commercially acquired information and that even ODNI lacks awareness of the full scope of data brokerage contracts across its 18 units. Critically, the report recognizes that modern advancements in data collection have outpaced existing legal safeguards: “Today’s CAI [commercially available information] is more revealing, available on more people (in bulk), less possible to avoid, and less well understood than traditional PAI [publicly available information].”
+
+The ODNI report demonstrates how the traditional view of the privacy-security trade-off is becoming increasingly nuanced, especially as gaps in outdated federal law around data collection and transfers expand the number of actors and risk vectors involved. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan recently noted that there are also geopolitical implications to consider: “Our strategic competitors see big data as a strategic asset.” When Congress banned the popular mobile app TikTok on government devices in the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), it cited fears that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) could use the video-hosting app to spy on Americans. However, the NDAA did not address how numerous other smartphone apps, beyond TikTok, share personal information with data brokers — which, in turn, could transfer it to adversarial entities. In 2013, over 250,000 website privacy policies acknowledged sharing data with other companies; since then, this number inevitably has increased. In a digitized society, unchecked data collection has become a vulnerability for U.S. national security — not merely, as some once viewed, a strength.
+
+The reinvigorated focus on TikTok’s data collection practices creates a certain paradox. While politicians have expressed concerns about Chinese government surveillance through mobile apps, U.S. government agencies have purchased access to smartphone geolocation data and social media images related to millions of Americans from data brokers without a warrant. The U.S. government has simultaneously treated TikTok as a national security risk and a handy source of information, reportedly issuing the app over 1,500 legal requests for data in 2021 alone. It is also important to note that national security is not the only value that can come into tension with information privacy, as unfettered data collection carries broader implications for civil rights, algorithmic fairness, free expression, and international commerce, affecting individuals both within and outside the United States.
+
+___`The ODNI report demonstrates how the traditional view of the privacy-security trade-off is becoming increasingly nuanced, especially as gaps in federal law around data collection and transfers expand the number of actors and risk vectors involved.`___
+
+Technological advancements warrant a reexamination of the traditional privacy-security trade-off — one that prioritizes forward-looking guardrails around emerging trends in data analytics, particularly the rising ubiquity of commercially available information. This report attempts to bridge these gaps by analyzing the relationship between the U.S. data brokerage industry and domestic and foreign government agencies. It first explains how private companies have built up massive troves of personal information, which data brokers aggregate and sell to both public and private sector entities without proper safeguards to protect privacy and civil liberties. Then it analyzes U.S. privacy developments alongside those in the European Union, Canada, and China, illustrating how even governments that have recently modernized their data protection frameworks still have not fully addressed voluntary access to private sector data. Ultimately, it illustrates how stricter U.S. data privacy regulations in the private and public sectors will strengthen the national security, human rights, and economic interests of the United States rather than hobble its geopolitical competitive position.
+
+
+### Background
+
+_How Data Brokers Operate_
+
+Over the past decade, popular consumer-facing devices, websites, and apps have built up increasingly sophisticated surveillance capabilities due to several trends. For one, data storage has become more affordable, creating incentives for companies to retain data even when it is no longer needed for the purpose for which it was originally collected. In addition, widespread deployment of predictive algorithms across all sectors has generated high demand for personal information. As a result, numerous digital platforms now operate their business models around sharing detailed user information with advertisers, private corporations, individuals, or government agencies — often through third-party intermediaries known as data brokers.
+
+Data brokers operate in many forms, but they generally profit from aggregating, packaging, and transferring the personal information of large numbers of individuals. Many of these companies compile nonpublic information such as smartphone geolocation, internet history, communication metadata, utilities, and biometrics, which they obtain from sources like mobile apps and web browsers using software development kits, cookies, real-time bidding processes, and direct purchases. Some also scrape publicly available information like social media posts, audio and visual footage taken in outdoor areas, or government archives like Department of Motor Vehicles records, voter registrations, tax or property filings, or arrest histories. Data brokers may also obtain information from other data brokers or even purchase mobile apps in order to acquire datasets, creating an intricate, nontransparent web that affected individuals and the general public cannot follow.
+
+According to Sensor Tower, the average American interacts with almost 50 mobile apps per device per month, many of which track intimate details such as a person’s location history, communications records, purchases, web or browsing activity, and biometrics. When data brokers combine such information from multiple first-party sources, they can paint an extensive picture of a person’s lifestyle habits and preferences. A 6(b) study by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in 2014 found that Acxiom had over 3,000 data points for almost all U.S. individuals, and since then the information ecosystem has only grown. The same 6(b) study also found that some of the nine large data brokers surveyed “store all data indefinitely, even if it is later updated, unless otherwise prohibited by contract.”
+
+___`Widespread deployment of predictive algorithms across all sectors has generated high demand for personal information.`___
+
+There is no single legal definition of a data broker in the United States, which presents a challenge to regulating their interactions with government agencies. In 2014, the FTC described data brokers as “companies that collect consumers’ personal information and resell or share that information with others.” This definition broadly encompasses both first- and third-party companies, as well as those that transfer data without a monetary transaction. California requires any business that “knowingly collects and sells to third parties the personal information of a consumer with whom the business [it] does not have a direct relationship” to register with the state attorney general. As of November 2022, 515 companies had done so. The American Data Privacy and Protection Act (ADPPA) generally defines third-party collecting entities as those “whose principal source of revenue is derived from processing or transferring the covered data that the covered entity did not collect directly from the individuals.” This report primarily analyzes third-party data brokers who lack direct relationships with individuals linked to datasets and fall within the ADPPA’s definition.
+
+While some data brokers sell datasets in aggregate form, deidentification does not guarantee individuals’ privacy or safety. It is possible to reidentify specific individuals by combining multiple attributes or tracking location data points over an extended period. In 2013, Harvard University professor Latanya Sweeney reidentified over 40 percent of 1,000 “anonymous” individuals who shared DNA for the Personal Genome Project by combining their information with public records like voter registration. Tufts University professor Susan Landau recently testified that often only four data points are required to reidentify specific individuals. In a 2022 letter, a trio of senators expressed concerns that BetterHelp and Talkspace had shared sensitive mental health information that could readily reidentify individuals: “Even though you claim this data is anonymized, it can still provide third parties with important and identifying information.” One broker, Fog Data Science, claims it does not collect names or email addresses but sells the long-term geolocation history of smartphone devices, which can infer where somebody lives or sleeps based on their movement patterns. Furthermore, even aggregated location patterns can help law enforcement officers locate abortion facilities with high levels of activity or detect routes along the U.S.-Mexico border with unusual traffic.
+
+Data brokers may also build and license algorithmic models to infer or predict information from otherwise unconnected data points, such as health, finances, race, religion, gender identity, sexual orientation, familial status, and more. Without federal regulations, Americans have little control over how data brokers handle their personal information, particularly since first-party businesses typically do not disclose the identities of the third parties with whom they share such information or how algorithmic inferences can inform decisions that could significantly affect people’s lives.
+
+> #### `Examples of U.S. data brokers`
+
+- `LexisNexis has reportedly compiled over 78 billion data points from 10,000 public and private sources in 442 lifestyle categories that predict individual health risks and subsequent medical costs. While the company stated in 2018 that its analysis had not yet influenced individual insurance costs, there is no guarantee this will not happen in the future.`
+
+- `As of 2014, an Equifax subsidiary had reportedly aggregated and sold access to employee pay stub information for approximately 38 percent of the U.S. workforce.`
+
+ - `Datalogix compiles and sells personal shopping history from over 1,400 store loyalty programs.`
+
+ - `LexisNexis had reportedly scraped over 37 billion data points from 10,000 different government sources as of 2021, including criminal and property records. Meanwhile, Spokeo, Intelius, and BeenVerified, also known as people search websites, sell access to personal information scraped from public records to anybody on the internet, typically for a low fee.`
+
+ - `SafeGraph, Venntel, X-Mode, and Babel Street purchase geolocation and other personal information from smartphone apps, advertising exchanges, and other data brokers, which they then sell to other companies, individuals, or government agencies. In recent years, U.S. agencies including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) have purchased U.S. smartphone geolocation information from data brokers without a warrant.`
+
+ - `Clearview AI has reportedly scraped billions of images from publicly available websites, including social media platforms. Using facial recognition technologies, it matches specific individuals to uploaded photos. It licenses access to this extensive database to over 3,000 federal and state entities, including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and FBI.`
+
+ - `Giant Oak, Palantir, and Barbaricum monitor social media platforms in aggregate, allowing customers to search billions of user-generated posts for keywords or images. The DHS has reportedly contracted private vendors to track open-source social media posts to identify individuals within the United States that could be associated with visa overstays, public safety risks, or national security threats. Starting in March 2020, Barbaricum, in partnership with Palantir, received a $2.1–$5.5 million contract to track real-time social media activity, which could include content that users later delete, from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).`
+
+ - `Vigilant Solutions and Thomson Reuters have monitored and stored the image, location, and time stamp history of billions of license plates in open-air parking lots, highways, and intersections, effectively providing a warrantless means of tracking individuals’ locations for thousands of U.S. law enforcement agencies. Between 2017 and 2021, the DHS awarded $7.4 million to West Publishing Corporation, owned by Thomson Reuters, to access its license plate recognition database.`
+
+ - `Fog Data Science has advertised collecting billions of data signals from mobile apps, revealing “near real-time” location histories from over 250 million U.S. devices dating back to 2017. It has sold access to this information to federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies for under $10,000 annually, sometimes offering free trials.`
+
+
+### Privacy Concerns from Domestic Government Relationships with U.S. Data Brokers
+
+By design, third-party data brokers pose risks to a person’s privacy. Among other practices, the industry infers intimate details about a person’s life from a myriad of data points, processes personal information for secondary purposes outside the scope of the initial interaction, and multiplies the number of parties that access a dataset throughout its life cycle. For instance, ProPublica reports that data brokers have helped health insurers predict physical and mental health conditions by analyzing disparate data points such as education, age, race, marital status, neighborhood, and recent purchases. In addition, Duke University researcher Joanne Kim found that several U.S. data brokers may have access to contact information that can identify individual users of mobile mental health apps.
+
+As a result, privacy violations by the U.S. data brokerage industry can cause both measurable and immeasurable consequences for Americans, including psychological, emotional, reputational, financial, and physical harm. For example, data brokers have targeted predatory advertisements related to debt or financial scams to individuals whom they have algorithmically profiled as financially vulnerable. In 2016, LeapLab settled with the FTC after selling payday loan applications to marketers who then stole money from bank accounts. Data brokers can also reveal details such as sexual orientation without individuals’ consent, placing LGBTQ+ individuals at disproportionate risk of doxing or discrimination. In 2021, a senior official of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops resigned after being involuntarily outed by a religious publication that had purchased his Grindr location information from a data broker. Data brokers can even enable stalking or physical violence. In 2020, a gunman shot a federal judge’s husband and son after purchasing her home address and other personal information online.
+
+When third-party data brokers share personal attributes with U.S. government agencies, they may influence significant societal decisions, such as imprisonment, deportation, distribution of public benefits, and more. Since 2014, ICE has regularly contracted Palantir to mine personal information from public and private databases, reportedly facilitating deportations, workplace raids, and family separation. In 2019, ICE — aided by Palantir systems — arrested 680 workers at a food processing company in Mississippi, leaving at least two children at home unaccompanied for over a week after their parents were detained. In 2021, LexisNexis received a contract worth up to $1.2 billion to verify individuals’ identities for state unemployment insurance claims, a critical lifeline for many Americans. The same year, researchers at the Center for Democracy and Technology uncovered an additional 30 U.S. federal government awards for data brokerage services that totaled approximately $86 million, likely a fraction of the full scope of government contracts that data brokers received.
+
+As U.S. government agencies become increasingly dependent on the private sector, some analysts point out that data brokers can offer material benefits. For example, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Department of Labor, Internal Revenue Service, and Department of Veterans Affairs have used aggregated data points to predict fraudulent or erroneous payments. However, the same datasets used for beneficial purposes can also lead to secondary, more controversial outcomes. For example, Thomson Reuters offers a CLEAR database that contains home addresses, vehicle registrations, employment histories, and utility records from at least 400 million individuals. Although the company markets this database to provide alternative credit histories for people who lack access to traditional credit cards, ICE also reportedly used this service until 2021 to help enforce deportations of individuals who do not pose physical security threats. In fact, data brokers can serve a variety of functions for both public and private organizations, potentially informing decisions related to employment, credit or risk scores, health insurance, public interest research, political outreach, and policing.
+
+Regardless of the purpose behind the surveillance effort, there is at least some ethical ambiguity with any contract that U.S. government agencies sign with data brokers. First of all, U.S. government contracts feed into the rapid growth of an industry that faces minimal legal limitations on collecting, processing, storing, and sharing data. Second, algorithms based on personal attributes sometimes draw inaccurate conclusions that can significantly affect people’s lives. Between 2008 and 2019, ICE relied on faulty databases, compiled with the assistance of private data brokers, to arrest approximately two million individuals based on their country of birth and lack of verified citizenship documents — a practice a federal judge found unconstitutional in Gonzalez v. ICE (2019). Due to overreliance on flawed electronic databases, law enforcement officers have mistakenly targeted individuals such as Renata and Chris Simmons, whose dog police officers shot, and Denise Green, whom officers wrongly held at gunpoint. In many cases, individuals do not have the option to view these databases or request that data brokers correct inaccurate profiles.
+
+___`U.S. government contracts feed into the rapid growth of an industry that faces minimal legal limitations on collecting, processing, storing, and sharing data.`___
+
+When data brokers collaborate with law enforcement agencies to implement predictive policing, they could produce inaccurate or flawed outcomes based on historically biased training data. At the local level, some police departments have used modeling systems designed by firms like PredPol to anticipate crime based on historical patterns and adjust their patrol routes accordingly. In addition, data brokers have sold Americans’ personal information to state-run fusion centers, which hire analytics firms like Palantir to scan past data for future threats. But since local governments have historically focused surveillance resources on neighborhoods based on factors like race, income, and religion, predictive modeling systems draw upon and reproduce these biases in future cycles. At the federal level, the DHS’s use of social media analysis to predict threats is notoriously defective, since it frequently uses vague keywords as proxies for illegal activity and may fail to identify context clues, cultural differences in speech, and satire.
+
+The data brokerage industry is shadowy and opaque, as companies rarely disclose details of their data collection and analysis to external parties. This lack of transparency prevents government agencies and other customers from discovering potential biases in these technologies, even when they lead to erroneous criminal arrests. Trade secret protections further complicate access to exculpatory evidence that could prove an individual’s innocence if inaccurate datasets or algorithms are used. Although data brokers may post vague privacy policies on their websites, they generally do not disclose the specific entities they access information from, clients they share information with, methods of building algorithmic inferences, and types of data that are stored or shared. In other words, there are few ways for impacted individuals, public interest researchers, or the general public to learn about the sale of personal information or to correct any subsequent predictive profiling.
+
+___`Since local governments have historically focused surveillance resources on neighborhoods based on factors like race, income, and religion, predictive modeling systems draw upon and reproduce these biases in future cycles.`___
+
+Aside from accuracy concerns, data brokers can also perpetuate systemic biases in law enforcement by directly targeting personal attributes like race, ethnicity, country of origin, religion, and income. For example, X-Mode and Predicio have reportedly sold information from smartphone apps like Muslim Pro and Salaat First to Department of Defense (DOD) contractors. Kochava, which is facing an FTC lawsuit, sold location information that could be used to track people who visit places of worship, reproductive health facilities, addiction recovery centers, and homeless shelters. In mid-2020, Mobilewalla reportedly monitored the device geolocation history of approximately 17,000 individuals at Black Lives Matter demonstrations, and the Los Angeles Police Department tested ABTShield to scan Twitter for keywords like “lives matter,” “protest,” and “solidarity.” In 2018, the DOJ initiated an investigation into the Oregon TITAN Fusion Center for tracking local residents who had posted #BlackLivesMatter on social media platforms. Furthermore, Venntel has sold smartphone geolocation data to ICE and U.S. Customs and Border Protection to track individuals along the U.S.-Mexico border, which increases the vulnerability of immigrants and noncitizens.
+
+
+### National Security Concerns about Foreign Government Access to the U.S. Data Brokerage Ecosystem
+
+In the United States, most private companies, including data brokers, face few constraints on transferring or storing personal information outside the country. As a result, foreign governments can easily obtain sensitive personal information about Americans through data brokers, whether through direct transactions or third-party intermediaries like front companies. However, due to a general lack of transparency, it is difficult to measure the degree to which U.S. data brokers currently work with foreign governments, including China or Russia.
+
+In 2020, William Evanina, then director of the U.S. National Counterintelligence and Security Center, stated that China is “one of the leading collectors of bulk personal data around the globe, using both illegal and legal means.” Between 2020 and 2021, the Washington Post documented over 300 relationships between China and Chinese-based private data miners to cross-analyze social media posts, public records, and commercial datasets. These included detailed profiles of domestic and foreign journalists and critics, some of whom were located in the United States, that were accessible to China’s Propaganda Department, state media, law enforcement, and military. In 2018, China’s state-controlled People’s Daily reported the government’s public opinion data mining industry was worth tens of billions of yuan and rapidly expanding by 50 percent each year.
+
+Although foreign governments, like China, do not have legal jurisdiction over most Americans, they could still benefit from the ubiquitous digital surveillance U.S. data brokers offer. For example, foreign entities could purchase sensitive geolocation information to target specific high-profile individuals like politicians or journalists. Demonstrating the ease of smartphone tracking, the New York Times obtained over 50 billion anonymized smartphone geolocation points from 2016 to 2017 and almost instantaneously identified former U.S. president Donald Trump, Secret Service agents, senior congressional staffers, and DOD officials. In addition to geolocation, commercial data sales related to physical or mental health, personal relationships, or finances could increase the vulnerability of high-profile Americans to blackmail or doxing by foreign and domestic bad actors.
+
+Foreign governments gaining direct access to Americans’ personal information or algorithmic inferences through U.S. data brokers could compromise military or intelligence operations. In 2016, PlanetRisk inadvertently detected U.S. military operations in Syria by tracking soldiers’ smartphone geolocation data. In December 2017, Strava unveiled a publicly available heat map that displayed over 1.4 trillion latitude and longitude points of individuals wearing fitness trackers, possibly implicating those in military bases in Afghanistan, Syria, Niger, Djibouti, Yemen, and Turkey. As recently as 2021, Acxiom, LexisNexis, and Nielsen actively advertised selling or sharing information related to military officers. Even China cautioned its People’s Liberation Army personnel in 2015 about the data protection risks of “device[s] that can record high-definition audio and video, take photos, and process and transmit data” — in other words, most popular consumer products today.
+
+Advanced data analysis could also help foreign actors strategically promote authoritarian or otherwise harmful messaging during U.S. elections based on voters’ interests and backgrounds. During the 2016 U.S. presidential election, the Russia-linked Internet Research Agency (IRA) purchased about 3,000 political advertisements and uploaded 80,000 posts on Facebook using stolen U.S. identities, reaching tens of millions of U.S. users. The IRA disproportionately targeted Black voters with both paid advertisements and unpaid content to discourage turnout; many of its user-generated posts mentioned race in some form. A subsequent investigation by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, led by Robert Mueller, found the threat posed by ad targeting “is magnified by the ease with which personal data can be purchased or stolen by a foreign adversary with advanced cyber capabilities.”
+
+Seven years after the 2016 election cycle, commercial data brokers routinely sell Americans’ personal information to U.S. political campaigns, leaving the infrastructure in place for foreign governments to potentially influence domestic elections using the same tools. Both Democratic and Republican campaigns use U.S. data brokers like Experian to purchase datasets on income, religion, gun ownership, credit score, and voter registration in order to direct relevant online advertisements, paper pamphlets, and phone calls to voters. The Republican National Committee reportedly possesses over 3,000 data points per U.S. voting adult. These tactics resemble those used by the controversial UK-based firm Cambridge Analytica, which amassed personal information from over 50 million Facebook users to target advertisements and fundraising requests for Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign. The widespread availability of these datasets, combined with common data brokerage practices of categorizing individuals based on inferred background or interests, could facilitate foreign government targeting of disinformation in future democratic elections.
+
+The vast quantity and scope of information that data brokers store also enlarge the attack surface for state-sponsored cyber breaches, especially since not all companies employ adequate security protections. After the Chinese government hacked Equifax in 2017, exposing sensitive information of approximately 147 million Americans, the FTC discovered Equifax had failed to implement basic security measures such as encryption and strong passwords. In 2019, hackers offered up LimeLeads’ non-password-protected database for sale online, exposing names, email addresses, and home addresses from 49 million customers. Other major data broker breaches include Acxiom in 2003, Epsilon in 2011, and Experian in 2015, highlighting how U.S. personal information is of high interest to both domestic and foreign hackers. In 2005, a Senate hearing warned that massive aggregation and storage of sensitive personal details could create opportunities for identity theft. Since then, data collection has only escalated.
+
+___`Seven years after the 2016 election cycle, commercial data brokers routinely sell Americans’ personal information to U.S. political campaigns, leaving the infrastructure in place for foreign governments to potentially influence domestic elections using the same tools.`___
+
+Adam Klein, director of the Robert Strauss Center on International Security and Law of the University of Texas at Austin, notes, “As long as this [the data broker] business model persists, it will remain virtually impossible to prevent this information — and the intelligence bounty that it represents — from falling into the hands of hostile foreign powers.” Although foreign governments may access information through many channels, the growing data brokerage industry both expands and expedites authoritarian surveillance and censorship efforts to a larger scale. This highlights the importance of modernizing privacy laws to curb extraneous data collection and mitigate risks to privacy, civil rights, and national security across the ecosystem.
+
+
+### Current U.S. Privacy Laws Fail to Check U.S. Data Broker Partnerships with Government Agencies
+
+#### The U.S. Federal and State Commercial Privacy Landscape
+
+The United States has dozens of federal and state statutes that address how private businesses protect personal information, but they have not undergone significant updates in decades and have fallen behind technological advancements. Many U.S. commercial data protection laws cover only specific sectors and types of companies, which leaves certain underregulated entities — data brokers, digital platforms, and mobile apps — free to process, share, and store an extensive range of sensitive personal information.
+
+For example, the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 generally requires medical providers and health insurers to obtain affirmative express consent before sharing personal health information, but does not apply to data brokers, which can transfer mental or reproductive health data at will. Similarly, the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) of 1974 requires U.S. schools to follow certain privacy safeguards to protect their students, but does not prevent schools from using data brokers to target recruitment advertisements to individuals who are not enrolled. Most federal laws do not directly address geolocation tracking and sharing, except for the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) of 1998 which requires companies to obtain parental consent before collecting personal information from minors under 13.
+
+Only eight states — California, Utah, Virginia, Colorado, Connecticut, Iowa, Indiana, and Tennessee — have enacted laws that allow residents the right to access, correct, and delete the personal information that private companies, including data brokers, hold. These states also require first-party companies that share information with third parties to impose contractual privacy obligations and mandate various degrees of data minimization. However, most U.S. states have not yet enacted comprehensive privacy laws, and the laws that exist have varying strength. For example, California allows people to opt out of automated profiling, while Utah does not. In addition, California and Vermont require data brokers to register with the state, providing some degree of transparency for individuals, regulators, and the public. Nevada, meanwhile, mandates data brokers to permit individuals to opt out of the sale or transfer of their personal information.
+
+___`Many U.S. commercial data protection laws cover only specific sectors and types of companies, which leaves certain underregulated entities — data brokers, digital platforms, and mobile apps — free to process, share, and store an extensive range of sensitive personal information.`___
+
+The FTC can act against companies, including data brokers, engaging in “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” across the U.S. economy, but there are limits to its enforcement power. Historically, it has focused primarily on companies that engage in deceptive behavior or misrepresent their privacy policies, leading to a system of “notice and consent,” in which companies require users to click “I accept” to data collection in order to access basic services. But an emphasis on notice and consent can incentivize companies to publish vague language that promises little-to-no privacy protections. As the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation observed in 2015: “If you do not want the FTC to come after you, do the bare-minimum on privacy.” As a result, many data brokers, such as Oracle and Epsilon, openly admit to aggregating data from thousands of companies in their privacy policies.
+
+Most agree the traditional notice-and-consent model does not effectively safeguard user privacy or restrict data brokerage practices. Even if individuals click “I consent” to use a first-party mobile app, they have no direct relationship with third-party data brokers and typically cannot control the future resale or use of their personal information. Additionally, nearly all digital platforms share personal information with third parties, leaving individuals with few options but to accept blanket data transfers if they want to engage in fundamental functions such as electronic communications, work, social or political activities, e-commerce, and rideshares.
+
+Reflecting these concerns, the FTC filed a complaint against Kochava in August 2022 to challenge its sale of the geolocation history of hundreds of millions of people, which could reveal visits to sensitive locations like reproductive health clinics or addiction recovery centers. Notably, the FTC argued Kochava’s practices are unfair, rather than deceptive, under Section 5 of the FTC Act — a departure from the traditional notice-and-consent approach. In August 2022, the FTC also issued an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) seeking public comment on topics that could directly affect data brokers, including business models “that are premised on or incentivize persistent tracking and surveillance.” However, a federal court dismissed the FTC’s complaint against Kochava in May 2023, writing that “the alleged privacy intrusion is not sufficiently severe to constitute substantial injury,” and the ANPR is not guaranteed success either. The FTC filed an amended complaint against Kochava the following month, but bipartisan FTC commissioners have also recognized the limits of existing enforcement authority and have called on Congress to pass legislation to directly regulate data privacy practices and strengthen agency resources.
+
+#### Voluntary and Compelled Disclosure of Personal Information by U.S. Government Agencies
+
+As with commercial privacy laws, Congress has enacted several pre-internet statutes that limit the U.S. government’s access to data held by private companies. But Congress has not passed major reforms in years, and the recent evolution of the data brokerage industry has offered government agencies a loophole to work around outdated and uneven rules on digital surveillance.
+
+For example, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) of 1986 prevents certain types of businesses, such as phone companies and internet service providers, from voluntarily disclosing U.S. communications content and metadata to U.S. government agencies without a court order or subpoena. However, the ECPA does not apply to third-party data brokers or app developers, which largely did not exist back in 1986, leaving gaps where phone companies can sell “non-content” personal information to data brokers, who, in turn, can sell to government agencies outside the legal process. In 2018, Senator Ron Wyden called attention to Verizon, AT&T, T-Mobile, and Sprint’s sales of customer cell phone geolocation data to companies like LocationSmart, Zumigo, and Securus Technologies, which subsequently sold it to law enforcement agencies. In 2014, the Obama White House recommended modernizing the ECPA to remove “archaic distinctions” in privacy protections, but one decade later, the statute has not been substantially amended.
+
+In the absence of a statutory framework that directly regulates data brokers’ sales, U.S. government agencies are still bound by constitutional constraints that provide minimum processes to protect individual privacy and civil liberties. However, technological advancements raise legal uncertainties about the application of data brokerage contracts to traditional legal jurisprudence, especially regarding Fourth Amendment requirements for government agencies to obtain probable cause warrants to conduct “unreasonable searches and seizures.” While the Supreme Court has historically defined “unreasonable searches and seizures” as violating a “reasonable expectation of privacy,” commercial digital surveillance has eroded societal expectations of privacy over time.
+
+To determine what constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy, courts have traditionally distinguished between public and private places, generally holding that Americans possess a lesser expectation of privacy in at least some public settings. In line with this traditional viewpoint, Clearview AI reportedly does not require U.S. government agencies to obtain warrants to access its facial recognition database, which draws billions of images from publicly available sources. Similarly, U.S. law enforcement agencies have not obtained warrants before accessing Vigilant Solutions’s and Thomson Reuters’s vehicle location databases, which automatically scan license plates in public areas. Nor have government agencies sought warrants to scan billions of public social media posts and images for specific keywords or people, aided by analytics companies like Palantir and Giant Oak.
+
+___`Technological advancements raise legal uncertainties about the application of data brokerage contracts to traditional legal jurisprudence, especially regarding Fourth Amendment requirements for government agencies to obtain probable cause warrants to conduct “unreasonable searches and seizures.”`___
+
+The U.S. data brokerage industry also benefits from the third-party doctrine, or a legal notion that people do not possess a reasonable expectation of privacy from government agencies in information that they voluntarily share with third parties. In Carpenter v. United States (2018), the Supreme Court rejected the DOJ’s argument that the third-party doctrine should extend to cell site location information collected over a seven-day period, pointing out that smartphones are now a de facto requirement for modern society and that individuals cannot voluntarily choose to hand over unlimited geolocation data. However, the Carpenter decision was narrow, and it did not “call into question conventional surveillance techniques and tools, such as security cameras” nor “collection techniques involving foreign affairs or national security.”
+
+While Carpenter leaves a fair amount of gray area on the constitutionality of data brokerage partnerships with U.S. government agencies, these activities have nevertheless continued. In 2021, the DIA stated in a memo that it “does not construe the Carpenter decision to require a judicial warrant endorsing purchase or use of commercially-available data for intelligence purposes.” In 2020, Chad Mizelle, then acting general counsel at the DHS, arrived at a similar conclusion. The January 2022 ODNI report acknowledged that intelligence agencies have purchased the same types of cell phone geolocation records that Carpenter contested, stating that the sensitivity of such data may warrant additional safeguards. Some legal experts, like Carey Shenkman, Sharon Bradford Franklin, Greg Nojeim, and Dhanaraj Thakur of the Center for Democracy and Technology, argue that “the broad language of the [Carpenter] opinion suggests that the government must also obtain a warrant in order to access sensitive personal information in contexts beyond the facts of the case.” Yet others, such as Berkeley Law’s Orin Kerr, state that the Fourth Amendment does not require U.S. government agencies to have any justification or warrant to purchase information from a willing seller.
+
+Technological advancements also create legal uncertainties around the constitutionality of geofence warrants. In United States v. Chatrie (2022), a Virginia federal court found a geofence warrant identifying all smartphones signed into Google within 150 meters of a bank robbery unconstitutional. The court ruled that law enforcement lacked probable cause to broadly track the geolocation history of every nearby individual during that time frame but, emphasizing the “novel” nature of geofencing technology, allowed the government to proceed with the evidence under the “good faith” exception in United States v. Leon. In United States v. Rhine (2023), the D.C. District Court upheld the constitutionality of a geofence warrant to track January 6 rioters at the U.S. Capitol but did not address whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his smartphone geolocation history.
+
+Data brokers offer a path to work around these legal uncertainties, allowing law enforcement officers to sidestep geofence warrants by selling similar information (such as devices in specific locations at certain times) in ways that are much broader than a traditional warrant might allow. The judicial branch alone cannot resolve these legal issues. While courts interpret existing legal frameworks, they do not create new ones; rather they often either address overarching concepts like the Fourth Amendment or issue specific rulings like in Carpenter. Hence, Congress must act to both establish new privacy safeguards and amend existing statutes to account for emerging technologies.
+
+
+### The Commercial and Government Surveillance Ecosystem in the European Union and China
+
+Advancements in data collection have exacerbated geopolitical tensions. It is difficult to preserve global trust if too many governments are escalating their own intelligence activities while also being averse to surveillance by other nations. Individuals and multinational companies, in turn, bear the immediate consequences of this lack of trust, especially if governments respond to extraterritorial access to personal information by cutting off cross-border exchanges of information and commerce.
+
+Most large economies like the European Union, Canada, and China have enacted national laws that regulate how technology platforms collect, process, and share personal information. The United States, which does not have a comprehensive federal commercial privacy law, is an outlier. Despite this, all four governments have acted as customers as well as regulators of commercial data brokers, though the size of the industry in each country varies widely. In December 2022, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) released nonbinding principles in the Declaration on Government Access to Personal Data Held by Private Sector Entities, in which 38 OECD countries pledged to follow democratic practices like transparency, accountability, and redress when compelling access to private sector data. The guidelines acknowledged, but did not specifically address, stakeholder calls for multilateral engagement on voluntary government access to commercial or publicly available personal information.
+
+___`It is difficult to preserve global trust if too many governments are escalating their own intelligence activities while also being averse to surveillance by other nations.`___
+
+If the United States can demonstrate willingness to implement major domestic restrictions on commercial data broker purchases, there is significant opportunity to illustrate shared values on privacy and promote global trust in cross-border data flows. As the data brokerage industry continues to operate globally, it is also important to understand how non-U.S. governments procure commercial datasets and explore ways to promote consistent and interoperable global frameworks.
+
+#### Constraints on the EU Data Brokerage Market under the General Data Protection Regulation
+
+Under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), data brokers face stricter legal constraints in the European Union than in the United States. The data brokerage market exists in the European Union, but on a smaller scale. The EU market is estimated to be around €100 billion ($116 billion) compared to a U.S. market of over $200 billion. Around 2018, Privacy International exercised its GDPR right to access data held by several major U.S.-based data brokers like Acxiom, Oracle, and Equifax, ultimately filing complaints to UK and EU data protection authorities over alleged violations of GDPR provisions on purpose limitations, consent, transparency, and more. The UK Information Commissioner’s Office subsequently audited several major data brokers, including Acxiom, Data Locator Group, GB Group, Experian, Equifax, and Callcredit. Around the same time, France’s Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés (CNIL) audited over 50 data brokers and ad-tech companies.
+
+In 2020, the Norwegian Data Protection Authority fined Grindr €6.5 million ($7.1 million) for sharing personal information, including geolocation, age, gender, and sexual orientation, with third-party marketing entities between at least 2018 and 2020 without a valid consent mechanism. The same year, the Privacy Collective and others filed a class action lawsuit for €11 billion ($12 billion) against Oracle and Salesforce in the Netherlands, alleging that their use of ad-tech trackers and real-time bidding systems violated the GDPR. The Privacy Collective’s suit was dismissed for lack of standing, but future litigation is possible. In 2022, the French CNIL fined Clearview AI €20 million ($22 million) for scraping EU personal information in violation of the GDPR, following previous charges by data protection authorities in Italy, Greece, and the United Kingdom. In other words, the GDPR’s transparency and data minimization requirements expose EU data brokers to heavier compliance costs and higher possibilities of litigation, making the industry riskier and less profitable than in the United States.
+
+Since 2018, the GDPR has established legal responsibilities for most public and private sector entities, including data brokers, that process information “relating to an identified or identifiable natural person.” The GDPR applies to some types of pseudonymized information, or information that “can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject,” and primarily excludes datasets where individuals cannot possibly be identified or reidentified in the future. In addition, GDPR protections cover public records and publicly available information. Overall, the GDPR regulates a much broader swath of personal information than what most recent U.S. legislative measures propose (see Section VII), which can constrain how EU data brokers initially collect and store commercial datasets, social media analysis, and public surveillance imagery.
+
+Although the GDPR does not directly apply to most law enforcement and intelligence operations, it still requires data brokers to have legal justification to sell personal information to government agencies — unlike the U.S. system, which places few hard restrictions on voluntary disclosure. Article 6 of the GDPR allows covered entities to process data to “protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person” and perform “task[s] carried out in the public interest.” Article 23 of the GDPR allows member states to pass legislation to restrict the GDPR for national security, defense, and other “important objectives of general public interest.” The GDPR’s purpose limitations prevent entities from collecting personal information for one reason, such as to provide a requested service, but then using it for secondary purposes, such as selling it to law enforcement through data brokers, without an additional legitimate reason. Nonetheless, the permitted categories are broad, so law enforcement agencies overall can still purchase commercial datasets.
+
+In addition to purpose limitations, Article 5 of the GDPR requires data brokers to process personal information “fairly and in a transparent manner” and grants individuals the rights to access, correct, and delete data after they are processed. Article 14 requires data processors to disclose the names or categories of recipients of personal information, which could increase visibility into third-party data transfers. Furthermore, Article 22 allows individuals to opt out of automated profiling that could “significantly” affect them, which could limit some data brokerage activities but does not entirely prohibit behavioral advertising. Article 35 mandates entities perform “data protection impact assessment[s]” for processing activities “likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons,” which could affect development of tools by third-party data brokers for law enforcement or intelligence use.
+
+Although the GDPR has reduced the potential for privacy risks stemming from the EU data brokerage industry, it has not eliminated them entirely. For instance, OnAudience identified 1.4 million people who had searched for LGBTQ+ rights content ahead of the 2019 Polish parliamentary election, according to the Irish Council for Civil Liberties. While the data broker claimed its objective was to target voters with information about pro-equality campaigns, any data breaches or secondary uses of highly sensitive information like sexual orientation or gender identity could potentially result in involuntary outing or discrimination. The GDPR has also experienced challenges in enforcement timing and funding, both at the international and national levels. As of March 2022, Ireland’s Data Protection Authority had resolved only around 65 percent of cases involving cross-border data transfers since the GDPR became effective in 2018. In addition, the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) and national-level data protection authorities (DPAs) have faced procedural and communications challenges with regulatory enforcement.
+
+___`Although the GDPR has reduced the potential for privacy risks stemming from the EU data brokerage industry, it has not eliminated them entirely.`___
+
+#### Efforts toward Member State Harmonization on Law Enforcement and Privacy
+
+Despite the constraints the GDPR imposes on the data brokerage industry, some EU member states have continued to purchase commercial datasets and automated open-source intelligence from private vendors, raising privacy concerns. In 2022, the Dutch supervisory committee Commissie van Toezicht op de Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdiensten (CTIVD) revealed the country’s intelligence agencies Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (AIVD) and Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (MIVD) had contracted private companies to analyze commercially available personal information and automatically scan open-source information. However, a general lack of transparency across EU intelligence and national security agencies means the full extent of their data broker partnerships is not publicly known, similar to the ongoing situation in the U.S. market.
+
+Article 4(2) of the Treaty Establishing the European Union (TEU) states that “national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State,” though EU law generally overrides any conflicts with national law. Some EU member states have enacted statutes that affect data brokerage relationships. For example, Articles 21 and 41 of the Dutch Intelligence and Security Services Act, or Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten (WIV), require authorities to receive permission to engage in the systematic collection of publicly available information, including commercially available datasets. Nonetheless, since the European Union primarily leaves intelligence and law enforcement operations to individual nations, local rules around government transactions with commercial data brokers are fragmented and not always publicly clear. Still, attempts to standardize EU-wide safeguards for civil liberties and national security, such as the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR), Convention 108, and the Law Enforcement Directive, carry implications for the regional data brokerage market.
+
+Article 8 of the CFR affirms individuals’ rights to personal data protection in the European Union, stating that processing should take place only with a person’s consent or “some other legitimate basis laid down by law.” Furthermore, Article 8 of the ECHR prohibits government entities from interfering with a person’s “private and family life” except when “necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” But it is not always possible to draw a clear line at “necessary” or “democratic” in the context of government transactions with commercial data brokers, especially when balancing civil liberties and national security interests. Although the CFR and ECHR — unlike the U.S. Constitution — explicitly recognize privacy as a fundamental human right, the application of traditional rights to new technological developments remains ambiguous.
+
+The Council of Europe, an international organization with 46 countries including 27 EU member states, amended its treaty on individual privacy and data processing in 2018. Article 11.3 of the Council of Europe’s amended Convention 108+ states that personal information may be processed for national security or defense activities only “by law and only to the extent that it constitutes a necessary and proportionate measure in a democratic society.” Article 6 states that more sensitive categories of data — genetic information, criminal history, race, and health information — may be processed only with appropriate legal safeguards. But Article 11 permits data processing for broad categories, including “the prevention of threats to national security and public safety,” which do not clearly define EU government restrictions on access to datasets voluntarily sold by third-party brokers.
+
+___`It is not always possible to draw a clear line at “necessary” or “democratic” in the context of government transactions with commercial data brokers, especially when balancing civil liberties and national security interests.`___
+
+The European Union’s Law Enforcement Directive (LED) also sets out requirements for authorities to process personal information in a “lawful, fair and transparent” manner that “constitutes a necessary and proportionate measure in a democratic society.” Article 8 of the LED allows data processing to occur only when necessary, based on existing law, and for a legitimate purpose. Article 11 prohibits the use of automated profiling for “adverse” legal decisions without robust safeguards. However, the LED generally does not apply to intelligence authorities and, as such, does not protect individuals from all types of commercial transactions with third-party data brokers.
+
+The European Union has debated the acceptable parameters of facial recognition for law enforcement purposes, including in the context of commercial databases like Clearview AI. In April 2021, the European Commission presented a draft Artificial Intelligence (AI) Act that seeks to prohibit the use of real-time facial recognition in public spaces by law enforcement, except when strictly necessary to mitigate physical threats, prosecute criminal offenses, or locate missing victims. Due, in part, to concerns over the broad scope of these exceptions, the European Council approved an amended version in December 2022 that proposed to ban “remote biometric identification systems that are or may be used in publicly or privately accessible spaces, both offline and online.” This update expands the proposed prohibition from real-time surveillance to ex post identification, which would directly affect firms like Clearview AI that rely on ex post facial recognition. Once the AI Act is finalized and enacted, it will become one of the world’s first major AI regulations and could carry implications for data brokers that sell facial imagery in not only the European Union but the United States as well.
+
+#### Schrems II and GDPR Data Adequacy: How Data Brokers Could Create Uncertainty for Cross-Border Data Flows
+
+In Schrems I and II, the CJEU invalidated the Safe Harbor and Privacy Shield data transfer agreements between the European Union and United States due to concerns that U.S. government surveillance practices did not meet the necessity and proportionality standards required by EU law. In particular, the CJEU cited the U.S. government’s ability to conduct bulk surveillance of EU individuals under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and Executive Order 12333. In response, the Biden administration released a new EU-U.S. Data Privacy Framework (EU-U.S. DPF) in October 2022 that directly adopted the same necessity and proportionality language found in the CFR, Convention 108+, and LED. The EU-U.S. DPF also creates a new redress mechanism to allow individuals within designated countries to request review of suspected U.S. government signals intelligence collection by the ODNI, subject to the oversight of a new Data Protection Review Court within the DOJ. However, the EU-U.S. DPF remains susceptible to future court challenges, and the United States still lacks comparable commercial privacy laws and has not received an adequacy determination under the GDPR.
+
+Going forward, it will be interesting to see whether EU courts and data protection authorities will shift their focus to the growing data brokerage industry in the United States, especially as technological advancements in the private sector continue to enhance U.S. government surveillance. The European Union’s transactions with commercial data brokers pose a challenge to mitigating similar U.S. practices, as it is difficult to place geopolitical pressure on other countries to refrain from voluntary data access when the full scope of engagement on both sides is unknown. Fragmented intelligence statutes between EU member states can lead to less robust oversight of government purchases of personal information or algorithmic inferences, even if the GDPR reduces the availability of those commercial datasets overall.
+
+The European Commission has deemed Canada’s level of data protection, but not the United States’, as “essentially equivalent” to the European Union’s, allowing Canada-EU cross-border data transfers greater legal certainty under Article 45 of the GDPR. However, like the United States, Canada has accessed commercial or publicly available information from data brokers and is a member of the Five Eyes alliance. Canada’s Criminal Code generally requires domestic law enforcement agencies to receive authorization to access personal information, but their interactions with data brokers are not publicly clear. In a 2019 annual report, the Canadian National Security and Intelligence Review Agency found that the Canadian Security Intelligence Service used publicly available geolocation data without a warrant, even though it “lacked the policies or procedures” to ensure the legality of such access. The Security Intelligence Service and the Communications Security Establishment of Canada, the nation’s other major national security agency, both adhere to lighter due process requirements in their respective statutes compared to in the Criminal Code.
+
+___`It is difficult to place geopolitical pressure on other countries to refrain from voluntary data access when the full scope of engagement on both sides is unknown.`___
+
+Canada’s Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) governs how private companies process and share information, which limits but does not fully prevent commercial transactions with data brokers. After the PIPEDA became effective in 2004, at least one broker, R. L. Polk Canada Inc., announced it would no longer process personal information in Canada. Clearview AI also terminated its services with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in July 2020 after the Office of the Privacy Commissioner began investigating whether its use violated the PIPEDA and Privacy Act. However, the PIPEDA does not cover de-identified information and still allows firms like Cornerstone, Acxiom, Oracle Canada, Conway, Epsilon Data Management, and InfoCanada to engage in direct marketing or commercial data sharing. Section 7(3) of PIPEDA even allows private entities to voluntarily share personal information with law enforcement agencies without notifying or obtaining consent from the affected person.
+
+Even if the EU’s Schrems I and II and GDPR adequacy decisions have not focused on the relationship between data brokers and government agencies, multilateral dialogues or consensus on safeguards and privacy principles could help improve trust between partner nations like the United States and Canada. All three governments have laid down some guardrails for compelled disclosure of data, but voluntary access to commercial or public information generally has not received the same level of attention or legal protections.
+
+#### China’s Data Protection and Data Localization Landscape
+
+China’s surveillance apparatus relies heavily on private companies that collect and process personal information from both Chinese and non-Chinese individuals. Several statutes codify this relationship, giving China extensive control over the information companies store under its jurisdiction. In response to concerns over China’s data localization and national security laws, the United States, European Union, Canada, and other nations have blocked TikTok on government-issued devices. In May 2023, Montana became to first state to issue a blanket ban on all TikTok operations and app downloads within state borders, which, pending legal challenges, will come into effect in January 2024. Because TikTok’s parent company, ByteDance, is based in China, legislators fear the CCP could access information about U.S. individuals that mobile apps, specifically TikTok, transfer or store within Chinese borders. There is no clear public evidence of direct CCP access through TikTok to date, but legislators have generally cited China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law, which requires individuals and organizations to “support, assist, and cooperate with state intelligence work according to law,” as a primary risk factor.
+
+In addition to the National Intelligence Law, China’s Cybersecurity Law requires internet platforms that operate within its national borders to assist law enforcement in identifying content “endangering national security, national honor, and national interests.” These categories are fairly expansive. The Cybersecurity Law also imposes explicit data localization requirements, forcing companies to store “personal information or important data” collected in China on domestic servers. Some U.S. technology platforms ceased operations in China after the statute became effective in 2017, but others changed their policies to store data and decryption keys on local state-owned servers. The updated Multi-Level Protection Scheme (MLPS 2.0) also allows the government to monitor domestic private networks for national security threats, facilitating access to all data stored on servers or transmitted on networks within China.
+
+Enacted in June 2021, the Data Security Law (DSL) further strengthens government access to user data, allowing law enforcement to compel private businesses that operate within China to disclose personal information. The DSL broadly defines key terms such as “core data” and “important data,” which gives authorities oversight over a range of user data like geolocation, browsing activity, financial records, and communications. For example, “core data,” which receives the greatest protections, refers to information that relates to significant public interests, national or economic security, or citizens’ welfare. Data localization laws present privacy concerns for individuals located within the United States that communicate with those in China, as government agencies could potentially read cross-border electronic communications stored in local data centers. This legal framework, in parallel with the burgeoning U.S. and Chinese data brokerage industries, gives the Chinese government significant resources to surveil individuals both within and outside of China.
+
+Beyond legal authority to compel disclosure of personal information, the CCP has additionally shifted to contracting private companies that voluntarily sell datasets or analytics software to surveil citizens. China’s Ministry of Public Security has reportedly allocated billions of dollars to private sector surveillance technologies under the SkyNet and Sharp Eyes plans. Among these are AI start-ups SenseTime and CloudWalk, which developed facial recognition systems that could identify members of the Uyghur community. According to procurement documents, Wuhan law enforcement has sought out commercial tools to identify people in public spaces, along with their internet, phone, and location history. Shanghai law enforcement, meanwhile, hired Shanghai Cloud Link and other firms to analyze posts and photos from Twitter and Facebook, reportedly combining commercial or public-facing data with government records like driver and voter registries to identify anonymous online accounts.
+
+In 2019, Forbes reported that some Chinese data brokers sold access to personal information online to any willing buyer, not just government entities, for a few dollars. It is not clear how enactment of the Personal Information Protection Law (PIPL) in 2021 will affect the Chinese data brokerage industry. The PIPL, which includes provisions similar to those of the GDPR, requires private companies to process sensitive personal information only when necessary for approved purposes and limit data retention. It also mandates companies obtain individuals’ consent to process sensitive personal information, which includes data that could harm “personal dignity” or “personal or property safety.” It requires companies that use personal information to conduct algorithmic decisionmaking to follow transparency measures, conduct impact assessments, and allow individuals to opt out of targeted ads or solely automated decisions. Although the DSL and Cybersecurity Law allow government access to private sector datasets, these provisions could reduce the amount of information first-party platforms and data brokers process within China to begin with, depending on compliance and enforcement in practice.
+
+___`Beyond legal authority to compel disclosure of personal information, the CCP has additionally shifted to contracting private companies that voluntarily sell datasets or analytics software to surveil citizens.`___
+
+While U.S. due process requirements under the Fourth Amendment and the ECPA are outdated, they generally provide stronger civil liberties protections than Chinese government agencies follow when compelling personal information from private companies. However, the relative strength of U.S. protections becomes less relevant if law enforcement agencies can bypass them by purchasing commercial data from brokers. Voluntary disclosure creates a significant gap the United States could close to strengthen civil and human rights, promote the long-term sustainability of cross-border data flows, and strengthen geopolitical alliances. Without stronger protections for uncompelled access to commercial datasets, it is more challenging for the United States to discourage other countries from engaging in similar practices and to distinguish itself as a global leader in human rights values.
+
+
+### Recent U.S. Legislative Developments
+
+#### Federal Commercial Privacy Legislation
+
+Over the past few years, Congress has proposed dozens of bills that aim to limit data collection, retention, and transfers in the private sector. Some examples include the ADPPA, Consumer Online Privacy Rights Act (COPRA), and SAFE DATA Act, all of which propose a baseline for data minimization, or general limits on companies to collect, process, and share personal data only as necessary to provide a user service or fulfill approved purposes such as fraud or malware detection. Most proposals to update commercial privacy standards would also grant U.S. individuals the right to access, request, and delete personal information held by private companies, as EU individuals possess under the GDPR. These proposals could prevent both first- and third-parties from collecting extraneous data solely for the purpose of resale or targeted advertising and require them to obtain affirmative consent to transfer data to additional parties.
+
+Many major bills in the 116th and 117th Congresses excluded de-identified, aggregated, and publicly available data from their protections. However, as previously discussed, data brokers often collect and package such data or sell inferred insights in aggregate form, so these bills could exempt some business practices that pose privacy problems. In addition, there is ongoing debate over which data processing purposes should be either categorically or conditionally permitted. For example, the California Privacy Rights Act, but not the ADPPA, explicitly allows companies to process personal information for advertising or marketing services and analytic services, provided that the data are “reasonably necessary and proportionate” to the original purpose of collection. Federal commercial privacy legislation could indirectly reduce the amount of personal information available for domestic government agencies to purchase from brokers, but would not directly impose new restrictions for those that wish to do so.
+
+#### Proposals to Modernize Government Access to Personal Data
+
+Compared to its commercial privacy legislation efforts, Congress has introduced a smaller range of bills aimed at restricting the U.S. government from purchasing datasets from commercial brokers. The Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act, introduced in 2021, is the most high-profile such initiative to date. The bill’s premise was fairly straightforward: if laws like the ECPA or FISA would otherwise require U.S. government agencies to obtain a warrant or court order to compel traditional communications service providers to disclose Americans’ data, the same legal procedures should be mandated to purchase that information from a data broker.
+
+The Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act would not apply to all transfers between data brokers and U.S. government agencies, including those that lack an exchange of money or “anything of value.” It also would not protect non-U.S. individuals from the sale of personal information to U.S. intelligence or law enforcement agencies. Moreover, depending on interpretation, the bill’s definition of “covered customer or subscriber record” could exclude some types of personal information, such as biometrics, algorithmic inferences, publicly available data, or data relating to individuals who are not direct customers of a service. It prohibits government agencies from purchasing “illegitimately obtained information,” which companies obtain either deceptively or in violation of terms of service agreements. This could prevent some, but not all, transactions, especially since many privacy policies openly disclose (in vague terms) transfers of personal information to third parties.
+
+___`Federal commercial privacy legislation could indirectly reduce the amount of personal information available for domestic government agencies to purchase from brokers, but would not directly impose new restrictions for those that wish to do so.`___
+
+While the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act focuses on the sale of information to the U.S. government, several export control bills emerged in the 117th Congress that would block U.S. data brokers from selling certain categories of personal information to specific foreign governments. The Protecting Military Servicemembers’ Data Act aimed to prohibit data brokers from selling personal information related to military personnel to countries like China, Russia, and Iran. In addition, the Protecting Americans’ Data from Foreign Surveillance Act, reintroduced in June 2023, would prevent private businesses from transferring sensitive U.S. personal information to certain countries such as China and create a list of low-risk countries where data can flow freely.
+
+In the 118th Congress, legislators have proposed several bills in response to concerns that the CCP could compel ByteDance to hand over TikTok data or control of its content moderation algorithm. For example, the reintroduced ANTI-SOCIAL CCP Act would direct the president to block social media companies, namely TikTok, that use certain algorithms and are located in a handful of countries, including China. The DATA Act would amend the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to allow restrictions on free flows of sensitive personal information, paving the way for the United States to ban TikTok or future Chinese companies. Also motivated by TikTok, the RESTRICT Act would direct the secretary of commerce to identify and potentially prohibit technology transactions relating to companies under the jurisdiction of six countries including China. The White House has endorsed the RESTRICT Act, even though it could further disrupt international data flows by creating another global adequacy system alongside the GDPR and the PIPL.
+
+
+### Next Steps to Regulate U.S. Data Brokers and Their Interactions with Government Agencies
+
+Because the U.S. data brokerage industry poses systemic risks to privacy and national security, it requires a comprehensive approach to rein in excessive data transfers across the ecosystem. Without across-the-board rules on how all U.S. mobile apps and data brokers transfer sensitive personal information, banning or divesting any single company, like TikTok, would not effectively prevent data leakage to foreign governments like the CCP. It is also worth noting that neither a divestiture nor forced data localization would stop U.S. domestic agencies from accessing Americans’ sensitive personal information — whether through TikTok or data brokers — in ways that could significantly impact privacy and civil liberties.
+
+Instead, the United States needs a multifaceted strategy that (a) imposes boundaries on how all U.S. companies process personal information, (b) places guardrails on U.S. government transactions with data brokers, (c) enforces purpose limitations on data transfers both within and outside the United States, while also protecting cross-border data flows, and (d) improves transparency and grants both regulators and individuals greater control over personal information. As Thorsten Wetzling and Charlotte Dietrich observe, the German Federal Constitutional Court, or the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG), put forward a double-door model in 2012 that demonstrated privacy safeguards on both sides of the data transfer relationship — the private sector seller and government buyer. In a similar fashion, both U.S. data brokers and government agencies now require greater accountability in a modern digital age. While Congress could implement some data privacy regulations in the short term, it is also important to consider broader open questions — such as the balance between safeguarding publicly available information, cross-border data flows, and free and open expression — that may require additional dialogue and research in the long term.
+
+#### Short-Term Actions: Boundaries on Data Brokers
+
+_Federal comprehensive privacy legislation is necessary to regulate how all U.S. businesses, including data brokers, treat personal information._
+
+The growth of the U.S. data brokerage industry is a result of an outdated privacy legal system that urgently needs modernization to keep up with more than 100 nations, including EU member states, Canada, and China, that have already established nationwide rules for how digital platforms process personal data. As a baseline, any forthcoming commercial privacy legislation should limit first- and third-party companies to collecting, storing, and transferring personal data only as necessary to offer a product that users explicitly request — and delete that information once the transaction or service is completed. This general rule should apply to both original data points and any related algorithmic inferences, including aggregate data that could potentially reidentify individuals or pose substantial privacy risks. In addition, such limitations on processing, retention, and transfers should apply to personal information that is widely accessible on the internet or through other means in cases where an individual’s right to privacy outweighs any public interest in that data.
+
+All U.S. companies need clear rules on handling information, but commercial data brokers require enhanced transparency and oversight measures. Congress should require data brokers in all 50 states to register with the FTC, similar to existing provisions in California and Vermont. In turn, the FTC should create a Do Not Track portal to allow individuals to opt out of all data brokerage transfers in a single place. This concept has already been proposed in various forms, dating back to an FTC preliminary staff report on consumer privacy (2010), a Government Accountability Office report on information resellers (2012), an FTC report on data broker transparency (2014), the draft Consumer Data Protection Act (2018), the Data Broker Accountability and Transparency Act (2020), the SAFE DATA Act (2021), and most recently the ADPPA. The FTC already maintains a Do Not Call registry as a centralized portal for individuals to opt out of telemarketing calls, and a Do Not Track portal would be a logical extension of this concept.
+
+Finally, all digital platforms should publicly disclose the specific names of third parties they transfer personal information to, along with the third parties’ contact information, categories of data involved, and general purposes of transfer. Such disclosures could bring clarity to otherwise opaque data brokerage practices. Additionally, all individuals should have the right to understand how their personal information is processed and request to correct or delete it. Even if most internet users do not read privacy policies (and should not have to), more detailed public statements could benefit watchdog organizations and regulators, like the FTC, which have used terms and conditions to identify unfair or deceptive acts or practices under the FTC Act.
+
+_Any forthcoming legislation should carefully craft a definition of “data broker” that extends beyond commercial transactions._
+
+Data brokers operate under many different business models. The legal definition of a data broker is critical because it will determine which specific entities would be subject to any enhanced transparency or accountability requirements, like the registration and opt-out mechanisms proposed here. While some proposed frameworks like the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act focus on transactions involving money or other resources of value, data brokers can operate outside traditional financial exchanges. Kochava and Clearview AI, for example, have offered free trials or demos of individuals’ real-time location information and facial recognition photos, respectively. Data brokers could also voluntarily disclose sensitive personal information to law enforcement agencies without a tangible exchange in hopes of gaining future political goodwill or even to advance their own ideological beliefs — for example, opposition to immigration or abortion.
+
+The FTC’s 2014 definition of data brokers as “companies that collect consumers’ personal information and resell or share that information with others” can serve as a possible model for data sharing that may or may not involve an exchange of anything of value. However, as data collection and aggregation techniques continue to evolve, it will become crucial to monitor trends in the broader data brokerage industry and periodically revise legal terms as necessary.
+
+#### Short-Term Actions: Boundaries on Government Agencies
+
+_Congress needs to pass clear rules to govern how U.S. government agencies procure information from private sector entities._
+
+Because Congress has not significantly updated the U.S. privacy legal framework in decades, there is a significant amount of legal uncertainty over the application of traditional statutes to advanced commercial surveillance methods. To bridge these gaps, Congress should prioritize additional research into U.S. government commercial transactions with data brokers and ultimately establish bright-line rules to mitigate the potential for privacy or civil liberties abuses. Unless and until robust legal processes are in place, U.S. government agencies should either impose a temporary moratorium or voluntarily obtain a warrant in order to conduct transactions with data brokers, scrape photos or keywords from publicly available sources, and use facial recognition technologies on commercial databases.
+
+_U.S. government agencies must improve public transparency and oversight around data access practices._
+
+The Obama administration took some measures to improve transparency following the Snowden disclosures, including by declassifying some redacted documents related to FISA surveillance and participating in public hearings. But, in general, the covert nature of national security and law enforcement operations means most Americans are not notified of government surveillance, and many data brokerage transactions may not be disclosed to the public. The January 2022 ODNI report revealed that even “the IC does not currently have sufficient visibility into its own acquisition and use of CAI across its 18 elements,” demonstrating an absence of internal accountability mechanisms as well. The United States is currently undergoing a serious reckoning about racial profiling in state and local law enforcement partially due to increased public visibility, as bystanders can capture videos in public areas using their smartphones and many local police officers wear body cameras. Because many federal operations lack similar external and internal transparency, it is more challenging to exert public pressure to implement critical changes that could benefit society.
+
+Members of Congress previously introduced the Government Surveillance Transparency Act, which would lift most nondisclosure orders issued to technology companies after the surveillance period ends, and the NDO Fairness Act, which would establish necessity requirements to obtain gag orders and limit their duration to 60 days. The NDO Fairness Act, which passed the House of Representatives in 2022, would also require the DOJ to annually report the quantity and acceptance rates of nondisclosure order applications, as well as the number of individuals affected. To further enhance transparency, after an investigation concludes, federal agencies should directly notify all identifiable individuals whose sensitive commercial data (such as precise geolocation, communications, and biometrics) were obtained, with limited exceptions where disclosure might reasonably and significantly impact national security.
+
+The Office of the Director of National Intelligence releases the annual Statistical Transparency Report Regarding Use of National Security Surveillance Authorities, which provides generalized figures on the use of compelled mechanisms, including FISA and national security letters. As a next step, all federal agencies could release annual transparency and equity reports that describe any voluntary procurement of commercial datasets or algorithmic insights from private data brokers. At a minimum, these disclosures should include high-level statistics on the frequency, purpose, and context of data brokerage transactions; the specific identities and contact information of sellers; demographic trends within purchased datasets; and percentage of data access requests that contribute to adverse actions like an arrest. By increasing transparency, it is possible to strengthen public accountability for potential abuses of power or gratuitous access to sensitive personal information, inaccurate or discriminatory outcomes, and disparate impact on historically marginalized communities.
+
+_The FTC and the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board need sufficient resources to carry out enforcement and oversight duties._
+
+Although the FTC has decades-long expertise in data privacy and consumer protection, resource constraints may force it to make tough choices between litigating, settling, and passing over cases. In 2019, the FTC had around 1,100 full-time employees to oversee consumer protection across the entire economy, with only about 50 focused on data privacy. In comparison, the UK Information Commissioner’s Office had around 700 employees exclusively dedicated to data protection, despite having a smaller data brokerage market, a GDP approximately one-tenth the size of the United States, and one-fifth the U.S. population. As the U.S. digital economy continues to grow, FTC appropriations must similarly increase to help prioritize unfair and deceptive data practices or potentially enforce any future federal comprehensive privacy law. In addition, the agency could benefit from additional funding to conduct 6(b) studies on the effects of data brokers on competition in digital markets, especially for small- or medium-sized businesses that might not possess the data aggregation capabilities of dominant digital platforms.
+
+The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) was created to oversee federal government surveillance for counterterrorism purposes, but it may be necessary to strengthen its role and resources to monitor commercial data brokerage transactions as well. The Electronic Privacy Information Center recently called on the PCLOB to examine the use of facial recognition technologies, data-driven fusion centers, and geolocation history from commercial data brokers. The PCLOB could also probe government contracts for social media analysis by private data miners. In addition, the board should prioritize oversight into any potential disparate impact of surveillance on marginalized communities. In 2020, U.S. representatives Anna Eshoo (D-CA), Bobby Rush (D-IL), and Ron Wyden (D-OR) asked the board to investigate federal government surveillance of Black Lives Matter racial equity protests across the United States.
+
+#### Short-Term Actions: Boundaries on both Data Brokers and Government Agencies
+
+_While purpose limitations may be effective for private companies, U.S. government agencies need boundaries on their access to personal information in all contexts — no matter their perceived legitimacy of use._
+
+Data minimization is a core principle of commercial privacy; businesses should collect, retain, and share personal information only if necessary to provide a requested product or service. However, most privacy frameworks also recognize that businesses may need to process personal information for other legitimate reasons, such as to prevent cybersecurity breaches, detect harmful or illegal activities, or issue product recalls. While the GDPR’s legal bases for companies to process personal information are broad (for example, with individual consent, to carry out “legitimate” or “vital” interests, or to fulfill a “public task”), they still establish a basic structure of categorically or conditionally permitted data processing uses that could serve as a general model for other privacy frameworks.
+
+Purpose limitations could be effective in the context of the consumer-business relationship, but U.S. government agencies need hard rules like modernized warrant requirements to govern their access to personal information — regardless of the context or original basis for data collection. The U.S. government should not unduly compromise privacy and civil liberties, even if it aims to address a legitimate national security threat. This is particularly important given the sheer scale of data brokerage: some firms advertise access to billions of data points, and most inevitably relate to individuals who do not pose any public safety risks. In addition to warrant requirements, government agencies need clear data retention and minimization rules to prevent unlimited secondary uses or transfers of Americans’ personal information, particularly geolocation, biometrics, and communications.
+
+_Both companies and government agencies should follow specific legal processes to prevent biased or discriminatory outcomes stemming from digital surveillance._
+
+Since historically marginalized communities have borne disproportionate consequences of surveillance, data brokers need formal procedures to promote civil and human rights. Just as medical and legal professionals have legal obligations to maintain client confidentiality, technology companies should bear duties to safeguard the equity, fairness, and security of their data processing and algorithmic outcomes — no matter if they develop or simply deploy the software. The United States has a body of federal and state civil rights law that prohibits some types of discrimination in specific contexts like employment, credit, or housing, but there is legal uncertainty around how pre-internet statutes apply to data brokerage activities. Therefore, Congress must explicitly recognize privacy as a fundamental civil and human right: no company should use or transfer data in ways that could create disparate impact or unequal digital participation based on factors like race, gender identity, country of origin, religion, sexual orientation, age, or disability status.
+
+There are ongoing debates around whether federal privacy legislation should include a private right of action, but it is important to note that many existing federal and state antidiscrimination statutes allow both individuals and government enforcers to sue companies for civil rights violations. By the same token, individuals should have a legal right to sue data brokers that collect, process, or share personal data in a manner that leads to discriminatory outcomes. On the government side, any federal or local agency that contracts commercial data brokers should undergo robust racial equity and ethics training and improve community engagement on these topics. Ultimately, though, government agencies need strict warrant requirements and public accountability over commercial data transactions to prevent abuse of power.
+
+In addition, all companies (including data brokers) and government agencies that either develop or deploy automated inferences should regularly audit their processes and outcomes for disparate impact by gender, race, age, disability, or religion. These risk and impact assessments could evaluate the type and scope of personal information processed, high-level demographic information of affected individuals, measures to ensure privacy and data minimization, and completeness of training datasets, particularly around highly sensitive decisions related to law enforcement or public benefits. Moreover, private companies and government agencies should be required to report their findings to Congress and the FTC, which can use the data to advance research on data brokers and inform future recommendations to prevent algorithmic bias or privacy violations.
+
+#### LONGER-TERM ACTIONS: OPPORTUNITIES FOR FUTURE DIALOGUE AND RESEARCH
+
+_Any new guardrails on U.S. government transactions with commercial data brokers must also safeguard individuals from the aggregation of “publicly available” information._
+
+Americans should have a legal right to privacy in their personal information, regardless of whether they download mobile apps, post on social media networks, drive cars in public areas, or shop online. Several recent surveys suggest shifts in public attitudes toward privacy, although the majority of Americans still expect companies to safeguard personal information. A 2022 Morning Consult poll, for example, found that 92 percent of baby boomers, compared to 70 percent of Generation Z, expects companies to adhere to minimum privacy standards. As societal norms evolve in a digital era, it is possible for the conception of a “reasonable expectation of privacy” to change over time. Other traditional legal standards, such as the third-party doctrine, may lose relevance in a digital ecosystem powered by complex and nontransparent data transfers. Therefore, U.S. internet users need concrete privacy rights even in personal information that mobile apps and third-party data brokers exchange on the commercial market.
+
+Because public information receives fewer constitutional protections, U.S. government agencies have stretched their interpretation of the term to the furthest possible limits. For instance, the DOD and the CIA consider publicly available data to be any information “available to the public by subscription or purchase” — a binary definition that even the January 2022 ODNI report acknowledges to be outdated. Information should not be considered public if government authorities can access it only through commercial data brokers, which, in turn, must scrape it from millions of websites against their terms of service or purchase it from mobile apps. The ADPPA broadly exempts publicly available information from privacy requirements, including data from “a website or online service made available to all members of the public, for free or for a fee.” Yet, this language could potentially strip information from protections the moment it is posted online, even if it still poses privacy concerns. This definition might also include content that users do not voluntarily upload to the internet and are unable to retract, including images captured by surveillance cameras in public places, or facial recognition databases where a person appears in a photo background without their knowledge or consent.
+
+While the long-term understanding of publicly available information will continue to evolve alongside society, Congress and government agencies can adhere to some basic principles more immediately. First, publicly available data should encompass only information that is reasonably accessible to the general population without paywalls, subscriptions, or advanced engineering knowledge. For example, if ICE needs to pay Barbaricum $2.1 to 5.5 million over five years to scrape online social media data, then that information should not be considered publicly available. As one precedent, the Supreme Court held in Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press (1989) that a person’s rap sheet should not be considered public information, even if available through some channels, because it was difficult to access and therefore “practically obscure.”
+
+Second, the definition of publicly available should be limited to content that individuals affirmatively choose to disseminate to a wide audience — and, unless it is a matter of significant public concern, they should be able to retract it at any time. For instance, content that a politician uploads to their public Twitter account with millions of followers might be considered widespread dissemination, but the majority of Americans might not reasonably expect data miners to scrape personal photos intended for tight-knit circles like friends and family. Even in public areas, the geographic movements of most Americans are also not issues of public concern, and individuals often do not voluntarily choose to share them and cannot delete them under U.S. federal law. Public availability should not automatically void all privacy protections either; basic privacy protections should apply unless data are particularly newsworthy or serve a significant societal benefit.
+
+_While data brokers need clear boundaries to prevent sales of sensitive personal information to adversarial individuals, companies, or governments, cross-border data flows are still vital to the United States and global economies._
+
+As surveillance technologies advance, several governments, including the European Union and China, have introduced measures that promote data localization or otherwise restrict cross-border data flows, citing national security or privacy grounds. But data localization alone cannot prevent privacy violations and sometimes enhances domestic government access to sensitive personal information. Moreover, overly broad restrictions on data flows can disrupt online communications and commerce, especially since almost all modern businesses operate websites or apps, conduct electronic global transactions, and otherwise depend on international data flows.
+
+As the United States weighs various options to address national security risks posed by mobile apps like TikTok and data brokers, it is important to consider how blanket restrictions on cross-border data flows could create unintended long-term consequences. Data localization could prompt other countries to institute reciprocal limitations on the United States or weaken global negotiations on free flows of data in the future. U.S. businesses have already experienced significant uncertainty after the CJEU’s Schrems I and Schrems II decisions threatened to curtail transatlantic data flows. When France joined the United States in blocking TikTok on government-issued devices in March 2023, it also added U.S. apps like Twitter and Netflix to that list. If even close political and economic allies like the European Union and United States cannot maintain trust in data flows, then further normalization of data localization could cause a breakdown of commerce and communications across the global economy. Moreover, even if forced data localization for TikTok or future non-U.S. mobile apps might slow foreign governments from accessing those specific databases, it could simultaneously streamline U.S. government access or potential misuse. Instead of data localization, the United States should promote free flows of information among allies along the lines of the Data Free Flow with Trust framework proposed under Japan’s Group of Twenty (G20) leadership in 2019 — a process that will require ongoing multilateral dialogues and understanding.
+
+Some bills, like the Protecting Americans’ Data from Foreign Surveillance Act of 2023, propose to use export control laws to prevent certain categories of personal information from being transferred to select foreign countries. Tailored limitations like these could prevent all data brokers and private companies from selling exceptionally sensitive personal information abroad while maintaining overall cross-border data flows. In the end, though, comprehensive privacy measures are the best way to mitigate risk by reducing the amount of extraneous data available to foreign and domestic entities. All U.S. data brokers and private companies should follow certain fair information practice principles: minimizing data collection to specific purposes, deleting data after it is no longer necessary, allowing stronger transparency and oversight, and more.
+
+_Boundaries on data transfers must also balance values of free speech and expression._
+
+An individual’s right to privacy can sometimes come into tension with First Amendment protections on free speech and communications, especially regarding dissemination of publicly available, aggregated, or de-identified information. In Sorrell v. IMS Health (2011), the Supreme Court struck down a Vermont law that prevented pharmacies from selling prescription information to data brokers for marketing purposes, stating it could violate legal standards of “discrimination in expression” and commercial speech. Hoan Ton-That, CEO of Clearview AI, has cited the First Amendment to defend the company’s indiscriminate scraping of photos on public-facing websites. Yet Clearview entered into a settlement agreement in ACLU v. Clearview AI (2022) to halt access to its facial recognition database to private businesses and individuals nationwide and to temporarily pause sales to both public and private entities in Illinois under the state’s Biometric Information Privacy Act.
+
+While the United States should avoid imposing overly restrictive limitations on information flows, stronger privacy protections can also promote values of free speech and expression. China’s surveillance laws demonstrate how forced censorship can also lead to self-censorship, as fear of government reprisal can prevent individuals from expressing themselves through public or private online channels. Closer to home, experts at the Brennan Center for Justice and Georgetown University’s Institute for Technology Law and Policy warn that social media web scraping by U.S. federal and local police could have a chilling effect on constitutionally-protected environmental, reproductive rights, and racial equity activism. In this manner, clear parameters on how U.S. government agencies collaborate with data brokers can safeguard individuals’ right to speak openly, particularly for historically marginalized communities that have been disproportionately subjected to surveillance based on their race, religion, income, or location.
+
+The First Amendment is strong but not absolute, as the government can impose tailored restrictions on speech to advance important interests like individual privacy. However, sales of public, aggregated, and de-identified information are an underdiscussed aspect of federal privacy legislation. Additional congressional investigations and hearings may be necessary to gather civil society input on possible restrictions without raising undue censorship concerns. Furthermore, as Cameron F. Kerry and John B. Morris Jr. point out, legislative findings will be important to clarify congressional intent on this matter, which could help any forthcoming federal privacy bill withstand future constitutional challenges.
+
+_As data collection and algorithmic analysis advance, Congress should thoroughly reevaluate conventional constitutional and statutory limitations on both compelled and voluntary disclosure of data to U.S. government agencies as a long-term objective._
+
+In 2014, the White House published a report acknowledging
+
+> the laws that govern protections afforded to our communications were written before email, the internet, and cloud computing came into wide use. Congress should amend ECPA to ensure the standard of protection for online, digital content is consistent with that afforded in the physical world — including by removing archaic distinctions between email left unread or over a certain age.
+
+In addition to updating the ECPA to ensure consistent privacy standards across companies like data brokers, any forthcoming reauthorization of Title VII of the FISA Amendments Act should codify the EU-U.S. DPF into statute and consider modernized privacy safeguards.
+
+The failure to update the ECPA and FISA for the big data era has resulted in archaic distinctions such as the type of device or length of time a message has been stored. The ECPA assigns privacy protections based on categories like metadata or communications content, but since data brokers often derive algorithmic inferences from multiple sources, it is difficult to neatly label modern datasets by type. Title I of the ECPA, commonly referred to as the Wiretap Act, requires the FBI to obtain a “super warrant” to intercept certain real-time communications, but Section 702 of FISA allows the FBI to query incidental communications concerning U.S. individuals without a warrant. The Stored Communications Act mandates a warrant to access electronic messages stored for less than 180 days but only a subpoena or court order for those stored longer than that time frame, even as the increasing affordability of data storage leads individuals and private companies to retain messages for longer periods.
+
+While this report does not focus on compelled access requests under the ECPA and FISA, the rise of the data brokerage industry calls for a more holistic review of all forms of law enforcement access to private sector data. Congress can undertake this review by holding hearings and conducting investigations. The FTC reporting recommendations from subsection VIII (5) and (6) of this report would assist in this endeavor. Future discussions could also consider new statutory limitations on geofence or keyword warrants given their outsized potential to pose privacy or civil liberties risks to large numbers of individuals.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+To summarize, stronger privacy guardrails on the commercial data brokerage industry would present both short- and long-term benefits for the United States. First, these could enhance the nation’s global reputation for data protection, which is essential to sustaining cross-border data flows and promoting economic stability for U.S. businesses. Even though many international dialogues like the EU-U.S. DPF continue to center around pre-Snowden compelled access to signals intelligence, instead of the rising prevalence of “voluntary” sales of personal information, clear boundaries on commercial data transactions could help build longer-term global confidence in both the U.S. public and private sectors.
+
+Stricter privacy measures are also vital to national security since data brokers can accumulate detailed personal information and transmit it abroad in ways that could advantage foreign adversaries. However, privacy is not only an economic and national security imperative; it is also an important human and civil right. There are moral and ethical grounds to both directly regulate the data brokerage industry and also reduce U.S. government dependence on it, particularly in light of racial profiling patterns in law enforcement. Without explicit protocols to restrict their interactions with U.S. government agencies, commercial data brokers risk reinforcing the disproportionate oversurveillance of individuals by factors like race, religion, or income.
+
+Lastly, there are geopolitical implications to consider. By limiting domestic government surveillance, the United States can demonstrate the importance of privacy values for the rest of the world. In turn, stronger U.S. privacy protections could provide a meaningful starting point for longer-term multilateral dialogues on limiting non-U.S. government transactions with data brokers. While the CCP should be held accountable for mass surveillance of its own citizens, particularly the Uyghur and Kazakh communities, the United States is in a weaker position to counteract China when it has made unjust arrests and deportations using personal information acquired from millions of Americans without a warrant. As technology continues to advance, big data will become increasingly central to economics, national security, and human rights. Therefore, it is crucial to set strong precedents and smart policies for data brokers now in order to positively shape their interactions with government agencies for years to come.
+
+---
+
+__Caitlin Chin__ is a fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where she researches the impact of technology on geopolitics and society. Her current research interests include the relationships between data brokers and government agencies, the evolution of news in a digital era, and the role of technology platforms in countering online harmful content.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-21-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-71.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-21-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-71.md
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@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第 71 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-06-21 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 鄭達鴻稱曾向選舉經理提有意申豁免跟黨投票 控方質疑屬虛構
+- 控方引彭卓棋單張提民主派願景為否決財案 稱反映公民黨立場
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（21日）踏入審訊第71天。前公民黨區議員鄭達鴻今開始接受控方盤問，稱曾告知其選舉經理，若當選後未能改變黨否決財案的立場，會申請豁免跟隨黨立場投票，但因當時仍需黨支持故沒有向黨表達。法官質疑為何鄭不擔心對方泄密，鄭解釋對方是較疏離的黨員，而選舉期間「議辦係同一條船」；控方亦質疑鄭不記得經理當時回應，且在追問下始稱有向助理提最壞情況可退黨，其說法屬虛構，鄭否認。鄭亦同意，公民黨以黨名義簽「墨落無悔」是無指向個別參選人的「空頭支票」，他認為實際上會引來批評，但黨當時要保留彈性。
+
+此外，鄭達鴻同意曾與李予信以港島區議員身分作聯合宣傳，但無對外公布他是其名單第二。李予信的代表大狀並稱，其立場是李最早於6月19日才加入「35+計劃」，而公民黨簽署「墨落無悔」與李無關。
+
+#### 昨稱因應《國安法》刪改 鄭達鴻今認投票教學片稿或在新法生效前修改
+
+鄭達鴻昨供稱，公民黨初選投票教學片段原定2020年7月3日發布，惟因應《國安法》，講稿將「否決所有議案」的「所有」刪除、亦刪去「財政懸崖」，片段延至7月10日發布。惟代表李予信的大律師關文渭質疑，片段早於6月20日已拍攝。
+
+鄭達鴻今在盤問下確認，在5月31日的選舉經理會議已有該份稿件，但記不清於6月底或7月頭進行拍攝，並強調在7月後，曾舉行會議確認片段符合當時法例要求。法官李運騰指他不理解，指《國安法》於6月30日晚生效，若於7月1日前拍攝，如何修訂講稿。鄭重申7月後有選舉經理會議確認片段符合《國安法》，並指講稿可能在《國安法》生效前修改。
+
+#### 4月文件提「鄭達鴻李予信團隊」 鄭稱曾以港島區議員身分聯合宣傳
+
+鄭達鴻昨亦提及，李予信於3月至5月曾可能排在其名單第二位，二人名字曾出現在一份文件。關文渭今展示題為「香港島 鄭達鴻 李予信 立法會選舉工程前期工作計劃」的文件，提及各種宣傳方式，最底寫有「鄭達鴻 李予信競選團隊」，日期為4月23日。鄭確認是從沒公開的內部文件，他亦從沒對外公布李予信是其名單第二。關文渭指李予信排第二是一個從沒實現的計劃，鄭不同意。
+
+
+▲ 李予信（資料圖片）
+
+法官陳仲衡續問，工作計劃上有哪些項目有實現。鄭稱二人6月19日前曾一起派發《國安法》單張作聯合宣傳，單張上有二人的相片，牌頭應是港島區議員，但無註明出選哪一區；並同意辯方指，單張上亦有余若薇和陳淑莊的相片，但二人也不會是其第二位。
+
+#### 辯方指李予信6月中下旬始加入「35+」 「墨落無悔」與李無關
+
+法官李運騰續指，不理解李予信是否鄭達鴻名單第二與案何關，關文渭指因鄭講述的事實錯誤，強調當時可能有討論，但李予信從沒排在鄭達鴻名單第二。陳慶偉亦關注投票教學片段講稿修改時間與案何關，李運騰也指更重要的問題應是李何時參與35+計劃。
+
+關文渭稱其立場是李予信於6月20日提交初選提名表格、或6月19日出席公民黨街站時才正式加入「35+計劃」，而公民黨簽署「墨落無悔」與李無關；至於投票教學片段的修訂，辯方立場是所有修改在《國安法》生效前已有定案（set in stone）。
+
+#### 被問「墨落無悔」簽署約束何人 鄭稱視乎實際情況以保彈性
+
+關文渭表示盤問完成，法官再就工作計劃提問。鄭同意文件顯示當時似乎有人已決定將他和李予信組成競選團隊，而工作計劃由其選舉經理撰寫，理論上適用於初選和正式選舉，並為港島而設，若李參選超區會另有計劃。鄭續指他有參與過討論，李予信亦應有看過文件，但二人應沒有作直接討論。李運騰問，那李予信有就計劃給予意見嗎？鄭稱記不清楚，而雖擬定計劃後二人曾一同派單張並作討論，但記不清討論內容，因二人本是區議會同事，會在很多場合見面。
+
+陳慶偉亦指，工作計劃提及「一同建立公民黨立法會團隊之整體形象」，而時任黨魁楊岳橋稱否決財案是「莊嚴嘅承諾」，鄭達鴻是指他不用受此承諾約束？鄭重申，選舉期間要跟黨的立場，若有幸當選會嘗試改變，和申請豁免跟隨黨立場投票，若不獲批准，最壞情況是退黨，並視乎實際預算案決定。
+
+而就鄭達鴻稱公民黨刻意以黨名義、而非個別參選人名義簽「墨落無悔」，陳慶偉問是否「空頭支票（empty promises）」？鄭先稱是「選舉期之中嘅情況」，後同意是沒指向個別候選人的「空頭支票」。陳仲衡再問該簽署會約束什麼人？鄭稱視乎實際情況。陳慶偉指換言之即無人會受聲明約束，因黨是「抽象的、在天空上的東西」。鄭回應，認為實際上會有批評，「但黨嗰一刻嘅講法就係會保留彈性。」
+
+
+▲ （資料圖片）
+
+#### 鄭稱曾告知選舉經理當選後有意申豁免 指選舉時最親密不擔心泄密
+
+其後進入控方盤問。鄭達鴻早前曾稱，無意在當選後無差別否決預算案，若公民黨立場要否決，他會申請「議員豁免跟隨黨立場投票機制」，最壞情況可退黨。鄭今在盤問下同意，他不曾與李予信或其他人討論使用豁免機制，只曾與其選舉經理 Catherine Cheung 表示有意使用，但他不太記得清楚她如何回應，又指「佢一直以嚟都知我同個黨有啲問題」。
+
+陳仲衡問，鄭達鴻當時是否想黨知道他當選後會申請豁免？鄭稱「嗰一刻唔想」，重申選舉期間要跟隨黨的立場，「當選到之後先會有 bargaining power（議價力）去講。」陳問，若鄭不想黨知道，為何又告訴選舉經理？鄭稱因競選經理是他選舉期間「最親密嘅人」，指她是「我搵返嚟，跟住向黨申請薪金去支付佢」，並同意她是公民黨的員工。
+
+陳慶偉問她是否公民黨員，鄭先思考5秒指「嗰刻我唔清楚」，後再稱「應該係黨員」。陳仲衡指他應不會聘請民建聯成員，多人發笑，鄭同意，但指他不是所有助理都是黨員。陳慶偉續指，若其選舉經理是黨員，則應對公民黨有一定的忠誠，「為何你會告訴她當選後，你會做公民黨的『反叛者（rebel）』？」鄭回應，他之所以不清楚選舉經理當刻是否黨員，「因為佢就算係（黨員），都係一個好疏離嘅黨員」，而在選舉期間「議辦係同一條船」。陳再問，若鄭告知選舉經理自己會做「反叛者」，不擔心其秘密會泄露嗎？鄭答「唔擔心」。
+
+#### 鄭追問下稱討論「墨落無悔」後告知選舉經理 無向黨交代因仍需黨支持
+
+鄭續表示，在6月10至11日公民黨「好劇烈」討論是否簽「墨落無悔」後，選舉經理知道他曾在群組提出反對，「所以佢本身就安撫我，我就同佢講，如果真係改變唔到，會用個（豁免）機制。」萬德豪問就是這樣？鄭答「係」，但在追問下稱還有向選舉經理提「最壞情況可能退黨」。萬質疑，鄭追問下才提及有向選舉經理提可能退黨，其說法實是「虛構（made up）」，鄭否認，並在追問下稱不記得經理有否回應「唔好咁做」，再遭萬質疑若經理有說過他會記得。鄭後補充，是在議辦與選舉經理面對面談上述問題。
+
+陳慶偉其後再次問，鄭達鴻有否想過對黨誠實，向黨團或執委交代他當選後的做法。鄭稱在他們討論否決預算案時已表達反對意見，但「改變唔到」。陳追問即使如此，他有沒有嘗試誠實表達即使他當選也不會跟隨黨立場，不會實踐其黨魁的「莊嚴承諾」？鄭再指「嗰一刻沒有」，重申當時無論資源和宣傳，「都係需要黨嘅幫忙」，故並非適合時間去講。
+
+
+▲ 左起：譚文豪、鄭達鴻、李予信、楊岳橋、郭家麒、余若薇（資料圖片）
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（21日）踏入審訊第71天。鄭達鴻繼續接受控方盤問，重申否決預算案只是迫使政府落實五大訴求的「策略」和「籌碼」，望政府談判讓步，同意有機會否決一次預算案，以令政府提出更好的版本，而當時公民黨主軸認為應將警察新增撥款用作「救市」以獲市民支持。
+
+控方又引用同參選港島區的彭卓棋選舉單張，指寫有民主派立會過半願景是否決預算案迫當權者回應五大訴求，而公民黨是民主派的一分子，故彭是談及公民黨的立場。鄭達鴻稱民主派是很大的團體，上述是彭對民主派的理解，但不清楚彭所指。控方其後在法官詢問下，表示望顯示其他協調會議參與者，均知道公民黨就否決預算案的立場。
+
+
+▲ 鄭達鴻
+
+#### 鄭達鴻不同意公民黨記者會否決財案立場清晰 惟認一直知悉黨立場
+
+鄭達鴻今繼續接受盤問，控方引公民黨一連串文件，質疑公民黨實一直持有否決預算案的立場。鄭早前供稱，曾於籌備會議上反對譚文豪和楊岳橋否決所有議案的主張。萬德豪指，否決預算案是公民黨一直以來的立場、鄭亦知道。鄭稱「唔係統一立場」，只是楊和譚的立場，又指雖知道楊岳橋記者會上提及否決財案，但郭家麒有不同的說法，曾提及視乎議案內容，好就贊成、不好就反對。
+
+控方其後展示記者會謄本，指楊岳橋提及政府不回應五大訴求，公民黨會義無反顧反對預算案，又稱會不惜代價爭取五大訴求。鄭同意楊是站在黨的立場，而非個人立場而說。
+
+控方續指，郭家麒會上之所以提及要審視財案優劣，是回應前中聯辦主任駱惠寧質疑立會過半是「奪權」的說法，郭指《基本法》列明立會監督政府運作，故立會「一定要」要求政府回應五大訴求，但沒有說公民黨不會用否決權迫使政府回應五大訴求，鄭同意「佢冇話唔用」。控方續指，公民黨在記者會的立場十分清晰，就是否決預算案迫使政府回應五大訴求，鄭不同意，但同意一直知悉黨立場。
+
+
+▲ 2020年3月25日公民黨記者會（資料圖片）
+
+#### 鄭稱否決權僅「籌碼」不阻經濟、公民黨會議曾建議用警察撥款「救市」爭支持
+
+控方其後展示公民黨「立法會選舉心戰室核心小組」3月30日的會議紀錄，鄭指是3月25日記者會後的檢討會，楊岳橋、譚文豪、郭家麒、余德寶、黃文萱、林瑞華、李予信等曾出席記者會的人士均有參與。鄭指他沒出席，但獲前助理、陳淑莊助理李綽晞匯報會上內容；並解釋因此前發表過意見但不被接納，「所以呢啲會議我好少去。」
+
+控方引述文件提及：「針對未來議會過半後，民主派透過否決財政預算案迫使政府落實五大訴求的策略，會否阻礙振興經濟的措施，建議要求政府將警察的撥款用作救市，以爭取市民支持」，鄭同意是提及公民黨3月25日記招的立場，但強調做法僅「策略」，亦有說明若政府願意讓步，如將警察撥款用作「救市」，他們會同意預算案。
+
+李運騰問何謂「策略」，鄭解釋是「籌碼」，作用是「一開始去令到政府談判」。李問若政府最終沒回應，公民黨是否會退縮（chicken out）？鄭重申是有其他的讓步（trade-off）會做。李續問何謂「救市」，意指不支薪予警察嗎？鄭否認，解釋當時警察有很多新增撥款，但公民黨主軸認為應將撥款用作「救市」。陳仲衡續問，故否決權只是爭取五大訴求的籌碼，不會阻礙振興經濟？鄭同意，指文件意思是「有機會否決第一次嘅財政預算案，去令政府提出更加好嘅財政預算案」。
+
+#### 鄭稱有其他方法迫政府落實五大訴求 惟黨內無討論過
+
+控方續引文件指「上星期三各團隊聯合召開記招，各團隊認為成功為民主派設定選舉議程，力爭透過立法會選舉議會過半迫使政府落實五大訴求，為未來民主派繼續就選舉作出協調及合作提供基礎」，問文件所述是否正確。鄭同意，但指控方混淆了兩個「團隊」的意思，指首個「團隊」是指出席3月25日記者會的團隊，而第二個團隊是指3月30日出席是次檢討會的團隊，惟陳仲衡指兩者屬同一句。
+
+鄭續同意，兩個團隊均包括郭家麒在內。萬德豪續問，即郭亦同意否決財案迫使政府落實五大訴求？鄭指文件僅提及「議會過半」迫政府落實五大訴求，而否決權只是迫政府回應的其中一個方法。陳慶偉問有什麼其他方法，鄭指郭榮鏗會上提及立會過半後可調查警隊，惟控方指那與迫政府回應無關。鄭其後在法官追問下，指無論在3月25日記者會前的籌備會議、當天記者會前或後，其認知均沒有討論過其他迫使政府回應的方法。
+
+#### 鄭稱論壇天書提無論是否DQ均不會改反國安法立場
+
+鄭達鴻續同意，根據選舉經理會議紀錄，就初選論壇的「Line to take」於5月31日已完成，而6月20日更新的「論壇天書」包含對DQ、「攬炒」和運用否決權等的回應，他於論壇上按天書作答。李運騰主動指，天書就DQ的回應提及前政制及事務局局長曾國衞：「覺得自己高唔高風險被DQ？高，因為曾國衞話所有反對國安法嘅候選人都應該被DQ。但係無論D不DQ，公民黨都不會改變固有原則和立場。」
+
+李運騰問，故公民黨早於6月20日已預視《國安法》的風險？鄭稱此前已有消息《國安法》會實行，並有消息傳出過相關內容。李運騰續指，天書提及不論是否DQ，公民黨都不會改變立場，該立場是否指3月25日記者會就否決財案的立場？鄭稱只是針對「反對國安法」的立場，因「我哋覺得嗰陣時被DQ嘅風險最高，就係因為反《國安法》」，但同意李運騰指亦包括「墨落無悔」的立場。
+
+#### 控方引彭卓棋單張提民主派願景為否決財案 稱反映公民黨立場
+
+控方續展示同參選港島區的彭卓棋的選舉單張電子檔案，寫有「共同協調人民奪權 齊上齊落對抗極權」，稱是從鄭達鴻辦公室搜得，惟代表鄭的資深大律師潘熙指，該文件並非從鄭搜獲。控方其後改為展示一張相片，顯示一隻手持有該單張，鄭確認該相片是從其辦公室的一部手提電腦搜得。
+
+
+▲ 彭卓棋
+
+控方續指，單張顯示「民主派提出立會過半『35+』願景，提倡運用立法會權力，否決財政預算案，迫使當權者回應『五大訴求』」，而公民黨是民主派的一分子，所以彭卓棋也是在談及公民黨的立場？庭內有人大聲說「吓」。鄭稱「民主派係好大嘅一個團體」，惟萬德豪打斷指鄭已同意公民黨是民主派一分子，重申故單張提到的民主派立場，亦是公民黨立場。鄭停下思考，後指彭提到民主派，而民主派有公民黨，「但我唔清楚知道呢度講嘅民主派係……」
+
+法官陳慶偉改問，單張是否顯示彭卓棋對公民黨立場的理解，就是否決預算案？此時潘熙起身指，單張屬於彭卓棋，鄭達鴻未必能回答，惟陳慶偉不接納並着他坐下。陳再重覆問單張是否代表彭卓棋對公民黨立場的理解，潘熙再插口「你知不知道或你同不同意」，惟陳慶偉即說：「Shut!」，又問潘熙：「那條問題有什麼問題？」潘指同意事實只提到單張從鄭的辦公室搜得，但辦公室有很多人。鄭其後在法官追問下同意當時他管有該相片，亦同意單張顯示彭卓棋對民主派的理解。
+
+李運騰關注，在眾多港島候選人中，為何鄭特別保有彭的單張？鄭指不清楚，但同意陳慶偉指或會在選舉論壇使用，稱助理會定時搜查不同候選人單張。李運騰其後就審訊文件夾的內容發問，問為何鄭的電腦亦搜得戴耀廷文章〈齊上齊落 目標35+〉，鄭稱是促進35+的理解。至於另一張相片顯示一個白板，寫有「初選」等字眼，鄭同意是在其辦公室拍攝，同意上述材料應在準備選舉時作參考。鄭亦被搜得區諾軒與彭卓棋就港島初選投4票的 WhatsApp 對話截圖。
+
+#### 彭卓棋代表大狀突離庭要求去醫院 官押周五續審
+
+陳慶偉最後問，控方展示彭卓棋單張與案何關？萬德豪重申，是要顯示其他協調會議的參與者和共謀者均知道公民黨就否決預算案的立場。下午3時03分，代表彭卓棋的大律師盧敏儀突然從座位站起，問法庭她可否去醫院，又一度掩嘴和大口吸氣，法官批准並下令先休庭，盧執拾物品後即急步離開。法官書記其後表示，法官指案件押後至周五（23日）續審。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-23-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-72.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-23-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-72.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..943dd187
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-23-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-72.md
@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第 72 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-06-23 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 鄭達鴻稱公民黨國安法後改政綱無公布 因憂予人印象「縮得好勁」影響初選勝算
+- 鄭達鴻多次稱與公民黨立場有分歧 官問何不加入街工
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（23日）踏入審訊第72天。鄭達鴻今繼續接受控方盤問。鄭達鴻早前供稱，公民黨曾因應《國安法》生效修改政綱，包括將以「否決權」促政府落實五大訴求改為爭立會「主導權」，但因正式選舉延後而沒公開。法官李運騰今關注為何不在初選前公布，鄭指黨沒有透露，但相信是「公關嘅考慮」，擔心《國安法》後公民黨予人印象立場「縮得好勁」，影響初選勝算，故選前沒有明顯改變立場的說法；又解釋參與初選投票的是「最黃」或「偏黃」的選民。
+
+至於政綱提「彈劾及罷免林鄭」，鄭稱該黨一向認為政府應就社運問責。法官一度質疑先提出彈劾再成立調查委員會調查是「未審先判」，鄭稱是《基本法》賦予的權力。另外，控方指鄭曾提35+共同目標為「撼動政權」，是打算當選後否決財案，鄭不同意，重申否決財案僅黨的立場。
+
+#### 控方質疑鄭達鴻無讀FB帖文留言 鄭稱選舉期忙碌非每則留言都有留意
+
+鄭達鴻今繼續接受控方盤問。鄭主問時稱，就其 Facebook 專頁2020年6月23日帖文提及會否決預算案迫特首下台，是助理跟隨公民黨「Line To Take」發帖，他被捕後才知悉。鄭今在盤問下同意，會就選民問題作準備，亦會想知其帖文的反應；但因選舉期間有很多帖文，一日至少3個以上，故「唔會每一則留言都有留意」、「我有睇（留言）同冇睇都唔出奇」，他亦沒有閱讀上述帖文的9則留言。控方質疑他說謊，鄭否認。
+
+
+▲ 鄭達鴻
+
+鄭在法官陳仲衡詢問下，指當時也有看過其他候選人的網站和專頁帖文。陳續問但鄭沒看他自己的帖文，這不是可在籌備選舉時用作參考嗎？鄭同意，但指選舉期間「我嘅職責唔淨止係睇 Facebook posts」，解釋當時大概每日都有至少3個街站、每次歷時兩至三小時，亦有其他地區居民諮詢、區議會工作要處理，也要籌備選舉論壇的立場和造勢活動。
+
+鄭在李運騰追問下，指專頁並非只為選舉而設，實於2013年已設立，除選舉相關帖文，亦與區議員工作相關，探討地區議題。李續問，鄭當時是否決定選舉期間不會看其專頁？當時為何沒有看其專頁內容？鄭稱沒有作特別決定不去看，但因專頁有很多管理員，選舉經理亦會「一齊睇」。陳仲衡指但鄭是要答問題的那個人，鄭同意。
+
+#### 鄭指黨改政綱後無公布屬保勝算的「公關考慮」、不想予人印象「縮得好勁」
+
+鄭達鴻早前亦稱，公民黨因應《國安法》將原有的9點初選政綱，改為「無字政綱」，後於7月初擬定新的9點政綱，包括將「以關鍵否決權」促政府落實五大訴求改為「爭取立法會主導權」，但因正式選舉延後而沒公開。陳仲衡先關注新政綱提及「立即撤回『港版國安法』」，問如何能要求撤回同時亦遵守《國安法》，鄭稱該點為「倡議」，但當《國安法》生效後就須跟隨。
+
+鄭在盤問下確認，新政綱並無向公眾公布，因預期於初選之後的正式選舉才使用。法官李運騰關注，初選目的就是讓民主派知道正式選舉時應投票予哪人，那為何不在初選前公布？鄭稱黨沒有透露，但「相信係一個公關嘅考慮」，「佢哋好擔心過咗《國安法》之後畀人哋嘅一個印象係佢哋縮得好勁。」
+
+李運騰續問，若該黨立場有任何退縮，不是更應讓公眾於初選前知道，以讓他們投票時能作出「知情的決定」？鄭解釋黨當時是考慮勝算，「因為參與初選個光譜唔係全部嘅選民，而係一班最黃或者偏黃嘅選民。」鄭同意，預計初選選民並不代表一般的民主派支持者，解釋很重要的因素是初選少了很多傳統實體票站，故上了年紀的傳統民主派支持者未必能出來投票。李追問，簡單而言，公民黨沒公布立場的改變，是為增加獲得選舉「入場券」的機會？鄭答「事實上係」。李再稱，而這比起讓公眾知道所有資訊更重要？鄭答「嗰一刻係」。
+
+陳慶偉後問，故公民黨立場一直是否決預算案，但因望增勝算，故公開撤回這個立場？鄭否認，解釋公民黨是打算改政綱，「跟住驚喺初選前畀人哋見到縮得咁勁，去影響到初選嘅勝算」，故在初選前「都冇一個明顯改變立場嘅一個說法」，並維持否決預算案的立場。陳表示明白，指他弄錯了。
+
+#### 控方質疑新政綱無被公民黨採納 鄭不同意
+
+鄭早前亦稱，該新9點政綱於7月4日會議後數天，由助理發出籌備選舉的 WhatsApp 群組，無人有異議，所以通過。控方質疑無人反對是否就代表通過？鄭稱認為是通過，因該9點先由公民黨立法會議員討論，再經選舉經理會議討論，雖當時沒有人明說這是新政綱、亦無書面紀錄指通過，但認為無異議便是通過。控方指該新政綱並沒有被公民黨採納，鄭不同意。
+
+#### 政綱提「彈劾及罷免林鄭」 鄭稱黨認為政府須為社運問責、過往政綱有提及
+
+陳慶偉其後關注，新政綱亦提及「彈劾及罷免林鄭月娥」。鄭達鴻解釋根據《基本法》第73條，議員有彈劾的權力。陳追問當時公民黨打算以甚麼方式提出彈劾，鄭表示無詳細討論，但一直以來黨也認為「政府應該就住社會運動負責、問責」。
+
+李運騰質疑，一方面公民黨提出要就社運作調查，但另一方面尚未有調查結果就提出要彈劾特首，這是否「未審先判（prejudged）」？鄭回應指，「彈劾行政長官」不只是在今屆政綱出現，因此公民黨成員不認為有問題。李追問，過往政綱彈劾的對象是歷屆特首，是否代表不論特首是誰，提出彈劾都是公民黨的固有議程（consistent agenda）？鄭稱不是。
+
+#### 官質疑先彈劾後調查「未審先判」 鄭稱按《基本法》條文啟動程序
+
+鄭續解釋，如果公民黨運用《基本法》第73條彈劾，屆時將會啟動程序，成立獨立調查委員會調查事件，調查有否理由彈劾林鄭月娥。但他同意李運騰所指，有這個權力不等於要運用，亦同意這並非五大訴求的一部分。
+
+李運騰及陳慶偉均表示不理解鄭的邏輯，陳指他本人也曾擔任調查委員會的主席，但委員會的成員是由特首委任；李亦指鄭似乎是提議先彈劾，然後再找理由。鄭認為不是，因公民黨的立場一向認為特首需為社會運動負責，而《基本法》提及如四分一議員動議，會交由獨立調查委員會調查事實的真相，若獲三分二議員通過後可交中央決定。
+
+李運騰續問到，該點出現在鄭的政綱，是否也是鄭的立場？鄭指該點只是出現在他一份沒有公開發布、交給民主動力的政綱方格表中，重申「呢個只係黨嘅立場」，又主動補充指公民黨「5個候選人都係統一嘅政綱」。
+
+#### 控方質疑選舉單張提「鄭達鴻承諾」否決財案 鄭稱屬設計、為黨立場
+
+萬德豪續問及鄭達鴻的選舉單張，他早前同意在《國安法》落實後曾刪去「力抗《國安法》」等字句，但新舊單張均以小題寫上「鄭達鴻承諾」：「35+ 反制政府 實現五大訴求」，「進入議會行使基本法賦予的否決權，否決財政預算案，迫使政府回應五大訴求」。鄭同意相關單張於7月6和7日全發出，意味《國安法》生效後，派發的單張仍寫有他承諾會否決預算案。
+
+萬德豪指那不是黨的承諾，而是鄭達鴻個人的承諾，鄭不同意，強調是「黨嘅立場」。陳仲衡追問但黨的立場成為了鄭的承諾？鄭不同意，重申「嗰刻係要跟返黨嘅立場」，而單張上提及「鄭達鴻承諾」只是單張的設計，由他批准，而當時「冇特別留意」該字眼，但他知道政綱內容代表黨立場。
+
+#### 控方質疑鄭達鴻擬當選後用否決權「撼動政權」 鄭不同意
+
+就6月15日鄭達鴻出席D100節目《風波裡的茶杯》，鄭解釋他與楊岳橋出席，因黨當時想他有多些公開發言的機會，視該節目為訓練和曝光機會。其中有聽眾問及「點解唔需要去簽生死狀？又話要有共同目標？⋯⋯咁你哋35+嚟做咩？」，又批評民主派議員表現欠佳，如「民主黨一嚿雲」不跟大隊投票。
+
+鄭同意聽眾談及議員當選後的事，而他當時回應「其實唔係話冇共同目標，共同目標就係撼動個政權、去用35plus」。鄭早前解釋，提「撼動政權」是跟隨主持吳志森的說法，控方質疑那不是事實，指鄭提「撼動政權」實是指運用否決權迫政府，而他當選後打算這樣做，鄭均不同意。
+
+#### 鄭稱戴耀廷怕被指「操縱選舉」故毋須簽協議 強調無關否決財案
+
+鄭當時續回覆，「其實一開始都講過簽唔簽呢樣嘢」，只是戴耀廷有一個「良好願望」，擔心《國安法》來時會影響很多人，想留「走盞位」才沒簽署，「咁當然有啲人想繼續有一啲共同嘅願望，咁所以之前有個聯署喺度，譬如公民黨都簽咗嘅，咁呢個就等每一個政團自己去考慮啦，呢個都好難去規限得到。」
+
+控方指，戴耀廷沒要求簽署的就是否決預算案的協議，鄭不同意，強調是指「贏咗先有得選，輸咗冇得選」的協議。控方質疑這並非聽眾的關注，鄭同意聽眾的確是關注「共同目標」、想「35+係有啲嘢要做」，但其後主持已打斷，稱35+就是要有共識才能取得35席，否則「35+就玩完」，他理解主持提及的共識是指「贏咗先有得選」的協議。
+
+鄭續同意法官李運騰指，戴耀廷當時不想留下任何文件證據以被政府DQ。李續指，而「墨落無悔」的內容正反映鄭指的「共同目標」，因此他才會提到公民黨有簽「墨落」？鄭不同意，解釋他提到的「共同目標」和「共同願望」是兩回事，並指在港島區，唯一曾討論過不想留下會被政權DQ的文件，「係因為驚畀個政權話操縱選舉。」
+
+李運騰續指，只有勝選者才能參選，不是「35+計劃」的常識嗎？若戴耀廷只是不想政權知道這個協議，那為何要舉行6月9日的初選記者會？鄭重申，當時最主流反對初選的新聞，均是指戴操縱選舉，故戴協調會議時提出「驚因為咁會製造咗一張DQ名單畀人DQ」。李追問當時有選舉論壇、有票站，參選人名單是秘密嗎？鄭否認，解釋是指當參選人一同簽署提名表格，就可能被指操縱選舉。萬德豪最後指，鄭於節目上並非談及兩個協議，一直都是談及否決預算案的協議，鄭不同意。
+
+案件下午續審。
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（23日）踏入審訊第72天。鄭達鴻今繼續接受控方盤問，就同屬公民黨的李予信原排其名單第二，其後改選超區，鄭指二人曾「有啲拗撬」，李想專注地區事務，不想參與派傳單「咁機械性嘅工作」；而李2020年6月12日參與街頭活動「被邀請入警署」後，黨才討論找李參選超區。法官李運騰問公民黨是否想找看來像「街頭戰士」的人，鄭否認，稱黨只是想被攻擊時，「可以有呢樣嘢講出嚟」，顯示對街頭的「貢獻」。
+
+此外，控方質疑公民黨以黨名義簽署「墨落無悔」，實對鄭達鴻有約束力。鄭不同意，重申屬黨的立場、而非個人立場。法官陳慶偉一度指，鄭達鴻供稱自初選開始已有自己的議程，問他有否想過加入其他政黨如街工，多人發笑，鄭指當時「公民黨係我最大機會、最有勝算嘅一個身位」，又指對黨既有感激亦有不快，其意見不被接納便會跟隨黨立場。
+
+#### 鄭稱與李予信有「拗撬」、李想專注地區工作遂退出其名單第二位
+
+鄭達鴻下午續接受控方盤問。鄭早前供稱，前黨友李予信曾有機會排其港島名單第二，後改由楊岳橋和譚文豪「徵召」參選超區。主控萬德豪今問及，鄭6月10日曾於公民黨籌備選舉的 WhatsApp 群組反對黨簽「墨落無悔」，成員包括楊岳橋、譚文豪和郭家麒等，問李予信是否在群組內？鄭稱當時未必是，而當時李「已經唔係」排其名單第二，亦應未參選超區。
+
+法官陳仲衡問李為何不再在其名單之上，鄭早前接受辯方盤問時多次稱不記得，惟今稱「我記得同佢有啲拗撬，佢話佢唔想做第二位，想做返一啲地區工作」，並解釋當時二人「好密集落區」，李「唔係想做啲咁機械性嘅工作」，加上李當時於區選只是贏了不夠一百票，李「想專注返個區」。被問何謂機械性工作，鄭形容當時二人所謂「排第一、排第二」，「只不過係落區派傳單。」
+
+鄭續指，不記得李何時最早成為他第二位，但4月初時應已在其名單內；而上述「拗撬」於5月中發生，之後二人減少一起派傳單和進行競選工程，「個模式就好似我同個黨其他嘅區議員咁」，李只是作為區議員而非他名單第二的身分參與，李並在6月13日後改為參選超區。
+
+
+▲ 李予信
+
+#### 鄭稱李予信因街頭活動入警署後才被徵召參選 引楊岳橋稱擔心黨「街頭貢獻不足」
+
+主控萬德豪問是否知道李成為參選人的原因，鄭稱記不清楚，但李被徵召出選超區後，曾獲楊岳橋告知李於6月12日因街頭活動「被邀請入警署」，並從警署出來後，黨內才討論找他參選超區。鄭續引述楊稱，本身公民黨「街頭嘅論述不足」、「擔心個黨喺街頭嘅貢獻不足」，並同意法官指即黨在街頭的參與不夠。
+
+李運騰問，所以公民黨當時想找一個看起來像「街頭戰士（street fighter）」的人？鄭否認，指「只係佢哋想畀人攻擊嘅時候，可以有呢樣嘢講出嚟」。李追問，鄭是說公民黨有參與街頭抗爭？鄭稱「唔係參與抗爭，係喺前線監察個活動」。李續笑指，所以鄭是指一個曾被邀請入警署的人會對公民黨有幫助？鄭答「係」，李再笑說「最好他曾被捕？」，鄭再答「係」。
+
+翻查資料，2020年6月12日反修例運動一周年，李予信於銅鑼灣被捕，他發文稱當時是履行社工及區議員工作。
+
+
+▲ （資料圖片）
+
+#### 「墨落無悔」提共同綱領已取共識 鄭稱不記得黨內有人提出與會議情況不符
+
+萬德豪續展示鄒家成 Facebook上「墨落無悔」聲明的帖文，當中提及「我們認為，在初選協調會議上已取得共識的共同綱領，乃一眾參選人之合作基礎」，並表明認同「五大訴求，缺一不可」，及會「運用基本法賦予立法會的權力，包括否決財政預算案」。
+
+萬德豪問帖文是否指參選人在協調會議已就共同綱領取得共識，只是欠缺簽名？鄭表示：「佢嘅講法，係。」萬再問，在公民黨討論是否簽「墨落」的群組中，有沒有人提過協調會議就否決預算案未達成協議？鄭稱不記得，他亦沒有這樣提出。萬質疑，若根本無達成協議，這應是看到「墨落」首先會提出的問題；惟鄭指當時討論只是圍繞在「會運用」否決權的那點，而公民黨後來發文亦是提及該點。
+
+#### 控方質疑黨簽聲明對鄭達鴻有約束力 鄭否認 重申屬黨立場、非個人立場
+
+萬德豪續展示公民黨6月11日宣布已簽署「墨落無悔」的帖文，當中轉載3月25日的記者會帖文，並指當時已承諾會行使否決權讓政府落實五大訴求。鄭確認，帖文沒提協調會議就否決預算案未有達成共識，亦與楊岳橋3月作出的「莊嚴承諾」相同。萬續指，故「墨落」並非新事，因公民黨自3月25日一直持有否決財案的立場，宣布簽署「墨落」亦只是重複該承諾？鄭回應「我認為都係有呢個立場，但唔係統一立場」。
+
+萬續指，公民黨使用黨而非個人名義簽署「墨落」，是因這正是黨的立場。鄭回應指，簽署時認為是黨的立場，但同時刻意採用不同簽署模式，保留彈性。萬續指鄭身為黨的候選人，聲明對他有約束力，鄭不同意，強調是黨的立場，而非他個人立場。
+
+#### 官質疑申豁免跟黨投票會影響鄭誠信 鄭稱可能退黨或解散
+
+法官李運騰質疑，雖然鄭稱用黨名義簽署是保留彈性，但鄭出席記者會並手持紙牌站着、事後公民黨又將相片發布，這如何給予他彈性？鄭重申或會申請豁免跟隨黨立場投票，惟李即質疑公眾不會覺得有彈性，只會認為鄭看來「講一套做一套」，影響其誠信。鄭續指因此尚有另外兩個可能保留彈性，就是「當我不再是公民黨黨員，或者公民黨解散」。
+
+#### 官稱鄭有自己議程、有否想過入其他政黨如街工 鄭：嗰刻公民黨係最有勝算嘅身位
+
+陳慶偉續指，公民黨的 Facebook 專頁有6萬多個讚好，既然黨的立場大受歡迎，而鄭又想成為公民黨立法會議員，為何會採取與黨不一樣的立場？鄭指因他想成為立法會議員，故要採取黨立場，但最後預算案「必然會拎上枱，我無可能唔去睇（內容）而作出決定」，強調要審視預算案內容。
+
+陳慶偉問鄭，故他是說初選一開始，他已有自己的議程（agenda），會成為公民黨的「異類（black sheep）」？鄭回應：「我會認為如果我要作出任何改變，都必須要先成為立法會議員，喺個黨我先會有議價能力。」萬德豪隨即問他是否打算「勒索（blackmail）」公民黨，惟陳慶偉即打斷指「不不不」，並改問：「你有沒有想過加入其他政黨？例如街工？」延伸庭的被告包括袁嘉蔚、黃之鋒及譚凱邦均大笑。鄭回答：「喺嗰一刻，公民黨係我最大機會、最有勝算嘅一個身位。」
+
+鄭其後確認，使用黨名義簽「墨落」並非由他提出，亦是黨而非他望以此保留彈性，但當時無討論過為何可保留彈性。而鄭確認沒有討論過前，一度答「冇深入討論」，李運騰即向鄭指他是法律博士，望他的答案越精準越好，又指這並非第一次鄭先說無深入討論、後更正為無討論，望他能理解兩者分別；陳仲衡亦着鄭勿為其答案保留彈性，鄭表示明白。
+
+#### 鄭稱無印象區諾軒協調會提否決財案 控方問為何黎敬輝作虛假紀錄遭官打斷
+
+就協調會議的情況，鄭同意首次會議有人提出否決預算案，但他事後沒向黨匯報，因當時副主席賴仁彪與他一同出席。萬德豪指否決預算案是公民黨的「莊嚴承諾」，李運騰問他和賴難道不會在會上表達對否決預算案的支持嗎？鄭不同意，指他們當時「冇講啲乜嘢」。
+
+至於第二次會議，萬德豪引黎敬輝會議紀錄提到區諾軒曾稱：「讓區議員知道選舉形勢不樂觀，要有戰意鬥志，否決財政預算案」，而鄭達鴻提及有關票站站長的安排。鄭確認自己及區有出席會議，但不記得自己當晚會議說過這些話，亦無印象區諾軒說過上述說話，也無印象有人提及否決預算案，重申除第一次會議後就無再提及。
+
+萬德豪其後問鄭，「你知道為何黎敬輝要作出虛假的紀錄（fake record）？」陳慶偉即打斷指不認為控方可問這問題，李運騰亦指那是要求證人揣測（speculation）。萬指他們尚未知道答案，惟李指無論如何也不會有幫助，萬續就下一議題發問。
+
+#### 鄭稱譚文豪簽共同綱領後始知有該文件 否認知道所有地區達協議否決財案
+
+被問其他參選黨員有否告知他協調會議情況，鄭稱參選九龍西的譚文豪「直到最尾簽咗嗰份『共同綱領』先有 send 出嚟」，引述譚稱「九龍東要簽呢份嘢，佢簽咗」，確認是在譚發訊息後才得知有該文件。至於報名時同樣夾附「共同綱領」的新界西，鄭稱沒印象該區候選人郭家麒有提及要簽協議。
+
+李運騰問因此公民黨各區候選人都沒有溝通？鄭稱就是在 WhatsApp 群組溝通，但沒討論過各區協調會議上曾討論過什麼。萬德豪指，鄭事實上清楚知道在協調會議期間，每個地方選區都有討論否決預算案，而在「墨落無悔」發布前，鄭亦知道所有地區均已就否決預算案迫使政府落實五大訴求達成協議，鄭一律不同意。
+
+鄭主問下亦表示從沒收過港島協議文件，而否決預算案並非協調會議共識之一。法官陳慶偉問，若他當時收到相關文件，是否不會對否決預算案的條款感出奇？鄭稱雖戴耀廷及公民黨均有提過，但不會認為是共識，同意因此不會花長時間閱讀文件。
+
+#### 控方質疑鄭以豁免跟黨立場投票機制為「藉口」 官指是評論非提問
+
+此外，鄭達鴻早前稱該黨2016年設立「申請豁免跟隨黨立場投票」機制，而郭榮鏗於任命終院首席法官張舉能的議案曾使用。控方指，郭2016年當選前並不會知道2020年會審議該法案、亦不會知其立場將與黨不同；但鄭達鴻情況完全不同，鄭當選前已知道會申請豁免機制。鄭重申「我知道有呢個機制，改變唔到嘅時候就會使用」。
+
+萬續質疑即使如此，鄭也沒有想過告訴黨內資深成員其想法？鄭同意。萬續指出，鄭以此機制作為被控此罪的藉口也太過方便了吧？惟陳仲衡即指那是一個評論，多於一個問題，萬續就另一範疇發問。
+
+#### 鄭稱對黨雖感激但亦有「唔開心」 作為黨員會跟黨立場
+
+萬德豪最後談及鄭的從政生涯，指他2012年入黨後連續6年任執委會成員，包括青年公民主席、副秘書長和政策倡議執委；鄭亦於2015及2019年獲黨支持參選區議會獲勝，2016年立法會選舉排陳淑莊名單第二位。
+
+萬德豪問公民黨是否給予鄭很多機會，鄭同意，但否認是黨鼓勵他修讀（read）法學博士，強調「係我去讀 JD（法學博士）同埋 PCLL（法學專業證書），希望同佢哋有返一個 level ground（水平）」，又指：「我報完，收咗，佢哋先知」，延伸庭的黃之鋒不禁抱頭。萬追問：「即黨支持你？」鄭稱：「有知悉我呢個決定。」萬又問：「黨是否對你好多栽培？」鄭回答：「有畀機會我。」
+
+萬續問鄭是否對黨心存感激，鄭表示：「我對個黨有感激，亦都有唔開心嘅地方」，萬問而他一直跟從黨的立場？鄭指「我有跟隨黨嘅立場，亦都有提出異議」，並同意陳仲衡所指，當其意見不被黨接納，便會跟隨黨的立場。萬最後指，只要鄭一日是黨員，就會跟隨黨的立場？鄭同意。
+
+案件下周一（26日）續審。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
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+---
+layout: post
+title : State Threats Taskforce
+author: RUSI
+date : 2023-06-26 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/BXWhSWi.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "RUSI State Threats Taskforce: “Assessing the Responses”"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_In line with the UK’s Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, RUSI set up a State Threats Taskforce to support the UK and its partners in detecting, understanding and responding to such challenges in February 2023._ _As part of this work, RUSI has held two expert workshops on different aspects of state threats. This report provides an overview of the key themes discussed in the second workshop in May 2023, which focused on the challenges faced by the UK national security architecture in responding to state threats, and potential approaches and actions which might improve the UK’s response._
+
+_The meeting opened with introductions and guidance from the chair, and an initial presentation recapping the findings of the first workshop, held on 9 February 2023. The presentation was used to frame discussions during the opening plenary session, which was followed by three parallel breakout group discussions looking at key challenges and recommendations for policy responses in the areas of central government, cyber security and information operations, and illicit finance. The meeting was concluded with a further plenary session to sum up key findings. As the meeting was conducted under the Chatham House Rule, names and affiliations of participants are not included here. For ease of reference, this report does not provide a direct transcript of the discussions, but an overview of participants’ insights, grouped by theme._
+
+
+### Presentation: Key Findings from Workshop 1
+
+The opening presentation explored the current UK government understanding of state threats, defined as hostile acts, short of war, undertaken by state actors or proxies against the interests of the UK and its allies. It noted that the UK government envisaged 15 types of state threat combining vectors of attack and targeted assets grouped into five categories: threats to people; threats to assets and services; information acquisition; interference; and efforts to shape the international environment. The presentation noted several key findings from the first workshop:
+
+- __Critique of the UK approach:__ Participants had raised general concerns about the ambiguity of the definition of “state threats”, the comprehensiveness of the range of threats identified, and an apparent lack of prioritisation.
+
+- __State actors:__ Participants had noted four primary state actors of concern – Russia, China, Iran and North Korea – which used state agencies and proxies to undertake hostile and/or damaging acts. A number of other states loosely associated with these powers – for example, Syria, Venezuela and Cuba – were also highlighted, as were a number of other less obvious states, such as South Africa. However, it had been observed that levels of hostility, character of intent and capability varied widely. Participants had also noted the potential for damaging, if not explicitly hostile, activity by “non-aligned” states such as India and Brazil, or even friendly states, such as Israel, especially in the development and deployment of cyber capabilities. Overall, there had been a perception that the problem of “state threats” was not simply a clearcut contest between democracies and authoritarian states.
+
+- __Vectors of attack:__ Participants had noted the growing importance of cyber activity, including disruptive cyber operations and information operations, as vectors of attack in their own right and as enablers of other types of attack and campaigns of wider activity. There had been a strong emphasis on the role of criminal proxies in executing state cyber activities, affording them state protection to undertake other forms of criminality such as fraud, theft and ransomware attacks. A further area of concern had been the use of illicit finance as an enabler of political corruption and interference, and as a corrosive force on UK economic security.
+
+- __Targeted assets:__ Participants had confirmed the ongoing importance of the physical safety and security of UK citizens and residents, and the need to protect domestic critical national infrastructure, although it had been emphasised that this needed to be considered from an international perspective in light of UK dependence on global supply chains and undersea infrastructure, such as the telecoms cables in Irish coastal waters, or shared UK/European energy lines.
+
+ Most significantly, however, workshop participants had expressed concerns about the detrimental effect of hostile/and or damaging state activity on political elites and democratic, legal, economic and social processes and cohesion.
+
+- __UK resilience and capabilities:__ Participants in the first workshop had assessed that the UK continued to enjoy significant resilience to state threats, in part as a result of active responses to ongoing strategic challenges such as terrorism, cybercrime, and serious and organised crime. UK intelligence and law enforcement agencies were highly competent and experienced, and structures existed within the UK government to coordinate an effective response, but there had been a concern that the exigencies of the Covid-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine and subsequent economic instability had degraded some of these capabilities and reduced available resources. There had been further concerns about the level of energy, priority and coordination being devoted to state threats in the UK government compared with other security concerns.
+
+In light of these discussions, several key themes emerged as areas for potential response, including: strengthening and coordinating centres in UK government tasked with tackling state threats; dealing with the challenge of political corruption through increased transparency; and developing a wider range of domestic and international partnerships.
+
+
+### Workshop 2: Further Reflections on State Threats
+
+Throughout the second workshop, participants provided further reflections on the threat-related concerns of the first workshop. One of the most persistent issues was how the term “state threats” was to be defined, and whether that should be in a narrow sense, comprising only intentionally hostile acts by state actors or proxies, or more broadly, to include damaging, if not explicitly hostile, activities.
+
+Although there was no settled consensus on this point, the weight of opinion in the workshop suggested that the current challenge posed by state threats was less clear-cut than during the Cold War. Primarily, there were concerns about potentially “over-interpreting” or misreading some states’ actions. While China, Russia and other states undertake hostile acts against the UK and its allies, many of these (espionage, for example) are within the boundaries of acknowledged activity that all states undertake, while some, although damaging to Western interests, are not necessarily intended to be hostile per se, either reflecting the pursuit of a domestic agenda or attempting to reshape international norms. In addition, several participants noted that larger and more capable states of concern such as Russia were chaotic and disorganised in conducting hostile or damaging acts: there was “no master plan” and very often no coherent design to their behaviour, according to one participant.
+
+This perception of a more disorganised threat than during the Cold War was also emphasised with regard to the relations between states; participants did not perceive two distinct blocs, authoritarian and democratic, in dedicated combat with each other. Some coordination and material support between authoritarian states was evident; for example, the supply of North Korean munitions and Iranian drones to support the Russian war effort. There was also some cooperation and knowledge-sharing between authoritarian states in order to avoid Western countermeasures, for example, between Iran and Russia on how to avoid economic and financial sanctions. However, these activities did not necessarily amount to formal alliances. Many of those non-aligned states with authoritarian tendencies that have sympathies for the behaviour of Russia or Iran also want to maintain their links and good economic relationships with Western-oriented democratic capitalist states.
+
+A further area of caution was the problem of attribution. Participants observed that while the UK might assess that certain states, or their proxies, might be behind certain actions, these would be difficult to prove based on the intelligence available (especially in the realm of cyber). In practical terms, all that could be seen was a hostile act and its impact, rather than its origin or intention. This meant that it would be difficult to develop responses that either disrupt or deter such attacks at source, although the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) was beginning to make efforts to use AI to tackle this challenge in collaboration with the private sector.
+
+Given the diversity and ambiguity of the risks posed, whether in terms of origin, intention or coordination, the weight of opinion in the workshop emphasised the importance of the UK being able to develop resilience in the face of the most harmful state-inspired activity. Yet, several participants also stated that a generally defensive posture should not preclude the development and deployment of offensive capacity where the origin and intent of an attack was clearer and its significance more pronounced. Nor should it limit proactive work in the diplomatic sphere to shape the international environment. As several participants noted, although it was important to be able to withstand attacks or damaging activity, this had to be balanced against actions taken to reduce the chances of such attacks occurring in the longer term.
+
+_The following three sections focus on the three parallel breakout room discussions._
+
+
+### UK Government Architecture
+
+Participants noted that as external observers of the UK government, it was difficult to fully understand the organisation of the response to state threats on the basis of the policy statements that had so far been released, or through their own ongoing contacts with government.
+
+However, participants acknowledged a wide range of departmental and agency activity – policy focused, analytical and operational – targeted at different aspects of state threats. Various departments, for example the Cabinet Office, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) and the MoD, were understood to have units focused on developing relevant policy, with the Homeland Security Group at the Home Office holding policy oversight. The Joint State Threats Assessment Team (JSTAT), based at the Security Service, provides all-source intelligence assessments on state threats, feeding these into the Joint Intelligence Organisation (JIO) at the Cabinet Office, alongside existing intelligence streams from the agencies. The UK intelligence community itself has also long been tackling hostile state activity at home and overseas, both offensively and defensively, while the National Crime Agency (NCA) has begun to play an increasingly significant role in combating overseas organised crime groups (OCGs) potentially linked to hostile regimes. On top of these layers of activity, the National Security Council (NSC) and National Security Secretariat (NSS) provide a mechanism for coordinating and prioritising state threats, in theory at least.
+
+Participants further noted that new elements have continued to be added to this infrastructure, such as the National Protective Security Authority (NPSA), which began work in spring 2023. Initiatives such as the National Preparedness Commission are also considering various risks relevant to state threats, such as UK preparedness in the event of a major incident or attack.
+
+#### Challenges: Coordination and Prioritisation
+
+Although activity is taking place across the UK government, participants believed it was less clear that it was of significant magnitude, with sufficient resources or coordination, to support effective delivery. While departments have set up appropriately named state threats units, these still appear to be siloed from other similar units, creating overlaps, wasting resources and generating friction and competition. Workshop participants had no sense of who the ultimate risk owners for state threats might be, or which ministers and officials are accountable for success or failure. There were additional concerns that those departments that are risk owners in the state threats space – the Treasury, for example, in terms of illicit finance and economic security – do not see themselves as such.
+
+Moreover, with the current imperatives to control public finances, participants judged that officials are being incentivised to restructure and rebrand existing work as “state threats” to satisfy a requirement to show activity. As a result, public statements that claim to show the development of policy in the area tend to be communications pieces listing renamed activities, rather than explanations of intended outcomes and supporting strategies. Participants identified a variety of reasons for why this situation has occurred.
+
+1. __Lack of political will and leadership:__ Participants perceived an absence of political leadership and ambition in state threats. Several participants felt that senior ministers have not taken the issue seriously enough, in particular the potential for corruption of political elites, institutions and processes. There has been no strong push from the prime minister nor from an empowered senior cabinet minister to take the issue of state threats seriously and drive coordinated action across departments, as happened with counterterrorism after 9/11. There are indications, several participants felt, that ministers wish to discuss state threats, but do not wish to pay for dealing with them.
+
+2. __Ambiguity and lack of a compelling narrative:__ Participants reiterated previous concerns that as yet the UK government’s approach is hampered by ambiguities on the concept of state threats. In the words of one participant, “it can mean everything, and it can mean nothing”. Whereas the mission in counterterrorism is clear – to stop terrorist attacks – the objectives and aims in tackling state threats are more diffuse and amorphous. Therefore, it is difficult to shape a narrative that would drive strategic action and encourage public support. In the words of another participant, the issue of state threats remains “below the line of public concern”, much in the same way that Islamist extremist terrorism did in the 1990s.
+
+3. __Commercial versus security concerns:__ Participants judged that ministerial unwillingness to take state threats seriously comes in part from an ethos which places commercial concerns above those of national security. The main target is making and saving money for “UK plc”. One participant highlighted a recent speech by Jake Sullivan, US national security advisor, which noted that the requirements of the neo-liberal economic philosophy undermined public goods, and therefore need to be addressed and rebalanced.
+
+4. __Limited skills and resources:__ A further concern among members was an apparent weakening of the required skills, competencies and resources needed to tackle state threats within relevant UK departments and agencies. Several expressed fears that competence and capability are major problems, with not enough focus on the delivery of tangible objectives within and across departments.
+
+5. __Weakening of analysis and assessment:__ One area of particular concern for some participants was the weakening of the UK’s analytical and assessment capabilities, which hampers the government’s capacity to build a convincing intelligence picture around state threats. Despite the existence of JIO, JSTAT and other analytic teams, there was a perception that not enough resources are devoted to analytic effort. Many departments have small analytic capabilities, which are managed “off the side of the desk”, and JSTAT itself was seen as a “poor relation” in comparison to the much larger Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC). One participant noted that when new funds become available, they are “always much more likely to go to those who ‘do’ over those who ‘think’”, leading to much analysis being outsourced to academia. A linked concern was an absence of effective knowledge-management systems and processes on state threats issues both within departments and across UK government.
+
+#### Responses: Enhancing Political Will
+
+Participants argued that a step-change in attitude is required to tackle the state threats issue, and to ensure that the UK government architecture is agile and sufficiently well resourced to do so. There was near universal agreement that political leadership needs to take the issue of state threats more seriously than has been the case. At the same time, there was a recognition that political will cannot be conjured from thin air in the absence of a major crisis – “the political earthquake effect” – and that responsible officials within government, in dialogue with civil society, need to develop a case that combines a political “want” – to tackle state threats – with a set of political “cans”, or actions, that would then lead to a political “must”.
+
+There was no settled view from the workshop participants on how this might happen, but several noted how cyber security had become a greater issue once senior officials “signalled” the importance of the issue from within government to the public via the media and wider civil society engagement, engendering the creation of the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) in 2016.
+
+Others suggested that the public could be engaged through highlighting the risks that state threats, especially external influence and corruption, could play in undermining democracy, a core dimension of UK life highly valued by its citizens. The issue must be felt as a real risk and concern to the lives and livelihoods of individuals and families. A further suggestion was to frame the issue as one where the UK could play an international lead, especially in the Five Eyes community and NATO, which is likely to appeal to ministers as well as the public.
+
+#### Responses: Strengthening the Centre
+
+On the assumption that necessary political will would grow over time, participants suggested areas of activity where the UK government could improve its response:
+
+1. __Tackling corruption risks:__ One of the areas of strongest consensus was the need for the UK’s political leadership to take the issue of state threats seriously, especially with regard to the potential corruption of the political process and the undermining of institutions. There was wide support for greater transparency on the receipt of overseas funding by members of both Houses of Parliament, as well as political parties, think tanks and media outlets. A further suggestion was a refresh of the Nolan Principles on conduct in public life, encouraging all political parties to endorse and support them publicly. Such a refresh would need to highlight the role they play as a barrier to negative external influence, and thus the importance of the Principles to UK national security.
+
+2. __Developing definitions, assessments and strategy:__ As previously discussed, participants agreed that much greater effort was required to clarify the meaning of the term “state threats”, to develop a tailored intelligence picture and map threats and vulnerabilities. These policy elements could then be used to prioritise the harms arising to the UK and its interests, identify risk owners and actions, and structure a cross-government response. Several suggested the utility of the UK Counter-Terrorism Strategy’s (CONTEST) “four Ps framework” (Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare), which created a clear and understandable framework for counterterrorism in the early 2000s. Participants also stressed that using a similar, if not identical, framework would help frame a public strategy that could be shared and internalised by the private sector, civil society and the public.
+
+3. __Re-energising existing governance structures:__ The majority of participants believed that the governance structures necessary to coordinate and prioritise responses to state threats already exist, especially in the Cabinet Office (the NSS and JIO were mentioned by several). It was important therefore not to create new departments and organisations as a substitute for making the current machinery work as intended, as unnecessary changes could prove disruptive. However, several others suggested the need to create a dedicated state threats unit, either in the Cabinet Office or another major department such as the Home Office or FCDO, to help focus and coordinate efforts. Whichever approach is taken, it was agreed that there needs to be a clear and precise recognition of risk ownership and accountability at strategic, operational and tactical levels.
+
+4. __Enhancing institutions and resources:__ There was a common perspective that institutions tackling state threats need to be better resourced to underpin effective action. One area where there was an interest in seeing an uptick in investment was analysis and assessment, with JSTAT and relevant departmental teams being better staffed. As a complement, not an alternative, to an improvement in resources, it was also suggested that analytic functions should develop deeper connections with the wider research and policy communities looking at state threats outside government.
+
+5. __Applying a “whole-of-government” approach:__ Participants observed that while it was probably unnecessary to bring radical change to UK government infrastructure, it is also vital to ensure that all relevant departments and agencies are included at an appropriate level in the crafting and delivering of the state threats response. The role of the Treasury as a risk owner around illicit finance was emphasised by several, as well as the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) and the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT) around cyber and information risks. Other workshop members noted the importance of ensuring that NCA activities against OCGs are fully integrated with relevant operational streams of the intelligence agencies and the military.
+
+6. __Addressing the commerce versus security paradox:__ Several participants suggested that the current implicit hierarchy of concerns in UK government philosophy needs to be addressed. While there was no appetite for the “securitisation” of UK economic, finance or cultural policies, it was felt that there needs to be an explicit acknowledgement that many activities fundamental to an open society are open to abuse from outside, and that when policy decisions are made, the “security angle” must be considered. It was seen as particularly vital that the Treasury sees itself not only as a promoter of UK prosperity, but also as a guarantor of its economic and financial security.
+
+7. __Focusing on resilience but being proactive:__ A recognition of the complexity of the threat, and especially the difficulties posed by understanding the origin and intention of attacks or damaging acts, meant that the primary focus of a state threats response has to be on resilience. Nonetheless, several participants noted that to take a purely defensive posture would not provide any deterrent or punishment, potentially incentivising ongoing hostile or damaging activity. Where intention and origin can be more confidently detected, therefore, the UK needs to ensure it is prepared to take active measures in response. Again, however, such responses would need to be considered within the bounds of what overall international norms and standards of behaviour the UK wishes to encourage. While not constraining the UK government too far, the potential unintended consequences of an excessively offensive response to state threats needs to be factored in.
+
+8. __Adopting a “whole-of-society” approach:__ In tandem with the need for a “whole-of-government” approach, participants stressed the importance of private sector, civil society and public engagement. There was interest in the potential application of the Swedish “Total Defence” model, which encourages businesses, institutions and individuals to take up responsibility for societal defence in partnership with state agencies. Several participants noted synergies here with the development of the NCSC, which led to an open dialogue with the private and public sectors about cyber security, and the development of the Joint Money Laundering Intelligence Taskforce (JMLIT), which has enabled a new intelligence-sharing channel between law enforcement and the financial services sector. One participant suggested the National Security Communications Team at the Cabinet Office could play a leading role in developing a narrative to generate public support.
+
+
+### Cyber Security and Information Operations
+
+Participants noted that cyber security and information operations were discrete topics, the former dealing with intrusions into a network or system to cause disruption and the latter the use of cyberspace for psychological operations, such as disrupting society or influencing elections. As a result, they needed to be treated separately.
+
+#### Challenges: Cyber Security
+
+The perception of workshop participants was that the UK is a global leader in terms of cyber, with a strong narrative of action over the past 30 years. In what one participant described as a “three-stage journey”, the UK has gone from taking the “pain without response” in the 2000s to developing a robust strategy and infrastructure in the 2010s to a more flexible and agile response in the 2020s. Several participants emphasised the important role of the NCSC as a central hub of operational activity against cyber-linked state threats, a leader of public dialogue, and a key player in policy coordination with the NSC, the Government Security Group and DSIT. Within the decision-making infrastructures linking these stakeholders, it was assessed that a clear risk ownership and a functional system for prioritisation of cyber security risks exists.
+
+Participants noted that the private sector is also deeply involved in cyber security partnerships through the NCSC Industry 100 scheme (i100), which supports secondments from the private sector into NCSC, and the Cyber Security Information Sharing Partnership (CiSP), designed to facilitate real-time intelligence sharing between the public and private sectors. The UK government has also sought to drive up cyber security standards in the private sector and civil society through direct advice and awareness campaigns such as NCSC’s Cyber Aware, and the NPSA’s Security Campaigns. It has sought to stimulate a more agile, risk-based approach to communications network resilience with a new regulatory framework set out in the Telecommunications (Security) Act (TSA), which came into force on 1 October 2022. The UK has also played a major role in ongoing international discussions on cyber security standards, and developed world-leading cyber security frameworks, such as the Bank of England’s CBEST threat simulation methodology.
+
+Despite the overall positive assessment on cyber security, however, some participants saw a risk of becoming complacent, with one noting that the UK’s cyber security, while strong so far, is entering a “troubling adolescent phase”. Participants were particularly concerned about the scale and depth of available public sector resources, especially for investigations. As one noted, “the problem is large and not enough people are involved in the response”. There was a risk, therefore, that some lower prioritised risks – potentially including less obvious state threats – might fall off the operational agenda.
+
+There were concerns too that some aspects of cyber security are not as well managed as others. Some noted that cyber-related threats can sometimes be treated in isolation from other vectors of attack, hampering the effectiveness of response. A major concern – voiced by several participants – was that the response to cybercrimes such as fraud are not well integrated into the wider cyber response, given that OCGs linked to hostile state actors are likely to be a part of that threat. It was also felt that local police forces do not have the same level of awareness or private sector engagement as national agencies. In addition, some believed that offensive cyber operations are neither as well resourced nor coordinated as defensive preparation and incident response.
+
+#### Challenges: Information Operations
+
+Participants noted that the publicly available material on the UK’s management of information operations is more limited than for cyber security, although there are several indications of growing activity. In 2018, the MoD created the National Security Communications Unit to counter external information operations but further details have not been reported in Parliament or the media. In February 2019, the House of Commons Committee on Digital, Culture, Media and Sport published its report on disinformation and fake news, which provides recommendations for enhanced private sector responsibilities for tackling disinformation, although these have yet to be actioned by the government. Action has also occurred in the development of offensive information operations; in February 2023, the UK government published “Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations”, recently agreed across NATO, which provides practical guidance for the conduct of information operations. Alongside these public sector initiatives, the government has also been seeking to pass the Online Safety Bill, which would require social media companies to protect children and adults online and features specific powers to deal with terrorist content. Participants suggested that UK government departments and agencies are also working with major social media platforms on information operations on a case-by-case basis.
+
+Nonetheless, the consensus view of workshop participants was that the UK’s response to information operations is well behind that of cyber security. Based on what participants knew, there is limited coordination on information operations across agencies and departments, and engagement with the private sector is much less mature than for cyber security. One of the suggested reasons for this more limited response is the difficulty of measuring impact, disruption and costs from information operations in comparison with cyber attacks, where it is thus easier to encourage private sector involvement.
+
+#### Responses: Public Sector
+
+In light of the broadly supportive assessment of the UK government’s approach to cyber security, the main emphasis of participants was on maintaining the continuity of the current model, which comprises strong government-led coordination and private sector engagement. The creation of a new public institution to tackle cyber, a so-called “NHS of Cyber”, was deemed unnecessary. However, some changes were suggested, including the consolidation of the police response to cybercrime into a unit operating at national level, which would enable its better coordination and integration with other cyber security threats. The UK also still has room to learn from the experiences of overseas partners, especially in the testing of cyber threat simulation methodologies such as the EU’s Threat Intelligence-Based Ethical Red Teaming (TIBER), Australia’s Cyber Operational Resilience Intelligence-Led Exercises (CORIE), Hong Kong’s Intelligence-led Cyber Attack Simulation Testing (iCAST) and Singapore’s Adversarial Attack Simulation Exercises (AASE).
+
+Participants also wished to see a much stronger UK response to information operations underpinned by a clear public strategy and coordination by a lead department such as the Home Office or DSIT, with involvement of the Information Commissioner’s Office and Advertising Standards Agency and NSC oversight. Several suggested the need to widen legalisation to support this, including through an update to the Online Safety Bill that would incorporate challenges around state actor-inspired misinformation.
+
+Participants also showed some interest in exploring the possibility of more proactive measures to deter bad actors in cyberspace. Some were supportive of a US-style approach which would “name and shame” bad actors, and the use of targeted financial sanctions and no-fly bans against state-linked cyber criminals. However, others believed that these efforts were likely to be punitive at best and would likely prompt retaliatory measures against those working in cyber at UK agencies.
+
+#### Responses: Private Sector and Civil Society
+
+Participants saw the private sector as a vital element in the UK’s ongoing response to cyber threats and information operations. On cyber security, there was a wish to see a continuity of approach, with the government mandating standards of cyber resilience through legislation and regulation, direct engagement in knowledge and intelligence sharing, and shared capacity-building efforts. Several participants believed these efforts could be developed further with reform of the 1990 Computer Misuse Act to re-target efforts on issues such as fraud and other economic crimes, enhance intelligence-sharing and enable private sector firms to “hack-back” against those seeking to penetrate and disrupt their systems – already allowed under US law. Some participants further suggested that private sector firms could be encouraged to take out cyber security insurance to protect them from the potential of a major attack. Nonetheless, although participants wished to see the private sector playing a significant burden-sharing role, it was felt that this should not be used as an excuse for public sector agencies to pull back, which could leave gaps in areas where multiple smaller firms had fewer resources, or larger firms saw less of a financial or regulatory requirement to act.
+
+On information operations, by contrast, participants believed that a greater UK government effort is needed to drive action from technology and social media firms on state threats without the need for legislation or regulation. Suggestions included encouraging the development of a state threats-focused industry partnership similar to the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism, founded in 2017 to tackle extremist online content by firms including Microsoft and Facebook, or the promotion of a code of practice along the lines of the International Association of Business Communicators Code of Ethics, which stresses a responsibility to communicate accurate information. Several participants pointed to EU initiatives such as the Code of Practice on Disinformation as a potential model for a voluntary code which would place greater onus on platforms to deter, detect and disrupt misinformation.
+
+However, participants also accepted that whereas the lack of commercial incentives for firms to work closely with government on information operations needs to be addressed, the UK government could not expect technology and social media firms to fall into line, and efforts would be required to develop a business case to encourage their involvement, possibly involving close cooperation on intelligence sharing, investigative coordination and capacity-building. If this did not prove effective, further consideration of legislative and regulatory changes, including potential penalties and enforcement, might be required.
+
+Participants also noted that academia, civil society and the public should be involved in deterring and disrupting information operations. Non-UK initiatives highlighted as potential models that could be emulated included the recently announced European External Action Service’s Information Sharing and Analysis Center, which has developed a platform for sharing information on the spread of online disinformation, and the Finnish digital literacy journey, which trains students to apply critical thinking to online media stories and social media trolls.
+
+#### Responses: International Partnership
+
+Participants also emphasised the need for UK actions to be taken in collaboration with international partners in the Five Eyes community, Europe and beyond. A joint statement by Five Eyes members with Germany and the Netherlands in April 2023, encouraging the private sector to build technology secure by design and default, was noted as a positive example of how the UK could play a role in helping set common standards on cyber security. Another area of proposed collaboration was on overseas cyber capacity-building in areas targeted by Russia and China such as Eastern Europe, East Asia and Southeast Asia. Although there was an expectation that this would require some UK public funding, it was noted that major UK businesses with relevant overseas interests could be encouraged to lead by example. Participants did not see any grounds for cooperation or agreement of standards with potentially hostile actors, and it was also assessed that collaboration with major non-aligned powers such as India remains unlikely for now, given their desire to maintain good geopolitical and economic relationships with some anti-Western states. However, dialogue should continue.
+
+
+### Illicit Finance
+
+Participants noted that the UK has a well-developed framework for tackling different dimensions of illicit finance. As a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the UK is a leading voice in the promulgation of the FATF’s 40 Recommendations, a set of minimum standards in the fights against money laundering, terrorist financing and proliferation finance. The Recommendations place obligations on the financial and other regulated sectors to undertake customer due diligence and issue suspicious activity reports to a national financial intelligence unit (FIU) as preventative measures against financial crime. In the UK, the execution of these obligations is overseen by a range of regulatory bodies, the most important of which is the Financial Conduct Authority. The primary national law enforcement agency with competence for financial crime is the NCA, which also houses the UK’s FIU. The UK also has a public–private partnership on financial crime, the JMLIT, founded in 2015, and its own autonomous national sanctions regime underpinned by a range of legislation including the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018.
+
+#### Challenges: No “Business Case”
+
+Participants noted that while the issue of state threats was touched on by several aspects of the UK’s anti-financial crime regime, the relationship is only implicit. The FATF Recommendations and relevant UK laws and regulations do not explicitly foresee the potential abuse of illicit finance in support of hostile state activity, and therefore regulators and law enforcement have paid the issue little attention. In parallel, public agencies have a weak understanding of the financial dimensions of state threats, and lack sufficient expertise, resources or will to rectify this situation.
+
+Given the absent regulatory obligations around illicit finance and state threats, the private sector is thus largely focused on those areas where it is most at risk of regulatory enforcement action, such as sanctions evasion, and to a lesser extent, the laundering of the proceeds of bribery and corruption. Even in this latter case, however, corruption is seen more through the lens of corrupt kleptocrats using the UK as a home or conduit for their proceeds of crime than as a potential threat to the UK body politic. When firms are required to identify politically exposed persons (PEPs) during customer due diligence, they are expected to do so to clarify financial crime risks rather than identify malign state influences. Concerns about the impact on national economic security of overseas investments from high-risk jurisdictions are also not considered, as this is not an area where UK financial institutions have any significant legal obligations.
+
+Alongside the lack of regulatory imperatives, participants assessed that the private sector does not feel direct moral pressure from the UK government, regulators or agencies to take action on illicit finance linked to state threats. To the extent that there is any interest in the issue, the messages emanating from different parts of the UK public sector were seen as discordant and episodic. Although cases with state threat dimensions have been covered in public–private dialogues, they are not presented as ongoing shared threats, and from the perspective of the private sector, the UK government’s behaviour seemed inconsistent; the willingness of the UK government to allow Yevgeny Prigozhin, head of the Russian paramilitary Wagner Group, to mount a libel action in the UK while subject to UK sanctions was noted by several. As a consequence, the private sector took the view, in the words of one participant, “if the government doesn’t seem to care … why should we?”.
+
+In fact, several participants noted that there were significant disincentives to take action, not least of which would be shutting down commercial opportunities and generating additional costs to monitor and investigate state threats. A further layer of complexity for international financial institutions would be the potential for conflicts of interest in overseas markets which might be areas of concern for the UK government. For some of the larger banks, this would clearly be a constraint in eastern Europe, the Middle East and East Asia. A further barrier to financial institutions taking proactive measures on state threats was also the fear that by taking action they would make themselves regulatory targets as they would be creating a new risk for which they might suffer enforcement action. As a participant noted, the current regime in the UK encouraged regulators to look less at bad actors and more at the intermediaries who could be more easily punished for failure to prevent illicit activities.
+
+A final concern was that, even if financial institutions were prepared or required to take up the issue of state threats, they themselves present a new vulnerability because of the susceptibility to insider threats. Not only could compromised bank staff provide a valuable conduit for information gathering by overseas intelligence services, but they could also offer the potential to exert influence on UK economic and financial policymaking. Even without direct private sector access to secret intelligence, there are already anxieties about the private sector acting as the “soft underbelly” or “backdoor” for malign activity; for example, one participant expressed concerns about the NCA’s decision to share typological and strategic intelligence openly with the private sector on Russian sanctions evasion techniques in 2022, which they judged could be used by evaders to work around any new countermeasures.
+
+#### Responses: Obligations and Incentives
+
+There was wide agreement among participants in the workshop that the UK government must find ways to engage the regulated private sector in the management of state threat risks linked to illicit finance, but without causing serious disruption to financial stability. There was some interest in clarifying and extending legislation to create new obligations on illicit finance linked to state threats: one suggestion was to identify trading in influence as a predicate financial crime offence. But overall, there appeared to be little appetite for imposing significant new legal and regulatory obligations. Nor was there a desire to see the UK financial sector securitised to the extent that it has material effects on private sector profitability. Therefore, participants wished to see the private sector incentivised rather than forced to engage on state threats. Several approaches to achieving this were discussed:
+
+- __Clarifying and unifying UK government engagement:__ Even under the current regulatory and law enforcement agency arrangements, there was a perception among participants that the UK government and its agencies speak to the regulated private sector in many conflicting voices, even via shared mechanisms such as the JMLIT. Dialogue on financial crime and security risks would thus benefit from a more unified, coordinated and consistent UK government approach and narrative. Participants also felt that, on the specific issue of state threats, engagement would also benefit from more consistent and wholehearted involvement of the UK intelligence agencies.
+
+- __Articulating a narrative around reputation and responsibility:__ Several participants noted that there have already been conversations between the UK government and the financial services sector which led to the latter’s active involvement in tackling issues such as human trafficking and the illegal wildlife trade, based more on reputational risks, ethical concerns and wider corporate social responsibility, than immediate commercial imperatives. Others noted that the private sector is likely to respond if it is clear that state threats are a national priority, or a wider concern of leading Western economies. However, it was also agreed that costs and benefits could not be ignored and that the UK government would need to “incentivise the upside”, perhaps by stressing the value of gaining insights from engagement or creating moral capital with regulators, while “de-risking the downside”, by noting the long-term potential effects of declining reputation on share price, or the future risk of regulatory change if voluntary actions were not taken, or the wider impact on the UK’s reputation and credit ratings.
+
+- __Clarifying risk appetite and providing guidance:__ Because of the potential tensions between commercial concerns and the economic and financial security agendas, participants observed that the government would also have to provide a sense of risk appetite and “red lines” to drive business-level action, underpinned by clear guidance on how to engage with potential transactions and relationships where there might be national security sensitivities. Such guidance would need to make it apparent that government does not wish to prevent commercial ties with less friendly countries per se, but only stop hostile state actors from abusing the financial system for malign reasons. One suggested area where the government could introduce relevant private sector guidance quickly was the management of so-called “insider risks”, where employees and/or former employees use access or knowledge to damage an organisation.
+
+- __Using existing machinery for cooperation:__ Participants stressed that engagement with the regulated private sector on state threats needs to be an “official conversation”, and not conducted surreptitiously or as a bilateral informal discussion between businesses and UK government agencies. Several noted that JMLIT could provide a framework for such a conversation, although it was accepted that its remit, structures and membership would need to be extended to enable effective and sustained cooperation. Processes and procedures would need to be put in place to allow the sharing of appropriately classified assessments and intelligence with the private sector, emphasising the need for the UK government to reform current vetting channels for private sector staff. Correspondingly, both public and private agencies would need to review the security and efficiency of current processes for sharing financial data.
+
+- __Starting with a pilot project:__ Participants agreed that to get substantive engagement moving once the right enablers were in place, JMLIT or any alternative mechanism would need to start with discrete areas of well-defined cooperation to prove the concept. An area suggested, based on the concerns of many participants in the workshop, was to look at the flow of illicit overseas funds into the UK political process. It was judged that this would be one touch point where there would be genuine synergy between intelligence and assessment available to agencies with the data and financial analysis open to the private sector. It was further suggested that academia and think tanks might be involved in more strategic and less sensitive aspects of this dialogue, potentially helping to provide context and assessment of the shared intelligence.
+
+While participants expressed broad support for closer collaboration between the public and private sectors on illicit finance linked to state threats, several also noted that it was important to consider the potential unintended consequences of action. Several participants believed it was vital that the focus remained on the bad actors rather than the financial services sector itself. If this did not occur, there were concerns that the sector would become more guarded in how it engaged. In addition, there were concerns that a public recognition of improved collaboration might drive illicit activities into less well-resourced areas of the private sector, forcing the need for public sector engagement with a much wider number of smaller businesses. This would bring its own challenges for sharing sensitive intelligence and assessments, necessitating the need to calibrate public exposure of levels of cooperation.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+The discussion across the plenary sessions and breakout groups was diverse, and as several participants noted, could only tackle a limited number of aspects of the response to state threats. As one participant observed, the focus on issues such as cyber security and illicit finance tended to ignore more traditional vectors of hostile state activity, such as espionage via human sources, or the use of diaspora communities as tools of overseas state action. Nonetheless, given the current ubiquity of cyber and illicit finance as enablers of a variety of state threats, it was judged appropriate that they were prioritised in the short time available and indeed many of the discussions around these issues also had wider relevance to other potential vectors of attack.
+
+At the conclusion of the second workshop, the chair and participants noted several persistent themes that had recurred across both workshops. And although not providing a detailed agenda for UK government action as yet, they did indicate the broad philosophical underpinning for future recommendations:
+
+- __The need to clarify and understand the threat:__ It remained unclear to many in the workshop how the UK government understands the term “state threats”, and as a result, official thinking remains ambiguous. Clarity is required, and, even if a narrow definition is chosen, the UK government needs to ensure that other linked concerns, such as indirect and damaging state activity, also receive a suitable policy response.
+
+- __The need to give security concerns their due.__ Consequently, the UK government needs to re-evaluate its thinking about issues of national security and the potential vulnerabilities of an open society. In the years since the end of the Cold War, the UK has increasingly prioritised commerciality over security. While there was no appetite in the workshop to see the country become a “garrison state”, it was agreed that security concerns require greater weight in policy- and decision-making.
+
+- __The need to face up to the risk to democracy:__ As part of this reassessment of attitudes, it was further agreed that the UK needs to confront the potential risk to its democracy and open society, if sustained action is not taken soon. There was a persistent anxiety across the workshops that UK processes and institutions are being slowly corroded by malign and damaging external influences, intentional and otherwise, and that this has to be addressed urgently.
+
+- __The need for coherent and sustained action in government:__ All participants concurred that this clearer view of the threat and potential dangers to the UK necessitates a more coherent, coordinated and sustained approach from the UK government. In no area was there a sense that this required radical reform of most of the machinery or institutions of government, but rather an infusion of energy and purpose, and the better integration of some areas of activity (for example, cybercrime and information operations) into the overall UK approach. High-level political will and buy-in are essential.
+
+- __The need to communicate the threat with clarity and consistency:__ The nature of the threat and the harms faced by the UK need to be articulated clearly and consistently to the private sector, civil society and the public. At present, there is still a mood outside government that state threats are happening elsewhere, and that the UK is insulated from these issues by virtue of geography. However, while not seeking to generate panic, UK citizens need to be disabused of this view by sober public messaging similar to that used in Scandinavian countries.
+
+- __The need to engage beyond government:__ Workshop members recognised that although the UK government will have to take the lead in tackling state threats, it will not be able to do so without wider societal engagement. Businesses, civil society institutions and the public will need to be encouraged, incentivised and, in some instances, obliged to respond constructively to the new public messaging.
+
+- __The need to take a consistent international approach.__ Participants noted that while some of the issues facing the UK are distinct, most are also being faced by friends and allies. The UK should therefore not seek to act alone and should engage in cooperative dialogues with partners in the Five Eyes community, Europe and beyond. These dialogues should look not only toward direct cooperation, shared standards and, where appropriate, burden-sharing, but also to pool knowledge and best practice where states have developed effective responses. Regardless of the difficult geopolitical environment, moreover, participants stressed that the UK should continue to engage with a wide range of non-aligned states on these issues, seeking to encourage compliance with accepted international standards, even in discouraging circumstances.
+
+---
+
+__The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)__ is the world’s oldest and the UK’s leading defence and security think tank.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-26-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-73.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-26-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-73.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第 73 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-06-26 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 官問楊岳橋否決財案「莊嚴承諾」是否「用完即棄」 鄭達鴻：環境有變未必要實踐
+- 彭卓棋稱想於內地營商、曾被笑「大灣棋」 官：想告知法庭你不反政府、不反共？
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（26日）踏入審訊第73天。前公民黨區議員鄭達鴻今在盤問下重申，不認同黨無差別否決預算案的立場，而他從無向黨或選民透露有意申豁免跟黨立場投票。法官問及，時任公民黨黨魁楊岳橋曾提及否決預算案是「莊嚴承諾」，但對鄭達鴻來說是否「用完即棄」？鄭稱是「選舉嘅承諾」，又指《國安法》生效後實際環境改變，黨亦「盡量做一啲事情令到自己成個主張係合法」，環境有變時不一定要實踐承諾。
+
+法官追問政綱提及罷免特首如何合法，又指《基本法》雖賦予權力，但不代表可以任意或無差別使用，鄭重申是要求特首就社運問責。此外，鄭今亦表示與區諾軒不算好友，法官問為何區會在獄中寫信給鄭，且明顯是向他提供法律意見，鄭表示不清楚。鄭今完成7天作供，續由下一名被告彭卓棋作供。
+
+#### 鄭同意從無向黨或選民透露有意申豁免 認不容易但郭榮鏗投票前始申請亦成功
+
+鄭達鴻今續接受控方盤問，他確認，他於初選提名表格的政綱、公民黨街站、Facebook 專頁帖文、初選論壇、7月初派發的選舉單張等，均曾提及以否決預算案爭取五大訴求。主控萬德豪指鄭回覆選舉主任提問時亦沒提不會否決預算案，惟法官李運騰指若當時選舉主任沒這樣問，鄭便不會這樣答，陳慶偉亦指他們知道鄭的回覆，萬指會留待陳詞。
+
+
+▲ 鄭達鴻
+
+鄭盤問下續同意，從沒告知黨他不會跟隨黨立場，亦從沒告知選民或黨，他有意於否決預算案時申請豁免跟隨黨立場投票，及若被逼否決財案會退黨。法官陳仲衡問，以鄭當時在論壇、街站和 Facebook 上的發言，他當時認為申請豁免機制會容易嗎？鄭稱不會，因為進入選舉期就要跟隨黨立場，但指郭榮鏗就任命終院首席法官張舉能的議案申請豁免時，「都係喺（2020年）6月投票嗰一刻之前先講。」
+
+陳仲衡即指，控方早前已指出郭榮鏗和鄭達鴻的分別，即鄭於參選前已有意申請該機制，但郭並不是。鄭指認為無分別，因在3月25日記者會楊岳橋稱會否決任命首席法官的議案時，郭榮鏗「正正喺（楊岳橋）隔離」。李運騰指楊是談及下一個任期的事，鄭同意，但指從郭榮鏗最終贊成該議案的理由，「佢係從根本地就算有35+、冇35+，喺（2020年）7月前甚至喺9月之後，佢都係不會反對（首席法官任命議案）。」翻查資料，郭榮鏗當時就議案投贊成票，其他公民黨員則投棄權票。
+
+#### 官問楊岳橋「莊嚴承諾」否決財案是否「用完即棄」 鄭稱屬「選舉承諾」
+
+李運騰續問，楊岳橋曾兩次提及否決預算案是「莊嚴承諾」，但對鄭達鴻來說，這個莊嚴承諾是「用完即棄（used and dumped）」、視乎情況才實踐的？陳志全微笑。鄭指「我會認為嗰個係一個選舉嘅承諾」，而且6月30日《國安法》生效後，「其實實際環境都改變咗，個黨都盡量做一啲事情令到自己成個主張係合法」。李追問，即「莊嚴承諾」其實不是一個承諾，若環境有變，不一定要實踐？鄭答「係」。
+
+陳慶偉續指，鄭稱公民黨在《國安法》生效後嘗試令主張看來合法，換另一個角度，其實也是令主張看來「不是不合法」？鄭回應：「我會認為佢事實上，或者睇落都係令到成個黨嘅立場係合法。」
+
+#### 官質疑不能無差別用權罷免特首 鄭重申要求行政長官為社運問責
+
+陳慶偉續問，政綱提及罷免時任特首林鄭月娥，如何看來合法？鄭重申是根據《基本法》第73條的條文。陳指，「但你也要有理由才能用第73條，不能只是說想用就用。你可能有《基本法》賦予的權力，但不代表可以任意（arbitrarily）或無差別地（indiscriminately）用那個權力。」鄭同意，解釋因此動用第73條的理由，就是「要求行政長官為社會運動問責」。
+
+陳指簡言之即是回應五大訴求，並指經修訂的政綱仍離不開五大訴求，只是無明確表明否決預算案，而是用其他字眼避免《國安法》風險。鄭重申，「五大訴求係嗰陣時好多人嘅訴求」，但新政綱「唔淨止係五大訴求」，亦有提及為港人爭取便利。
+
+#### 官質疑控方重複發問 鄭稱採納最溫和立場從無提否決一切議案
+
+萬德豪其後再指，公民黨曾作莊嚴承諾否決預算案迫政府回應五大訴求，而鄭代表黨參選卻稱無意否決預算案，是對選民的背叛，他是否同意。惟法官陳慶偉在萬發問時多次稱「yes, next」，並指認為鄭已答過很多次，就是會視乎實際情況，而該承諾只是當時採用的「政治語言」。
+
+萬再指，鄭曾稱需要黨支持參選、亦望獲得黨支持，陳慶偉打斷說重複發問並沒有意義，「我們不是陪審團，我們會看證據」，陳仲衡亦着萬德豪直接問問題，指他們對證據已很熟悉。
+
+萬最後指，無論黨立場如何，鄭為獲得黨支持參選，均會跟隨黨立場？鄭稱「我會跟隨黨我認為係合法嘅立場」。陳仲衡問他就35+有否偏離黨立場，鄭表示7月前黨立場「最少係否決財政預算案」，「有啲其他人講否決一切議案，但我從來都會揀最溫和嘅立場去 adopt，冇講過否決一切。」
+
+#### 鄭否認與其他被告串謀顛覆國家政權 重申視乎實際情況審視財案
+
+萬最後指，鄭與本案其他被告串謀取得立會過半，無差別否決預算案以迫使政府回應五大訴求，意圖顛覆國家政權，鄭一律不同意。陳仲衡追問，鄭當時是否認為「無差別」否決預算案是合法？鄭答「係」，但他個人不同意，亦不同意當時黨的立場和口徑，亦認為成功取得立會過半是「非常不可能」。
+
+陳續指，而若成功取得過半，鄭便會打算「跳船」，申請豁免跟隨黨立場投票或退黨？鄭稱「我會睇實際情況」，重申「無論如何，財政預算案都必然會做出來，冇人會阻止佢，所以去到嗰一刻有一份咁嘅嘢出咗嚟，我冇可能唔睇，再去作出衡量」。
+
+#### 鄭稱15助理可登入電腦、無印象看過彭卓棋單張 靠助理搜資料擬「論壇天書」
+
+辯方資深大律師潘熙其後進行覆問。就控方早前以鄭達鴻辦公室手提電腦內搜得的彭卓棋單張發問，鄭表示初選期間自己及助理也可登入電腦，而當時他共有7名全職及8名實習助理，延伸庭有被告聞後嘩然。鄭指自己無為意電腦內有該單張的檔案，亦不知誰人將檔案存入。
+
+
+▲ 彭卓棋
+
+法官陳仲衡指，但鄭競選期間應閱讀及了解其他候選人的選舉政綱。鄭表示應該要，但實際操作上，會由其助理及選舉經理閱讀，再為他制定（formulate）「論壇天書」，他不記得有否看過彭的單張，助理亦沒為他簡報過其他人政綱。李運騰追問，故鄭在辯論時不知道其他人的政綱？鄭解釋其助理及選舉經理就搜集到的資料，製造有機會攻擊或防守的位置，他會閱讀相關資料，但事實上無可能確認知道所有人的問題。
+
+潘熙其後展示「論壇天書」，顯示就「攻擊」一欄下列有其他候選人的名字，包括彭卓棋，鄭確認是一些有機會問彭的問題，「我都係跟返本論壇天書畀我嘅資料」就其立場準備回應。
+
+#### 鄭稱與區諾軒不算好友僅工作關係 不清楚為何區獄中寫信給他
+
+潘熙其後展示同一電腦搜得、彭卓棋與區諾軒有關港島投4票的對話截圖，鄭確認是區諾軒傳給他的截圖。法官陳慶偉問鄭達鴻是否區諾軒的好友（good pal），鄭稱「不算是，只有工作關係」。陳慶偉追問，那為何區諾軒會在獄中寫信給鄭，而且明顯是在提供法律意見，林卓廷等發笑。鄭表示不清楚，同意法官指他是「突然（out of the blue）」收到信件，而他在2021年1月6日被捕後從來沒有與區諾軒以書信聯絡。
+
+#### 鄭同意與鄒家成就共識理解不同 但認為無需問區諾軒有關提名表格共識及目的
+
+另在陳慶偉提問下，鄭表示以其理解，港島區協調會僅達成6點共識，但不包括運用否決權。陳續指，但鄒家成於「墨落無悔」表明「協調會議已取得共識的共同綱領」，明顯地運用否決權是其中一項共識，鄭指他當時不知道亦不同意。
+
+陳慶偉續指，提名表格列明「我確認支持和認同由戴耀廷及區諾軒主導的協調會議共識，包括民主派35+公民投票計劃及其目標」，但似乎鄭認為的共識，與鄒家成指的共識有別，鄭同意。陳慶偉問，那他有否問區諾軒何謂共識和目標？鄭稱沒有，對方亦無向他解釋。
+
+陳續問，兩個共識明顯不同，為何鄭沒有查詢？鄭解釋，「因為我好清晰港島區嘅共識就係嗰六點。」陳再問，鄭是否無視鄒及公民黨的說法，只單純依賴自己的理解？鄭表示「靠我出席協調會議嗰陣時嘅理解」，又同意要致電或傳訊息予區諾軒查詢並不困難，但認為沒有這個需要。
+
+#### 鄭稱議員可用《立法會（權力及特權）條例》權力 要求調查警察濫權濫捕
+
+此外，法官李運騰早前質疑，公民黨一方面要求調查，但尚未有結果已倡議彈劾，鄭指是據《基本法》第73條賦予的權力提出。潘熙今引第73條條文：「如立法會全體議員的四分之一聯合動議，指控行政長官有嚴重違法或瀆職行為而不辭職，經立法會通過進行調查，立法會可委托終審法院首席法官負責組成獨立的調查委員會，並擔任主席。調查委員會負責進行調查，並向立法會提出報告。如該調查委員會認為有足夠證據構成上述指控，立法會以全體議員三分之二多數通過，可提出彈劾案，報請中央人民政府決定。」鄭確認是指上述權力。
+
+至於新政綱提到「全力調查及追究警隊濫權及濫暴罪行」，潘熙問這方面的調查權力有何法律基礎，鄭表示以其理解，其中一個途徑也是運用第73條，而立法會亦有調查權，但他忘記是哪一條文。潘熙遂問是否與第382章《立法會（權力及特權）條例》有關，遭陳仲衡打斷問：「你是否將答案餵給證人？（“You are feeding the witness with the answer?”）」，最後鄭主動補充：「Powers and Privileges Ordinance（權力及特權條例）係立法會議員經常想使用嘅一樣嘢。」
+
+#### 鄭達鴻完成7天作供 楊雪盈無辯方案情
+
+潘熙覆問時，亦再重複陳仲衡的問題，問鄭當時是否認為容易申請豁免跟黨立場投票。鄭稱當選前不認為可行，但當選後「當大家都係立法會議員，喺同一個 level ground（水平）底下，我就有機會可以申請成功」。惟陳仲衡指這並非他的問題，指鄭當選前無權就預算案投票，根本無需申請該機制。
+
+潘熙一度問鄭達鴻是否誤解了法官問題，陳仲衡指潘熙若打算問，風險自負。潘熙休庭後，表示沒有進一步問題，亦不會傳召其他證人。鄭達鴻完成作供，從證人席後方取回背包，微笑步回被告欄。
+
+
+▲ 楊雪盈（左）
+
+代表楊雪盈的大律師表示，楊不會作供，亦不會傳召辯方證人。代表彭卓棋的大律師盧敏儀稱彭擬作供，審訊下午續。
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（26日）踏入審訊第73天。前南區區議員彭卓棋今午開始作供，指自己大學時創業，2017年成立「香港青年創業聯盟」，曾辦活動推廣粵港澳大灣區創業；其名下公司亦曾在內地註冊19個商標，直言大灣區創業優惠和機遇較香港大，想在內地做生意，又自言初選期間曾「畀人笑我係『大灣棋』」。法官李運騰指，彭似乎想告知法庭他並非反政府和反對共產黨，彭回應望法庭全面知道其心路歷程。
+
+彭又表示，參選立法會的初心，是望在政策層面推動香港青年創業，而他當選後不會無差別否決預算案。彭又表示，於2020年3月在前灣仔區議員李永財邀請下，首次與戴耀廷和區諾軒見面談及初選，並在法官追問下指視自己為泛民主派，而「我喺5月、6月嗰時就視自己為本土派」。
+
+#### 彭卓棋稱喜愛中國文化及時事 中文中史獲5**、大學修政治及歷史
+
+鄭達鴻今早完成7天作供，下午由同參選港島區初選、時任南區區議員的彭卓棋作供，他身穿西裝、以基督教宣誓，由辯方大律師盧敏儀主問。彭表示於1994年出生，上周二（20日）剛過29歲生日。就其教育程度，盧敏儀展示彭的中學文憑試成績單，多名被告發笑和議論紛紛，彭表示：「我喺中學時代比較鍾意中國文化同時事，亦都多謝母校嘅栽培，我喺中文、中國歷史同通識教育有幸攞到5**」，余慧明掩嘴發笑。
+
+彭供稱，中學畢業後入讀香港大學社會科學系，主修政治及公共行政，副修歷史，現正於中文大學修讀行政人員工商管理碩士課程（EMBA）。彭指自己於大三開始創業，做補習社、賣衫和市場推廣；畢業不久與港大同學「膽粗粗試吓搞香港自己嘅品牌」，2017年參與年宵售出全部產品，「我當時都同今日一樣，我相信香港嘅品牌係可以嘅。」
+
+
+▲ 彭卓棋
+
+#### 彭稱2017年成立「香港青年創業聯盟」 推廣大灣區創業
+
+彭卓棋續於2017年6月15日成立「香港青年創業聯盟」，為該公司的董事，於初選期間亦有營運。他解釋聯盟的宗旨，是望團結一批對營商或創業有興趣的青年人，並會舉行講座和創業比賽；亦會在社交平台宣傳創業資訊，「特別係粵港澳大灣區」，因當時很多年青人對創業非常有興趣，但不知如何創業，「而大灣區係一個選項。」
+
+辯方展示聯盟 Instagram 帳戶一則2018年的帖文，提及「財政預算案 點幫你？」，並介紹寬免企業登記費的計劃。彭解釋很多時預算案會有政府資助的「糖果」，但營商人士並不知道，故望作宣傳讓商界善用。
+
+法官陳仲衡一度問，其公司屬於哪個功能界別？彭指當時無想過，因「我唔係話一啲搵到好多錢嘅營商者」。陳澄清不是問他會否參選，而是問其選民身份，彭回答「唔係好清楚」，指成為功能界別選民有很多要求及門檻，但其公司業務並非要「搵錢、營商」，性質為非牟利公司。
+
+#### 彭稱初選期間被笑是「大灣棋」、但亦獲邀任民政局資助活動導師
+
+被問外界對彭卓棋在「香港青年創業聯盟」工作的評價，彭指「有認同亦有批評」，解釋「當時我選初選嘅期間，畀人笑我係『大灣棋』」，陳志全等發笑。彭指其工作「亦都有讚賞嘅」，辯方續展示多張聯盟的活動相片、海報及獎狀，彭指他2018或19年曾獲邀任民政事務局資助的「18區公民教育活動資助計劃」工作坊的導師；亦曾邀澳門大學創業學會來港交流，促進兩地年青人對大灣區創業的合作，並曾在香港城市大學和浸會大學辦講座，進行大灣區創業分享。
+
+#### 彭公司曾於內地註冊19商標 望獲政府資助在內地做生意
+
+辯方後展示彭名下公司於2020年4至9月，在中國內地註冊的19個商標註冊證，彭確認共花約6萬至7萬元人民幣申請，解釋「創業一定要係商標行先」、商標是做品牌的「命根」，而他推廣大灣區創業，要「自己走一次流程」才有說服力向會員示範如何申請；其生意與預算案也有關係，望能透過獲得商標註冊，申請由預算案撥款的企業支援計劃「BUD專項基金」。
+
+法官陳慶偉關注，註冊證顯示商標由「黑木」公司申請，問彭有否實際做生意。彭指有，指公司於他2016年讀書時已創立，會賣衫、幫人做市場推廣和設計等，將一些品牌放在獨有平台賣廣告，如「KOL business」，在2017至2018年每個月約有十多二十萬收入，亦有報稅。
+
+#### 官問是否想表示不反政府不反共 彭稱想法庭全面知其「心路歷程」
+
+李運騰續問，彭卓棋的生意是否主要在大灣區？彭稱「未係，想係」，指其生意當時主要在香港，但想擴至大灣區，「坦白講，大灣區創業嘅優惠同機遇係比香港大嘅」；並解釋要去內地發展就要得到政府資助，而「條件就係畀政府見到你有呢一啲嘅傾向或者計劃打算去內地發展」。李問，所以彭當時是否真心（sincerely）想在內地做生意？彭稱：「係⋯⋯係想喺內地做生意嘅。」
+
+李運騰續攤手笑指，彭談及上述所有的原因，是想告知法庭他不反政府、不反共？彭答「我想全面啲畀法庭知道我個心路歷程，我都知道係⋯⋯」，惟李運騰打斷並着辯方加快主問進度，指上述全部只是背景，盧敏儀表示明白，稱被告讓法庭知道其心路歷程屬重要。
+
+而就彭卓棋在初選提名表格填上職業為「企業家」和「區議員」，彭笑言當時雖並非很成功的創業家，但相信「創業家精神」。
+
+#### 彭稱參選因想推廣香港青年創業、不論崗位想入政府實踐 不會無差別否決
+
+彭卓棋於2019年當選南區（赤柱及石澳）區議員，於2020年1月開始任期。彭表示，他當選區議員後已有心競逐立法會，因「發覺好多區議會嘅問題唔可以喺區議會嘅層面解決」，「一定要拎上立法會先可以傾到」，如赤柱塞車問題牽涉整個港島區的路政規劃；另一方面，彭指他參選的「初心」是望在立法會推動香港青年創業，因在政策層面才可大範圍推廣，形容是其「夢想」，「想喺立法會層次體現。」李運騰指彭於同年6月報名參與初選，關注他任區議員多久後有此念頭，彭指「唔係好耐，好短時間㗎咋」。
+
+盧敏儀問，那彭若當選，推廣香港品牌和生意會否影響他如何考慮財政預算案？彭稱會，指會留意預算案相關資助的金額、門檻和申請程序，「有一籃子考慮。」盧再問，若初選是有關無差別否決預算案，彭會同意嗎？彭稱「我唔會不予區別嘅，我會一併考慮（財案內容與優劣）」。
+
+被問其志向是否不限於做生意，彭重提法官關注他何時有意參選立會，解釋準確而言他是想入政府的單位實踐理念，不論是立法會議員或任何部門，總之需要有個位置讓他將抱負發展。辯方續展示彭2019年初就政府「青年委員自薦計劃」的自薦短片，彭自薦加入博物館諮詢委員會。彭指自己2018和2019年連續兩年申請該計劃均失敗，盧敏儀問他在該次失敗有何經歷，彭稱：「接受囉，只能夠，繼續努力去增值自己。因為人哋唔收得你，一定有原因嘅」，林卓廷發出笑聲。
+
+#### 彭稱曾跨黨派倡石澳石礦場建大型水上活動中心 獲施政報告接納
+
+辯方續就彭卓棋的區議員工作發問，並展示彭的政綱單張和區議會紀錄等。彭表示，區議會雖是諮詢架構，但也有撥款權，區議員有權就地區小型工程撥款及社區參與撥款決定如何運用。彭就任時亦曾提出要維修情人橋、巴士站和卜公碼頭，指需與政府部門磋商，涉很多「據理力爭」的過程，但該些項目均在他被捕後得以落實；他亦曾支持政府和區議會各出60萬讓低收入家庭兒童課外閱讀，及政府防疫基金擴至中小企和增聘人手公布檢疫數字等。
+
+此外，彭卓棋亦曾任南區經濟、發展及規劃事務委員會副主席，司馬文則是主席，彭指該委員會負責收集民情讓政府官員審視，若獲採納會在施政報告或預算案推行。彭續指，當時許多南區居民因疫情失業，故想到利用南區的「品牌特色」，即「優美嘅海洋啦，山啦」，進行經濟活動舒緩短期失業情況；而當時石澳石礦場丟空已久，他遂與南區區議員跨黨派提議程，建議政府興建大型水上活動中心，「咁樣就唔會浪費咗呢個大咕窿。」
+
+
+▲ 已復修的石澳石礦場的航空照片
+
+彭形容該議案「係我當時好開心嘅一個議案」，他一當選後每兩三星期都會「努力諗點樣去做」，約見相關政府部門、建立互信；而教他「好深刻」的是特首於2020年施政報告第111段接納他們的意見，「都感謝政府接納我哋嘅建議，喺施政報告度體現」。被問當時考慮什麼，彭稱是「對市民有冇好處啦，或者幫到社會」，並指初選沒有改變他對區議會議案的支持。彭並指他參加初選後，司馬文從來沒有說他不是為該規劃事務委員會利益行事，亦沒反對他任副主席。
+
+#### 彭稱視自己為泛民主派 於5至6月則視為本土派
+
+就彭卓棋參與初選的經過，他指自己第一次和戴耀廷和區諾軒見面，是大約於2020年3月、協調會議舉行前，於李永財議員辦事處與李一同和二人見面，解釋當時他想參選立法會，並從李永財口中得知區及戴想與有意競選立法會的潛在候選人見面，於是出席。
+
+法官陳仲衡即指，但區及戴只想見泛民主派候選人，並非所有候選人；彭回答指，因此其實是李永財直接邀請自己出席，而李亦有興趣參選立法會，提議「不如一齊去聽吓」。陳仲衡追問，那彭是否視自己為泛民主派？彭表示「都可以」，經追問下才回答「係」。
+
+李運騰問，那彭會否形容自己為本土派？彭起初回答「當時我未正式真係選擇去選立法會⋯⋯」，惟李打斷並重複問題，彭才回答：「我喺5月、6月嗰時就視自己為本土派。」
+
+#### 彭稱3月與戴耀廷區諾軒首見面 無透露有意出選惟認有討論初選投票方式
+
+就會面內容，陳慶偉問彭當時有否告知兩人自己有意參選，彭稱當時「未表露有意定或無意，因為我想聽吓佢哋講乜」。陳續引區諾軒證供，指彭當時關注初選使用電子或紙張投票，問彭若沒透露對參選感興趣，又為何會談及相關議題？彭同意有說過，指若他決定參選，「電子投票對我係有利嘅」，但「嗰時我未決定心志一定會參加，因為選立法會要好多資源」。
+
+陳慶偉追問，投票牽涉較多支出，而進行民意調查的支出則較少？彭同意並補充指，雖然他沒在席上表露一定會出選，但他答應與戴及區見面，「可能都係某種程度上暗示我會出選。」
+
+#### 彭稱獲李永財邀請出席首次港島協調會 後獲區諾軒戴耀廷電話號碼
+
+李運騰問，是否因彭卓棋出席了首次會面，故獲邀出席首次港島區協調會議？彭同意，並指是獲李永財邀請出席協調會，解釋與戴見面後，曾與李討論若真的參選，兩人應該合作，因此最後彭名單上有不同人。彭在法官追問下，指李沒有政治聯繫，但有一個社區組織。
+
+彭續指，會面上沒有與戴耀廷及區諾軒交換電話號碼，但其後從不同途徑得到兩人號碼——其中區是南區前區議員和前民主黨成員，他相信在3月之後，在處理區議會事務時經一名民主黨黨員取得區的號碼；至於戴的號碼，則是戴6月中至尾成立協調會議的 WhatsApp 群組後，彭從通訊表找到。
+
+#### 彭稱無直接聯絡戴耀廷 所有初選訊息均透過李永財獲得
+
+在李運騰提問下，彭表示印象中3月26日至7月初選前曾出席3至4個港島協調會議。被問期間如何與其他參選人溝通，彭指李永財與區諾軒比較熟悉，「佢哋一齊踢波」，因此一般會由李直接找區；但區亦曾向他發 WhatsApp 訊息，即鄭達鴻作供時曾展示二人討論投票的截圖。李運騰問對話是否於5月左右發生，彭指無法臆測，因截圖寫着「今天」，但內容提及不可投全票、要投單票，故深信應是港島協調會議尾聲時區傳給他。
+
+彭最後指，於3月至7月期間沒有直接聯絡過戴耀廷，但曾經直接聯絡區諾軒，致電他請教如何處理南區區議會區務。李運騰問，彭有否與區討論初選事宜，彭指沒有，但在初選前區有一次曾約他吃飯，惟具體日期卻不記得。最後彭確認，有關初選及協調會議的訊息，全部都是透過李永財獲得。
+
+
+▲ 李永財（資料圖片）
+
+案件明早續審。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-27-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-74.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-27-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-74.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..97da778f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-27-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-74.md
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第 74 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-06-27 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 彭卓棋認「扮黃」討好選民、提「攬炒」僅屬選舉語言 官問何不加入民建聯
+- 彭卓棋稱《國安法》後派爛單張以示放棄政綱 官質疑屬「抵抗」
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（27日）踏入審訊第74天。前南區區議員彭卓棋繼續作供，表示參選初心是重振香港品牌，但當時社會氣氛「冇人理」，故為爭取「最黃」的初選選民支持，於選舉單張和政綱提及「攬炒」、「重組警隊」、「劣質的中國東江水」等激進的「選舉語言」。彭承認自己為討好選民「扮得比實際上更黃」，法官陳慶偉問他為何不加入民建聯，笑指該黨亦談大灣區發展，「你很適合民建聯」，多人大笑。彭指在當時氣氛，民建聯會輸，又承認自己當選區議員，是2019年社會氣氛的得益者。法官亦質疑，彭於政綱提及沒打算履行的承諾是當選民「盲」，彭稱相信選民「眼睛雪亮」，故最終他票數十分低。
+
+此外，彭稱他於被捕時始知「攬炒十步曲」由戴耀廷提出，戴無在協調會議提無差別否決，而他對否決權的理解一直是「可用可不用」，直言對不公義的議案，不論政治立場或有否35+，議員都應「秉行公義行事」。
+
+#### 彭卓棋稱無收過協調會議文件、不知6.9記者會
+
+前南區區議員彭卓棋今繼續作供，就協調會議，彭表示他從沒有從戴耀廷或任何人收過港島區協調機制初稿及協議文件，亦沒有從任何人得知文件上運用否決權的內容。彭亦確認，有出席初選前所有協調會議，討論過名單不可超過3個、用全票制投票、用電子票、決定辦初選而非民調等，但無討論過簽署任何協議。
+
+法官李運騰問，那彭卓棋知道戴耀廷於6月9日舉行的初選記者會嗎（會上戴稱毋須簽署協議）？彭答「我不知道」。李運騰驚訝問：「你不知道？」，彭指當時「決定咗積極考慮參選」，但未正式報名，又引鄭達鴻被搜得他與區諾軒的對話截圖，指區提過或於5月30日辦記者會，但他無收過有關6月9日記者會的訊息。
+
+
+▲ 2020年6月9日舉行的初選記者會（資料圖片）
+
+法官陳仲衡一度指，這是彭卓棋與區諾軒的對話，為何他聽起來如此「事不關己（aloof）」，要提及鄭達鴻，彭解釋因其電話已非由他掌管，「唔係好有印象啲對話」，故靠審訊文件夾回憶。
+
+#### 彭稱戴耀廷協調會議提否決權可用可不用、無提過無差別否決
+
+彭續指，首次港島區協調會議上，戴耀廷提及否決財政預算案是《基本法》的權力，之後司馬文就反對。法官陳慶偉追問，戴有說議員一定要否決預算案嗎？指戴應說過更激進（aggressive）的話，司馬文才會有此回應。
+
+彭指戴當時沒這樣提過，「個對話其實係好短」，司馬文反對後，戴就回應否決權「其實係可用可不用」，「即係政府做得唔好就用，政府做得好呢，就唔使用喇。」彭並在法官詢問下，表示開會前無看過任何戴耀廷有關否決預算案的文章，戴會上也沒提過無差別否決。
+
+#### 彭稱直至被捕始知「攬炒十步曲」由戴耀廷提出
+
+李運騰續問，彭卓棋決定參加初選前，有從任何途徑得知戴耀廷的「攬炒」概念嗎？彭稱「攬炒十步曲我係有聽過」，指首次接觸該字眼，是在他一份宣傳單張的設計初稿，但「我係淨係聽過『攬炒十步曲』呢幾個字」，他當時不知道誰提出、亦不知道十步曲的內容，「我係直至（2021年1月）去到警署被捕之後，警員展示《十步曲》嘅文章我先至知道。」
+
+#### 彭卓棋單張草稿列「攬炒十步曲」 彭稱由同事準備曾着刪去
+
+辯方續展示相關初稿，前面有彭卓棋自我簡介及與李永財、何致宏、陳衍冲和張嘉莉4人的相片，寫有「共同協調人民奪權 齊上齊落對抗極權」；背面則寫有「攬炒十步曲時間表」，詳列攬炒十步的時間和內容，並寫有「轉載自2020年4月28日蘋果日報戴耀廷專欄」。彭確認是首次看到「攬炒十步曲」字眼的來源，但當時無深究細節。
+
+彭指，當時指示一名兼職員工、選舉助理的朋友「小白」為他設計自我簡介單張，由彭提供自我簡介文字，其餘則由小白設計。彭形容，當時「我䁽到『攬炒十部曲』，我覺得關我咩事呢？」，並在法官追問下指沒問為何加入該部分，「我淨係同佢講話唔要嗰 part」，設計最終「冇出街」。法官李運騰追問彭有否與團隊其餘4人討論，彭指「冇，因為好早期已經 foul 咗啦」，並指他們也沒看過該份草稿。
+
+
+▲ 彭卓棋
+
+#### 單張提否決權 彭稱同意但當時「未係好理解」該字眼
+
+彭卓棋最終派發的單張，設計與草稿相似，鄭達鴻電腦亦被搜得該張單張的相片。彭同意相信單張於5月中前已派發，因當時「積極考慮」參選。李運騰追問，積極到他甚至製作和發布選舉政綱，令其對手也獲得一份？彭指「其實唔係」，解釋單張僅屬「自我簡介」，而4月時團隊內部仍討論由他抑或李永財出選，最後決定由他出選。
+
+李運騰關注，經修改的單張仍寫有「提倡運用立法會權力，否決財政預算案，迫使當權者回應『五大訴求』」，問彭是否同意該字眼？彭承認「我哋最後都同意」，「但係嗰陣時未係好理解呢個字眼嘅，我哋未話好似而家案件咁細節，去到知道個法律點做嘅。」李運騰反問彭不是持有政治學的學位嗎？彭同意，並在法官追問下，指無印象單張印刷數量，也無相關紀錄，解釋是由同事跟進。
+
+#### 彭稱理解否決權是「可用可不用」、不論立場憑公義行事 稱被捕前無聽過「無差別」
+
+彭卓棋續確認，他簽署的「墨落無悔」、論壇發言、政綱等均有提及否決權。盧敏儀問，當時他如何理解否決預算案？彭稱「我一路嘅理解都係協調會講嘅『可用可不用』」。惟陳仲衡質疑彭從來沒有提及過，彭指他沒有直接用「可用可不用」，但政綱有提到「公義與不公義」的問題。
+
+辯方展示彭的政綱，寫有「背水重光」，印有張嘉莉、李永財、何致宏3人和另外兩人的相片，並列有6點政綱概要，彭確認該3人屬他最終參選名單。彭解釋雖沒提「可用可不用」，但他理解用和不用否決權，是視乎某個議案是否符合公義，與35+無關：「因為作為一個立法會議員，應該秉行公義行事，乜嘢立場都唔緊要」，「對一啲唔好嘅議案、不公義嘅議案，無論35+與否，民主派建制派也好，都應該係憑公義行事（運用否決權）。」
+
+陳慶偉指其政綱亦提及政府是「不公義政權」，彭稱是當時選舉的「誇張手法」，但認同政府「有啲位置係做得唔好」，政治和抗疫也與民意期望有落差，故「我都係會憑返我嘅良心同埋我認為啱嘅嘢去行事」，正如協調會議共識名單不可超過3人，「我都唔跟嘅。」
+
+盧敏儀續問，彭如何理解「無差別」，彭指「我係去到被捕之後，先至理解咩叫做無差別否決財政預算案」。陳仲衡指他被捕前有聽過「無差別」一詞嗎？彭稱「冇聽過」。
+
+#### 彭稱提「攬炒」屬選舉語言冀獲黃營選票、指列服務及創業經歷無人理
+
+法官李運騰問那彭有聽過「攬炒」嗎？彭稱有，指他無深究理解該字，但有在選舉單張「利用」該字眼。李運騰引彭政綱提及：「35+是選舉主軸，以議會抗爭攬炒迫使政府回應五大訴求，這是沒有妥協的空間」，彭確認稱，「當時我係用咗好多呢啲選舉語言，希望去爭取選民嘅支持」，並解釋因他報名初選後，「我先至慢慢意會到，我嘅競爭對手其實就係當時嘅民主派，因此我用咗好多呢啲激進嘅詞語，希望喺黃陣營可以攞到票。」
+
+彭續解釋，於4月左右，曾想過將以前創業及服務社會的例子放在選舉單張，「但係慢慢感受到社會氣氛，係冇人理嘅，所以我承認係用咗一個，今日睇返唔係好好嘅選舉策略。」李運騰問那是不是彭昨日提到的「心路歷程」？彭同意。陳仲衡續問，彭報名前，認為誰是他的競爭對手？彭稱當時沒有細想，但「我忽略咗初選嘅 target segment（目標選民），其實係最黃嘅一群」，「所以如果我講我自己創業嗰啲嘢，我相信係唔會有任何機會。」
+
+惟彭卓棋指，他也希望在選舉單張「加返啲真係我嘅初心」，故提及「重振香港品牌」、「進行19年免費教育」和「英語教學」等，又指「我本身係一個中文中學嘅學生，我用咗好多時間去學英文」，故望推行英中教育以全面提升香港年青人競爭力，「好似新加坡咁樣」，又強調「香港品牌係我一直嘅初心」。
+
+#### 官追問是否不想只任一屆議員 彭稱當時熱情相信、惟今不信
+
+陳慶偉續指，這是彭卓棋對選民的承諾？彭答「係一個賣點啦」。陳追問，彭並不打算兌現承諾？彭重申只能說是「一個推廣自己、我哋團隊嘅賣點啦」，但追問下指一旦當選，會「盡力爭取」。
+
+陳慶偉問，若彭在第一屆未能做到，會於第二屆繼續嗎？彭指「第二屆係會唔會選我都未知」，陳問他作為從政者，沒有長遠的願景？彭答「係要遠啲，但我要承認，當時我係短視咗」，但補充當時亦曾報名青年事務委員會自薦計劃，認為「立法會議員唔一定係唯一一個可以將我嘅初選或者理想實踐嘅地方」，惟陳打斷並追問他是否不只想任一屆議員，彭稱「當時我嗰熱情係相信呢一點嘅，但係今日我唔相信」。被告席的鄒家成微微張嘴。
+
+#### 官質疑不打算兌現承諾 彭認部分屬裝飾、選民眼睛雪亮故獲低票
+
+陳慶偉續質疑，彭一方面稱望實踐政綱，另一方面又指政綱內容是不真實。彭否認，強調就「香港本位經濟」、「教育自主化」、「資源發展」和「地方充權」4點，「係我真誠真心地相信去做」；至於「從一而終的抗爭派」和「重組警隊」兩點，是「當時社會氣氛選舉語言」。陳慶偉問，所以那兩點只是「裝飾（dress up your platform）」？彭同意，形容「當時嘅食客係好需要食呢啲嘢」。陳指若他是彭的選民，「我不會知道你哪些政綱為真」，彭表示「所以我個選舉策略導致我哋嗰票數係大敗」。
+
+李運騰其後再次問，如無意實踐上述兩點，為何在政綱提及，彭重申當時社會氣氛「都唔會睇你做啲乜嘢嘅倡議㗎啦，只係對於政府有啲咩不滿你就寫出嚟啦，我就寫出嚟啦」，直言「當時嘅氣氛係要講呢啲先至有機會贏囉」。
+
+彭又指他經常與跨黨派合作，「政治，係要溝通，但係選舉，係要情感，啫係要勾起人哋嘅情感，因為選舉嘅策略同做廣告一樣。」陳慶偉再追問他會否想連任，並繼續使用選舉語言，彭重申只是因應初選目標選民使用特定語言。陳問，「所以你假設你的選民是盲的？他們可以看到你做什麼，可以看到你的承諾」，彭答「我諗選民眼睛雪亮嘅，所以我咁低票」，鄒家成和余慧明等發笑。彭確認他初選排最後。
+
+#### 政綱提劣質「中國」東江水 官質疑看來引起憎恨 彭稱無深究
+
+陳慶偉亦關注，彭政綱提及「劣質的中國東江水」，彭解釋與其用錢淨化東江水，不如建海水化淡廠更貼合成本效益，但承認用「劣質」是「想突顯一啲選舉語言」。陳仲衡問但為何要用「中國」這個字？何桂藍和余慧明等微笑。彭答：「欸⋯我冇深究點解用『中國』呢個字眼」，並指「喺中國或者內地都可以形容係『中國』，或者大陸啦」。
+
+李運騰質疑，彭昨天指他積極鼓勵青年到大灣區創業，並不反內地政府；但到了選舉，又突然採用看來會引起對政府憎恨的語言，問他能否解釋其改變？彭重申「我係採納咗一個選舉策略」，因初選的目標選民是「深黃」，若要取得足夠選票一定要用選舉語言爭取認同。
+
+#### 彭卓棋同意為取悅選民「扮黃」 官問何不加入民建聯
+
+李運騰指他不明白，指初選並非必須，彭想參選大可直接參與正式選舉。彭回應，認為初選無論資源或規模都無正選般大壓力，是一個好的機會充當民調「試水溫」，可「試吓我哋嘅團隊攞唔攞到支持」。惟陳仲衡指，彭不是試水溫，而是將整個政治格調改變，彭承認有格調改變，重申當時慢慢意會到目標選民「原來係最黃嘅」，「平心而論，如果我仲講大灣區，我應該即刻畀人 foul 走咗。」李運騰問，所以彭為了取悅選民，便扮得比他實際上更黃（pretend yourself to be more yellow than you actually were）？彭答「係」。
+
+陳慶偉笑說，「那為何你不加入民建聯？」庭上多人發笑。彭表示：「因為喺嗰個選舉氣氛，DAB（民建聯）會輸。」陳續指，民建聯有協調機制、亦談及大灣區，「你很適合民建聯（“You fit right into DAB.”）」，林卓廷笑說「哇」，余慧明亦掩嘴發笑。彭答「都唔一定係」，因對一些主流建制派「我都未必完全同意晒佢哋」。
+
+陳慶偉續指，彭或不完全同意建制派，「但你完全不同意泛民主派」，彭承認當時是「雄心壯志」，指2019年的社會氣氛「造成咗好多未必有好多經驗嘅年青人素人出到嚟」，「我承認我係呢一個浪潮嘅得益者，佢畀我實踐我所想嘅，所以我喺區議會，我係努力建設。」彭說話時林卓廷和鄒家成一度嘆氣。
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（27日）踏入審訊第74天。前南區區議員彭卓棋繼續作供，表示「墨落無悔」是「鬥黃嘅書」，當時簽署是因「簽咗就唔使畀人夾」；而論壇上提「敵人係共產黨」和不惜入議會「肢體抗爭」等，均屬爭取選民的選舉語言。法官質疑是否為達目的不擇手段，彭同意自己「唔啱」，重看論壇片段亦感「好尷尬」。彭又指自己是土生土長香港人、想香港好，故是本土派，並指「本土派」只是讓選民知道他的「標籤」。
+
+此外，彭供稱《國安法》前，團隊曾開會決定銷毀所有政綱，並於《國安法》後將撕掉政綱的選舉單張派發，亦曾要求民主動力將所有政綱移除，以表明已放棄所有政綱。法官質疑為何不於社交平台公開撤回，又稱彭卓棋於持有爛單張的相片握拳是意味「抵抗」，彭承認有「鬥」的心態，但稱當時認為採取的措施已經足夠。
+
+#### 彭稱簽「墨落」可免「畀人夾」 即使細看亦會簽因要「鬥黃」
+
+前南區區議員彭卓棋今繼續作供，彭今早承認選舉政綱提「攬炒」等屬「選舉語言」，以討好「最黃」的初選選民。辯方下午問及彭有簽署的「墨落無悔」聲明，彭稱當時不覺得「會運用」或「會積極運用」否決權有何分別，解釋簽署是因當時同事注意到聲明於 Facebook 流傳。彭指他有「睇過䁽過（聲明），但唔係好詳細」，留意到談及五大訴求和推動普選，而當時團隊認為「我哋如果唔簽呢份嘢呢，就一定會輸，簽嘅話起碼可以頂住，唔使畀人問咁多嘢」，他本人亦同意簽署，因「簽咗就唔使畀人夾」。
+
+彭續指，涉案後仔細看「墨落」便發現提及「共同綱領」，但港島並無「共同綱領」，「不過就算我有細睇，我要好坦白同法庭講，我都會簽，因為依一份係鬥黃嘅書嚟。」盧敏儀續問，彭簽「墨落」時，打算無差別否決預算案嗎？彭否認，指當時區議會工作如改建石澳石礦場等，及其選舉政綱如19年免費教育和重振香港品牌等，均需預算案通過，故即使其政綱「用好多呢啲唔係咁啱嘅言論」，但他當刻並沒有無差別的概念。
+
+#### 選舉論壇稱共產黨為敵人、不惜肢體抗爭 彭稱全屬選舉語言回看感尷尬
+
+彭卓棋同意，於初選論壇上亦運用了與選舉單張類似的選舉策略，讓人看來他相信他所說的話。李運騰指，認為彭事實上在論壇比其單張去得更盡（go further），不僅提否決預算案，更指「我哋嘅敵人就係共產黨」，「我哋入到議會不惜以肢體抗爭、癱瘓政府、否決財政預算案」等。
+
+彭承認當時有用該些字眼，重申「要爭取最黃嘅選民」，認為「呢一啲語言，會有助我喺初選贏」。李運騰問，所以他為達目的不擇手段（the end justifies the means）？彭稱「我認為係唔啱㗎呢啲」，但當刻他希望在黃色陣營內勝出，「但係而家我睇返，當然好尷尬啦。」
+
+法官陳仲衡問到，該段發言有多少代表彭的真實看法？彭說「我諗整段都係選舉語言嚟，除咗『我係彭卓棋港島團隊』之外」，庭上多人大笑。彭並稱，他後來才知道「以肢體抗爭其實係癱瘓唔到政府」，重申是想以此獲選民支持；又指論壇上曾想談及創業和香港品牌，「但係個主持 stop 咗我啦已經，啫係冇人有興趣知道我想做啲咩㗎啦。」
+
+#### 彭稱「想香港好」是為本土派 提入議會「肢體抗爭」屬無深究、不可傷人
+
+庭上遂展示論壇謄本，彭提及畢業後想創業，將香港品牌做好，但被打斷。彭同意當時是在解釋他為何是「本土派」，並指：「我係土生土長香港人，我想香港好，所以我係一個本土派。」陳仲衡問，所以任何在香港出生、想香港好的人，在他眼中都是本土派？彭同意，但指其實不重要，因就如將商品放在百貨公司貨架，「一定要有個標籤畀自己，唔係其實市民係唔會知你係邊個或者咩派別咁樣。」
+
+彭同意，標籤自己的目的同樣是為在初選勝出，並指當時本土派較流行，有很多本土音樂、市集和電影。陳仲衡質疑人們當時「鬥黃」是關乎向政府抗議，而不是關於本土音樂和市集，彭指他理解是有包括在內。
+
+彭再指，認為本土派也應捍衛香港核心價值，即自由、民主和法治。法官李運騰質疑，彭一方面說不惜議會肢體抗爭，一方面又稱核心價值是法治是有矛盾。彭指他沒提過會用暴力，亦無深究肢體抗爭「具體係乜嘢」，但認為「進行肢體抗爭嘅嘢都唔可以傷害到人」。李運騰指，這又是另一個例子，彭說出他不全然明白意思的字眼？彭承認有「唔啱」，但重申當時無深究。
+
+#### 彭稱《國安法》前撕毀政綱及要求民動移除政綱 確保犯法倡議不可公開
+
+彭卓棋續指，《國安法》6月30日生效前，曾於6月中與團隊開會討論會否「有機會中招」，但因「根本唔理解」、「根本冇呢個法律水平」判斷何謂合法，故「拗咗一輪」後決定將所有政綱銷毀，認為「嗰啲選舉語言都全部唔好要啦」。陳仲衡指彭只是破壞證據，而不是公開撤回其主張，彭解釋撕毀單張目的就是「放棄所有政綱提及嘅內容」、意味放棄主張；而他當時亦曾致電民主動力職員 Christy 要求將政綱全部移除，解釋因應《國安法》「我哋唔做任何有機會犯法嘅倡議」。
+
+陳仲衡多次質疑為何不公開於專頁說明，彭承認最好應立即在 Facebook 說清楚，但當時「冇諗過原來呢個都係一個 option」，認為他們在街上派「爛溶溶」的單張及通知民主動力已經足夠，指當時「基本上我哋係冇政綱去進行一個選舉」，而選民在票站和投票系統也可看到「冇晒嘢」。
+
+辯方續展示彭卓棋個人 Instagram 帳戶的相片，顯示彭與另外兩人手持撕毀的選舉單張，嚴肅面對鏡頭握拳。彭同意單張上其相片和名字仍完整，但撕毀了政綱和他的個人介紹，並指《國安法》通過後於街站派發，想讓人知道他是無政綱下參選。法官關注他有否口頭告知公眾他放棄了舊政綱，彭稱沒有，但很多人問「點解你張嘢爛嘅」，他則回應「我哋冇政綱」並指已「放棄政綱」。彭又指，與團隊花約兩日撕毀了很多份單張，以確保「一啲放棄咗嘅倡議同埋政綱，唔可以喺街上有」。
+
+#### 官關注相片表情和身體語言顯示「抵抗」、不喜歡《國安法》
+
+法官陳慶偉關注，相中三人均手握拳頭，有什麼意思？陳仲衡亦指張開手似乎更顯示他們放棄政綱。彭稱「我哋冇話夾埋係咩」，「我哋覺得拎住拳頭好似勁啲」，多人發笑。陳慶偉指是代表「抵抗（defiance）」，又指彭的表情看來不喜歡《國安法》。彭承認「係有一種『鬥』嘅心態喺度」，又指「我承認我對於《國安法》，係有一啲⋯⋯」，陳慶偉即指，「沒錯，所以你們面部表情和身體語言均有「抵抗」的意味。（“Exactly, that’s why there is this facial and body language of defiance.”）」
+
+陳慶偉又一度問，該相片獲61人讚好，「他們喜歡你什麼？（“What did they like you about?”）你的拳頭？你的姿勢？」身旁的陳仲衡探頭向陳慶偉說，不認為彭能回答。彭續指，他不能代表61人回答，但有很多原因會按讚，陳慶偉續着他不用再回應，並拿出一張白紙，即場撕開再晃動展示，說「你可以這樣做」，庭上傳來笑聲。彭重申當時認為已足夠，「我真係冇諗過咁樣做」，亦否認是刻意顯得含糊（ambiguous）。
+
+#### 彭否認「對抗極權」是反抗中央政府 稱屬流行選舉用語「冇諗過有機會犯法」
+
+辯方續展示另一張彭卓棋派發撕毀的單張的相片，上寫有「背水 重光」。在法官陳仲衡詢問下，彭解釋背水是「背水一戰」，「其實屆屆都背水一戰嘅」，想營造「快啲投票」、「好緊急」的氣氛；至於「重光」不是解「liberation」，而是「重拾光輝」，指他望香港可重拾過去光輝，如在「亞洲四小龍」可「做返第一」。
+
+至於另一份被搜得、屬其團隊何志宏的文件，提及彭是「年青堅定抗爭派聲音」，彭同意都算是政治語言，但不一定是不真實（untrue），解釋因「抗爭」也可以指在法律框架下「據理力爭」，同意自己算是「年青抗爭派」。
+
+辯方最後展示一份「請柬」，彭解釋因派了撕爛的單張後有很多人查詢，於是「整一張好睇啲」但無政綱的單張，「咁啲人就唔使問我嘢啦」，亦認為公眾已得知他們的轉變。陳慶偉指，彭稱《國安法》後不望違法，但單張上提及「對抗極權」，是反對中央政府？彭否認，重申是「當時好流行」的選舉用語，「今日睇返冇諗過呢句都有機會犯法」，同意當時口號無實質含意，並非針對中央或香港政府、或民建聯。
+
+陳慶偉指，彭的政綱亦提到「香港喺最黑刻嘅時刻」，彭回應「今日係香港最黑暗嘅一日」是競選常用語言，很多時選舉街站都會稱「今日好黑暗，快啲投我啦」。旁聽席的劉慧卿發笑。陳慶偉指認為是前英國首相邱吉爾所說，案件明早續審。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-28-nato-race-of-logistics.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-28-nato-race-of-logistics.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : NATO Race Of Logistics
+author: Anna M. Dowd, et al.
+date : 2023-06-28 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/CtKHoel.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "European Warfighting Resilience and NATO Race of Logistics: Ensuring That Europe Has the Fuel It Needs to Fight the Next War"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Russia’s war in Ukraine demonstrates the importance of logistics. More interoperable logistics, including fuel storage and distribution, underpin NATO forces’ readiness and ability to operate in contested environments while maintaining forward defense on the eastern flank._
+
+
+
+_The NATO’s initial response to Russia’s brutal war against Ukraine signaled a commitment to strengthening deterrence and defense posture. Yet, the conflict highlighted capability gaps, readiness shortfalls and problem points across the alliance, including ever more contested logistics, vulnerable transport infrastructure, and growing energy insecurity. The need to meet these looming and often-overlooked challenges is acute. Left unchecked, they could weaken the alliance’s collective resilience and undercut efforts to provide continuous military support to Ukraine, stopping the military momentum on the ground from shifting decisively in its favor. One fundamental component of warfighting capability underpinning all others is operational energy broadly and fuel specifically, both in peacetime and wartime. Efforts to increase the readiness and enablement of NATO forces should therefore explicitly take into consideration the logistics implications and the compounding effects of rising logistics requirements, including fuel. Enhanced ability to operate in contested environments as well as maintaining forward defense on NATO’s eastern flank will result in higher fuel consumption and, in turn, will require a larger logistics footprint. Thus, increasing operations energy capabilities, including storage and distribution, and reducing risks associated with the lack of or dependence on vulnerable supply lines are critical supporting capabilities for the future fight._
+
+
+### Sustaining Ukraine’s New Systems
+
+> #### “Chapter 8: Fueling the Force,” Army Field Manual 54-30
+
+> “Fuel can be a war stopper. A force can move and attack only as long as vehicles and weapon systems receive fuel, oils, and lubricants. Ultimate success may depend on having enough fuel to support the mobility requirements of air and ground weapon systems.”
+
+As the war continues into its second year, it has become increasingly clear that conventional heavy force, capabilities, and fires – as well as a constant and continued supply of Western weapons systems – are key to defeating Russia.
+
+The equipment provided to Ukraine – including air defense, self-propelled howitzers, infantry fighting vehicles, main battle tanks, Soviet-era fighter jets from Poland and Slovakia, and most recently the promise of F-16 fighter jets from U.S. allies – will need to be sustained and fueled, and some of this support requires a significant logistics footprint. All of the advanced Western systems now in Ukraine’s possession will do little to shift the balance in the country’s favor if they are stuck behind the lines waiting for parts and fuel or are left without qualified specialists to maintain them. Growing maintenance and support challenges, including the lack of spare parts and fuel, will impact timelines for further deliveries of advanced Western military equipment. Although training Ukrainian soldiers to use Leopards, Challengers, or Abrams is essential, equally important is training the maintenance and sustainment personnel necessary to keep those tanks running. Similar considerations will challenge the readiness of the F-16. The challenge of logistics for Ukraine is real and immediate. Any effect on the battlefield from these systems will depend on the availability of parts, ammunition, and fuel. Plans to supply these systems to Ukraine will need to account for the challenge of getting them where they need to be, when they need to be there.
+
+
+### NATO’s Race of Logistics
+
+For the alliance, sustaining large-scale operations in a high-intensity conflict requires sufficient initial weapons stocks for warfighting, but also robust logistical support networks – including maintenance, refueling, and medical support. Identifying and developing solutions to logistical challenges is thus a pressing issue for NATO and allies.
+
+As NATO secretary general Jens Stoltenberg observed, “We are in a race of logistics.” In an increasingly contested security environment, resilient and more interoperable logistics are critical enablers to support ongoing deployments and effectively respond to emergent threats. The volatility of supply chains during the Covid-19 pandemic, along with disruptions caused by the Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack and the Suez Canal blockage, laid bare vulnerabilities that would be catastrophic in wartime. Adversaries can intentionally disrupt logistic networks and pursue regional gains through anti-access/area denial strategies in all-domain warfare.
+
+Without improved capacity and infrastructure, NATO forces may face the prospect of “fighting to get to the fight,” unable to surge combat-credible forces and provide timely reinforcement of allies in a crisis or military conflict.
+
+To convincingly meet the demands of the alliance, NATO members also need access to large amounts of fuel. For a high-end conflict, fuel capabilities will require a robust stockpile of fuel, including prepositioned fuel storage capacity, and the capability to move fuel to enable military movement. Fuel stockpiles and a multimodal network of fuel distribution can ensure redundancy and strengthen resilience. Of course, ensuring an adequate supply of fuel is an issue that goes beyond tanks to other weapons and capabilities; as such, it is particularly important to NATO airpower. The U.S. Air Force’s recent decision to move its refueling mission from Germany to Poland further demonstrates the role that strategic assets play in enhancing readiness and responding to any potential challenge in the region.
+
+
+### Europe’s Fuel Vulnerabilities
+
+Sufficient fuel – encompassing acquisition and contracting, transportation, storage, and distribution – is a necessary foundation for sustaining a combat-credible force. Enhanced ability to operate in contested environments as well as maintaining forward defense on NATO’s eastern flank will result in higher fuel consumption and, in turn, will require a larger logistics footprint. Thus, increasing future operational energy capabilities, including storage and distribution, and reducing risks associated with the lack of or dependence on vulnerable supply lines is essential.
+
+During the Cold War, the development and maintenance of robust and credible military movement infrastructure and enabling elements across Western Europe was one of NATO’s top priorities. NATO understood that war might begin and end with logistics. Therefore, logistics considerations were at the heart of NATO’s deterrence posture and firmly embedded in its defense plans. These plans were underpinned by relevant logistics infrastructure, including fuel depots and pipelines. In fact, NATO started to work on a dedicated military pipeline system back in the 1950s. From the beginning, allies agreed that the pipeline networks must be capable of meeting military requirements at all times. In 1956, the NATO Pipeline Committee was established and tasked with acting on all matters pertaining to the supervision, operation, and maintenance of the pipeline infrastructure. In 1958, NATO created and funded the Central Europe Pipeline System to satisfy operational requirements during peace, crisis, and war for the transport, storage, and delivery of fuel in the central European region covering Belgium, France, Germany, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands. Over time, the NATO Pipeline System (NPS) evolved and encompassed eight additional pipelines, one each in Greece, Iceland, Italy, Norway, Denmark, and Portugal, and two in Turkey.
+
+> #### ___`NATO Pipeline System (NPS) Highlights`___
+
+- `The NPS consists of 10 distinct storage and distribution systems for fuels and lubricants.`
+
+- `In total, it is approximately 6,200 miles (10,000 kilometers) long, runs through 12 NATO countries, and has a storage capacity of 4.1 million cubic meters.`
+
+- `The NPS links storage depots, military air bases, civil airports, pumping stations, truck and rail loading stations, refineries, and entry/discharge points.`
+
+- `Bulk distribution is carried out using facilities from the common-funded NATO Security Investment Program.`
+
+- `The networks are controlled by national organizations, except for the Central Europe Pipeline System (CEPS), which is a multinational system managed by the CEPS Program Office under the aegis of the NATO Support and Procurement Agency.`
+
+Additionally, NATO regularly exercised logistics for large-scale collective defense operations, including during the annual REFORGER drills – annual military exercises conducted from the late 1960s to early 1990s to validate the ability of NATO allies to rapidly deploy forces to Europe and reinforce NATO positions on the continent, as well as demonstrate Western commitment to defend against Soviet aggression.
+
+However, this robust structure for collective defense eroded following the collapse of the Soviet Union. As NATO shifted its focus from collective territorial defense to out-of-area contingency operations, Western European allies stopped modernizing the infrastructure necessary to underpin large-scale reinforcements to the east, and new Eastern and Central European members did not embark on developing standardized infrastructure in the absence of uniform NATO guidelines and other competing commitments. In leveraging the peace dividend, allies also started to divest from military logistics capabilities as they downsized their forces, instead developing plans to reach out to the private sector in case of contingencies.
+
+> #### Admiral Rob Bauer, Chair of the NATO Military Committee
+
+> “NATO has for decades ‘neglected the larger-scale logistics that is connected to collective defense’ because it was planning for operations out of its operational area.”
+
+As a result, the existing fuel storage capacity and capabilities required to move fuel across all of Europe are limited, and logistical challenges persist. This is especially notable in the Baltic Sea and Black Sea regions, where refining capacity, storage, transportation, and distribution might not be sufficient to support an increase in fuel demand over a longer period of time. In a potential conflict scenario, this would be further affected by Russia’s hostile economic and military actions. Shortfalls exist in military storage and distribution capacity on NATO’s eastern flank, including aviation fuel (F-34/F-35) and naval fuels (F-75/F-76). Civilian storage capacity might partly mitigate the shortfall. However, it would require much deeper civilian-military cooperation and integration, ensuring that civilian storage increases its readiness and is available on short notice in a contingency – which is possible but comes at a cost.
+
+Transportation of large amounts of fuel to storage facilities across the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) area of responsibility faces similar challenges. Due to the limited number of military pipelines on NATO’s eastern flank, this is primarily done via rail and road. Since military fuel transportation assets are limited, the armed forces – including in a crisis – tend to rely on commercial capabilities.
+
+Finally, the acquisition of fuel is an underestimated factor in assessing logistical challenges. The existing acquisition arrangements were designed for peacetime. Scaling up the acquisition of fuel without advanced planning would require concluding new contracts, which can be time-consuming and might not entirely meet the increased consumption volumes. There is also no clear mechanism to prevent contractor fratricide or deconflict requirements more rapidly. This is an even bigger challenge if one assumes that the acquisition of fuel will generally only be possible at very high prices in a conflict scenario. All of those factors can have a direct impact on the operational efficiency of allied forces. This, in turn, could negatively affect NATO’s deterrence and defense posture, including the readiness of forces, their responsiveness, and their ability to reinforce.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 1: Central Europe Pipeline System in 2023.__ Source: NATO Support and Procurement Agency/Central Europe Pipeline System Office._
+
+
+### Efforts to Improve Military Mobility and Operational Energy Security
+
+Europe has undertaken initial steps to address the energy security of military operations since Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. In 2018, the European Union launched an Action Plan on Military Mobility to ensure “swift and seamless movement of military personnel, materiel and assets,” including with short notice and at large scale. In an attempt to tackle the impact of the deteriorating security environment following Russia’s renewed aggression against Ukraine and to improve military mobility beyond EU borders, the European Commission adopted a revised version in November 2022. It calls for identifying possible gaps in the infrastructure, which would inform future improvements and help integrate fuel supply chain requirements, including meeting the demands to support short-notice, large-scale movements of allied military forces. The European Union also committed to invest €1.69 billion ($1.82 billion) over the next five years to revamp civilian and military dual-use transportation infrastructure across Europe.
+
+Other EU-led supporting initiatives include the Permanent Structured Cooperation Military Mobility project, the Logistic Hubs project, and the European Defence Agency’s Optimising Cross-Border Movement Permission Procedures in Europe program. Despite these efforts, developing European military mobility capabilities able to “reach in strength” to the very eastern frontiers of both NATO and the European Union remains a strategic challenge, according to the Center for European Policy Analysis.
+
+In parallel, NATO allies have been talking to improve mobility and operational energy security. In 2018, NATO established the Joint Support and Enabling Command (JSEC), which is responsible for the alliance’s rear-area operations. JSEC’s enablement mission is to create conditions that allow for the movement of forces across SACEUR’s area of responsibility, though its role does not currently include fuel oversight. Allies continue to discuss the potential enhancement and extension of the NPS to the eastern flank. As agreed at NATO’s 2021 Brussels summit, the alliance will continue to prioritize improving its ability to support the deployment and sustainment of allied forces into, across, and from the entire alliance territory. These efforts include the development of fuel supply chain arrangements.
+
+
+### Fuel Logistics on NATO’s Eastern Flank
+
+
+_▲ __Civilian Fuel Infrastructure in Poland, PERN Gdańsk Base.__ Photo: PERN._
+
+With the center of gravity shifting to the east, Eastern European allies have been playing an instrumental role in providing support to Ukraine while shoring up their own defenses against the Russian threat. Poland, in particular, has made significant investments in its military capabilities and critical infrastructure, becoming a “linchpin of Eastern Flank security” and a pivotal U.S. ally. The country has been providing substantial host nation support for over 10,000 U.S. troops stationed in different locations in Poland, as well as for over 1,000 soldiers contributing to the NATO Enhanced Forward Presence Battlegroup in Orzysz. It has also been the primary channel through which the West has been delivering vital military assistance to Ukraine. A de facto logistics hub for the alliance’s forward defense, Poland has been able to find practical solutions to logistical challenges and enhance infrastructure to support resupply and reinforcement. On the civilian side, PERN – the leading Polish company in oil and fuel logistics – has invested in its fuel storage and transportation capacity. Since 2019, the company has built 20 new fuel storage locations throughout Poland, with a total additional capacity of 574,000 cubic meters. In February 2023, PERN and Orlen – the largest Polish energy company – opened a new pipeline that enhances energy security in the southern part of Poland. The pipeline replaces rail transport, carrying an amount equivalent to that of 25,500 tankers annually. Both companies are also working on building a second pipeline to link the oil terminal in the port of Gdańsk with the refinery in Płock, the largest in Poland.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 2: Major Investments in Civilian and Military Fuel Infrastructure in Poland since 2019.__ Source: CSIS research and analysis based on [PERN](https://www.pern.pl/en/); and [“Agreement between the United States of America and Poland,” November 13, 2020](https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/20-1113-Poland-EDCA.pdf)._
+
+Additionally, the Polish government has been heavily investing in military infrastructure and in 2020 offered to fund infrastructure and logistical support for U.S. forces in Poland. The Poland Provided Infrastructure (PPI) and Poland Provided Logistical Support (PPLS) programs, as part of the 2020 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement between Poland and the United States, will further support long-term sustainment. Under the PPI, Poland agreed to invest in a large bulk fuel storage and distribution facility and rotary wing aviation fuel point in Powidz Air Base, as well as a large bulk fuel storage in Żagań Training Area and the Toruń and Skwierzyna military complexes. Some of the PPI projects will be funded jointly by the NATO Security Investment Program, Poland, and the United States. Under the PPLS, Poland covers 75 percent of the cost of fuel for U.S. forces in agreed locations, including aviation fuels and ground transportation fuels, and 50 percent of the cost of fuels beyond the agreed volume. These initiatives provide considerable support for U.S. force posture and enhanced prepositioning, as well as modernized infrastructure on the eastern flank.
+
+
+### The Way Forward: Developing a Robust Operational Energy and Fuel Strategy for NATO
+
+Russia’s full-scale invasion and war of aggression against Ukraine has accentuated the challenges facing NATO’s efforts to secure sufficient supply and access to fuel. These challenges will require sufficient attention from policymakers and military leadership, as well as decisive action to develop collective solutions on multiple levels – from NATO, national governments, and the fuel and infrastructure industries. Adapting the current fuel strategy requires reframing critical enablers and supporting resources within a broader NATO deterrence and defense policy, as well as resilience efforts. The new approach should account for policies and investments – in both the short and long term – necessary to ensure full fuel resilience and operational energy security. Although a comprehensive, sustained, and coordinated effort is needed, focusing on urgent actions to address immediate challenges will be essential for supporting Ukraine in its fight and ensuring that the alliance is ready to face the current threats while preparing for the future contingencies. Fortunately, the upcoming NATO Vilnius summit offers an opportunity for allies to plan for decisive action, including toward the following steps:
+
+___Providing Ukraine with the vital operational energy and logistical support required to continue the fight.___ Logistics remain central to Ukraine’s success on the battlefield. The war reveals crucial lessons for the alliance. The importance of logistics suggests that allies should find ways to expeditiously ensure that systems and capabilities provided to Ukraine receive the necessary operational energy support and are accompanied by fuel tankers to sustain battlefield fuel resupply. Moreover, the capacity of maintenance hubs should be further expanded in the vicinity of the border with Ukraine, including by employing Ukrainian mechanics. Poland’s recent initiative to set up a maintenance hub for Ukraine’s Leopards and Rheinmetall’s maintenance center in Romania are good examples of supporting operational readiness closer to the front lines and should be further leveraged.
+
+___Identifying strategic vulnerabilities in fuel supply across the alliance and taking urgent action to mitigate critical shortfalls.___ The enablement of SACEUR’s area of responsibility and NATO’s ability to rapidly move forces and their equipment depends on fuel availability. This puts into sharp focus the need to develop an alliance-wide robust action plan to identify strategic vulnerabilities in fuel supply, secure adequate funding for new infrastructure, and take immediate action to mitigate any gaps. The upcoming NATO summit offers an opportunity for discussion to move this forward. Furthermore, the recently launched EU-NATO taskforce on resilience and critical infrastructure offers a starting point that could be leveraged. The taskforce could be provided with a clear mandate to improve fuel resilience as a matter of priority.
+
+___Optimizing joint logistics on the eastern flank and fortifying frontline states.___ Given the importance of the military presence in the eastern part of the alliance in building NATO’s credible deterrence and defense posture, developing a robust logistic capacity on the eastern flank is crucial. The alliance can focus on joint logistics on the entire eastern flank and effectively support deployment, operational-level sustainment, and redeployment. The Vilnius summit offers allies the opportunity to consider options to include establishing a new NATO Joint Logistics Support Group (JLSG) in Poland or moving one from Western Europe – perhaps the Allied Joint Force Command in Brunssum, the Netherlands – to Poland in order to collocate it with the Multinational Corps Northeast in Szczecin. In addition, building a forward-deployed strategic fuel storage facility in Poland for the northeastern part of the eastern flank will further enable logistics support for any potential allied reinforcement through the Suwałki Corridor. Interlinking the strategic fuel storage with a network of smaller and dispersed fuel depots in Poland and the Baltic States will mitigate potential vulnerabilities. Updating the NATO Support and Procurement Agency’s toolbox offers another opportunity, including improving its current funding model and establishing a system to better track fuel needs, that will also facilitate the rapid acquisition of fuel. Finally, including fuel logistics in the Three Seas Initiative’s priority projects will better link NATO’s entire eastern flank and enhance regional civilian-military cooperation. As this list shows, there are multiple potential approaches to strengthening joint logistics.
+
+___Developing a resilient and adaptable NATO fuel infrastructure.___ Deploying NATO forces relies on resilient and adaptable infrastructure, including fuel infrastructure with adequate storage and ability to facilitate movement. NATO committees responsible for fuel policies (the Logistics Committee and Petroleum Committee) could convene to plan for the next step, which is to develop a road map for bolstering fuel resilience and enabling energy transition with clear deliverables. There are several opportunities here. First, NATO could prioritize expanding the NPS to Eastern Europe to strengthen supply, which will also involve taking additional steps to revise military fuel supply chains. Creation of the Eastern European Pipeline System would be key to the operational effectiveness, combat power, and agility of NATO forces and would considerably support U.S. permanent and rotational presence on the eastern flank. The extension of the NPS would also play a crucial economic role and help enhance civilian-military logistics cooperation and integration.
+
+___Establishing a reliable, resilient, and adaptive logistics system in Europe.___ A system of interoperable logistics hubs – especially in potential theaters of operations – connected in a network across Europe would further strengthen the development of agile, scalable, and resilient operational support systems to maintain projection and sustainment superiority, as well as enable enhanced operational agility and resilience. Given Poland’s emergence as a strategic focal point and “a critical Ally in deterring and responding to Russian aggression,” it could serve as a central hub for the alliance’s logistics efforts.
+
+___Enhancing intermediate-level operational logistics.___ Additional efforts would strengthen the response to the logistics challenges on NATO’s eastern flank. The JLSGs are a deployable capability that provides command and control of assigned logistical forces from the theater to tactical levels in support of a joint task force. The JLSGs responsible for coordinating reception, staging, and onward movement, as well as pushing forward supplies from the rear to the corps level, remain underinvested in and are remote and detached from the eastern flank. The JLSGs can implement insights from the current conflict, with increased staffing levels and equipped with various logistics-enabling units that train together.
+
+___Prioritizing fuel support requirements and operational energy needs.___ The use of analytic tools, such as modeling and simulation, can help prioritize and better estimate fuel support requirements and operational energy needs. For example, a 2015 RAND report developed a methodology that could serve as a model for NATO. The report highlighted the impact of operational energy on combat effectiveness and the importance of stewarding limited resources more strategically. Furthermore, NATO should leverage its Defense Innovation Accelerator for the Northern Atlantic and the NATO Innovation Fund to identify and drive innovative, dual-use technological solutions, including artificial intelligence, to better determine how much, when, and where fuel is needed to sustain NATO’s missions and operations, as well as future solutions for generating energy on the battlefield.
+
+___Exploring alternative operational energy solutions.___ Another opportunity for the alliance is the exploration of alternative operational energy solutions – including cutting-edge technologies and processes, as well as alternative fuels – that can be integrated into civilian and military energy supply chains. This will require some additional resources, but because the investment will benefit the civilian sector as well, this could help support energy innovation and green energy solutions. The NATO Operational Energy Concept could include language on alternative solutions, with guidance for the future design of NATO energy standards.
+
+___Integrating collective and national energy resilience requirements.___ Lastly, NATO and EU states have different energy needs and will be making different investments to support their own economies and militaries. Adequate energy is both a foundation of warfighting effectiveness and an aspect of national resilience. If NATO as a whole has insight into where these operational energy capabilities exist, it can see where countries would have the assets to contribute in case of a war and note where gaps still exist. With such an approach, the whole can be greater than the sum of its parts.
+
+
+### Conclusions
+
+Russia’s unprovoked and illegal invasion of Ukraine, resulting in the largest war in Europe since World War II, is a grinding war of attrition and a battle of logistics. The conflict magnified the necessity to address often overlooked enablers to operational capabilities vital to the execution and sustainment of military missions and operations.
+
+Enhancing the ability to rapidly increase the readiness and enablement of NATO forces and improve combat capability is essential to ensuring that they are prepared and ready to face current and future threats. To help Ukraine win the war now, and prepare to win the next war, Europe needs prepositioned war reserve stocks, a robust and resilient fuel supply, operational readiness of fuels, and reliable infrastructure.
+
+> #### U.S. Army General Christopher G. Cavoli, Commander of United States European Command and Supreme Allied Commander Europe
+
+> “The force structure requirement is not just tanks and ships and fighter planes. A large part of it is the required enablement, the required logistics, equipment, systems units, and so forth.”
+
+This war demonstrates that meeting wartime demands in a large-scale conflict benefits from prior peacetime investments and clearly defined targets, as well as from better integration of logistics into strategic planning. Military planning for NATO collective defense can take insights from the current conflict and ensure that these considerations are part of the implementation for the deter and defense strategy and the decisions to conduct geographically specific regional plans, as well as functional strategic subordinate plans (SSPs) – in particular, the SSP for enablement. The urgency to solve real problems at scale through adapting and improving fuel supply logistics is not only fundamental to building capacity along Europe’s eastern flank to address Russia’s military threat but also to an expanded U.S. force posture that requires sustained access. Effective logistics across national borders will depend on the integrated effect of every ally. The Vilnius summit offers the alliance leaders the opportunity to collaborate on an approach to identify challenges and to resolve logistics burden-sharing. A comprehensive approach including a NATO Resilience Planning Process and adequate investments would bolster collective resilience in Europe. Ensuring that Europe has the fuel it needs to fight the next war could usefully be the first application of this approach.
+
+---
+
+__Anna M. Dowd__ is an adjunct fellow (non-resident) with the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.
+
+__Dominik P. Jankowski__ is a policy adviser in the Office of the NATO Secretary General.
+
+__Cynthia R. Cook__ is the director of the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group and a senior fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-28-next-generation-reactions.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-28-next-generation-reactions.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Next Generation Reactions
+author: Heather Williams, et al.
+date : 2023-06-28 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/JLTTnNM.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "The Fragile Balance of Terror: Deterrence in the New Nuclear Age"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_This report collects opinions on The Fragile Balance of Terror, from the next generation of policy, technical, and operational nuclear professionals at the Project on Nuclear Issues._
+
+
+
+### The Fragile Balance of Terror and Nuclear Uncertainty
+_By Heather Williams_
+
+The Fragile Balance of Terror, edited by Vipin Narang and Scott Sagan, outlines the rising nuclear risks associated with arms racing between the United States, Russia, and China; crisis escalation; and nuclear proliferation. It paints the picture of an evolving and potentially destabilizing nuclear balance. At the outset, Narang and Sagan offer a harrowing observation: “We are unprepared for it.” The Fragile Balance of Terror includes analyses of multipolar deterrence, the impact of social media on crisis escalation, nuclear survivability, and command and control, among many others.
+
+As a follow-on to The Fragile Balance of Terror, the Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) at the Center for Strategic and International Studies invited eight early- and mid-career experts to offer their reflections on the volume’s chapters and conclusions. These rising voices outline a landscape of uncertainty that they will confront throughout their careers. Their reflections are succinct and insightful, and they point to specific trends contributing to nuclear uncertainty that raise challenging questions for policymakers and scholars alike. While much of the nuclear policy community is focused on the challenges of a return to great power competition and how to deter two peer competitors while reassuring allies, as these next generation experts highlight, The Fragile Balance of Terror is a timely reminder of the wider nuclear landscape and the new complexities of nuclear deterrence.
+
+This reaction series points to three interrelated trends that will shape the future nuclear landscape. First, newer nuclear actors feature prominently in The Fragile Balance of Terror and in these reflection pieces. For the most part, the authors agree that these smaller regional nuclear actors will undermine strategic stability and increase nuclear risks, although over time this may be less of a concern. Jamie Kwong captures Caitlin Talmadge’s two-tiered approach to nuclear competition at both the great power and regional levels, which will complicate – and potentially undermine – both arms control and extended deterrence and assurance efforts. These regional actors may value nuclear weapons differently than the Cold War superpowers or contemporary great powers; Doreen Horschig describes newer nuclear actors as valuing “political gains of prestige-bestowing displays . . . over the increased reliability of their forces” in her analysis of Jeffrey Lewis and Ankit Panda’s chapter, and suggests that over time deterrence could become stronger as new nuclear programs become more sophisticated. Conversely, Jessica Link notes the uncertainty around nuclear learning among new nuclear actors, cautioning that we should not assume they will “inevitably fall into these stable deterrence patterns,” in her analysis of Mark Bell and Nicholas Miller’s chapter.
+
+A second theme of the reaction series is the importance of the information domain and new pressures on nuclear decisionmaking. One of these new pressures relates to perceptions of counterforce, whereby new technologies may or may not undermine nuclear survivability. Lachlan MacKenzie’s exploration of Christopher Clary’s chapter captures the debate about counterforce amid arms racing and technological innovation and points to important policy challenges for nuclear decisionmaking, including during crises. MacKenzie, like Clary, comes to a potentially optimistic assessment, whereby “strategic stability is more durable than many appreciate.” An additional pressure on nuclear decisionmaking will be the credibility of information. Melissa Chan’s reaction essay points to the “ever-widening gaps of knowledge” due to new nuclear actors, new technologies, and poisoning of the information domain. In reacting to Narang and Heather Williams’s chapter, Suzanne Claeys observes, “In a nuclear-tinged crisis, disinformation on social media platforms could cause unintended escalation (due to increased ambiguity), impact decisionmaking processes, and amplify nationalism, resulting in stronger public pressure for escalation.” Decisionmaking resilience and the credibility of information is a wider challenge not just for crises, but also for intelligence and analysis, with open-source intelligence (OSINT) being increasingly vulnerable to poisoning with implications for analysis, as captured by Joseph Rodgers’s reaction to Amy Zegart’s chapter.
+
+A final trend the authors identify is the role of psychology in nuclear uncertainty, particularly the rise of personality regimes and populism. Psychology and perception are an inherent theme in The Fragile Balance of Terror, including in how scholars and practitioners perceive adversary capabilities, but also in how adversaries might perceive U.S. capabilities and behaviors. Jessica Link’s essay, for example, points to the recent U.S. ban on anti-satellite weapons testing as one example of risk reduction efforts and a way for the United States to signal its responsible intentions and influence others’ perceptions. The psychological challenges of deterrence are not wholly new, but one emerging contemporary challenge is the rise of populist leaders and “personalist regimes,” the subject of McDermott’s chapter in The Fragile Balance of Terror. In his analysis of the chapter, Nicholas Adamopoulos captures potentially shifting strategic values in personalist regimes, such as “protection of status” and “demonstrations of strength and resolve.” Populist leaders may also have different decisionmaking structures, “valuing loyalty over competence” in their advisers. This should be a concern not only for the United States in engaging its adversaries but also in how others perceive U.S. leadership and nuclear decisionmaking.
+
+This volume should be read as a snapshot of what the next generation of nuclear leaders have identified as their challenges. These are the issues they expect to confront in their careers. It speaks not only to rising nuclear risks and uncertainty, but also to the need for continued scholarship into new nuclear actors, nuclear decisionmaking, and personalist regimes, along with the importance of knowledge transfer and community building among nuclear experts. The Fragile Balance of Terror is the start of that much longer conversation.
+
+
+### Response to “Multipolar Deterrence in the Emerging Nuclear Era”
+_By Jamie Kwong_
+
+Caitlin Talmadge opens The Fragile Balance of Terror by presenting a framework for policymakers and experts alike to conceptualize the new nuclear age. She characterizes this as an era of interrelated nuclear competitions at the great power and regional levels. No longer defined and bound by the bipolar Cold War era, these competitions are indicative of changing relationships among a larger set of nuclear actors. Talmadge explores how this “two-tiered, multi-actor nuclear world” may play out in peacetime or in crisis by drawing on historical vignettes that bring a concerning dose of reality to her forecasting.
+
+In addition to effectively explaining and exploring these dynamics, Talmadge makes three important contributions. First, her chapter helps to address a key set of policy questions: What will deterrence look like in the new nuclear age? Will this emerging era of multiple, overlapping nuclear competitions present new risks? And how will different sets of nuclear competitors interact? Talmadge makes a strong case that deterrence will become inherently more complex and difficult to navigate in this emerging era. On the one hand, the potential for an opportunistic third actor to take advantage of a dyadic conflict – what Talmadge dubs the “postwar predation problem” – may inform nuclear states’ decision calculus and bolster rational deterrence, that is, discourage states from deliberately escalating and instead incentivize restraint.
+
+On the other hand, the interrelated nature of both great power and regional nuclear rivalries increases the risk of misperception, arms racing, accidental or unauthorized use, and inadvertent escalation – risks that outweigh the marginal benefits of bolstering deterrence. Central here is recognizing that decisions made in both peacetime and crisis will not remain insular to a single competitive relationship. The impact of those decisions – including diverging interpretations of intent – will be felt beyond the competition at hand, as a result of an emerging feedback loop between these different competitive groupings. In a crisis, the effects of a nuclear signaling feedback loop between different sets of competitors could plausibly draw in additional actors or even prompt a concurrent and exacerbating conflict, only making de-escalation harder. In short, a world of more and interrelated nuclear rivalries will make for an increasingly dynamic, difficult, and dangerous deterrence landscape.
+
+Second, Talmadge’s chapter highlights the implications of this world for arms control and extended deterrence. Because states will have to account for multiple nuclear competitors, it is unlikely they will agree to arms limitations with one competitor that may thwart their capabilities vis-à-vis additional competitors. While universal arms control remains unlikely, these conditions will challenge the prospect for future arms control agreements. Even worse, the need to ensure that arsenals are equipped to respond to multiple threats not only disincentivizes arms control but also incentivizes arms racing. These dynamics are already playing out at the great power level, with important implications for U.S. nuclear policy. The United States, China, and Russia have seeded a new arms race through their extensive modernization campaigns. China in particular appears to be expanding its arsenal at a rapid pace. Growing U.S. concerns about China’s nuclear expansion, in turn, will likely challenge efforts to negotiate a U.S.-Russian follow-on agreement to New START – even beyond the challenges posed by Russia’s recent suspension of the treaty. Without an agreement in place, the United States could face an unrestrained arms race with two peer competitors.
+
+These pressures are intensified by extended deterrence relationships that have historically posed challenges to arms control efforts. The need for a patron to assure its allies of a credible security commitment – and also to convince their adversaries that it is ready and willing to follow through on that commitment – favors larger and highly capable arsenals. This is particularly pertinent in the U.S. context, as the United States has extended deterrence commitments with allies in multiple regions. Calls for greater assurance will only become more pressing as nuclear competitions continue to heat up. South Korea and Japan, for example, are already seeking greater U.S. assurances in the face of North Korea’s advancing arsenal – developments which are, in turn, being closely monitored by China. To make matters more complicated, a world with more nuclear competitors may drive some nonnuclear states to seek their own nuclear weapons to counter growing threats. If its historical nonproliferation efforts are any indicator, the United States might try to mitigate this proliferation pressure by forging new extended deterrence relationships – only amplifying these challenges, and thus making arms control prospects even dimmer, in the process.
+
+Finally, Talmadge lays out a pressing agenda for this new nuclear age. How should scholars adapt – or entirely rethink – deterrence theories for this multi-actor era of interrelated nuclear rivalries? How must assumptions based on a bipolar Cold War order change? What are the implications of these changes in terms of escalation pathways and risks? How does this vary in big power versus regional contexts, or in nuclear dyads versus nuclear trios? How should policymakers advance arms control and mitigate arms racing dynamics? How must these efforts differ from their bilateral precedents, and how can allies effectively contribute to these efforts? How will feedback loops between distinct competitive relationships challenge the ways in which states conduct deterrence? What are the risks of an increasingly interconnected deterrence landscape and how can they be mitigated?
+
+The Fragile Balance of Terror helps to scope and present some initial answers to these critical questions, making it required reading for practitioners and experts in the nuclear field. Talmadge’s chapter in particular makes an invaluable contribution, providing a common framework for understanding and approaching this emerging landscape – a foundational step to ensuring that the nuclear community is adequately prepared to navigate and manage deterrence in the new nuclear age.
+
+
+### Response to “Psychology, Leaders, and New Deterrence Dilemmas”
+_By Nicholas Adamopoulos_
+
+While nuclear states today feature a wide variety of regime types, the vast majority of them have a degree of institutional strength capable of checking the leader’s ability to exercise complete control over their nuclear arsenal. North Korea could be considered the exception to this description, and thus it provides a glimpse into the rather bleak picture that Rose McDermott paints about deterring nuclear-armed states with personalist regimes in her chapter “Psychology, Leaders, and New Deterrence Dilemmas.”
+
+McDermott highlights three features of personalist regimes that will complicate efforts to deter them from nuclear threats or use: (1) few, if any, organizational constraints on leaders; (2) the resultant ease with which psychological mechanisms and individual pathologies can influence decisionmaking; and (3) the inability of personalist leaders to learn from previous mistakes. Taken together, these three aspects of personalist regimes raise substantial deterrence challenges, as these regimes will behave less predictably in crises and may conceptualize the risk and reward of nuclear brinksmanship differently than their democratic counterparts.
+
+The concept of state survival is central to deterrence thinking: state survival is presumably the highest priority of actors in deterrence games; therefore, the rationality of all subsequent decisions is judged with the pursuit of that goal in mind. McDermott’s characterization of personalist regimes sheds light on how different understandings of what constitutes survival for such leaders may make deterring them in crises extremely difficult. While democratic leaders tend to see themselves as responsible temporary shepherds of a collection of institutions, and therefore define survival as the continuity of these mechanisms, survival for personalist leaders is far more personal. Threats to their power are more likely to be perceived as existential threats to the state, and therefore decisions are made with personal survival in mind. This leads to personalist leaders valuing loyalty over competence when choosing advisory staff, which in turn threatens their ability to act coherently and learn from previous mistakes, again increasing the potential for rapid escalation in crisis.
+
+There is a similar discrepancy in how the established nuclear powers and potential personalist nuclear states view nuclear weapons as a symbol of, and tool for, achieving status. Personalistic leaders will be more risk-tolerant when protecting their international status, as losing it risks overthrow from within. Protection of status is more likely to be considered an existential consideration in personalist regimes – again making them far less predictable in crises and more likely to manipulate risk to demonstrate resolve. In turn, strategies of deterrence designed to threaten state resources will likely be less persuasive to personalist leaders, as they value demonstrations of strength and resolve above all and are less beholden to constituencies that may be put at risk during periods of international brinksmanship.
+
+Central to McDermott’s argument is the notion that leader behavior is the result of personal preferences expressed within a particular organizational context, and that the new challenge to deterrence comes from leaders who possess certain mercurial tendencies but lack the institutional guardrails that can course-correct them toward more predictable behavior. McDermott provides some initial thinking on how to manage future adversaries that fit this bill in the form of psychological advisors that could provide recommendations for dealing with the personalities of such leaders. While this might drastically improve insight into adversary thinking and lend a degree of stability to crisis situations, it poses interesting questions for the future of U.S. deterrence planning. How can the United States maintain a coherent deterrence strategy if it must also be carefully tailored to manage the individual pathologies of adversary leaders? While bilateral relationships may be relatively straightforward, states learn a great deal from interactions between their adversaries and third parties; and as McDermott points out, personalist regimes are particularly bad at learning due to their valuation of loyalty over competence in advisory circles. This may lead to personalistic leaders drawing incorrect conclusions about U.S. resolve or intent while observing third-party interactions, increasing the likelihood for miscalculation in crises. The United States will therefore be faced with a difficult balancing act between maintaining coherence and clarity in its communicated deterrence strategy while tailoring it to match individual leader psychological profiles.
+
+McDermott concludes with perhaps the most important lesson for future policymakers and strategists: the likelihood that this could happen at home. While democratic institutions are by far the regime type best suited to counter the negative traits of personalistic leaders, these protections are not ironclad. Institutions can be crippled or co-opted by a handful of well-placed individuals, allowing the same personal pathologies to run free in leaders of nominally democratic regimes. While deterring nuclear saber-rattling from personalist regimes with weak institutional constraints will be a challenge worth dedicating serious intellectual resources to, considerable time and effort is needed to ensure such leaders are appropriately constrained in democratic regimes as well.
+
+In the future, strategists should factor leadership psychology into their deterrence planning, as one-size-fits-all deterrence strategies may be just as likely to provoke as they are to deter in the face of nuclear-armed personalist regimes. At the same time, while nuclear proliferation to new personalist regimes is a problem worth considering in the near future, it is not a certainty, and intense effort should be focused on preventing those regimes from acquiring a nuclear capability. Finally, faced with a potentially much less stable nuclear future, the United States and its allies should make great efforts to ensure that all nuclear powers retain strong institutional guardrails surrounding nuclear use and look for ways to incentivize nondemocratic nuclear powers to invest in similarly restrictive measures.
+
+
+### Response to “Thermonuclear Twitter?”
+_By Suzanne Claeys_
+
+“Thermonuclear Twitter?” by Vipin Narang and Heather Williams examines the role of social media platforms during crises, particularly ones involving one or more nuclear powers. The chapter analyzes three case studies – the 2019 India-Pakistan crisis, the 2018 Hawaii missile alert, and the 2017 U.S. Forces Korea evacuation order from the Korean Peninsula – to explore whether and how social media affects crisis dynamics. The chapter makes three important contributions to current literature and policy implications related to social media and crisis dynamics.
+
+First, Narang and Williams address key policy questions: How do social media platforms affect crises, particularly between nuclear-armed states? Do social media platforms trigger crises and increase escalation, or do they just serve as noise without fundamentally affecting crisis dynamics? And do different platforms affect dynamics in different ways?
+
+These questions have become more relevant as people – including world leaders – flock to social media to receive and disseminate information. Today, social media has increased the interconnectivity of the world’s population, with limited restrictions on content, leading to questions and concerns about the ways in which social media can and should be leveraged in crises, especially by political leaders. Similar to the advent of the 24/7 news cycle, social media – especially open platforms – increases public pressure on governments to respond to events in real time. However, the breadth of users on social media means that decisionmakers can also be reached in real time and might fall victim to disinformation online.
+
+A close examination of the three case studies finds that although social media platforms may not independently cause crises or escalation, they can add complexity to the broader information environment. However, social media platforms are not monolithic, and different platforms create different effects depending on platform properties, crisis properties, and audience properties.
+
+Second, “Thermonuclear Twitter?” highlights policy implications for the growing reliance on social media platforms, especially as a means of information sharing. World leaders and organizations are using social media as a form of communication and signaling, but if those profiles are hijacked by hackers or malicious actors during a crisis, it creates potentially very escalatory scenarios regarding the chain of command. Should all statements made on social media by a world leader be considered an official order or policy? The chapter does not have a concrete answer to this question, but the question itself raises concerns about the use of social media for signaling purposes.
+
+Moreover, if social media can be a source of escalation, should governments shut it down during a crisis? The answer is complicated, but shutting social media down during crises may increase disinformation and rumors while also potentially removing pathways for de-escalation. Although all social media platforms have become vehicles for disinformation, Narang and Williams find that open platforms, like Twitter, will generally provide more accurate information while closed platforms, like WhatsApp, will generally reinforce mis- and disinformation.
+
+Overall, social media platforms create complexity and increase information velocity in a nuclear-tinged crisis. The speed at which information is spread and the vast audiences that can be reached through social media mean that today, both the public and policymakers are subject to the same disinformation campaigns. In a nuclear-tinged crisis, disinformation on social media platforms could cause unintended escalation (due to increased ambiguity), impact decisionmaking processes, and amplify nationalism, resulting in stronger public pressure for escalation. However, platform properties, crisis properties, and audience properties will all impact the situation, creating unpredictable outcomes – some escalatory and some de-escalatory. In preparing for future crises, decisionmakers will need to consider the role that different social media platforms could play and leverage them accordingly.
+
+Finally, Narang and Williams note that research at the nexus of social media and crisis escalation treats social media as a monolith or focuses on a single platform, with no differentiation. Moreover, social media literature does not distinguish between shorter versus longer crises. This raises several important questions and lines of effort for future scholarship: How should researchers disaggregate the effects on crises of different social media platforms? How should the public, as well as state leaders, interpret social media posts by U.S. policymakers? Are there different interpretations depending on which social media platform is used? How much impact does information on social media actually have on the decisionmaking process? And how should social media platforms be used during crises?
+
+“Thermonuclear Twitter?” offers a novel approach to research on the topic by disaggregating types of platforms, crises, and audiences to create a more granular approach. Narang and Williams’ main finding is that different social media platforms will have varied volume, accuracy, and speed of information, which in turn create distinct pathways for escalation or de-escalation during crises. These findings and continued scholarship on the nexus between social media platforms and crisis dynamics will be increasingly important as more people turn to social media for news and information.
+
+In addition to implications for future scholarship, Narang and Williams’s findings have policy implications, specifically related to the ways in which the U.S. government should interact with social media companies and disinformation in future nuclear-tinged crises. Today, content moderation is not required of social media companies, but there is an international push to hold companies more accountable for the information on their platforms. The different characteristics of platforms could require different levels of moderation and interaction between social media companies and the government. It seems, based on the chapter’s findings, that closed platforms present more of a risk for the U.S. government during a crisis, as they often enforce already held beliefs, creating echo chambers and resistance to contrary views. To counter future disinformation, the U.S. government should focus on engaging key stakeholders (including social media companies), putting out coherent messaging on social media platforms, and building societal resilience to disinformation via digital literacy initiatives.
+
+
+### Response to “Understanding New Nuclear Threats: The Open Source Intelligence Revolution?”
+_By Joseph Rodgers_
+
+“The Open-Source Intelligence Revolution” by Amy Zegart examines the emergence of a community of nongovernmental analysts in nuclear policy that will have a profound impact on the way that governmental intelligence analysts conduct their work. Zegart explores the benefits and costs of this emerging network of analysts (referred to as OSINT) and poses questions about how to best regulate this network to maximize beneficial uses and mitigate the detrimental impact of bad analysis in the public domain.
+
+Zegart broadly defines open-source analysts to include virtually all experts and hobbyists outside of government. Some OSINT analysts are former government employees, while others have little or no technical or government experience. This community includes corporations, journalists, academics, interested amateurs, and policy wonks. Zegart notes that currently, this “US-led ecosystem serves the country’s national interests well. But the future is likely to bring more players from more countries with less expertise, less responsibility, and less connectivity” to the United States and its allies.
+
+The network that spans the nongovernmental ecosystem utilizes a variety of tools and technologies to analyze developments in nuclear policy. Zegart largely focuses on the use of newly available commercial satellite imagery, but OSINT analysts also use machine learning, social media, computer modeling, crowdsourcing, and metadata to examine nonproliferation and arms control.
+
+The creation of this network of nongovernmental analysts will have a significant impact on the day-to-day operations of the intelligence community. OSINT is by nature public, and OSINT analysts are publishing their findings in newspapers and media outlets that policymakers and journalists see every day. Publications in the news may distract government intelligence analysts. Zegart notes that “the more time intelligence officials spend going over what they already know, the less time they spend on what they do not.”
+
+OSINT may unintentionally get analysis wrong, polluting the information ecosystem with disinformation that appears to be backed by credible evidence. There are numerous instances where OSINT analysts produced false news reports backed by misinterpreted satellite imagery analysis. Zegart notes one such example in 2001, when an OSINT analyst claimed to have information about Saddam Hussein’s nuclear weapons program, including an alleged covert nuclear test in 1989. In this new information environment, intelligence agencies are increasingly focusing their efforts to serve as what Zegart calls “verifiers of last resort,” assessing whether OSINT analysis is correct.
+
+While some OSINT analysts can draw wrong conclusions, the crowdsourced nature of this network of nongovernmental analysts means it can self-correct. For example, Phillip Karber and a group of Georgetown students claimed that China had constructed tunnels holding up to 3,000 hidden nuclear weapons in 2011. Other OSINT analysts reassessed the images and found serious analytical errors.
+
+That said, it is also worth noting that U.S. government intelligence itself is not always correct. Zegart notes that several academic analyses of the U.S. intelligence community have found that the track record for assessing foreign nuclear weapons programs has been poor and has tended toward overestimation.
+
+While OSINT poses significant challenges, there are also several opportunities there for U.S. intelligence agencies. Within the military and intelligence community, evaluating information and publicly releasing data is a bureaucratic process that can be slow and cumbersome, and Zegart notes that the “classified environment is designed to induce caution and confidence in analysis, but it moves at a slower pace.” One benefit of OSINT is that it can be produced publicly at a rapid rate. OSINT analysis can provide support for claims or can debunk government lies; for example, analysts at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies have repeatedly used open-source information to question North Korean claims about missile development and nuclear testing.
+
+One potential avenue for future scholarship is to look at other fields outside of the nuclear community for lessons. Numerous other disciplines have grappled with questions of data-rich environments and emerging actors. There may be useful frameworks for understanding these developments in other fields, such as systems theory or the study of technology. Policymakers should consider how to best regulate this new development to maximize benefits while minimizing the disruptive potential of OSINT to detract from the intelligence community’s vital missions.
+
+Policymakers could also consider enacting small-scale changes to improve OSINT’s standards, such as lowering restrictions on the resolution of commercially available satellite imagery. Currently, it is not legal to purchase satellite imagery that was captured at less than 25 centimeters resolution. On a larger scale, the U.S. government should consider how to foster the development of standards and best practices for OSINT. Where possible, publicly sharing best practices from intelligence agencies or holding publicly available government-sponsored workshops to train OSINT analysts could show that the United States is a leader in promoting the democratization of these technologies.
+
+The most important takeaway from this new era is that intelligence agencies are no longer the only players in the nuclear threat assessment landscape. For better and worse, these changes are inevitable, and getting ahead of the curve is the responsible course of action.
+
+
+### Response to “How Much Is Enough? Revisiting Nuclear Reliability, Deterrence, and Preventative War”
+_By Doreen Horschig_
+
+In contrast to the old nuclear states, new ones such as India, Pakistan, and North Korea tend to value the political gains of prestige-bestowing displays – including nuclear explosions, missile flight tests, and other military exercises – over the increased reliability of their forces. This relegates technical considerations to the periphery, as Jeffrey Lewis and Ankit Panda explain in their chapter, “How Much Is Enough? Revisiting Nuclear Reliability, Deterrence, and Preventive War.” They argue that new nuclear states have seemingly internalized the dramatic effects of nuclear weapons early in their development, even if their deterrent effects possess low levels of credibility. In other words, they perceive enoughness – their self-determined technical and political threshold in accomplishing their nuclear deterrence objectives – differently than the old nuclear states.
+
+Lewis and Panda’s chapter explores how political and military leaders in new nuclear states claim a nuclear force capable of sufficiently deterring aggression. It also provides a timeline of states’ nuclear developments, presents the rationale for respective levels of weaponization, and explains when adversaries accept other capable nuclear forces, while unpacking the requirements for deterrence between both sides. Lastly, the chapter explores what mechanisms are at play if two states perceive their own capabilities and those of their opponents differently. A state’s perception of enoughness often has little to do with the adversary’s reasoning about its capabilities, suggesting an inherent risk of misperceptions and misunderstandings that need to be addressed by policymakers.
+
+There are five specific implications of the chapter’s findings for international security. First, if domestic political calculations matter more than technical ones to leaders in nuclear states, there is room for error in building and testing nuclear materials. When technical considerations are of secondary importance, this can lead to major accidents during weapons displays. The humanitarian and environmental effects of such mishaps would likely be hidden given the opacity of nuclear programs, several of which have personalist leaders with little interest in publicizing errors.
+
+Second, the chapter explains that enoughness should be understood through the perception of the states themselves. This poses the broader implication that decisionmaking in foreign policy should circumvent mirrored thinking and similar cognitive biases. Instead, policymakers should comprehend the opponent’s perspective and mode of reasoning. Pyongyang does not rationalize nuclear developments in the same way Washington did. Hence, policymakers cannot use Cold War thinking to understand new nuclear states, as these do not determine their enoughness using the same quantitative and qualitative metrics of the old nuclear states. However, if decisions are driven by internal pressures, it is extremely challenging to understand North Korea’s domestic political situation.
+
+Third, when a new nuclear state prioritizes political gains, meaningful arms control agreements can be difficult to achieve. New states may be less willing to engage in negotiations or agree to restrictions on their nuclear programs, which makes nuclear risk reduction more difficult. For example, Pyongyang’s refusal to comply with international inspections and verification measures impedes any monitoring of its nuclear activities to ensure compliance. This poses significant challenges for arms control efforts in the region.
+
+A fourth implication is heightened regional tensions. If new nuclear states engage in frequent displays of their nuclear capabilities for “dramatic effects,” it can create a sense of mistrust among others in the region. For example, Pakistan felt validated in its nuclear pursuit after India’s 1974 nuclear explosion. Adversaries may interpret these displays as threats and risk arms races to develop their own nuclear capabilities for countering the perceived threat. This dynamic is also visible between India and Pakistan with their 1998 nuclear tests, which led to escalatory tensions and increased concerns about regional stability. Similarly, North Korea’s displays of its nuclear and missile programs have led to an expanded military presence, joint military exercises between the United States and South Korea, and elevated concerns about the possibility of a nuclear conflict on the Korean peninsula. These dynamics increase the risk of regional arms races, exacerbate tensions, and amplify the risk of conflict, both conventional and nuclear.
+
+Lastly, the chapter implies that deterrence is at its weakest in the early stages of a state’s nuclear program, whether it values political or technical factors. An important pillar of robust nuclear deterrence is a secure second-strike capability, through which two nuclear states refrain from attacking each other. Yet, early-stage programs tend to have uncertain retaliatory capabilities, according to Lewis and Panda. The gap between a state’s perceptions and its opponent’s perceptions of its nuclear capabilities could differ significantly, presenting a challenge for strong deterrence. Policymakers should aim to understand an opponent’s perception of its nuclear capabilities to address this challenge to deterrence.
+
+A subsequent, encouraging lesson is that deterrence ultimately becomes stronger as new nuclear programs become more sophisticated. The authors pose that new nuclear states evolve their conceptions of enoughness and eventually begin behaving like the preexisting nuclear powers, engaging with the security dilemma of attaining advantage and assuring survivability. Hence, if policymakers can get through an initial period of instability, a stronger form of deterrence will emerge. This is closely related to the concept of nuclear learning, which suggests that there will be more stability as new states learn that nuclear weapons are useful for deterrence, as discussed in Chapter 8. However, Bell and Miller argue that this theory is weak and that new nuclear states are unlikely to adapt restrained nuclear policies like the old nuclear powers.
+
+Several key questions for future scholarship emerge. For one, in what circumstances does deterrence theory change? In other words, if the decision to expand nuclear arsenals derives primarily from domestic political calculations, how does it change the strategy of deterrence and engagement with nuclear adversaries? Traditionally, the strength of deterrence is measured by technical benchmarks, but posture and doctrine are seemingly as important – if not more so. Future scholarship should explore if deterrence remains robust despite less tangible political benchmarks.
+
+Another thought-provoking question is whether it is in the international community’s interest if new nuclear states test their capabilities. If their technical benchmarks are not tested and verified as with prior nuclear powers, deterrence may weaken in this new global order. On the other hand, testing capabilities would not only incur international costs and violate global norms but also raise tensions with adversaries and have environmental effects. Given this unequal treatment, new nuclear states may feel permitted to test because of the inherent injustice of the nuclear order.
+
+A last case-specific question that derives from the Lewis and Panda chapter is how North Korea’s nuclear program will change. According to the authors, it has shifted from latency to a rudimentary, unreliable nuclear deterrent to an operational force. Given the ongoing discussion of a possible South Korean nuclear deterrent, will Pyongyang move beyond simple operationality? And if so, what might this shift look like with regard to modernization and nuclear strategy?
+
+The balance of terror described in the book is fragile and highly sensitive to changes in states’ technical capabilities. However, according to Lewis and Panda, the experience of new nuclear states suggests that the nuclear balance does not lie on technical considerations but on political ones. This contrasts with much of the academic and policy writing surrounding these issues and emphasizes a need for policymakers to reconsider how deterrence is conventionally understood and applied.
+
+
+### Response to “Survivability in the New Era of Counterforce”
+_By Lachlan MacKenzie_
+
+In his chapter, “Survivability in the New Era of Counterforce,” Christopher Clary challenges experts’ assertions – namely those of Keir Leiber and Daryl Press – that the world has entered a new era of counterforce, in which protecting nuclear arsenals against attack is significantly more difficult. Clary argues that states refrained from employing counterforce attacks during past periods of highly questionable force survivability and that, while developments in sensing and strike technology have introduced new vulnerabilities for nuclear forces, technological advancement is unlikely to generate greater instability than in previous crises. Specifically, Clary suggests that, while hardening may now have less value for survivability, force mobility can still generate significant uncertainty for counterforce targeters. Clary further asserts that there is a large degree of asymmetry in the competition between counterforce “hiders and finders.” While wealthier nuclear powers will need to spend heavily to develop sensing and strike capabilities that could enable counterforce, smaller nuclear states will need only an “arms jog” to preserve the security of their forces. Nonetheless, smaller states’ reactive measures could have serious ramifications for strategic stability.
+
+Clary’s finding that counterforce is no easier today than in past eras has at least two significant implications for international security. First, it indicates that U.S. leaders will continue to contend with mutually assured destruction (MAD) as an inescapable condition in competition with its principal nuclear adversaries. Despite significant investments in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and prompt strike capabilities, the United States, like all nuclear powers, will remain unable to unilaterally eliminate the threat posed by other states’ nuclear forces. Second, Clary’s work suggests that strategic stability is more durable than many appreciate. Weaker nuclear powers – with the possible exception of North Korea – should not be overly concerned about falling victim to counterforce. Minimal investment on the part of Russia, China, and Pakistan will ensure that counterforce remains an unappealing option for U.S. and Indian leaders. Russian investments in novel nuclear delivery systems and the massive ongoing expansion of the Chinese nuclear force – sometimes assessed as responses to U.S. missile defense developments and related concerns about counterforce vulnerability – may therefore be unnecessary for the maintenance of strategic stability. To the extent that counterforce fears drive these modernization efforts, they could reflect misunderstanding on the part of foreign leaders about the technical feasibility of counterforce.
+
+Clary’s discussion of states’ possible responses to the development of new counterforce-enabling capabilities also raises an important question for U.S. policymakers: Does the continued pursuit of nuclear primacy serve U.S. interests when that pursuit is unlikely to mitigate challenges posed by mutual vulnerability and may provoke destabilizing responses from adversaries? As a case in point, do the advantages that new ISR and strike capabilities provide to conventional forces outweigh the risks that might result from U.S. adversaries expanding and dispersing their nuclear forces, or potentially moving to launch-on-warning postures (possible responses that Clary identifies)? U.S. policymakers should carefully weigh the strategic benefits of new technologies against their potentially destabilizing impacts. When possible, it may make sense to tailor investments in ISR and prompt strike capabilities to maximize the conventional advantages that these capabilities confer, while minimizing their counterforce applications – and thereby forestalling adversaries’ dangerous reactions.
+
+Finally, Clary’s work raises three key questions for future research about the factors that might influence a leader’s decision to pursue counterforce. First, how do the leaders of nuclear-armed states assess the military feasibility of counterforce? While Clary makes a compelling argument that nuclear forces will remain survivable despite ongoing technological changes, Russian and Chinese nuclear modernization and expansion programs indicate that the leaders of those states may believe otherwise. Understanding what the leaders of nuclear-armed states believe about counterforce vulnerability and why they hold those beliefs is crucial for understanding counterforce temptations, since leaders will ultimately make policy based on their perceptions – rather than on the reality – of counterforce feasibility.
+
+Second, how do factors other than the chances of military success – such as considerations about third-party intervention, the difficulties of dealing with a target state after a nuclear strike, or global perceptions – influence a leader’s counterforce deliberations? Clary and other experts focus on military feasibility as the key determinant of whether states will pursue counterforce. In the Sino-Soviet case of 1969, however, non-military factors appear to have been decisive in deterring Soviet counterforce strikes, so is scholars’ focus on military feasibility well-placed? Developing an understanding of the full range of factors that influence a leader’s decisionmaking is crucial for understanding the circumstances under which a state might employ counterforce strikes.
+
+Third, how does a leader’s psychology influence the chances that a state will pursue counterforce? While leaders refrained from launching counterforce strikes during past crises, could events have played out differently had a more arrogant, paranoid, or vengeful leader been in command? Previous studies on the viability of counterforce have largely ignored personality and psychology. As leadership psychology gains increasing recognition as an important determinant of strategic stability, it will be important to examine how psychology and personality interact with counterforce temptations.
+
+Clary’s chapter contributes new thinking to the counterforce debate, carries significant implications for international security and U.S. policy, and raises a number of important questions for follow-on research. Exploring these questions will be vital for developing a fuller understanding of counterforce temptations, especially as states invest in modernizing and expanding their nuclear forces and as tensions between nuclear powers – most notably the United States, Russia, and China – continue to escalate.
+
+
+### Response to “The Fulcrum of Fragility: Command and Control in Regional Nuclear Powers”
+_By Melissa Chan_
+
+In their chapter, Giles David Arceneaux and Peter D. Feaver highlight a fundamental dilemma of possessing nuclear weapons: nuclear weapons should always be ready and secure to resist preemptive or decapitating efforts and should never be launched without authorization. Nuclear command and control (NC2) arrangements are designed to address this dilemma.
+
+Arceneaux and Feaver explain that early NC2 theories from the post–Cold War era were mostly accurate for regional nuclear powers. The theories predicted that regional NC2 could vary based on geostrategic context, political and material constraints, and learning derived from the U.S. and Soviet experiences, which is all true. However, regional nuclear powers are forced to make tradeoffs – not previously made by the two superpowers – between the resilience and reliability of their arsenal and its safety and security. To increase readiness and response time for deployment, political leaders must sacrifice administrative oversight and recognize the value of delegating decisionmaking to lower-level military commanders. In contrast, efforts to increase arsenal reliability jeopardize arsenal safety due to the increased likelihood of unauthorized or accidental use. The authors also argue that all nuclear states must ultimately defer to military operators for delivering a nuclear strike, although political leaders may initiate it. Their new framework for understanding NC2 asks when the delegation occurs with respect to a crisis: in peacetime, early in a crisis, or late in a crisis. The authors introduce three distinct NC2 styles with inherent policy implications.
+
+First, delegative control systems authorize nuclear use – including physical assets control – to lower-level military operators during peacetime, though not typically with use-control technologies such as permissive action links (PALs) and their equivalents. The authors present one challenge to this: it enables the military to launch a nuclear strike under any conditions for the sake of arsenal readiness. To avoid decisionmaking mishaps in governing the nuclear arsenal, the military has to reinforce standard operating procedures for nuclear codes, prevent divergence in the chain of command, and anticipate threats with an objective mentality. During a crisis, the military is closer to initiating a nuclear strike and more prone to using nuclear weapons to resolve conflicts whenever they see fit.
+
+Second, assertive control systems promote resilience against unauthorized nuclear use by deferring to a centralized authority in a crisis. This includes deeper political control with PALs or equivalents to dissect administrative control and physical possession with limited military influence. Arceneaux and Feaver explain that this strategy increases decisionmaking time and delays the reassembly of warheads and delivery platforms to initiate a nuclear strike, rendering arsenals – especially ground-based missile systems – vulnerable to decapitation. Even with time-related vulnerabilities, there are opportunities to fill the assembly time required by occupying the adversary’s attention with nonnuclear and face-saving tactics, such as diplomacy and alliance building. The time needed for deployment can allow optimal collaborative moments for building trust, calling off a nuclear strike entirely, and de-escalating a crisis.
+
+Finally, conditional control systems are a mixed approach, because delegation powers lie with a centralized authority during peacetime but are then transferred to military operators early in a crisis. The authors highlight three implications: (1) rapid assembly and nuclear weapons readiness can signal malign intent to an adversary and further increase escalation; (2) rapid transfer of delegation powers can weaken political oversight and increase chances of a political-military conflict while political leaders attempt to de-escalate a crisis; and (3) the fast decentralization process may convince adversaries of intended first use, along with any other misperceptions.
+
+From these three approaches, Arceneaux and Feaver explore three arguments for explaining regional NC2. A state’s external threat environment creates “use them or lose them” pressures that encourage a preemptive strike. Nuclear threats tend to produce delegative control because of increased urgency for rapid use, especially in states with small arsenals, inferior conventional capabilities, limited geographic depth, and nuclear adversaries. However, the authors explain that this argument fails to explain assertive control in states facing nuclear threats, such as China and India, and persistent delegative control within the United Kingdom and France. Observing an adversary’s external threat environment is more doable but more prone to accelerating crises due to the existing likelihood of nuclear use.
+
+The strategic rationale of the arsenal is derived from first-use or late-use nuclear strategies that shape NC2. Arceneaux and Feaver explain the nuclear postures of China (assured retaliation), France (first use), South Africa (late use), and India (late use), but they note the unexpected first-use strategy held by Pakistan (excluding delegation powers to the military during peacetime) and the United Kingdom’s persistent delegative control despite their late-use doctrine. This argument illustrates discrepancies, but understanding regional nuclear doctrines can help determine the next move in a crisis.
+
+The domestic political environment pertains to civil-military relations, including political and military interests, domestic instability, and regime survival. The authors mention the United Kingdom’s entire history of military involvement in nuclear decisionmaking due to limited bureaucratic barriers, China’s domestic instability after the Cultural Revolution, South Africa’s apartheid regime, and India’s exclusion of the military in nuclear issues. However, they note that this argument does not predict how strong military influences in Israel and South Africa did not lead to assertive control and how domestically stable states like the United Kingdom retained delegative control even when external threats subsided. Regional domestic politics can be considered the least understood, especially in authoritarian regimes, because of a lack of transparency and understanding of different societies.
+
+The simplified Cold War–era framework through which the nuclear community has been approaching NC2 needs to evolve on a case-by-case basis for understanding new nuclear powers. The limited knowledge of NC2 systems is further disrupted by new technologies like social media, cybersecurity, and artificial intelligence. Each form complicates the always/never dilemma and opens additional pathways for crisis escalation and nuclear use related to disinformation, technical controls, and nuclear use authorization and decentralization processes. With greater uncertainty about the intentions and capabilities of new nuclear powers, how should the United States modernize its NC2 system to address the additional caveats that come with the technological age while learning how new nuclear powers govern their own NC2 systems?
+
+In an era of numerous nuclear states, there is a clear need to rethink ways for strengthening strategic stability to reinforce de-escalation tactics with adversaries during a crisis. New nuclear powers have opted for more flexible NC2 styles, making their behaviors more unpredictable. With recent events including Russia’s suspension of New START and rejection of obligatory inspections, North Korea’s cadence of missile tests, and China’s reacting to U.S. diplomatic visits by threatening Taiwan’s sovereignty, the urgency of creatively strengthening strategic stability coincides with ever-widening gaps of knowledge as all nuclear states navigate the international security order in the age of advancing technologies. This is further exacerbated by the noticeable lack of technological studies in the strategic studies community.
+
+In the event of nuclear use, the fallout includes ramifications to climate change, global health, the international economy, and humanitarian crises. To prevent this, knowing the ins and outs of command and control systems in regional nuclear powers is the first step to reinforcing deterrence, strengthening strategic stability, and preventing nuclear use in a conflict. Some challenges in pursuit of this goal include a closed “us versus them” outlook when rationalizing adversarial behaviors, new nuclear states pursuing destabilizing NC2 features, and advancing technologies corrupting scholars’ limited understanding of regional nuclear powers’ doctrines.
+
+
+### Response to “The Limits of Nuclear Learning in the New Nuclear Age”
+_By Jessica Link_
+
+In their chapter, “The Limits of Nuclear Learning in the New Nuclear Age,” Mark Bell and Nicholas Miller challenge core assumptions of the nuclear learning argument, which posits that the behaviors of nuclear-armed states become more stable over time as they learn from nuclear interactions and crises. Proponents of nuclear learning assume that stable deterrence dynamics emerge after a period of learning.
+
+While Bell and Miller acknowledge that some nuclear learning can occur, they push back against the assumption that it is an inevitable, automatic path to stable deterrence relationships. The authors highlight several weaknesses in the nuclear learning argument. First, states are “poor learners” that face several institutional barriers to identifying and understanding the correct lessons. Moreover, states might struggle to implement what they have learned into the domestic institutions responsible for nuclear stewardship. Second, states may learn the wrong lessons that encourage destabilizing behavior, especially if they emerge from a situation in which destabilizing behavior paid strategic dividends. Finally, dynamics between nuclear-armed states are not necessarily conducive to positive nuclear learning. Interactions between nuclear-armed adversaries are marked by skepticism about the intent behind stabilizing actions, thus undermining their impact. Some states might also intentionally exploit their adversary’s stabilizing measures to gain an advantage.
+
+Nuclear learning will only become more difficult in the coming decades given increasingly complex deterrence dynamics, weakened crisis stability, horizontal and vertical proliferation of emerging technologies that “increasingly facilitate aggressive, counterforce-oriented nuclear postures,” and higher levels of nuclear secrecy, particularly by potential proliferators. Considering this, Bell and Miller’s chapter makes several valuable contributions to international security policy and scholarship.
+
+First, Bell and Miller’s findings have important implications for the international security environment as states contend with a weakened nonproliferation regime, high global levels of nuclear latency, and a new set of states with heightened demand-side drivers for proliferation. Some U.S. nuclear strategy circles (albeit small ones) advance the idea of “nuclear optimism” in a way that excuses or tolerates future proliferation. For example, these advocates might openly flirt with the idea that proliferation by South Korea will lead to more stable deterrence dynamics in East Asia, particularly with North Korea. Under certain conditions, nuclear weapons deter aggression and create a stabilizing balance between adversaries. However, there is no guarantee that new nuclear actors will inevitably fall into these stable deterrence patterns.
+
+If anything, as Bell and Miller point out, future nuclear actors might face incentives to undertake risky and destabilizing behavior and steer their arsenals to meet aggressive counterforce requirements. As The Fragile Balance of Terror meticulously outlines, the new nuclear era is increasingly complicated, and risks of intentional and unintentional escalation are heightened. The destabilizing impact of future proliferation is unpredictable and nuclear learning is not guaranteed. To hedge against this uncertain future, U.S. policymakers must maintain a steadfast commitment to nonproliferation and strengthen extended deterrence commitments to prevent the emergence of new nuclear-armed states.
+
+Bell and Miller also address several key policy questions against the backdrop of an increasingly complex nuclear order and worsening proliferation landscape. Do new nuclear-armed states represent unique risks to stability, whereas established nuclear-armed states do not? Do recent proliferators that act in destabilizing ways, such as North Korea, pose long-term policy challenges or short-term problems that will naturally stabilize over time? Bell and Miller establish that the international community cannot expect states such as North Korea to naturally act within the bounds of stable deterrence dynamics after an initial period of learning. As such, North Korea might very well be a long-term policy challenge for the United States. Moreover, policymakers and scholars cannot assume that established nuclear-armed states will inevitably demonstrate responsible nuclear behavior. Russia’s nuclear saber-rattling in the context of its invasion of Ukraine – along with its willingness to allow strategic stability measures, such as arms control agreements and crisis communication mechanisms, to atrophy – clearly demonstrates that experienced nuclear-armed states might behave outside the bounds of stable deterrence dynamics despite decades of learning.
+
+U.S. policymakers should continue to seek stable deterrence relationships with other nuclear-armed states where possible – perhaps with more innovative approaches, such as engaging non-aligned movement (NAM) states to advocate for the adoption of globally beneficial stability measures by the United States, Russia, and China. However, knowing that U.S. efforts might fail since some states face incentives for destabilizing behavior, the United States should also be prepared to mitigate risks emanating from destabilizing nuclear-armed states. For example, unilateral moves to establish responsible behavior norms, such as the U.S. ban on anti-satellite weapons testing, as well as track 2 (backchannel) diplomacy, might provide valuable avenues for risk reduction when official multilateral efforts fail.
+
+Finally, this chapter poses critical considerations for future scholarship as Bell and Miller push back against the assumption that nuclear-armed states change their behavior in a progressive and normative way, rather than a “value-neutral” way. In other words, advocates of the nuclear learning argument assume that nuclear-armed states value stable deterrence patterns above other foreign policy objectives and, therefore, progressively change their behavior to that end. The authors, however, highlight that this is not always the case – not all nuclear-armed states value stable deterrence as it is defined in the United States. As a new nuclear era marked by unprecedented nuclear dynamics emerges, scholars must interrogate their assumptions about the nature of state behavior and its drivers in order to provide accurate scholarship. Looking at the nuclear learning argument within a value-neutral framework raises several questions in need of rigorous analysis: Under what conditions does nuclear learning yield positive impacts to stability versus negative impacts? What other factors might impact these outcomes? What qualities and characteristics of the stabilizing measure (i.e., permissive action links) itself make it more or less likely to be adopted by states? As the world enters into a new nuclear era, these questions might yield insights into how the international community can reinforce stability between nuclear-armed states.
+
+---
+
+__Heather Williams__ is the director of the Project on Nuclear Issues and a senior fellow in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
+
+__Jamie Kwong__ is a fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Her research focuses on public opinion of nuclear weapons issues; threats climate change poses to nuclear weapons; and multilateral regimes including the P5 Process, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.
+
+__Nicholas Adamopolous__ is a program manager and research associate with the Project on Nuclear Issues in the International Security Program at CSIS, where he manages the CSIS PONI Nuclear Scholars initiative. His research focuses on the future of arms control, disinformation and crisis escalation, and alliance dynamics.
+
+__Suzanne Claeys__ is a former associate director and associate fellow with the Project on Nuclear Issues in the International Security Program at CSIS, where she managed the CSIS European Trilateral Track 2 Nuclear Dialogues and research on the future of arms control in an era of strategic competition.
+
+__Joseph Rodgers__ is an associate director and associate fellow with the Project on Nuclear Issues in the International Security Program at CSIS.
+
+__Doreen Horschig__ is an associate fellow with the Project on Nuclear Issues in the International Security Program at CSIS.
+
+__Lachlan MacKenzie__ is a program coordinator and research assistant with the Project on Nuclear Issues in the International Security Program at CSIS.
+
+__Melissa Chan__ is the program coordinator for Global Security and International Affairs at the American Academy.
+
+__Jessica Link__ is a program coordinator and research assistant with the Project on Nuclear Issues in the International Security Program at CSIS.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-28-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-75.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-28-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-75.md
new file mode 100644
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-28-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-75.md
@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第 75 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-06-28 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 官質疑論壇作出虛假陳述 彭卓棋指為「鬥黃」、今回看是「策略錯誤」
+- 彭卓棋稱無興趣理會民主派能否獲35+：我只關注自己攞唔攞到議席
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（28日）踏入審訊第75天。前南區區議員彭卓棋繼續作供，表示《國安法》後已放棄原有政綱，盡力避免犯法，「我認為當時我係安全，我唔覺得我會係犯法嘅人」；又指整個初選期間不知道「35+計劃」是有關無差別否決預算案，「墨落無悔」亦沒提及「無差別」，惟法官質疑他「捉字蝨」，指該字眼是於公訴書才首次出現。
+
+昨天承認「扮黃」的彭今亦確認，在選舉論壇上說他並不相信的事，重申「用呢啲語言先至有機會贏」。法官陳慶偉質疑他是與團隊串謀作出虛假陳述，彭一度稱「我哋嗰刻冇係想係欺騙選民」，後答「如果係咁樣嘅話，係囉」。彭承認當時「我係鬥黃嘅」，但坦言現時回看是「策略錯誤」和「自傲的代價」，「因此我今日喺度。」
+
+#### 彭稱單張提「對抗極權」僅口號、曾確認初選政綱無在票站展示
+
+前南區區議員彭卓棋今繼續作供。他昨供稱，因應《國安法》將選舉政綱撕毀並派發，以示放棄政綱，其後並派發名為「請柬」的單張。彭解釋，該「請柬」是想邀請選民投票，不稱為「政綱」是因「我哋已經放棄晒所有政綱」；並指《國安法》後將原有單張的「支持任何一位你屬意的參選人」，改為「支持『對抗極權，背水之戰』，彭卓棋港島團隊」，指「雖然係冇政綱，但係我哋依然想贏」。
+
+法官陳仲衡問「對抗極權」是什麼意思，彭稱「我認為政綱應該係要具體嘅，（但）呢個係一個口號」。陳再指，彭政綱提及的「19年免費教育」才更似一個口號多於具體計劃，彭指「嗰個係我真心想實踐出嚟嘅」，因很多大學生有很重的負擔。
+
+彭昨亦指，曾聯絡民主動力職員 Christy 將所有政綱移除。他今指初選投票首天曾載入投票系統，確認政綱被移除並作出截圖，庭上所示其政綱一欄空白；他亦曾到李永財辦事處票站，確認沒有展示他的政綱。陳仲衡問，就彭當時與民動職員的對話，書面證明不是更好？彭稱「冇諗過」，因相信口頭亦有效力。李運騰再問為何不公開撕毀單張，以達到最佳效果，彭重申沒有想過，認為派爛單張和通知民動刪政綱已足夠。
+
+#### 彭稱「以為自己好安全」、葉劉淑儀稱看不到初選違法
+
+李運騰問，那彭有沒有想過退出初選？彭稱：「我冇諗過，因為我以為自己好安全，如果用今日睇返嘅話」，李微笑指那將會由法庭裁定。盧敏儀再問，那彭當時是否已用盡所有方法避免觸犯《國安法》？彭稱「基本上我做盡咗㗎啦」。
+
+李運騰續問，彭作為「35+計劃」的參與者，曾否確保組織者沒有違法。彭重申當時「真係唔知道咩係犯法，咩係唔犯法」，「我只能夠確保我自己係唔犯法」，並指記得當時社會上一些「好有影響力嘅人士」包括葉劉淑儀，曾指「見唔到初選有咩違法」。李運騰指葉劉淑儀並非計劃的局內人，彭同意她並非運動的一部分，但相信是代表政府。陳仲衡追問，那葉劉淑儀有說「無差別」否決預算案是違法嗎？彭指「我冇睇到呢一句」。
+
+#### 彭稱曾閱讀《國安法》但「唔太睇得明」 重申放棄政綱下參選以為安全
+
+被問有否收過組織者稱初選不違法的訊息，彭指只是於7月14日從群組收到戴耀廷稱，公開訊息說35+目的是運用《基本法》權力包括否決預算案，令政府問責，「不提否決每一個議案，也不說癱瘓政府。」在法官追問下，彭指當時沒有問區諾軒，重申「嗰刻我真係認為自己係好安全」；又指他有讀《國安法》條文，「但我唔太睇得明最初版本」，他曾嘗試透過英語理解但找不到英文版。
+
+李運騰問，若他看不明白法律，會否令他更擔心觸犯法例？彭重申：「我當時真係唔覺得係咁樣，因為我覺得自己好安全」，又指他已「放棄政綱」，「我係一個空洞嘅情況下去選舉，我認為當時我係安全」，又指「我唔覺得我會係犯法嘅人囉」。
+
+#### 彭卓棋稱「墨落無悔」無提「無差別」否決 官着勿「捉字蝨」
+
+盧敏儀再問及，整個初選期間，彭是否知道35+計劃是關於無差別否決預算案？彭否認，亦不知道其他參與者有意無差別否決預算案。陳仲衡指因彭沒細看他簽署的「墨落無悔」，彭同意當時沒細看，但被捕後「睇返都好似冇『無差別』呢個字」。
+
+李運騰表示，不認為要太着重「無差別」一字，認為重點是有沒有人提過無論如何都會否決預算案以爭取政治目的，例如五大訴求，彭指沒聽過。李運騰問，所以彭是唯一一個提出否決預算案的人？陳慶偉亦問，即彭從來沒聽過否決預算案，否決是的主意？彭指當時有人提及，具體不記得是誰，「但好多人講。」
+
+陳慶偉指，戴耀廷在首次協調會議已提過，彭怎能說沒有概念、不記得？彭稱因他是被問及「無差別」的概念。陳慶偉指，不要管「無差別」，指該字眼從來沒有在任何文件出現，只是於公訴書上首次出現，「不要捉字蝨（play with the word）。」彭指，若並非針對「無差別」一字，協調會議有提過，亦有聽過其他參選人指會運用否決權爭取五大訴求。法官指彭自己在論壇亦有提過。
+
+#### 被問是否盡力避免違法 彭卓棋稱曾受BBC訪問提因不想違法遂放棄政綱
+
+盧敏儀其後向彭指，法官「有智慧又好心地（wisely and kindly）」向彭建議了一些避免違反《國安法》的方法。惟陳慶偉即指他們從沒有建議人們如何避免違《國安法》，李運騰亦指，他們只是提議彭可嘗試通知公眾他已改變的其他方法。盧敏儀續改問，考慮到各種通知公眾已改變政綱的方法，彭當時有否盡所能避免違法、符合法例和通知公眾？
+
+彭回應時主動提到，BBC曾訪問他為何單張「爛溶溶」，他回應「我唔想犯《國安法》，所以我放棄個政綱，同埋我唔想犯法同埋唔想被人DQ。」辯方續展示該篇訪問〈香港立法會選舉：民主派面對《國安法》與「不割席」的考驗〉，提及彭向BBC中文表示，「由於《國安法》含糊不清，不知道當局會怎樣利用《國安法》或其他理由去取消民主派人士的參選資格，他自己也在文宣物品上有所改動，相信選民會了解候選人的做法。」陳仲衡指段落只是顯示彭擔心被DQ，彭稱「唔止呢樣嘢」，重申曾告知記者因《國安法》故放棄政綱，亦擔心DQ。
+
+陳慶偉亦再次問，彭是否已盡力避免違法和通知公眾，彭稱「我認為真係已經做到最好喇」。李運騰補充，《國安法》下或沒列明「應盡的努力（due diligence）」為抗辯理由，但彭的相關證供或與他是否意圖顛覆國家政權相關。
+
+
+▲ 彭卓棋
+
+#### 彭認刻意違港島名單不多於3人共識 稱盡力壯大團隊、「跟返個心去做」
+
+此外，彭卓棋確認港島區協調會議，就一張名單不得多於3人達成共識，但他報名初選時名單有4人，確認他不跟從共識行事：「因為我覺得立法會正選都冇呢一啲嘅限制，點解要限制我有幾個人呢？咁我就覺得，唔好理佢喇，我哋只要跟返我哋個心去做。」李運騰問有否想過民主動力會拒絕其申請，彭稱有想過，「但係我哋覺得跟返我哋個心去做先啱」，同意他當時刻意違反會議共識，因該規矩不利其勝算。
+
+陳仲衡問他當時以為可贏取多於一席？彭指「我當時冇咁天真認為我可以贏多一席，但係由於我哋係素人，我哋嘅知名度好低，我可以做嘅就係盡可能令我哋嘅團隊壯大」，陳仲衡問是為他自己的利益？彭指是為了團隊一起勝出，「因為若果我贏咗，呢一個嘅勝利佢哋都有份」，解釋因做立法會議員可以開聯合辦事處，他可合法地將政府資源與團隊成員分享。
+
+#### 官質疑彭串謀作出虛假陳述 彭認「鬥黃」用選舉語言 但並非想欺騙選民
+
+彭卓棋續確認，其團隊成員、前灣仔區議員張嘉莉也有出席論壇。李運騰問，彭是否真誠（honest）相信他在論壇上說的話？彭指「嗰啲係選舉語言囉」，陳仲衡着他直接答問題，李運騰亦指不認為需解釋何謂真誠相信。彭回應，「我諗未必喇」，重申他當時亦「唔係好理解」肢體抗爭不能癱瘓政府。李運騰着彭勿轉移話題，重申是問彭當時是否相信他說的話，彭指「我嗰陣時淨係諗，呢啲用語對我嘅選情有冇利」，李追問即是真實與否並不重要？陳慶偉亦問：「你所講嘅嘢係唔係你深信嘅嘢，係唔係一個正確嘅事實？」彭堅定答「唔係」，指張嘉莉亦同樣。
+
+陳慶偉續舉起手指指着彭說，「簡言之，即是你與團隊串謀向選民作出虛假陳述（conspire together to utter false statements to the voters）」，彭說「我哋嗰刻冇係想係欺騙選民」，陳說不是欺騙，而是串謀作出虛假陳述，彭放慢語速：「如果係咁樣嘅話，係囉」，旁聽席有人搖頭和發笑。
+
+盧敏儀問，彭一開始就有目的（set out）作出虛假陳述？彭稱「唔係咁樣」。陳仲衡續指，「但你知道你不是那麼黃，卻塑造自己成非常黃的候選人」，彭同意，指「因為我要用呢啲語言先至有機會贏」。陳追問他是刻意為之？彭答：「我哋係刻意係用選舉用語囉，但係我哋唔係想呃人嗰種態度出發。」
+
+陳仲衡再次問：「你想選民相信你很黃，但其實你不是？」彭答：「我覺得當時黃唔黃冇一個具體嘅定義，但係我係鬥黃嘅」，此時被告席的鄒家成笑着向旁聽席展示一張黃色紙。彭續同意法官指，他當時的選舉策略就是要取悅選民，以增加勝算，李運騰問，所以他當時認為取得初選入場券是最重要的考慮？彭答：「係，但一定要係法律嘅框架下進行」，又指若他並非立法會議員，「我心中所想實踐嘅理想，根本就冇可能達成。」
+
+#### 彭稱從無說要特首下台 現時回看「策略錯誤」
+
+盧敏儀最後問，若彭知道「35+計劃」是關於不理會預算案的內容和優劣也否決、迫使行政長官落台和顛覆國家政權，彭會同意嗎？彭一律說「不會」，並指他當時從來沒說過要特首下台。
+
+陳仲衡指，彭政綱的說法是只會否決不公義的議案，彭同意，陳再指但他也有說政府是不公義，彭稱是「誇張嘅選舉修飾」，但就他個人而言，則認為立法會議員不論立場「不可能違反公義」，「冇理由係會支持一啲不公義嘅財政預算案同法案。」李追問，但公義也包括向他人講述真心相信的事？彭同意，並重申「我當時用嘅呢一啲策略係錯誤嘅」。李問那他當時也是不公義地行事嗎？彭語氣略帶凝重：「而家睇返，呢個係我哋⋯⋯策略錯誤，同埋我哋嘅自傲啦，嘅代價。因此我今日喺度。」
+
+彭卓棋完成主問。
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（28日）踏入審訊第75天。前南區區議員彭卓棋開始接受控方盤問，表示2020年3月與戴耀廷首會面討論初選時，無特別回應戴提出立會過半的目標，指自己「冇特別有興趣理會民主派係咪攞到35+議席」，「我只關注自己攞唔攞到議席」；而就戴協調會議上提否決權是「可用可不用，視乎政府做得好唔好」，彭稱雖戴無解釋何謂「好」，但當時「心中已經同意」，戴亦沒提要以否決權迫使政府回應五大訴求。
+
+彭又表示，因留意到有港島潛在候選人已簽署「墨落無悔」，故當時僅「䁽過」便簽，以免「輸陣勢」，但後同意自己是除發起人梁晃維外第一名簽署的港島參選人。彭亦指，「抗爭」可解作「據理力爭」，故自視為「抗爭派」，指該稱呼「既修辭亦都係有真誠形容」。法官反問政府若據理力爭是否也是「抗爭派」，彭稱分別是權在政府，議員要政府放權才能爭取。
+
+#### 彭稱不關注民主派過半僅關注自己議席、五大訴求「部分係」助晉身立會政治修辭
+
+彭卓棋早上完成主問，下午開始接受控方周天行盤問。就彭卓棋與戴耀廷和區諾軒於2020年3月的會面，彭稱戴耀廷會上提過會進行初選，目標令民主派「唔好浪費票源」，以達致立會過半，但否認控方指有提及運用否決權迫使政府回應五大訴求。他亦記得討論過初選應該用電子票，因電子票對他有利，但他對戴耀廷提立會過半「冇特別回應」。
+
+法官陳仲衡問，彭當時想民主派立會過半嗎？彭答「我想我可以攞到議席」，林卓廷和鄒家成露齒笑。陳着他直接回答問題，彭答：「我冇特別有興趣理會民主派係咪攞到35+嘅議席」。陳追問彭作為35+計劃的參與者，不關注泛民能否過半？彭再稱「我只關注自己攞唔攞到議席」。陳着彭不要逃避問題，又指判斷彭的可信性時，會考慮他的行為舉止。李運騰並指他不明白，若彭望入議會實踐政綱，只有他一票又如何能做到？彭稱會作提倡並說服其他議員同事。
+
+彭續在盤問下同意，有關注爭取五大訴求，指是當時社會對政府一些不滿意見，望政府能回應。周天行問他是否想五大訴求實現，彭指「如果可以達成嘅就可以達成」，但「最緊要」仍是達成立法會議員政綱的倡議。李運騰問，所以五大訴求對他而言只是幫他晉身立會的政治修辭（political rhetoric）？彭先稱「嗰陣時係好多人關注呢件事，我都有關注」，追問下稱「部分係」。
+
+彭稱無看過任何戴耀廷區諾軒35+帖文、對公民黨及戴耀廷記招不知情
+
+彭亦確認，案發期間沒看過戴耀廷和區諾軒與35+有關的任何一篇文章和 Facebook 帖文。李運騰指，彭於見面前並不私下認識戴耀廷，不會想了解他的政治立場和他是否可信嗎？彭稱雖不私下認識戴，但公眾層面上知道他是港大教授，「咁應該唔會係騙局或者呃人囉」，又指知道戴是民主派，涉佔領中環。
+
+彭續確認，有出席3月26日的首次港島區協調會議，但對同日早上戴耀廷等召開的立會過半記者會，以及前一日的公民黨記者會均不知情。李運騰問，協調會議有人談及早上舉行的記者會嗎？彭稱「印象中冇」。
+
+#### 彭稱協調會無反對用否決權 指司馬文說法有道理惟不記得理據
+
+彭卓棋早前供稱，戴耀廷於首次會議提及運用《基本法》權力否決預算案，司馬文反對。彭指他當時無表達任何反對，「因為我覺得司馬文嘅講法有道理，戴耀廷嘅答法都有道理，可用可唔用，我覺得兩個都冇錯。」
+
+陳慶偉問，司馬文反對的理據是什麼？彭稱不記得。陳仲衡即指但彭剛說司馬文有道理，陳慶偉亦指若戴耀廷只是說否決權可用可不用，看不到司馬文為何會反對。彭說「真係唔記得」，陳慶偉問二人均屬經濟、發展及規劃事務委員會，會否與此有關？彭稱「以我認識嘅司馬文，應該都係同經濟有關係」，但強調因相隔太久故記不清楚。
+
+彭在盤問下表示，與司馬文是同事，但沒有討論他為何反對否決預算案，也無討論過「35+計劃」，但補充司馬文曾問他能否提名自己參選立法會「區議會（第一）」界別，確認與初選無關，他初選時亦沒有問司馬文取提名。
+
+
+▲ 司馬文
+
+#### 彭指戴耀廷稱政府做得好可不用否決權 認無解釋何謂「好」但心中已同意
+
+周天行續指，彭曾提及若預算案包括他的政綱倡議，便不會否決，若這些事項真是他所關注，他會在會上反對戴耀廷？彭重申，因當時戴提及否決權是「可用可不用，視乎政府做得好唔好」。李運騰問戴有否解釋何謂「做得好」和有否提要政府回應「五大訴求」，彭指沒有，重申戴只稱政府「做得好，你咪唔使用囉」。但彭後在陳仲衡追問下，指戴耀廷會上傳閱的「35+計劃」文件亦提及凡認同「五大訴求，缺一不可」便可參與協調，他當時讀過並同意該條文。
+
+法官和控方其後追問彭當時為何無反對。李運騰指不同人對何謂「好」都會不同的看法，再問戴有否提到何謂「好」？彭稱沒有，他亦沒有問，「因為好同唔好我心中有個答案。」周天行追問，戴提到否決權可用可不用，彭擔心否決權會被運用嗎？彭答沒有，並指「每個立法會議員運行佢嘅權力，佢一定有佢嘅原因」。李運騰追問，但若預算案包括對彭的選區有利的項目，他會擔心被否決嗎？彭稱「我會擔心嘅，但係人哋嘅意志係乜嘢，我冇辦法去左右」，並指若其他人想否決他認為是好的預算案，「咁我諗我會盡力說服佢唔好咁做，如果唔得都冇計。」
+
+李運騰追問，若就何時用或不用否決權達成共識是否更理想，彭重申會上已提及「政府做得好就唔用（否決權）」，他「心中已經同意咗」；但他相信若會上提及「點樣都一定要用（否決權）」，「咁我應該會出聲啦。」
+
+周天行其後再指出控方案情，指戴耀廷於首次會議提及積極運用《基本法》權力否決預算案，迫使政府回應五大訴求，彭答「同意」。法官李運騰指問題有點長，不想對彭不公，指無爭議首次會議提否決權，但問題重點是後句，即戴有否提用否決權迫政府回應五大訴求，彭答：「抱歉法官啱啱我有啲攰，我係不同意嘅，啱啱聽返清楚，多謝法官幫我釐清。」
+
+
+▲ 周天行
+
+#### 彭稱單張「對抗極權」口號等為同事自行加上 官稱令彭看來「超黃」
+
+控方續展示彭卓棋列有「攬炒十步曲時間表」的選舉單張草稿，彭卓棋昨供稱指示同事小白設計，惟「䁽到」提及「攬炒十步曲」便着他刪除，他亦沒有派發該版本單張。陳仲衡關注，該頁最上方提及「協調方案 我們支持有約束力初選」，並寫有「參與初選＞宣傳＞初選投票＞落定出選人」，問彭當時無反對？彭稱當時沒細看，「冇特別贊成或反對」，現在看則認為「都冇乜問題」。
+
+法官關注小白的背景，彭解釋是由選舉助理介紹，約20至30歲，「應該冇讀過大學」。陳仲衡質疑彭知道小白的學歷，卻不知其名字？彭指當時沒問過，解釋正式參選前人手很緊張，需解決宣傳問題，「我要嘅就係製成品，過程我唔係好在意。」
+
+控方續追問為何要求刪去「攬炒十步曲」的部分，彭重申是與指示不符，因當初他僅提供並指示小白設計其自我指介和團隊照片，但「攬炒」一詞「都唔係我提出」。彭在法官追問下亦指，單張上「共同協調人民奪權，齊上齊落對抗極權」的口號，及提到民主派「35+」願景是否決預算案迫使當權者回應五大訴求，還有「然而，具體執行會是如何？我們又在爭取立會過半的同時，會提出甚麼倡議？」的問題，均是小白在他沒要求下自行加上。
+
+陳慶偉即高聲說，「但小白是對你好（doing you good），透過加上這些部分，你看來非常非常黃！（very very yellow!）」、「超黃！（“Super yellow!”）」，林卓廷、黃碧雲和楊雪盈等發笑。彭重申，當時指令是製作自我簡介單張「畀人認識先」。陳慶偉問當時沒需要顯得更黃？彭指當時「冇理解呢一個」。
+
+#### 彭稱「逼當權者重新立約，讓香港人抉擇未來」為當時理解的「35+」
+
+控方展示最終派出的單張，彭指當中的口號由「人民奪權」改為「人民掌權」，「對抗極權」改為「對抗暴政」，並同意採納了小白所寫關於民主派「35+」願景的段落和就立會過半具體執行如何等問題。彭指其自我簡介亦有回答該問題，引述「議會抗爭、司法抗爭、街頭抗爭逼使當權者重新立約，讓香港人抉擇未來」，指是他當時理解的「35+」。李運騰指是口號多於倡議？彭終同意是政治修辭。
+
+#### 彭稱見港島候選人已簽「墨落」遂簽署
+
+就彭卓棋簽署的「墨落無悔」聲明，他昨稱認為是「鬥黃嘅書」，「䁽過」便簽署，因「簽咗就唔使畀人夾」。陳仲衡今問為何僅「䁽一眼」，彭稱因當時第一眼留意有誰簽署，「我留意到已經有港島區嘅潛在候選人簽咗」，確認是梁晃維，又指「如果唔簽，就會輸陣勢」，重申是「鬥黃嘅書」。
+
+李運騰問，彭當時知道「墨落」是由聯署名單頭三位的鄒家成、張可森和梁晃維發起嗎？彭指當時未知。李運騰續指，除發起人外，彭卓棋實是第一位簽署的港島參選人，彭起初稱「不肯定」，李續讀出第四位起的簽署者：黃子悅、劉頴匡、朱凱廸、岑敖暉和何桂藍，指他們無一是港島參選人，之後就到彭卓棋，彭稱「咁應該係喇唔好意思」。
+
+#### 彭稱自視「抗爭派」 解釋為「據理力爭」 官問政府也可是「抗爭派」？
+
+彭卓棋發布「墨落無悔」的帖文，亦附有一張他站着、表情嚴肅的相片，上寫有「抗爭派立場聲明書」。陳仲衡問，彭花時間設計圖片，也不花時間讀聲明內容？彭稱「因為我哋 make 咗個決定（簽署），咁就得喇」，同意簽署後也沒有看聲明。彭續同意，自視為抗爭派，李運騰問是真誠的形容抑或政治修辭？彭答「既修辭亦都係有真誠形容」，解釋理解「抗爭」是「據理力爭」，認為要爭取政綱提及的措施。
+
+陳仲衡指，所以政府若「據理力爭」也會是「抗爭派」？彭指只能說他是以此形容自己，「但係唔同嘅係，權，喺政府度，我哋，即係我哋嘅團隊，想爭取啲嘢嘅話，係要佢哋放一啲權同意先至可以咁做。」李運騰問這是否35+的目的，彭同意是做立法會議員的目的，又同意自己是會講政治語言的抗爭派。陳慶偉問，所以彭卓棋立場並沒有改變？指彭一開始在選舉單張有笑，但在該相片的表情似乎很嚴肅，問為何有此改變。彭稱「就係因為個選舉策略喇，就係當時用一啲嚴肅嘅相，都要忍笑」，鄒家成忍不住發笑。
+
+陳仲衡問，即看似嚴肅但內心發笑？彭答，「我唔係心裡面笑緊，但係要影一啲相要嚴肅，但又要好認真，係要一啲時間」，鄒家成再大笑。彭並指，該相片非特意為「墨落無悔」而拍攝，但挑選了以往嚴肅的相片。
+
+#### 鄭達鴻一方指彭卓棋亦有收到區諾軒私函
+
+此外，代表鄭達鴻和梁國雄的大狀陳曉妍盤問彭卓棋，指出第三或第四次港島區協調會議，曾討論簽署「贏咗先有得選，輸咗冇得選」的協議，彭稱印象中沒有。陳又指，在2023年2月控方披露的未被使用材料中，有一封為區諾軒寫給彭卓棋的私人信件，問區諾軒是否曾寫信給彭。
+
+彭稱「有寫信」但沒印象是何時，並確認是被捕之後。法官陳仲衡質疑，辯方應問區諾軒而非彭卓棋，李運騰亦質疑，辯方於盤問區諾軒時沒有提出，做法不妥當，有可能要重召證人。陳解釋，因鄭達鴻接受盤問時，曾被問他是否區諾軒的好友故收到區來信，但辯方想提出區也有向其他人發信。
+
+案件明早續審。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-29-chinas-escalation-on-taiwan.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-29-chinas-escalation-on-taiwan.md
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@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : China’s Escalation On Taiwan
+author: Bonny Lin, et al.
+date : 2023-06-29 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/qcURqBp.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Analyzing China’s Escalation after Taiwan President Tsai’s Transit through the United States"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_As Taiwan president Tsai Ing-wen transited through the United States in March and April 2023, China embraced significant military and diplomatic measures to coerce and punish Taiwan and, to some extent, the United States._ _This is reminiscent of Chinese actions after then-speaker of the house Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in August 2022, though there were differences between China’s behavior. While some elements of China’s actions in April 2023 appear less escalatory than those in August 2022, there was considerable continuity and even progression with respect to People’s Liberation Army (PLA) operations, tactics, and reach vis-à-vis Taiwan. This brief analyzes Chinese activities in August 2022 and April 2023 and explores the factors impacting Beijing’s decisionmaking._
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+In March and April 2023, Taiwan president Tsai Ing-wen transited through the United States, during which she met with Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy. This meeting was framed as an alternative to an immediate visit to Taiwan by Speaker McCarthy, and there were hopes that Beijing would not escalate as much as it did in August 2022 when Beijing provoked the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis after then-speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan.
+
+China nevertheless carried out significant diplomatic and military measures. Diplomatically, Beijing intensified some of its already-sharp measures aimed at punishing Taipei, while simultaneously softening its approach on other fronts. Militarily, China’s activities were substantively different from those in August 2022, but no less significant. Overall, Beijing appears to have taken a less heavy-handed, more targeted approach this time, suggesting it learned from its experience in August and was better postured to take action.
+
+
+### China’s More Sophisticated Diplomatic Approach
+
+China’s diplomatic activities took a two-track approach, with some measures aimed at ramping up pressure on Taipei and others aimed at softening China’s approach. This represents a considerable shift from August, when Beijing’s activities were overwhelmingly punitive. It also shows a more sophisticated use of multiple efforts in tandem.
+
+Two Chinese diplomatic activities stand out in comparison to August 2022. First, Beijing appears to have timed a 12-day visit to China by former Taiwan president Ma Ying-jeou to coincide with Tsai’s transit and meeting with Speaker McCarthy. This was the first time a former or sitting Taiwan president had traveled to mainland China. As president, Ma endorsed the “1992 consensus” and encouraged greater cross-strait engagement, and as a result, Chinese leaders have been far more willing to engage with Ma and the Kuomintang (KMT) party that he previously led.
+
+Ma’s visit to China contrasted starkly with Tsai’s transit through the United States. China likely encouraged Ma’s visit to demonstrate that it is willing to engage with China-friendly parties such as the KMT — even as it engaged punitively with President Tsai and her ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).
+
+Beijing’s second major diplomatic maneuver came a few days before the start of Tsai’s U.S. transit, when China poached one of Taiwan’s few remaining diplomatic partners, Honduras. China reportedly offered Honduras up to $2.95 billion to establish diplomatic relations with China. This is the ninth time China has enticed a country to switch diplomatic ties from Taiwan to China during Tsai’s presidency, and it marks the second time China has poached one of Taiwan’s diplomatic partners around the time of a U.S. transit. In 2018, China established ties with El Salvador a few days after Tsai returned to Taiwan after transiting through the United States. Beijing likely did this again and timed its actions as a demonstration of its influence and power.
+
+
+
+On other fronts, China took measures in April that were similar to those taken in August 2022. China commonly uses disinformation to put pressure on Taiwan, so it is unsurprising that it did so in both August 2022 and April 2023. Ahead of Speaker Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan, a Chinese group reportedly published articles condemning her visit and used fake Taiwan news sites to argue that the United States would not be a reliable partner in the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Chinese actors also launched several cyberattacks in August, including changing signs and screens to display anti-U.S. messages. In April, China again launched disinformation campaigns, with much of these efforts targeting President Tsai. During her transit of the United States, Chinese consulates in the United States reportedly organized and paid pro-China demonstrators to protest outside of Tsai’s hotels and venues. These protests were in turn amplified by Chinese netizens who also falsely claimed that Tsai had paid the Hudson Institute to present her an award.
+
+Mirroring its actions in August, Beijing also punished multiple U.S. and Taiwan organizations and individuals this April. Both U.S. institutions that hosted Tsai — the Hudson Institute and the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library — were sanctioned. For a second time, China also sanctioned Taiwan representative to the United States Hsiao Bi-khim, as well as her family and investors and firms tied to her. After Tsai’s transit concluded, Chairman of the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee Michael McCaul met with Tsai in Taiwan, and shortly after that, China announced sanctions on McCaul as well. Beijing used these sanctions to engage in targeted coercion. They allow Beijing to show domestic and foreign audiences that it is enacting punishments, but they have little or no tangible effect on the wider public in Taiwan or the United States.
+
+China likewise repeated its use of punitive arrests of Taiwan citizens as an additional show of power against Taiwan. Chinese authorities announced on April 25 the formal arrest of Taiwan pro-independence activist Yang Chih-yuan. Yang was originally detained in August 2022 in the immediate aftermath of Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. The formal confirmation of his arrest appears intentionally timed to coincide with the Tsai-McCarthy meeting. Adding to that, the Chinese government confirmed on April 26 the arrest of Li Yanhe, a Taiwan-based publisher. Given that there were no other high-profile arrests of Taiwan citizens between August and April, this too should be seen as intended by Beijing to showcase its displeasure over the Tsai transit.
+
+
+
+China’s other major diplomatic steps varied from last year. Beijing did not announce major new diplomatic “countermeasures” against Washington, as it did in August when it canceled or suspended eight key areas of U.S.-China dialogue. Whether this should be viewed as a sign of restraint on China’s end is unclear. It could be that there were few remaining areas of U.S.-China engagement to target — seven of the eight key areas of U.S.-China dialogue that China canceled and suspended in August have yet to resume. Instead, China has been reluctant to engage in dialogue with the United States at the highest levels. Beijing has yet to respond to the U.S. request to arrange a phone call between President Biden and President Xi. This request was made public in mid-March after newspapers revealed initial U.S. plans for the Tsai transit.
+
+On the economic front, Beijing’s embraced additional measures. In August 2022, China suspended imports of Taiwan fish and fruits and cut exports of sand to the island, though these had limited economic impacts on Taiwan. China stopped short of suspending imports or exports of specific goods in April 2023, but it did take some measures: on April 12, China’s Ministry of Commerce announced it was launching an investigation into Taiwan’s trade restrictions on certain Chinese goods. Importantly, the ministry’s notice stated that the investigation should conclude by October 12, 2023, but added that it could be extended until January 12, 2024 — the day before Taiwan’s presidential election. Depending on how political dynamics evolve, experts are concerned that China may use the investigation to impose additional economic sanctions or change or cancel parts of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement that China and Taiwan signed in 2010 to facilitate trade.
+
+At the same time, however, China continued to signal a desire to increase cross-strait linkages. On April 10 — the last day of China’s major military exercises — Wang Huning, the fourth-ranked member of the Chinese Communist Party’s all-powerful Politburo Standing Committee, met with a delegation of Taiwan business executives in Beijing. During the meeting, he called for improved economic and trade exchanges as a means of promoting peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.
+
+
+### China’s Significant Military Escalation
+
+On the surface, China’s April 2023 military activities differed substantively compared to those in August 2022. Some of the more provocative activities from the 2022 exercise — such as launching missiles over Taiwan and establishing military exercise exclusion zones around the island — were not carried out again in 2023. However, the latest round of military activities also showed considerable continuity and even progression with respect to PLA operations, tactics, and reach. Overall, China’s military activities were no less significant in April 2023 than in August 2022, with both exercises demonstrating the range of capabilities that the PLA is practicing against Taiwan.
+
+#### Military Signaling Prior to the Main Exercises
+
+The PLA’s primary activities began on April 8, with the start of large-scale exercises around Taiwan, but Chinese military signaling began days before that while President Tsai was transiting the United States. On April 5, the Fujian Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) announced a joint patrol and inspection operation of the Taiwan Strait. As part of this operation, Chinese maritime law enforcement officials were tasked with conducting “on-site inspections” (现场检查) aboard vessels in the Taiwan Strait.
+
+The operation is significant in multiple respects. First, although there is no evidence that the operation actually stopped any vessels, it laid out an example of what China could do if it wanted to escalate. The intended “targets” of this operation encompassed several commercial shipping routes, including the Pingtan-Taiwan direct container route, the “mini three links” (小三通), and areas with heavy commercial and fishing vessel traffic. This, coupled with changes in Chinese maritime safety regulations, allows China to set conditions for an escalatory stance in the Taiwan Strait and around Taiwan. It also reflects another effort to assert Beijing’s claims (which contradict international law) that China has “sovereign rights and jurisdiction” over the “internal waters” of the Taiwan Strait. Finally, the operation demonstrated China’s civilian mobilization capabilities and its capacity for operational coordination of civilian maritime actors in support of a joint operation.
+
+Next, Chinese authorities released several announcements of multiple smaller-scale live-fire military exercises. On April 7, the Fujian MSA announced two series of live-fire drills north and south of Taiwan’s outlying Matsu Islands. These were scheduled to occur during and after the main military exercises; however, both of these announcements were later removed from the MSA website, resulting in uncertainty about the extent to which these exercises took place. Around this same time, military drills were announced at other locations, including multiple exercises off the coast of Liaoning Province (well to the north of Taiwan).
+
+While there are few details about these drills, the flurry of announcements in a short time frame and the variety of locations of the drills are likely all part of the PLA’s overall activities aimed at countering the Tsai transit and meeting with Speaker McCarthy. Together, they served as a show of force and emphasized not only China’s ability to carry out several military activities at once, but also its ability to conduct operations in geographically dispersed areas farther from Taiwan.
+
+#### Comparing China’s April 2023 and August 2022 Exercises
+
+Following these initial activities, the PLA Eastern Theater Command announced that from April 8 to 10, it would “organize combat readiness patrols around Taiwan Island and conduct ‘Joint Sword’ exercises in the Taiwan Strait, around the northern and southern parts of Taiwan Island, and in the sea and airspace to the east of Taiwan Island.” These exercises were the centerpiece of China’s April 2023 military activities and were reminiscent of the large-scale August 2022 exercises.
+
+
+
+At first glance, some aspects of these exercises suggest an overall scaled-back military demonstration of force compared to August. The April Joint Sword exercises lasted three days, while the August exercises were scheduled for four days and later extended to seven. Perhaps most importantly, the April exercises lacked the highly provocative live-fire ballistic missile launches seen in August. On August 4, 2022, the PLA Rocket Force took the unprecedented step of firing multiple ballistic missiles over Taiwan and into the waters around the island. Five of these fell into Japan’s exclusive economic zone. In April 2023, the PLA primarily focused on simulating joint precision strikes on and around Taiwan, and the Rocket Force did not fire ballistic missiles near or over the island.
+
+Another key difference was the amount of information released about the drills. Two days before the start of the August 2022 exercises, Chinese authorities released the coordinates for six distinct exercise exclusion zones encircling the island (and later announced a seventh zone). This allowed for a direct comparison to the exclusion zones that were mapped out during the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis. In April 2023, the PLA did not announce specific coordinates for its main exercises and commenced the exercises the same day they were announced, providing no advance warning.
+
+The PLA’s decision to provide less information this time is significant for a few key reasons. First, it could be an indicator that Chinese leaders do not believe they need to pre-notify Taiwan or the international community regarding operations near or around Taiwan. Second, it likely reflects Beijing’s desire to prevent external interference by not showing where its forces could operate. Finally, it suggests more confidence in the PLA’s control of air and naval assets to operate around Taiwan without creating inadvertent hazards. It is likely that China will try to set a new norm of increased military operations around Taiwan without prior notification or announcement.
+
+Despite these differences, the April exercises were no less significant than those in August. There were several areas of continuity between the two, as well as substantial new elements. Fundamentally, both the August and April exercises were suggestive of an “encirclement” of Taiwan using PLA Navy forces, with the objective of rehearsing elements of a potential blockade and other kinetic military operations against Taiwan.
+
+PLA forces were roughly as active around Taiwan this April as they were last August. Information released by Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) shows that, like in August, PLA vessels surrounded the island. The MND reported a single-day maximum of 12 vessels on April 10, close to the one-day high of 14 seen in August. Crucially, Taiwan’s MND also released maps indicating that, during the exercises, PLA vessels encircled the island in ways reminiscent of the August exercises.
+
+
+
+With respect to air activities, the April exercises surpassed the peak of activity during the August exercises. On the last day of the Joint Sword exercises (April 10), Taiwan’s MND reported that 91 PLA aircraft were operating around Taiwan. This marked an all-time high up to this point and was considerably higher than the highest one-day total during the August 2022 exercises (66 aircraft). During the April exercises, the PLA also averaged higher daily incursions into the air defense identification zone (ADIZ), as well as incursions and crossings of the Taiwan Strait median line. However, it is worth noting that PLA air activity in April spiked higher and then subsided more quickly than in August.
+
+PLA air and maritime activity around Taiwan is aimed at negating Taiwan’s ADIZ and the Taiwan Strait median line and is on track to increasingly challenge Taiwan’s contiguous zone. Incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ ramped up in 2020 and have become a near daily occurrence. Prior to the August exercises, there were only a handful of reported instances of PLA aircraft crossing the Taiwan Strait median line, but China ramped up crossings in August, and this now occurs frequently. Similarly, PLA Navy vessels rarely came close to Taiwan’s contiguous zone — a boundary extending 24 nautical miles beyond Taiwan’s territorial baseline — in August, but China reportedly sent multiple vessels right up to Taiwan’s contiguous zone during the April exercises.
+
+
+
+On top of that, the April 2023 exercises saw far more activity from one of China’s aircraft carriers. In the days leading up to the August 2022 exercises, the PLA Navy’s two operational aircraft carriers, the Liaoning and Shandong, deployed from their respective home ports of Qingdao and Sanya and moved in the waters around China as a show of force, but they were not integral to the exercises taking place around Taiwan.
+
+By comparison, China’s Shandong aircraft carrier and its carrier group played a primary role in April 2023. The carrier stayed in the waters east of Taiwan for several days before, during, and after the Joint Sword exercises. The Japan Ministry of Defense (JMOD) reported that the Shandong launched a total of 620 sorties between April 7 and 24, including both fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. During the exercises, a total of 19 carrier-based J-15 fighters entered Taiwan’s southeast ADIZ — the first time those aircraft have been reported in Taiwan’s ADIZ. Many more carrier-launched sorties occurred near Taiwan (outside of the ADIZ), but there is no data available on the specific amount. Although it is far from certain that China would risk deploying the Shandong or any of its aircraft carriers to such a vulnerable location east of Taiwan in an actual conflict, the carrier operations signaled China’s intent and its efforts to practice capabilities to operate near and attack Taiwan’s east coast.
+
+Access to Taiwan’s east coast is critical to the island’s defense. Military bases located on the island’s east side are key to force preservation, and the island has long sought the option of moving military assets to the east for protection during the onset of a potential PLA attack or invasion. Given the likely intense fighting in the Taiwan Strait in a cross-strait conflict, access to Taiwan’s bases to the east could provide the easiest way for the United States and allies to flow forces or supplies to Taiwan. This is not lost on China. A researcher at China’s Academy of Military Sciences, Zhao Xiaozhuo, emphasized that the carrier group “played a vital role” in showing the PLA’s ability to project power on Taiwan’s east, which would be crucial to deterring foreign intervention in a Taiwan Strait conflict.
+
+Along with significant naval activity around Taiwan, April also showed an uptick in PLA vessels operating near Japan, according to JMOD reports. Around the time of the August exercises, the JMOD reported seven PLA vessels operating near Japan in the weeks before the exercises, but only one vessel — a Type 052D destroyer — during the period of the exercises.
+
+By comparison, in the two weeks before and after the start of the April 2023 drills, the JMOD reported 19 distinct PLA vessels near Japan, five of which were tracked around Japan for more than 12 days and three of which were repeatedly tracked for 17 or more days. Some of these vessels included the Shandong and its carrier group, but there were also several other vessels operating separately in the waters on all sides of Japan. This increased PLA activity around Japan was likely intended as a warning and signal to Japan given Tokyo’s heightened concerns that a conflict in Taiwan will negatively impact Japan’s security, as well as its increased military investment and preparations to deal with such contingencies.
+
+
+
+#### Continued Signaling after the Military Exercises
+
+China’s military signaling continued after the end of the Joint Sword exercises. On April 12, Taiwan’s Ministry of Transportation and Communication revealed that on the preceding day, China privately notified Taiwan that it would close an area of airspace north of Taiwan due to “aerospace activities” related to the launch of an orbital rocket into space. This zone was situated just 85 nautical miles from Taiwan’s northern coast, extended into Taiwan’s ADIZ, and spanned a busy route for air traffic in the region.
+
+China initially warned against aircraft entering the zone from 9 a.m. to 2 p.m. on April 16–18. This lengthy period sparked anger, with officials in Taiwan calling it “unprecedented” and Chinese authorities later reducing the airspace closure window to only 27 minutes on April 16. China further muddied the waters when the Fujian MSA announced the closure of the zone to maritime vessels from 9 a.m. to 3 p.m. on April 16. When April 16 finally came, China reported it had successfully launched a meteorological satellite on a Long March-4B rocket, and debris from the launch was later detected in the announced zone.
+
+This episode resulted in confusion and left many unanswered questions. It is not clear why China did not initially acknowledge the closure zone until it was reported by authorities in Taiwan. It is also unclear why the initial three-day window was later shortened to just 27 minutes on one day. This backtracking and lack of clarity may have been the result of poor internal coordination, but the episode was widely seen as part of China’s campaign to pressure and intimidate Taiwan. It is also worth noting that the original time frame overlapped with the G7 foreign ministers’ meeting that was taking place in Japan.
+
+
+
+On top of that, President Xi Jinping played a role in military messaging when he traveled to the PLA’s Southern Theater Command to inspect the readiness of its naval forces. During his inspection on April 11, Xi stated that the PLA should “analyze and address military issues from a political perspective” and called for the military to “resolutely defend China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests and strive to maintain the overall stability of the country’s neighboring regions.”
+
+Xi also emphasized driving forward the modernization of PLA forces and doctrine, and in a nod to the recent military exercises, he called for the PLA to “intensify force-on-force training based on operational plans.” Xi’s visit and his statements showcase that he believes the PLA plays a crucial role in overall efforts to increasingly exert control over Taiwan through coercive and kinetic means.
+
+Taken together, China’s military escalation in April should be seen as a continuation of efforts to intimidate Taiwan and allow the PLA to practice a variety of operations around Taiwan. While its activities in April were different in important respects from those in August, they were no less significant.
+
+
+### Factors Shaping China’s Overall Escalation
+
+It is not exactly clear how and to what extent certain factors shaped the intensity and contours of China’s overall behavior, but a number of initial observations are possible.
+
+While Chinese leaders likely felt domestic pressure to take action to oppose the transit, it is not clear they faced the same level of pressure as they did in August 2022. There was significantly less coverage of the Tsai transit on Chinese media and social media compared to then-speaker Pelosi’s August trip, when Weibo crashed around the time Pelosi was about to land in Taiwan and many netizens in China were tracking her flight to the island. It is possible that the Chinese public was either generally less aware or less interested in the transit or that Beijing did a better job of controlling public expression of views. This could have created more space for Beijing to act as it sees fit.
+
+After Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in 2022, China engaged in significantly escalatory activities, but this resulted in substantial diplomatic backlash. This likely influenced Beijing’s thinking this time, and it sought to achieve its objectives while reducing blowback. This aligns with Beijing’s use of more sophisticated diplomatic efforts — namely Ma Ying-jeou’s visit to China and the poaching of Honduras from Taiwan — which put pressure on Taipei and showcased Beijing’s willingness to work with China-friendly elements in Taiwan.
+
+It is also possible that China acknowledged U.S. and Taiwan efforts to try to address some of Beijing’s concerns and aimed to craft a set of countermeasures to the Tsai transit visit that was proportional to what Beijing viewed as the level of Taiwan and U.S. “provocativeness.” Beijing closely monitored Tsai’s transit and likely recognized that certain elements were scaled down to reduce the profile and public nature of her engagements. Beijing might have also appreciated the attempt by Washington and Taipei to at least delay a Tsai-McCarthy meeting in Taiwan by offering McCarthy a chance to meet in the United States. If that is the case, it suggests that China will continue to escalate against future high-profile meetings between senior U.S. and Taiwan officials but will adjust the level of its activities based on its perceptions of the meeting’s dynamics.
+
+Importantly, Chinese decisionmaking does not occur in a vacuum, so other geopolitical factors play a role. In recent months, Beijing has accelerated diplomatic efforts and sought to improve China’s international image. China’s continued support for Russia throughout the war in Ukraine has led to a considerable fraying of China-Europe relations. As part of Beijing’s efforts to restore ties with the region, President Emmanuel Macron of France and President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen were in China from April 5 to 7 to meet with President Xi.
+
+A significant Chinese escalation during their visit would have undercut Beijing’s efforts to smooth over tensions with Europe. Beijing appears to have waited until the departure of Macron and von der Leyen (and Ma Ying-jeou) to announce some key parts of its activities, including small live-fire exercises near Taiwan’s outlying Matsu Islands (which were announced the day that they left China), as well as the large-scale exercises around Taiwan (which were announced and started the following day).
+
+Broader geopolitical trends may have also factored into Beijing’s calculus in its actions toward the United States and its allies. Around the same time as the Tsai transit, China targeted several major U.S. companies amid mounting economic and technological competition. On March 31, Japan announced restrictions on exports of semiconductor manufacturing equipment to China in a crucial move to support sweeping export controls issued by the Biden administration in the fall of 2022. On the same day as Japan’s announcement, the Cyberspace Administration of China announced a “cybersecurity review” of U.S. chip manufacturer Micron Technologies in apparent retaliation. Beijing has targeted other U.S. companies as well. On March 24, officials raided the Chinese offices of U.S. due diligence firm Mintz Group, and on April 28, officials questioned staff at the Shanghai office of U.S. consulting firm Bain & Company. China also reportedly slowed its review process of proposed mergers and acquisitions of U.S. companies.
+
+These moves are not explicitly part of Beijing’s countermeasures against the Tsai transit, but they likely factor into Beijing’s thinking. Amid heated U.S.-China tensions, Beijing regularly employs measures against the United States in the context of overall tensions and competition, and Chinese officials likely calibrated their actions against the Tsai transit to factor in action along other vectors. Thus, the absence of harsh diplomatic or economic retaliation against the United States after the transit may reflect the fact that China has already taken — or was planning to take — actions against the United States unrelated to the Tsai transit.
+
+Finally, the approaching 2024 Taiwan presidential election also factors into Beijing’s calculus. President Tsai and the DPP have successfully leveraged past Chinese aggression to their electoral benefit. Most notably, China’s 2019 crackdown in Hong Kong severely worsened perceptions of Beijing among the Taiwan public, which aided the DPP in the 2020 presidential elections. This April, China avoided engaging in some of the activities that would affect Taiwan as a whole — such as suspending trade of certain goods and launching ballistic missiles over the island — but still demonstrated the range of military options China has against the island. At the same time, it embraced measures to directly pressure President Tsai and the DPP ahead of the elections.
+
+China’s decision to invite Ma Ying-jeou to China at this time was a key part of this. Ma’s trip to China, and his talking points after the trip, likely helped Beijing message to the Taiwan people that Beijing is open to working with leaders in Taipei. It was also meant to show that working with Beijing will bring Taiwan peace and prosperity, while pushing for Taiwan independence will create crises and conflict. Beijing’s messaging sets the stage for how to interpret Chinese actions toward Taiwan and does not rule out the possibility of another major escalation between now and January 2024 if Beijing perceives Taipei is embracing more “pro-independence” actions.
+
+Overall, Beijing’s escalation against the Tsai transit showcases a China that is learning from its past actions and adapting its countermeasures based on how it assesses the level of “provocativeness” of Taiwan and U.S. activities. China also appears to be sensitive to the potential costs of its actions and is seeking to advance China’s claims over Taiwan using more sophisticated means beyond just punitive measures. Beijing demonstrated its willingness to take firm and escalatory measures vis-à-vis Taiwan, and it is likely to continue to do so in the future.
+
+---
+
+__Bonny Lin__ is director of the China Power Project and a senior fellow for Asian security at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.
+
+__Brian Hart__ is a fellow with the CSIS China Power Project.
+
+__Samantha Lu__ is a research assistant with the CSIS China Power Project.
+
+__Hannah Price__ is a program manager with the CSIS China Power Project.
+
+__Matthew Slade__ is a former research intern with the CSIS China Power Project.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-29-mired-in-mogadishu.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-29-mired-in-mogadishu.md
new file mode 100644
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-29-mired-in-mogadishu.md
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Mired In Mogadishu
+author: Michael Jones
+date : 2023-06-29 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/fHCfRyc.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "An Appraisal of UK Engagement in Somalia"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_As part of the project “Furthering Global Britain? Reviewing the Foreign Policy Effect of UK Engagement in East Africa”, this paper examines the UK’s efforts of development, defence and diplomacy in Somalia from 2015 to 2022 and the “Global Britain” agenda._
+
+
+
+### Executive Summary
+
+Since 2016, successive UK governments have spoken of an outward-looking, collaborative and influential post-Brexit Britain. A series of speeches and policy statements emphasised the need to pursue future prosperity through overseas engagements, building on investments in diplomacy, trade, defence and development aid. In March 2021, the UK government published its Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, reiterating similar themes and referencing Eastern Africa as a theatre where the UK should increase its focus.
+
+Against this backdrop, a RUSI research team examined how the UK has deployed its development, defence and diplomacy toolkit across the region since 2015. The project, entitled “Furthering Global Britain? Reviewing the Foreign Policy Effect of UK Engagement in East Africa”, identified factors helping or hindering the UK in its pursuit of a “Global Britain” agenda across four countries in the region: Kenya; Ethiopia; Somalia; and Sudan. It tested common assertions about the effects of Brexit, reductions in the UK aid budget, and the merger of two government departments – the Department for International Development (DFID) and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) – alongside any wider enablers and constraints.
+
+This paper sets out findings on the UK’s intervention within one of these countries, Somalia, from 2015 to 2022. Beneath an (erstwhile) “Global Britain” rebrand, the aims and scope of UK activities appeared largely unchanged, with an emphasis on mitigating successive humanitarian crises and containing the regional threat of Al-Shabaab. Sharing links to conflict, violence and poor governance, these objectives have been integrated into a broader state-building approach to help improve Somali self-sufficiency, military capabilities and, by extension, stability.
+
+From the low baseline of 2012, when the Federal Government of Somalia was first established, progress has clearly been achieved. Alongside other external partners, the UK supported the development of a new political framework, a national security architecture and the trappings of a modern administrative system. It has co-chaired key international conferences, championed the federal agenda and contributed to the formation and function of Federal Member States. The flexibility of UK programming, relationships at the subnational level, convening power and widely recognised expertise, especially in the humanitarian sector, have also allowed stakeholders to carve strategic niches in an otherwise congested donor landscape.
+
+Similarly, the longevity and breadth of its coverage and permanent in-country presence afford the UK credibility and influence, and position its embassy as an information hub for international and local parties. Among other examples, this has fed into progress on debt relief and improvements in public financial management, acted as a catalyst for stabilisation processes, and proved critical in mobilising outside engagement during the 2017 drought.
+
+Recent shifts within the UK have, of course, had an impact. Leaving the EU caused disruption, as did the creation of a new Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), although the benefits of greater synchronicity of diplomacy and development is evident given the politicised realities of operating across the Horn. A larger problem was the reduction of Whitehall’s aid budget, which damaged the scope and reliability of interventions and the confidence of partners and local recipients. Perhaps most obvious is in humanitarian delivery, where inadequate levels of UK funding detracted from an already-lacklustre response, various workstreams faced cuts to activities and lags in follow-on programming occurred. Exacerbated by a preoccupation with the 2021/22 presidential election campaign, this confusion interrupted forward planning, sapped momentum for long-term structural reform and diminished the UK’s ability to translate influence into tangible change, whether multilaterally or at the national level. Should the fall in aid spending continue – as it is forecast to do – this trend will likely persist, making it difficult to rapidly upscale engagement later down the line as the UK’s networks, access and reserves of goodwill steadily diminish.
+
+However, it is important to recognise that the main impediments to UK strategic goals predate these changes. Aside from the contextual difficulties of operating in Somalia, such issues are tied to disparities between donor expectations and capabilities, which stem from broader questions over the feasibility of Western state-building. Technical fixes and capacity-building have a limited shelf-life if there is little Somali agreement over fundamental issues of governance and authority. As illustrated by the UK’s stabilisation efforts, successes can be achieved at the local level, but sustainability and scalability depend on whether they can plug into legitimate, sufficiently resourced domestic infrastructure. Incremental advances have been made, but they are neither sufficient nor commensurate with the timelines imposed by weary donors. At the same time, external contributions are often enmeshed (deliberately or incidentally) in a political economy that incentivises and reproduces instability. As a result, the “Global Britain” agenda remains subject to the same critiques of international state-building that have framed UK policymaking in Somalia for the past decade.
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+Following the June 2016 Brexit vote, then UK Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson repeatedly referred to the concept of “Global Britain”. While the phrase attracted widespread commentary, much of it quizzical or critical, it was an attempt to frame the UK as a proactive, outward-facing country.
+
+In March 2021, the UK government published the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy. Within an increasingly competitive international environment, the document reiterated familiar “Global Britain” themes, heralding a proactive role in global affairs; work in partnership with others; and better integration of foreign policy, defence, trade and international development efforts. In Africa, the UK would forge relationships and pursue shared goals such as prosperity, democracy and security, and in Somalia specifically, focus on conflict resolution, stabilisation and support for the African Union Mission (AMISOM) and its successor, the African Transition Mission (ATMIS).
+
+Two years later, the Integrated Review Refresh provided an update of the government’s policy priorities amid a fast-changing global context. Although no longer using the language of “Global Britain”, the key themes remained consistent, with Africa flagged as an arena for deepening relationships and engagement, and greater emphasis placed on leveraging international development alongside “the full range of UK strengths and expertise”.
+
+Against this backdrop, the RUSI project “Furthering Global Britain? Reviewing the Foreign Policy Effect of UK Engagement in East Africa” examined how the UK has used development, defence and diplomacy to pursue the “Global Britain” agenda in Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Sudan. It explores how far UK engagement contributed towards positive change in recipient countries, and whether this helped advance the national interest at a time of domestic and international change. The project considers whether structural shifts – including a reduced UK aid budget, Brexit and the creation of the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) – have proved a help or a hindrance, and identifies wider factors enabling or constraining UK influence and impact.
+
+The research methodology entailed a review of selected academic and policy literature and, in the case of this paper, 61 semi-structured expert interviews conducted between November 2021 and December 2022, featuring a range of current and former government officials, staff from multilateral organisations, academics, and civil society and business figures (see Table 1). The intention was to provide an overview of UK engagement in each country over the six-year period and to diagnose factors salient in driving significant outcomes, with particular reference to “positive” areas where British agency was considered to be important. While references to interviews have been omitted to maintain anonymity, quotations from interviews are used in this paper to demonstrate the complexities of the UK–Somalia bilateral relations and politics without referring to any individual person.
+
+
+_▲ __Table 1: Interview Breakdown.__ Source: Author generated._
+
+This paper is composed of three chapters. Chapter I provides background on UK–Somalia relations and summarises the UK’s major policy interests and main development, humanitarian, diplomatic and defence investments in recent years. Within this broad portfolio of work, Chapter II highlights examples of UK contributions to positive outcome areas, before identifying key factors that have constrained or enabled UK action, which are unpacked further in Chapter III. Due to limited space, the paper focuses exclusively on the Federal Republic of Somalia, rather than Somaliland.
+
+The analysis forms part of a series of publications, including a capping paper that lays out the project methodology and greater detail on UK investments across the region, four country case studies focusing on the UK’s work in Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and Kenya and a further publication that synthesises the overall findings and recommendations of this project.
+
+---
+
+__Michael Jones__ is a Research Fellow in the Terrorism and Conflict team examining political violence, governance by non/pseudo-state armed groups, and the convergence of violent extremism and insurgent militancy in East and sub-Saharan Africa. He has led investigative fieldwork across various countries including Sudan, Kenya and Lebanon; managed conflict focused projects looking into Darfur and Somalia; and worked in RUSI’s Nairobi Office on a range of projects related to the EU’s STRIVE Horn of Africa and STRIVE II programming.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-29-the-eu-data-act.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-29-the-eu-data-act.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c27364b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-29-the-eu-data-act.md
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : The EU Data Act
+author: Meredith Broadbent
+date : 2023-06-29 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/wov5VDw.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "The Long Arm of European Tech Regulation Continues"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_As recently as the 1980s, most U.S. trading partners sought to adopt U.S.-style regulations governing business, manufacturing, and consumer safety. However, the dominance of U.S. regulatory practices in global tech sector has given way due to the ascendancy of the European Commission._ _Brussels’s growing global regulatory influence marks a tectonic shift: European regulators are increasingly succeeding in demanding changes in the business methods of U.S. tech companies as the price of doing business in Europe, and Europe’s influence is spreading beyond the continent as a result._
+
+Although elements of European tech regulation in the pursuit of digital sovereignty threaten the success of U.S. businesses in global markets, U.S. officials have hesitated to insist on fair treatment in Europe. A case in point is the latest Trade and Technology Council meeting and declaration. Meanwhile, the administration under U.S. president Joseph Biden is bending the language of regulations under the Inflation Reduction Act beyond what Congress intended to accommodate Europe’s objection to discriminatory aspects of the legislation.
+
+Large internet platforms — mostly U.S.-based tech businesses — have led the way in global tech innovation from Web 2.0 to artificial intelligence, despite Europe having a roughly comparable gross domestic product (GDP), population, and talent pool of educated workers. Most game-changing large language models have been developed by U.S. digital services firms competing with one another, not European firms. Even with the success of the light-touch U.S. regulatory environment, Europe believes, to the contrary, that more heavy-handed regulation will nurture the growth of aspirational European tech champions.
+
+
+### Regulatory Costs for U.S. Companies
+
+The EU Data Act makes clear that if Europe intends to impose regulations that slow down U.S.-based tech companies through targeted “gatekeeper” designations and asymmetric data sharing requirements and limitations so that European firms have space to catch up, it will do so.
+
+Europe’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) law, implemented in 2018, is shaping data protection laws beyond Europe in countries such as India, Indonesia, and Colombia, which are emulating Europe as the first mover in regulation. The GDPR has caused an 8.1 percent decline in business profits and a 2.2 percent drop in sales, according to a new estimate by researchers at the Oxford Martin School, which is consistent with estimates made before the implementation of the GDPR.
+
+In implementing the Digital Markets Act (DMA) and the Digital Services Act (DSA), Europe is putting in place discriminatory provisions aimed directly at large U.S. platforms. For example, the DSA initially designated 19 entities as Very Large Online Platforms (VLOPs) or Very Large Online Search Engines (VLOSEs), 16 of which are U.S.-based private entities, 2 of which are Chinese, and only 1 of which is based in the European Union. Recently, CSIS published a study estimating the significant economic costs of the DMA, DSA, and other new tech regulations that U.S. and EU companies will bear. For U.S. service providers, the estimated cost of compliance is in the range of $22–$50 billion. CSIS analysis also shows that U.S. global services exports could decrease by 2 percent. Going forward, weighing the steep costs for innovation and productivity against the aspirational benefits of these laws should be a more transparent part of EU deliberations.
+
+While Europe has declined to fix discriminatory provisions in the DMA and DSA, several impactful pieces of legislation still in the drafting stage may be written more in line with international trade obligations of nondiscrimination and national treatment that do not favor domestic businesses to the detriment of foreign firms. Such acts include the Data Act, the European Cybersecurity Certification Scheme for Cloud Services, and the Artificial Intelligence Act. All of these proposed laws deserve attention because of the significant changes they would require in routine U.S. business practices and the attendant impact on U.S exports and jobs.
+
+
+### The Data Act
+
+#### Intent
+
+The overall intent of the proposed Data Act is to achieve more competition in the European cloud services market; give users of connected devices such as cars, refrigerators, and smart phones control over their data, guarding against vendor lock-in (forcing consumers to buy products or services from particular vendors); and enable governments to access data controlled and generated by private companies in emergencies.
+
+EU concern over the lack of European-based data processing service providers, as articulated by EU political leaders, has been clear for some time. U.S.-based companies supply over 70 percent of cloud services in Europe, a figure EU politicians and regulators seek to reduce. According to Margrethe Vestager, executive vice president of the European Commission, “One of the main reasons that U.S. tech companies are popular in Europe is that their products are good. . . . Market forces are more than welcome, but we do not leave it to market forces to have the final say.”
+
+The European Union adopted its overall European strategy for data in 2020, which recognizes that data are an essential resource for innovation and economic growth. The document envisions enhancing European competitiveness and data sovereignty by establishing a “single European data space.” The goal of this space is ensuring that more data are available in Europe “while keeping the companies and individuals who generate the data in control.” Director general for data at the Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology (DG Connect) Yvo Volman has said, “Europe should be able to benefit from the value of its industrial data, and we need to act now to make it happen,” which would be transformational for production and manufacturing.
+
+Stretching credulity, the European Commission estimates the new data rules will create €270 billion in additional GDP by 2028. European industrial policy will combine policy, legal actions, and financing mechanisms under an overarching plan to coordinate different elements of the strategy. The Data Act stipulates who must relinquish data — a novel government power as seen from the U.S. side of the Atlantic — as well as who can access data, how data can be used to create value in the European Union, and for what purposes.
+
+The Data Act aims to ratchet up the value of data in the European Union controlled by Europeans, specifically to reduce EU reliance on U.S. companies for data. The regulation targets U.S. tech firms operating in the European Union by forcing the sharing of proprietary data and intellectual property with their European and Chinese competitors. Under Articles 4(3) and 5(8), trade secrets must be disclosed to users and third parties so long as “all specific necessary measures pursuant to Directive (EU) 2016/943 are taken in advance to preserve their confidentiality.” In a world where U.S. trade secrets are regularly lost to theft, enforcing this requirement, particularly on third parties, will prove extremely difficult.
+
+> The Data Act stipulates who must relinquish data — a novel government power as seen from the U.S. side of the Atlantic — as well as who can access data, how data can be used to create value in the European Union, and for what purposes.
+
+Industry stakeholders stress that further clarification in these requirements should come out of the trilogue discussions so that data holders have solid guidance on when disclosure of data is mandatory and how to demonstrate when they are likely to suffer damage from the disclosure of trade secrets. Joining this debate, a recent joint statement by Digital Europe and the European Business Roundtable for Industry raised alarm bells regarding what they view as the fundamental interests of holders and creators of industrial data:
+
+“Capitalizing on the value of data will be crucial for Europe’s competitiveness over the next decades. But as it stands, the Data Act will force European heavyweights that have invested heavily in automation and digitalisation in sectors like manufacturing, green tech and health to give away their data, leading to a new wave of de-industrialisation and putting our cybersecurity at risk.”
+
+#### Scope
+
+The scope of the Data Act covers both nonpersonal and personal data. The act defines data as “any digital representation of acts, facts or information and any compilation of such acts, facts or information, including in the form of sound, visual or audio-visual recording.” Because the Data Act covers all data, not just personal data, it must be read in tandem with the European Union’s GDPR, which deals with personal data only.
+
+One of the main obligations of the Data Act is greater accessibility of data generated by product-related services linked to connected devices, such as smartphones and refrigerators. The regulation outlines requirements for business-to-consumer and business-to-business data sharing. Users have the right to request their data and share it with a third party, such as an independent repair service, free of charge and without delay. Furthermore, data holders must make data available to data recipients in a “fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory” as well as “transparent” manner. The regulation enforces users’ right to switch between providers of data processing services.
+
+The draft rules also compel cloud providers to take measures to shield customer data from foreign extra-territorial government data access laws that may (or may not) conflict with EU or national laws on privacy or other EU fundamental rights; intellectual property, including trade secrets; and “the fundamental interests of a Member State related to national security or defence.” To quote Commissioner Breton, “We have also adapted our regulatory framework through the Data Governance Act and the Data Act by inserting anti-Cloud Act clauses, because it is not acceptable that the data of Europeans can be accessed in an unjustified manner.” In some ways these rules are similar to the so-called Standard Contractual Clauses under the GDPR, where the responsibility of sorting out alleged or substantiated conflicts of laws falls exclusively on companies. This recently led the Irish Data Protection Commission to conclude that “any internet platform” subject to the conflicting law, in this case FISA 702, “may equally fall foul” of the data transfer requirements of the GDPR. Similar rules would result in high compliance costs for U.S. tech companies operating in the European Union and push U.S. companies to store more of their data in Europe, further limiting data flows to the United States. The regulation also instructs providers to put safeguards in place to protect international transfers of nonpersonal data. With few exceptions, it broadens the GDPR stance on cross-border transfers of personal data to cross-border transfers of business data.
+
+This will be a challenge for U.S. companies that rely on cross-border data transfers of industrial data and could result in the same levels of disruption and cost that the GDPR caused to U.S. and EU businesses when it was passed in 2018. For example, it seems Tesla would be barred from transferring safety data collected in Europe to analysts at auto manufacturing sites in the United States. In addition, beyond issues of data flows, Article 27 could be used to ban U.S. firms from doing business in some sectoral markets, even if the data is stored in Europe. The article leaves room for interpretations that would lead to the development of “immunity requirements” against non-EU cloud providers — in other words, implementing discriminatory rules against cloud providers subject to foreign laws.
+
+> Article 27 could be used to ban U.S. firms from doing business in some sectoral markets, even if the data is stored in Europe.
+
+
+### Contractual Freedom
+
+Intruding into freedom of contracts for data transfers, the regulation also aims to ensure unfair contracts are not imposed on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) through a gray list and a forbidden list of contractual practices. The regulation outlines the requirements for interoperability of data sharing and processing, specifically in a section on the use of smart contracts for data sharing. The European Commission plans to outline models for contractual terms to allow for negotiation of fair contracts, as defined by regulators. While U.S. companies will not be obligated to use these templates, they will face pressure to do so to avoid friction and extra scrutiny from EU authorities.
+
+Lastly, relevant parties must make data available to public sector bodies in case of exceptional need. This would be relevant in times of public emergency when certain data are necessary to fulfill a specific task. In these cases, the Data Act might allow sharing of mobility and location information on connected devices for public health and humanitarian reasons. However, U.S. companies may fear handing over proprietary information to their competitors and government agencies. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce commented, “We support frameworks that encourage data sharing when it is in market participants’ mutual interests, but data sharing mandates such as what is envisaged in the Data Act will dissuade companies from investing in R&D or other critical activities in Europe.”
+
+Enforcement of the Data Act will fall to competent member state authorities. There could be fines or financial penalties for infringements of the law, though the European Commission has not yet established revenue-based remedies as under the GDPR. Furthermore, the regulation foresees a dispute settlement mechanism to resolve data-related disagreements.
+
+
+### Negative Consequences for the European Economy
+
+Aside from the act’s financial toll on U.S. digital services providers, a rise in digital services costs would pose a high burden for European firms. In a 2022 CSIS survey, over 60 percent of micro and small European firms stated a 5 percent increase in technology costs would be worse or much worse than inflation, slowing demand, or supply chain backlogs. A 2020 EU survey showed how 40 percent of European businesses have a very low level of digital intensity — much lower than their U.S. counterparts. European regulators should recognize that additional digital costs will have an adverse impact on EU economic growth by increasing regulatory compliance costs. Given that European firms are already underinvesting in new technologies and are hampered by higher operating costs than U.S. or Asian firms, increases in the overall cost of digital services in Europe will put European firms at an even greater disadvantage.
+
+The Data Act, as proposed, also may hinder emergence of competitive European platforms by encouraging dependence on easy access to regulated data. While alternative platforms may emerge in the EU market, they would rely inherently on the regulated right to receive ported data. The resulting business models, built around regulation rather than innovation, would make for a less dynamic digital services landscape.
+
+> Given that European firms are already underinvesting in new technologies and are hampered by higher operating costs than U.S. or Asian firms, increases in the overall cost of digital services in Europe will put European firms at an even greater disadvantage.
+
+As mentioned, the Data Act perpetuates the objectionable classification of gatekeepers designated under the DMA and states that these firms would not be able to use the new portability right established by the Data Act to transfer data to other designated gatekeepers, which discriminates against U.S.-based cloud providers. Thus, U.S. digital platforms, while required to divulge large amounts of data to their competitors upon request, are excluded from receiving the data other firms generate. On the flip side, preventing European users from migrating their data from one large U.S. provider to another, just because they are large and designated as gatekeepers, runs counter to European consumer interests, including the freedom to benefit from the greater privacy, security, quality, and performance standards U.S. firms often employ. It also runs counter to the principle of interoperability that has characterized the professed goals of earlier EU digital regulations.
+
+The European Union’s attempts to create opportunities for EU companies by preventing gatekeepers from benefiting from the portability right may backfire. For instance, while a given payments company could transfer data from Amazon Web Services to another cloud services company, the recipient could not be another gatekeeper, such as Microsoft. However, the next best option would be transferring the data not to European providers but rather to Chinese firms more efficient than their EU counterparts. Aside from nullifying the goal of the act, this result raises a host of economic security issues. Chinese data providers have a spotty track record when it comes to information sharing. For one, they have in the past blocked some offshore users from accessing business data. Two, they have improperly shared user data with the Chinese government.
+
+
+### Stakeholder Input on the Data Act
+
+As ambitious as the Data Act is with its aggressive forays into regulating the new economy, a thorough process for considering stakeholder concerns is important. Stakeholders have had several opposition views. BusinessEurope requested Europe preserve contractual freedom in data sharing. Similarly, the Mechanical Engineering Industry Association (VDMA) maintains that business-to-business data sharing should remain voluntary and authorized on a contract-by-contract basis. In a letter to European officials, German software maker SAP and Siemens offered objections, stating the Data Act “risks undermining European competitiveness by mandating data sharing — including core know-how and design data — with not only the user, but also third parties.” By contrast, the European Consumer Organisation (BEUC) enthusiastically advocates a data portability right for customers that extends beyond personal data.
+
+On February 1, 2023, a total of 30 trade associations released a joint statement stating, “As the policymaking process accelerates on this pivotal proposal, industry warns against possible unintended economic consequences across data value chains.” They also cautioned, “Before opening Pandora’s box, the Data Act’s rules need to be tried and tested in real-world market conditions to make sure that they work for European businesses.”
+
+The exceptional circumstances clause of the Data Act has stimulated further debate. BusinessEurope has expressed concerns about the relatively broad nature of the provision, and the European Data Protection Board and the European Data Protection Supervisor have also questioned the necessity and proportionality of making data available to public sector bodies and EU institutions in these cases.
+
+
+### Outlook
+
+The legislative process for the Data Act is about halfway complete, and there is not a clear picture of how it will look in final form. On March 14, 2023, the European Parliament adopted the act, including several amendments, by a vote of 500–23, with 110 abstentions. The final text will be decided through trilogue negotiations involving the European Commission, European Parliament, and Council of the European Union, where many of these issues will be debated.
+
+Overall, member states have supported the Data Act proposal. Finland’s minister of transport and communications expressed that the Data Act was a crucial step in EU efforts to “share knowledge, pool our research and development resources, and ensure that human rights and democratic values are entrenched in all global standards and protocols.” However, the new Swedish president has pointed to challenges in finding agreement on exemptions for SMEs, business-to-government data sharing, and trade secrets.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+The global influence of European regulators continues to grow despite the better record of the lighter-touch U.S. regulatory model in producing innovation, competition, and growth in technology firms. EU regulations have been directly discriminating against large U.S. digital service providers. The DSA, for instance, designates 16 U.S.-based entities out of the 19 regulated VLOPs or VLOSEs. The Data Act, for its part, is just one element of the European Union’s march to digital sovereignty, a multifaceted industrial policy that poses systemic challenges to the future success of U.S. businesses in Europe and global markets.
+
+At present, however, it does not appear Europe is very interested in decelerating its legislative schedule or taking on board policy concerns and questions by U.S. parties with respect to how the Data Act will operate in practice. From the outside looking in, it seems that U.S. officials, so far, have been reluctant to engage with Europe to improve the discriminatory aspects of the Data Act proposal aimed solely at U.S. employers and workers. Now is the time for U.S. digital trade negotiators to vigorously raise questions and concerns with their EU counterparts.
+
+---
+
+__Meredith Broadbent__ is a senior adviser (non-resident) with the Scholl Chair in International Business at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-29-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-76.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-29-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-76.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..60df6206
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-29-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-76.md
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第 76 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-06-29 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 彭卓棋稱《國安法》後放棄政綱「已做盡」：真係萬估不到都係會出事
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（29日）踏入審訊第76天。彭卓棋繼續接受盤問，表示不知道初選組織者於《國安法》生效後舉辦記者會的內容，亦沒看過戴耀廷談初選合法性的文章，解釋當時已撕毀政綱和通知民主動力移除政綱，已「做盡咗」，雖不知《國安法》具體法律含意，但「我放棄政綱，我真係萬估不到，都係會出事」。控方質疑，彭要求移除政綱不等於撤回政治主張；法官亦質疑，彭只於 IG 發布手持爛單張的相片，無法顯示他放棄政綱，彭回應：「其實 po 一張爛嘢⋯⋯明眼人都知我哋縮咗㗎喇。」
+
+此外，控方今引述彭於論壇提「昂首拒默沉，吶喊聲響透」，指是《願榮光歸香港》歌詞，法官李運騰聞言稱「我從來沒聽過那首歌」。彭又自言，初選後「成績實在太難睇」、「市民唔鍾意我哋」，並否認意圖顛覆國家政權：「初選期間我都繼續搞大灣區嘅商標，咁樣係矛盾嘅。」彭今完成4天作供。
+
+
+▲ 彭卓棋
+
+#### 彭卓棋稱直至被捕後始「逐字細睇」墨落無悔聲明 理解否決權是「可用可不用」
+
+彭卓棋今繼續接受主控周天行盤問。就「墨落無悔」聲明書，彭稱其同事應於2020年6月10日得知並告訴他，他於同日簽署。法官陳仲衡問彭與競選團隊有否 WhatsApp 群組，彭答有，陳問可否看群組內容，惟法官陳慶偉即着休庭5分鐘。再開庭後陳仲衡改問彭是以 WhatsApp 或是口頭與同事溝通，彭指就此聲明不記得，同事只是問他「簽唔簽」，而他只是有「䁽過第一點」和見到有「梁晃維」的名字，他直至被捕後「先至逐字細睇」。
+
+周天行問「墨落無悔」聲明內容是否初選協調會議的內容，彭重申「當時冇細睇」，但他「䁽過第一點」，即會運用否決權迫使行政長官回應五大訴求，理解是「可用可不用」。彭續指，港島區並沒有任何「共同綱領」，而他得知梁晃維是港島的潛在參選人，因梁也有出席協調會議。
+
+#### 控方播梁晃維論壇談「墨落」片段 彭不同意當時已知聲明內容來自港島協調會
+
+周天行續播放梁晃維在論壇的片段，被問及為何發起「墨落無悔」，彭指：「因為我哋就係知道，我哋有啲人可能即使今日喺個初選嗰度協調咗，初選會嘅內容係冇人知道，淨係得戴耀廷教授同所有參與呢次初選會嘅人先知道，咁其實任何人如果佢背叛佢嘅承諾，根本係冇人能夠保證⋯⋯我就覺得既然大家都認同呢啲概念，咁點解唔能夠真係做一個公開承諾呢？」
+
+周天行指，梁提及「墨落無悔」是初選協調會議的內容，彭稱「依個係佢嘅講法」。周又指梁稱所有參與協調的人都知道，惟陳慶偉着問下一條問題。李運騰並指，認為控方就另一人的發言要求證人評論並非妥當的盤問方式，即使梁真的這樣說過而彭沒有提出反對，也不能幫助辯方案情。
+
+周天行指重點是彭卓棋在場，想顯示他當時已知道「墨落無悔」的內容。陳慶偉不耐煩問有何需要問，指他們都知道彭卓棋和梁晃維也在場，李運騰亦指彭當時有權保持沉默，不一定要提出反駁。周改為向彭指出，初選論壇時彭一定已知道「墨落無悔」是來自港島協調會議的內容，李運騰並補充控方意思是雖然彭簽署時沒細看，但因論壇上有討論「墨落無悔」，故彭會知道聲明的內容。彭不同意，亦指論壇前沒有看聲明作準備。
+
+#### 控方指彭卓棋論壇提《願榮光》歌詞 官稱無聽過、質疑與案無關
+
+周天行其後再引彭卓棋的開場白，提及「昂首拒默沉，吶喊聲響透，盼自由歸於這裏」，指是《願榮光歸香港》的歌詞。李運騰質疑相關性，又指他沒為意這是《願榮光》歌詞，「我從來沒聽過那首歌」。周解釋是與反修例示威相關，陳慶偉指他們並非審理該示威是否合法。周再解釋是以顯示當時背景，惟陳慶偉指對背景沒興趣。
+
+#### 彭稱無深究何謂「肢體抗爭」 認說出自己也不明白的話
+
+李運騰續關注，彭該段發言提到「我哋入到議會不惜以肢體抗爭」，但昨又稱會在法律框架下實踐志向，他如何沒有暴力地進行肢體抗爭？彭重申「當時我冇深究呢個字具體係點樣做」，又指是「當時都幾流行嘅說法」，是「選舉語言」。李笑問，所以彭是說自己也不明白的東西？（“You are speaking things without knowing what you are saying?”），彭稱「呢個當時係唔啱，但真係我當時嘅情況，因為而家我睇返，以肢體抗爭係不能夠癱瘓到政府」。
+
+彭其後再指，上述發言除了「大家好我係港島區彭卓棋團隊」外，均屬「選舉語言」。陳仲衡指若然如此，該段發言不會讓其潛在參選人更了解他？彭答「當時我哋以為係有用囉」，認為可助他取得議席。控方指，該段發言是彭打算當選後做的事，彭不同意。
+
+#### 彭稱無關注戴耀廷初選後發言 指已放棄政綱「真係萬估不到都係會出事」
+
+控方其後就《國安法》實施後初選記者會和戴耀廷帖文發問。彭表示，知悉7月6日初選組織者召記者會，但沒看過亦沒有嘗試了解，「我認為應該關注返自己個選舉。」李運騰指，但彭因關注初選合法性才撕毀選舉單張，為何不嘗試了解戴在會上的發言？彭指因他撕毀單張和通知民主動力移除政綱後，「雖然我明白未必做得最好，我係做盡咗之後，我放咗心」，「當時我真係有信心係冇事嘅。」
+
+陳仲衡指但彭說過不了解《國安法》條文，而戴是法律系教授，彭回應：「我係唔知道《國安法》嘅具體法律含意當然，我放棄政綱，我真係萬估不到，都係會出事。」彭亦指，沒看過戴翌日於《蘋果日報》的〈民主派35+初選會否觸犯國安法〉一文，重申：「我做晒所有防範措施，我嘅警戒心經已係完全係好放心。」
+
+#### 彭稱無開啟戴耀廷帖文、無興趣曾國衞發言 稱專注拉票「冇認為需要睇」
+
+彭卓棋續確認，7月9日於港島區群組收到戴耀廷發出一條連結，但「我冇撳入去睇」，不知道是戴對時任政制及內地事務局局長曾國衞稱初選或違法的回應之 Facebook 帖文。彭在追問下，指不知道曾國衞當天的發言，但從新聞知道葉劉淑儀稱初選不犯法的言論是回應曾國衞。
+
+李追問他對葉劉淑儀的話有興趣，卻非曾國衞的話？彭指「我當時冇認為需要去睇」，「嗰陣時我專注係做返我嘅拉票囉」，又指「就算佢（葉劉）唔講，我都主觀地以為自己冇事」，因他於7月9日前已做盡所有措施，「葉劉淑儀又令我更加放心。」
+
+戴耀廷於7月9日召初選記者會，多名初選候選人均有出席。彭稱知道有該記者會，其團隊的李永財和張嘉莉亦有出席，但他與何志宏決定不去。彭指他不知道會上內容，亦沒有問，因沒興趣，只是在二人出席前「我千叮萬囑佢哋，唔好亂講嘢」，李永財着他「放心」。
+
+#### 控方質疑刪政綱不等於撤回主張 彭：冇政綱，即係放棄政綱
+
+控方續問及彭卓棋應對《國安法》的做法，質疑公眾不會得知他放棄政綱。就彭卓棋要求民動於投票系統移除政綱，周天行指移除政綱並不等於撤回政治主張，只是系統上看不到政綱。彭不同意，指「冇政綱，即係放棄政綱，唔係掩藏任何嘢」。周天行再指若選民不打開投票系統，便不會知道彭移除了政綱，彭不同意，重申他在街上也有派發撕爛的政綱，但同意法官指若沒看過其原有單張，不會知道被撕走的內容。
+
+李運騰一度關注，彭派發單張時有否提及放棄了政綱。彭稱雖然不能逐字覆述，但當時「我心態係放棄政綱，因此變成空白」，其後確認他有向查詢者表示已放棄政綱。
+
+#### 控方質疑彭受訪無提擔心違《國安法》、仍保留「墨落無悔」無要求刪論壇片
+
+彭昨亦指曾接受BBC訪問，稱不想犯《國安法》故放棄政綱，報導提及彭卓棋「由於《國安法》含糊不清，不知道當局會怎樣利用《國安法》或其他理由去取消民主派人士的參選資格，他自己也在文宣物品上有所改動。」
+
+周天行質疑彭無提及擔心違反《國安法》。彭稱「有提及，係不清楚、含糊囉」，並指「佢冇寫出嚟」，但他有告訴記者。周問他在訪問刊出後有否向記者查詢？彭稱沒有，亦「唔知道個記者點解咁樣報」。周再指，若人們沒有看到這篇文章，不會知道彭政綱有變？彭同意，但重申「我相信唔係唯一一個方法知道我嘅情況」。
+
+周天行續質疑，彭稱已盡力讓公眾知道他放棄政綱，但卻沒有在 Facebook 公布，又指彭發布的「墨落無悔」聲明於6月30日後仍保留，至初選前亦沒有要求組織者移除選舉論壇的片段，彭均同意。彭亦同意，於7月6日後派發名為「請柬」的單張，但單張上無提放棄政綱。
+
+#### 相片見手持爛單張 官質疑彭卓棋IG若為私人 如何助告知公眾已放棄政綱
+
+就派發撕爛的單張，辯方早前展示彭卓棋 Instagram 的相片，顯示彭與競選團隊李永財和何致宏同手持撕毀的選舉單張，嚴肅面對鏡頭緊握拳頭。控方問該帳戶是公開抑或私人，彭稱「現在係 private，當時係 public」，但頓了頓改稱「抱歉，當時係咪 public 唔記得」。
+
+李運騰即質疑，彭曾稱嘗試以該相片顯示他已放棄政綱，若帳戶是私人的，如何能幫助他告知公眾？彭稱「我私人嘅意思係朋友之間嘅分享」，惟李再問：「若只是限於朋友分享，如何能告知公眾？」彭望住螢幕約10秒後稱，「或者咁講，我搣完（單張）同埋通知咗民動之後，我就認為夠喇。」李追問，即彭不打算透過該相片告知公眾？彭答「都唔係，因為擺得上 IG，就預咗係公開」。
+
+李運騰續指需要彭的幫助，指「我們不用 Instagram，我們屬於老一代人，我們甚至不用 Facebook，我們不用社交媒體」，問彭若不是其朋友能否看到相片。彭指他可翻查自己呈交的審訊文件夾，看看宣傳時有否提及其帳戶，並即場翻閱文件。李運騰指可留待覆問處理，彭並確認該相片有出現於其公開的 Facebook。
+
+#### 官質疑相片不能傳達放棄政綱意思 彭：明眼人都知我哋縮咗
+
+陳慶偉續主動提到，該相片只有3名男子手持撕爛的單張、沒有任何解釋，可有不同解讀，例如代表彭已透過撕爛政綱，「擺脫了女性成員」，變成「全男班（macho team）」；又指若他不認識彭，可能完全不知道相片的意思，而他若認識彭，或會理解彭的團隊減至3人，港島區初選名單限制亦正正是3人。陳續指問題是，單單發布該相片，並不能傳達彭放棄政綱或擔心違反《國安法》的訊息。
+
+彭思考一會後指拍照時，其團隊的張嘉莉沒出席。陳慶偉指那不是他的問題，李運騰亦指問題是該照片可有不同解讀，公眾或不知道彭想說什麼。彭再說「我諗依張相都⋯⋯我當時認為可能⋯⋯應該咁講，sorry」，陳慶偉問是否認為已足夠表達訊息，彭同意，並補充：「其實 po 一張爛嘢，po 呢張相出嚟，明眼人都知我哋縮咗㗎喇。」
+
+惟陳慶偉質疑是視乎讀者理解，直言「我看不到你退縮。有些東西是撕爛了，但實際上無人知道你『縮』了什麼」。彭答「抱歉答唔到」，重申「我以為足夠喇」。陳再說，尤其是彭在相片握緊拳頭，「你在縮什麼？不縮什麼？無人會知道！」彭僅表示：「當時攝影師話擺啲有型啲嘅甫士。」周天行終指，彭有時間發布帖文和準備新單張，卻沒時間公布已放棄政綱？陳慶偉指彭已回答他已盡力。
+
+#### 控方質疑彭有意實踐初選承諾 彭稱《國安法》後已放棄、初選成績「太難睇」
+
+控方其後展示彭卓棋2020年10月至2021年8月的區議會工作報告，顯示報告兩個項目時有「兌現選舉承諾，promise made, promise kept」的蓋章。周天行問，彭立志入立會服務港人，並於區議會努力工作裝備自己，而彭參與初選試水溫，因知道落敗就不能參與立法會選舉？彭回答時提到，他的夢想是推動青年創業，「立法會只不過係一個平台」，而他初選落敗後未必會再參選：「因為我當時初選之後，個成績實在太難睇，得3%都唔夠，就要承擔責任，市民唔鍾意我哋。」
+
+彭在李運騰追問下同意，作為區議員，認為兌現選舉承諾是重要，因此在工作報告提及自己的成績，以向選民展示他有兌現承諾。周天行問，因此彭在初選作出的承諾，不只是政治語言？彭重申，政綱中「香港本位經濟」、「教育自主化」等四點「係我深信嘅」，而「從一而終的抗爭派」和「重組警隊」兩點則為「選舉語言」。
+
+周天行續向彭指出，他有意實踐初選作出的承諾。彭答：「七一（《國安法》生效）之後放棄咗，連同選舉語言。但係講青年創業到今日都冇變過。」周終指，彭於案發期間，與其他被告同意取得立會過半後無差別否決預算案，迫使政府回應五大訴求，彭不同意。周再指彭意圖顛覆國家政權，彭表示不同意，指「初選期間，我都繼續搞大灣區嘅商標，咁樣係矛盾嘅」。控方表示完成盤問。
+
+#### 辯方展示2021年帖文 官質疑無法證案發時帳戶為公開 反問為何要相信彭
+
+就彭卓棋2020年7月的 Instagram 帳戶是否公開，大律師盧敏儀於覆問時展示2021年2月19日「赤石號」專頁提及彭工作旳帖文，當中寫有彭的 Instagram 帳號。彭指該帖文於他被起訴前發布，而他2021年3月獲法庭保釋後，擔心可能違反保釋條件故關掉 Facebook 專頁，並將 Instagram 轉為私人，故肯定2020年7月時其帳戶是公開。
+
+陳慶偉多次質疑，以該2021年的帖文如何能推斷2020年的情況，「告訴我你的邏輯」，盧敏儀亦問有否客觀證據顯示帳戶於2020年7月公開。彭答「我記得係啦」，強調其 Instagram「一路以嚟都係 public」，直至被正式控告。陳慶偉指，彭今早才告知法庭不肯定當時是公開或私人，正因為他的答案，才引來這一連串問題。彭說：「我⋯而家係肯定嘅。」陳慶偉問：「為何我現在要相信你？（“Why should I believe you now?”）」，並指似乎彭只是從個人記憶回答。
+
+#### 官問為何初選落敗仍保留「連儂牆」 彭稱無特別意思
+
+陳慶偉續指，彭稱於初選成績「太難睇」，即他即使用了政治語言，對其選民也沒有效果，彭同意。陳續指，而初選後他就無需使用該些政治語言，可以回復「真我」（“... return to your true self?”），彭答「都係」。陳續要求展示彭2021年1月6日被捕當天的辦公室照片，問既然彭於初選落敗、又無需再使用政治語言，為何仍保留「連儂牆」？彭答「我冇特別意思係點解唔拎走」。盧敏儀追問，牆上沒有違反《國安法》的東西？彭答「唔會有」。
+
+彭完成3天作供，案件明不開庭，下周一（7月3日）續審，料由何啟明作供。
+
+
+▲ 此外，立法會議員謝偉俊今午亦有到庭旁聽，坐於家屬席。他庭外向記者確認，其律師行代表本案被告彭卓棋、區諾軒和鍾錦麟。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-30-euro-sifmanet-madrid-report.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-30-euro-sifmanet-madrid-report.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Euro SIFMANet Madrid Report
+author: Gonzalo Saiz
+date : 2023-06-30 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/PESqwbL.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "European Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network: Madrid Report"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Participants from both the public and private sectors voiced confidence in their abilities to implement sanctions but the Spanish government needs to work harder in providing support._
+
+
+
+The Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies at RUSI convened a roundtable in Madrid in late May 2023, to discuss the state of the implementation of sanctions in Spain. The event is part of the series of in-country engagements through the European Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network (Euro SIFMANet). The roundtable, held under the Chatham House Rule, gathered Spanish representatives from major financial institutions and relevant authorities including the Spanish Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Defence. This report summarises the main findings of the discussion related to Spain’s experience of sanctions on Russia since February 2022.
+
+
+### Sanctions Implementation in Spain
+
+The roundtable opened with a description of Spain’s progress on implementing sanctions at a national level. Participants started by pointing to the positive assessment of Spain’s anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in 2014. The FATF rated highly both Spain’s AML/CFT controls and the understanding of the private sector in enforcing them. Participants argued that a robust AML/CFT regime can facilitate more effective implementation of sanctions, given the importance of transaction and client monitoring systems of financial institutions for monitoring sanctions breaches and ensuring sanctions compliance of their clients.
+
+Participants did acknowledge that the FATF highlighted some deficiencies regarding Spain’s capabilities to implement sanctions. These weaknesses were related to significant delays in transposing new designated entities into national sanctions lists, the lack of clear channels or procedures for directly receiving foreign requests to take freezing actions, and not having proposed or made any designations. The FATF found these deficiencies to persist in its follow-up assessment in 2019. With this in mind, one representative from the public sector agreed that Spain does not have a framework that is as well-developed to implement financial sanctions as it could have, notably for identifying where a designated individual has control over an entity and for establishing ultimate beneficial ownership of companies.
+
+Within this framework, responsibilities for sanctions implementation are distributed among various national competent authorities. Notwithstanding their varying individual responsibilities, public authorities at the roundtable acknowledged that they all also rely on the private sector to provide information on the ownership and control of entities by designated individuals. Furthermore, Spain has not adopted a leadership role among member states in the negotiation of sanctions against Russia and has proposed only a few designations, usually in conjunction with other countries. Since February 2022, in contrast to other EU member states, Spain has not passed any new legislation to facilitate the implementation of sanctions at the national level, except for an amendment to allow the freezing of unregistered assets. Some participants felt this absence leaves gaps that need addressing.
+
+Despite these shortcomings, discussants pointed to several factors that contribute to Spain’s compliance with sanctions. First, a representative from the Spanish FIU emphasised that Spain has a good track record in implementing financial sanctions, mainly due to the experience with sanctions imposed against Iran since 2010. Second, in contrast to many other European banks, Spanish financial institutions have a record free of major scandals or fines for breaching sanctions, which participants attributed, in part, to their limited exposure to the Middle East compared with other international banks, but also to strong internal policies. Third, Spain has voluntarily chosen to comply with both EU and US sanctions for a number of years. In this regard, representatives from financial institutions at the roundtable added that while they noted Ukraine’s domestic sanctions list, to avoid overcompliance and de-risking, they restricted their sanctions actions to those entities designated by the US and the EU – all of which are also on Ukraine’s list.
+
+Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has significantly impacted financial institutions. While many required sanctions controls are already in place, the cross-border ownership structure of large Spanish banks has required them to maintain wide-ranging oversight. Representatives from these institutions explained that they have reinforced their sanctions compliance programmes, and some have developed tools to facilitate the implementation of sanctions. An example of this is an internal website that provides staff with updates on regulatory guidance and relevant articles on sanctions.
+
+The Spanish private sector demonstrates great understanding and commitment to effectively implement sanctions. However, there was a consensus among participants regarding the unique challenges posed by the sanctions regime against Russia, in contrast to those the EU has previously implemented, which will be discussed in the next section.
+
+
+### Challenges in Spain
+
+Having addressed the context of Spain’s capacity to implement sanctions, the discussion turned to the challenges the public and private sectors face when implementing the sanctions regime against Russia.
+
+As identified by participants, a particular challenge posed by the sanctions regime against Russia is the complexity of trade sanctions. A significant aspect of this challenge is the division between financial and commercial flows. While the latter relies on Customs for enforcement, financial institutions also play an important role as they contribute by sharing intelligence on the involved actors, jurisdictions and other relevant elements such as payments related to restricted goods.
+
+The impact of the Russian invasion has further complicated the task of enforcing sanctions, escalating from dealing with a limited number of cases to thousands of hits and increased exposure. This has heightened the risk of unintended supply chain disruption, for example in relation to food supplies. To mitigate this risk, participants welcomed the introduction of “firewalls”. The European Commission recently issued guidelines regarding firewalls that allow entities trading in agricultural and food products controlled by a designated individual to continue operating under supervision while their assets are frozen. This facilitates sanctions implementation and reduces the risk of business closures and the subsequent consequences to supply chains, business viability and staff employment.
+
+Lack of harmonisation and alignment among member states was also identified as an issue. For example, if a bank in one member state identifies an entity connected to a sanctioned individual, a different interpretation in another member state could allow transactions to be structured to take advantage of this difference in interpretation. In such instances, participants observed that the private sector often unfairly bears the blame and may become subject to litigation. The lack of centralised mapping of entities owned or controlled by sanctioned individuals at the EU level was noted as a particular shortcoming. Currently, the private sector in each jurisdiction undertakes this mapping endeavour, and authorities rely on it, but there was a consensus on the need for centralisation within the EU.
+
+One result of this divergence and lack of common criteria is that some member states have individually introduced their own sanctions lists. A representative from the public sector added that the lack of harmonisation in sanctioning entities also reflects commercial competition among member states. To this end, implementing sanctions in a harmonised manner would be instrumental to effectively enforce sanctions and participants recommended that the existing voluntary nature of the European Commission’s guidance and the lack of enforcement by many member states need to be addressed.
+
+Central to this issue is the complexity of the “control” criteria and determining ownership. Participants noted that the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control follows an easier and more straightforward system in this regard, as it does not have the EU’s concept of control and relies on simple percentage rules and provides clear guidance. On the other hand, the EU frequently changes its criteria on this term and has modified its FAQs, making it challenging to implement the criteria in a consistent manner. For this reason, participants agreed that some of the sanctions and guidance put forth by the European Commission should be revisited to assess the usefulness and impact. On a similar note, representatives from the banking sector pointed to the €100,000 limit on deposits as a measure worth reconsidering, as it can be easily evaded and overcomplicates payment processes.
+
+These challenges give rise to major concerns for representatives from both public and private sectors, namely overcompliance and de-risking. The aim of the sanctions regime is not to refuse all transactions related to Russia beyond what is mandated, but to limit the financing and resourcing of the war through targeting specific sectors and individuals. Participants have experienced a substantial increase in their sanctions workload, and many banks lack the resources to monitor all Russia-related transactions, leading them to opt for broad actions such as ending their Russia-related activities and thus overcomplying with sanctions. Financial institutions are concerned about false hits and the difficulty in achieving a high level of efficiency, often resulting in a failure to focus on the real designated individuals.
+
+In sum, participants argued that to achieve greater effectiveness, governments need to work harder to support the implementation work of the private sector, which led to the following concluding recommendations.
+
+
+### Recommendations
+
+Spain’s stakeholders in charge of implementation of sanctions voiced confidence in their understanding and experience. While Spain has not been a vocal player in the field of sanctions, the country will take over the Presidency of the Council of the EU in July 2023, placing a spotlight on the country’s sanctions capabilities and leadership. In their commitment to achieve an effective sanctions regime and overcome the identified challenges, participants put forth a series of recommendations that could inform the Presidency’s upcoming agenda.
+
+1. __Centralised mapping of entities under the ownership or control of designated individuals, with EU-wide guidance and harmonisation.__ The mapping efforts are currently the responsibility of the private sector and there is a need for an EU-level approach to list the entities under the control of designated individuals and a comprehensive European-wide guidance that ensures the information reaches the key operators implementing sanctions across the EU and is implemented in a uniform manner.
+
+2. __Promote the introduction of “firewalls”.__ Allowing a company to operate under supervision despite being controlled by a sanctioned individual would make sanctions more sustainable. This approach would prevent the complete devaluation of a company’s assets, which is not beneficial for either the state or the owner. An added benefit would be the shifting of responsibility from banks to the company itself to adhere to agreed controls. Currently, banks are obliged to request licences on behalf of the company. The introduction of general licences and firewalls would facilitate more agile sanctions that do not harm sectors such as fertilisers and food supplies.
+
+3. __Criminalisation of sanctions violations.__ While trade sanctions evasion can be considered contraband, financial sanctions evasion has not yet been criminalised in Spain and the European directive mandating it has not yet entered into force. Given that many countries lack the capacity to conduct investigations into sanctions breaches with the same tools as with criminal offences, criminalising sanctions evasion has become a necessary and overdue step.
+
+4. __Strengthen the information-sharing loop.__ The private sector is a key provider of financial intelligence but continues to lack sufficient feedback on the usefulness and outcomes of the information reported to the authorities. Guidance is being provided but enhancing this feedback loop would help prevent evasion.
+
+5. __Clarity on the extraterritoriality of sanctions.__ Although the EU holds that there will be no extraterritorial application of sanctions, indications in FAQs and upcoming packages suggest otherwise. This creates uncertainty as to the exact application of the mandate.
+
+6. __Sanctions should not be viewed separately from anti-money laundering efforts.__ Even if the ultimate beneficial ownership of an entity by a sanctioned individual is only 25%, there may still be concerns about working with such entities. The focus should be on beneficial ownership transparency, and adequate resources should be allocated to mitigate the challenges the private sector faces in obtaining this information.
+
+7. __Reassess the sanctions imposed.__ The effectiveness and utility of certain sanctions have not been thoroughly assessed and should be revisited. The complications brought by the lack of clarity regarding the control criteria and rules such as the restriction on deposits over €100,000 were a recurring theme at the roundtable. In consequence, many businesses seek to achieve compliance through de-risking and overcompliance.
+
+---
+
+__Gonzalo Saiz__ is a Research Analyst at the Centre for Financial Crime & Security Studies at RUSI, focusing on sanctions and counter threat finance. He is part of Project CRAAFT (Collaboration, Research and Analysis Against Financing of Terrorism) and Euro SIFMANet (European Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network).
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-07-03-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-77.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-07-03-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-77.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..e957a7e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-07-03-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-77.md
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第 77 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-07-03 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 何啟明：「光復香港」指望回復以往自由法治 區議會曾過半冀立會再實踐
+- 何啟明稱支持「墨落無悔」內容、理解可用「一系列權力」不限於否決財案
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（3日）踏入審訊第77天。前民協區議員何啟明開始作供，表示因關注基層民生加入民協，任區議員時與政府有良好合作關係，2020年3月初有意參選立法會。庭上展示民協會議紀錄，法官李運騰指有建議口號是「立會過半、光復香港」，何承認「呢個口號係我諗嘅」，解釋民協曾在深水埗區議會過半，認為有效實踐民生理念，「我哋好早已經明白到議會過半嘅功用」，故望將區議會經驗在立會實踐；又指「光復香港」是2019年社運口號，意思是「希望回復返香港以往嘅價值：自由、法治」。
+
+何又指，「參與初選就係要願賭服輸」，落敗就不會參與正式選舉。法官陳慶偉追問他是否支持「三投三不投」，何稱當時不知道亦無支持過；法官再問若知道會否支持，何表示：「我答唔到喎，呢個假設性問題。」
+
+#### 何啟明稱民協為溫和民主民生派 任區議員時與政府關係良好
+
+彭卓棋上周作供完畢，今由前民協副主席、參選九龍西初選的前深水埗區議員何啟明作供。身穿深藍色襯衫和卡其褲的何啟明以基督教形式宣誓，他在辯方大律師阮偉明主問下，表示自己於1988年出生，於城大完成社會科學學士，現於民協任社區幹事，及於中國神學研究院修讀基督教研究碩士。何指，於2013年加入民協成為職員，2015年成為黨員，解釋「因為想參與多啲地區服務，同埋關注多啲基層民生嘅工作」。
+
+
+▲ 何啟明
+
+何續指，他2015年當選深水埗區議員，2019年連任，並於2016年成為民協副主席直至2021年3月。何指，任區議員時不時需與政府溝通，雙方合作關係良好，舉例西九龍法院外的地盤亦是溝通的成果，「我哋成功爭取拆咗長沙灣屠房，將佢改成3幢嘅公屋，依家仲起緊。」何又形容，民協是「溫和民主嘅民生派政黨」，同意其立場與黨立場一致。
+
+#### 何稱2月從民協黨團會議得知辦初選 但不記得誰提及
+
+被問何時知道民主派有舉行初選的討論，何稱約是2020年2月，從民協黨團會議得知。法官李運騰問是否獲施德來告知，何僅表示「喺個會議入面係有個同事講係有初選」，陳仲衡追問是誰，何指不記得。
+
+辯方續展示2020年2月29日的民協中央黨團會議紀錄，何確認出席者包括他和施德來，但無法說出由哪位同事告知會有初選，亦不肯定是否施德來告知他。他又指紀錄寫由十八區正副主席匯報，而楊彧是深水埗區議會主席，「有機會係佢收到消息講都唔出奇」，但重申不能肯定是誰提及初選消息，亦不肯定是由一人或多人提及。
+
+何確認，會上決定由施德來出席3月2日的九東協調會議，但之後沒有再討論初選。李運騰關注會議紀錄提及「反對通過預算案」，何確認是指2020年的預算案，與「35+」無關，而民協當時反對，是因預算案「冇回應到我哋一啲民生嘅訴求」，如失業援助金甚至全民退休保障。
+
+#### 何指民協持續關注綜援等議題 官關注會議紀錄提「武漢肺炎」
+
+李運騰續主動提起，留意到紀錄上以「武漢肺炎」稱呼「新冠肺炎」，問是否刻意選擇。何否認，解釋「當時係疫情開始嘅時候，咁仍然有好多人都係用『武漢肺炎』呢個字」。李追問，故該字不是用作「貶義（derogatory）」？何答「唔係」。
+
+陳慶偉亦指，會議紀錄提及「民主動力參與協調會議或立法會選舉的籌備」，問民主動力當時是否已有份籌備？何指他只是當天聽同事匯報民主動力有參與籌備，而梁有方為民協於民主動力的代表。
+
+何亦確認，會議紀錄提到民協參與社會事務，包括「要求釋放桂民海請願行動」，民協亦持續關注綜援和低收入的議題，而民協與民主黨、社民連和街工均有參與「關注綜緩低收入聯盟」。
+
+#### 何認構思口號「立會過半、光復香港」：望回復香港以往自由法治價值
+
+就參選經過，何啟明表示於2020年3月初，有意參與當年的立法會選舉，而民協中央黨團3月7日的會議紀錄亦顯示他開始參與選舉工作。法官李運騰留意到，會議紀錄提議的口號為「立會過半」、「光復香港」，問何當時已有爭取立會過半的願景？何答「係」，解釋民協曾於2003年在深水埗區議會獲過半議席，「我哋嗰時明白到議會過半時，係更有效地實踐我哋嘅民生理念，所以我哋好早已經明白到議會過半嘅功用。」
+
+李運騰指但這裡是談及立法會過半，彭同意是指民主派立會過半，並解釋是根據他們經驗「都好希望將呢個區議會嘅經驗喺立法會都實踐得到」。李再問，施德來當時已曾出席一次九東協調會，他對這個口號有任何貢獻嗎？何說：「呢個口號係我諗嘅，而我係好似頭先想講，根據過往嘅經驗，希望將呢個願景擺落立法會度」，並指他當時知道立會過半也是「35+計劃」的主題。
+
+
+▲ 施德來（右）
+
+陳慶偉追問，為何提「光復香港」？何稱「因為當時19年嘅運動係有呢一個嘅口號」。李運騰問，所以立會過半與光復香港是有關係的？何認為光復香港是2019年運動的延續？何思索約5秒說：「會係。」陳仲衡問，當談及光復香港，是光復什麼？何說：「我係希望回復返香港以往嘅價值：自由、法治。」
+
+#### 何稱與九東選舉團隊「獨立運作」 民協望取九東第4席
+
+辯方續展示民協3月14日的會議紀錄，提及九龍西和九龍東選舉工程策略，何啟明確認是有關正式選舉而非初選，而分開討論是因屬兩個團隊，望獨立運作，「唔好大家互相 chur 散咗啲資源。」何同意民協會競逐九東及九西，而當時「得我一個有意去選九龍西」，但黨未有最後決定，而他當時未知九東要否競爭，但事後回看亦是無競爭。
+
+陳仲衡續指，會議紀錄提及民協望取得九東第4席，李運騰問這與「35+」的「6 6 4 4 3」目標有關嗎？何否認，指「35+」九龍東目標是3席。陳慶偉問既然如此，為何紀錄提及「視乎初選安排或結果」，何解釋民協如能入圍，望在九東取得民主派第4席，但當時就是否舉辦初選，他理解九東仍未有最終決定。李運騰問，所以九東的選舉工程策略會否是指初選的策略？何稱「我代表唔到佢哋答」，亦不肯定有否在會上討論。
+
+#### 何稱施德來有匯報九東進展 惟「詳細內容唔記得」
+
+法官其後提及，庭上證供早前提到，民協黃大仙區議會主席許錦成於4月18日在九東群組發訊息，指有人認為九東應要有初選，後譚文豪、胡志偉、施德來和黃之鋒也贊成。何同意因此3月時九東未確定是否辦初選，至於該選舉工程策略是初選抑或正選用，「其實真係未知之數。」
+
+何啟明其後在法官詢問下亦表示，當時他將出席九龍西協調會議，施德來則出席九東會議，施有向黨團匯報會議進展。被問施有否談及「35+計劃」的目標，何稱「詳細內容唔記得」。
+
+#### 何啟明稱參與初選要「願賭服輸」 落敗不會參與正選
+
+陳慶偉續引會議紀錄提到30萬元作選舉前期工作，問是為初選抑或正選準備？何表示「我哋係一定會參與9月嘅選舉嘅其實」，而當時未決定是否辦初選，故該30萬「點都會用嚟做（選舉）宣傳」。陳追問，即民協無論有無初選都會參與正式選舉？何說：「起碼我喺九龍西都係咁諗嘅，喺當時。」
+
+陳慶偉續主動提到，「墨落無悔」在之後才出現，但其實民協無意受聲明約束？何答「唔係」。陳指似乎有矛盾，指何剛才說無論如何都會參與正式選舉。何解釋，民協很早時已決定參與9月選舉，而當時「未傾好有冇初選，所以當時嘅想法係點都會去選」，但何指「後尾傾得成係有初選，所以我哋參與初選，而參與初選就係要願賭服輸，所以當參與咗初選嘅時候，咁你如果輸咗初選就唔會去選㗎喇」。
+
+#### 何稱無支持過「三投三不投」 官問會否支持無參與初選者 何無正面回答
+
+陳慶偉指，所以何是支持（subscribe to）「墨落無悔」？何答：「我係支持墨落無悔嗰兩點聲明嘅。」陳問何亦支持「三投三不投」？何答「我冇支持過三投三不投」，他亦是至7月才知道該運動。陳續問，但若何當時知道「三投三不投」，他也會支持？何思索約5秒說：「我答唔到喎，呢個假設性問題。」陳再指，只是要求何回想他會否支持，何回應：「我只能夠答你，我參與初選，就係願賭服輸，唔夠票就唔會去選喇。」
+
+陳追問，那何啟明會支持那些沒參與初選、直接參與正式選舉的人嗎？何會同意他們的行為嗎？何指當時是辦民主派初選，而他們過去一直支持民主派候選人，「如果佢係民主派嘅候選人，咁我咪會支持佢囉。」陳問即他會支持這些人？何答：「唔好意思呢樣嘢冇發生過啊，我真係唔能夠答到你啊。」
+
+陳續指，何啟明已參與審訊77天，聽到很多證據，他只是問一個認為何有能力答的問題，不是叫他揣測。何重申民協過往也會支持民主派候選人，按此紀錄他也會支持民主派。陳指何似乎不想回答他的問題，因他不是問及歷屆選舉，而以往選舉也沒有初選或協調機制，何表示以往立法會補選有協調機制，陳指他知道，但是談及過往選舉的大圖畫。辯方其後再次重覆法官的問題，問若初選落敗者參與正選何啟明會否支持，惟陳慶偉指不認為何能回答。
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（3日）踏入審訊第77天。前民協副主席何啟明繼續作供，表示支持「墨落無悔」聲明的內容並簽署，認為聲明提及「我會運用基本法賦予立法會的權力」是指「一系列權力」，除否決財案亦包括調動議程、修訂議案等，簽署者有空間選擇是否運用，而他本人不會否決財政預算案。何又指，各參選人在當時社會氣氛下的「最大公因數」是會運用權力迫特首回應五大訴求，只是就否決財案與否有立場差異，認為聲明旨在「求同存異」。
+
+何啟明在法官詢問下，表示不界定自己為抗爭派。法官質疑其帖文為何提「抗爭派」而非「溫和派」聲明，何指聲明望求同存異，故沿用聲明標題，又指「我覺得溫和係做出嚟嘅，唔係自己講，民協係溫和係有往續可尋」，而他亦不會介意「嗰一個半個字」的不同而不參與。
+
+#### 何啟明稱無收過任何協調文件 戴耀廷介紹否決權後無討論
+
+前民協副主席何啟明繼續作供，今早供稱2020年3月初有意參選立會。辯方大律師阮偉明展示民協黨團3月21日的會議紀錄，何指當時未確認其候選人身分，但決定由他出席3月24日的九西協調會議。至於3月28日會議紀錄提及民協傾向參與初選，何同意這也是他個人的傾向，亦同意當時黨團建議他撰寫支持初選的文章，他應有撰寫和發布。
+
+何續表示，有出席九西3月24日的首次會議，並確認如區諾軒所述，會議開始時戴耀廷介紹運用否決權否決預算案，其後沒有進一步討論，會上主要討論初選機制。何在法官追問下，指從沒收過該次會議的紀錄，開會期間也無傳閱過任何文件，包括「35+計劃」。至於4月29日的第二次會議，何亦確認張崑陽曾要求戴耀廷介紹其「攬炒十步」文章，戴介紹後無進一步討論。
+
+李運騰續指，有證據顯示戴耀廷於第二次會議後，曾以廣播訊息發出九西協議文件，問何有否收到？何稱沒有，並在辯方追問下，指就區諾軒提及的3份文件，即「35+ 計劃」、「民主派九龍西協調機制（初稿）」及「民主派九龍西協調機制協議」，他均沒收到，案發時亦不知道該些文件存在。被問如何與組織者溝通，何稱是收到通知就開會，而他與戴耀廷和區諾軒本身認識，於初選前已互相交換電話。
+
+#### 何認支持「墨落無悔」、看過才簽署 「共同綱領」指辦初選等4共識
+
+就何啟明有簽署的「墨落無悔 堅定抗爭 抗爭派立場聲明書」，他指於6月10日下午獲同事楊繼昌以電話向他展示，楊稱當時流傳此聲明。何指簽署前有看過聲明，亦在民協中央黨團、有施德來的 WhatsApp 群組討論，當時黨沒有意見，交由參選人自行決定。
+
+何今早已表明「我係支持墨落無悔嗰兩點聲明嘅」，即「我認同『五大訴求，缺一不可』。我會運用基本法賦予立法會的權力，包括否決財政預算案，迫使特首回應五大訴求，撤銷所有抗爭者控罪，令相關人士為警暴問責，並重啟政改達致雙普選」，及「我認同若支持度跌出預計可得議席範圍，須表明停止選舉工程」兩點。
+
+何續指，理解聲明提及「在初選協調會議上已取得共識的共同綱領」，就是區諾軒早前稱協調會議的4點共識，即辦初選、辦選舉論壇、以靈童制為替補機制、及各區議席數目。至於聲明提及「考慮到立場差異，此一綱領已達致抗爭陣營光譜的最大公因數」，何認為「立場差異」是就否決財政預算案的立場，「有人會選擇否決，有人選擇唔否決」；而達致「最大公因數」則是「求同存異」，鄒家成邊聽邊點頭。
+
+法庭傳譯主任一度未能翻譯「求同存異」，何啟明稱是「to strive for common ground despite the differences」，李運勝則提議為「to strive for consensus and tolerate the differences」。
+
+#### 何稱可用「一系列權力」 不限於否決財案
+
+阮偉明追問，是求什麼「同」？何指是聲明提及的「會運用基本法賦予立法會的權力」；至於「異」，則是有空間選擇運用什麼權力，「不限於否決財政預算案」。何又解釋，「基本法賦予立法會的權力」是「一系列嘅權力」，「我哋係有選擇嘅空間，有啲可以用，有啲可以唔用」，否決預算案只是「呢幾個權力嘅其中一樣」。李運騰指那或是他的理解，但他立場是會運用否決權嗎？何答「我不會用」，又指其立場與他理解一致。
+
+被問其他權力是什麼，何指若民主派立會過半，可調動議程讓議員不斷問問題或修訂所有議案，包括財政預算案。李運騰問即拉布？何指是兩回事，指同時可有一些「有建設性」、「有用」的修訂。
+
+何亦指，議員可以不開會，透過點人數製造流會。李運騰問即癱瘓會議？何否認，並解釋當民主派過半，政府議案需民主派同意才可通過，過程需雙方商討。李追問上述做法如何迫使政府回應五大訴求，何指是令政府通過議案時需民主派同意，而在過程中民主派會要求特首回應五大訴求。
+
+#### 何稱九東無討論「會」或「會積極運用」、無想過否決預算案
+
+至於庭上早前提及「會運用」和「會積極運用」否決權的討論，何啟明指他直至被捕前亦不知道相關討論，九西協調會上亦無談及兩者的分別；而他對聲明「會運用」的理解從自己而來：「我係就咁睇完個文本，然後按我自己嘅理解囉。」
+
+李運騰再追問他說不會運用否決權的意思，何解釋「會運用」是在「一系列嘅權力入面去揀」，而他不會否決預算案。陳慶偉問，即他會否決不支持的議案和撥款，但即使不支持預算案也不會否決？何重申，「一系列權力」有選擇空間，「聲明入面冇講到你揀啲乜嘢嘢（權力），或者我都冇應承過會揀啲乜嘢嘢，但係當刻呢我真係冇諗過會否決財政預算案。」
+
+#### 官質疑何理解與他人不同 何稱「最大公因數」為迫特首回應五大訴求
+
+陳慶偉指，這只是何的理解，但其理解可以與其他參與者完全不同，何說「呢個有機會」。陳追問，故聲明是無效（futile）的，因聲明內容如「一中各表」，可各自表述？陳志全等發笑。何指「咁我睇到嘅理解就係 state the obvious（顯而易見）⋯其實好多嘢都係咁淺白」。
+
+惟陳慶偉指，若真如何所說的明顯，「墨落無悔」上列明的就應是何提及的4點共識。何回應，「我諗個最大公因數係大家都會運用《基本法》賦予立法會嘅權力，去迫使行政長官回應五大訴求。」陳再質疑何說法與其他人理解不同，並非「最大公因數」，何強調：「喺當時嘅社會氣氛裡面呢，所有參選人都係要迫使政府回應五大訴求。」
+
+李運騰再指他不明白，指「墨落無悔」列明會運用《基本法》權力，「包括」否決預算案，但何的立場卻是「不包括」否決預算案，與聲明不符。何表示：「咁我嘅理解真係同法官閣下唔同喇」，重申他「會運用」的一系列權力是包括否決預算案，而他有空間選擇是否運用這些權力。何在李追問下，指他整個初選、甚至初選完結後均抱有同一立場，他在選舉主任查詢時「我都答佢話我唔會咁做」。
+
+#### 何稱簽聲明可免指責、集中精力宣傳 不知其他簽署者想法
+
+何啟明續重申，理解「墨落無悔」的目標是「用嚟求同存異，搵最大公因數」，法官陳仲衡質疑他不一定要簽，何同意「係有選擇嘅空間」，但如果不簽，「一定會畀人問、甚至指責」，他要花時間精神回應；但若簽署就可省卻該些時間「集中精力資源去宣傳返民協同埋自己」。陳慶偉問即是政治上的便利？何答「咁本身都要認同先至可以簽嘅」。
+
+陳慶偉笑着問，所以何啟明是同意抑或不同意，抑或是按他的理解？何稱「係會有呢個成分嘅」。陳仲衡續問，何當時是否知道有其他簽聲明者無論如何都會否決預算案，李運騰舉例如「張崑陽」。何指「我唔知其他簽署人嘅想法」，而同事向他展示的聲明無其他署名，他表示「OK」後就交由同事處理帖文，「我冇去細心睇其他簽咗嘅人」；又稱「我只係覺得佢係一個好簡單嘅要求」，故無理會其他人。
+
+陳慶偉再問，那何是否支持聲明最後兩段的內容：「我們深明議會絕非抗爭終點，以上聲明，僅為確保抗爭陣營參選人，有最基本的抗爭意志。我們的抗爭決心，絕不應因極權打壓而讓步。我們呼籲各位香港人，拒絕支持抗爭意志飄忽不定的參選人。」何湊前看電腦閱讀一會後表示「都係嘅」。
+
+#### 官質疑何提「抗爭派」 何稱沿用聲明標題、溫和派係做唔係講
+
+何啟明在法官陳慶偉詢問下，指不會形容自己為抗爭派。陳續問，那為何他發布「墨落無悔」帖文時，附上寫有「墨落無悔 堅定抗爭 抗爭派立場聲明書」、「何啟明 民協 施德來」的圖片。何指抗爭派望聲明求同存異，取得最大公因數，故理解是形容整個光譜的民主派。
+
+陳慶偉打斷問，何會指民主派全屬抗爭派？何否認，指理解法官提及的「抗爭派」指「嗰啲本土素人」，「咁我就唔會界定自己係抗爭派喇，最起碼係初選之後嘅抗爭派記招，我係冇被邀請嘅。」陳指，但何啟明寫明是「抗爭派」，何回應「當時其實抗爭派真係有好多個說法」。
+
+陳慶偉續問，那為何他不說是「民主派溫和派聲明」？何重申「墨落無悔」是望求同存異，「佢（標題）用『抗爭派』，所以我用返佢嘅字，而我覺得溫和係做出嚟嘅，唔係自己講，民協係溫和係有往續可尋。」陳再質疑何稱否決權不一定要使用，則溫和派也可簽署聲明，但何仍選擇用「抗爭派」一詞，何搖頭道「或者呢個真係做法上嘅不同」。
+
+#### 何否認標籤「抗爭派」為爭選票 稱為求同存異不介意用字不同
+
+陳仲衡續問，何標籤自己為「抗爭派」，是為了爭取更多選票？何否認，強調民協本身都是一個「重視民生、溫和嘅民主派政黨」，而他們眼見聲明望求同存異，「我覺得既然係搵最大公因數嘅時候，我哋都可以參與，我唔會介意嗰一個半個字嘅不同，就唔參與。」何在陳仲衡追問下，指聽過「鬥黃」。陳問標籤自己為「抗爭派」也是表現自己為「黃」？何答「唔係，我哋冇咁做」。
+
+案件明早續審。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-07-04-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-78.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-07-04-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-78.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..30f28188
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-07-04-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-78.md
@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第 78 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-07-04 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 簽「墨落」但無意否決預算案 何啟明指民協支持者理解無需澄清
+- 何啟明解釋選舉單張：政府是對人民「暴政」、港人對強權要「Full Counter」反擊
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（4日）踏入審訊第78天。前民協副主席何啟明今繼續作供，就昨稱簽「墨落無悔」但無意否決預算案，法官質疑選民不會知道他對聲明的理解，又問為何不另發不提否決權的聲明。何指理解民協支持者都不會支持無差別否決預算案，「我有我嘅理解，我又明白民協嘅支持者會明白我嘅理解，所以我唔覺得有需要再澄清，而事後我真係贏到初選。」法官陳慶偉質疑，何最終勝出或因簽署了「墨落無悔」，選民因聲明表面意思投票給他，何說：「我只能夠話呢個係你嘅分析，因為選民投票可以基於好多原因。」
+
+而就提名表格提及支持「民主派35+公民投票計劃」及其目標，何今表示理解計劃「目標」只是民主派立會過半，不包括五大訴求，指五大訴求是取得35+之後才爭取。控方質疑，立會過半後民主派議員要用相同的「大殺傷力憲制武器」（否決權）才能迫政府回應五大訴求，何稱「唔一定」，認為過半後政府需與民主派商討，議員又可提問和修訂議案等，政府要回應訴求。他亦不同意「墨落無悔」的「共同綱領」指無差別否決預算案。
+
+#### 昨稱不會否決財案 何啟明今補充若當選會據財案內容與黨商討再決定
+
+何啟明昨就「墨落無悔」作供，表示自己支持聲明內容並簽署，並理解「我會運用基本法賦予立法會的權力，包括否決財政預算案」一句指可運用「一系列權力」，簽署者可選擇是否運用，而他本人不會否決財政預算案。
+
+何啟明今主動補充，昨日意思是在「墨落無悔」的語境下不會運用否決權，「我唔會用呢個權力（否決權）去迫使特首回應五大訴求」；但即使如此，「我哋都要面對一個現實，無論政府回唔回應五大訴求，我哋都要就住財政預算案作出表態」，故他若當選立法會議員，「我就會根據返財政預算案嘅內容，同民協商討再作決定。」
+
+
+▲ 何啟明
+
+何昨稱簽署「墨落無悔」前，曾在有施德來在內的民協中央黨團群組討論，他今指群組不多於10人。法官陳仲衡及李運騰問，何有沒有將他對「墨落無悔」的理解告知黨友？何表示有，但「詳細內容係咪好似琴日（庭上）咁討論呢，我就真係唔記得喇」，他亦記得大家「其實冇乜反應」，因此之後民協亦沒有立場，由參選人自行決定是否簽署。
+
+官質疑選民不會理解何立場 何稱理解民協支持者不會支持無差別否決
+
+法官陳慶偉問，那何啟明有告訴其選民嗎？並指若他是其選民，怎會理解到何的「隱藏議程」，即聲明內的「包括否決財政預算案」，其實意指「不包括否決財政預算案」。何表示：「或者我對民協嘅支持者理解就唔係咁樣喇，民協嘅支持者都係一啲基層嘅市民⋯⋯我理解民協嘅支持者都係唔會支持無差別咁否決財政預算案。」
+
+陳慶偉續指，即何認為支持者會明白簽署「墨落無悔」的他是不會否決預算案？何答：「係，所以我哋喺初選入面，深水埗仍然有好高嘅支持」。李運騰指深水埗不是九龍西唯一選區，問何只是想獲得深水埗區的支持嗎？何指理解初選是「每個候選人 call 返自己嘅支持者出嚟支持佢」，而民協根據地在深水埗，故支持者集中在該處。
+
+#### 官指勝出初選或因簽「墨落無悔」 何：只能夠話呢個係你嘅分析
+
+法官陳仲衡亦指，若何啟明稱不會否決預算案，則應簽署一份表明所用權力「不包括否決財案」的聲明，何答「但現實冇呢份聲明」，故他沒有簽。陳仲衡指他可以自己發布，陳慶偉亦指可以說「我會運用基本法賦予立法會的權力，審視財政預算案」，因何的選民是深水埗草根市民。李運騰也指，若何啟明無意否決預算案，聲明根本不應出現「否決」預算案一詞，問有什麼阻礙他發布一份代表他立場的聲明？
+
+何啟明邊擺動左手邊說：「我有我嘅理解，我又明白民協嘅支持者會明白我嘅理解，所以我唔覺得有需要再澄清，而事後我真係贏到初選」，被告席傳出笑聲，鄒家成亦邊聽邊笑着點頭。陳慶偉續說，何贏得初選可能是因為他簽了「墨落無悔」，選民基於聲明表面上的意思（face value）而投票給他，何說「我只能夠話呢個係你嘅分析，因為選民投票可以基於好多原因」，林卓廷露齒笑，鄒家成亦笑着點頭。李運騰續指，法官尚未有任何立場，只是就證據提出疑問，讓何解釋。何最後在李追問下表示，「冇嘢阻礙」他發布自己的聲明，但當時認為沒有需要。
+
+
+▲ 何啟明2020年7月勝出九龍西初選後，到深水埗謝票。（資料圖片）
+
+阮偉明最後問，「我會運用基本法賦予立法會的權力，包括否決財政預算案」，何啟明理解是「不包括」否決權，抑或是「不限於」否決權？何指是「不限於」，即可在一系列權力作選擇，而他自己沒有意圖使用。
+
+#### 何稱只知35+目標為立會過半、五大訴求是達成35+後再爭取
+
+何啟明確認，於6月20日提交初選提名表格。就表格上「我確認支持和認同由戴耀廷及區諾軒主導之協調會議共識，包括「『民主派35+公民投票計劃』及其目標」，何指「共識」就是辦初選、辦選舉論壇、以靈童制為替補機制、及各區議席數目的4點共識；至於「目標」，他理解是「民主派喺立法會議席過半」，解釋協調會議內戴耀廷和區諾軒有提及，他理解所有參與者都同意。何亦指沒有收過任何有關「民主派35+公民投票計劃」的文件。
+
+李運騰續指，該「目標」的英語是眾數「goals」，問立會過半是唯一的目標嗎？何答「我淨係知道立會過半啫」，李追問那「五大訴求，缺一不可」呢？何指「我收到嘅訊息係35+之後去爭取嘅」，理解爭取五大訴求並非「35+計劃」目標。陳慶偉續提到區諾軒早前供稱，九西首次會議曾討論政治聯繫較「尷尬」的人，如新思維狄志遠可否參與初選，戴耀廷回答只要認同「五大訴求」就可參選。陳問據戴耀廷說法，「五大訴求」不就是計劃的目標嗎？何稱「咁就唔係喎」，指「嗰個『五大訴求』係一個立場，我哋呢個初選係希望做到35+，35+到先至更有力去爭取『五大訴求』」。
+
+李運騰問立會過半是否只是手段（means），用來爭取五大訴求這個目標（goal），何答就陳提到的例子，他們是認同以「五大訴求」的立場來界定參選人資格，但初選計劃是希望達致35+，重申爭取五大訴求是「之後嘅事」。何又說，「或者可能真係大家又係理解唔同」，強調「嗰個目標我就好簡單諗，就係要攞35+，而事實上參選得嘅，都冇人會話佢唔認同『五大訴求』」。
+
+#### 何同意想達成五大訴求 達致制衡
+
+李運騰問，那何啟明自己呢？他想達成五大訴求嗎？何答「想」。李問故他當選後，會用任何權力來爭取？何指他不會用「任何」來形容，解釋要實現五大訴求有很多種模式，而他當時認為取得35+，就可在議會對政府有「制衡（checks and balances）」的功用，政府就需與民主派商討，商討過程就可爭取實現五大訴求。陳仲衡問他在論壇有沒有這樣說，何說他已忘記論壇內容。
+
+#### 控方稱要用相同武器才能迫政府回應五大訴求 何啟明：唔一定
+
+何啟明上午完成主問。他下午在主控萬德豪盤問下同意，簽署「墨落無悔」的人同意迫特首回應五大訴求，而除非民主派立會過半後團結否則無法做到。萬德豪續指，他們實要用相同武器（same weapon）才能迫政府回應五大訴求？何啟明一度問何謂相同武器，萬指若有人修訂、有人問問題、有人否決就是不同的武器。李運騰再指，控方意思是為達致五大訴求，取得過半的民主派就武器的選取應一致，採取同樣的方式迫使政府回應。
+
+何回應「唔一定」，指因民主派過半，政府一定要找民主派商討。李運騰指但沒有人可代表所有民主派，何續回應：「咁所以其實政府係要回應五大訴求囉，因為呢個係民主派嗰個共同願望囉」，又指：「有人負責調議程，有人負責問問題，有人負責做修訂，係可以同時進行，所以我話唔一定要共同武器。」
+
+陳仲衡續問何當時是否知道「大殺傷力憲制武器」？李運騰指他一定知道，因為他聽過「攬炒十步」，何同意有此印象。萬德豪續指，這就是他提到35+後議員可使用的「武器」，惟何攤手說：「問問題、修訂咋喎？」
+
+李運騰續問，但到了投票的時候，民主派若要達到共同目的，就要有一致的投票意向？何重申可以有人不斷問問題和修訂，亦有人可與政府商討，「一路都唔做表決住」，「呢個情況都可以出現㗎喎。」李再追問，但投票時意向要一致才能達到目的？何靜默數秒後表示：「因為我真係諗唔到嗰個狀況。」
+
+#### 何啟明不同意「墨落」共同綱領指無差別否決財案、一度稱聲明「有語病」
+
+此外，控方亦就「墨落無悔」聲明進行盤問。就聲明提及「我們認為，在初選協調會議上已取得共識的共同綱領，乃一眾參選人之合作基礎。考慮到立場差異，此一綱領已達致抗爭陣營光譜的最大公因數」，何啟明同意認為「已取得共識的共同綱領」是指區諾軒提到辦初選等4點共識。萬德豪續指，但「墨落無悔」提及認同五大訴求和會運用否決權等，與何稱的4點共識無關？何答「唔係喎」，李運騰即指何啟明卻指五大訴求並非共識之一。何續指，「嗱，其實呢句嘢係有語病㗎所以」，鄒家成和林卓廷等即大笑，何並解釋若該4點共識是共同綱領，「咁點解下一句就即刻話有立場差異呢？」
+
+法官李運騰指不認為有邏輯問題，稱有些參選人或推本土派議程、有些人不，有人擁護一國兩制、有人不會，與4點共識不相違。李並着控方直接問問題，萬德豪指認為問題已頗清晰，李說：「那就令它更清晰」；陳慶偉亦說他昨日已問過同樣問題，何啟明亦已答了不同意，不認為重複有什麼意義。
+
+控方最後指出，聲明中的「共同綱領」是指無差別否決預算案的協議，何不同意。李運騰問，施德來有出席黨會議，有否提到九東候選人會簽署和提交共同綱領？何說「冇印象有呢份文件嘅討論」，他亦不知道有該份文件。
+
+#### 何啟明稱簽署「墨落」時不知誰發起 官問會否擔心是陷阱
+
+就何啟明昨稱，他對「墨落」的理解或與其他人不同，他在盤問下指當時沒有向發起人澄清內容，而他簽署時亦不知道誰是發起人，因同事展示帖文時「冇人名，淨係得內容」、並稱陸續有不同人簽署，何看到內容覺得可接受就簽署，沒有嘗試找出誰是發起人。李運騰問，他不擔心這是陷阱？何說「嗰時冇諗到係陷阱喎，嗰時覺得係有人想有一個立場上嘅展示」，鄒家成笑着與吳政亨討論。
+
+法官陳仲衡問，何不會想知道發起人是來自傳統抑或激進陣營嗎？何解釋選舉期工作忙亂，重申純粹看到聲明覺得內容可接受就簽署，對控方質疑可找黨友或施德來查詢，何笑言其團隊「唔係好多人」，他亦沒有問施德來。何續指他於簽署後約一星期內，看到其他候選人帖文「頭嗰幾個名都係一樣」，理解應該「嗰幾個」是發起人。
+
+#### 何啟明稱黨友對「墨落無悔」無強烈反對
+
+何啟明亦供稱，曾於黨團群組討論「墨落無悔」，但當時包括施德來也「冇乜反應」。李運騰問故何是自說自話？何解釋是無強烈的反對，可能「覆啲 emoji」，陳慶偉發笑。控方質疑他談「墨落」，黨友卻只覆表情符號？何解釋因大家「冇好大嘅意見」，他不記得如何回覆，「可能真係手指公、OK咁樣」。陳慶偉問為何是手指公不是「滴汗」，何指群組內不是每人熱衷討論，重申不記得詳情。
+
+何亦確認，沒有向施德來查詢，聲明中「包括否決預算案」其實是指「不包括否決預算案」。萬德豪續指，何並沒有將他的理解告知選民，惟陳慶偉指何已答過、稱選民會理解，何表示他亦有回覆選舉主任。萬再質疑，但何沒有與選民討論他否決財案的意向？何指選舉期間時間太少，他沒有這樣做。
+
+
+▲ 施德來（資料圖片）
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（4日）踏入審訊第78天。前民協副主席何啟明今繼續作供，解釋選舉單張的意思。就單張提到「反暴政」，何表明當時政府「唔理會人民嘅聲音」，一意孤行實施《逃犯條例》，甚至由警察施放催淚彈、用水炮車，是「對人民的暴政」，港人要「Full counter」反擊；至於單張提「凡推倒政府的執政模式，都可謂之革命」，何稱無意推翻政府，而是「推翻林鄭月娥嗰種嘅執政模式」，直言政府疫情紓困措施不足，故意「撳低香港人嘅生活，要香港人靠政府先可以過活」。
+
+何啟明又表示，初選論壇前無與參選九東的黨友施德來討論，指兩個選舉隊伍「各自運作」；而就施於論壇提到民協入議會會兩次否決預算案，何認為是施的個人看法，不代表他和民協立場。何盤問下，亦表示無收過戴耀廷發出的協調文件。
+
+#### 何解釋單張提「暴政」：政府不理人民聲音、由警用催淚彈水炮車
+
+何啟明今繼續作供，辯方展示何啟明報名時附上的選舉單張，寫有「反暴政 衛我城 FULL COUNTER」。被問「暴政」指什麼，何答：「我指當時嘅政府，佢唔理會人民嘅聲音，一意孤行嚟到實施《逃犯條例》。」陳仲衡說但當時政府已撤回草案，何指當時政府說法是「暫緩」，後來才「撤回」，又指「暴政除咗呢樣野仲有其他嘅」，鄒家成和林卓廷對視而笑。何續解釋，政府不理會人民聲音，「好多民生嘅事政府都冇回應，甚至由得警察嚟到去施放催淚彈、用水炮車，所以我哋覺得呢個政府就係對人民嘅暴政」，鄒家成點頭。
+
+
+▲ （資料圖片）
+
+陳慶偉再問何謂「Full counter（全面反擊）」，何指是足球術語，「指弱隊面對強隊嘅時候，無論前鋒中場後衛都一齊反擊，所以就引申落去香港人即使面對強權，都要一齊嚟到反擊」，又指是「跨階層，跨世代」。至於「衞我城」，何確認是指香港。
+
+#### 單張提「全面否決權」包括否決財案 何稱僅解釋35+情況無意運用
+
+辯方欲就下一議題發問，但李運騰指何啟明還有其他單張，問辯方會否想就此提問。辯方其後展示另一單張，寫有「團結爭四席 初選你話事」，而在「乜嘢係民主派初選？」、「點解...香港人需要『民主35+』？」下，寫有「取得全面否決權，包括否決財政預算案」。
+
+就「全面否決權」，何解釋以往民主派是少數，只有就重大議案的「關鍵否決權」；但民主派過半則可有「全面否決權」，所有政府議案都要得到民主派同意才可通過，解釋單張是「事實的陳述」。李運騰指所以「包括」一詞在這裡不是指「不包括」？何答：「哦係啊，全面否決權係包括呢啲（否決預算案）。」陳仲衡續問，單張提到「不同戰線」，是指「Full counter」？陳慶偉問還是指「攬炒十步」？何指應是「Full counter」。
+
+何其後再主動補充，「包括否決財政預算案」是形容「全面否決權有啲乜嘢嘢」，解釋民主派立會過半後可取全面否決權、制衡暴政、實現五大訴求，但與「墨落無悔」一樣，「我冇話過用呢一樣嘢嚟到迫使特首回應五大訴求。」李運騰問若何無意運用否決權，為何要提及，何解釋希望用字較「一致」，指簽署的「墨落無悔」有提，故想單張亦提及，因不一致又會被發現和要花時間回應。
+
+陳慶偉問，所以單張不是用來宣傳何自己，而是宣傳「35+計劃」整體？何指其他部分有介紹民協。李運騰再問，所以何是在單張提及他認為計劃的重點（salient features）？何同意。
+
+#### 單張提「推倒政府執政模式」 何稱非推翻政府、指林鄭故意撳低港人生活
+
+至於另一份單張寫有「議會過半 民生革命」，何啟明解釋「民生革命」是「我哋唔要林鄭月娥嗰個領導嘅模式喇」。何並確認，單張上提到的利瀚庭是他參與正式選舉的拍檔，但因民協資源有限，「一份單張用到尾」，故在初選和正選都有使用。
+
+
+▲ （資料圖片）
+
+就單張提及「林鄭用呢一種7.21執政模式」、「香港人不可以容忍林鄭這方面的政策」、「凡推倒政府的執政模式，都可謂之革命」，何指「政府執政模式」與「政府」兩者有分別，解釋「單張意思唔係要推翻政府，而係推翻林鄭月娥嗰種嘅執政模式」。李運騰問及單張首句「林鄭政府是香港民生的敵人」，何解釋因林鄭政府「冇去理會到香港人嘅生活」，疫情的紓解民困措施不足夠，而「我睇到佢係好特登咁做，因為佢就係要撳低香港人嘅生活，要香港人靠政府先可以過活」。
+
+李運騰問，所以何想表達的訊息，是林鄭月娥「刻意地對香港人做邪惡的事（deliberately doing evil against the Hong Kong people）」？何指在2020年初，看到政府把關不力致疫情擴散，民協曾去政總請願要求封關，但政府無理會。
+
+李運騰再次問，而何是認為政府不止是漠視市民需要，更是刻意做邪惡的事情？何指單張是寫「政府刻意地令到嗰個香港變得更差」，「差」意思是疫情擴至整個社會。李運騰問他是談及2020年初？何指當時疫情已很嚴重，李指不認為如2022年嚴重，何說：「咁的確係一波比一波嚴重。」
+
+#### 何啟明稱初選論壇前無與施德來討論 因屬兩團隊 自己無提否決權
+
+何啟明確認，他於6月24日出席九龍西的初選論壇，而事前沒有與黨討論應該或不應該在論壇說什麼。李運騰指論壇有固定環節如限時的自我介紹和問答，何確認獲初選組織者通知相關程序，而他有為相關問答等準備，「但唔係寫稿咁」，亦確認預期會就黨立場被發問。
+
+陳仲衡問既然如此，何會與參選九龍東的黨友施德來討論當被問及民協立場時會說什麼？何指「我冇同佢討論」，因兩個選舉隊伍「各自運作」。李運騰再指，但假若何在論壇說了一些會引起人攻擊施德來的話，他們有想過為此準備共同的反駁（common defence）嗎？何說「我哋真係冇咁諗過」。
+
+何啟明續確認，他於論壇上沒提過運用否決權。阮偉明指就論壇發問完畢，李運騰問辯方會否想就何啟明一些發言發問，並主動提到是哪幾段發言，阮偉明一度坐下閱讀，後表示該些發言沒提及運用否決權，不認為與控罪相關。
+
+#### 何啟明指黨友施德來九東論壇發言是個人看法 不代表民協立場
+
+至於就施德來在之後九龍東初選論壇，提及「今日嘅民協入到議會裏面，我哋一定會兩次否決《財政預算案》，入到議會裏面，今日係要抗爭，唔抗爭嘅就行開」，何啟明稱是論壇後約一兩日由同事告知大意，而他認為這只是施德來個人看法，不代表其立場和民協立場，他亦不同意施稱會兩次否決預算案，「佢喺論壇講嘅野就唔代表我。」
+
+何續指，他沒有向施表達不同意，因九西論壇後他已忙於進行街站和競選工作，「加上我明白九龍西民協嘅支持者，係會清楚分到我同施德來」，解釋「佢哋理解民協過去嘅往績，知道民協本身係一個乜嘢嘅政黨，佢唔會話因為一個人一句半句說話，就會話呢個人呢個黨就係咁喇」，加上他出選九西，「我知道民協嘅支持者都會支持我嘅。」
+
+陳仲衡問，故何啟明的看法是民協的正統（orthodox）看法？何指「好難判斷到底邊一個較為傳統」，但認為民協支持者會明白和支持他的立場。何續確認，他於初選勝出，7月22日報名參與正式立法會選舉，後被選舉主任就「墨落無悔」等作提問，他有作回覆。
+
+#### 何稱無意圖顛覆國家政權和無差別否決預算案
+
+辯方最後問，何參與初選時同意顛覆國家政權和無差別否決預算案嗎？何答「不同意」。辯方再問，何入議會唯一願景是否迫使政府回應五大訴求？何否認。
+
+#### 何稱無興趣戴耀廷「攬炒」文章、協調會僅岑子杰反對否決權
+
+何啟明今早完成主問。他下午在主控萬德豪盤問下確認，自2018年風雲計劃認識戴耀廷，知道他是35+計劃的主要推手，亦有發布很多文章，惟他2019年尾至2020年7月沒有讀過戴的文章和 Facebook 帖文。萬德豪問，何稱第二次協調會議上戴耀廷曾應張崑陽要求介紹「真攬炒十步」文章，提及運用否決權，何會後沒有再看那篇文章？何同意，指「一嚟冇興趣，二嚟佢都講咗啦」。
+
+何續指，戴提及否決權後，只有岑子杰反對，戴回應可用或不用，之後「好快轉咗 topic 去（協調）機制度喇」，他亦沒有提出反對。萬德豪指那不是他首次聽到戴耀廷提「會積極運用」否決權的說法，指戴首次會議上已提及。何指戴有提否決權，但不記得確實字眼。
+
+#### 何啟明稱無收過戴耀廷發出協調文件
+
+控方續展示戴耀廷與趙家賢的 WhatsApp 訊息，其中3月18日提及首次九西協調會的時間地點，何確認從區諾軒收到該訊息內容，但不記得戴耀廷有否發該訊息給他。控方指他實是從戴耀廷收到，惟何說：「吓，我到而家個記憶都仲係區諾軒。」
+
+控方續展示首次會議兩日後、即3月26日的訊息，戴提及「這是我草擬的文件，作下次會議討論的基礎」，並附上「35+九西」文件，何指他均沒有收到。法官和萬德豪問，會議上有沒有人想要排除民協參與討論？何說「我唔明佢點樣想撇除我哋」、「我冇聽過咁嘅訊息」。
+
+#### 何稱協調會無需文件可討論、亦無會議紀錄
+
+李運騰指訊息顯示戴為下次會議準備了討論文件，問何出席第二次會議時有收過文件嗎？何表示沒有，他「冇嘢揸手」。陳仲衡問會上有否其他人用他沒有的文件討論，何重申兩次會議集中討論初選機制，「唔會有文件嗰啲嘢。」李運騰問，會議有很多人出席，戴耀廷作為主持，發言時沒有草稿？何說：「唔使㗎佢！」，多人發笑。
+
+李問那何是否需要，何稱「都唔使」。李問即所有人自由說話？何重申，初選機制就是討論有否初選和論壇等，「唔使文件都討論到」；至於計劃的目標，「咪就係佢一開始簡介佢啲文章提及嗰啲嘢，咁講完大家就『哦』，就落返去個機制」，鄒家成、彭卓棋等發笑，陳慶偉亦笑出聲。
+
+陳續敲了枱上文件數下，指民協開會有紀錄，辯方亦呈上相關文件，何說「咁我哋黨運作係有紀錄啊嘛」，陳指但據何所說，35+計劃就沒有準備文件，李運騰亦說，就同意的事項也沒有書面紀錄，所有人就發生什麼事或同意了哪些事項都是憑記憶，何同意，並指辦初選等4點機制「唔使文件就講到」。陳慶偉再問，那何如何獲悉下一次會議日期，何指是有人 WhatsApp 通知，同意他收訊息沒有困難。
+
+案件明續審。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-07-05-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-79.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-07-05-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-79.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..8149b801
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-07-05-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-79.md
@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第 79 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-07-05 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 何啟明指戴耀廷倡「攬炒」不信對否決權解釋、無公開指施德來說法不代表黨因「冇諗過咁大鑊」
+- 論壇提「打倒共產黨」 何啟明稱屬「憤慨之言」、信鄧小平說「共產黨是罵不倒」
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（5日）踏入審訊第79天。何啟明今繼續接受控方盤問，表示沒有收過戴耀廷發出的協調機制文件，亦不同意文件表明「會積極運用」否決權。法官質疑何也簽署了寫有「會運用」權力的「墨落無悔」聲明，為何不同意協調文件內容，何解釋理解「會積極運用」比「會運用」更積極，而雖然戴曾於協調會解釋「會積極運用」為「可用可不用」，但認為戴「本身就諗住（實踐）『攬炒十步曲』，所以我唔相信佢嘅解釋」，同意法官指戴解釋時是不誠實、無說出動機。
+
+被問民協曾否討論否決預算案迫政府回應五大訴求，何表示民協重視民生，不會無差別否決，或因「老奉」而「冇認真討論都唔出奇」。至於黨友施德來於論壇提「攬炒政府」和兩次否決預算案，何表示不同意，但沒公開表示其說法不代表民協，解釋當時「真係冇諗過會咁大鑊」，亦知道支持者「心水清」會分得清二人。
+
+#### 帖文提公帑不能再落入警隊 何啟明解釋僅反對追加撥款
+
+前民協副主席何啟明今繼續接受盤問。他昨稱無收過戴耀廷於首次九西會議後兩日發出的「35+九西」文件，主控萬德豪今展示該份「民主派九西協調機制（初稿）」，何重申無收過。被問會上有否討論初稿內容，何指就第一點凡認同「五大訴求、缺一不可」及35+均可參與協調機制，「呢個唔駛討論㗎」，指會議無討論過但他同意；至於第二點「會積極運用立法會的權力，包括否決財政預算案」，何指他不同意否決財案迫特首回應五大訴求，而會上有提過但無詳細討論。
+
+李運騰續引何啟明初選後發布的帖文，提及「警暴橫行欺壓市民，公帑絕不能有一分一毫再落入惡貫滿盈的警隊手上；否決對犯罪組織的任何撥款，從來都不是策略問題，而是立場問題」，問何是否不會同意任何有警隊撥款的財政預算案。
+
+何同意「有咁寫過」，解釋他當時強調要追究警暴問題，而在追究之前「我唔同意撥款警隊」。李追問即只要預算案有警察撥款，他就會反對？何說「呢個要分清楚」，指警隊一直都有「恆常出糧」，但「我係反對佢再加任何撥款畀警察」，帖文「一分一毫」亦是指額外撥款，「例如要再買水炮車嘅話，咁我真係唔會喇」，強調仍是要看清預算案內容才決定。
+
+李運騰指，何的用字似乎不是那麼明顯（explicit）。何同意「如果你淨係睇呢一篇，其實就或者未必睇到」，認為是「用字問題」，但重申他是上述理解。何其後又補充，即使否決預算案，政府仍可有臨時撥款繼續營運、警隊仍能繼續運作，「所以我唔能夠透過否決財政預算案令到警察冇糧出或者一蚊都攞唔到。」
+
+
+▲ 何啟明
+
+#### 官質疑何啟明若簽「墨落」 為何不同意協調文件提「會積極運用」否決權
+
+至於初稿其他內容有否討論，何啟明指兩次會議均沒討論會進行選前民調，也沒提過香港民意研究所或鍾庭耀；目標議席數目亦無決定取4席，是選完後再決定。陳慶偉問，那所有項目在九西協調會議結束後，是否都已解決（resolve）？何指不知最後定稿，因沒收過文件，並指會議有討論用靈童制抑或遞補機制，但沒有結論、初稿亦無提及。
+
+何亦表示，就第二點「會積極運用立法會的權力，包括否決財政預算案」，「真係唔係個個認同」。法官李運騰指該點與「墨落無悔」相似，只是初稿提「會積極運用」、「墨落無悔」是「會運用」，有些人甚至認為「會積極」較溫和，問何同意該點的內容嗎？何說「我不同意」。陳仲衡續指，但初稿與「墨落」同樣使用「包括否決預算案」字眼、何亦談及過對此的理解（即可用一系列權力，不限於否決財案），何啟明回應他當時不知道字眼的運用，是後來看文件才得悉有「會積極」和「會」。
+
+陳仲衡續指，但該點甚至比「墨落無悔」溫和，若何願意簽署「墨落」，為何會不同意該點？辯方大律師阮偉明一度站起，指這是假設何啟明知道兩個字眼的分別。惟陳慶偉指「會」或「會積極」不重要，重要的是何曾供稱「包括否決預算案」其實指「不包括否決預算案」，若他願簽「墨落無悔」，那：「你一定會同意初稿的第二點！」
+
+#### 何稱理解「會積極」比「會」更積極、指戴耀廷想攬炒十步不信其就字眼解釋
+
+何啟明回應：「因為我理解『會積極』係更加積極，比起『會』，即係更加積極去 veto 個 budget。」被告欄內的梁國雄邊聽邊點頭。陳慶偉續指，但何昨同意在第二次會議上岑子杰反對否決權後，戴曾提議用「會積極」字眼，即「可用可不用」。何同意，指當時戴提及「攬炒十步曲」而岑子杰反對，其他人也沒太大反應，「咁然後戴耀廷就『轉軚』啦，話其實都係可以用可以唔用嘅，但係我真係唔信佢。」
+
+陳慶偉續指，「我讀過區諾軒的證供很多次」，指區稱戴在首次會議已曾提過「會積極」運用否決權。何同意戴在首兩次會議均有解釋「會積極運用」的意思，李運騰問既然如此，他同意初稿第二點嗎？何說：「我都係唔認同，因為係戴耀廷講嘅，因為佢本身就諗住攬炒十步曲，所以我唔相信佢嘅解釋。」
+
+李運騰笑着問，所以何認為戴耀廷一直都想實踐「攬炒十步」，故他解釋「會積極」為「可用可不用」時，他是不誠實（dishonest）、沒有說出他真正的動機？何答「你可以咁講」。
+
+
+▲ 戴耀廷
+
+#### 何同意協議與「墨落無悔」用字接近 官稱「墨」提撤銷控罪比協議提特赦更進一步
+
+何啟明續在盤問下，表示無從戴耀廷收過有關第二次會議時間地點的訊息，他是從區諾軒收到。至於戴第二次會議兩日後發出「35+九西final」文件，並表示「這是最終的協調文件」，何也沒收過。控方其後展示該份「民主派九龍西協調機制協議」，問參與者是否就協議內容達成共識，何指會上無就使用靈童制達成共識，亦無討論民調。
+
+法官再比較初稿和協議有關否決權的段落，其中初稿提及：「會積極運用立法會的權力，包括否決財政預算案，迫使特首特赦抗爭者、令相關人士為警暴問責、及重啟政改」，協議則為：「會積極運用基本法賦予立法會的權力，包括否決財政預算案，迫使特首回應五大訴求，特赦抗爭者、叫相關人士為警暴問責、及重啟政改以達雙普選。」
+
+何同意後者加上迫使特首回應「五大訴求」及達雙普選，用字與「墨落無悔」更接近。陳慶偉續指出，而「墨落」提到「撤銷所有抗爭者控罪」而非「特赦抗爭者」，是「更進一步（one step further）」，即在抗爭者定罪前或被控前便要撤銷控罪，而非定罪後再赦。
+
+#### 何稱4項共識簡單 無文件訊息提及不奇怪
+
+控方和法官其後追問，何啟明在協調會議沒收過有關初選計劃或討論事項的文件、亦沒收過任何訊息或文件提及達成了的共識，不覺得奇怪嗎？何說「唔奇怪」，「因為大家討論真係唔使文件」，而且「4樣嘢（共識）好簡單咋嘛，兩個（辦初選和論壇）係『有冇』嘅問題」。
+
+陳慶偉再追問，會上有否傳閱「35+計劃」文件，李運騰亦指區諾軒曾供稱首次會議有傳閱，何搖頭答：「可能我遲到我 miss 咗喎，我真係冇印象有呢樣嘢」，並同意他參與的是「無紙會議（paperless meeting）」。控方續指出，何實收到了所有相關文件，何不同意。
+
+#### 何稱民協不同意否決財案迫特首回應五大訴求、會視否財案內容決定
+
+就民協的立場，何啟明指民協對「墨落無悔」聲明「冇立場」，至於就否決預算案，「民協就係會睇返財政預算案嘅內容再作決定。」李運騰問，即民協不同意「墨落無悔」？何指是不同意否決預算案迫特首回應五大訴求，而他於群組曾講及自己對「墨落無悔」的理解，黨「冇乜反對意見」。
+
+萬德豪追問，民協有就否決預算案迫使政府回應五大訴求討論嗎？何指「就咁呢個 statement 我就唔記得有喇」，萬追問即有沒有，何手指向萬說：「嗱，呢句你話有討論過咩先？」萬重申是否決預算案迫使回應五大訴求。
+
+何續說：「呢句句子我真係唔記得有冇，亦都唔肯定」，重申每次都會據預算案內容討論。萬遂提高聲量問，無差別否決預算案會影響香港居民生活，若有討論會是很大的事（very very big issue）？何同意是大事，並反問他向民協成員講述對「墨落無悔」的理解，而他們「冇乜反應」，「咁樣算唔算一個討論？」
+
+#### 被問黨曾否討論否決財案 何稱民協重視民生或「老奉」、「冇討論唔出奇」
+
+萬德豪和法官李運騰追問，那在2020年3月至7月期間，還有其他場合討論過嗎？何指他在九西第二次協調會議後，曾簡單匯報會上有提過用否決權，「但大家都係話咁再討論啦。」控方質疑，何沒有將會上積極運用否決權的議題帶回民協討論，何邊攤出左手邊答：「或者咁樣講，其實民協一路都係咁重視民生，我覺得有啲嘢可能真係老奉咗，佢哋唔需要討論喎——『唔會』囉！所以我哋每次就住財政預算案嘅立場，咪就係睇返財政預算案嘅內容囉！所以可能真係咁冇認真討論都唔出奇喎。」
+
+萬兩度追問，那何印象中有無討論過？何重申：「我之前都講過我同民協嘅立場係唔會咁做嘅，咁呢啲冇討論真係唔出奇喎！」，又說「我真係唔肯定，我只能夠話畀你聽我嘅立場同民協嘅立場」。
+
+萬德豪欲再追問，惟陳慶偉打斷說：「Thank you, move on.」李運騰改問何有否與團隊討論，指否決預算案似乎當時是熱門話題（hot topic），何指有，形容與助理對話很簡單，就是因為重視民生，故民協「係唔會隨便咁否決一個財政預算案」，反對無差別以否決權迫特首回應五大訴求。陳仲衡問他有沒有想過這是民協在選舉中的賣點或弱點，何指當時認為「兩個都有可能」。
+
+#### 何稱施德來論壇發言前無通知 認會感驚訝
+
+何啟明昨表示，就施德來論壇稱民協入議會會兩次否決預算案，是其個人看法，不代表他和民協立場。何今在盤問下表示，沒有與施討論過他不會否決預算案，施亦沒向他提過對「墨落無悔」的理解及會否決預算案。
+
+控方續引施在論壇的發言：「我哋冇討論嘅空間，冇談判嘅餘地，只有抗爭到底。入到議會裏面，我哋大家都要否決財政預算案，大家都要否決政府所有議案，同呢個政府抗爭到底，攬炒呢個政府」、「今日嘅民協入到議會裏面，我哋一定會兩次否決《財政預算案》，入到議會裏面，今日係要抗爭，唔抗爭嘅就行開」。
+
+
+▲ 施德來（資料圖片）
+
+何表示，施發言前沒有通知他，其說法亦非民協立場。萬德豪問，那何對施的說法感到驚訝嗎？何笑着問：「你問緊我心情啊？」，旁聽席傳來笑聲。李運騰重申問題，指何已認識施一段時間，他對施的說法感到驚訝嗎？何答「都會嘅」，並確認他不同意施稱兩次否決預算案和攬炒政府。
+
+#### 被問民協支持者是否左右為難 何：知道九西選民心水清會分得清
+
+李運騰續指，有趣的是，如何啟明和施德來同時當選，兩人就否決預算案的投票就會不同。何說：「如果真係根據字面咁，係真係會出現呢個情況。」萬德豪再指，何和施是民協唯二候選人，何稱不會否決預算案，但施就說會？何答：「所以我唔知點解佢咁講。」
+
+陳慶偉說，那民協支持者就會左右為難（torn between two lovers）了，何回應：「因為我哋分開九西同九東選嘅，而我知道九龍西嘅選民都係啲心水清嘅選民，會分得清我同阿來。」李運騰問，所以他們是何的支持者，而不是施的支持者？何答：「係㗎，因為好多票都係一啲關係票嚟㗎。」陳仲衡指若然如此則無需參加初選了，何答：「咁我哋係民主派啊嘛，同埋事前真係唔知施德來會咁樣講。」
+
+#### 何稱對施德來發言無興趣：當時真係冇諗過會咁大鑊
+
+何在盤問下表示，他沒有告訴公眾施德來的說法不代表民協，而他不知道施為何這樣說、事後也沒有問。萬德豪追問他不會有興趣知道施為何說出與黨立場相違的話嗎？何笑說「我當時真係冇乜興趣」，指當時已完成論壇、亦有很多選舉工作，「我又清楚知道民協嘅支持者會分得出我同阿來，同埋當時真係冇諗過會咁大鑊㗎嘛，所以冇真係公開地話佢講嘅野唔符合黨囉」，鄒家成、陳志全等發笑。萬最後指，何沒有問施的原因，是因為這也是何的立場，何答：「呢個非常不同意。」
+
+陳仲衡追問，《國安法》實施後，何啟明不會擔心施德來會說出類似的話令他或黨有麻煩嗎？何指「我當時冇咁諗」，因越來越近初選「都係專注返自己嘅選舉工作」。至於初選之後，何表示「咁阿來都輸咗，所以我就冇再講」，控方追問但施說的仍代表黨立場？何說：「冇理到啦。」
+
+案件下午續審。
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（5日）踏入審訊第79天。何啟明繼續接受盤問，就初選論壇的發言作出解釋。對於論壇提及「打倒共產黨」，何啟明指是批評中共無兌現《基本法》承諾的「憤慨之言」，又指社會很多人講「打倒共產黨」講了數十年，當時《國安法》亦未實施，他相信鄧小平稱「共產黨是罵不倒的」。何又強調「攬炒嘅係中共」，指《國安法》令股市跌、令市民有恐懼。
+
+對於論壇表示民協「唔會同呢個極權有咩嘢好傾」，何指「極權」是指港府而非中央，直言「中央政府唔會同我哋傾」；又解釋要展示堅定形象，但認為政治本質仍避不了「傾」。法官問即虛偽是關鍵？何稱由選民決定。何亦曾提及要令立會成為政府及保皇黨「地獄」，他解釋以往民主派是少數，即使議案有建設性亦被「熄咪、趕出會議廳」，望「建制派經歷返民主派經歷過嘅嘢」。
+
+#### 論壇表示與極權「冇咩好傾」 何稱指香港政府：中央政府唔會同我哋傾
+
+主控萬德豪下午就何啟明於2020年6月九西選舉論壇的發言提問。其中何啟明被馮達浚問民協以往「又傾又砌」，今時今日是否摒棄此主張，何答：「唔係，呢個好清楚㗎喇，我哋面對呢個極權呢，佢就係不斷嚟到打壓我哋，所以反抗係我哋唯一嘅出路，我哋唔會同呢個極權有咩嘢好傾㗎喇。」
+
+萬德豪問「極權」是指香港政府？何答「係」。萬問也指中國政府？何說：「我記得呢一句嗰陣時係講緊⋯應該係講緊特區政府㗎啫，因為中央政府唔會同我哋傾」，鄒家成和林卓廷等發笑，何再說：「我哋傾嘅對象⋯⋯中央政府都唔會睬我哋啦。」
+
+#### 何稱論壇上要展示堅定形象、政治本質避不了「傾」 虛偽與否由選民決定
+
+法官陳仲衡續指，何啟明「唔會同呢個極權有咩好傾㗎啦」一句，與施德來論壇稱「冇討論嘅空間，冇談判嘅餘地」很相似。何不同意，指他是回應馮達浚的問題，指「民協畀人鬧咗三十年『又傾又砌』，啫係話我哋搖擺不定、話我哋騎牆」，而他要短時間回應馮達浚，「就要喺最短嘅時間展示返民協係一個堅定嘅民主派，所以話『冇嘢好傾』」，但何強調，「呢個係一個形象上嘅展示，我哋要明白政治嘅本質就係有『傾』呢個過程。」
+
+李運騰問，所以當何說「冇嘢好傾」時，並沒有這個意思？何說：「呢個係政治嘅本質，你避免唔到『傾』呢樣嘢。」李指現時不是發表演說的時候，只是想理解何當時的想法，並問即何內心深處是認為仍要「傾」？何同意。控方質疑他沒說出來，何重申「我要回應佢嗰個形象嘅攻擊嘛」，因此要表明是堅定民主派。
+
+李再問，即何不是說他真心相信的話？何答「唔係」，重申「呢個政治本質係咁，你形象要堅定，但你要明白個操作真係避免唔到『傾』」。李再問，即虛偽就是關鍵？（“Hypocrisy is the key?”）何說：「我覺得我係希望⋯⋯將民協嘅形象定位喺一個堅定嘅民主派啦，至於係咪虛偽呢，咁選民就自行決定喇。」
+
+萬德豪說，但何可以直接回應他不是騎牆派。何語速稍快說：「有好多個選擇嘅如果要答嘅話，咁我當時時間短，佢問我係咪『又傾又砌』，我就答佢『冇嘢好傾』，唔係更加中 point 咩，我覺得係喎。」鄒家成和李予信等發笑。萬德豪指，何說的話實與施德來的立場一致，何不同意。
+
+#### 稱令立會成保皇黨地獄 何稱民主派曾被熄咪等 要建制派有同樣經歷
+
+控方續引何啟明於論壇提及達到35+「我哋要令到立法會成為呢個政府同埋保皇黨嘅地獄」。何解釋，「咁以往民主派係少數，我哋畀人熄咪、我哋畀人趕出會議廳，咁35+我哋係多數，咪我哋熄返佢咪，我哋趕返佢哋出去囉。」多人發笑。
+
+陳慶偉問即癱瘓政府？何說「冇呢個意思」，解釋「以往呢民主派少數呢，無論我哋嘅提議幾咁有建設性、幾咁有意義呀，我哋都唔會得到重視，結果就係畀人熄咪、畀人趕出會議廳，甚有啲唔合法嘅程序都可以繼續落去㗎，所以其實對我哋嚟趕係真係好憤怒」，並確認「我哋」是指「民主派」。
+
+李運騰問，故何認為以往民主派遭受不公義（injustice），他們就要做同樣的事？何指「趕佢哋出去、熄佢哋咪」是過半後可以做的事情的例子，「但係我冇話我哋會變成佢哋一樣咁唔公義」，「我諗係要建制派經歷返民主派經歷過嘅嘢囉，但唔一定會變得不公義。」被問民協議員曾否被熄咪、趕走，何說不記得。
+
+#### 何稱「攬炒嘅係中共」 指《國安法》令股市跌、令市民生恐懼
+
+控方續引何啟明於論壇被主持問到，民協簽署「攬炒」的「墨落無悔」聲明，但攬炒受傷最大的是基層，若深水埗居民有天要求民協放棄抗爭，否則就放棄民協，「你會選擇背棄堅定抗爭聲明，定係背棄深水埗嘅支持者？」何當時表示深水埗居民眼睛很雪亮：「而家攬炒係邊個，攬炒係中共呀嘛，有《國安法》，股市先跌喎⋯⋯有《國安法》，真係會有個中國特務走嚟搶你啲魚、搶你啲菜，話係國家安全，佢做乜都得噶喎，所以真正令到香港經濟差、真正令到基層市民生活苦，嗰個係共產黨，係呢個極權社會，係呢個極權政府」，並指街坊都明白，「我哋真係要出嚟抗爭，我哋真係要出嚟反抗喎。」
+
+萬德豪質疑，何啟明一直表示關注深水埗基層，不認為當時是黃金機會告知公眾他無意否決預算案嗎？何表示：「我覺得呢個係黃金機會講『我唔同意攬炒』，因為主持問題係『攬炒』」，又指當時主持稱簽「墨落無悔」就是攬炒，但「我唔認同『攬炒』，我亦唔認同嗰份抗爭聲明係攬炒，因為我覺得攬炒嘅係中共」。李運騰問，問題是如果抗爭和民生之間有兩難，他會如何取捨？何表示若抗爭派與民生如此對立，便會視乎預算案內容與民協商討再決定，重申主持刻意將攬炒與民生對立，故他就表明「真正攬炒嘅係呢個中共」。
+
+李運騰指「一隻手掌拍唔響（“It takes two to tango.”）」，何再重申是「中共攬炒導致到民生差」，指「因為有《國安法》，股市跌」。李問何真的如此相信？何指當時記得「吹風出嚟話會有《國安法》，股市真係跌，跟住『國家隊（內地資金）』進場先升返」，多人大笑。
+
+李再問，那何提及中國特務搶魚和菜，也是真的有發生嗎？再引來哄堂大笑。何解釋是「同街坊傾偈得出嚟嘅結論」，指當時說法是《國安法》凌駕一切香港法例，「大家就會有一個恐懼，當恐懼去到極致嘅時候，大家就會諗咗呢啲嘢出嚟。」李問所以這是想像，多於其個人經驗？何同意「字面上咁我真係冇經歷過呢啲」，但他是在說街坊的憂慮。
+
+#### 何稱無民主就無民生 政府人民所選才會回應訴求
+
+李再問，故在抗爭與民生只能選一樣，何啟明會怎樣選擇？李又問何稱會以民生為先，在其發言何處看到？何表示：「因為我相信沒有民主，就沒有民生」，惟陳慶偉打斷着他回答問題。何續解釋，他發言時表示明白街坊生活困苦，而要改變就要告訴他們，令大家生活困苦的是極權政府，並要出來反抗。他又提到「墨落無悔」亦提及爭取雙普選，「有民主就有民生喇。」
+
+陳慶偉質疑，何事實上是着重抗爭多於民生，萬德豪亦問，何認為民主比民生更重要？何否認，表示：「我係話有民主先會有民生，因為個政府要係人民選出嚟，佢先會回應人民嘅訴求。」萬指，即何啟明優先爭取民主？何答：「因為喺而家嘅處境冇民主，所以要爭取民主囉。」萬再追問，是以民生為代價（at the expense of livelihood）？何答：「唔係，冇講過。」萬最後指，何意圖否決預算案爭取民主，何不同意。
+
+#### 論壇說「打倒共產黨」 何稱無意打倒、信鄧小平說「共產黨是罵不倒的」
+
+萬德豪續指，何啟明表示中國政府是極權政府，何表示「我係話⋯⋯共產黨」，惹來哄堂大笑。萬指中共是中國執政黨，故何啟明是反對政權？何回應是指「不輕易順從」。李運騰指，但何在論壇亦曾提及「一定就係出嚟打倒共產黨」，並不只是不順從。何回應是「憤慨之言」、「對共產黨嘅批評」，解釋因中共「由『8.31條例（人大8.31決定）』去到《國安法》」，均「冇兌現返佢喺基本法嘅承諾」，「同埋我相信鄧小平話『共產黨是罵不倒』的」，多人發笑。
+
+陳慶偉續指，何無意打倒共產黨，實可以只說「一定要出嚟批評共產黨」，但何卻選擇了用「打倒」一字，何同意「我係揀咗呢個字」。李運騰指那不是何唯一提及「打倒共產黨」之處，控方續引何被問如何運用議會資源結合街頭抗爭，亦曾回答可「請手足」來「生生不息對抗極權」，「打倒共產黨」。
+
+萬德豪問何是否與「手足」一起打倒共產黨，何否認，解釋在選舉論壇「要短時間內 appeal to（吸引）群眾，係會運用選舉語言」，同意法官指是「誇張法（hyperbole）」，又指「當時嘅社會有好多人講咗『打倒共產黨』講咗幾十年」，且當時《國安法》未正式實施故這樣說。何強調，「我用『打倒』呢真係唔係諗住打倒，係真係一個批評嘅意思，情形就好似你真係憤慨嘅時候你講粗口，你都唔係真係嗰個意思咁樣」，林卓廷哈哈大笑。
+
+萬德豪續問，《國安法》後，何有否告訴公眾他無意打倒共產黨？何表示「我諗住過咗去就算，就冇解釋喇」，又指「因為我記得好似話7月1號之前嘅嘢就唔會追究」。萬最後指，何有意打倒共產黨，《國安法》前後均意圖透過否決預算案推翻政府，何不同意。
+
+案件明續審。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-07-06-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-80.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-07-06-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-80.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..be3d9f99
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-07-06-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-80.md
@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第 80 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-07-06 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 何啟明稱爭民主不代表推翻政府 「武裝革命」方為推翻政府門檻
+- 劉偉聰稱參選因望修法、不曾簽「墨落無悔」亦不同意五大訴求
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（6日）踏入審訊第80天。何啟明今繼續接受盤問，就其訪問提「反抗極權」等，何解釋認為無聆聽市民聲音的香港政府是「極權政府」，而抗爭包括支持黃店等，但他無提過要「肢體衝突」和「推翻政府」；又指抗爭目標是望香港成為更公平公義社會，但取得民主不代表推翻政府，只是想制度更回應人民聲音。法官一度問，兩次否決預算案導致立會解散、迫特首下台不是推翻政府？何不認同，認為武裝革命才是推翻政府的門檻。何又同意，初選時望市民「重新認識民協」，但否認是表現得比實際上黃，指是「做返自己」。
+
+控方盤問期間，法官陳慶偉一度打斷，指法庭是決定法律問題而非政治議題對錯，雖案件涉政治，但不要深入政治；不過陳亦表示，不認同何稱不聽人民聲音就是極權，以美國槍械管制和英國脫歐為例，指有不同意見但也不會視為極權。何啟明完成4天作供，續由另一名被告劉偉聰作供。
+
+
+▲ 何啟明
+
+#### 官問《國安法》後有否收回言論 何啟明稱無：理解七一前不會追究
+
+前民協副主席何啟明今繼續接受盤問，控方就何2020年7月10日的大紀元訪問〈【珍言真語】何啟明：極權最怕遍地開花 港人堅持抗爭〉提問。何啟明同意，訪問於《國安法》生效後進行，但在法官陳仲衡詢問下，表示受訪前沒有讀《國安法》，只是看了關於《國安法》的評論。
+
+陳仲衡追問即沒有讀《國安法》條文？何答「我自己就冇詳細睇」，追問下確認沒有讀過。陳仲衡即嚴厲說：「不要嘗試令答案變得模棱兩可！（“Don’t try to be ambiguous in your answer!”）」法官李運騰亦表示，明白廣東話的說話方式有時是含糊，但法庭基於何的口供作出裁決，故很重要的是他說話時要越準確越好，又指何作為一個受過教育的人，應理解有讀過和只是瞥一眼的分別。
+
+何啟明續補充，他無正式看《國安法》官方文件，但看的評論內有《國安法》內容。李運騰問，何當時是否意識到《國安法》的刑事範圍很闊（casts criminal net very wide），問他有否做任何事確保他當時是符合《國安法》？何表示「我盡可能小心我嘅用字」。李續問，那他受訪前有否做任何事收回他的言論？陳仲衡舉例即「打倒共產黨」。何先重申他說「打倒共產黨」並無意「打倒」，而他無收回言論或澄清，「因為我嘅理解係7月1號（《國安法》生效）之前係唔會追究」，但他有嘗試去說一些話作「更新」。
+
+#### 控方質疑何以民主為先 何啟明：「無民主就無民生」不代表民主先於民生
+
+主控萬德豪續讀出訪問內容，被問《國安法》後市民的反應變化，何回應「呢次香港人最大嘅反應是，其實佢哋覺得香港變咗大陸」，又指大家知道「大陸就係一個黑暗、恐怖，甚至封閉嘅地方」，新聞看到很多「冤枉錯判、屈得就屈」的事，「佢哋明白內地就係一個人治嘅社會，一個極權嘅國度。」何確認是他的理解。何續於訪問稱：「而家立埋《國安法》，香港變大陸，其實呢種情緒就係令大家點解走出嚟反抗，甚至係越來越認同要對付呢個極權呢，反抗係唯一嘅出路。」控方指何仍認為反抗是唯一出路，他根本沒有改變，何否認，指他在有在訪問解釋何謂「反抗」。
+
+何於訪問續被問及民協相比其他泛民和本土派，定位是怎樣，何表示望藉此機會「大家能夠重新認識民協」，指以往很多人認為民協「淨係做民生」，「但係其實我哋越嚟越見到就係，無民主就無民生。」萬德豪指這就是何昨日所說，民主比民生優先。惟何不同意：「我話冇民主就冇民生，唔代表民主個 priority 就高過民生」，又指他在訪問有解釋民生受政治制度影響，故「要個制度變得民主，政府先至會聆聽民意、回應民生」。
+
+#### 何稱抗爭目標非推翻政權 而是令香港變更公平公義社會
+
+控方續引何於訪問稱，「極權」不會理會市民生死、不會處理民生問題，「所以點解我哋要出嚟爭取民主自由，因為其實好多香港人走出嚟抗爭，都係希望香港變成一個更公平、更公義嘅社會，都係香港變成一個更適合人居住的地方⋯大家走出嚟抗爭，因為大家真係好撚鍾意香港啊嘛，所以其實我哋都係因為咁而走出嚟反抗極權。」
+
+萬指，故最重要的仍是「抗爭」？何指他是說抗爭的目標，就是希望香港成為更公平、更公義的社會，變成更適合人住的地方「而不是推翻政府」。陳仲衡問，但要達到那樣的「烏托邦社會」，就要先取得民主？何同意，並指：「但攞到民主都唔代表要推翻政府，我哋希望嗰個制度係更加能夠回應到人民嘅聲音」，強調他提「反抗極權」並非要「推翻政權」。
+
+#### 官問否決財案致立會解散是否推翻政府 何啟明指武裝革命方為推翻門檻
+
+法官李運騰指，但何昨提到「極權」是指香港政府，何同意，指「因為當政府唔聽人民聲音嘅時候，佢就會變成極權」。李問，故何在2020年時已認為港府是極權？何同意，重申因香港政府無聆聽市民聲音，故「極權政府」是對其批評。李運騰續問何說的「反抗」是指什麼，何指訪問中也提到可融入日常生活，「例如支持黃店、例如喺自己嘅工作崗位度堅守價值，但我冇講過話要肢體衝突，更加冇提過話要推翻政府。」
+
+陳仲衡問，何認為什麼會推翻政府？何指「嗰陣時我真係聽過有人話要武裝革命」，故他認為「武裝革命就係推翻政府」。陳仲衡問，所以何認為兩次否決預算案導致立法會解散，並不是推翻政府的行為？此時何桂藍和余慧明發笑。何啟明回應：「如果按我頭先武裝革命嘅定義，咁嗰樣嘢都未算係。」陳仲衡再追問，迫特首下台也不代表推翻政府？何再說：「唔好意思啊法官閣下，因為我真係唔認同呢樣嘢，你問緊我唔認同嘅嘢⋯⋯」陳最後問，武裝革命是推翻政府的例子或門檻，何說：「誒我會話係門檻。」
+
+#### 訪問提「重新認識民協」 官問是否表現得比實際上黃 何：我哋係做返自己
+
+萬德豪續問，何提及「重新認識民協」，其黨立場是否由溫和變激進。何否認，指「以往啲人淨係覺得我哋做民生、甚至覺得我哋唔係民主派，所以我重新認識嘅意思就係民協既關注民生亦關注民主」。陳慶偉指不認為有人覺得民協是建制派，何續解釋，「民協畀人鬧咗三十年，真係有人話過我哋係建制派」。萬質疑何昨日說被罵「騎牆派」，今日又說是「建制派」，何回應兩者無衝突，指民協被罵「騎牆」甚至「鬼」，「佢哋就界定我哋唔係民主派就係建制派喇」。
+
+李運騰問，那2020年時，何啟明是在嘗試令公眾清楚知道他們不是建制派嗎？何同意，指「我哋每一次嘅公開言論都係希望話畀公眾聽我哋係民主派」。李運騰問，那何當時是想表現得比他實際上黃嗎（“portray an image that you were in fact yellower than you actually were”）？抑或只是做自己？並叫何想清楚再回答。何表示：「我哋係做返自己，所以我哋好清楚解釋我哋重視民主同民生嘅路線。」
+
+#### 法官提醒控方法庭不是決定政治議題對錯 僅關注被告意圖
+
+陳慶偉續打斷說：「Thank you，這是一個法庭，我們對政治沒興趣，move on。」萬德豪續指民協過去立場是「又傾又砌」，但何捨棄了其立場，惟陳慶偉再打斷，着控方留待陳詞。陳慶偉續表示：「記住我們是來決定法律的問題，不是來決定政治議題和對錯，我當然明白案件涉及政治元素，但不代表要深入政治。」李運騰續指，法庭關注的是被告案發時的意圖，以及該意圖是否落入控罪範圍。
+
+陳慶偉再提高聲線：「我當然沒有深入政治！」在被告席的何桂藍笑出聲並掩口。陳續說，他並沒有反駁（refute）被告說的每句話，舉例當何啟明說政府不聽人民聲音就是極權，「那不可能是對的，對嗎？」，並以美國槍械管制為例，指民主黨傾向收緊，共和黨則反對，「但你可以說美國是極權嗎？當然不！永遠都有不同的看法。」
+
+陳又舉例英國脫歐，最後只是以很小的差距通過，「你會說英國是極權嗎？當然不！但我也沒有反駁他說的每句話。」陳又再指，「我也對新疆沒興趣，全視乎你問誰和看什麼。」李運騰再重申，他們只是關注被告案發的意圖及該意圖是否落入控罪範圍，並不會考慮政見。萬德豪續指會嘗試問相關的問題。
+
+#### 何啟明認視香港政府為敵人、稱不會與共產黨打交道但會與港府「傾」
+
+萬德豪續引何啟明於訪問稱：「其實根本就唔需要同共產黨打交道，咪就係繼續反抗，繼續嚟到抗擊呢個極權」，問是否即從來不打算商討。何否認，指他只是不與共產黨打交道，但當選後會與特區政府「傾」，因為「港人治港」，又指他昨日亦稱「共產黨係唔會有渠道同我哋傾嘅，個對口單位係特區政府」。
+
+控方續引何啟明7月11日的帖文，提及前一日「港共政權漏夜走去搞香港民意研究中心，就係想嚇怕我哋，但係我哋唔驚，所謂敵人反對的我哋就要堅決擁護，用盡一切方法想打壓我哋嘅初選，我哋就要用盡一切方法話畀全世界知香港人係唔會投降」。萬德豪問何是否當香港政府是敵人，何表示「個敵人咪就係用盡一切方法想打壓初選嘅人」，追問下表示：「你可以咁理解。」李運騰追問，不僅是理解，而是何啟明撰文時也意指香港政府是敵人？何答「係」。
+
+#### 何稱共產黨和特區政府是「兩樣嘢」、但兩者做事方式相似
+
+李運騰續問，何啟明提及「港共政權」，即認為港府是共產黨的代理人（agent）；但他一邊說願與香港政府「傾」，另一邊又說不會與共產黨打交道？何指據他對《基本法》理解，「特區政府同共產黨係兩樣嘢嚟嘅，喺『港人治港』下，我哋傾嘅對口單位依然係特區政府」；又指「港共政權」是對政府的批評，「因為我理解嘅共產黨呢有好多對人嘅打壓，我就話緊特區政府就係做緊呢啲嘢喇」，但他並非將兩者等同，只是認為做事方式上「真係好似」。李運騰追問，即何啟明再次不是說字面的意思？何否認，重申港府和共產黨是「兩樣嘢」，只是「我哋見到真係有時候特區政府做咗好多唔好嘅事都好似共產黨咁」。
+
+#### 參選帖文提「和勇一體」 何啟明稱僅指大選配票
+
+控方續引何啟明7月22日宣布參加正式選舉的帖文，何確認於《國安法》後、發文前幾天準備。帖文提及九龍西「現有4席為賣港惡勢力所盤踞。我們要逆轉形勢，光復九龍西，前路定非坦途。然而過去一年，香港人『和勇一體』，團結守望」。萬德豪問何啟明是否同意「和勇不分」，何指這是其參選宣言，意指大選時配票要「和勇一體」。萬德豪質疑何是談及街頭上的「勇」、包括使用暴力，何否認，強調是指「勇」的人投票要一致。
+
+陳仲衡續問及帖文「在香港重光後回望，也不過是敵人滅亡前的瘋狂」一句，何笑說「如果咁樣逐個逐個字眼呢⋯⋯簡單講，呢份係我選舉宣言，係有選舉語言成分嘅」，並在追問下同意是誇張法。何其後再主動補充，就「敵人」一說，「我係視佢為對手，希望贏佢，就係咁簡單」，又指「贏係有誇張成分嘅，但係就唔係你死我亡嘅狀態」。被問指誰為敵人，何啟明說既指建制派對手亦指香港政府，「要贏呢個敵人，就要贏呢場選舉。」
+
+控方其後展示施德來的提名表格，附上共同綱領，何啟明表示「我係喺佢交咗之後先至知呢件事」，而他有去的會議也沒有討論該份文件。控方最後指，何啟明與其他被告串謀無差別否決預算案，以迫使政府回應五大訴求，意圖顛覆國家政權，何啟明一一否認。
+
+控方表示盤問完結，何啟明覆問下再確認無從戴耀廷收過九西會議的訊息。何作供完畢，說「唔該晒咁多位」，後拿着水杯返回座位並笑着呼氣，續由另一名被告劉偉聰作供。
+
+
+▲ 劉偉聰
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（6日）踏入審訊第80天。大律師劉偉聰今開始作供，供述參與初選的經過。他表示2016年旺角衝突被告盧建民上訴失敗後決定參選立法會，因認為《公安條例》的暴動和非法集結罪頗嚴苛，望能進入議會修訂法例；而他曾因認為初選不民主、自己取態溫和勝算不大而不打算參加，惟因避免被視為「鬼」故終決定參與。劉並指自己只曾出席首次九西協調會議，肯定戴耀廷會上無提要綑綁當選後行為，會上亦無達成共識。
+
+對名字出現在「墨落無悔」聲明書，劉指他無簽署亦無授權人簽署，至今仍不知原因。劉亦指他不完全同意亦從沒有主張五大訴求，認為要求撤銷控罪是邀請行政干預司法，對此抱有懷疑；就要求問責警暴亦認為不能一方面要求特赦示威者、一方面要求追究警暴。惟劉指他最終沒有公開澄清，因不想人知道他不同意五大訴求，否則形同「選舉自殺」。
+
+#### 劉偉聰以英語作供 稱曾加入香港皇家警察、修博士研憲制修訂
+
+何啟明今完成4天的作供，後由同參選九龍西、自辯的劉偉聰作供，身穿深藍間條西裝的劉以英語宣誓和作供。劉先表示，他承認參與九龍西初選，但否認控罪，因他沒有與其他人串謀否決預算案，亦無意顛覆國家政權或嚴重干擾特區政權機關履行職能。劉並指其證供分為三部分，一為自我介紹，二為他為何參與初選及參選時做了什麼，三為他案發時沒做過的事。
+
+劉先講述個人背景，指他55歲，於香港出生，1993年畢業於香港大學法律系後加入香港皇家警察任見習督察，4個月後因獲政務官（AO）有條件取錄而辭職。他形容政務官是他的理想工作（dream job），不過他終因三級榮譽畢業，未達要求不獲聘。劉偉聰數個月後任自由黨創黨主席李鵬飛的寫手，並於1994年修讀法學專業證書（PCLL），翌年正式成為執業大律師。
+
+劉於2000年赴英國倫敦政治及經濟學院（LSE）修讀哲學碩士，修讀博士期間研究範圍主要為英美自由主義、憲制設計等，其論文題目為〈Rationality of constitutional ammedment（憲制修訂的合理性）〉，以中國和美國憲法為例子，研究由一代人設計的憲制約束下一代人是否合理，他對1954年後中國憲法的修訂尤感興趣。惟劉研究4年後，因與老師意見不合而沒有完成學位。
+
+#### 劉稱約於2016年起參與社會事件案件、引著作談擁護法治價值
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+劉偉聰供稱返港後，於2010年至2012年先後任暫委特委裁判官及暫委裁判官，其後繼續執業，並於2016至2017年左右因社會環境改變，而主要參與社會事件的案件如非法集結及暴動。劉並於2017至2021年於港大法律系任客座副教授，2012至2020年為《信報》及《明報》寫專欄，主要談及書本、電影和文化活動，很間中才談及時事。
+
+劉指，他個人的價值和操守均被法律的價值和精神所形塑，並引用他曾合着的《Professional Conduct and Risk Management in Hong Kong》一書中，他撰寫有關「何謂法律專業操守（legal professional ethics）」的段落，提及法律專業人士不僅對其客人負責、亦要對法庭和公義負責，又指法律專業是構成法治的一部分，超出商業利益或個人成就。劉指這是他任大律師以來一直持守的價值。
+
+#### 劉稱對反修例運動感同情、2019年當選區議員
+
+劉偉聰其後供述為何參與初選。劉於2019年當選深水埗又一村區議員，他表示此前從未想過參選，稱1997年前渴望加入英殖政府，但回歸後只有特首可組成政府，而他認為參政應是指加入政府。
+
+惟劉指在2019年的反修例運動，他對運動有極大同情，亦對草案感不滿（displeased），同意許多人擔心會令兩制的界線變得模糊；更重要是他認為條例大幅增加特首要求移交逃犯的權力，卻無相應增加法庭權力，「無可避免令法庭捲入政治風波，侵蝕法治」。法官陳慶偉說他完全不同意劉的看法，不過那不重要。
+
+劉表示雖然如此，他當時並無參與許多示威，因認為他以律師身分幫助被捕者更有用；但後來有朋友打算參與區議會選舉但未能成功，邀請他代為參選，他遂選擇他居住、原屬親政府議員的又一村選區出選，最終以99票之差勝出，並坦言不會因當選只有諮詢性質的崗位而感到高興。
+
+劉續展示他參選時的橫額，印有一隻貓及「從投開始 由您出發」、「Let the people see the sun」。劉解釋是來自英國詩人奧登（W.H. Auden）於1939年的詩〈Law, like love〉，並於庭上讀出第一段：「Law, say the gardeners, is the sun,/ Law is the one/ All gardeners obey/ To-morrow, yesterday, to-day.」，指他望當選後推動基層的法治教育。
+
+#### 劉稱九西首次協調會戴耀廷提可用否決權但無與初選綑綁、無達共識
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+劉偉聰續指，當選後原沒打算參選立會，但在2020年2月有朋友、支持者和媒體查詢甚至鼓勵他參選。劉指他開始考慮但未有決定，因擔心其能力和憂影響執業，他並於3月獲助理告知九龍西有公開會議（open meeting）供有意參選者參加，他遂出席3月24日的首次九西協調會議。劉指他就會議無收到任何特定邀請，而會上除他和助理外，記得戴耀廷、區諾軒、趙家賢、何啟明和巴裔商人簡浩名亦在場，共有約10多20人。
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+劉續指，雖然區諾軒供稱會上傳閱「35+計劃」文件，但他沒有印象；並指會上主要由戴耀廷發言，戴指民主派於區選取得勝利，但投票率沒有大幅增加，故需「策略性投票（strategic voting）」才能勝出立會選舉。劉認為其說法有道理，因區選是單議席單票席，立會是比例代表制。他並指不記得戴有否說「35+」，但有提及取得大多數。
+
+劉指，戴亦有提及民主派過半能做到很多事，因有許多憲制權力如否決預算案，但不記得戴有否提及「積極」運用和「可以用可以唔用」，戴並建議可進行公民投票或選前民調，並指九西目標議席為4席。惟劉強調，非常肯定戴當時沒有提及要將初選與議員當選後行為綑綁。
+
+#### 劉憂初選不民主及令政綱激化惟不獲理會、不知悉有第二次會議
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+劉偉聰指，他會上亦提出初選可能會不民主，因會剝奪選民的選擇，而他當時沒說出口的是，初選會令政綱變得激進（radicalization），趕走立場溫和者。惟劉指，當時無人對此話題感興趣，而他因已了解民主派的協調安排故選擇離開。劉指會議歷時約一小時，參與者「來來去去」，他離開時亦看不到任何共識或協議達成，認為會議更像是簡介（briefing）。
+
+劉並指，他會後沒有與人交換聯絡，解釋是律師的習慣，其他人只能透過助理聯絡他，他只會留個人電話給朋友與親人；而他當時未確定要參選，亦認為初選不適合他（not a thing for me），故沒有出席第二次會議，他亦不知道有第二次會議。
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+#### 劉稱盧建民上訴失敗後決定參選 望入立會修訂暴動法例
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+劉續解釋後來決定參選立法會的原因，指他當時是2016年旺角衝突罪成被告盧建民上訴案的律師代表，其上訴於2020年4月29日被高等法院駁回。劉指這影響了他的想法，因他認為《公安條例》下非法集結及暴動的罪行均頗為嚴苛（quite draconian）。陳慶偉聞言即指法例因英殖年代的1967暴動而定下，劉同意，但認為法例應與時並進。陳慶偉指他在這一點上同意劉，說「事實上很多香港的法例都要修訂和更新」，舉例《藥劑業及毒藥條例》是複製自英國1933年的法例，直至2023年仍在使用。
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+劉續指，認為3人便構成暴動的罪行範圍太廣闊（sweeping），舉例英國已修例將非法集結人數門檻定為12人，故當時希望能作出改變，並指現時回看，上訴失敗是重要的因素令他決定參選，同意法官指他想進入議會修訂法例。劉又解釋，望修改相關法例，因認為民主運動要有更知情（better-informed）的公民社會，可有辯論的空間。
+
+#### 劉稱僅讀戴耀廷英文文章無讀過〈真攬炒十步〉、對倡大殺傷力武器感驚訝
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+陳慶偉續提及，戴耀廷4月28日發出〈真攬炒十步 這是香港人宿命〉一文，劉偉聰表示他沒有讀過，他直至收到控方文件夾才知道有該篇文章。劉指他讀大學時由戴耀廷任教法律寫作和研究，但其後二人無聯絡，只是在2019至2020年則在兩三個場合被邀請就法治演講，如曾同被邀出席醫管局員工陣線舉辦的《芝加哥七人案：驚世審判》電影放映會及法治對談，此時余慧明向旁聽席微笑。
+
+劉續指，數年前曾讀戴寫的〈讓愛與和平佔領中環〉，但認為其中文冗長（convoluted）和沉悶，故之後沒有讀他寫的中文文章，但有讀其英文學術文章，並指2020年上半年曾讀戴有份寫的〈Pursuing Democracy in an Authoritarian State: Protest and the Rule of Law in Hong Kong（在極權下追求民主：香港的示威與法治）〉一文，戴提及面對香港法治挑戰，真正戰場是「文化」，要在社會培養更強的法律文化；又提倡民主派政黨和公民社會要宣傳策略投票以取得更多議席。
+
+
+▲ 戴耀廷
+
+劉表示，他被戴於文章倡議的策略性投票和文化改變吸引，而他當時沒讀過戴寫的中文文章，亦不知道「巨大殺傷力憲制武器」的概念。劉形容，戴寫英文文章時猶如另一個人，故他聽到戴提倡此概念時感到驚訝。
+
+#### 劉稱兩同事離開團隊、憂被視為「鬼」遂再考慮參與初選
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+劉偉聰續表示，盧健民上訴被駁回後，他更確定參選立會，但當時仍未打算參與初選，因認為性質不民主並認為其溫和取態難以取勝。而當時有兩名同區的議員同事常為他提供建議，又鼓勵他參選立法會和初選，指若不參與別人便會認為他是「鬼」或不忠誠（undevoted）。劉指與兩人意見不合，二人遂於5月告知不能再與他合作，轉為支持其他潛在參選人。
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+劉指二人雖沒明言，但其離開應與他不參與初選有關，亦考慮到他在大選的勝算。劉指這令他重新考慮是否參與初選，亦認為他們所言有理，因屆時正式選舉他會與比他更有認受性（legitimacy）的初選勝出者競爭，他可能會被視為「鬼」，未開始競選便背負「原罪」。劉續在法官陳仲衡詢問下，指當時未聽過「三投三不投」，指是初選前數日看到相關橫額才得悉。
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+#### 劉稱無簽「墨落無悔」 至今仍不知名字出現在聲明的原因
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+劉偉聰續指，其助理於6月告知他會有初選，而他不知道6月9日的初選記者會。至於6月10日發布的「墨落無悔」聲明，劉指他是於九西選舉論壇前數日，才由助理和義工告知其名字出現在聲明上。
+
+劉表示他沒有簽署聲明，亦沒有授權任何人為他簽署，而他的社交媒體和所有選舉材料也沒有提及該聲明，因為他並不同意該聲明。李運騰問，那他的名字為何會出現在其他人轉發的帖文上？劉指他當時有詢問所有競選團隊成員有否代簽，但無人有頭緒，事件至今對他仍是謎團（mystery），而他當時亦尚未正式宣布會參與初選。
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+#### 劉稱「墨落」語法上解偶然非刻意、「共同綱領」僅指政協共同綱領
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+劉續指，發現「被簽署」聲明後便閱讀聲明內容，第一反應是失笑。劉解釋他對中文頗為敏感，認為想強調刻意做某些事時，便會將動詞放在賓語前，故中文有說法「落子無悔」，但「墨落」則只代表墨水是偶然或意外落下，林卓廷微笑。此時有份發起聲明的鄒家成翹起雙手靠牆、頭微微向上，陳慶偉指「鄒家成在疑惑（wondering）」；李運騰亦指這不是批評文法的場合，「可能是中文文法、可能是日文文法，我們不知道」，多人大笑。
+
+劉指他不是批評任何人，只是談及當初的理解，並指聲明亦提及「共同綱領」，但認為簽署的本土派或不熟悉，中文上「共同綱領」只能指《中華人民政治協商會議共同綱領》。
+
+#### 劉稱「墨落」僅陳述明顯事實、本土派比平時溫和或想回復理性形象
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+劉續指，認為聲明只是陳述明顯的事實（state the obvious），包括談及當選後會運用憲制權力，及票數不足便不會參選。劉並認為，稱會運用權力也不代表一定要用，舉例若仍有死刑，他作為高等法院法官會表示運用所有憲制權力包括死刑執行法例，但不代表他會對所有犯人判處死刑。
+
+此外，劉指當時看到聲明有本土派簽署，認為他們立場應較進步（progressive），疑惑他們為何只寫如此溫和（mild）的聲明。他續認為本土派可能望透過聲明重塑正常、理性、合法的形象，才表明只會運用《基本法》賦予的權力，以爭取更廣闊光譜的支持，並解釋因有本土派倡制裁中國官員等，而該些倡議並非《基本法》賦予的權力。陳慶偉指，即劉偉聰認為聲明並沒有任何不尋常的地方，故他也沒有問題？劉指唯一不尋常，就是本土派使用了如此溫和及體面的字眼。
+
+#### 劉稱不同意五大訴求 指要求撤控是行政干預司法
+
+聲明提及會運用《基本法》權力迫使特首回應五大訴求，即「撤銷所有抗爭者控罪，令相關人士為警暴問責，並重啟政改達致雙普選」，劉指他所有競選材料都無提過「五大訴求」。陳慶偉問，他不同意（subscribe to）五大訴求？劉說簡單而言「是」，並解釋人生中有些事是他認為可以接受（agreeable）但不會參與（engage），就如就同性戀，他尊重人們的性向，但他本人沒有選擇成為同志。
+
+李運騰指，即劉認為「五大訴求」是好的，但他不會爭取？劉同意，並逐一解釋為何他不會提倡五大訴求。就撤回《逃犯條例》，劉稱當時政府已撤回。而就特首下台，他指對誰任特首不關心，重要的是制度，但《基本法》列明特首同時要對中央政府和特區負責，他認為那不是經常都可能，是一個左右為難的局面（catch-22 situation）。
+
+劉續指，就特赦抗爭者或撤銷所有控罪，他現在仍對此感到懷疑（skeptical），認為即邀請行政部門干預司法事務，有些案件亦已進入司法程序。至於要求相關人士為警暴問責，劉亦指對一方面要求撤銷示威者控罪、一方面卻追究警暴感到「不舒服」，認為應效法南非處理種族隔離問題的「真相與和解委員會」，讓雙方說出真相，但不會作出檢控追究。
+
+劉最後指他不反對雙普選，但認為頗為「遙遠（remote）」，因要重啟政改，特首要寫報告和獲全國人大通過等，故其政綱也沒提到普選。劉解釋時法官李運騰三度打斷，指不認為劉要解釋其政治立場，重申法庭只關注被告案發時的意圖，並非參與任何政治的辯論，又指明白劉表示他不支持五大訴求，着他談及下一話題。劉指表示其價值觀與其意圖相關。
+
+#### 劉稱無澄清無簽「墨落」 因形同「選舉自殺」
+
+陳仲衡最後問，劉最後有否要求將名字從「墨落無悔」移除？劉指沒有，並指是刻意為之，解釋他曾想過在社交媒體澄清，但這樣會曝露他不同意五大訴求。陳慶偉問那有什麼問題，劉不是有原則和誠信的人嗎（a man with principle and integrity）？劉解釋因那等同「選舉自殺（election suicide）」，又指他仍是有原則和誠信，競選期間也從沒有提倡五大訴求。
+
+劉最後指，他不同意「墨落無悔」第一點，但同意就支持度不足須停止選舉工程，因那是參與初選的意義。至於最後「以上聲明，僅為確保抗爭陣營參選人，有最基本的抗爭意志。我們的抗爭決心，絕不應因極權打壓而讓步」等部分，劉指他當時沒留意，但不同意當中的修辭以及該修辭所代表的概念。
+
+
+▲ 劉偉聰
+
+案件明天續審。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-07-07-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-81.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-07-07-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-81.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..271c5793
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-07-07-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-81.md
@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第 81 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-07-07 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 劉偉聰稱由助理告知初選共識、理解不綑綁當選後行為
+- 劉偉聰稱不用WhatsApp不看FB遭官質疑方便開脫 劉：這是我選擇的生活方式
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（7日）踏入審訊第81天。大律師劉偉聰今繼續作供，就初選提名表格列明支持和認同戴耀廷及區諾軒主導之協調會議共識，劉表示他只曾出席首次九西協調會議，故向助理查詢，獲悉共識包括目標議席數量、及會用電子和實體票等；並理解計劃目標只是策略性投票助民主派爭立會過半，但不綑綁當選後行為。法官質疑劉為何沒有再確認，劉強調他當時只是認為自己參與初選，最重要的是目標議席和參選名單數。就警方在劉辦公室搜出的初選論壇筆記，劉稱不知道由誰準備、他當時亦不知悉，而筆記提及「法治已死」的字眼，他亦表明「我從來不說『法治已死』」。
+
+此外，劉表示《國安法》頒布後，他任國安法首被告唐英傑代表律師，亦曾研讀條文，惟檢視選舉材料後認為沒有違法，故無改變立場並繼續參選，惟他唯一沒考慮自己會干犯串謀：「因當時我只是認為自己參與初選。」
+
+#### 劉偉聰稱獲助理轉述九西4點「共識」 理解目標僅爭立會過半無綑綁當選後行為
+
+參選九西的前深水埗區議員、大律師劉偉聰今繼續作供。就初選提名表格，他供稱是由其助理李先生提供，他簽署前有仔細閱讀。對表格上提及「我確認支持和認同由戴耀廷及區諾軒主導之協調會議共識，包括『民主派35+公民投票計劃』及其目標」，劉表示因他只出席了首次九西會議，故當時曾問助理「共識」是指什麼，助理表示曾問民主動力，共識是指九西目標議席為4席、初選後才決定參與正式選舉的名單數目、會有電子及實體票，以及參選人要幫忙找地方設立票站。
+
+
+▲ 劉偉聰
+
+劉表示他對這些答案感到滿意，只是對要參選人找票站感到有點奇怪，認為可能會有不中立的問題。他強調，「我當時認為我在參與初選」，即是民主陣營間就參選資格的競爭，「最重要的便是目標議席數目和合資格參與正式選舉的名單數目⋯⋯而我一直也不知道會綑綁初選與當選後在立法會的行為。」
+
+至於「民主派35+公民投票計劃」，劉指他認為只是計劃的正式名字，而非任何文件，又指以往一直只以為叫「民主派初選」，當時才首次發現計劃有正式名字；至於「目標」，他認為是選取勝算最高的參選人參與正式選舉，以達致「策略性投票」並增加民主派立會過半的可能性。劉並指，他交表前沒有與組織者表示會參與初選。
+
+#### 官質疑無再確認共識及目標 劉強調對助理答案感滿意、僅參加初選
+
+法官陳慶偉續問，戴耀廷在首次會議上已談及否決權，劉有查詢否決權的議題已被解決了嗎？劉指沒有，重申當時不認為有此關注，亦不知道初選是綑綁當選後行為。陳續指但其實除目標議席外，其餘3點均並非目標，只是一些流程（logistics）的問題，問經過那麼多區的那麼多次會議，唯一的共識只是取得4個議席，劉不覺得很奇怪嗎？劉說他不覺得，亦不知道其他區發生的事。
+
+陳再追問，劉曾加入香港皇家警察、獲政務官有條件取錄，均會做很多準備，現在首次參與立法會選舉應是很重要的事，但卻說對什麼都不感興趣，助理說目標是取得4席就已感滿意？又指參與初選亦要付1萬元按金，並非「免費午餐」，「如果我要付1萬元，我會看，我會問」，而訂金收據亦再表明「必須支持和認同」協調會議共識及計劃目標，如違反將不會獲發還按金。劉強調他當時已感滿意，因認為自己只是參與初選，他亦不知道有第二次會議。
+
+陳慶偉再問，劉在選舉論壇上有否問其他參選人有出席過多少次協調會議、或會上達成了什麼共識。劉說他沒有，因他當時根本沒為意有其他協調會議，亦就他對共識的理解感到滿意。陳追問，但其他參選人均是他的競爭對手和敵人，如果劉不認識他的敵人，如何能打敗他們？陳又指劉是一名大律師，一定會知道法庭最重要的規矩是：「認識你的法官！（Know your judge!）」劉回應，他有仔細閱讀其他參選人的政綱，知道他們的政治立場和光譜，但不視他們為「敵人」；又指了解其他參選人也與協調會議共識無關。
+
+#### 劉承認估計勝算微、立場屬「非常不黃」
+
+陳續問，是否因為劉認為自己勝算很微，所以不關注其他事？劉同意其勝算較微，當時估計張崑陽會是最高票者，其次為岑子杰、毛孟靜、何啟明。而劉估計自己或排在第5或第6名、最多亦只能排第4，最終他排名第6。劉並解釋，就「鬥黃」而言，他是「非常不黃（very not yellow）」。
+
+
+▲ 左起：岑子杰、毛孟靜、何啟明、張崑陽
+
+#### 劉選舉單張無提否決預算案 提「威權壓力」指中央及特區政府無維護一國兩制
+
+法官續問及劉偉聰的選舉單張，劉確認沒提過否決預算案或議案，並指重點是希望改善或修訂法律，為警暴問責，及「民權重光」。劉解釋，原想沿用他參與區選的口號「Let the people see the sun」，惟因團隊認為會與張崑陽（Sunny Cheung）混淆，故最終僅用「民權重光」，希望仍保有「光」的意思。
+
+陳慶偉續引政綱的英文版本，提及「目睹威權對香港司法制度持續不斷的壓力和攻擊（“witness the unceasing authoritarian pressure and tyrannical attacks on the Hong Kong legal system”）」，問劉「威權壓力（authoritarian pressure）」是指什麼？劉表示，是指特區政府和中央沒有維護（upheld）一國兩制。劉一度欲講述政治學的理論，惟陳慶偉打斷指對理論沒有興趣，笑言「我知道你閱讀很多，但我不，我只是對審訊這單案和處理案中的問題有興趣」。劉又解釋，用「壓力」一字，是因特區和中央政府並非每刻都在做壞事，但當他們沒有維護一國兩制，該壓力就變為威權。
+
+#### 劉稱需正常運作立會方能通過修訂法案、不會違反法治
+
+劉在法官追問下，同意該句主要指《逃犯條例》，亦不是指整個政權，而是指某些政策或政府的某個部分。政綱英文亦提及「我們會同樣勇猛捍衛普世權利和自由（“We will defend with equal ferocity our universal rights and freedom.”）」，陳問「同樣勇猛（equal ferocity）」指什麼措施？劉指修改法例。陳慶偉問：「不是否決預算案？」劉否認並指：「我需要政府、我需要正常運作的立法會才能通過修訂法案。」
+
+陳慶偉指，那或是他的想法，但其他參與者不是這樣想，而是想用盡一切方法。劉指他不肯定其他人是否如此絕望或願意犧牲所有，但就民主選舉而言，「如果我有人民的授權（mandate），我只會做我認為對的事、和我選民支持的事」，同意法官指他重視法治的價值，不會想做任何違反法治的事。
+
+#### 被搜得論壇筆記 劉偉聰稱不知由誰準備、論壇無使用
+
+就選舉論壇，李運騰問及劉偉聰何時開始準備。劉表示，「我不想聽起來很自大，但我自大學起已是經驗豐富的辯論員，獲得很多獎項，如果說我要準備，那是說得輕了（understatement），我整個人生都準備好辯論，我沒有特別哪一刻為這個論壇作準備」，但補充他有花時間看別人的政綱。陳慶偉笑說：「你看，你令在場的律師都汗顏。」
+
+法官李運騰續問及在劉偉聰辦公室搜得的「625 Debate 要點」，劉確認是從其辦公室搜得，但表明不是由他本人準備，是在收到控方文件夾才首次得知有此份文件，他在論壇上沒有使用、亦沒有獲任何人告知可以使用，也不認得文件上的字跡。被問辦公室由誰使用，劉指不是與他人共用，而他有招募選舉經理、5名核心義工和10名大學實習生，其助理李先生則負責區務。
+
+李運騰問及筆記「黃碧雲：為何不簽署初選立場確認書？是否連否決財政算案，這樣制度內的抗爭都不願意承諾？」，指似乎顯示草擬者知道黃碧雲沒有簽署，那應知道劉的名字有出現在聲明上，問為何劉昨又說論壇前數日才得知？劉重申他完全不知道誰準備筆記，而且那人也完全不了解他：「我不會口頭攻擊一名女士，這完全是錯的！」陳慶偉問，即他的助理完全不了解他？劉重申他不知道誰撰寫，亦沒要求任何人撰寫，筆記上出現的很多話他也完全沒有說過。
+
+#### 筆記提「法治已死」 劉稱他從不這樣說、論壇提「法治係唔會死」
+
+陳追問，即有人無故（out of the blue）出於好心幫助劉？劉稱不能作出揣測，但後稱如一定要猜，一定是由一個很想幫忙但不了解他的人所寫。陳提及，但筆記提到的一些議題也有在劉的論壇發言或政綱出現，所以劉是說一切全屬巧合？劉解釋，他在辦公室會與職員和實習生傾談，讓他們了解他的取向和願景，亦當然可能有談及相同的話題。
+
+李運騰主動指，劉偉聰論壇上曾說「法治係唔會死」，與筆記「被問的回應」下提及「法治已死」字眼有所不同。劉重申，因準備筆記的人不了解他，「我從來不說『法治已死』⋯我怎會說『法治已死』？（“I never say ‘法治已死’... How would I say ‘法治已死’?”）」，重申整份筆記也與他完全無關。陳慶偉指，也可以另一種方式解讀，即若劉當選後，法治就不會死，惟劉認為是過份解讀。劉續在陳仲衡追問下，同意「法治已死」僅屬回應問題的議題、而非回應的答案和立場，相關的答案是寫在「法治已死」之後。
+
+劉強調，不希望為一份不知是誰撰寫的文件負責，李運騰指理解其證供，但劉是否真的對筆記不知情，法庭會再決定。
+
+#### 論壇提「啟明兄」 劉稱為人老派喜叫人「乜乜兄」
+
+此外，筆記亦另提及「啟明兄，我知道你有簽署共同綱領，你點睇有些候選人冇簽署共同綱領呢？會唔會質疑他們的抗爭意志？」，何啟明早前稱簽署「墨落」時無意否決預算案，陳慶偉指，似乎筆記草擬者並沒有讀出何啟明這個意圖，劉同意。
+
+陳仲衡並問，筆記提及「啟明兄」，而劉在選舉論壇亦有稱何為「啟明兄」，劉同意，指二人是好友。陳慶偉笑問，所以準備筆記的人知道劉的想法（“... can read your mind”），兩人都很尊敬何？庭上傳出笑聲，何啟明則輕輕皺眉和「O嘴」。
+
+劉說他不能代其他人說話，並指他在論壇上亦不止稱何為「兄」，亦稱馮達浚為「達浚兄」，並指「說我老派（old-school）吧，我喜歡叫人『乜乜兄』」。陳慶偉笑問那他怎樣稱呼女士？劉說視乎年紀，庭上多人大笑，陳指尊重應不取決於年紀，劉欲再解釋，惟陳說「算了（“Forget it.”）」。
+
+#### 劉稱《國安法》後曾檢視選舉材料 認為無違法故無改變
+
+劉偉聰續指，《國安法》生效後，他出於學術和知識上的興趣、加上是《國安法》首案被告唐英傑的代表律師，曾研讀《國安法》條文，惟由於當時未有任何案例或權威，故他以普通法的方法閱讀，特別是當中四大罪行及有關保釋的條文。劉續指，他當時檢視自己的立場和選舉材料，但認為沒有任何違反《國安法》之處，他亦沒有改變他的選舉材料和政治立場。劉指，他唯一沒考慮的就是「串謀」，「因當時我只是認為自己參與初選。」
+
+劉續補充，當時除選舉論壇，亦有辦街站宣傳，他亦曾讀過《國安法》後有關戴耀廷等組織者對初選合法性看法的報導，但他沒有從組織者收過任何相關訊息。劉最後指，初選結束後因他只是排名第六，故即時停止選舉工程，並着助理發文表示尊重結果。
+
+劉偉聰主問完畢，續由控方盤問。
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（7日）踏入審訊第81天。劉偉聰今在盤問下表示，自己不使用 WhatsApp，主要由助理與初選組織者聯絡，遭法官質疑。劉解釋自己是私密的人，不喜歡使用社交媒體，惟法官質疑組織者於本案以 WhatsApp 傳送協調文件，劉的說法是「方便的開脫理由」。劉其後自願提供手機密碼讓控方查證，但終解鎖不果。劉最後於覆問表示，留意到法庭對他不用 WhatsApp 的關注，但他指自己家中沒有電視和電腦，只有書本、音樂和兩隻貓，「這是我選擇的生活方式」。劉完成兩天自辯，同參選九西的黃碧雲決定不作供，料下周一將由參選九東的前民協主席施德來作供。
+
+此外，劉偉聰今指自己不看《蘋果日報》、無看過戴耀廷在該報的文章及 Facebook 帖文，指自己不看別人 Facebook，兩名法官聞言指自己亦不看別人 Facebook。劉又重申雖沒簽署「墨落無悔」，但無要求移除姓名是為免人誤以為他反對「五大訴求」，並引述何啟明早前稱當時「唔知咁大鑊」，主控周天行表示：「那你現在知道了。」
+
+#### 劉偉聰稱不用WhatsApp、無收組織者訊息 官質疑是方便的開脫理由
+
+劉偉聰今早完成主問，並接受主控周天行盤問。劉表示自己從沒有政治聯繫，不會自視為抗爭派，而其議員助理李大衛（音）當初只是告知他泛民有一個開放予所有有意參選立會者的會議，但他沒問李從何得知。控方問其助理有否與組織者聯絡，劉指他應與組織者有接觸，否則不會知道協調會議的資訊，但對他如何獲得資料不關注，直言「我有其他工作要做」。
+
+劉亦表示，自己從不用 WhatsApp，從沒從組織者收過任何文件或相關訊息。法官陳仲衡問那組織者如何與他聯絡，劉稱是通過助理。法官陳慶偉亦問他為何不用 WhatsApp，劉自言是一個私密的人（private person），「我不喜歡使用社交媒體也不喜歡 WhatsApp 的群組對話，不想參與群組討論」，只會打電話或以蘋果手機的 iMessage 與親友聯絡。
+
+陳慶偉多次追問劉沒用 WhatsApp 的原因，指若劉沒有電話，可理解他不用 WhatsApp，但如他有電話，「我不明白為何你完全不用WhatsApp？」劉指他沒有任何事要隱瞞，只是他不喜歡用那些軟件。惟陳再指，本案初選組織者正透過 WhatsApp 傳送協調文件，故要測試劉的邏輯，又認為「從來不用 WhatsApp」於本案是「方便的開脫理由（“a convenient way out in this particular case”）」。
+
+#### 劉自願提供電話密碼 惟未能成功解鎖
+
+劉表示，其電話被警方檢取，但如有需要可開啟，供法庭測試。李運騰稱如控方有相反說法，相信已提出證據。午休後，周天行問劉提供其手機密碼，劉表示不反對，但不肯定是否仍記得3年前密碼，彭卓棋面露驚訝張嘴。李運騰一度指劉沒有義務要協助控方，但認為無需提醒劉這一點，多人大笑。
+
+劉其後將密碼寫在紙上交予控方，陳慶偉並指他使用了蘋果手機多年，問會否有指紋或面部解鎖，惟劉指其電話沒有用到。下午小休後，控方表示劉只記得4位數密碼，但電話要6位數密碼才能解鎖，故未能成功解鎖。
+
+#### 劉偉聰重申認為五大訴求可接受但不會參與、不認同但亦不反對
+
+被問是否認識初選組織者，劉稱知道區諾軒名字、認得趙家賢的樣子，而就參與九西初選者，他認識何啟明，因何是其九西區議會同事，兩人辦事處距離近，何不時會來跟他談天；他亦認識岑子杰，指岑會邀請他參與同志活動。劉亦知道毛孟靜、黃碧雲、張崑陽的名字，但不認識馮達浚，並指張崑陽與他同樣曾參與港大辯論隊。
+
+劉並表示，不記得戴耀廷在首次會議有否提五大訴求，但有提也不出奇，因是當時流行（currency）的。周天行指，劉當時是反對（against）五大訴求，惟劉指那不準確，強調他是認為可接受（agreeable）但他不會參與（engage），指他不反對並尊重別人有這個立場。
+
+控方展示「35+計劃」文件，提及凡認同「五大訴求，缺一不可」才能參與初選協調，指似乎與劉的想法相違。惟法官李運騰指，劉是認為五大訴求可接受，只是他不會爭取，陳慶偉亦指劉不認同（subscribe to），但亦不反對。
+
+#### 劉稱無讀過戴耀廷《蘋果日報》文章、不看別人Facebook
+
+劉在盤問下亦確認，辦初選期間不曾讀過戴耀廷在《蘋果日報》刊出的文章，重申除〈讓愛與和平佔領中環〉外沒讀過戴的中文文章，而他不看《蘋果日報》，只看董橋逢周日的專欄。周天行指他有使用 Facebook，惟劉指其 Facebook 只是用作區議會工作，由其議辦營運，他不看別人的 Facebook，並直至收到控方文件夾才讀到戴耀廷和區諾軒等人的 Facebook 帖文。此時李運騰主動表示，他也不看別人的 Facebook，陳慶偉說他也不看，指法官不准在 Facebook 發文，亦指他沒有 Instagram 帳戶。
+
+#### 劉稱僅讀過6.9記者會報導、無與何啟明討論協調會共識
+
+至於初選組織者曾辦過的記者會，劉稱對3月26日記者會不知情，而他曾讀過6月9日記者會的報導，但沒看過該記者會，對其他記者會亦不知情，亦無收過其他計劃的訊息，劉並於6月報名參選。劉盤問下表示有與何啟明談及初選，但主要關注最終誰會勝出，沒有談及協調會議達成的共識。他亦不同意交表時知道35+計劃共識是取得立會過半，以否決預算案爭取五大訴求。
+
+#### 劉稱無要求刪「墨落」簽署因「唔知咁大鑊」 控方：你現在知道了
+
+就「墨落無悔」聲明，劉盤問下表示，當時沒有興趣找出聲明提及「已取得共識的共同綱領」是什麼，而他僅出席首次九西會議，當時沒達共識，事後亦無獲訊息初選有重大改變。劉亦認為聲明「會運用基本法賦予立法會的權力，包括否決財政預算案，迫使特首回應五大訴求」的字面意思，是指有一系列的權力可用，但沒有說明必須用哪種權力。周天行質疑字面並沒有說明該些權力是「可用可不用」，法官打斷指可留待陳詞。
+
+
+▲ 周天行
+
+劉曾供稱不知道其名字為何出現在聲明，同意事件對他仍是「謎團（mystery）」。周天行今再問這至今對他仍是「謎團」？惟周發問時誤稱作「不幸（misery）」。劉反問「是 mystery 抑或 misery？」，並稱認為兩者皆是，「這對我來說既是謎團亦是不幸。」
+
+劉續重申，當時沒有要求移除其名字，因若要求移除，便會被理解成反對五大訴求，形同「選舉自殺」，故他做法是沉默應對，沒有表示支持聲明。周天行指，他不一定會被以為反對五大訴求、可以只顯示為不同意「墨落無悔」，惟劉認為文字很容易被人誤會和誇大，故選擇不要求移除名字，指屬風險管理。
+
+劉並指，事後回看，「我當然應該要求移除我的名字」，但引何啟明早前證供稱：「我哋都唔知咁大鑊㗎嘛。」何啟明發笑。周天行續望着劉偉聰說：「那你現在知道了。（“Now you know.”）」，被告席傳來低聲的「嘩」，亦有人發笑，陳慶偉說：「Thank you.」
+
+
+▲ 劉偉聰（左）、何啟明（右）
+
+#### 論壇問何啟明簽「墨落」 劉稱若被問會表明無簽、初選非「你死我活」想對手發亮
+
+此外，劉偉聰曾於選舉論壇表示：「啟明兄，喺深水埗呢，我就知你第一個走出嚟就簽我哋個參選嘅聲明，咁我想知，你點解咁勇呢？」劉主問時主動澄清當時說錯了，「我哋」應指「你哋」。
+
+控方質疑若劉擔心會曝露他沒有簽署聲明，為何在論壇又主動提及；李運騰續指問題應是，若劉不想強調他沒有簽署聲明，為何主動提起？劉主問和盤問下均表示，望提供機會讓何啟明在論壇「發亮（shine）」，解釋因過往民協或予人守舊或過時的印象，但何願展示勇敢的、年輕的形象，故特別提及聲明讓何能表現自己。劉並表明，他自從發現名字出現在「墨落無悔」後，已準備好若有人問及，而他無法隱瞞其立場，「我就會表明我沒有簽署。」
+
+控方問，若劉真的認為「墨落無悔」只是「陳述明顯的事實」，那為何要以「勇」形容何啟明？劉重申，因何簽署聲明，在他看來是與本土派有連繫，並展示勇敢、進步的形象。
+
+李運騰亦問，劉既然認為勝算不大，為何仍想競爭對手在論壇「發亮」？劉指雖然他不是完全無私，「但若有更多人進入立會，對香港來說不是壞事」，他亦認為初選不是「你死我活」，想人們展現最好的一面。李運騰問，所以劉當時認為何比起他是更適合、勝算更高的候選人？劉同意何有更多支持者、勝算更高，至於是否適合就由選民判斷。
+
+#### 劉稱不知義工為九西群組成員亦無要求加入、得悉其他參選人主張但忘具體內容
+
+劉偉聰續在盤問下重申，《國安法》後有讀過戴耀廷回應初選合法性的報導，但無為意戴稱35+計劃目標是取得立會過半，否決預算案令政府問責。周天行問有沒有人告知他初選的合法性，劉說沒有，他亦沒有問，李運騰提醒控方「記住他的專業」。
+
+劉盤問下並表示，他不知道九龍西於6月設立「35+計劃九龍西訊息發佈區」的 WhatsApp 群組，亦不知道其核心義工 Victoria Wong 是群組成員，也沒有要求她加入，是直至控方現時告知才得知。控方指 Victoria Wong 曾於群組發言數次，包括票站事宜，劉指曾獲她告知相關事宜，至於其他群組的訊息，劉指他不知情。
+
+控方最後就其他九西參選人單張發問，其中何啟明單張在「點解香港人需要『民主35+』？」下，提及「取得全面否決權，包括否決財政預算案」；張崑陽單張提到民主派密鑼緊鼓辦初選協調爭立會過半，「以行使否決權，阻截政權予取予求」；岑子杰亦有提到否決權以爭五大訴求，問劉是否知悉。劉表示他曾閱讀其他參選人政綱，知道大概的立場，但不記得具體內容。
+
+控方最後指，劉與其他被告串謀無差別否決預算案，以迫使特首回應五大訴求，意圖顛覆國家政權，劉表示不同意，亦否認曾收過九西的協調文件初稿和最終版本。
+
+#### 劉稱無用WhatsApp是他選的生活方式
+
+控方盤問完畢後進入覆問。劉表示，他不會說這是覆問，但因看到法庭關注他不使用WhatsApp，故希望說明：「我家中沒有電視、我家中沒有電腦，我只有書本、音樂和兩隻貓，這不是邏輯的問題，這是我選擇的生活方式，沒有其他補充，感謝法官閣下的耐性和忍耐。（“I do not have a TV set in my home, I do not have a computer in my home, I only have books, music and two cats, it’s not a matter of logic, it’s a chosen way of living. I have nothing to add. I’m most grateful to my lord, thank you for your lordship’s patience and tolerance.”）」
+
+劉偉聰完成2天盤問。代表黃碧雲的大律師沈士文續表示，黃決定不會作供，亦不會傳召證人。料下周一將由前民協主席施德來作供。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
diff --git a/_config.yml b/_config.yml
index bbbde506..f68020d8 100644
--- a/_config.yml
+++ b/_config.yml
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
title: The Republic of Agora
-description: UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.29 © MMXXIII
+description: UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.30 © MMXXIII
baseurl: "/pen0" # the subpath of your site, e.g. /blog
url: "https://agorahub.github.io" # the hostname & protocol, e.g. http://example.com
google_analytics: 'UA-166928354-2' # agorahub-pen0
diff --git a/_data/archives.yml b/_data/archives.yml
index 8d325daa..407a4913 100644
--- a/_data/archives.yml
+++ b/_data/archives.yml
@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
+- name: VOL.29
+ repo: https://gitlab.com/agora0/pen/0x1d
+ site: https://agora0.gitlab.io/pen/0x1d
- name: VOL.28
repo: https://gitlab.com/agora0/pen/0x1c
site: https://agora0.gitlab.io/pen/0x1c