diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2022-12-19-the-arrested-in-the-a4-revolution.md b/_collections/_columns/2022-12-19-the-arrested-in-the-a4-revolution.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..5e93569e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2022-12-19-the-arrested-in-the-a4-revolution.md
@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "“白纸革命”・被捕者（一）"
+author: "Sharon"
+date : 2022-12-19 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/AMSCml0.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "在寒流袭来的12月，参加“白纸抗议”被捕的年轻人，有人陆续被释放，也有人至今音信皆无。“应该让所有人知道，这些年轻人，才是这个国家最为宝贵的一部分。”一位观察者这样说。"
+---
+
+十二月的广州，湿冷多雨。53岁的高秀胜从山西临汾的小城侯马来，住在出租屋里，等待着女儿杨紫荆（网名“点心”）的消息。
+
+每天出门，辗转坐一个小时的地铁，去位于越秀区惠福东路484号的北京派出所询问消息。她得到的答复始终只有一个：杨紫荆的案情不能说，律师不能会见。
+
+唯一的安慰是在这个周一（12月11日）和周四（15日），她分别给女儿成功送去了两次衣服：一件毛衣，一身秋衣秋裤，还有袜子和内衣。
+
+
+
+当这位忧愁的母亲在北京派出所的门外徘徊时，1900公里之外的中国西南四川省会成都，另外三位被捕年轻人的家人，也在苦等着自己孩子的消息。这三个年轻人分别是黄颢、胖虎（网名）夫妇，以及一名西北来的青年。
+
+12月15日下午，位于郫都区安靖镇正义路3号的成都市看守所，原本预定的律师会见再次被取消，警方以“正在提审”为理由，拒绝了律师会见。几天前从新疆坐了4小时飞机、专程赶到成都来寻找儿子的父亲，再次陷入了担忧与绝望。
+
+和高秀胜一样，在得知儿子被抓之前，这位父亲对11月底发生在繁华都市上海、北京以及广州、成都的“白纸抗议”一无所知。
+
+“现在疫情放开了，可我的女儿还被关在里头。她究竟犯了什么错？”高秀胜说。这也是至今还被关押着的抗争者家属的心头疑问。
+
+
+### 1 街头，以及夜晚的歌声
+
+11月27日晚上九点左右，点心和朋友们出门了。
+
+点心出生于1997年7月1日的山西，当天正是香港回归中国的纪念日，母亲给女儿起了杨紫荆这个名字。但在广州的朋友，平时都喊杨紫荆叫“点心”，这也是ta的网名“废物点心”的简称（点心的性别认同代称为ta）。
+
+广州十一月，夜里已有点冷。十点半，点心和朋友们根据网上看到的信息，到了海珠广场一带，“第一眼看见的，全是警察”。
+
+根据另一位当晚参加了抗议的年轻人回忆：原本大家在朋友圈里说的是到人民桥一带，结果到了后发现周围全是警察，大家就转移到附近海珠广场的一个小花园那边，聚到了一起。
+
+在报道中，一位叫费晴的年轻人回顾说，当晚一开始在现场，因为警察和便衣密布，大家彼此不敢打招呼，只用“眼神确认彼此”。他看到有两个年轻人，穿着外卖小哥的衣服，在江边唱了一支崔健的《一无所有》，这是1980年代末的名曲。“我在瞬间想到了六四”。
+
+站在人群里的点心，和ta的朋友们并没有听到《一无所有》。但当人群越聚越多，警察把大约四十多个人围堵在中间、抗议者和支持者们被隔开的时候，除了不断响起的口号，ta们依然听到了很多首歌。这些歌包括Beyond的粤语歌曲《光辉岁月》、《海阔天空》等等。有朋友在点心的身边吐槽，“广东人听了那么多年的港乐，现在终于不说’去政治化’了。”
+
+这是一个ta们以前从未经历过的夜晚。一个在场者描述：“原本以为晚上会冷，带了瓶热水。可站在人群中，我才发现自己全身发热”。
+
+点心和朋友们也站在人群里。有人在喊口号，“人民万岁”。还有人喊了“不要核酸要自由，不要专制要民主”等等。在点心和ta的朋友们看来，这些“口号并没有太多想象力”。接着，有人又唱起了《国歌》。“那一刻，觉得有些尴尬。”一些年轻人开始沉默。
+
+当人群中响起《国际歌》时，不少年轻人也加入了合唱。
+
+夜已深。广场上灯光通明，警察的制服外面套着鹅黄绿的荧光背心。点心和朋友们被警察的人墙围在中间。在人群的外围，有支持抗议者的声音，也有人在用粤语破口大骂，让抗议者“收皮”，也就是闭嘴。有人骂抗议者是“废青”，让“外地人滚回老家去”。
+
+一位在场者说，一位谩骂的人说了一句让她印象深刻的话：“广州人不说自由”，“广州人只要堂食”。她在心里吐槽：“把广州人说的像被圈养的家畜似的”。事实上，那些谩骂很快就被另外的人用粤语怼了回去。
+
+鲜花和白纸在人群中晃动。一位在场者回顾，当时，警察虽然很多，也只是维持着秩序，一切都很平和。“我并没有恐惧”。
+
+“警察把我们都围起来的时候，我有点激动，就跑上前举着白纸，说了一句我想说的话。我说：有武器的是你们，我们手上只有白纸，你们怕什么？”一位叫依轩的抗议者事后回忆说。
+
+
+▲ 11月27日晚，大量市民在广州海珠广场响应白纸运动。
+
+夜色渐深。随着时间推移，有越秀公安分局的人来和抗议者交谈，要求ta们逐个离开。但抗议者们要求一起走，也拒绝把手中的花和白纸交到一起。最终，警察围堵的地方开了口子，被围堵在中间的抗议者们走了出去。
+
+点心和朋友们也一起离开了。多人证实，在现场，点心一直很平和，也很沉默。事实上，一位曾经有留学经历的男生说：“这是我参加过的最平和的抗议。”
+
+已是深夜一点。大家都觉得有些精疲力竭。地铁已经没有了，点心和朋友们一起打车回家。
+
+“可能我们就得接受这样的事实。在这样的现场，就会有很多观点不同的人。”在路上，点心对一位朋友这样说。在朋友眼里，这就是点心。ta确实一直都不是一个很激烈的人。
+
+
+### 2 青年（1）
+
+2015年，18岁的杨紫荆从山西老家考上了哈尔滨工程大学，专业是工程力学。“她的文科本来一直很好。为了证明自己，又学了理科，也一样考得很好。”母亲高秀胜说。
+
+在母亲的记忆中，女儿从小的爱好是看书。大学毕业后，因为疫情，杨紫荆回老家呆了一段时间，准备考研，方向是“社会学”。母亲才知道，女儿现在比较关注社会了。
+
+2020年夏天，杨紫荆去了广州，在这座中国南方最有活力和包容度的繁华都市，ta拥有了许多相投的朋友。在朋友们眼中，点心是一个极富洞察力的人。ta对性别议题敏感，关心底层疾苦，在被抓之前，出于个人的兴趣与关怀，ta正在翻译一些和残障人士权益有关的文字资料。
+
+在朋友们眼中，点心还是一位诗人，能用十分准确和炽热的语言，来表达内心的情感。“或许只有诗才能帮ta用超越语言的方式来表达自己。”有朋友这样说。
+
+
+▲ 点心的诗和笔迹。
+
+出事前，点心和朋友们看了最新的漫威电影《黑豹2》。朋友们回忆，点心对这部电影有些失望，ta的观点是：“被自由主义收编的超级英雄黑豹，有辱‘黑豹’这个激进派黑人民权运动的象征。”看完电影之后，ta又看了关于黑豹党的一些历史和纪录片等。“点心就是这样一个人，对自己感兴趣的议题，就会去深入地看，最终对这个议题变得很了解。”一位朋友这样评价ta。
+
+在大多数朋友眼中，点心就是这样一个安静、善良、有才华的青年。ta在家里养了一只丑丑的玳瑁猫。“看上去很像一只大老鼠的样子。”
+
+高秀胜并不了解长大后的女儿。但在广州的这些日子，她开始尝试着去了解。她在老家山西过着并不宽裕的生活，靠打零工度日，但女儿是她的心头肉。每次电话，她都喊女儿“臭宝”。事实上，当12月4日的夜里，便衣警察冲进房门，带走ta时，点心正在和母亲通电话。
+
+
+### 3 青年（2）
+
+也是在11月27日晚，当广州的海珠广场上，传出一阵阵年轻人的呼喊时，成都的望平街上，也已被祭奠的烛光和鲜花，以及一张张年轻的面庞充满。
+
+位于锦江沿线的望平街，是成都一个新兴的“网红”街区。作为中国西南最时尚的城市，疫情也挡不住成都年轻人热爱潮流、追逐时尚的脚步。近年来城市改造，望平街这条老街巷变漂亮了，既有各种潮流小店，又和成都普通人的日常生活紧密贴合，比起太古里、春熙路等成都时尚地标，望平街更有人文内涵，也更吸引年轻人。
+
+开始于黄昏时分的集会，是在跳舞的快乐气氛中展开的。在江边，有人和朋友、伴侣一起翩翩起舞，有人还带着宠物狗。年轻的胖虎，也在这江边起舞的人群中。
+
+胖虎是一个漂亮的成都女生，职业是纹身师。她平时留短发，有英姿飒爽的气质。她在知乎上的简介，是“一个没有纹身的纹身师”。说自己“出生在江南，但有一颗川渝的灵魂。”
+
+和胖虎结婚不久的黄颢，则是一个刚刚通过律师协会面试的见习律师。在他的一个朋友眼中，黄颢是那种很可爱的男生，“有艺术气质”。几天前，他刚刚告诉朋友，自己律师面试过了，很开心。朋友也热情地祝贺了他。
+
+三天前的11月24日，发生在乌鲁木齐的大火，至少导致十个人遇难。和其它几个城市一样，11月27日这晚，人们来到望平街，也是为了祭奠乌鲁木齐火灾的死难者。
+
+青年夏南（此处为化名）也是祭奠人群中的一员。据他的朋友介绍，乌鲁木齐火灾发生后，这位年轻人一直非常难过。当从网上得知11月27日晚有祭奠活动后，他和朋友从还在被封控的小区里翻墙出来，来到了望平街。
+
+在朋友眼中，祭奠现场的夏南，虽然情绪很悲伤，但显得理性平和。当集会的气氛渐渐变得热烈，人们开始喊出“不要核酸要自由”、“不自由、毋宁死”、“要生存”等充满感情的口号时，他还不止一次地试图提醒周边的人们：我们要克制，要回到祭奠的轨道上来。
+
+一位叫“老油条”的男生也在当晚的抗议现场。他印象最深刻的是，那一天，他看到很多人在现场流泪。“不断有人哭着从人群中离开。”
+
+“我没有设想过自己处于这种场景下的状态。在看乌鲁木齐的视频时，我是伤心；在看上海的视频时，我是愤怒。但在这一刻，我只是想哭。”“老油条”说。
+
+集会的人群喊出一声声热烈的口号，包括“新闻自由”、“言论自由”。人们表达着对过度防疫的愤怒，也表达着他们心中的诉求。在人群被警察围住后，抗议者们开始移动，沿着大街走出了大约两公里。但至始至终，人们只是和平的抗议。
+
+
+▲ 11月27日晚，大批成都市民聚集在望平街一带响应白纸运动。
+
+
+### 4 抓捕
+
+夜里九点多，成都抗议现场，人群不肯散去，警察们开始失去耐心。清场开始了。
+
+“我现在都无法忘记那个画面对我的冲击，一群警察蜂拥而上，无助的人群四散而逃，好像一群豹子冲击迁徙的人群。”网民“老油条”曾在此前一篇报道中，这样回忆当时的现场。
+
+“后来才知道，很多朋友当时已经被抓了，只是我没有看到。”他说。
+
+让另一位在场者印象深刻的是，清场的一瞬间，突然有100多名穿黑衣的便衣冲进了人群。人们在一瞬间被冲散了。当晚，多名年轻人被抓。青年夏南也在这个晚上失踪。
+
+抗议发生的次日，也就是11月28日下午，黄颢和胖虎被警察从家中带走。
+
+在广州，当27日晚上的集会和平结束之时，点心和ta的朋友们没想到，抓捕会随之而来。
+
+12月3日，在广州东山口，有三名年轻人被抓。据知情者介绍，两人后来被释放，但一名年轻人至今还被关押。
+
+紧张的气氛开始在广州蔓延，但点心并没有意识到危险也在向自己迫近。
+
+12月4日晚上，在点心租住的房子，一名男子自称查看水表，敲开了门。开门的瞬间，十多个便衣警察一涌而入。在被搜查了电脑、手机等电子设备后，点心被警察带走，一辆停在楼下的私家车带走了ta。临走时，警察让ta收拾一下，ta只换上了一件厚羽绒服。
+
+凌晨，点心的朋友打通了家附近派出所的电话。派出所说，办案区没有人。接下里的两天里，没有人知道点心被带到了哪里。朋友们和ta处在失联状态。
+
+12月5日，在24小时的讯问截止时间之前，陆续有被带走的人放了出来，亲友被要求去北京派出所接人。点心的朋友怀疑ta也被关在那边，于是就去了那边等。
+
+派出所周围，布满警察和便衣。点心的朋友们站在路边，也受到了盘问。但朋友们并没有打探到关于点心的任何消息。
+
+
+### 5 亲人的寻找
+
+12月7日深夜十二点，高秀胜接到点心朋友的电话，才知道女儿已经失踪了3天。
+
+“为什么？”电话里，她问点心的朋友。年轻人告诉她：“因为去了海珠广场，因为白纸。”高秀胜有点迷惑，不知道什么是“白纸”。如今她才知道，“白纸就是无声的抗议”。
+
+放下电话，这位焦急的母亲连夜出门做核酸检测，并订到了第二天下午飞广州的飞机。12月8日的傍晚8点，高秀胜飞到广州。让她哭笑不得的是，当天广州已经完全放开防疫政策，出机场不再需要核酸证明。因为防疫放开，一路顺利，晚上十点，她就赶到了广州越秀分局的北京派出所。
+
+在派出所，接待她的民警称给她的老家发了拘留通知书。但她根本没有收到。她问案子到底是什么情况，对方说：“不能说。”
+
+第二天早上，她又去了派出所。这次她收到了一张拘留通知书。通知书上写明：杨紫荆涉嫌寻衅滋事罪，予以刑事拘留。现羁押于越秀区看守所。
+
+但实际上，办案机关并没有依据刑事诉讼法的规定，在将杨紫荆刑拘后，依法送往看守所。从12月4日至今，十天已经过去，杨紫荆依然被关押在派出所内。
+
+“因为疫情，看守所不接收”。这是派出所的接待人员给高秀胜的说法。
+
+有法律界人士认为，这种做法严重违反了中国的相关法律规定。“派出所不具备羁押条件。不把人送往看守所，而是长期关押在派出所，这有可能严重侵犯当事人的合法权利。”
+
+高秀胜锲而不舍地每天去北京派出所交涉，虽然并没有什么结果。坐在地铁上时，这位忧虑的母亲会不停地想，为什么女儿会有这样的遭遇。有时她忍不住想，自己是不是太溺爱孩子了，“她做什么事，我都不反对。”但另一方面，她也会想，其实女儿并没有做错什么。
+
+“现在疫情管控放开了，大家都在享受便利，但为他们争取便利的人，包括我的女儿，却还在里面呆着。”她说。
+
+“我现在担心她在里面吃苦。万一给她硬扣一个帽子，把她批捕了，我这个当妈妈的怎么办？我很担心。”高秀胜说。广州冰冷的夜里，她躺在女儿的床上，怎么也睡不着，电热毯也挡不住沁骨的寒意。
+
+
+▲ 点心朋友眼中的点心。
+
+就在高秀胜为女儿竭力争取会见权利的同时，在成都，黄颢等三位青年的家人，也正艰难地寻找着自己的孩子。
+
+夏南的家在西北西边的一个小城。在他11月27日当天被抓后，家人就一直联系不上他。最终，警察打来了电话，称夏南已被羁押，但其余的情况一概不说。
+
+心急如焚的父母，按照电话打过去，没人接。发短信、由当地的派出所联系，都没有回音。到了12月10日，父亲坐了四个小时飞机到成都找儿子。临走时，怕饮食不习惯，夏南的母亲专门打了20个馕，装在丈夫的行李里。
+
+这位无法说出流利汉语的父亲，最终顺利地到达成都，这得益于从12月初开始的疫情管控放松。但到成都后，他不知到哪里去寻找儿子。有好心的当地朋友陪着他，奔波于成都的好几个看守所之间，数天后，才确定了夏南是被关押在郫都区看守所。
+
+在女儿失联几天后，胖虎的妈妈从江苏赶到了成都。
+
+为了确认女儿到底被关押在哪个看守所，这位年迈的母亲花了很大力气。去一家，查不出来，只能再去另一家。折腾了许久，她才确认女儿是被关押在双流看守所。但当她想给女儿送去几件御寒的衣物时，又多次被拒绝。最终，她在看守所门口情绪崩溃，哭闹起来，这才终于给女儿把衣服送了进去。
+
+
+### 6 “请珍惜这个国家最宝贵的年轻人”
+
+根据社交媒体上的消息，黄颢等三人的家人，都已为他们聘请了律师。律师也已依照法律规定，申请会见。但截至12月15日，三位律师在官网上预约的会见，都没有成功，理由都是“犯罪嫌疑人正在被提审”。他们的罪名都是“聚众扰乱社会秩序罪”。
+
+12月17日，距离抗议发生的11月27日，已经过去20天。不管是在广州，还是在成都，因参加抗议而被抓捕的年轻人，绝大部分都没有见到律师。
+
+在广州的北京派出所，据知情者介绍，同时还关押着另外两个年轻人，其中一位是叫王晓宇的NGO（公益组织）从业者。12月17日，在社交媒体上，有消息传出，一名出生于1994年、名叫陈大栗（原名陈思冶）的男生，也因11月27日去了海珠广场而被关押在北京派出所。
+
+
+▲ 陈大栗的个人介绍。
+
+陈大栗的朋友称，陈是一名影像工作者和音乐爱好者。他在12月4日下午被警察从住处带往北京派出所。随后被以寻衅滋事的名义处以行政拘留7天。但在12月12日晚办理了释放手续后，又再次与朋友失联。
+
+在这些年轻人被关押的同时，从12月5日起，中国的各个城市，疫情管控全面放开。清零政策已被放弃。那些促使年轻人走上街头抗议的“过度防控措施”，已经成为历史。
+
+但那些参与和平抗议的年轻人，却至今没有获得自由。在上海、北京、南京等“白纸抗议”发生的城市，一些被抓的年轻人，到现在没有任何音信。外界无从知道ta们的处境。
+
+“这几位年轻人算是好的，有朋友和家人帮助。其他人呢，如果没有家人和朋友，还不知道ta们是什么情况。”一位居住在广州、从事法律工作的女士这样说。
+
+“这个事情，让我觉得年轻人很棒。那些天，大家真是被逼迫到了极端，防疫过度已经到了一个巅峰时刻，这儿不引爆，哪儿也会。”她说。
+
+“如今既然已证明过度防疫是错误的，而且国家已经放弃了清零政策，就应该让这些年轻人回家。”她说。“应该让所有的人知道，这些被抓的年轻人，才是我们这个国家最为宝贵的一部分。”
+
+“我存了很多很可爱的表情包，就等你回来，然后一股脑发给你了。请坚持住。”
+
+12月17日这天，广州。在点心失去自由的第13天，一位朋友在手机上这样写下对ta的思念。
+
+（最新消息：12月17日，经各方努力，关押在成都的青年夏南被取保候审，已和父亲团聚。另外，在广州，也有两名年轻人被取保候审，但不包括本文提到的点心、王晓宇、陈大栗）。
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2022-12-21-tribute-to-the-true-bravery-of-hk.md b/_collections/_columns/2022-12-21-tribute-to-the-true-bravery-of-hk.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..be27fa4a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2022-12-21-tribute-to-the-true-bravery-of-hk.md
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "致敬香港真勇武"
+author: "陶樂思"
+date : 2022-12-21 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/QnotTdU.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+只維持一秒的影片，一面黑紫荊旗。
+
+烏克蘭戰場的志願軍隊伍當中，原來有香港人！
+
+
+
+昨天收看一則時事評論節目，得知烏克蘭國防部在推特發放影片，感謝來自數十個國家的志願軍，和烏克蘭軍隊並肩作戰抵抗入侵的俄羅斯軍隊。在影片中約有一秒鐘時間展示了志願軍所屬國家的國旗，其中有香港旗。據香港媒體報導：「香港區旗被塗黑。」
+
+其實黑色紫荊旗是香港2019年反修例運動時用的標誌。因此不存在什麼區旗被塗黑這件事。人家烏克蘭可心水清呢！怎會不知道參加志願軍的，就是2019年反修例運動的抗爭者？難道是香港藍絲不成？在俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭之初，藍絲社交群組已經拼命污衊烏克蘭了。什麼「老婆跟佬走（與情夫私奔），總之什麼骯髒話都說得出來。因此，烏克蘭國防部其實很清楚他們真正要感謝的是誰。
+
+身為其中一個擁抱普世價值的香港人，我為了這些參加志願軍的真勇武香港人而感到驕傲。是的。我是一個尚武的人。不過尚武並不表示要好勇鬥狠。即使擁抱民主、自由、和平，我們仍然需要保有一定的武力來自衛。尤其今時今日的亂世，身處民主國度的人，也非常需要培養武力來保家衛國。否則遇到像俄羅斯這樣的野心家垂涎，又能夠怎樣呢？
+
+在烏克蘭，女性也自願參軍，或者加入地方的半軍事組織保護自己的家園。我認為不論男性女性，甚至殘疾人士如瞎眼的、瘸腿的，或者失去雙手的，都應該服兵役接受軍事訓練，以及在國家遭到入侵時在軍隊服役，保家衛國。
+
+記得曾經在一個台灣媒體看到一篇投稿文章，大概是說軍事訓練是在培養野蠻行為。當時我心裡真的忍不住罵了一句髒話。若有一天台灣被入侵時，就請那位作者優雅地跪著舔入侵者的鞋底吧！這肯定是作者想要的和平與文明。其他台灣人又是否渴望呢？
+
+最後，我衷心祝願在烏克蘭戰場的香港手足最終能平安回家。我也相信他們能為香港作出無可取代的寶貴貢獻。向他們致敬！
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-01-21-returning-home-in-pandemic.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-01-21-returning-home-in-pandemic.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b88f6707
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-01-21-returning-home-in-pandemic.md
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "大疫返乡记"
+author: "陈纯"
+date : 2023-01-21 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/QI6K6XY.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+今年本来是不打算回潮州的，后来听说外婆的情况不乐观，我想着反正也是上网课，去那边上也未尝不可，就这样匆匆忙忙决定回去。这次对全中国老人来说都是渡劫，我太太的爷爷就没有熬过去，外婆生日前一天正好是她爷爷的丧礼，她要守孝，不能陪我回去。我对这种事倒是没那么在乎，就是亲戚们觉得可惜：结婚以来，都没带她回去过一次，难得我这次回来，应该让大家见见她，谁知出了这种事。
+
+我回来还有一个原因，那就是见见刚刚从里面出来的阿泉。
+
+
+
+2019年我写过一篇《故乡的沉沦》，里面稍微提到这件事：阿泉大学毕业以后，在一家科技公司实习，后来公司卷入了P2P业务，被一个还不起钱的用户举报，于是公司全员都抓，连他这个已经离职的实习生都没有放过，判了四年。到去年年底，正好刑满释放。
+
+前阵子微信上有一个人，给我发了一个关于我的一个帖子。我对这个号几乎没有印象，几年前加了一些读者，所以有陌生的号给我发信息，我也并不感到奇怪，但我对这种好事的举动有点不耐烦，冷冷地回了两句，就没有再说话了，只记得他有点慌张地说，我也是反动派。回到潮州，我跟阿泉说，你现在微信叫什么，给我发个信息。接着，那个陌生的号在我微信上吱了一声，我问阿泉，你那时怎么不说你是谁，你说你是我弟，那我肯定不是那个态度。
+
+我在心里对他是有愧疚的，那时他爸（我大舅）和他的大舅在瓜州为他奔走，我咨询了不少律师朋友，最后得出的结论是：要是想让他被放出来，怕是得在网上闹大了才行。那次对P2P的打击就是“运动式治理”的一个范例，他们公司被当成了典型，老板判了十几年，员工几乎都是三四年起步，走法律渠道是徒劳的。我跟小舅（他叔叔）和他大舅商量，我打算写一篇东西，也联系一些做媒体的朋友，要得到舆论关注应该是不成问题，他们的意思是，还是打官司争取一下，一个是怕我有危险，二是怕事情闹大了，他们家面子上不好看。我当时没有坚持，后面他们提起上诉，二审维持原判。每次想起他就这样不明不白被关了四年，总是怪自己当时不够坚决。
+
+阿泉现在在小舅的一个朋友那上班，是一个药店的仓库管理，工资当然不高，所幸是他足够乐观，他对我说，感觉以后医药行业会越来越有利可图，他想先学习一下。我顺着他的话说，对，其实现在大学生毕业大部分也找不到工作，你这个工作也很好，以后再加上你的计算机背景，搞互联网医药，还是挺有前途。
+
+我对阿泉在牢里的情况颇为关心，试探性地问了一句，你在里面，没有被欺负吧？他轻描淡写地说，没有，毕竟他们还是花了一些钱打点了关系。他对我谈起里面的见闻，说进去的，大部分确实也不是什么好人，有贪官，也有坑蒙拐骗的，不过近几年进了一些大学生，有一些像他一样，遇到国家要整顿某个行业，于是倒了霉。还有一个特殊的人群，因为没有说普通话就被抓进去了，在里面直接上了手铐和脚铐。他说自己在里面过得并不惨，但他见过有人没日没夜地被狱警打，打得哭爹喊娘也没人管。
+
+他说刚进去的时候也想过找我帮忙，但不知道如何和我联系，我听他这么说就更内疚了。在他出来以后，他们还要他交出二十万的“非法所得”，他拿不出来，就只能先欠着。“我就一个实习生，哪有什么非法所得？当时我家为了给我打官司和打点关系，前前后后已经花了几十万，现在还欠着人钱。”他说现在自己征信已经黑了，坐不了高铁飞机，我说，不被国家体制承认，并不是什么值得羞辱的事，你哥我也一样。
+
+阿泉虽然说着说着有点气，但我感觉他并不沮丧，这多少让我感到宽慰。他说经历这件事，他对这个体制已经失望透顶，所以出来以后，看过不少我的文章。他打开豆瓣，搜索一本哲学的科普书，问我这本怎么样，我说，这个估计太浅了，给他推荐了张志伟老师的一本，说我大一就是读这本书，读完再从里面挑一些我感兴趣的哲学家的著作来读。我又看到他案头有一本二战史，这些都是他进去以前不会看的，他对这个经历的反应让我的愧疚有所减少。
+
+外婆今年九十周岁，这四年，他们逢年过节都骗她说，阿泉在深圳打工，公司比较忙，规矩比较多，没有办法回来。如今阿泉回来，她却几乎不认得他了。
+
+这次外婆的病情究竟如何，大家都说不上来，因为他们没怎么带她去看医生，主要是医生也说不知从何下手：她的血氧值尚在正常范围，但整个人非常虚弱，神志有时清醒有时迷糊。他们指着我问了她几次，这是谁？她说，是阿纯。然而更多的话她就说不出了。她的几个子女和媳妇轮流照顾她，但没有一个人能说得出她究竟情况如何。
+
+外婆家的气氛一点也不凝重，就像是一次正常的过年聚会。和阿泉在房间里聊完，我和阿江在客厅喝茶，一会儿阿川洗完澡也过来了。前年九月我来参加了他的婚礼，他太太和他一样，都是潮州的公务员。这两年中国的地方财政颇为紧张，有不少小城市的公务员已经发不出工资，但潮州非常奇怪，这个GDP在广东倒数的地方，现在居然有钱修地铁，还要打通潮汕三市。我问阿川他们收入有没有变少，他说，不算吧，虽然有些补贴取消了，但是每个月多发了三千。我并没有再深究，但这种逆势而上的发展让我颇感意外。
+
+聊了一阵，又到潮汕人吃宵夜的时间。小时候在这边过暑假，每到晚上九点多，大舅妈一定要我和海哥吃宵夜，只不过吃的是白粥。按照她的理论，一整晚时间那么长，到早上才吃饭，肯定是要饿坏的。阿川和我都是生腌爱好者，如今肯定是不会在宵夜吃白粥了。阿江说，要不把阿溪也叫上？阿溪是小舅的儿子，去年刚本科毕业，据说教师资格证都快考到手了。我听说阿溪以后要当老师，笑得腰都快直不起来。我是看着这小子长大的，二十几年来，从未见他捧过一次书。阿江说，我们是绝对支持他当老师的，只要教的不是我们的孩子就行。
+
+阿溪出门十几分钟后，我们在群里喊他说，在楼下买三份汕头肠粉，他居然二话不说就答应了。等到他拎着几盒肠粉进门，我就大声喊他“林老师”，他一下就脸红了，放下肠粉缩在角落，生怕再引起注意。阿川还是没有放过他，问他有没有买考公务员的复习资料？他低声说还没有买，阿川继续叮嘱说，你一定要记得。阿溪的状态与我的当下大学毕业生的了解充分对应：大学毕业，首选还是考公和考编，尤其像他这样，家里不指望他拿钱帮补的，准备考公和考编就是不去工作的最好理由。
+
+阿泉最后也忍不住凑到宵夜桌上来，他妈妈一般不让他吃生腌，但今晚人多势众，大舅妈也不好说什么。在2019年之前，我有七年没有回潮州，2019年以后，阿泉又有四年不在，我们几兄弟好久都没如此齐聚一堂，如今遍插茱萸少一人，那就是在美国的海哥。我们小时候关系有这么好吗？也不见得。阿川十岁前脾气比较横，经常欺负海哥，每次我帮海哥揍阿川，海哥都会觉得我太过分；阿泉性格温顺，对他哥极其崇拜，对我总是有点敬而远之。这些年大家也算是各自经历了一些世事，突然觉得这种从小玩到大的感情难能可贵。
+
+阿泉问在一旁的小舅，外婆生日那天，能不能帮他跟老板请个假。小舅被逗笑了，说这种事，你该自己开口啊。阿泉说，你跟他比较熟嘛。小舅说，现在他是你老板了，外婆生日，这种理由光明正大，没什么不好意思开口的。你就跟他说我小叔叫你也一起来，他大概率不会来的，但这么说就比较得体。阿泉诺诺地点了点头，看得出他依然不太善于和人打交道。小舅指着我说，你问问纯哥，是不是得学学怎么跟人打交道？我笑着说，你拿我当榜样，估计对他没什么说服力吧。
+
+我还有另一个表弟，是我爸那边的亲戚，我二姑的儿子，也是从小玩到大。17号我和表姐（他姐姐）吃了一次晚饭，第二天下午她开车送我去金石。两天她都和我聊到表弟的状况：他在工厂里上班，每个月赚三千多，给他老婆两千，过年还得给一万，但她还是嫌他给得太少；她也嫌家里地方不够住，虽然有两层，父母住楼下，他们在楼上各自有一间房，但她想把老房子拆了，重新建一栋三层的。家里没有这么多钱，她就让两老想法子去借。“这个钱算下来怎么也得六七十万吧？你要说现在只缺一二十万，我们还能去借，但缺口太大，借不借得上且不说，借了以后也不知道怎么还。我妈说要不给你们付个商品房的首付（金石的商品房并不贵），你们自己住，以后慢慢供，她也不愿意。”
+
+源弟跟我同龄，现在儿子已经上中班。他太太是怎么愿意嫁给他的，我到现在还没搞清楚，但反正婚后没多久她就后悔了，等到有了孩子，后悔也没用了，就凑合着过，只是矛盾频频。他不抽烟不喝酒不赌钱，缺点就是赚得不够多，但也算达到国家的平均收入水平，以他的性情，这辈子怕是很难赚什么大钱，但在这边能赚大钱的又有几个呢？
+
+表姐对于这个弟弟，感情比较复杂，她对他当然是疼爱的，有几年源弟精神状态不太好，她经常往娘家跑，料理这个料理那个，还和二姑一起带他去看医生。然而她喜欢拿我和他比较，觉得他现在一切不如意，就是他小时候不爱读书，父母还由着他的缘故，所以她现在对自己两个子女的教育特别重视，有时可能有点苛刻了。表姐也知道我被敏感的经历，要说让自己弟弟去承受这些，她大概更加不愿意，但她觉得，如果能只学我会读书会赚钱的那一面，我关注公共事务的那一面完全不要学，那应该就不错。只是这些真的这么容易割裂开来吗？
+
+来到二姑家，源弟也在，他之前的厂没有熬到防疫放开，已经倒闭了，他在年前找了个新的厂，年后才上班。我和他在茶几边坐了下来，二姑放下手上的活也过来了，还是说，这次你老婆没能一起回来太可惜了。二姑丈身体不太好，坐下寒暄了两句，他们就让他回房间休息了。他们说现在是冬天，没有我最爱的草粿（仙草），源弟出门给我买粽球和甜汤，我一边冲茶，一边和二姑聊天。
+
+来潮州忘了带上龙角散，喉咙不舒服的时候喝上一小杯茶，似乎颇能缓解。潮州人喜欢喝凤凰单丛，我在外婆家和二姑家喝的都是这个。不一会儿源弟也回来了，我们四人围着茶几说话，源弟来冲茶。他喝茶非常讲究，一壶茶叶只能冲十泡，再多味道就淡了，一定要用沸水冲，冲的时候不能起泡，不然影响口感。我们聊到我两个堂弟，小叔的两个儿子，他们也在深圳，但因为我们一东一西，来往并不多。表姐说二叔的五个女儿里，只有大女儿阿珊跟她有联系，其余的名字样子都忘了。小姑一家，跟我们两家人都没什么往来。
+
+上一辈的潮汕人普遍重男轻女，所以我二叔生了五个女儿，好不容易才生了一个儿子。表姐说自己绝不会再这样，她一直教育儿子说，你和你妹妹是平等的，甚至你和爸妈都是平等的，所以家务不能全部给爸妈做，你们也是家里的一分子，你们两个都得做。17号晚吃饭，两个孩子也跟着她来，我看她儿子说话温文有礼，女儿自信而表现欲强，觉得她的性别教育做得真是不错。表姐一直羡慕我妹妹，又会打扮又能赚钱，但在我心里，她在力所能及的范围将自己的家庭和父母的家庭都照顾得如此得当，实在是相当了不起的。
+
+源弟对于家庭承担得确实不够多，但这更多是能力问题，不是品性和意愿问题。在他自己有所意识的时候，生活对他来说就有点吃力了。潮汕地区的教学资源相对匮乏，主要靠学生自己的天赋，源弟一直在金石，没有过遇到特别好的老师，对于学习缺乏兴趣，父母也不想把孩子逼得太紧，实在很难把他读不好书这点独立归因于哪个因素。倒不如说，这边读不好书是常态，能读出去的，才是罕见。我小学就到了深圳，在我成长的过程中，有几位数学、英语和历史老师，给我打下了坚实的基础，更别说我还有一位超级学霸表哥，偶尔给我点拨。以源弟曾经的经历，他如今有这一番面貌，我觉得他已经付出了相当大的努力。
+
+二姑离开的当儿，我和源弟聊到自己刚刚得奖的那本书，他说你不在国内出书，是因为被人针对了吧？我说，好像可以这么说。于是他说，国内就是有些人见不得别人好，莫言得了诺贝尔奖以后，也被国内的人骂得要死。我说对，其中有一个叫司马南的，最恶心。他说是，哥，你不用管国内的人怎么说，安心做你的学问就好。我说我这不是什么出名的奖项，但对我的研究来说只个重要的认可。他说我懂，你一直在追求自己的理想，我做不到，但我佩服你。
+
+我跟他聊完，绝对不相信他是别人口中的“呆子”。他聊到新冠，说现在死了这么多人，政府又不愿意公开，他觉得这样的管理模式太不透明了；他聊到自己孩子的教育，说他会告诉他读好书有多么重要，但绝不会不惜一切代价让他上大学，他似乎对所谓的“学历通胀”有一点蒙蒙胧胧的感觉，说出来打工也不错，行行出状元。
+
+吃完晚饭，感觉还没聊多久，就已经九点，表弟媳快回来了，他们问我要等等再走吗，我说等等吧。九点半的时候，一个扎着粗辫、穿着粉色羽绒服的女人，和一个发型时尚的小男孩一起进门了，两个人还戴着口罩。源弟让小男孩喊我“伯伯”，他害羞地轻声喊了一句，就躲到他妈妈的后面。表弟媳跟我打了招呼以后，一直跟表姐聊天，表姐是她在这个家里最能说得上话的。她对大家伙就说了一句，说二姑丈那个样子，一点活都不能让他干，然后又对着源弟说，你有空就多干一点，别老蹲在电视前。源弟说，我活也没少干呀，语气倒没有一点不耐烦。
+
+回去的路上，我收到陈椰兄的信息，问我明日何时到樟林。陈椰兄是我大学时的师兄、博士时的同学，因为我读研读了两年，他读了三年，毕业后去了华师工作，上公共课。
+
+我们离上次见面，已经有十年了。十年前是他回深大开会，我在深圳家中写博士论文，于是约在文山湖见面。这次他听说我回潮州，问我是否有空到他樟林的祖宅喝杯茶。这几年，我时常在朋友圈看到他发自己修缮祖宅的照片，后来似乎还把祖宅做成了一个开放的展馆，经常承办有关潮汕文化的座谈会。他还帮乡里的人整理旧物和修族谱，俨然已经成为澄海一地的乡贤。
+
+19号我一大早打车从湘桥到樟东侨联，另一位澄海的朋友也在，刚好我们都认识。椰兄带我们到他祖宅的品茗居喝茶，旁边有一桶他接的山泉水，比我表弟更加讲究。他说时间差不多了，他得到附近的永定楼，给一些年轻学生做侨批展览的介绍，于是带我们穿过了几个小巷，来到了樟林古港的旧址，永定楼就在旁边。
+
+在1860年代汕头兴起前，樟林港是潮汕地区的第一大港口。当年潮汕乃至客家赣南都沿着韩江流域到樟林港出发，坐着红头船去南洋闯荡。“如今这条河道已经被缩窄，一度变成死水，是近年将河道疏通，水才重新变活了。”椰兄又指着这附近的一些楼房说：“民国那一代的樟林归侨，有一批是思想相当激进的，曾想在这一带建立一个‘大同村’，这附近的一些宅子，就是他们建的，是潮汕地区最早用上自来水的民居。作家秦牧那会儿就住在河对岸的那栋楼。”我顺着他指着方向看去，看到一家写着“粽球”的店。他说：“在粽球的后面。”
+
+我们正聊着，迎面走来两个女生，用潮汕话对椰兄说，学生来得差不多了。椰兄邀我们一起去，进了大门，一些年轻的学生渐渐向他围了过来，从高中到大学都有。椰兄说，这个展览，我讲两个小时都行，要我半个小时给你们讲完，对我是个挑战，但我尽量。所谓的“侨批”，就是华侨从海外寄回家的汇款带信件。《侨批档案》是中国入选联合国教科文组织“世界记忆名录”的十三个项目之一。永定楼的这个展馆，是椰兄和几个朋友一起策划布置的，柜台的信封和信件，是椰兄的朋友用毛笔模仿书写的，其他的诸如各种侨批的分类和介绍，视频的制作和配音，前前后后花了他们一年的时间。
+
+椰兄给这些学生的讲解，是极其细致的，我听了一遍，也不能复述出十之七八。这些寄回侨批的华侨和他们的家人，大多文化水平不高，所以他们一般会请人代笔，比如樟林这边有一位人称“写批洪”的洪铭通先生，为人代写书信，还有所谓“四不写”原则，其中有一条：夸大儿孙不肖引以为同情以求多寄钱者不写。这便引出了侨批里的一条主线：在外闯荡的人，和在家操持的人，通过侨批，互相讨价还价。在一个展厅，椰兄向我们展示了侨批里出现最频繁的字，那便是“难”，在外打拼不易。有一篇长达150公分的最长侨批，文采斐然，其中有如下词句，将“难”的心境，写得入木三分：“自知当此生意苦淡，才识有限，舍而就他，未必能优于此，总之贫而清较胜富而浊，人生几何，系能为五斗米而长吞心血？”另一份侨批，寄回五十元，详细讲明如何掰成十四份，分赠各位亲属。
+
+展出的侨批里也不尽是这些人生艰难，也有缠绵悱恻的情书，其中最为耐人寻味的一篇，是写给自己已婚的姨亲表妹的：“彼时为何你不出一言，实在愚哉。倘有出一声，如今即成为最快乐清心爱情的佳偶，但木已刻成舟，追想亦算是无益，不过此时心中偶触起来，不得不写几行字来告诉你。”椰兄在讲解此篇时，几次忍俊不禁，说八卦色彩太浓，不宜对游客细说，我倒觉得这封侨批可以媲美《霍乱时期的爱情》，可惜没有再来一个秦牧，将其背后的故事演绎成传世佳作（秦牧另有一篇《情书》，被椰兄的团队做成短视频动画，椰兄亲自给写字先生配音）。
+
+回到椰兄祖宅，我已经深受震撼，一是对潮汕人与“家”的羁绊，二是对樟林的人文环境。前者不好发感慨，后者我倒是可以坦率直言。我2019年和2021年两次回沙溪，发现不仅民生凋敝，而且杂乱的新建民居与残破的传统老宅形成鲜明对比，一副被世界遗弃、任其自生自灭的模样，而樟林却颇有欧洲小镇的风骨，旧中藏新，新旧相映，这与椰兄这样的文化研究者为樟林投入大量心血有着莫大的关系。
+
+椰兄说自己为了筹措款项，不得不常与现实体制周旋。文化项目投入周期长，不易出政绩，地方有钱还是更想投在路桥基建上面。他又感慨自己为学十数载，深受体制的束缚，许多话不敢直说，“但见到你畅快直言，身体力行，还是深感佩服。”我问他是否还在做薛侃，他说是，岭南儒学一脉，是他学问的根基。明代的儒者，已经从“得君行道”走向“觉民行道”，在潮汕一带，这种儒学的实践有着更具体的表现形态，这就是他研究的重点。我说你不仅是在研究他们，你也是在接过他们的衣钵，但我觉得这才是做学问的本真模样，不仅仅是冷眼静观和客观剖析，而是将学问与时代和自身的生命相结合，以本己的生命热情熔化冰冷的学问之石，看看碰撞出的岩浆，会凝固成什么新的形态。
+
+2012年秋天，祖叔陈伟南回潮州接受潮汕几地政府的表彰，也让我一同随行，我在潮州呆了近一周的时间，此后直到2019年11月，我都没有再回来过。如今想起，也不知道自己为什么隔了那么久都不回去，大抵就是每个有空的时节，都有更想去的地方吧。我以前说过，自己对潮汕文化并没有太多认同，但近年有所感触，可能是自己对潮汕文化本身的理解也是比较扁平化的，而不是活泼泼的，像椰兄所收集的那些侨批，就让我了解到潮汕人之百态，并非如我以前想象的那般刻板。椰兄的展厅，动画的结尾播放的是“玩具船长”的《一封侨批》，不知为何让我想起了“五条人”的《阿珍爱上了阿强》。
+
+18号晚，表姐的车开在金石的路上，我看到两旁的店铺和十几年前如此相似，突然问她，你现在还有少韩师兄的消息吗？少韩师兄是表姐的中学同学，也是我大学的师兄，在我刚上深大那会儿，表姐叮嘱他给我一些照顾，于是他带着我去了同乡会，让我结识了第一批文学院以外的朋友。她说，好像听说他回潮州发展了，但我没有他的微信。我指着近处一家简陋的餐厅，说大三那一年，我来金石看你们，少韩师兄刚好也在金石，他带着我们两个一起去参加你们的同学聚餐，饭后还对我说，在金石只能吃得这么简单，不要介意。其实那顿我吃得好极了，现在还经常回想起来，那个小镇春节的夜晚。
+
+表姐说，可能是你太念旧了。
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-01-25-do-aliens-exist.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-01-25-do-aliens-exist.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..6a424e4a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-01-25-do-aliens-exist.md
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "外星人存在嗎？"
+author: "艾碩讀哲學"
+date : 2023-01-25 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/Ocdhsxv.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+外星生命是否存在？他們曾否與地球接觸？各國政府是否有意隱藏事實？這些問題一直以來不僅引起人類的好奇心，甚至不斷激發人對各樣未知問題的幻想，外星人問題甚至會成為地球本身一些未解之迷的方便答案。
+
+
+
+例如由於古埃及金字塔的建造方法沒有任何文獻記載，其規模之龐大又看似非古時的技術所能應付，故一直以來均有人認為是有外星人協助古埃及建造金字塔的。當然，隨著考古學及測量技術的發展，學界已對金字塔的建造及大量石塊的搬運方法提出科學的解釋，而不再需要借助外星人或其他神秘力量。
+
+然而，在金字塔的問題以外，仍然有大量的事件和問題製造了空間去讓人們去主張外星生命的存在，以及他們曾經來到地球並與人類有所接觸，當中比較著名的例子有1947年羅斯威爾飛碟墜毀事件、1952年華盛頓不明飛行物事件、1994年黑龍江省孟照國事件等，近在香港亦有1984年華富邨不明飛行物目擊事件，當年引起大量公眾討論，把時間拉至廿一世紀，2018年香港天文台亦收到24宗市民目擊不飛行物體的報告。由此可見，目擊不明飛行物的事件其實一直與我們的距離不遠，但由於此類型事件均無法提供有力證據支持其真實性，加上其論述方式加入了大量陰謀論元素（例如美國政府於51區隱藏外星基地），故此我一直認為這些事件的可信性不足，亦不相信外星生命或文明曾與地球有所接觸。
+
+而如果要相信外星生命曾經與地球接觸，其實先要相信一個更大的前提，則是「外星生命的存在」。而我認為雖然不明飛行物目擊事件多屬陰謀論性質並涉及一些認知偏見及不理性思維，但有關外星生命是否存在的問題卻可以是科學問題，長久以來亦有很多科學家以嚴謹的科學態度探索這個大哉問。當然，同樣的問題亦有人以不科學的方式對待，讓是否相信有外星生命存在的問題，以是否相信有鬼的問題般的方式看待之。
+
+要討論有關外星生以至文明的存在問題在科學界的討論，可由費米悖論（Fermi paradox）開始。於1950年，美籍義大利裔物理學家於一次非正式的討論中，提出假若銀河系存在先進的外星文明，為什麼人類卻連任何的證據都無法獲得。透過引用德雷克公式（Drake equation）推測外星文明的數量，費米悖論可以表述為以下兩個命題：
+
+1. 宇宙顯著的尺度和年齡意味著高等地外文明應該存在。
+
+2. 但是，這個假設得不到充分的證據支持。
+
+就以上第一點來說，宇宙的呎吋非常龐大，銀河系大約有2500億（2.5 x 10^11）顆恆星，可觀測宇宙內則有700垓（7 x 10^22）顆。即使外星文明以微小的概率出現在圍繞這些恆星的行星中，那麼僅僅在銀河系內就應該有一定數量的文明存在，由此可引伸出平庸原理（Mediocrity Principle）的觀點。而以上第二點，則是由現實經驗的角度回應第一點，事實上人類並沒有在地球或可觀測宇宙的任何地方，找到其他外星生命及文明存在的可靠證據，由此可引伸出地球殊異假說（Rare Earth Hypothesis）及大過濾理論（Great Filter）。
+
+不論是地球殊異假說、大過濾理論或平庸原理，都在理論層面為費米悖論提供了可能的解釋。這些理論縱然在理性上能夠成立，但若要充分印証其真偽，則只有待外星生命及外星文明真正被發現，或地球被他們發現的一日。
+
+而我更感興趣的是，設想有一天外星生命，特別是具智慧的外星生命及其文明被證實為存在的話，將如行改變我們作為人的自我理解。從西方思想史的脈絡，一直有思索「人是什麼」的人性論傳統，在理論與實踐的歷史過程中建立不同的「人觀」。先蘇時期的學者把人理解為一個小宇宙，與自然世界相呼應，從人身上能夠認識自然，從自然身上也能夠認識人；直到柏拉圖和亞里士多德分別把人理解為「會說話的生命體」及「理性思考的動物」，開始進入把人與自然區隔的脈絡。而基督宗教所建立「人是上帝的肖像」（Image of God）的觀念，進一步去肯定人的獨特地位、尊嚴和本性；又發展出「位格」（Person）的概念，即「以理性為本性的個別實體」，為「人人生而平等」及「人作為不可分割的權利個體」等個體觀念建立基礎。而進入現代哲學，由笛卡兒開始，建立起「人是主體」的思想則確切進入「主體客體對立二分」的階段，亦可理解令人不斷強化「以人為中心」的世界觀發展。
+
+上述種種「人觀」除了為人本身作出定義與分析外，亦會有擴而充之的理論效果，影響人如何於世界/自然/宇宙中自我定位，以及如何理解人自身與外部世界的關係。縱然當代哲學的「他者轉向」、演化論對物種演化的科學解釋、外太空探索科技的進步，以上種種知識的進步，都稍稍讓人從「人類中心」中釋放而更多的去承認自身的不獨特和去尊重人以外的外部世界。然而，大體上現今具一定普遍性的人觀，仍然未有超越人與外部世界主客二分的主體觀念，特別是因為宗教及社會文化的原因，令演化論的觀點被多重誤解。人類仍然因作為獨特的理性存在者而賦予自身於世思超然的地位。
+
+那麼，如果人類作為能理性思考的存在者的獨特性被外星人的實例真正的去打破，更甚者是外星生命的生命存在方式與人類在根本性不同（例如他們的生命不是以個體計算或他們身處與人類不相同的維度等），我們對「什麼是人」的觀念會起怎樣的改變？其實我無法仔細想像整個轉變的內容，但可以想像的是很多由宗教所建立的觀念將會被挑戰和打破，例如人是「Image of God」的觀念就再被容許。又例如若外星智慧生命同樣擁有理性的能力，有作出道德行為的能力，他們又可否進入天堂呢？而我相信若然有另外一種能理性思考的存在者，將能夠作為一個人觀更新的時機，讓人在世界中從重定位自己，並走出人類中心而與世界從新作出具善意的連結。
+
+但我們人類是否能夠存活至這個時刻，我則比較悲觀了。
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-01-26-nothing-is-true-everything-is-permitted.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-01-26-nothing-is-true-everything-is-permitted.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..d03a1608
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-01-26-nothing-is-true-everything-is-permitted.md
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "万物皆虚，万事皆允"
+author: "PikachuEXE"
+date : 2023-01-26 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/DzDQ1Is.jpg
+image_caption: "《刺客信條》格言（The Maxim in Assassin’s Creed）"
+description: "“Nothing is true; everything is permitted” was taken from “Nothing is an absolute reality; all is permitted” in the 1938 novel Alamut by Vladimir Bartol, a book that served as a primary inspiration for Assassin’s Creed. The maxim was the highest truth of the Ismaili, the sect of Islam that gave rise to the historical Hashashin."
+---
+
+格言靈感來自Vladimir Bartol 1938年小說Alamut，原句“Nothing is an absolute reality; all is permitted.”
+
+此格言不能只照字面去理解，更多是像指引讓人思考，沒有既定終點，即沒有一個固定的訊息要傳達。
+
+接下來會先分開兩部分來探討。
+
+
+
+### Nothing is True
+
+如上所說，這不能只用字面去理解，否則只會變成自我否定句。（把這句本身都否定掉）
+
+那甚麼是“True”（真）呢？實際上是一個哲學問題。
+
+我們如何“知道”某些事情/陳述（Statement）是真還是假呢？
+
+當然科學上通常會說做實驗，用足夠多的實驗方法去證明某陳述的真假。例如陳述是現在身處地區的室外在下雨，那要用實驗證明此句是真是假可以：
+
+1. 去室外，看有沒有水滴在降下來。（但可能只是消防車在用水炮向上射）
+
+2. 用儀器在人工降雨（消防車那種）機會較小的地方偵測降水量。（但可以是局部地區性下雨）
+
+但在哲學上來說，任何實驗方法都需要透過人們的經驗（視覺觸覺等）令人接受某些事物為“真”。而人的用於經驗世界的能力有限，而且每人的經驗都不一樣（主觀）。
+
+所以實際上“知道”很有可能是“足夠相信”的變換，即是人們心中的“真相”可以跟運行此世界的“機器”中的“真實”不一樣。（而且可以差很多）
+
+（有關世界方面的探討可看關聯作品，不過有遊戲劇透）
+
+引伸出來可以有很多結論，例如：
+
+- 科學上任何“已證實”的理論可以被推翻。（困難度則是另一回事）
+
+- 任何現有的“知識”/“常識”/“真相”/觀點，例如“主流媒體”（即現代的宣傳機器）報導的，各種“專家”/組織發表的（“專業”）意見，不一定較接近“真實”。
+
+- 應對事物抱足夠懷疑，不論對該事物的信任政策是先預設相信（一部分）或預設不相信。
+
+- 任何人都不是“完美”可以犯錯，包括自己。
+
+
+▲ __天氣預報石：__ 石頭濕了就是在下雨；⋯⋯石頭不見了就是有龍捲風。
+
+
+### Everything is Permitted
+
+要是只用字面去理解，而不繼續思考下去，就可能會變成覺得甚麼都能做，而去做一些不可挽回的事。例如
+
+> [在第一代的刺客教條開場時，阿泰爾就曾經因為錯誤理解這句話而殺害了一名無辜的路人。](https://mzh.moegirl.org.cn/zh-tw/万物皆虚，万事皆允)
+
+但此句不只可應用於讀者身上。任何人、動物、生物死物、甚至世界本身（及其規則）無一例外。
+
+你可以嘗試違反此世界/社會的法則，但世界/社會的“執法單位”一樣可以回應。（世界的“執法單位”應該就是運行此世界的“機器”本身）
+
+簡單一點的例子有，你無端端打人，應該可預想到別人可能憤怒、可能反擊、可能防禦、可能報官，你總不能怪人時說：Everything is Permitted，我做甚麼都行你為甚麼要憤怒/反擊/給予回應。
+
+但是別人也是Everything is Permitted啊！
+
+
+### Nothing is true; everything is permitted
+
+> 此格言所指的是：世間萬物無常，總不會維持同樣的狀態，因此刺客不應被世間事物所束縛，亦不應過於被舊有的思想所控制，即為「萬物皆虛」。然而這不代表刺客可以為所欲為，教條本身只是一種提示，去告訴刺客總會有另一條路，即為「萬事皆允」。
+
+> 實際上各代的主角對于格言的理解都不盡相同，但都離不開「教條是一種提醒，並且要你去尋求智慧」這種解釋。
+
+因為各種社會規範/文化習俗等是人所創造的事物，因此人實際上擁有的可能性會比多數人所想的更多。（可能性包括好與壞，因為好壞本身也是各人給予的價值判斷）
+
+但是有可能性不代表為所欲為，因為周遭一樣可以“為所欲為”給予回應。
+
+
+### 總結
+
+正如阿泰爾（刺客信條第一代主角，Altaïr Ibn-La’Ahad）所說：
+
+> “Our Creed does not command us to be free. It commands us to be wise.”
+
+祝你過一個有智慧的人生。
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-02-02-huminerals.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-02-02-huminerals.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..3901cedd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-02-02-huminerals.md
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "“人矿”"
+author: "昌西"
+date : 2023-02-02 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/J1skzEA.jpg
+image_caption: "“…你是资源，不是主体，你是手段，不是目的。耗尽一生的能量，是为了成全他人，而不是追逐自己渴望的人生。”"
+description: ""
+---
+
+在微博热搜，曾有一个词汇“人矿”短暂出现在今年一月热搜榜单上。但当我们今天查看同一词条时，留下的仅有这样一行字：“根据相关法律法规和政策，话题页未予显示。”
+
+
+
+
+▲ 2023年1月22日，北京农历兔年的第一天，人们在雍和宫祈福。
+
+熟悉中国互联网话语体系的人都知道，这个叫做“人矿”的词汇就这样变成了中国互联网审查机制当中的又一个敏感词。在网易、知乎等中国境内网站上，关于人矿一词的讨论也被消灭得一干二净，即使通过谷歌搜索的网页缓存也无法访问这些已经被删除的内容。这不禁让人好奇，到底是什么让审查机构和中国当局对这个看似荒谬的词汇感到警惕。
+
+
+▲ 1985年4月1日，成都，行人经过一个巨大的计划生育宣传广告牌。
+
+
+### “人口生产计划工程”
+
+根据推特上有账号整理的来自网友的评论，人矿的意思是指那些读二十年书、还三十年房贷、养二十年医院的，从生下来就是被作为消耗品使用的中国人。在知乎上，还曾有这样一段对人矿的总结：“人矿意味着，你是资源，不是主体，你是手段，不是目的。耗尽一生的能量，是为了成全他人，而不是追逐自己渴望的人生。”“人矿的一生，分为三个阶段——开采，使用，残渣及废气处理。最初十几年，在你身上投资教育，目的是把你开采出来，成为可以使用的矿。中间几十年，是使用和消耗的过程。最后不能用了，以尽量不污染的方式处理掉。”而人矿一词据信最早于1984年3月20日被使用在《人民日报》的文章中。在这篇标题为《牵住了“牛鼻子”——罗庄公社乡镇企业纪事》的文章中，“人矿”一词被作者吴国光作为小标题使用。在这段话中，吴国光称中国是“人才的富矿”，并且处处可以开掘到新的高品位的“干部资源”。
+
+读起这些词语和文字，不由得让人感觉到露骨，但另一方面，这些关于读书、房贷、医疗的言论又着实反映了中国平民生活的现状：从小时候的补习班，学校的周考月考，升学时的中考、高考、考研，再到北漂、沪漂、进城打工，留守务农。但令人心酸的是，这些努力最终并没有让多数人的生活有飞跃式的改变，育儿成本高居不下，劳工环境待遇堪忧。而辛勤一生之后的老年人群体恐怕也无法享受天伦之乐：在户籍制度，养老金分配不均等的因素下，退休人士与老年人享受的待遇并不相同。而在近来中国突然取消一切COVID限制，在没有准备相应疫苗和医疗资源的情况下放开，也是将老年人的生命置于危险当中。
+
+对于第一次听说这个词汇的人来说，人矿一词的冲击感大多来源于这个词汇的荒谬性：在通常的认知当中，具有鲜活生命的人，与被当作是资源的矿物矿产显然不能相提并论。但在仔细翻看这一词条被查删前，网友们对“人矿”一词的感想，却着实有一种令人背脊发凉的绝望感觉：纵观中国自上世纪70年代末以来的人口与社会政策，又不难发现，在近半个世纪的时间内，在中国这片土地上推行的政策，着实是在将人民当作生产资源来使用。
+
+将人口资源化的理论，可以追溯到1956年10月12日，毛泽东在会见南斯拉夫妇女代表团时发表的如下观点：“社会的生产已经计划化了，而人类本身的生产还处在一种无政府和无计划的状态中。我们为什么不可以对人类本身的生产也实行计划化呢？我想是可以的。”与南斯拉夫妇女代表团的言论很快便成为了高层会议上的重要学习资料。1957年2月27日，毛泽东在最高国务会议上这样表示：“我看人类是最不会管理自己了。工厂生产布匹、桌椅板凳、钢铁有计划，而人类对于生产人类自己就没有计划了，这是无政府主义，无组织无纪律。这样下去，我看人类是要提前毁掉的。”在中华人民共和国初代领导人将“人类生产计划化”的大框架下，将人口“资源化”、“矿物质化”、制定生产计划、控制产出数量等等政策随即出现。而这样的政策思潮并没有随着毛泽东的逝世而停止。事实上，1976年后，毛泽东的继任者们，持续推进了将人口作为资源去“控制”的行动。
+
+
+▲ 2018年12月5日，北京，学生在家政培训课程中对着婴儿娃娃练习。
+
+
+### “180度大旋转”
+
+提起中国人口政策，人们很容易想到的，就是自上世纪七十年代末，以延缓人口增长为目标的计划生育政策。在《纽约时报》1978年的记载中，记录了在文化大革命和大跃进政策的失败后，中国寻找减缓人口增长的办法，从而推行了计划生育政策。这项获得了中央政府批准的政策，从最初的“鼓励只生一个孩子”，随后演变成为多数人熟知的独生子女政策。
+
+显然，推行这样的政策，会遇到很大的阻力。而为了完成这项影响力巨大的人口生产计划工程，当局使用过一系列鼓励措施与手段，从土墙上路边旁的计划生育标语，到每月5元的独生子女费，这些看起来带有戏剧色彩的历史遗留产物，在今天依旧存在于中国社会的各个角落当中。不过，比起这些鼓励性措施，真正令人们印象深刻的，是计划生育所带来的强迫性政策，以及这些政策执行对无数家庭与个人不可逆转的影响。
+
+起初，计划生育的强制性仅限于共产党员，但针对“超生”行为的处罚很快扩大到了整个中国社会。不遵守独生子女政策的人士面临轻则罚款，重则失去工作等经济与社会面的制裁。而在一些地区，甚至还上演了例如“百日无孩”这样的人为消灭新生儿的毁灭性行为。根据中国数字时代404文库的记录，百日无孩行动是1991年发生在山东冠县的一场针对计划生育政策的执行行为。这一政策的目标是在5月1日到8月10日期间“全县不允许一个农业户口的孩子出生”，为了完成这样的任务，乡镇干部还喊出将新生儿“生出来就掐死”的话语，并且调集外乡的人员，专拣孕妇的肚子猛踹，“一脚下去，一会儿地下一片血，哈哈！目的达到了，你想保胎希望不大了，即使我们让保，你到县医院也是给你打一针引产针，政治任务谁敢徇私啊！”
+
+2022年7月，“社会调剂”一词将计划生育政策中发生在广西全州县的政策推入了公众的视野。在一封回应信访的政府文件中，全州县卫生局宣称，在1990年代未知性计划生育工作中，对超生的孩子由全县统一抱走统一进行社会调剂。而在事件引发社交媒体关注后，在媒体的追问下，桂林市卫健委证实了社会调剂政策的存在。
+
+在上述两则案例中，为了一个政治目标，当局可以完成违背人伦的灭绝生育政策，而针对出生的孩子，当局亦可以选择将他们从父母的身边分离，并且为了防止日后这些孩子能够被父母找到而毁灭所谓“调剂”的记录。这些政策与执行细节体现了将人“去人格化”与数字化的本质。殴打孕妇，强制流产，只为执行一项政策；而全州县曾做过的“社会调剂”实则是一场由公权力介入的大规模婴儿拐卖行为。
+
+在2022年，中国达成了计划生育政策最初的目标。根据2022年中国国家统计局的数字，中国人口比起上一年年末减少85万人，这也是中国人口在近60年以来第一次下降。讽刺的是，没有人因为计划生育政策目标达成而庆祝。相反的是，在人口下降趋势出现的前几年，中国政府便开始了包括废除独生子女政策，放开全面二胎，以及鼓励三胎等等生育激励政策，试图扭转人口即将下降的趋势。比起三十多年前的百日无孩与社会调剂，这些新的鼓励性政策显示了中国人口政策的“180度漂移转弯”。
+
+而对于当局来说，试图扭转人口负增长趋势的目的并不难理解：此前执行了三十多年的独生子女政策的副作用，已经开始影响越来越多的人与越来越多的产业。劳动力缺失，老龄化社会，征兵困难等等问题已经成为中国今天面临的问题。在2020年，解放军将原本的每年一次征兵，一次退伍，改变成为了两次征兵，两次退伍，根据观察者网的解读，这一措施同样是为了缓解“征兵难”这一问题。但讽刺的是，在21世纪20年代中国所出现的人口问题，绝大部分却是由于政府此前的人口政策造成的。
+
+
+▲ 2015年8月1日，江苏省南京市，人们在水上乐园消暑。
+
+
+### 不再灵验的“低人权优势”
+
+而对于中国民众来说，伴随着当年“控制人口数量、提高人口素质”口号而来的，不是幸福快乐的生活，而是新一轮的烦恼。计划生育政策造就了80后与90后两个世代的独生子女人群。然而随着他们完成学业进入劳动力市场，不难发现自己所面临的劳工环境与薪资待遇的改善，赶不上日益上升的生活成本。而原本提到的“只生一个好，政府来养老”的口号，在现实层面上却变成了用“六个钱包买房”，在事业上面对福报996，辞退不能拼搏者这样恶劣的环境。这样的局面显然让人不由思考，一个人在这个国家的成长、就业、养老，究竟是可以自己选择，还是一场被公权力精心设计的工业流程。
+
+在推行独生子女政策的近40年间，中国经济得益于文化大革命后的改革开放政策，与中国巨大的劳工群体数量，得以迅速发展。但另一方面，这些经济发展成果，并没有转化成为民众在医疗、教育等民生问题上的福利。在中国舆论场当中，中国基数庞大的人口即是本国经济发展的重要动力，而在社会福利、民众生活等等问题上，中国巨大的人口数量又成为了政府政策不到位的最佳借口。
+
+在2007年，前清华大学教授秦晖提出了一个名为“低人权优势”的概念：在全球化时代，中国使用了这一种“专制非福利”体制，解决了例如“民主分家麻烦大，福利国家包袱多，工会吓跑投资者，农会赶走圈地客”的拖累。这样的条件使得中国经济在过去的40年显著增长。但对于中国执政者来说，这种来源于剥削普通民众的红利，他们似乎变得过于习以为常。在美中贸易战期间，在中国曾有“我们不惜一切代价，也要打赢贸易战”这样的话语出现。而普通民众逐渐发现，自己并不是这段话当中的“我们”，而是这段话当中的“代价”。
+
+“‘人矿’一词之所以好，不在于它的辞藻多华丽创意多新颖。‘人矿’之所以好，就好在难听，好在直截了当，好在鲜血淋漓，好在把太平背后的血与泪、骨与髓活生生的挖了出来，血淋漓的呈现在你眼前，叫你无处可逃。”这是在被删帖之前，知乎网友对于人矿一词的感受。从对人口数量论证的春秋笔法，到牺牲普通民众的利益来达成特定的政治指标，这些行为体现出中国执政者在对待其统治下的民众时展现的功利性与投机性。在威权国家当中，这样的行为并不罕见，这也是中国实行的国家资本主义这一政治经济体制治下的“常规操作”。但对于威权治下，长期受到政府宣传影响与公权力机器压迫的人们来说，人口政策的横跳，以及疫情“清零”封控与突然放开等等公共政策上的失误，都让人们发现，在政府的眼中，自己并不被当成一个具有鲜活生命的人来看待。在公权力眼中，自己更像是一个生产力，和一个取之即来、挥之即去的工具耗材。
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-02-03-the-arrested-in-the-a4-revolution.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-02-03-the-arrested-in-the-a4-revolution.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..d3a1c1e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-02-03-the-arrested-in-the-a4-revolution.md
@@ -0,0 +1,301 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "“白纸革命”・被捕者（二）"
+author: "素年"
+date : 2023-02-03 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/RaJEq0V.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+2023年1月20日上午，农历春节来临前一天。在失去自由29天后，27岁的曹芷馨第一次见到了自己的律师。
+
+这是在北京朝阳区看守所的会见室。她穿着土黄色的棉布上衣，灰色的棉裤，这是看守所的“号服”。按照惯例，会见时间只有40分钟。
+
+“她很坚强。”知情者说。
+
+
+
+前一天夜里，也就是北京时间的1月19日晚上11点多，被关押在朝阳区看守所的多名“亮马河悼念活动”的参与者，被陆续以“取保候审”的名义释放，其中有记者杨柳、秦梓奕等人，但曹芷馨没有在其中。她和她的另外几位同龄密友，包括李元婧、翟登蕊、李思琪，同时被宣布批准逮捕。罪名也由此前的涉嫌“聚众扰乱公共场所秩序”更改为“寻衅滋事”。
+
+据知情者称当晚被批准逮捕的至少有20多人，他们都与2022年11月27日夜发生在北京亮马桥、反对疫情封控的悼念与抗议活动有关。
+
+知情者说，曹芷馨在得知自己被批捕的消息后，感到非常失望。她确实从来没有想过，自己参加一个正常的悼念活动，会遭遇如此严重的后果。在收到家人以及男友的问候与关心时，她忍不住流下了眼泪。
+
+而在此次见到律师之前，她并不知道自己在被抓之前录制的求助视频，已传遍了全世界。在这个视频中，她预感到自己将要“被消失”，而尖锐地发问：“我们这些青年只是正常地悼念自己的同胞，为什么要付出被消失的代价？我们是谁不得不交差的任务？”
+
+早在1月9日，律师就为她提交了取保候审的申请，但被驳回。1月17日，律师向检察院提交了“不批准逮捕意见书”，认为她只是“参与了自发的民众悼念活动，完全不构成犯罪。”但这份意见书并没有被检察院采纳。
+
+和曹芷馨同一天被批捕的另一位年轻女性——27岁的翟登蕊，则没有在农历春节前见到自己的律师：繁琐的各种申请手续，以及不断出现的“意外”，让会见变得很困难。
+
+在失去自由之前，翟登蕊正准备申请到挪威的奥斯陆大学攻读戏剧专业的研究生。热爱文学与戏剧的她已经为此准备了很久。原本她的亲人想在律师会见时问到她的申请密码，替她提交申请，但因为律师迟迟不能会见，如今已错过申请日期，只能留下遗憾。
+
+还有李元婧，毕业于南开大学，又从澳洲留学回来，是一位职业会计师，也是她们中“最有钱的”。以及李思琪，一位热爱写作与读书、自称“不自由撰稿人”的青年。她曾经毕业的伦敦大学金斯密斯学院，于2023年1月28日刚刚为她发出了支持声明。
+
+她们四个人，是同龄的密友，在失去自由之前，都居住在北京鼓楼老城区的胡同一带。她们都有鲜明的文艺青年气质：喜爱阅读、写作、电影放映，以及地下音乐。她们热衷于探索这座城市里那些处于夹缝中的、有叛逆气质的公共空间。
+
+她们关心社会议题，但还没有来得及进行真正的公共发言。在一位密友的眼里，曹芷馨，以及她的朋友们，大多数只是“半积极分子”，是一群热爱生活的、“对什么都有兴趣”，愿意什么都去尝试的年轻人。“但她们与真正尖锐的问题之间，还有一定距离。”
+
+她们基本上都是在2015年左右进入大学。从那时到现在，原本就十分薄弱的中国公民社会一直处于被高度打压的状态。近十年来，在北京，很多公共领域的讨论与行动已难觅踪迹，而她们，身处文艺资源曾十分丰富的北京，在残存的公共领域的夹缝中生长起来，并有一条脉络可循。她们身上，有着这一代人的独特烙印。
+
+“她们是一群有反思能力的人。她们也是行动主义者。”曹芷馨和翟登蕊的另一位朋友阿田（为保护当事人，此处用化名）说。他于2022年9月离开北京，去攻读博士学位。他说自己如果在北京，那天晚上，也一定会和她们在一起。
+
+“这一切迟早都会发生的，这三年极端压抑的疫情管控只是一方面。”他说，“在这片土地上，只要有不公不义在，反抗就一定会发生”。
+
+“假以时日，她们可以承担起很多东西。但现在，随着她们仅仅因为一次街头抗议就面临严厉的刑罚，起点却仿佛成了终点。”阿田说。作为朋友，他为此感到痛楚。
+
+
+▲ 2022年11月27日，曾聚集大量悼念市民的上海乌鲁木齐中路，路牌被拆掉放在地上。
+
+
+### 1 被捕
+
+2022年12月18日，卡塔尔世界杯决赛的当天，曹芷馨从北京到了上海。
+
+二十多天前的11月27日夜，她和一些朋友在网上看到了悼念乌鲁木齐火灾死难者的消息，就去了离家不远的亮马桥。“对她来说，那是很自然的事情。”她的男友后来说。
+
+她带了一束鲜花，摘抄了一些诗句。有人看到了她在微信上发的两条朋友圈，那是她在现场。照片上也只是鲜花，诗句，还有站在一起的年轻人们。
+
+已是深夜，离开现场后，她和朋友们又去了鼓楼周边的酒吧玩，然后于凌晨时回家。好友翟登蕊也借宿到她那里。她一觉睡到大天亮，而此时，远在国外读书的男友，正在焦急地联系她。
+
+11月29日中午11点多，曹芷馨正在和男友通电话。男友在电话那头听到了曹的房间有警察上门，一片杂乱的声音。
+
+“她是个心很大的女生。常常连门都不锁。”她的另一位朋友后来说。五、六名警察直接进了她位于胡同杂院里的小屋。
+
+她被带去了附近的交道口派出所。根据中国法律的规定，传唤或拘传不得超过24小时。和当日被带走的大多数人一样，次日凌晨，曹芷馨被放回了家，但手机和电脑以及iPad被扣在了派出所。
+
+回到家的曹芷馨有一丝担心，但依然正常生活着。12月7日，在亮马桥悼念活动发生10天之后，中国政府公布防疫措施“新十条”，全面放开了疫情管控。身边几乎所有的人都感染了一轮，曹芷馨也不能幸免。
+
+政府在一夜之间放开管控，在全中国，买不到基本药物的人们都在自救。但无路如何，荒谬而严酷的清零政策终于结束了。“人们终于获得了在家生病的权利。”作家狄马曾这样评论。
+
+也是在这样的氛围中，曹芷馨和她的朋友们多了一丝乐观。无论如何，政府放开管控，其实是间接承认了封控清零政策的失败，这似乎使得此前的悼念和抗议活动无可指责。
+
+在第二次被警察带走之前，曹芷馨曾和密友一起讨论可能的后果。
+
+“我们当时猜测：有百分之五十的可能，这个事情会不了了之，毕竟大家只是正常地去表达了一下哀悼之情。但也有百分之四十的可能，去了现场的人会面临几天的行政拘留。只有百分之十的可能，会有严重的后果。”她的朋友说。
+
+但最终，出乎意料的，那个最坏的结果降临了。
+
+12月18日的卡特尔世界杯决赛，直播是在中国的半夜。曹芷馨专门买了炸鸡，和男朋友约好一起看世界杯。球赛大约看到一半，她突然告诉男友，她全身都凉了。因为她得到了消息：曾去亮马桥现场的好几个朋友又被抓了，包括杨柳。
+
+“那个夜晚，一方面是世界杯上的欢呼，梅西获胜的喜悦，一面我们的心又冷如冰窖。”她的男朋友说。那是个奇特的夜晚，愤怒、担忧交织在心头，让他至今难忘。
+
+第二天，曹芷馨就坐火车回到了湖南衡阳的老家。“她觉得，哪怕被抓了，也是和家里的人在一起。”朋友说。
+
+在老家的五天里，家人不知道，曹芷馨悄悄录下了一段视频。如果她被抓，这段视频将会被朋友们放出来。视频上，她穿蓝色的衣服，中长的头发。她有着明亮的眼睛，是一个美丽的女孩。
+
+12月23日，接近中午时分。来自北京的五六个警察敲开了湖南衡阳的家门，带走了曹芷馨。
+
+
+▲ 2022年11月27日，北京，乌鲁木齐火灾遇难者纪念活动期间，人们聚集在一起守夜并举著白纸抗议。
+
+
+### 2 胡同里的“鼓楼文艺青年”
+
+被警察带回北京的曹芷馨，先是被关押在平谷区看守所，又于2023年1月4日转移到了朝阳看守所。
+
+很快，房东的电话就打到了老家，告知要终止租房合同，让曹芷馨搬家。寒冷的北京一月，家人只得委托了她的朋友，一点点把她的书和生活用品搬出了她租住的东旺胡同一号。
+
+从湖南出来上学“北漂”在京，曹芷馨对胡同有一种热爱的执念。离开学校后，她就一直租住在鼓楼附近的胡同里。被抓之前，她租住在胡同里的一间一居室，在一个带大门的小杂院里头。
+
+朋友说，她此前租住胡同的第一个房子更小，是一个铁皮搭的阁楼，“站在房子里，有一块地方都伸不直腰。”
+
+2021年7月，曹芷馨从中国人民大学历史系研究生毕业。上学时，她的专业是环境史，研究生毕业的论文题目是关于清末的长沙。她对城市的历史很着迷，看过那本《美国大城市的死与生》。她也很喜欢研究城市的肌理和市井生活。
+
+“我是北京人，可我并不喜欢胡同。胡同里环境杂乱，没有厕所，一般人受不了。”她的朋友说。“我没有她那么热爱北京，但她和这次被抓的朋友，却最喜欢北京这种多元文化、民间生态，以及普通人的生活。”
+
+“这一次，他们抓了一群最爱北京的年轻人。”这位朋友说。
+
+毕业后，男朋友想去国外继续读书，曹芷馨却想先去工作。她一直想进入出版业，还没毕业就开始就在几个著名的出版社实习，包括广西师大出版社、中华书局等。
+
+在男友看来，她想去出版业，还是和她喜爱读书和写作有关。另外，学历史专业，本来就业就困难，周边的同学，或者考公务员，或者去国企、大厂什么的做宣传员，或者去中学当老师。这似乎都不是她的兴趣。
+
+可他们也都清楚，在当下的中国，出版业其实“很窒息”，许多出版社都面临着财务危机，要在北京立足，对年轻人来说并不容易。
+
+最终，作为一名优秀的实习生，她留在了北京大学出版社，并且转正成为一名正式职员。她工作也十分卖力。如今，在B站上，还有她介绍《全球通史》这本书的一个长视频。那时，她刚到北大出版社，正赶上推广这本书。
+
+“她很聪明，老师也很欣赏她。她有学术能力，也有思考的敏锐度。我一直希望她也能出来继续读书。”男友说。事实上，她身边的朋友，很多都有留学的经历，她也想出来看看。
+
+她的老家在湖南衡阳，父母在体制内工作，家里人大多是公务员。但最终，伴随着读书、成长、阅历，这个女孩，渐渐长成家人并不了解的人。
+
+2018年，她和男友相识，2019年开始交往。他们在一个电影放映活动上相识，两人都在读历史学硕士。2021年毕业后，他出国了，两人开始异国恋，每天都要电话。有时，两人视频，什么也不说，各自做各自的事，她会弹奏尤克里里，唱着歌。爱情甜蜜，他想，只要再重逢，就要考虑结婚的大事。
+
+
+▲ 2022年11月27日，上海的示威现场，一名示威者被警察逮捕并被押上警车。
+
+
+### 3 “有趣的”“半积极分子”
+
+在最熟悉和亲近的朋友眼中，曹芷馨只是一个有趣的、爱做些好玩事情的年轻人。她并不是政治上的活跃分子。“她太年轻了。从学校刚毕业，一切都开始，还没来得及做点什么。”
+
+和那个晚上很多去亮马桥现场的人一样，她并没有行动的经验。“在前一天上海的抗议事件发生后，当天的北京，有一种很乐天的气氛。去现场的很多人，甚至都没有戴口罩。”一位朋友回忆。
+
+在男友眼里，她和她的朋友们，此前并没有参与过政治活动，也没有真正反对过什么。他们中的很多人，甚至没有公开地发声过，也没有留下公共言论。
+
+“可她又是一个多么有趣的人啊。”男友说。她和朋友还曾一起出去“卖唱”。她不是专业的歌手，就是觉得好玩，像玩闹一样。大家都很开心，也并不是很认真。“挺逗的一群朋友。”
+
+他认为，曹芷馨和她这次被抓的一些朋友，最多算是“半积极分子”。她们一起做一些事，但都很正常，包括放电影、读书会讨论等等，这些放映和讨论关注女性、环境、家庭等议题，但并不是那些在这个国家绝对被禁止讨论的东西。
+
+而她大部分的朋友，是这一年多才形成的圈子。毕竟大家都是刚毕业才两年多。
+
+她有一位叫曹原的朋友，也是人大的同学，学社会学。那时候，大家一起去电影节看放映。“在路上见到好几次，后来回到人大，在食堂门口又碰上了，这就熟悉了起来。”
+
+曹原参与一个人类学的公众号编辑。和大家一样，关注相似的议题，从文学、艺术、电影到女性主义，生态自然等，也包括政治自由。2023年1月6日，警察带走了她。
+
+和曹芷馨一样，她的这些朋友也基本都住在胡同或周围。“对很多精致的年轻人来说，住进胡同里，没有厕所，而且周围住的都是快递小哥、送外卖的人。一般人接受不了。但大家都愿意接地气。”蓬蓬（为保护受访者，此处用化名）说。
+
+蓬蓬也是她们的朋友。她说：“基本上我的朋友们都有这个气质。她们愿意去做一些生活中的微小抵抗。”这些抵抗，很多时候，基于对性别身份的认知，以及对各种肉眼可见的不公正而发生。
+
+这次成为焦点的亮马桥，原本就是一个年轻人喜欢去的地方。那里原来河水污染严重，但在2019年完成了改造，成为一个很宜人的城市公园。而且这一带也是使馆区，文化多元，有世界各地的食物，中东菜、北非菜、印度菜等，吸引着有好奇心的年轻人。
+
+但是，城市在外观上的发展和变化，不能掩藏这几年越来越压抑的政治氛围。近年来，中国对言论环境的严苛打压已毫不掩饰。不管是媒体上，还是学校里，各种议题渐渐都成禁忌。三年疫情的封控，环境愈发压抑。一位朋友说，每次聚会、放映等活动完，大家一起会讨论，但其实大家也都“挺迷茫的”。“讨论完了，也不知道怎么办。”
+
+有时候，这些年轻人也会组织徒步，一起去郊野走走。曹芷馨喜欢小动物，也关心环境。此前她和男友一起去过南京的红山动物园。在这次失去自由前不久，她还在红山动物园认养了一只小野猪。每年捐几百元，“给小野猪加餐”。
+
+
+▲ 2022年11月27日，北京，人们聚集在一起守夜并举著白纸抗议政府防疫政策，同时纪念乌鲁木齐火灾中的遇难者。
+
+
+### 4 酒馆、地下音乐，那些夹缝中不可言说的公共空间
+
+2018年5月，正值1968年发生在法国的“五月风暴”青年运动50周年。
+
+5月11日，位于北京五道口附近的706青年空间，举办了一场“致敬60年代”的朗读会，位于居民楼的二十层、被改造为图书室的拥挤逼仄的小房间内，挤满了人。这是为纪念“五月风暴”而举办的其中一场活动。
+
+人们朗诵着文章与诗歌。空间里的一款黑色T恤上写着白色的字：“我们游荡在夜的黑暗中，直至烈焰将我们吞噬”。这是居伊·德波执导的纪录片的名字。
+
+在“五月风暴”的纪念活动上，秦梓奕（2023年1月19日被取保候审）也在。她和其中的一些人后来成了朋友。
+
+706是由几位年轻人于2012年发起的乌托邦式的自治空间，因各种困难，如今在北京其实已难以为继。大家在这里读书、讨论、生活，是许多朋友相遇并互相影响的地方。翟登蕊和李思琪也是在这里彼此认识，并成为朋友的。
+
+本世纪初，2000年前后，互联网在中国正蓬勃发展，经历过1990年代的市场经济发展，自由主义思想的传播，以及公民权利意识的觉醒，在北京，线上线下的公共空间，可以进行公共讨论的地方不断冒出来。三味书屋、万圣书园等都处于鼎盛时期。曾经的北京，有热气腾腾的公共生活。
+
+2012年之后，当蓬蓬到北京上大学时，“新时代”已开启，很多过去老的公共空间遭到打压，渐渐萧条。706青年空间在夹缝中依然存在和生长着。在蓬蓬和朋友们常去的那个时期，“空间里的年轻人，对各种各样的不平等，不公正议题，都非常敏感。”
+
+蓬蓬常去的是单向街书店，以及规模已缩小很多的万圣书园。除此之外，年轻人们更多去的是一些小酒馆，有地下音乐的酒吧、livehouse等。曹芷馨就是这样。她喜欢传统的民谣，包括新裤子乐队、张悬的歌等。“她也喜欢地下音乐，但还不是最激烈的那种。”她的男友回忆。
+
+蓬蓬也喜欢地下音乐。回顾过往与朋友们相识的日子，她会想起胡同里一个叫“暂停”的小酒馆，虽然它如今已不复存在。那里只有10平米不到，挤在胡同里，透过一张开在墙上的玻璃窗，能看到里面。
+
+10平米，这可能是全世界最小的酒馆了。但在一些朋友的印象中，当年那里却是一些“进步青年”常去的地方。
+
+2018年，深圳发生佳士工人罢工事件，北京大学的一些学生前往现场支援。许多年轻人都受到这个事件的影响。在关注中国青年知识分子的观察者眼中，他们是“左翼青年”。
+
+曾经，蓬蓬和她的朋友，也是这里的常客。她记得那些夜晚，很冷。小酒馆实在太小，有时大家只能站在门口。冬天冷的时候，大家站在寒风中瞎聊，酒馆会提供军大衣。
+
+酒馆内常有“不插电”的演出。一个叫万花筒的音乐小组，曾在停电的晚上在这里即兴弹唱。在另一个视频中，这个音乐小组的人在胡同里的屋顶演出。冬日的下午阳光明亮而刺眼，风呼呼吹着，天很蓝，他们弹唱到夜幕降临，因寒冷而披上了被子。
+
+曾几何时，北京这些边缘地带的酒馆，不仅承载了年轻人的文艺气息，更重要的，是为这些年轻人提供了一个公共空间。他们在这里寻找气息相投的同伴。在监控越来越严密的国度，寻找自由。
+
+这些自称“廉价而业余”的小酒馆，却吸引了很多乐手和艺术家光顾，年轻人也循声而来。“开酒馆本身不是我们最想做的。就像节目里我说的，人都是要有一个寻找自我的过程。”在一些节目和文章中，酒馆的老板曾这样讲述。“我们酒馆好像有一种乌托邦气质，吸引来的都是好同志”。
+
+“我一直在想，在北京胡同开一家⼩酒馆能有什么意义，其实趁年轻，开一间酒吧，帮任何人完成⼀次个人理想主义式的实验，这是目前这个社会所不能给的。”这或许可以看作是这些小酒馆的精神底色。
+
+在朋友们的经验中，在北京，这样有个性的小酒馆不止一家。另一个酒馆，在2019年开张2个月，卖光了2019杯酒，然后就决绝关张。
+
+除了这些小酒馆，在曹芷馨以及她的朋友们喜欢的鼓楼一带，原本就有很多音乐空间聚集。西至地安门外大街，往东南到东四，往北不超过雍和宫，不足5平方公里的地方，由几条大街和无数条小胡同组成的二环内核心区域，是北京小型演出现场的集中之地。
+
+这一片，以音乐为载体，逐渐形成一个小圈子。年轻人喜欢聚集在这里听乐队唱歌。中央戏剧学院也在附近，影视公司，文化媒体出版机构多。很多时候，朋友们一起去看演出，“江湖”酒吧等都是她们常去的地方。
+
+“至少在2005年到2015年的这十年间，这个片区是北京独立音乐和现场演出的心脏，吸引着全北京最负盛名的独立音乐人，以及最爱时髦和新鲜声音的年轻人。”有文章曾这样描写。
+
+2022年12月18日，因为去过亮马桥悼念现场，记者杨柳和她的男朋友林昀被抓。早在上大学时，林昀就和朋友开了一家小酒馆，叫“不二酒馆”。林昀也是一位有才华的音乐人。
+
+一位常去酒馆的朋友记得，不二酒馆的风格很文艺，有点像八九十年代的香港风。很多酒都是以歌名或地名命名。不同于那些商业化的酒吧，这里会做一些读诗、观影的活动，也有露台上的演出。她记得，酒馆曾放映一部女性主义主题的电影《正发生》，让她印象深刻。
+
+这位朋友是先认识杨柳的。杨柳做记者，文字很好，她们彼此加了好友，常在朋友圈互动，后来见面，便成了朋友。
+
+如今回顾，蓬蓬觉得自己最喜欢北京的理由，是因为有这些不同的群落。2017年，北京打压“低端”人口，清理掉很多胡同里的有趣空间。加上这三年严酷的封控，走了很多人，很多公共空间在慢慢消亡。但蓬蓬觉得，北京还是有那种很丰富肌理的场景。更重要的，是有一个朋友之间的社群。
+
+“我们之间的命运是连结在一起的。”2023年1月，怀念着那些失去自由的朋友，一位朋友这样说。
+
+
+▲ 2022年11月28日，北京，为乌鲁木齐火灾受害者守夜后的集会上，一名车内的人拿著一张白纸抗议。
+
+
+### 5 “一群认同行动主义的人”
+
+在得知翟登蕊（大家都喊她登登）被抓之后，阿田去搜索，才发现自己和登登在好几个共同的群里，大多是关注疫情的。
+
+阿田如今在读人类学的博士。今年9月才离开北京。此次失去自由并已被批捕的曹芷馨、翟登蕊都是他的朋友。“如果我在，11月27日那个晚上，我一定会和她们在一起。”他说。他也觉得，自己的命运和她们是连接在一起的。
+
+“这次被抓的朋友，她们有很多女性主义的意识，但其实她们关注的议题是不受限的。她们都是同情心、能动性很强的年轻人。面对不公平不公正的事，都是先参与再说。”阿田说。在这个意义上，他认为大家首先是一群行动主义者。
+
+阿田回忆起最后一次和登登聊天。因为当天刚好参与了一个网络上的交流，议题是关于“躺平”的。阿田问登登：“是不是现在打算躺平？”她说目前还没有办法躺平。“我想，大部分的原因，还是经济的因素。”
+
+登登是白银人。家境不错。她先是在福建师范大学上了本科，又考到北京外国语大学的比较文学与世界文学读研究生。在被抓之前，她的身份是“网课教师”。她的朋友、此次也被批捕的李思琪，曾经写过登登打工的经历。
+
+研究生毕业后，登登先试在教培行业，后来因为“双减”，又去做直播卖教辅书。朋友们都很惊讶，登登那么爱读书的一个人，怎么会去做直播？但登登自己做得不亦乐乎。
+
+朋友小可（化名）事后回忆，登登说过，其实这也是一个田野调查的机会，可以了解到很多家长到底怎么想的。登登兴趣十分广泛，她对戏剧非常感兴趣，所以决定申请奥斯陆大学的戏剧专业，去继续学习。
+
+在阿田的眼中，自己的这些朋友，家境都不太差。家里也都和体制、半体制有关。在她们这次出事后，联络家长很困难，父母们的态度多都是“要相信政府”。也能看出，“他们和家人的沟通是不足的。”
+
+阿田记得，2022年春节过后，他联络几位学社会科学的朋友，想去考察南方的一些有色金属的矿。四五个人一起去。他们选择了去湖南郴州的几个矿，曹芷馨也在其中，湖南是她的家乡。
+
+“她性格非常外向，而且她比较沉着。虽然毕业没多久，但已可以很有底气地和受访者交流。”阿田回忆说。虽然此前大家并不熟，但可以聊到一块儿去。“我们都对不发达的地方有一些感情。”
+
+在阿田看来，曹芷馨研究环境史，“她是真的关心环境”。他们曾一起聊过华南的这些有色金属矿和北方的煤矿有什么不一样。谈到北方的煤矿至少能给本地的农民带来利益，而南方这些有色金属矿都是国有矿，本地人并没有因此受益。
+
+他们想研究那些不发达的地方，没有那么“南”的南方，结合历史、地理、环境的因素。而在这种探访性的田野调查中，阿田发现，曹芷馨可以很自然、“有谱”地去和人聊。“她完全是出于朴素的好奇，以及对社会的关心来做这一切。”
+
+他们一起去了铀矿那边，找到一个寡妇村，这个村庄里，第一代“找矿队”的矿工全都得矽肺病死了，他们在得病之后，沦为最底层的城市平民。对这种发生在自己家乡的事情，“一般人如果不愿意多管闲事，都不会去。但她就去了。”阿田说。
+
+2020年，一直在上学的阿田“想和社会接触”，曾去一家新闻机构做了半年记者，还是秦梓奕牵线。
+
+在阿田看来，中国有太多的问题，而自己的这些朋友，包括曹芷馨、秦梓奕、翟登蕊她们，都对这些问题有关怀。其中一些朋友，想结合短线的新闻来关注，通过去做报道。“她们都有有机的问题意识。”在他眼里，这些朋友是这么年轻，又如此热情，是认同“行动主义”的朋友。她们关心眼前具体的不公，也是更加自我赋能的。
+
+“基本上来说，她们都是一路升学上来的好学生，和社会原本隔着一层的。”阿田说。他依照自己的经验，认为，对这些“好学生”，也会有一些让你和社会隔着一层的工具，例如做学术。但是，总有一种力量，可能对这些一直升学上来的生命状态产生冲击。例如一些公共空间，例如一些社会探访，以及参与一些志愿行为。阿田认识的一位朋友，就曾在上海疫情中，去养老院采访，做出第一手的稿子。
+
+“当你一旦开始关注社会，会很快找到志同道合的朋友。通过文章等，发生一些链接。”事实上，在北京，有更多这样的聚会，总是有一些共同的议题会引起她们的关注。这些议题就是比较广泛的“社会不公”。
+
+阿田认为，对ta们这一代人来说，“八九”运动虽然震撼，但还不是最有肉身经验的不公。对今天的这群人来说，当ta们站出来，并不是意识形态先行，还是出于很朴素的正义感，大家也愿意去克服恐惧。“Ta们有能力去克服社会性的冷漠，而且不轻易屈服。但同时，大家也非常缺乏经验。”
+
+“对她们来说，生活是非常重要的，除了个别人参加社会事务比较多，更多的人是一种亚文化的气质。”阿田说。但他也认为，“这一切并不矛盾。大量的年轻人，并不是高强度关注社会事件。具体做一些事情，也和机缘有关。”
+
+“今天在中国，你无论做一些什么，都会受到打压。但是，只要有不公不义在，反抗总会发生。你会问，为什么中国是这样一片无情无义的土地？然后，你就会想着要去做点什么。”阿田说。
+
+
+▲ 2022年11月27日，北京，为悼念乌鲁木齐大火死难者，市民在追悼期间点燃蜡烛。
+
+
+### 6 “这些封控的日子，和战争没有什么不同”
+
+在2022年的寒冬到来之前，因疫情彼此分隔的朋友们，曾经相聚一堂，有一些朋友是久别重逢。
+
+年轻人相聚总是很开心，但大家总体的感觉还是“太压抑”。从2020年开始的清零政策，到2022年开始更为严厉。年初，先是西安封城一个月，接着是上海长达两个多月的封城。整个中国，封城已成为常规手段，全员核酸，以及动不动的全城“静态管理”。她们身处其中，每日都感受着荒谬。
+
+“元婧说，曾经有一次，她在寒风中排队四个小时才等到做核酸，还飘着大雪。”蓬蓬说。朋友相聚，私下也聊到“润”的话题，因为实在是太压抑了。
+
+2022年5月11日，其中一位朋友的微博发了这么一条：“南磨房乡南新园小区，要求全小区所有住户去隔离酒店集中隔离，一人不留。未告知要集中隔离多长时间，未告知是否入户消杀。自5月8日以来，所有住户严格按照防疫封控要求，足不出户已久，每天配合上门核酸，突然拉走集中隔离恐会暴露在风险环境中。许多住户偏瘫、许多住户怀孕大月份、许多住户家有新生儿……现居民怨声载道，请有关部门重新考虑全小区集中隔离政策。”
+
+这条微博，直观地描述了处于封控中的人们的生活常态。而小可后来才知道，此前，杨柳因为在微博上批评防疫政策，已经被网警找房东威胁。
+
+在小可眼中，杨柳是一个责任感很强的记者，也是一个很漂亮的女孩。她喜欢写诗，也喜欢化美丽的妆。有时，男友林昀会把杨柳的诗谱成歌。在一个专辑中，有两首歌是专门写给杨柳。有一首叫《葬礼晚会》的歌，杨柳作词，翟登蕊唱的。“很好听”。
+
+小可说，这帮朋友都很优秀，也都有自己的想法。杨柳本科在华南师大学社工专业，后来申请到新加坡的教育学硕士，毕业后原本可以呆在新加坡，一切都很稳定。但因为深爱写作，觉得没法离开自己的文化土壤，就回到中国，做了一名记者。她看书喜欢做摘抄，用钉子定下来，近些年，文字越来越好了。
+
+疫情期间发生的荒谬而痛苦的事情，不断刺激着这些敏感的心灵。小艺（化名）记得，她们有一位朋友，是北京正念中心的创始人，叫Dalida，是前南斯拉夫人。上世纪90年代，Dailda来到中国。曾经经历过战乱的她，那时只有10多岁。如今，她目睹疫情以来发生在中国的封控，说，这些封锁，以及带来的恐惧悲伤，其实和战争没有什么不同。
+
+小艺说，这让她突然明白，在自己身处的这个环境中，她和她的同伴们，本质上和难民也没有什么不同。“我也更加明白了自己的位置。自己所遭受的这一切，经历的这一切封锁，其实也是一场没有硝烟的战争。”
+
+她想起李元婧，那个原本最没有“政治色彩”的女生。“她只是经济条件好一些，有时和大家一起玩。但就因为她是Telegram的群主，竟被批捕。”元婧本来要去法国上学。她从小衣食无忧地长大，很胆小。11月28日第一次被带走，回来后曾说，只能吃馒头，脚都被冻紫了。
+
+她想起12月22日是元婧的生日，原本想在2022年12月22日在“不二酒吧”为自己办生日，给大家都发了信息的，但这个愿望永远错过去了。
+
+还有曹芷馨，1月16日，因为被关押后一直没有消息，她录制的视频突然被传开。她的男朋友看到了，觉得很恍惚，“没有勇气去看。”他想起她被警察第二次带走的那天，他在西半球，要去赶飞机，当天暴雪，飞机延迟。结果等他下了飞机，就知道她失去了自由。
+
+她想念她们。在那个夜晚去亮马桥时，她们只是怀着热爱，毫无戒备之心。
+
+2023年1月26日，正月初五，被关押的朋友们，有的见到了律师，有的还音信皆无。
+
+“不二酒馆”重新开张了。但暂时不见了昔日的朋友，也不见了林昀和杨柳。不过酒馆里的“宝贝”，那个小小的黑板还在。
+
+酒馆最早开在鼓楼，后来由于北京治理“开墙打洞”的政策，曾一度搬去三里屯。据说，当年搬家的时候，为了把一块小黑板搬走，把原来的楼梯都拆了。
+
+小黑板上摘录了几句诗：
+
+即使明天早上 枪口和血淋淋的太阳 让我交出自由、青春和笔 我也决不会交出这个夜晚
+
+诗句出自北岛的《雨夜》，还是2014年酒馆开业那天写上去的。
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-02-04-why-goblin-mode-is-not-tangping.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-02-04-why-goblin-mode-is-not-tangping.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..7bbef0b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-02-04-why-goblin-mode-is-not-tangping.md
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "为什么“Goblin Mode”不是“躺平”？"
+author: "邓正健"
+date : 2023-02-04 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/4z4RxKk.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+《牛津英语词典》选出“Goblin mode”为2022年“年度词汇”，却经常被“误译”为“躺平”。两者在语境上的差异，道出了西方跟中国社会难以类比的文化面貌。
+
+
+
+每年年底，很多华人地区都会选出所谓该年的“年度汉字”。这个传统是在1995年起源于日本，内地则要到2006年才开始。但这类“年度词汇”（Word(s) of the Year, WOTY）则是来自欧美国家。它最早出现于1971年的德国，英语地区中则于1990年在美国出现。选出这类“年度词汇”的多是权威语言学学术机构，例如德国的“德语协会”（Gesellschaft für deutsche Sprache, GfdS）及美国的“美国方言学会”（American Dialect Society, ADS），后来英语界几部权威词典如“牛津”（Oxford）、“剑穚”（Cambridge）及“柯林斯”（Collins）等，在近十多年间都陆续开始公布它们的“年度词汇”。
+
+这些机构多从语言学角度入手，选择一个该年在公共领域中较新颖、广泛流传而又能反映那一年社会生态的词汇或短语，作为该年“年度词汇”。在性质上，“年度词汇”可被理解为这家学术机构以语言学角度，表达对当年世界状况的整体看法和评价。舆论对这些由学术权威选出的“年度词汇”向来都有一定兴趣，一来它不是官方论述，二来透过比较不同机构选出的词汇，可以勾勒出学者对这一年时局，尤其是社会潮流和趋势的判断，继而引起舆论话题。
+
+> 这种生活模式通常与消费垃圾食物和媒体、及无视自己的外表等事情有关，亦对立于社交媒体内容中普遍出现（和美化）的健康、有序、高效的习惯和生活。至此，“哥布林模式”已演变成一种对社交媒体所呈现的主流健康生活形象的刻意拒绝。
+
+
+### “他不喜欢我进入哥布林模式”
+
+2022年，出版《牛津英语词典》的“牛津大学出版社”选出了“Goblin mode”为其“年度词汇”，引起广泛争议。有些华语媒体将此词意译为“躺平”，这看似是个相当在地化的翻译，但既然这是由语言学权威所选，我们应对此词的精确意思、语意起源及社会应用有更准确的把握，才能理解此词当选的文化意义。“Goblin mode”直译为“哥布林模式”，哥布林（Goblin）是欧洲民间传说的一种妖怪，绿皮肤、红眼睛、长尖耳、鹰钩鼻，样子相当诡异。传统上，哥布林个性邪恶而贪婪，机伶但相当狡猾，他们往往被描述为生活在远离人类社会的黑暗地下世界，以作为反文明反人性的邪恶秩序象征。
+
+但“哥布林模式”则是一个网络新词。此词的出现，可以追溯至2009年，根据Urban Dictionary的解释，此词最初的意思是“当你迷失自我时，你就要得求助于成为哥布林妖精”（When you lose yourself so you resort to becoming a goblin.），后来就被网民用作描述一种“邋遢和懒散的生活方式”。但真正让此词流行起来的，则是来自2022年Twitter上的一则假新闻，内容是指美国女星Julia Fox分享她与其前歌手男友Kanye West的恋爱关系时，说了一句“他不喜欢我进入哥布林模式”（He didn’t like when I went goblin mode）。后来Julia Fox澄清，她并没有使用过此词。
+
+
+▲ 2022年2月9日，英国伦敦，一名年轻人坐在火车车厢里查看手机，鞋子放在对面的座位上。
+
+这则假新闻在2022年2月出现，而它的的最大影响，是导致“哥布林模式”一词的网络搜寻次数大幅增加，令其意思产生微妙变化。例如根据“维基百科”，此词是指“拒绝社会期望和以蓬头垢面、享乐主义的方式生活，而不关心个人形象的行为。”（...the rejection of societal expectations and the act of living in an unkempt, hedonistic manner without concern for one’s self-image.），相比原来意思，这解释提供了人们要过这种慵懒生活的理据：拒绝社会对个人形象的期望。
+
+而根据网上词典Dictionary.com于2022年6月7日的修订，此词更包含了“故意和无耻地屈从并沉迷于”（...intentionally and shamelessly gives in to and indulges in...）这种生活模式的意思。Dictionary.com亦进一步解释，这种生活模式“通常与消费‘垃圾’食物和媒体、以及无视自己的外表及有时是卫生等事情有关”（...commonly associated with things like consuming “junky” food and media and disregarding one’s appearance and sometimes hygiene.），亦跟“高度策划的社交媒体内容中普遍出现（和美化）的健康、有序和高效的习惯和生活”（...the kinds of healthy, organized, productive habits and lifestyles that are commonly presented (and glorified) in highly curated social media content.）相对立。至此，“哥布林模式”之意，已演变成一种对社交媒体所呈现的主流健康生活形象的刻意拒绝。
+
+
+### “哥布林模式”背后的真实情绪？
+
+投票给“哥布林模式”，而不是投更能反映主流世界大势的“元宇宙”或“#IStandWith”，恰恰就是一种对抗主流、不迎合主流意识形态的“哥布林模式”行为。“我们有点像撤退，不再希望生活被过滤器所控制。”
+
+为什么牛津会选择此词为2022年的“年度词汇”？饶有意味的是，这一年他们首次为“年度词汇”进行公开网上投票，让网民分别在三个候选词汇中选择其一。除了“哥布林模式”外，另解两个候选词汇分别是“元宇宙”（Metaverse）和“#我支持”（#IStandWith）。表面看来，“元宇宙”是2022的网络热话，“#我支持”则在俄乌战争爆发后爆红，两者都是比较主流的选择。可是，最终却是由“哥布林模式”获选，得票率更是压倒性的93%。
+
+牛津给予哥布林模式的定义是：一个俚语（slang）词汇，是“一种毫无歉意地自我放纵、懒惰、邋遢或贪婪的行为类型，通常以一种拒绝社会规范或期望的方式。”（The slang term is defined as a type of behavior which is unapologetically self-indulgent, lazy, slovenly, or greedy, typically in a way that rejects social norms or expectations.）意思跟Dictionary.com所提供的相当接近。
+
+牛津大学出版社语言部总裁卡斯帕‧格拉斯沃（Casper Grathwohl）为网民的热烈反应感到意外，却认为所选词汇捕捉了过去几年在疫症中的集体情绪，尤其是人们都想破除旧习，不再希望在Instagram或Tiktok等社交媒体上展示精心策划和过度美化的自我。
+
+可是，它实际上反映了一种怎样的集体情绪呢？有一件关于这场选举的边际活动应当被提及：电脑游戏杂志《电脑玩家》（PC Gamer）曾呼吁读者投票支持“哥布林模式”而不是“元宇宙”，原因是“Goblin mode rules”——此说语带相关，既可解作“我们应跟随‘哥布林模式’的种种规则（rules）”，亦可解作“现今世界已由‘哥布林模式’所主宰（rules）”。
+
+我们无从得知《电脑玩家》的呼吁对选举结果有多大影响力，但这确实反映了一个现实：投票者或多或少是基于认同“哥布林模式”的价值观，而去投票；至于投票给“哥布林模式”，而不是投更能反映主流世界大势的“元宇宙”或“#IStandWith”，恰恰就是一种对抗主流、不迎合主流意识形态的“哥布林模式”行为。正如“英国广播公司”（BBC）引述词典学家苏西‧丹特（Susie Dent）的评论：“在某些方面说，这似乎是一个相当轻率的选择，但实际上，你越深入研究它，就越会发现它实际上是一种对现世的反应。我们有点像撤退，不再希望生活被过滤器所控制。”
+
+
+▲ 2022年2月11日，一所学校教室里有一排牛津英语词典。
+
+
+### 十分“哥布林”地选中了“哥布林”
+
+“哥布林模式”本就有拒绝主流之意，而投票的网民选择此词，很可能不是认为此词能够代表2022年的文化大势，而是一种对“拒绝主流”价值观的宣示，尤其是当其余两个候选词汇是那么代表主流、也看起来更加“实至名归”的时候。
+
+换言之，“哥布林模式”本是网络俚语，它似乎只是反映了一部分人对主流生活的拒绝态度，但藉著网络传播，意外地进入语言学专家的视野，而被逐渐正典化（Canonization）。可是，恰恰是牛津今年选择以公众投票方式选出“年度词汇”，当专家引入一个网络俚语作为候选词汇时，却又将选择权交回网民，则意味著这个正典化程序并不完全掌握在专家手上：专家们试图有限度地向网民询问，这个词汇是否值得被写入正典里？
+
+可是，《电脑玩家》的说法本身就是对正典化的颠覆：“哥布林模式”本就有拒绝主流之意，而投票的网民选择此词，很可能不是认为此词能够代表2022年的文化大势，而是一种对“拒绝主流”价值观的宣示，尤其是当其余两个候选词汇是那么代表主流、也看起来更加“实至名归”的时候。
+
+这个意外的结果自然受到批评。英国新闻工作者蕾秋‧康诺莉（Rachel Connolly）曾在《卫报》（The Guardian）撰文，批评“哥布林模式”一词被选为年度词汇，是一场灾难，也是牛津作为权威语言机构的堕落。她指出，身为一名年轻也活跃在网络的人，她从未听过有人使用“哥布林模式”一词。
+
+她认为对不少人来说，大抵会依稀知道此词之义，却绝少使用它。从统计上说，即使投票人数超过三十四万，却仍只是一个很小的样本数量。她甚至认为，牛津的专家们没有履行他们的责任，却用上了类似“网上征名”的方式，任由选举结果以失控告终。但无论如何，如今“哥布林模式”当选，势将令其正典化过程得以巩固，日后将会有更人多使用它。
+
+
+### 华文媒体的联想
+
+“躺平”本意，若只是含糊地意指一种拒绝主流的态度，则2021年此词爆红后，却产生了起码两种修订和精确化：一是将“主流”指向中国当代社会的“内卷”；二是成了一种相对积极的生活态度，即原本“躺平”只用于下层群体私下自嘲，后来却成了积极抵抗“内卷”的代名词。
+
+此事也引起了华文媒体的兴趣，原因是很多人在得知“哥布林模式”的定义后，马上便联想到另一个华文流行用语：“躺平”。追溯“躺平”一词在中国内地语境中的演化，可以发现它跟“哥布林模式”的传播有相似之处，但亦有关键性的差异。据说“躺平”早在2011年已在内地网络上出现，到2016年，网上有“躺平任嘲”一语，意思大概是“无法辩白，于是脆干放弃，任别人嘲弄”。另外在一些零工群体中，“躺平”亦指一种消极反抗剥削的生活方式。
+
+在这里，可以注意到“哥布林模式”跟“躺平”在最初的意义发展过程中，都是指称一种消极、拒绝迎合主流的生活态度，同时在词汇的运用上，也有相当大的随机性和含混性，原因很可能是词汇流传不广，对词意尚未有一个集体共识所致。
+
+“躺平”一词的爆红大概出现于2021年，一篇题为《躺平即是主义》的短文在内地网络疯传，此有两个重点，一是文中引述希腊哲学家第欧根尼（Diogenes）在木桶里晒太阳，以及赫拉克利特（Heraclitus）在山洞里思考哲学，以指称“躺平”是一种人生哲学，一种“智者运动”，“只有躺平，人才是万物的尺度”，因以为此词赋予积极意义；二是发文者“躺平大师”自称没有工作两年，但没感到压力，这跟中国社会过度崇尚需要积极工作和生活的价值观背道而驰。
+
+“躺平”一词迅速引起共鸣，正是由于它道出了中国青年的生活压力和集体愿望，同时这亦回应了当时另一个网络流行词汇：“内卷”。“内卷”是借用自社会学述语，用以描述中国现代社会内地过度激烈的恶性竞争，却无法令整体社会向上发展，个人亦只能在竞争中被持续剥削，无法向上流动，反而愈渐下沉。
+
+必须透过“内卷”一词才能理解“躺平”。如果说“躺平”的本意，只是含糊笼统地意指一种拒绝主流的态度，那么在2021年此词爆红之后，它却产生起码两种在词意和用法的修订和精确化：一是具体将所谓“主流”指向中国当代社会的“内卷”，二是它成了一种相对积极的生活态度，即：原来“躺平”只是社会下层群体私下自嘲的用语，后来却成了积极抵抗“内卷”的代名词。
+
+
+▲ 2022年3月3日，一名戴著口罩的人躺在香港观塘海滨长廊的草地上。
+
+
+### 西方“年度词汇”与华文“年度汉字”之不同
+
+要用单一汉字描述该年整体社会状况，并不容易。汉字一字多义，民众有时单看字难以明白，还是需要官方机构解释，但也因此大大减弱舆论震撼力。同时“年度汉字”也通常反映了官方对该年社会情况的主观判断或意愿，而非民间共识。
+
+若跟“哥布林模式”比较，“躺平”更广泛地、也更具体地反映一个特定语境下的集体意识：“躺平”是中国内地在于2021年前后的独持社会现象，此词爆红后，有关此词及其所相关社会现象的讨论亦如排山倒海般涌现。当中有民间的陈述性评论，分析此词如何反映社会集体意识；亦有官方具针对性的批评，试图对“躺平”贴上负面标签，以淡化词汇可能形成的集体不合作思想，对维稳构成潜在威胁。同时官方亦以网禁及其他方法，限制此词在网络和民间的流传。
+
+值得细味的是，不少华文媒体虽没有把“Goblin mode”意译为“躺平”，却也刻意声称两词意义相似。可是，回溯两词的生产语境和传播路径，却大有不同，这甚至是对欧美跟中国社会文化差异的一种具体表述。“哥布林模式”的正典化，主要来自两种动力：一是网络上的次文化群体对主流社会的进击，反映于为数不少、但仍不能称为“主流”的网络群体，藉牛津进行“年度词汇”的公开投票，试图扩大对“哥布林模式”一词的曝光率；二是原话语权垄断者对社会集体意识的关注。
+
+一般权威词典对“年度词汇”的选择，不是由少数专家选出（例如柯林斯（Collins）选出“Permacrisis”（“长久危机”）），就是以科学方法统计词汇的使用率（如剑桥（Cambridge）选出“Homer”（“本垒打”）、Dictionary.com选出“Woman”（“女性”）等），而牛津的方法则结合了权威判断、科学统计及公众投票，试图将选择“年度词汇”的话语权部份下放给社会集体。可是，对“哥布林模式”的获选的种种批评，却说明了社会集体的分众特征：当一个次文化词汇透过这种形式被正典化，批评者所指摘的，并不是因为词汇不能登大雅之堂，而是词汇流通量太少，没能代表当前的社会整体面貌。
+
+而“躺平”则有著截然不同的生成方式。网络广传、中外媒体持续的报导、以及官方的打压，分别都清楚说明了此词的渗透力和代表性。客观地说，如果要在2021年中国选出一个“年度词汇”，“躺平”无疑是众望所归的一个选择。但华文世界并没有一个类似英语世界的“Word(s) of the Year”选举，而只有所谓“年度汉字”。不同华文地区皆有“年度汉字”选举，但多由官方机构或主流传媒主办，而不是学术上有认受性的语言机构。选举虽有公众投票的成份，但参与及讨论度均不高。
+
+对“哥布林模式”获选的批评说明了社会集体的分众特征：当一个次文化词汇透过这种形式被正典化，被批评的是它未能代表当前社会整体面貌。而“躺平”却有著截然不同的生成方式：网络广传、中外媒体持续报导、以及官方的打压，都清楚说明了它的渗透力和代表性。
+
+对于使用华文的人来说，要用单一汉字表达可以描述该年整体社会状况的意思，其实并不容易。汉字有一字多义的特性，往往需要多字组合成词汇，才能把意思固定下来。民众有时难以单看该字就立即明白其意，而需要官方机构作出解释。如此一来，在舆论间的震撼力也大大减弱了。
+
+另一方面，“年度汉字”也通常反映了官方对该年社会情况的主观判断或意愿，而不是民间共识。例如在2022年，香港建制政党“民建联”选“通”字，以营造香港各界均希望早日跟内地“通关”的印象；而台湾《联合报》、新加坡《联合早报》及马来西亚国内多个合办机构，皆选了“涨”字，以陈述社会对“通涨”的关注。而中国内地则分别选出“国内年度汉字”为“稳”和“稳”，以及“国际年度汉字”为“难”和“战”，有简繁体选举之分，这亦完全符合中共防疫政策及二十大前后的官方论述。
+
+相对而言，内地民间不少网络词汇在网络广泛流传，并引起热烈讨论，甚至获得国外主流媒体关注，却往往被官方视作敏感词而加以禁制。像“内卷”、“躺平”或“润学”等，显然更值得被选为近年的“年度汉语词汇”了。
+
+
+▲ 2019年4月12日，深圳，华为员工在午休时间睡在他们的办公室内。
+
+
+### 当“哥布林模式”被误译
+
+刻意将“哥布林模式”误译作“躺平”，某程度上是替“躺平”洗白，抹去其背后“中国式剥削”的复杂性，也表达了一种“中国的问题，在西方也有”的民族主义式苍白想像。
+
+关于“哥布林模式”跟“躺平”在语境上的差异，还有一点值得注意。对于“哥布林模式”的解释，通常都是朝文化现象分析的方向解读，而不会“过度诠译”为对社会体制的反映。综合英语世界一些语言学者及主流媒体评论的观点，“哥布林模式”之义有几个重点：
+
+一、它反映了2022年的“时代精神”（Zeitgeist）。这是美国语言学家齐默（Ben Zimmer）的说法；
+
+二、这种“时代精神”就是：放弃“田园风格”（Cottage-core）这样精心策划的美学，转而选择原始、邋塌的生活方式。这是美国《华盛顿邮报》（Washington Post）的说法。它主要是指向一种人们精心设计个人在社交媒体上展示美好自我形象的网络潮流，而“哥布林模式”则是对这种媒社交媒体美学的拒绝；
+
+三、这种生活态度的成因，乃是跟后疫症和当前世界政治动荡的大环境有关。人们对世界感到失望，因而以这种态度拒绝回归社会主流所期望的“正常生活”。这是来自牛津对“年度词汇”的官方说法。
+
+可是，一旦词汇来到华文世界，它不但马上跟“躺平”相对应，同时也产生了一种可能是有意为之的“误译”。例如媒体《香港01》一篇分析文章，就有意将“哥布林模式”跟“躺平”同样解读为跟全球疫症和世界不稳局势有关，而背后则跟“晚期资本主义”中的资本过度集中和贫富严重悬殊有关。文章断言，西方的“哥布林模式”跟中国的“躺平”一样，皆是对大资本家和企业的剥削、年青人因而缺乏向上流动机会而产生的集体反应。
+
+显然易见的是，这种将一切归因于空泛的“资本主义”制度的批评方式，是一种典型庸俗化的左翼批判，事实上，“哥布林模式”的出现，似乎跟所谓“资本剥削”没什么直接关系，反而跟当代网络文化中的个人主义、虚无和享乐意识有关；而“躺平”所要回应的“剥削”，则必须放在中国内地的语境中方可被理解，即人们所面对的“资本主义”，乃是一种跟中国威权体制结合的社会制度，随著近年中国官方国策、维稳和防疫政策的微妙变化，当中的“剥削”也变得相当精细和复杂。刻意将近日在英语世界中成为热话的“哥布林模式”“误译”作“躺平”，某程度上是替“躺平”洗白一词，抹去了其背后“中国式剥削”的复杂性，也表达了一种“中国的问题，在西方也有”的民族主义式苍白想像。同时，这亦淡化了“躺平”作为一种消极政治抵抗的意涵，暗合了中国官方所选的“年度汉字”之意：“稳”。
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-02-06-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-02-06-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c31f99fb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-02-06-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections.md
@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "香港民主派47人初选案开审"
+author: "李慧筠、袁慧妍"
+date : 2023-02-06 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "“争取普选无罪，对抗暴政无罪，无罪可认”、“我想知我在认哪条罪？”"
+---
+
+47名香港民主派人士涉嫌组织及参与立法会初选被控“串谋颠覆国家政权”罪，16名被告不认罪。案件于2月6日早上在西九龙裁判法院（暂代高等法院）开始审讯，预计需时90天，不设陪审团，由《国安法》指定法官陈庆伟、李运腾、陈仲衡审理，控方代表为副刑事检控专员万德豪、周天行。
+
+
+
+
+▲ 2023年2月6日，47人初选案开审，法庭外有不少市民提早排队取筹听审。
+
+控方今（6日）指，4名认罪被告林景楠、区诺轩、赵家贤和钟锦麟将以控方证人身份作供。辩方大律师沈士文指，上月才收到控方新呈交的1.3万页文件，包括同案被告的证供，及上周收到1200项“未被采用材料”，希望有更多时间索取指示，下周一（13日）前不会传召证人。控方预计，开案陈词约需时2至3日。法官批准辩方申请。
+
+辩方亦申请先处理不受争议的议题，再传召首名证人区诺轩。大律师马维𫘥形容，区为本案的重要证人，涉及文件繁多需时处理，惟法官拒绝申请。
+
+“47人案”为《港区国安法》实施后单一拘捕、控告最多反对派人士的案件。不认罪的被告分别为吴政亨、郑达鸿、杨雪盈、彭卓棋、何启明、刘伟聪、黄碧云、施德来、何桂蓝、陈志全、邹家成、林卓廷、梁国雄、柯耀林、李予信及余慧明。此外，6名还押被告包括黄之锋、岑敖晖、毛孟静、吴敏儿、袁嘉蔚、冯达浚亦到场旁听。
+
+法庭首先处理不认罪被告及改认罪的伍健伟、林景楠等人答辩；林及伍二人在庭上认罪。其中，梁国雄表示“争取普选无罪，对抗暴政无罪，无罪可认”，伍表示“我颠覆极权国家政权未成功，我认罪，我承认控罪”。何桂蓝指，开庭早上才得悉控方的开案陈词删走“威胁使用武力”的内容，要求厘清控罪，“我想知我在认哪条罪？”“你还告我们威胁使用武力吗？”她及后申明不认罪。另外，有被告申请在庭审期间以电脑摘录笔记，法官批准，但强调不可用于与外界沟通。
+
+
+### 庭外的他们
+
+开案第一天，逾百名市民在庭外等候入内旁听。队伍中有人以风衣遮挡脸孔、背向镜头，当记者问及今日前来的原因，其中一名女士指“有人排队就来排”。据《明报》报导，一批人成功取得筹号后离开法院。现场亦有英国、欧盟等领事馆人员排队轮候入庭。法院附近警力明显加强，两个街口外的街上已有警员巡逻，东京街设有路障检查车辆；通州街泊满警车，并有一辆爆炸品处理课车待命。有警员携带警犬在法院门口戒备。法院大楼内部亦比往日多出警力。
+
+今年76岁的马女士于早上9时到达法庭门外，撑著拐杖等候。她的亲人是案中被告，因已认罪，今天未会出席聆讯。“我想了解整个案件的控罪、程序、答辩，有时间都会前来。”她说。
+
+马女士早于1995年因八九民运跟随家人移民，她今年回港探亲，将会在港逗留约一个月。她回想2021年得知控罪时并不感意外。但她质疑，“一人一票选举而已，有什么理由发大（处理）？”她认为香港民主自由渐退，但回港后也感觉实际环境一切如常，在这一切变化面前，“关心（社会发展）的人才会有积极的态度。”
+
+早上9时30分左右，社民连主席陈宝莹、外务副主席周嘉发和成员曾健成在法院外举起横额，大批警员戒备，双方一度起哄。他们高叫“初选无罪、政治打压”的口号，陈宝莹质疑长达90日的审讯过程源于控方并无证据，国安法被告不准保释属荒谬，并指他们是市民的民意代表；他们又反问举行初选与参加立法会选举属何许非法手段，要求立即释放政治犯。
+
+
+▲ 2023年2月6日，47人初选案开审，社民连在西九龙法院外请愿，表达初选无罪，要求释放政治犯。
+
+
+### 开案陈词
+
+下午，控方读出开案陈词。控方指，16名不认罪被告于2020年7月1日至2021年1月7日，在香港串谋及与其他人串谋旨在颠覆国家政权。被告同意透过非法手段，严重干扰、扰乱或破坏特区政权机关依法履行职能，透过无差别否决政府提出的财政预算或公共开支，迫使特区政府解散立法会，最终导致行政长官辞职。谋划的目的为颠覆国家政权。
+
+控方的证据将主要依赖共犯证人、相关初选的文章、宣传材料、从被告检取的文件，以及相关记者会、集会、采访、选举论坛等影片。证据显示戴耀廷于2019年12月发起初选计划，并与区诺轩发表大量文章说服他人支持。戴于2020年4月提出“揽炒十步曲”，包括无差别否决财政预算案或公共开支。
+
+案情指，初选计划的核心是要在立法会取得多数控制权。戴耀廷、区诺轩、赵家贤、钟锦麟、吴政亨是初选组织者，负责制定初选框架；5人负责监察、安排和管理财务、后勤、宣传等，为不可或缺的参与程度。
+
+控方指，案中42名被告为初选参选人，33名被告有签署“墨落无悔 坚定抗争 抗争派立场声明书”的联合声明。而吴政亨曾发起“三投三不投”运动，呼吁选民只投票给初选参与者。2020年国安法实施后，时任政制及内地事务局局长曾国卫曾指初选为串谋行为，控方指众被告继续举行初选。戴、区、赵曾组织6个选举论坛，选举论坛在网上约有39.8万观看次数。
+
+控方指初选最终逾60万人投票。初选共有74名参选人，31人当选，其中包括27名被告。案情指，2020年7月31日，因疫情严峻，政府宣布延期举行立法会选举。
+
+案情指，戴耀廷曾于2019年12月在《苹果日报》发表题为“立会夺半 走向真普选重要一步”的文章，首次提及在立法会中取得多数控制权的想法，以解散立法会为代价，迫使政府同意他们的要求。2020年1月，戴再发文呼吁民主派就初选尽快达成共识。控方指戴与区诺轩其后继续在Facebook、《苹果日报》及《立场新闻》等平台讲解初选。
+
+案情又指两人在2020年2月至7月期间曾与所有参选人协调多场会议，讨论重点包括：一、无差别否决财政预算以实现“35+”；二、在各自地方选区的目标议席数目；三、承诺及协议受初选结果约束。
+
+控方指，戴、区两人于2020年3月召开记者会，解释立法会取得大多数议席，目的是获得足够影响力，与中国共产党及政府抗衡。庭上播放影片，戴在片中提及大家有强烈理念希望民主派在立法会议席过半，并指这是大杀伤力的武器。他指要讨论如何连结抗争运动，包括特赦被捕者、追究警暴责任及双普选重启政改等。此外，控方指区诺轩鼓励市民在不同界别登记作选民，争取胜出功能组别，增加在立会取得更大控制权的机会。
+
+控方并指出，戴在《苹果日报》发表题为“揽炒的定义和时间”、“揽炒的时代意义”的文章，解释如何通过初选实现“揽炒”；实施“揽炒”的时间；如何将“揽炒”成为颠覆大战略。
+
+案件是港区国安法推行后“串谋颠覆国家政权”罪首案。根据《国安法》第22条，一旦罪成分三级罚则：首要分子、罪行重大者最高可判无期徒刑或10年以上有期徒刑，积极参与者可判3至5年有期徒刑，其他参加者可判处3年以下有期徒刑。
+
+
+▲ 2023年2月6日，47人初选案开审，法庭外有不少市民提早排队取筹听审。
+
+
+### 近两年还押，开审前31人认罪
+
+47名被告依次为戴耀廷、区诺轩、赵家贤、钟锦麟、吴政亨、袁嘉蔚、梁晃维、郑达鸿、徐子见、杨雪盈、彭卓棋、岑子杰、毛孟静、何启明、冯达浚、刘伟聪、黄碧云、刘泽锋、黄之锋、谭文豪、李嘉达、谭得志、胡志伟、施德来、朱凯廸、张可森、黄子悦、伍健伟、尹兆坚、郭家麒、吴敏儿、谭凯邦、何桂蓝、刘颕匡、杨岳桥、陈志全、邹家成、林卓廷、范国威、吕智恒、梁国雄、林景楠、柯耀林、岑敖晖、王百羽、李予信及余慧明。
+
+47人案中大部份被告不予获保释申请。自2021年3月1日案件首提堂，至2021年中，47案中最多有15人保释获批，包括郑达鸿、杨雪盈、彭卓棋、何启明、刘伟聪、黄碧云、邹家成、施德来、张可森、余慧明、郭家麒、吕智恒、林景楠、柯耀林及李予信。不过，余慧明和邹家成两人后因违反保释条件，相继即时还柙。
+
+邹家成于2021年6月在高等法院申请保释获批，2022年1月被国安处拘捕；医管局员工阵线前主席余慧明则于2021年7月在高等法院申请保释获批，2022年3月被国安处拘捕，指其违反保释条例，在社交网站发表帖文，其言论和行为有合理理由被视为危害国家安全。国安法指定法官罗德泉裁定两人违反保释条例，再度还押。翻查二人社交平台，邹家成曾发表疑关于“八三一”和“七二一元朗事件”相关贴文，余慧明则发表支持医护罢工的言论。
+
+其余大多数被告还押逾700天。有舆论担忧被告遭“未审先囚”逾两年。控方则认为，被告还押时间不会超过定罪刑期。
+
+2022年6月，46名被告完成交付程序，惟吴政亨提出初级侦讯要求，用以检视控方是否有足够的初级证据，闭门程序由2022年7月4日开始。吴在初选之前提出“三投三不投”，并设街站宣传其理念，被控方视为5名案件组织者其中之一。在被指为初选“组织者”的5人当中，戴耀廷、区诺轩、赵家贤、钟锦麟早前均表示会认罪，只有吴不认罪。
+
+曾有10数名拟认罪被告，希望在开审前判刑。2023年1月11日，包括袁嘉蔚、吴敏儿、范国威、毛孟静、刘泽锋、黄之锋及冯达俊等7名已认罪的被告，希望在审讯前判刑。控方律政司副刑事检控专员万德豪称，让认罪被告先获判刑期，会导致审讯不公，案件罪行严重，被告在案中的角色重大，以“首要分子”作为量刑起点也不为过。最后，法庭决定所有被告在审讯后再判刑，理由择日颁布。被告赵家贤则与控方达成协议，在审讯后判刑。
+
+
+▲ 2023年2月6日，47人初选案开审，不认罪的被告陈志全进入法庭。
+
+
+▲ 2023年2月6日，47人初选案开审，不认罪的被告杨雪盈进入法庭。
+
+
+▲ 2023年2月6日，47人初选案开审，不认罪的被告郑达鸿进入法庭。
+
+
+▲ 2023年2月6日，47人初选案开审，不认罪的被告黄碧云进入法庭。
+
+
+▲ 2023年2月6日，47人初选案开审，不认罪的被告李予信进入法庭。
+
+
+▲ 2023年2月6日，47人初选案开审，不认罪的被告施德来进入法庭。
+
+
+▲ 2023年2月6日，47人初选案开审，不认罪的被告彭卓棋进入法庭。
+
+
+▲ 2023年2月6日，47人初选案开审，不认罪的被告柯耀林进入法庭。
+
+
+▲ 2023年2月6日，47人初选案开审，不认罪的被告刘伟聪进入法庭。
+
+
+### 案件部分关注点
+
+#### 一、有被告被指告发同案其他人
+
+开审第一天，控方在庭上指，4名认罪被告林景楠、区诺轩、赵家贤和钟锦麟将以控方证人身份作供。
+
+据独立媒体早前报导，区诺轩、赵家贤及钟锦麟3人在2021年9月23日第2次提讯日，即率先表示拟就控方案情摘要认罪。在其后的交付过程中，有数名被告嘲笑或怒斥赵家贤，更有人指“转污点证人有报应啊”；又提醒另一被告戴耀廷“小心‘金手指’（小心打小报告、告发别人的人）。
+
+于其中一次提讯中，各被告表达其答辩意向，控方案情详列各认罪被告的公开言论及行为，惟只有赵家贤一人无另辟一节；钟锦麟则在警诫下录取了混合供词，即供词同时具招认和开脱性质。至各被告确认是否同意案情时，区诺轩及赵家贤向被告道歉。控方亦曾在庭上透露由于赵家贤和控方达成协议，其判刑将在裁决后处理。
+
+至47人案开审前两个多星期，其中一名获保释的被告、阿布泰国生活百货创办人林景楠由原本不认罪，拟改为认罪。于2023年1月17日的审前覆核中，辩方透露林有可能会录取一份证人供词，及后传出林景楠被列作控方证人；同案被告岑敖晖则透过Facebook呼吁罢买阿布泰产品。
+
+至1月28日，林景楠在Facebook发文承认控方证人身份，称还押者呼吁抵制其公司，是因为“资讯缺乏流通性”及受情绪影响。惟林的言论旋即遭反驳，另一被告刘颕匡的女友黄于乔（Emilia）不点名批评林景楠，指出被还押的被告可看到控方证人口供，比公众更掌握全面资讯；岑敖晖妻子余思朗亦称，还押人士获得齐全的法律文件，了解案情及证供，又指长时间还押虽会影响在囚者情绪，“但完全无丧失基本思辨能力”。
+
+翻查资料，林景楠曾于2022年8月31日于Facebook罕有发文，对时事和政治发表观点，引述中国国家主席习近于七一当日“四个必须”的发言，称“我们要继续善用（香港）这个地位和优势，发展不同产业，让香港继续成为国家对外的其中一道大门”。他又在2023年1月1日上载与财政司司长陈茂波合照，形容香港“有完善的法律法规”，又指要“说好香港故事”。
+
+早在2021年9月，即尚未撤销87A报导限制之时，亲中媒体《大公报》曾引述消息报导，至少2名获准保释的被告会配合警方，提供污点证人书面口供，以换取减刑期。
+
+
+▲ 2021年3月2日，西九龙裁判法院，被告由囚车押回荔枝角收押所。
+
+#### 二、绝大部分被告不获保释，或须遵从极严苛保释条件
+
+47人遭以“串谋颠覆国家政权罪”起诉，各被告均曾申请保释，惟至今只有13人获批保释，部分保释条件包括︰不得以任何方式发放或转载任何可能被视为危害国家安全的言论，或作出被视为危害国家安全的的行为；不得组织、安排、参与或协调任何级别的选举；不得联络任何外国官员、议员、任何各级议会成员等。
+
+获批保释的被告不准离港，须交出旅游证件及英国国民（海外）护照（即BNO护照），亦须作现金及人事担保，并每周多次到指定警署报到。其后，部分被告删除或没有再更新其社交平台。而上文亦曾提及，有两名获批保释的被告，先后被指违反保释条件而遭再次还押，疑涉及社交平台发布的言论。
+
+事实上，国安法相关案件的保释条件比一般刑事案件严苛，相关争议可追溯到壹传媒创办人黎智英被控欺诈罪及国安法“勾结外国或境外势力危害国家罪”的案件。他遭还押20日后，于2020年12月23日曾获国安法指定法官李运腾批准保释，然而保释条件包括缴交1000万港元保释金，及不得离开住所至案件于2021年4月16日审理。
+
+而律政司同时向终审法院申请上诉许可与临时命令，要求等候上诉许可期间，将黎智英再次收押。终院于同月31日开庭裁决，并部分批准律政司的申请，黎智英随即再被收押。律政司一方当时指出，国安法第42条就保释门槛较高，并以维护国家安全为至关重要的考虑，“一次也不能承受相关被告潜逃或再作出危害国家安全行为”。
+
+值得留意的是，律政司司长林定国于2022年7月称，基本法23条立法时，将会采取港区国安法的保释门槛。他指出，无论现行及将来的刑事罪行，如法庭认为触及国家安全，按法理逻辑则必须适用国安法42条保释安排，又指国安法不是不准人保释，但保释门槛会跟之前有分别。他又称有案例指出有关保释条款不只限于国安法下的罪行，也适用于所有涉及国家安全的刑事罪行，包括煽动意图罪。
+
+#### 三、还押时间过长、案件不合理延误
+
+距离案件首次提堂15个月后，被告才交付高等法院。此后，控方将入禀公诉书，法院进行排期和案件管理聆讯。根据司法机构年报，近年案件平均轮候时间增加，由2019年167日，到2021年需要383日。故此，对47人案的被告而言，直至案件开审，已“未审先囚”逾2年。
+
+2022年8月16日，大律师吴宗銮在网台表示，国安法被告的保释申请非常困难，正因如此，法庭有责任加快处理案件。吴宗銮又指，若还押时间过长，会令被告认为抗辩意义不大，情况属“可悲”。吴举例，在其他案件中，有被告因还押时间已接近控罪的最高刑法，宁愿认罪以尽快获释。
+
+律政司司长林定国同月接受南华早报访问时表示，坊间对初选案长期未开审是合理关注，但该案的候审时间不算特别长，并强调甫上任便指示同事确保案件不会有任何不合理的延误。林还指，除视乎法官空档，辩方律师提出的诸多程序，例如翻译和披露案件，也是令候审时间较长的原因之一。在2022年10月，被告已还押逾1年半，林定国接受信报采访再次时表示，其上任后已向刑事检控科了解，涉国安法案件的被告还押时间“不比其他一般刑事案件刑期长”。他称所有国安法被告均有申请保释权利，不一定会全数还押，最终能否保释由法庭裁决。
+
+事实上，法庭也留意到此宗案件还押时间的问题。国安法指定法官杜丽冰在2022年4月处理范国威的保释申请时称，关注案件进度延误，不少被告还押已逾1年，建议下级法院设立限期、主动进行案件管理。杜丽冰在判词中还提及，对被告在交付过程中的漫长等待表示同情，认同对被告造成不公。
+
+2022年11月1日案件管理聆讯，代表袁嘉蔚的资深大律师祁志（Nigel Kat）指，已认罪的袁还押近20个月，长时间的等待对她不公。祁志表示，根据国安法，“其他参加者”将“处3年以下有期徒刑”，或会令袁的最终服刑期间超过判刑刑期。
+
+
+▲ 2021年3月2日凌晨6时40分，区议员岑敖晖和邹家成被押解到荔枝角收押所。
+
+#### 四、传媒报导“交付程序”的权利
+
+根据《裁判官条例》第87A条列明，除被告姓名、职业、控罪、裁判官是否将被告人交付审讯的任何决定等，任何人不得在香港以书面发布或广播交付程序的内容，违者可处罚款1万港元及监禁6个月；而当裁判官不将被告交付审讯，或审讯完结后，才可发布关于交付程序的报导。
+
+至2022年5月，另一案件“支联会煽动颠覆案”的其中一名被告、支联会前副主席邹幸彤，入禀提出司法覆核，希望解除交付程序的报导限制。法官认为，此条例的立法原意为确保潜在陪审员不受被告负面公众讯息影响，保障被告利益不被损害；而“司法公开”原则和采访自由受《基本法》、《香港人权法案》及《国安法》保障；根据条例含义，当被告申请撤销报导限制，裁判官没有酌情权拒绝，并下令废除该案裁判官拒绝撤限的决定，案件再次提讯时，必须根据87A（2）条撤销报导限制。
+
+此司法覆核案于8月初胜诉后，47人案4名被告吴政亨、袁嘉蔚、何桂蓝、刘颕匡，于8月中旬亦向国安法指定法官、主任裁判官罗德泉申请解除《裁判官条例》第87A条的报导限制，并获接纳，传媒终可报导首个提讯日后的聆讯内容，当中包括在交付过程中，29名被告表明会承认控罪、有18名则表明不认罪（至报导刊出前则有31人认罪，16人不认罪）；警察于庭上拒让被告见律师，甚至遮挡被告家人等情况。
+
+#### 五、对报导保释法律程序的限制
+
+《刑事诉讼程序条例》第9P条“对报导保释法律程序的限制”列明，“除非法庭觉得为了社会公正而有所需要，否则任何人不得就任何保释法律程序，在香港以书面发布或广播载有任何准许发布或广播的报导”。法例原意为避免对被告人构成潜在的不利影响，但过去鲜有案件能令法庭撤销限制，而相关条文也导致传媒无法报导47名被告的保释内容及条件。
+
+案件首度提堂并踏入保释申请程序之际，其中一名被告的代表律师马维𫘥透露，传媒希望法庭放宽保释程序报导限制，以保社会公正，并让人正确诠释国安法条文；当时控方对申请持极大忧虑，国安法指定法官苏惠德指“听到好多动容故事”，但同时质疑与公众利益的关系；而在结合双方陈辞后，苏官遂以保障被告利益与审讯公正为理拒绝放宽。
+
+2021年3月11日，律政司就11名被告保释获批提出司法覆核期间，国安法指定法官杜丽冰收到传媒联署信，再次要求撤销9P条的限制，惟当时杜官指，公开审讯原则虽重要，并了解传媒报导责任，不过为保未来聆讯的完整性与诉讼双方利方，因而拒绝申请。同年9月，被告之一何桂蓝透过律师就保释程序限制传媒报导申请豁免，因公众就涉港区国安法控罪的保释申请内容及法庭看法有知情权，为第3度就9P条撤销的申请，然而指定法官杜丽冰同样回绝。
+
+至2022年，先后再有3名被告曾向法庭申请向法庭申请放宽或解除9P条限制，均被拒绝。“47人初选案”中共6次就9P条的报导限制解除申请均以失败告终。
+
+
+▲ 2020年7月15日，16名抗争派初选胜出的民主派参选人士举行记者会。
+
+#### 六、国安法案件法官的选取、没有陪审团
+
+2020年7月1日，港区国安法实施，国安法第44条第3款规定，任何涉及中华人民共和国国家安全的犯罪案件应由“指定法官”审理。特首应指定部分现任裁判官及各级法官处理国安法案件，授予指定前，可咨询香港特别行政区维护国家安全委员会及终审法院首席法官意见。而国安法亦规定，特首不得委任曾发表危害中国国家安全言行的裁判官或法官成为指定法官。
+
+港府以涉及私隐和机密资料为由，并没有公开指定法官的完整名单，公众及传媒只能透过国安法案件在庭上进行法律程序时，才知悉谁是指定法官。
+
+而47人案的被于2022年8月告获通知，因案件有“涉外因素”、需要保障陪审人员的人身安全，决定不设陪审团。这是继唐英杰案后，第二宗不设陪审团的国安法案件。案件由3名国安法指定法官陈庆伟、陈嘉信及陈仲衡审理。而后陈嘉信因身体原因退出本案，改为指定法官李运腾负责。
+
+翻查资料，美国“美中经济与安全审议委员会”（USCC）于当地时间2021年11月17日发表年度报告，指香港有权指定哪名法官在哪个司法管辖区审理涉及国家安全的案件，做法几乎确保了案件会得出中共想得到的结果，因此司法机构不再可靠公正（no longer reliably impartial）。
+
+在2022年1月下旬，终审法院首席法官张举能出席2022年法律年度开启典礼致辞时曾表示，当3名高等法院原讼法庭指定法官，在没有陪审团的情况下审理国安案件，会就裁决颁下详列理由的判决书，该判决书亦会于司法机构网站发布，公众可审阅。他又称，适用于有陪审团参与审讯程序的保障措施，同样适用于这类审讯，会确保被告人获得公平审讯，被告亦可循相同程序提出上诉。
+
+
+▲ 2020年7月11日，黄埔民主派35+公民投票拉票区。
+
+
+### 全国人大改造香港选举制度
+
+在反修例运动期间，民主派于2019年11月的区议会选举取得大胜，在452个直选议席取得389席。是次选举投票率达71.23%，创香港主权移交以来最高。
+
+民主派希望在紧接而来的2020年9月立法会选举赢取过半议席（35席以上，当时亦有“35+初选”之称），就可左右包括财政预算案在内的政府决策，或回应“五大诉求”、重启“政改”。
+
+早在2月，官方就对初选进行强烈抨击。时任中联办主席骆惠宁称，“35+初选”的主张是夺取全面管治权。
+
+4月，戴耀廷于苹果日报撰文《真揽炒十步 这是香港宿命》，此文刊发后，《大公报》发文称戴耀廷的文章是“提出了颠覆特区政府的清晰路线图”。
+
+在初选前夕，2020年6月30日，全国人大常委会通过《港区国安法》，将其列入《基本法》附件三并于同日晚上生效，共有66条，分为6章。根据官方说法，条文主要用于防范、制止和惩治分裂国家、颠覆国家政权、组织实施恐怖活动和勾结外国或境外势力危害国家安全的犯罪行为；同时会根据法治原则履行，即依照法律定罪处刑、无罪推定、一事不二审和保障犯罪嫌疑人诉讼权利等。
+
+港府强调，国安法只针对极少数人，立法能够保障绝大多数居民的生命财产以及依法享有的各项基本权利和自由。港府还指，《国安法》与《基本法》、《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》和《经济、社会与文化权利的国际公约》并无抵触，仍然享有言论、新闻、出版的自由、结社、集会、游行、示威的自由在内的权利和自由。
+
+初选最后于2020年7月11至12日举行，抗争派及本土派赢得大多数出线资格。7月13日、14日，两办旋即发布声明，中联办指“非法初选破坏选举公平”，支持港府“依法查处”，港澳办称初选是将香港变成国家颜色革命和渗透颠覆的基地。
+
+2022年7月31日，政府延后立法会选举。2020年8月11日，全国人大常委会宣布延长第六届立法会任期。2021年3月5日，全国人大宣布将审议改变香港选举制度的决定草案，包括特首和立法会议员的产生办法。这份完善选举制度的决定于5月31日生效，引入资格委员会，此后特首选举、立法会选举均需迈过资为会门栏。不过，在2021年12月的新一届“爱国者治港”的立法会选举中，地区直选投票率仅30.2%，为香港主权移交以来最低。
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-02-23-russo-ukrainian-war-anniversary-casualties-and-supports.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-02-23-russo-ukrainian-war-anniversary-casualties-and-supports.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..3297cce4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-02-23-russo-ukrainian-war-anniversary-casualties-and-supports.md
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "俄乌战争一周年・伤亡与支援"
+author: "Yanina Sorokina"
+date : 2023-02-23 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/CcZEGP7.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "自俄军于2022年2月24日正式入侵乌克兰以来，一年的战争已经造成了大量死伤和难民，对交战双方，以及整个欧洲安全局势都造成了巨大的影响。"
+---
+
+> 疫情后，中国对俄罗斯经济的贡献更明显。
+
+
+
+2022年2月24日，俄罗斯宣布进行“特别军事行动”，正式入侵邻国乌克兰。在普京发表的电视讲话中，他表示北约在乌克兰的扩张，正直接威胁著俄罗斯的安全；而俄罗斯有必要在乌克兰“去军事化和去纳粹化”。当日凌晨，俄罗斯向乌克兰发起攻击，从四个方向进军乌克兰。
+
+
+
+由于双方军事实力悬殊，开战之初，不论是俄罗斯还是国际社会，大部份评论都认为俄军将会迅速夺取基辅，逮捕乌克兰总统泽连斯基，并且在乌克兰建立亲俄的傀儡政权。俄罗斯在一开始的时候的确取得了一些战略性胜利，但也很快失去明显的优势。而且，俄军在侵乌战争中暴露了许多缺点：训练不足，士气低落，装备薄弱等。
+
+根据《外交》杂志（Foreign Affairs）分析，俄军战力低下要归因于战争计划内部保密过度，部队和指挥官层级都没有充份时间准备；而且俄军作战目标过于宏大，最初的入侵计划又要求在没有后续部队的情况下进行多线攻击。乌克兰的抵抗力量也在俄罗斯意料之外。如果乌克兰军队士气低落指挥涣散，西方国家即使提供各种武器和财政援助也无法助乌克兰抵抗入侵，但泽连斯基以及乌克兰军队的坚定，是克里姆林宫没有预想到的。而自2022年9月开始，乌克兰军队反击俄军，夺回了数千平方公里的领土。
+
+
+
+现时战争到了一年仍未完结，超出了当初许多人的预期。而国际社会对俄罗斯的制裁和压力也逐渐增强，使得俄罗斯在战争中越来越孤立。
+
+
+### 充满争议的死伤数字
+
+
+
+2022年12月，乌克兰总统办公室公布士兵死亡人数，估计在1万到1万3000人之间。而2023年1月，美国美国参谋长联席会议主席，美国陆军上将麦利（Mark Milley）估算，乌克兰方死伤人数应该和俄方死伤人数相若，都在10万人左右。挪威国防部长Eirik Kristoffersen对乌方死伤人数的估计跟麦利一样，都是10万人；但对俄方死伤人数的估计则远高于前者，他在同月指出，至今俄方死伤应该接近18万人。以上数字全部未能被独立查证。
+
+俄罗斯方的阵亡或死伤数字也是人言人殊。据英国国防部最新的估计，俄军阵亡人数约4万至6万之间，伤员则达到20万，比较接近挪威方面的估算。克里姆林宫在开战约一个月后（2022年3月）公布的俄军死亡数字是1,351，而在实施军事动员令时，即开战七个月后的2022年9月，官方的数字则为5,937。
+
+无论是乌方还是俄方，在战争中的死伤人数都充满争议。首先，流传的数字很多时没有区分“阵亡”（killed in action）或“死伤”（casualties）。而军事史专家也警告，死伤人数是战时宣传的有力工具，不论是交战方还是其他来自各国政府的情报都未必真确。英国安全研究学者Lily Hamourtziad也指出，挪威国防部长和美军高层都很可能高估了俄军的死伤数字，而且低估了乌克兰的；同时支持乌克兰方的各国政府，也有夸大乌克兰平民死伤数字的倾向。而在战时乌克兰，许多平民加入作战，根据国际法就成为了战斗人员（combatants），令估计平民和士兵死伤更为困难。
+
+
+
+俄罗斯独立媒体Mediazona自开战之初就和BBC俄罗斯合作，统计俄军死亡数字，而根据该网站2023年2月12日的更新，共计有14,093名俄军死亡，当中以25岁以下的年轻男性为主。由于Mediazona只统计能够核实个人资料的死亡俄军，实际死亡数字应该更高。2022年9月，俄罗斯宣布实行局部军事动员令，官方指将征召三十万人入伍，引发了一波离境潮；据哈萨克当局，至少有20万俄罗斯男性逃到该国（俄罗斯公民不需签证就可入境哈萨克）。而在俄罗斯颁布局部军事动员令后，Mediazona也开始统计被动员军人的死亡数字；根据该媒体，截至2023年2月，在9月后被动员的俄军死亡数字为1800多人。
+
+
+
+而另一家俄罗斯独立媒体iStories也是自开战之初，就开始搜集整理阵亡士兵的背景资料，包括年龄﹑原籍地等等。分析阵亡俄兵资料发现大部份士兵除了非常年轻，还高度集中于俄罗斯边陲，相对贫穷，并且聚集较多少数族群的地区，例如达吉斯坦（Dagustan）和布里亚特（Buryatia）。
+
+
+
+虽然理论上俄罗斯全国曾服兵役的男性都有可能被征召，但据对iStories 9千多笔资料分析发现阵亡士兵的分布仍高度集中于贫穷地区，尤其是西伯利亚、远东和北高加索地区等经济相对薄弱的区域。这也意味著贫穷士兵更容易被征召参加战争，从而承担更高的风险和代价。此外，分析还显示俄罗斯的少数民族在侵乌战争中的死亡率远高于俄罗斯人。俄罗斯亚裔少数族群，例如图瓦人(Tuvans）、布里亚特人（Buryats）等民族在俄罗斯人口中占比较小，但阵亡军士数目却不成比例地高。由于来自这些地区的年轻男性学历一般较低，通常军阶也都较低，更容易被派往前线地区。而他们在侵乌战争中死亡的机会率，亦远远高于俄罗斯人。
+
+
+### 世界还在支持乌克兰吗？
+
+战争导致乌克兰国内生产总额大跌34%，去年6月至今经济损失达3500亿美元。乌克兰总理表示，损失数字将会在2023年膨胀到7000亿美元。因此，自俄乌战争起，西方国家向乌克兰提供了庞大的人道主义、金融及军事物资等援助。
+
+泽连斯基在2月16日接受英国广播公司专访时表示，“西方国家持续援助乌克兰武器，才能让乌克兰有和平的一天。武器是俄罗斯唯一能够理解的。”乌克兰一直游说并敦促西方盟友提供协助，尤其是远程导弹、战斗机等军事武器。而邻近俄乌战争一周年，西方国家也陆续向乌克兰提供更多先进的军事装备，以增强乌克兰的前线战力。
+
+迄今为止，美国向乌克兰提供了最大的支持，已向乌克兰提供高达466亿元的军事援助。美国总统拜登周一秘密访问基辅与乌克兰总统会面后，并表达了“对乌克兰民主、主权和领土完整的坚定承诺”。拜登又宣布再向乌克兰提供价值五亿美元的援助，包括榴弹炮弹药和海马斯火箭系统，标枪导弹和空中监视雷达。
+
+
+_▲ __各国对乌克兰援助金额。__ Source: Kiel Institute for the World Economy._
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-02-24-russo-ukrainian-war-anniversary-photo-records.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-02-24-russo-ukrainian-war-anniversary-photo-records.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..0e4aa01f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-02-24-russo-ukrainian-war-anniversary-photo-records.md
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "俄乌战争一周年・影像纪录"
+author: "陈鲍"
+date : 2023-02-24 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/LtrSS44.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "自俄军于2022年2月24日正式入侵乌克兰以来，一年的战争已经造成了大量死伤和难民，对交战双方，以及整个欧洲安全局势都造成了巨大的影响。"
+---
+
+> 烽火下的血和泪。
+
+
+
+2022年2月24日凌晨，俄罗斯总统普京发表电视讲话，宣布将在乌克兰东部顿巴斯（Donbas）地区开展“特别军事行动”，表明自2014年以来的俄乌武装冲突已经升级为全面侵略战争。
+
+随著开战宣言而来的是堆叠在4300万乌克兰人民之上的导弹和瓦砾。2022年3月发生的布查大屠杀（Bucha Massacre）震惊国际：这个基辅附近的小镇在经历俄军短暂占领之后，大约500乌克兰平民被俄军杀害，证据表明其中许多人是被虐杀致死。根据联合国人权高级专员办事处报告，截至开战一年后的今天，乌克兰已有超过8000平民丧生，逾1700万人流离失所，超过1800万人“迫切需要人道主义援助”(in dire need of humanitarian assistance)。
+
+开战初期，普京冀望能在数日内夺下乌克兰首都基辅，推翻乌总统泽连斯基，并扶持亲俄傀儡政权上台。但现实却不如他所预期。根据英国政府通信总部首长傅烈明（Jeremy Fleming），普京严重误判情势，开战前他以为俄军队有足够迅速拿下乌克兰的实力，但他不曾料到俄军会在乌克兰各地遭到乌军和民兵的顽强抵抗。去年11月，乌军成功解放战争初期便被部分占领的南部港口城市赫尔松（Kherson），重创俄军攻势。开战一年后，俄罗斯虽仍占领包括黑海沿岸重要城市马里乌波尔（Mariupol）在内的东南部分地方，但这场“军事行动”仍难算成功。
+
+这场战争也促使欧洲多国改变政策。芬兰和瑞典这两个曾因地缘政治而选择中立数十年的国家，皆因政治情势威胁而选择加入北约。战争前，乌克兰数次表明加入北约意愿，但因经济和政治等层面未达标而无法加入。而俄罗斯亦称北约自新千年始不断向东扩张，对俄罗斯构成威胁，这一说法进而成为入侵乌克兰的借口之一。虽然乌克兰并没有加入北约，但自战争伊始，北约盟国已经向乌克兰提供了数十亿美金的军备物资，其中包括：防空武器，反坦克武器，装甲车，侦测和攻击无人机，直升机，小武器和弹药等。但随著战争时间延长，俄乌双方都饱受军备、人员和物资困乏之苦。
+
+战争还发生在外交场上。自战争开始以来，曾经不被看好的乌克兰总统泽连斯基展露了令人惊艳的外交手段。他塑造的坚韧不拔的形象，在国际上赢得相当赞誉与同情。去年11月，泽连斯基出访美国，与美国总统拜登会晤后获得了450亿美元的援助。今年2月8日，泽连斯基突访伦敦和巴黎，与英国首相辛伟诚（Rishi Sunak）同现记者会，并在巴黎与法国总统马克龙（Emmanuel Macron）和德国总理朔尔兹（Olaf Scholz）举行会谈。翌日，泽连斯基马不停蹄前往被冠有“欧盟首都”之称的布鲁塞尔，并在欧洲议会发表演说称，乌克兰现在需要更多的武器，且乌克兰期待最终能加入欧盟。
+
+结束西欧之行后，2月21日，时隔数个月后泽连斯基在首都基辅又一次会见拜登，二人在阵亡战士纪念碑时，一度传来防空警报。另一头，普京与中国外交部长王毅也在拜登离开基辅一天后于莫斯科会面。据新华社报导，双方就乌克兰问题交换了意见。王毅表示赞赏俄方重申愿通过对话谈判解决问题。
+
+
+▲ 2022年2月24日，乌克兰哈尔科夫，俄军与凌晨时分向乌克兰发动侵略行动，大批当地居民涌到地铁站暂避。
+
+
+▲ 2022年3月5日，乌克兰首都基辅近郊，大批等候走难的当地居民在一座塌桥下躲避。
+
+
+▲ 2022年3月6日，乌克兰首都基辅近郊小镇伊尔平，撤离中的市民慌忙走避突如其来的俄军炮弹袭击。
+
+
+▲ 2022年3月6日，乌克兰首都基辅近郊小镇伊尔平，数名逃难中的当地居民被俄军炮轰炸死。
+
+
+▲ 2022年3月6日，乌克兰首都基辅近郊小镇伊尔平，乌军士兵在俄军炮弹攻势下找掩护。
+
+
+▲ 2022年3月6日，乌克兰首都基辅近郊小镇伊尔平，当地居民慌忙走避突如其来的俄军炮弹袭击。
+
+
+▲ 2022年3月10日，乌克兰首都基辅近郊小镇德米迪夫（Demydiv），一名乌军士兵在战壕里躲避俄军直升机的空袭。该照片摄影师于同年4月1日在邻近小镇被发现死亡，调查称他遭俄军枪杀。
+
+
+▲ 2022年3月14日，乌克兰哈尔科夫，俄军炮弹击中民居引发大火，一名消防员在扑救。
+
+
+▲ 2022年3月25日，乌克兰哈尔科夫，一名居民从一个著火的货仓中取回个人物品。
+
+
+▲ 2022年3月27日，乌克兰马里乌波尔，亲俄武装组织用担架抬走一名受伤的士兵。
+
+
+▲ 2022年3月28日，乌克兰首都基辅东部战线，一名乌克兰志愿军坐在一个当地居民的房子里。
+
+
+▲ 2022年4月3日，乌克兰首都基辅近郊小镇布查，数名居民在一个乱葬岗旁为一名失踪的亲人感到忧心。
+
+
+▲ 2022年4月30日，乌克兰哈尔科夫，一名居民被俄军炮轰炸死，遗体躺在房子里。
+
+
+▲ 2022年5月22日，乌克兰首都基辅近郊小镇，12岁的Andrii与6最的Valentyn在一个地洞里拿著玩具枪玩耍。
+
+
+▲ 2022年6月18日，乌克兰南部港口城市米科拉夫（Mykolaiv），俄军炮轰袭击引起大火，消防员正在扑救。
+
+
+▲ 2022年7月7日，乌克兰哈尔科夫，一名男子坐在一名女子的遗体旁哭泣。
+
+
+▲ 2022年7月12日，乌克兰哈尔科夫，数名士兵在一个防空洞内找掩护。
+
+
+▲ 2022年7月12日，乌克兰哈尔科夫，一名士兵正离开一所房子的地牢，前往战线。
+
+
+▲ 2022年9月13日，乌克兰城市伊久姆（Izium），击退占据城市的俄军后，一名乌克兰士兵拿起一幅破烂的俄罗斯旗。
+
+
+▲ 2022年9月21日，乌克兰哈尔科夫，67岁昆虫学家Yurii Voitenko在海豚馆内与一只海豚玩耍。鱼缸旁堆满沙包，以防战争造成损毁。
+
+
+▲ 2022年11月21日，乌军解放南部港口城市赫尔松后，当地居民从聂伯河打水。
+
+
+▲ 2022年11月22日，乌克兰赫尔松，数名医院员工在停了电的医院婴儿病房内照顾幼婴。
+
+
+▲ 2022年11月24日，乌克兰南部港口城市赫尔松，一名当地老翁抱著宠物狗走过瓦砾。
+
+
+▲ 2022年12月3日，乌克兰哈尔科夫，两名警员在视察一堆俄军炮弹壳。
+
+
+▲ 2022年12月7日，乌克兰顿涅茨克州巴赫穆特市（Bakhmut），一名居民从一所被俄军炮弹击中后著火的民居中逃生。
+
+
+▲ 2022年12月24日，乌克兰哈尔科夫，一辆炮弹装甲车向俄军战线发射炮弹。
+
+
+▲ 2022年12月25日，圣诞节，乌克兰顿涅茨克州康斯坦丁尼夫卡市（Kostiantynivka），一名义工装扮成圣尼古拉斯（Saint Nicholas）向当地军人派礼物。
+
+
+▲ 2023年1月4日，乌克兰哈尔科夫聂伯河，一个家庭在运送一位亲人的灵柩。
+
+
+▲ 2023年1月9日，乌克兰顿涅茨克，乌军军医位一名受伤的士兵施手术。
+
+
+▲ 2023年1月15日，乌克兰顿涅茨克州巴赫穆特市（Bakhmut），乌军向俄军战线方向发射高射砲。
+
+
+▲ 2023年1月20日，乌克兰与白罗斯接壤边境城市普里皮亚季（Pripyat），乌军士兵、边防部队和安全部队成员参与共同军事演习。
+
+
+▲ 2023年1月22日，乌克兰首都基辅，一名阵亡的乌军士兵Seyran Kadyrov下葬。
+
+
+▲ 2023年2月7日，乌克兰东部顿涅茨克，一名乌军士兵向俄军战线发射迫击炮。
+
+
+▲ 2023年2月11日，乌克兰西部里夫内州（Rivne），乌军士兵、边防部队和安全部队成员参与共同军事演习。
+
+
+▲ 2023年2月11日，乌克兰乌克兰顿涅茨克州巴赫穆特市（Bakhmut），乌军亚速营士兵在一个防空洞里休息。
+
+
+▲ 2023年2月14日，乌克兰基辅近郊，一名女子参加一名乌军士兵的丧礼期间跪地哀嚎。
+
+
+▲ 2023年2月16日，乌克兰哈尔科夫，Natalya在丈夫Hennadii Kovshyk的丧礼上向他的遗体道别，他在乌克兰东部的战线中阵亡。
+
+
+▲ 2023年2月16日，乌克兰哈尔科夫，一名女子在一个阵亡士兵墓地中走过。
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-02-26-russo-ukrainian-war-anniversary-changes-in-belarus.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-02-26-russo-ukrainian-war-anniversary-changes-in-belarus.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..1d12afe9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-02-26-russo-ukrainian-war-anniversary-changes-in-belarus.md
@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "俄乌战争一周年・白罗斯的变化"
+author: "吴言"
+date : 2023-02-26 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/9RnrfzK.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "自俄军于2022年2月24日正式入侵乌克兰以来，一年的战争已经造成了大量死伤和难民，对交战双方，以及整个欧洲安全局势都造成了巨大的影响。"
+---
+
+> 战争没有胜利日，胜利日只是人们一厢情愿的憧憬。于乌克兰是如此，于我们都是如此。
+
+
+
+牢狱之灾、道德负疚、亲友反目：白罗斯人被俄乌战争裹挟。
+
+白罗斯虽然不是正面战场，但是在暴力机器的裹挟下，这里的人也被迫成为了“侵略者”。而俄罗斯人、乌克兰人、白罗斯人从来都不具有血缘上真正的分野，这里每个人几乎都有亲人在俄罗斯或在乌克兰，他们也随着战争的爆发被不同的宣传机器分配到了不同的位置上，亲友间的谈话一旦涉及战争，就变得小心翼翼。在所有对抗独裁的抵抗努力都无效之后，这片土地上反对战争的人或承受牢狱之灾、或背井离乡，或揹负着负疚继续在政治高压下努力维系着正常的生活……
+
+2022年2月24日，俄乌战争爆发以后，白罗斯成为准战区，随时有可能正式派兵参战。在出发前，我还提着一颗心，在抵达明斯克的那一刻，反而感受到了放松。这里嗅不到任何战争的气息，2022年的深秋初冬时节，人们的日常生活照旧：工作日挤地铁上下班，周末蜂拥进商场，或坐在咖啡馆里谈笑。就像其他任意某个国家的任意某个城市一样。随后，一些不一样的东西开始浮现出来：各种琐碎的生活细节，开始不断提醒我战争的存在。
+
+从2020年总统选举以来，再到支持俄罗斯对乌克兰的战争，白罗斯成为西方制裁的对象。欧美企业接连宣布退出俄白市场，店铺关门。超市进口食品区主要摆放的是俄罗斯货，少量仅剩的欧盟进口产品价格过高而无人问津。白罗斯的麦当劳拆掉了门口的金拱门招牌，换上“我们在营业”字样，依旧人满为患。没有招牌的快餐店，没有任何字样的空白包装，看上去十分诡异。由于关税差异，书店里大量的俄罗斯出版物比乌克兰和拉脱维亚进口书便宜得多，也更好卖。
+
+制裁带来的往往是意想不到的连锁反应。白罗斯一所大学的海关事务专业教师告诉我，由于对各国海关关闭，海关部门用人需求骤减，大学相关专业招不到学生，相应的大学老师也面临被裁员。学术写作对眼前的战争最好闭口不谈，假装不存在，以免惹来麻烦。学术会议只讲所谓欧亚一体化。各类国际合作中断了，那就圈地自萌，举办各自俄白之间或者独联体国家内部的学术文体交流，增加贸易往来。大学里的留学生群体几乎只剩俄罗斯人、中国人和少量中亚人。在白罗斯我认识了很多俄罗斯人。他们连护照都不需要，拿着身份证就可以往返于两国之间。
+
+再往后，我在这里听到了许多人的故事：有白罗斯人的，有乌克兰人的，有俄罗斯人的。情节和观点各异，但是都离不开这场战争。俄罗斯政治高层的三人决策小组轻率地决定了亿万人的命运。战争成了无数人生活的背景音。在白罗斯，令我尤其感到好奇的是，这些被迫成为“侵略者”的人们在想什么，他们怎么看待战争，怎么看待国家的今天和未来。抗争未果之后，政权稳定未被撼动的俄白两国，水面之下巨大的冰川是什么样的。听完这些故事，我的结论是：不直面战场，不意味着就能享有暂时的安宁。相反，这里的人们也是受害者。他们要承受的不止是新闻头条里所写的制裁和征兵这么简单，还有牢狱之灾、道德上的负疚、亲友反目、去留的抉择，以及一个每况愈下的国家。他们中的一些人曾经尽自己所能，直面暴力的机器，走上街头，大声疾呼。如今，这些勇敢者的声音已经逐渐消散。稳定之下，我感受到的社会氛围是悲观的，充满创痛。它像一股暗流，以几近无声的方式，在缓慢地涌动。
+
+以下是他们的故事。
+
+
+▲ 2017年6月30日，白罗斯首都明斯克，市民在一个苏联时期的浮雕下走过。
+
+
+### 俄乌白：他们是谁
+
+从容貌上，你根本区分不出来这三个国家的人。因为本来就没有纯粹的俄罗斯人、乌克兰人和白罗斯人。也没人会说一个人是俄乌混血、俄白混血。后苏联空间里个人身份的边界性尤为突出。苏联时期大量的迁徙和通婚导致几乎所有人都有邻国的亲戚。判定一个人的民族属性既没有固定标准，也不会写在身份证上。人们往往以不同的理由自行决定自己的民族身份。有的人把自己的出生地作为自己的祖国，有的人把自己所生活的国家作为归属的对象。民族国家对大家来说都是晚近的新事物，是30多年来人们不同程度习得的东西，但某种意义上的民族主义观念已经事实上为人们所接受。民族认同的产生在这片土地上格外具有后现代意味，斯大林提出的原生民族论在其诞生地反而最不靠谱——在一个人一生中的某个时刻，突然意识到自己想要并且拥有某个具有浪漫化色彩的祖国，那么它就是祖国无疑。在下文中，我所使用的所有族裔称谓，都依据受访者本人的身份认同。
+
+Andrej和Nikita二人就是后苏联地区人口流动、身份混杂的典型例子。他们都来自俄乌边境地区的别尔哥罗德——这个边境城市集结了各种特殊背景的人。Andrej出生在乌克兰的哈尔科夫州，在俄罗斯长大。在他心目中一直把乌克兰当作祖国。哈尔科夫和别尔哥罗德两个城市隔着国境线相望，也许对于Andrej来说，这条国境线曾经只是一条可有可无的虚线，可以轻易地往返穿越。但如今这条边境承受着两国激烈的交战和轰炸，已经越来越成为分隔两个政治实体的坚固的边界。而Nikita是出生在吉尔吉斯斯坦南部的俄族。2010年吉尔吉斯斯坦发生了推翻总统巴基耶夫的革命，被称为既2005年郁金香革命以来的第二次革命。在国家暂时处于权力真空的情况下，吉尔吉斯南部城市奥什市发生了吉尔吉斯族和乌兹别克族之间的冲突。动乱风潮波及了当地的俄族。Nikita和家人因此离开了吉尔吉斯，来到俄罗斯的别尔哥罗德定居。
+
+相比俄乌，白罗斯被称为是“去民族化的国家”，主要来源于卢卡申科本人给这个国家打造的一种民族建构模式。它建立在诸多苏联的历史符号基础之上，但没有包括语言在内的族裔特征。但白罗斯并不如人们臆想的那样像是苏联的活化石，这里早已脱离了计划经济和共产主义意识形态，留下萎靡的市场经济，以及高度中央集权的国家。苏联记忆只是一幅空壳，化作以“共产主义”、“国际主义”、“共青团”命名的城市街道，以伟大卫国战争为主题的旅游项目，和城市边缘成片的赫鲁晓夫式住宅楼。白罗斯是后苏联空间唯一还将十月革命节作为法定节日的国家。苏联时期的每年11月7日，人们会举着列宁像在街头举办节日游行。如今，市政府仍然如期为列宁像献上红色康乃馨，白罗斯共产党、亲总统社会组织和对苏联抱有怀旧情绪的人们也会加入集会中。但集会规模和节日气氛早已远不如当年，这个日子和某种特定的意识形态以及社会理想也不再相关。人们开始以自己的方式阐释这个节日。2022年11月7日，在白罗斯政府大楼前的列宁像脚下，十月革命节集会散场的时候，一对年轻夫妇一边收起手中的白罗斯国旗，一边笑着对我说：“现在世界上发生了很多事情。我们想来表达一下白罗斯人是和平的民族！”一名当地大学生告诉我她选择在这一天好好睡个懒觉：“对我来说这纯粹是一个休息日。只有老一辈怀念苏联的人才会把它当节日过。”
+
+在白罗斯，从官方文件到日常聊天都使用俄语。人们虽然懂白罗斯语，但绝大多数人并不能很好地掌握这门语言。在口头和书面表达中，会将俄语词混进白罗斯语中，还会犯语法错误。中小学虽然开设白罗斯语课程，但是由于日常生活中没有机会使用，学生们对白罗斯语仍然感到陌生。强调民族语言问题的族裔民族主义在白罗斯往往和反对派运动联系在一起。上世纪80年代末90年代初，当时的反对派人民阵线和民族主义知识分子力主复兴白罗斯语言和文化，同时也着力于在“公开性”背景下揭露苏联时期白罗斯的民族创伤。但在第12届白罗斯最高委员会（1990-1995）的360个议席中，人民阵线只占25个议席。人民阵线领导人帕兹尼亚克在1994年总统选举中甚至没有进入第二轮。操俄语并重视对俄关系的卢卡申科成为首任白罗斯总统，并很大程度上塑造了日后白罗斯的民族建构选择。他甫一上台就发起全民公投，主要问题包括：是否支持俄语和白罗斯语享有同等地位，是否支持改变国旗和其他国家象征，是否支持和俄罗斯的经济一体化，结果都高票通过。这使得反对派的多年努力功亏一篑。而1991-1995年在人民阵线倡导下作为国旗的白-红-白旗此后为白罗斯政治反对派和反卢卡申科示威者所沿用。白-红-白旗自此成为白罗斯所禁止的符号，被官方称为是“纳粹主义的象征”。
+
+
+▲ 2022年8月9日，波兰城市克拉科夫，示威者挥舞白罗斯人民共和国国旗、撕破象征牢狱的道具，声援在白罗斯被拘禁的政治犯。
+
+卢卡申科任上启动了俄白两国一体化的进程。1996年建立俄白共同体，1997年签署了俄白联盟条约。虽然定调很高，但成果寥寥。普京对于俄白联盟国家设想的图景是白罗斯直接并入俄罗斯联邦，这时，卢卡申科就会跳出来强调白罗斯的独立性。对于卢卡申科来说，最不能放下的就是主权，因此一体化谈判陷入僵局。2018年，白罗斯驻华大使馆主页刊登了一则消息，对国名的中文翻译进行订正，指出Беларусь正确的翻译是“白罗斯”，而不是“白俄罗斯”。但是没有得到中国外交部的回应。如今中方还是照旧在公开场合称“白俄罗斯”，白罗斯一边也没有坚持。就连白罗斯驻华使馆主页上，时不时还会出现“白俄罗斯”的字样。
+
+如果你去问一个白罗斯人，他会告诉你：我们三个民族很像，语言、文化、宗教信仰都很像，但我们不一样。我为自己民族和国家的历史和文化感到自豪。乌克兰人尤其希望强调本民族的独立性，尤其是摆脱俄罗斯在历史上到今天投射下的漫长阴影，这某种程度上关乎这场战争的根源。当代乌克兰的历史学研究从各个角度挖掘本民族的建国史，希望给国家破碎的历史增加一片拼图。这又让很多白罗斯人不能理解，不知道乌克兰人为何这么渴望挣脱某种束缚。他们觉得乌克兰在历史上从未独立过。
+
+对于生活在俄乌白这片土地上的很多人而言，谁是“自己人”，谁是“外国人”，本来就有着特殊的标准。白罗斯的房屋中介跟我说，很多房东不愿意租房给外国人。我问，那如果是俄罗斯和乌克兰人来租房呢？中介说，他们不算，他们是斯拉夫人。来到白罗斯交换的俄罗斯学生都向我表示来这里留学体验很好，融入当地毫不费力。除了货币不一样，和在俄罗斯简直没有太大差别。俄罗斯姑娘Masha告诉我，她们能和当地人坐在一起讲苏联笑话，要是换成西方人可能不仅无法理解，反而只会觉得鄙夷。“有的白罗斯人比我们还热爱俄罗斯和普京。”一种常见的说法是说俄乌白是兄弟民族。但战争爆发以后，情况发生了变化。教师Yulia在一次公开场合称乌克兰为兄弟民族，遭到了在场者的攻击。“以前都说我们是兄弟，现在连‘兄弟’都不能说了。”
+
+一方面，应当尊重一个民族想要独立的愿望，以及已经独立的事实，但另一方面，不能忽视俄乌白三国又是如何以血缘联系在一起的。悖谬的是，一场以去纳粹化为名，强调乌克兰是小俄罗斯的战争，反倒给无数跨国家庭带来了无法弥补的伤害。破碎的家庭如同俄乌白三国关系的隐喻。这样的故事，每个当地人都能讲出一个来。而事实上这样的情形不止存在于这三个国家和这一场战争中。正如俄籍亚美尼亚族女孩Olia所说，“我爸爸是出生在阿塞拜疆的亚美尼亚人，这要他怎么选边站呢？”
+
+第一次听到这样的故事，来自人在白罗斯的俄罗斯大学生Nastia。我知道她家里在乌克兰有亲戚，就毫无意识地直接问她家里人怎样了，没想到触到了她的伤心事。战争在每个人心上划开了一道隐秘的伤痕，导致有时谈论都不那么容易。
+
+Nastia的妈妈生于乌克兰，年轻时来到俄罗斯，并且成长为一个俄罗斯的爱国者。Nastia在俄罗斯出生，父母离婚后，和母亲一起搬到了勘察加生活。我问她，妈妈是怎么决定自己是俄罗斯人的。Nastia说自己也不太清楚。据母亲的说法，似乎是随自己的父亲——Nastia的姥爷是俄罗斯人。但母亲家里的其他亲戚留在乌克兰。Nastia舅舅住在基辅，姥姥在伊万弗兰科，并且自我认同是乌克兰人。
+
+2014年乌克兰爆发了尊严革命。Nastia和妈妈去乌克兰做客，妈妈和舅舅因为政治观点分歧吵了起来。舅舅支持推翻腐败而亲俄的亚努科维奇政权，指责俄罗斯夺走了克里米亚。后来姐弟俩平静下来，才说好了家人才是最重要的，不值得为了政治问题伤感情。据Nastia说，战争爆发以后，两人又在电话里吵起来了。舅舅指责妈妈站在俄罗斯的一边。
+
+采访中，Nastia捧着茶杯，用平静的语气对我说：“我现在在笑不是因为轻松，而是我不知道应该作何反应。妈妈跟我说，她已经做好准备弟弟要和她断绝关系了。我简直无法想象。我们可是一家人呀！”Nastia说姥姥现在身体不好，每天躺在床上。她应该也知道这一切，但从来不提。她看似冷静的讲述，令我心里一沉。
+
+而白罗斯人Dasha同样拥有横跨俄乌白三国的家庭。她的家庭成员里有政见上从亲俄转向排俄的乌克兰人，有笃信普京的俄罗斯公民，她自己在白罗斯曾经参与过反对卢卡申科的抗争行动。而她的姥姥是那种典型的卢卡申科支持者——在苏联时是“既得利益者”，是党员和机关公共食堂的负责人，欣赏卢卡申科政策中的苏联色彩。“我跟姥姥谈不拢，她跟乌克兰那边的亲戚也谈不拢。我们家现在就这个乱糟糟的样子。”她一边讲，一边脸上露出了苦笑。
+
+
+▲ 2017年7月4日，白罗斯首都明斯克，一名途人走进胜利广场地铁站，后面的建筑物挂起绿红色的官方白罗斯国旗，有别于象征抗争的白红色白罗斯人民共和国国旗。
+
+
+### 从抗争到战争
+
+由于反对卢卡申科连任第六届总统，质疑其迫害反对派以及选举舞弊，2020年在白罗斯总统大选前后爆发了反对总统卢卡申科的游行。在乌克兰首都基辅，也出现了支持白罗斯示威者的公开活动。2020年夏天，我在乌克兰，看着基辅街头的游行队伍就像过节一样，浩浩荡荡穿过市中心的主街道赫利夏蒂克大街。人们牵着白红相间的带子，组成人链，有说有笑。令人完全联想不到隔壁政治革命的紧张感，反倒有种2014年乌克兰尊严革命胜利的余温在。人群穿过马路的时候，车辆会不急不徐地停下来让路，有的司机还会鸣笛致意。乌克兰人说，希望白罗斯人能像他们在2014年那样成功。白罗斯这次以失败告终的革命经常被用于和乌克兰2013-2014年的尊严革命相比较。卢卡申科镇压手无寸铁的示威者的消息每天在乌克兰主流媒体和社交网站上接连爆出。在失败已成定局之前，乌克兰朋友Dima就对我预言了糟糕的结局。他摇着头对我说：白罗斯人还是不如乌克兰人脾气火爆。
+
+白罗斯参与俄乌战争的根源就在于2020年的事件。2020年如此大规模的抗争使得卢卡申科政权受到了前所未有的震撼。尽管这不是白罗斯第一次反卢卡申科示威，也不是卢卡申科政权首次镇压行动。2006年总统选举期间爆发了被称为牛仔裤革命的政治运动，同样以失败告终。2020年，卢卡申科开始镇压示威者之后，受到了美欧猛烈的攻击和制裁。反对派领袖季汉诺夫斯卡娅及其竞选团队，以及众多异见人士选择了流亡，并得到了西方国家的保护。白罗斯和西方世界陷入严峻对峙状态中，甚至不惜将中东地区的难民引入欧盟国家进行报复。在外交上走投无路之后，卢卡申科开始高度地依赖俄罗斯。而俄罗斯趁机对白罗斯施压。俄方一直希望上世纪90年代就提上日程又裹足不前的俄白联盟国家再进一步，并且依靠白罗斯的支持使得俄军的颓势发生决定性的扭转。曾经卢卡申科嘴硬，不愿意因为和俄罗斯一体化放弃主权，而且他知道卷入战争无异于接下烫手山芋。但现在他只能服软，在战争中满足俄罗斯的种种要求，并且开始大举建设俄白联盟国家的武装力量——区域联合集群。2月24日，战前在白罗斯进行军演的俄军从乌克兰边境地区出发袭击基辅。此后白罗斯为俄罗斯提供武器装备和弹药，将白罗斯领土提供给俄罗斯打击乌方目标，为俄军提供军用设备维修和医疗服务，成为实际参战方。但卢卡申科至今都死握底线，不愿直接派兵正式参战。俄白一起组成了一座世界的孤岛。
+
+如今，2020年示威活动的组织者基本已经离开白罗斯了。曾经人潮汹涌、旗帜飘扬的明斯克街头恢复了宁静，仿佛什么都没有发生过。事发一年之后，当大家以为一切都已经过去的时候，白罗斯公共部门突然迎来了大规模的审查和清洗，许多参加过示威的人被解雇、逮捕、拘留。到了2022年，个别留在国内的人还在持续被捕。很多人哪怕已经逃离，也小心隐瞒身份，不愿意被称作activist，也不愿意面对媒体。2023年2月，卢卡申科宣布号召流亡者回国。他否认外界关于流亡者多达上百万人的说法，认为只有几千人。他称“有情可原”者递交申请后将有机会获得赦免；而剩下的人，“他们知道，我们迟早会找上门的”。
+
+
+▲ 2020年8月26日，白罗斯首都明斯克，大批民众参与反政府示威。
+
+Dasha参加过2020年反卢卡申科的示威。当时，她没有参与任何反对派社会组织，自愿走上街头。她告诉我，2020年从8月到11月，她每个周末都去参加游行。
+
+“明斯克200万人口，最多的时候有20万人一起走上街头，你能想象吗？我们那时是多数派！我们手持旗帜和鲜花，没有人推搡、打碎玻璃，世界上没有比这更和平的示威了。”
+
+11月的一个周日，Dasha和丈夫、姐姐三人一起去示威现场。据她讲，当时她丈夫站在她和姐姐中间，三个人并排往前走。一辆军车迎面开过来，朝人群里发射高压水枪。Dasha三人反应慢了，被一下子逼到了两座大楼之间的一个胡同里。警察冲上来，直接带走了她丈夫。
+
+“本来我们三人都有可能被带走，但最终只带走了我丈夫。他过了几天就给放出来了。谢天谢地，没有受到什么虐待，没有受伤。这已经是很好的情形了，还有糟得多的……”
+
+Dasha在IT行业工作。由于俄乌白这些国家能够为西方企业提供更廉价的劳动力，大量外国IT企业来这里招工。IT行业成为当地炙手可热的求职领域，也一度成为白罗斯经济的重要驱动力。用Dasha的话说，唯一还赚钱的行业。这里诞生了当代俄乌白的中产阶级。而且人们只需要一台笔记本电脑，不受空间限制，就可以工作。这也使得IT从业者比其他人更容易移民。在制裁冲击和外国企业的封锁下，IT行业从业者大量流失，导致2022年IT产业对白罗斯GDP增长的贡献为负值。
+
+我们见面的地点是十月街的一个咖啡馆。这里曾经是一个艺术街区，当时拥有明斯克最主要的两个现当代艺术中心，一个是美术馆Ў Gallery，另一个是文化中心OK16。Ў是白罗斯语区别于俄语和乌克兰语独有的字母，这样的名称本身就蕴含着反抗的意味。2020年以后它们全部关闭。如今这个艺术街区只剩下酒吧和咖啡馆，和建筑外墙上大幅的涂鸦作品，人迹寥寥。有几次，我一个人走进凋敝废弃的建筑物内部，试图在密密麻麻的涂鸦中找到那场失败的革命留下的痕迹，如同尝试破译密码，却一无所获。这里连半句标语、半个反抗的字体都没有留下。当年的风起云涌竟然如此轻易地被完全抹去。据Dasha讲，OK16的两个主要负责人均被捕入狱。而Ў Gallery的核心艺术家团队在波兰和波罗的海国家继续活跃，现在还在instagram上更新动态。同样关停的还有位于Masherova街区的文化中心Korpus。至此，明斯克最主要的公共文化空间全部被窒息。
+
+Dasha跟我抱怨明斯克如今文化生活的枯竭，优秀人才大量外流，公共空间凋敝。她谈起明斯克市民所钟爱的扬基·库帕拉剧院，由于剧团主要成员纷纷离开白罗斯，老票友们已经不愿再光临这里。另有一名白罗斯国家大剧院的芭蕾舞演员告诉我，由于疫情、抗争行动和战争的连环打击，大剧院同样失去了大量精英舞者，团体水平因此大打折扣。疫情期间，舞者得不到国家的正常资助，训练受到影响。战争打响后，乌克兰裔的前独舞演员选择了愤然离开。更别提2020年的事件。没有哪个文化圈能够在这些接连发生的疯狂中幸存下来。
+
+两年前的总统选举，加上战争带来的征兵可能，使得Dasha和丈夫选择离开白罗斯。他们在格鲁吉亚躲了2个月。经过边检的时候，为了躲避海关查验，两人把手机里关于2020年的记录删得一干二净。然而在国外就业和生活仍然存在问题。尽管Dasha在IT行业工作，只需一台电脑就能办公，但她丈夫不行。后来白罗斯局势相对稳定，没有像俄罗斯一样发起征兵，他们就又返回了明斯克。Dasha说，如果真的征兵，他们就完全不打算回来了。
+
+
+▲ 2020年8月6日，白罗斯首都明斯克，一辆巴士搭载士兵前往市中心的反对派示威场地。
+
+白罗斯著名作家和公共知识分子，诺贝尔文学奖得主斯维特兰娜·阿列克谢耶维奇由于2020年反对卢卡申科，也成为官方眼中的异见者。她流亡德国，现居柏林。而她的作品在白罗斯已经成为禁书。我带着“挑事”的心态，第一次走进当地一家书店的时候，就故意问店员有没有她的作品。店员是一名中年女性，她拨通了老板的电话后告诉我，每本售价40卢布（相当于人民币100元不止），因为禁书不好买，得调货。在另一家书店，进门最显眼的文学区货架，摆放着俄文版的阿列克谢耶维奇全套的作品，俄罗斯出版。店员笑着解释：“是禁书，但我们又拿出来卖了。”
+
+私营书店对于谈论和出售禁书并没有那么禁忌，对于政治议题最讳莫如深的是公共部门的工作人员。如果公开表达异见，一经举报，会导致当事人面临被撤职甚至被拘捕的风险。Liudmila在当地一所大学担任辅导员，四、五十岁上下的年纪，待人友善而热情。听到我的采访请求后，她面露难色。对于2020年的事件，她只转述了当年对自己女儿说过的话：
+
+“我跟她们说，只是出于一个妈妈的心愿：不要上街，不要去参加任何游行，不要因为这个把自己的一生毁掉。真的，这不是教训孩子，我作为一个母亲就是这么想的。”
+
+乌克兰同事Evgenia问我，白罗斯人是怎么讨论战争的。我说现在是敏感问题，人们不会轻易开口谈。她说，白罗斯人可能是害怕吧。这就是乌克兰人看不起白罗斯人的地方。我说，他们2020年也尝试过，但是失败了。毕竟白罗斯和乌克兰国情不同。她说，他们怕得有道理。但是2月24日之后我们都不带害怕的。我心里想，那不一样。面对外敌同仇敌忾孤注一掷和面对铁拳深深的恐惧那不一样。但我没说出口。
+
+
+### 普通人的政见分歧
+
+我不赞成Evgenia的很大一部分原因在于，那些有正义感的白罗斯人已经为对抗这场战争做了最大努力。开战三日后，2022年2月27日，在白罗斯举行了修宪公投。经过公投，白罗斯宪法中取消了中立国和无核国家地位，为进一步介入战争做了立法上的准备。这一天，白罗斯人再次为反战走上街头，高呼“白罗斯人和乌克兰站在一起”。可惜，据Dasha说，这次的情形比2020年还要糟糕，警方早有准备，出动了特种部队，连人群聚集都不可能。而且再次发生了对示威者的大规模拘捕，逮捕了近千人。
+
+社会组织BYPOL为了避免俄罗斯的武器装备通过白罗斯运往前线，组织了当代白罗斯版本的“铁道游击战”。战前，俄白两国举行的“联盟决心-2022”联合军演是俄乌战争的前兆。2022年1月，白罗斯人就开始以炸铁路的方式阻止参与军演的俄军及其装备进入白罗斯领土。战争爆发后，这样的破坏铁路事件又发生了几次。这些activists被捕后以策划和参与恐怖袭击的罪名被起诉。而在俄罗斯，从2月24日开始，示威和拘捕的消息就在持续传出。9月21日，普京宣布征兵当日，大规模的抗争行动再次在全国各地爆发。
+
+当然，坚决反战只是一部分人的观点。这场战争到底为什么发生？白罗斯是不是参加了这场战争？普通人对现状持什么立场？这些问题我不仅没有从人们那里得到一致的答案，准确说没有听到过两个相同的答案。在隐形的战场——信息战中，每个人根据自己的经验做出选择。我在访谈中遇到过俄乌白各国人，唯独没有见过一个为战争叫好的人。人们不想失去土地、亲人和自己的生活，也不想成为侩子手。
+
+
+▲ 2022年6月25日，波兰城市克拉科夫，当地乌克兰难民和离散族群到广场上集会，声援正被困马里乌波尔亚速钢铁厂的乌军士兵。
+
+Olia和Masha都是俄罗斯一所大学的新闻系学生。Olia即将毕业，已经开始在媒体行业工作。她参与制作了一档播客，叫做“移民综合征”。播客虽然不直接讨论政治议题，但有一个政治背景——战争和抓壮丁式征兵在俄罗斯掀起的移民潮。“润”从来不是一个随便就能做出的选择，可能带来一系列的适应问题。这给了Olia做播客的灵感。她决定从心理学角度切入，帮助那些打算和已经移民的人群。我在Olia的推荐下，去听了她的播客。播客主持人是一名心理咨询师，他会以独白，或者跟这些俄罗斯移民连线的方式，探讨一些心理议题，比如决定离开要克服的心理障碍，如何面对和家人在这个问题上的分歧，还有如何适应在国外的生活等等。
+
+战争导致俄罗斯对新闻媒体和互联网长期以来的审查进一步强化，甚至出台了所谓的“战争审查法”。俄联邦通信和媒体监督局要求媒体对战争的报道只能援引官方发布的信息。Instagram、twitter和facebook被封禁。媒体不得使用“战争”一词，只能说“特别军事行动”。除了媒体记者和文化界人士，普通人也因为在互联网上发布反战言论遭到刑事立案。
+
+我起初在讲话时会小心翼翼，避免冒犯任何一方，没想到Olia和Masha直截了当地告诉我“我们反对战争”，令我立刻放松了下来。Olia和Masha的反战立场主要基于功利主义的观点。她们认为侵略战争、攫夺领土没有使得任何人获益，包括俄罗斯人。在言谈中，她们也仍然按照俄罗斯人的习惯将乌克兰称为“на Украине”。对于乌克兰人，在国名前使用介词на具有贬低性的含义，暗示乌克兰不是一个正常国家，仅仅是帝国的边陲。与她们类似的是白罗斯青年Albert，他告诉我希望乌克兰获胜，这样就可以动摇普京和卢卡申科政权，让俄白两国有希望迎来民主自由。并非所有反战者都能对乌克兰所遭受的苦难感同身受。
+
+Olia和Masha告诉我，虽然俄罗斯拿回了克里米亚和顿巴斯，但这些地方在俄罗斯治下并没有繁荣起来，人们生活水平没有提高，因此毫无意义。她们还向我历数一系列发生在俄罗斯的战争后遗症：通胀、生活水平下降、进口店关门、从业者失业，普通人还面临被征兵的风险。她们抱怨在俄罗斯没法逛Zara和H&M，吃不到麦当劳。Masha说：“西方人为什么要制裁我们呀，战争不是我们的错。我们没法上街去抗议，只会被抓去坐牢。”
+
+Olia的妈妈是村里的护士。当地还专门为她开具证明信，证明必须留她在村里工作，避免征召她去前线。这使得Olia的妈妈躲过了一劫。而两人的校友中已经完成大学学业的，已经有人被迫奔赴前线。此前，俄罗斯的征兵政策强调不会拿大学生开刀。如今，由于前线兵员的短缺，征兵限制持续松动。一些大学开始对学生进行兵役登记。更多人面临被抓壮丁的命运。而且被征兵还只是一切麻烦的开始。媒体和网络持续曝出困难家庭的男丁被征兵，导致家人状况雪上加霜；前线的兵员抱怨被拖欠薪酬、缺少装备、后勤供应不足、频繁调度、死去的战友无人收尸；甚至有人因被征兵而无望自杀。“人就像耗材一样，战斗到最后一个，然后再送新的过来。”在白罗斯，虽然没有开始军事动员，而人们对此不无忧虑。不希望自己和亲人上战场成为很多人反对战争的理由。我跟他们说有些中国人比俄罗斯人还支持战争，供她们一笑。
+
+俄罗斯这个国家的未来怎么选，似乎是比反战更为复杂的问题。Olia说，如果纳瓦尔尼和普京同时出现在选票上，她会选纳瓦尔尼。但她又觉得纳瓦尔尼并不是理想的候选人。“他也很专断，为了迎合支持者说一些很绝对的话，这跟普京本质上没有区别。”正说着，Olia指了指Masha，笑着说：“她可喜欢普京了！”我有点惊讶。
+
+Masha支持普京的理由在于，普京将90年代独立之初的俄罗斯带出了混乱状态的泥潭，并一度依靠高油价实现了俄罗斯经济的快速增长。目前来看，俄罗斯正在倒退回发展前的状态，选举舞弊对于普通人而言也并非秘密，但人们依旧觉得没有除了普京更好的人选，甚至已经无法想象一个没有普京的俄罗斯。下一任有可能更糟，或者只是普京的延续。这其实正是当下很多俄罗斯人的想法。
+
+战争威胁的不仅是乌克兰人的生命安全，也使边境地区的俄罗斯公民生活在风险之下。来自别尔哥罗德的Nikita告诉我，那天他不仅能听到轰炸声，家里整栋楼都在晃动。新闻报道中不断出现关于边境地区俄罗斯居民死伤的消息。据官方统计，别尔哥罗德州截至2023年2月已疏散当地居民3700人。
+
+
+▲ 2022年7月3日，俄罗斯边境城市别尔哥罗德（Belgorod），一个燃料库存被乌克兰炮弹击中炸毁。
+
+当我问起Nikita和Andrej对于战争的看法，看得出来，不同的身份背景使得他们彼此之间存在异议。但两人的讲述很谨慎，相互避免争议。Nikita中途离开之后，Andrej才开始真正对我敞开心扉。Nikita表示持中立态度，同时他又强调自己没法自由发表意见。毕竟是代表自己的大学来白罗斯交换，如果讲了什么不合适的话，会被追责。Andrej没有直接回答问题：“如果要说我自己的立场的话，首先，我们聊天的这会儿时间可能已经死了50个人了。”
+
+在采访中，无论俄罗斯还是白罗斯人都提到了和军事的战争并行的信息战。人们对各方媒体都有种直觉的不信任，同时又因为不知道谁是可靠的消息源而感到迷茫。有的人因此而投向阴谋论，譬如认为决定战争起止的真正幕后主使和受益者是军火商，或者认为西方在2014年以前已经策划好了今天的战争，栽赃给俄罗斯。还有人因此产生了一种无力感，认为政治完全是精英游戏，普通人没有办法理解，只能选择承受后果。Andrej认为自己既从内部了解乌克兰，也从内部了解俄罗斯，所以很早就学会了自己去分析得出结论。
+
+作为生活在俄罗斯的乌克兰族，Andrej的处境似乎并不轻松。看得出来，在日常生活中他已经习惯了隐忍政治环境带来的压力。用他的话讲，在今天的俄罗斯，得学会“像外交官一样讲话”。Andrej中学时读的是俄罗斯的军校。2014年乌克兰尊严革命爆发，随后普京宣布出兵克里米亚。克里米亚以先占领后公投的方式加入俄罗斯领土。那时Andrej只有14岁，已经感觉到有些不对劲了。军校毕业后，他放弃了儿时当兵的志愿，选择了读大学。
+
+除了大学生，Andrej还有一重身份——别尔哥罗德区议会下设青年议会代表。战争爆发之后，俄罗斯方面也成立了很多人道主义援助中心，帮助受战争波及的人，其中也包括从乌克兰东部逃离的乌克兰人。青年议会也参与了这些援助倡议。许多大学生在援助中心担任志愿者工作，为难民发放生活物资，还有心理学专业的大学生提供心理援助。Andrej告诉我，虽然是国家倡议，很多时候援助者都是自掏腰包在做事。
+
+我问Andrej未来是否还想回到乌克兰。他给出了肯定的答复。“说到乌克兰……让我想到的是母亲的感觉。乌克兰人热爱自己的土地，而且热爱自由。俄罗斯人的历史上都是沙皇，但乌克兰人有哥萨克。如果哥萨克人不同意，就会把他们的首领盖特曼废掉。如今很多人不读历史，但历史都在我们的血液里……看看现在的这位，已经当政20年了。你想想，沙皇是怎样对待农民的？列宾的伏尔加河上的纤夫，穿的是什么样的衣服和鞋子？”
+
+Sergei是一名白罗斯的职业舞者，家在位于俄乌白三国边境的戈梅利州。他告诉我，他在戈梅利的住所就位于机场旁边。开战之初，在屋内就能听到军机和导弹的声音。作为体育舞蹈的从业者，Sergei的职业生涯就是由一场接一场的比赛组成的。由于世界各大体育舞蹈协会的总部都设在欧洲，战争爆发后，各舞蹈协会对来自俄罗斯和白罗斯的舞者不同程度地实施了禁赛政策。部分赛事虽接收白罗斯舞者参加，但只能以个人名义，不能代表国家参赛。这与2022年冬奥会对俄罗斯选手的政策一致。Sergei和他的队员目前参与的基本上都是俄罗斯、哈萨克斯坦和白罗斯国内的比赛。对于制裁的影响，Sergei不以为然。他每日的生活照旧：训练、教课、比赛。对于战争，Sergei说他不持任何立场，并表示自己对政治毫无兴趣，也没有精力去搞清政治议题的来龙去脉。他说，舞蹈是一项烧钱的事业。如果白天一整天的训练之后，晚上还拿着手机看这些新闻，整个人得发疯。我本来想问他，一旦开战，他会是理想的征兵对象，怎么办。看他快要发疯的样子，就没开口。
+
+“能逃到哪里去呢？白罗斯就这么大一片地方，在哪里不是一样。难道要举着标语上街去示威吗？然后立马被抓起来？我们什么都改变不了。只能选择等待。我觉得这一切都会得到解决的。会解决的。”
+
+从Sergei的家乡戈梅利到基辅的距离比到明斯克还近，他从小就往返于白乌两国之间。但他同样无法理解乌克兰的尊严革命。用他的话说，“乌克兰人的思维很奇怪。政坛全是寡头。一群民族主义者上街游行，可能是受了宣传蛊惑”。
+
+
+▲ 2023年2月1日，乌克兰与白罗斯边境防线，一名乌军在战壕里站岗。
+
+尽管想要远离政治，政治却没有绕开他走。为了缓解制裁带来的财政危机，国家对经济领域的控制进一步强化，白罗斯的税负持续攀升。国家征收各类税费的基准值在连年上升，从2022年1月的32白罗斯卢布上调至2023年1月的37卢布。2023年1月起，国家再次上调了小企业的所得税。大量店铺由于承受不了税负关停，有的经营者选择了离开白罗斯。俱乐部作为注册的私营企业，负担也日益沉重。这给Sergei造成了巨大的困扰。为此，他表示心情很差。
+
+“俱乐部今年开始要缴20%的税了，去年还是16%，这还不包括租金的。我觉得肯定和战争有关系。这20%的税已经够我烦的了！”
+
+理发师Nadja告诉我，税负让白罗斯的很多经营者难以为继，最终选择离开。她自己也攒下了一笔钱，以备不时之需。她在波兰的朋友已经在招呼她过去。
+
+“不止是营生的问题。留在这里，道德上会有负罪感。这本不是谁的错，但结果就弄成了现在这副模样。”关于“道德上的负罪感”，印象中我在白罗斯不止一次听到过。
+
+辅导员Liudmila还是没有直接回答我提出的问题。她告诉我说，之前有几个学生因为政见不合吵起来了，当时她参与了调解。“我跟他们说，出门在外，不要与人争吵，真的没必要。白罗斯人是温和包容的民族，我们只想捍卫自己，从来不愿意去侵犯别人。”她还建议我给这盘文章加一个题词，“就用白罗斯国歌的前两句——‘我们白罗斯人是和平的民族，我们的心献给祖国的土地。’我觉得再贴切不过了。”
+
+
+### 尾声
+
+从明斯克到基辅，只有短短一个小时飞机的行程。但在国境线的这一侧，我仍然难以真正想象乌克兰人所经历的日日夜夜，他们所感受到的希望与恐惧。因此，在采访和初稿写作完成之后，我还是决定请乌克兰学者朋友Evgenia谈谈自己的感受。她这样写道：
+
+“有时我在想，等到战争结束的时候，我要写一本书，记录下过去这一年经历过的一切。但我知道这不可能。因为首先，我没有力气再去回忆这一切，甚至连两行字都写不出来。其次，甚至等到我们头顶不再有炮弹落下，最后一个俄罗斯士兵被逐出领土的时候，这场战争永远都不会结束。还有数十万人残破的命运、被摧毁的城市、丢失的生命。有人说战争会在几个月后结束，有人说，得过上十年。但这都不重要，因为我们没有胜利日——战争不会在一天内结束，不会以一场大仗结束，以正义战胜邪恶的方式结束。那些都是电影里的情节，但不是现实……”
+
+“我一点都不担心自己，我担心的是其他所有人——我们怎么能带着这么巨大的创伤继续活下去？我已经无法想象没有战争的日子，正如一年前没法想象战时的生活。我心里的空洞如同被炸毁的马里乌波尔一样大，但我还活着，因为还有人需要我。我们会一起哭一阵，擦干眼泪，然后继续工作，继续活下去。我们还将制定未来的计划，并再度回忆起过去……遗憾的是，那些从我们这里被偷走的生命和时间，已经再也回不来了。”
+
+在国境线的这一边，我看到的是，创伤也同样存在于被迫成为“加害者”、“众叛亲离者”的人们身上，尽管它和被炮击和亲人失散的恐惧无法相提并论。这不仅因为三个国家的命运被历史紧紧缠绕在一起，被血缘捆绑在一起，更因为这场战争没有获胜者。俄白两国都正在走向自己历史更深更黑暗之处：社会丧失了活力，空留一架政治机器，依靠高压和强权在勉强维持运转。而无数的普通人，不论他们怀着什么样的政见，或粉身碎骨，或弯曲了脊梁。正如Evgenia所说，战争没有胜利日，胜利日只是人们一厢情愿的憧憬。于乌克兰是如此，于我们都是如此。
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-02-27-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-anniversary-feb-2023.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-02-27-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-anniversary-feb-2023.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b974f4e2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-02-27-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-anniversary-feb-2023.md
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "俄乌战争・一周年"
+author: "当代张敬轩"
+date : 2023-02-27 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/CIJpuuP.jpg
+#image_caption: "（2022年2月24日—2023年2月24日）"
+description: "俄罗斯对乌克兰的侵略战争，目的是把作为德、法等帝国主义国家附属国的乌克兰的全部或局部重新纳入俄罗斯帝国主义的控制下，乃至于进一步变成殖民地。"
+---
+
+周年之际，俄乌战局相比上次总结时变化不大：顿巴斯前线俄军恢复重点进攻，试图全线发起攻势，但在库皮扬斯克、利曼、武勒达尔方向都被轻易阻止，遭受相当大损失；唯独在巴赫穆特战场，俄军以瓦格纳集团雇佣军和空降兵等精锐部队为矛头投入作战，继续取得进展，对其形成包围之势。
+
+
+
+### 一、俄乌战争回顾
+
+2019年，泽连斯基政权在乌克兰上台后，对俄采取了缓和态度。俄乌关系在大约一年的时间里有所升温。然而，俄联邦帝国主义统治集团内部的权力斗争，却以主张促使乌克兰联邦化、利用顿巴斯傀儡从内部控制乌克兰的苏尔科夫一派势力的失败而告终。2020年2月苏尔科夫下野后，俄联邦内部以联邦安全局（FSB）为首、主张吞并乌克兰一部乃至大部领土的强硬派占据了绝对的优势，成功左右了普京的思维和决策。在接触中察觉到这一变化的泽连斯基政权，另一方面也受到国内民族主义势力的强大压力，遂在2020年9月完成了政策转向，开始对欧盟和北约一边倒。到2021年3月，泽连斯基政权开始对俄联邦采取强硬姿态。这一行为当然进一步强化了俄帝以武力吞并乌克兰的决心，最终俄军在2021年4月开始了真面目的对乌战备。同时，俄帝在2020年控制了白俄罗斯，并在2022年1月强化了对哈萨克斯坦的控制力，这样就解除了对乌克兰发动侵略战争的后顾之忧。
+
+2022年2月24日，俄帝对乌克兰发动了全面的侵略战争，目标是以闪电战方式瘫痪乌克兰国家机器，在短时间内占领基辅并征服乌克兰大部分领土，彻底消灭乌克兰民族国家，并把具有乌克兰民族认同的人驱逐到乌克兰西部残存的几个州作为缓冲国。然而，2014年以后重建的乌克兰国家机器比俄帝估计中要强大，乌克兰人民保卫民族独立的决心也超过了俄帝的想象：乌克兰当局在大约一个月的时间内成功地动员了近百万人拿起武器，在俄军后方也出现了数量庞大的游击队。然而，由亲欧买办资产阶级领导的乌克兰当局主要把希望寄托于西方的援助上，所以采取了主力部队固守城市和筑垒地域死守这样相对消极保守的抗战路线，仅以炮兵、无人机、特种部队和游击队打击俄军后勤线。尽管如此，由于俄军缺乏足够的技术兵器以及在信息技术和后勤保障能力上的缺失，侵略者除在南方的赫尔松方向上取得了惊人成功外，很快便受阻于坚城（基辅、哈尔科夫、尼古拉耶夫斯克、苏梅、切尔尼戈夫，等等）之下并陷入了后勤补给断绝的窘境。2022年3月底，俄军不得不承认其对乌克兰全面进攻的失败，并从乌克兰大部分领土上主动撤军以集中力量于顿巴斯发动重点进攻。
+
+2022年4月下旬，重组后的俄军在顿巴斯地区对乌军发动了重点进攻。因为乌克兰当局继续把希望寄托在西方的援助上，所以在前线继续了之前的片面抗战路线。俄军则在解决了后勤问题后，开始发扬其在兵器数量上的优势。到2022年7月初，乌军经营八年的马里乌波尔、北顿涅茨克—利西昌斯克两大要塞群相继被俄军攻占，伤亡惨重；然而，乌军坚定的防御战也严重消耗了俄军的战斗力量以及战术兵器。俄联邦帝国主义由于国内反战声浪的压力，不得不单纯使用职业军人、雇佣兵和顿巴斯傀儡军来进行战争，这就导致了兵力上的不足。在持续的消耗战后，俄军在次要战线上的兵力和兵器数量都下降到了危险阈值。2022年8月底，乌军在获得重型武器援助（首先来自东欧前华约国家，但由西方出资）后利用新锐兵团在战线两翼发起反攻，到10月初先后获得了三次进攻战役的胜利，基本上粉碎了俄军的重点进攻。2022年9月底，俄帝一方面宣布占领区“公投入俄”，一方面不得不宣布动员30万义务兵作为炮灰。
+
+2022年10月中旬起，俄帝一方面出动空天军使用远程导弹、自杀式无人机等精确制导武器对乌克兰深远后方的民用基础设施展开高强度的战略轰炸，另一方面开始积极收缩兵力重建防御。2022年11月，俄军放弃了其开战以来的最大战利品——赫尔松州首府赫尔松市，退往第聂伯河东岸固守。随着俄军动员兵陆续到位填充战线，俄军在2023年1月得以重新拼凑其精锐部队展开新的重点进攻。然而另一方面，随着远程导弹的耗尽，俄军战略轰炸的频率和力度又大幅下降。
+
+
+### 二、本月战局进展
+
+#### 1、巴赫穆特战场
+
+2023年1月17日，俄帝在瓦格纳集团雇佣军占领苏勒达尔镇后，继续在巴赫穆特战场的南北两翼发动攻势，试图会师于恰西夫谷、合围巴赫穆特市。同时，也以一部进入巴赫穆特市区同守军展开巷战，以牵制守军。
+
+2023年1月28日，北翼俄军渡过巴赫穆特河，此后各以一部向西、向北发展以牵制乌军，但无多大进展；其主力则继续进攻克拉斯纳霍拉镇。2月12日，俄军攻占克拉斯纳霍拉镇。2月18日，俄军攻占帕拉斯克沃夫卡村，切断了M-03高速公路。2月25日，俄军攻占了别尔霍夫卡村和亚吉德涅村，控制了巴赫穆特以北的铁路枢纽，并威胁巴赫穆特市通往外界的最后补给线O-0509公路。与此同时，南翼俄军并无多大进展，仍被阻于恰西夫谷以南的H-32公路一线；攻入市区的俄军，仍在市区东部、北部同守城乌军拉锯，进展亦不大。
+
+攻占克拉斯纳霍拉镇后，北翼俄军进展速度较快。若俄军继续保持这一速度，再加上目前的倒春寒气候，巴赫穆特市可能在半个月内被乌军放弃。
+
+#### 2、其他战场
+
+2023年1月下旬以来，俄军在库皮扬斯克、克列缅纳、马林卡、武勒达尔等战场也发动了战术进攻，但收效甚微。绝大部分战术进攻，都以俄军损失大量兵力兵器而一无所获告终。
+
+俄军恢复重点进攻以来，兵力和兵器的损失，特别是兵力的损失，明显增加。2023年1月中旬至2月中旬，俄军的阵亡数字超过2000人，比之前增加了50%以上。显然，把大量动员兵仓促投入作战，以及技术兵器质量优势的缩小，导致了损失数字的增加。
+
+#### 3、俄军战略轰炸
+
+因精确制导武器的库存不断下降，俄军战略轰炸的频率和力度日益下降。进入2月后，俄空天军虽仍保持半个月展开一次大规模战略轰炸的“惯例”，但投入的远程导弹数量已从过去的上百枚下降到三十多枚，战果自然是聊胜于无而已。不过，俄空天军在其中混入了大量气球等假目标，倒是有效降低了导弹被乌军拦截的几率。
+
+
+### 三、战争现状
+
+#### 1、俄罗斯方面
+
+2023年1月以来，随着俄军30多万动员兵（至少动员了316000人，后续可能还在进行动员）的到位，俄军在前线恢复了重点进攻态势，除在巴赫穆特战场实现突破外，在库皮扬斯克、克列缅纳、马林卡、武勒达尔等战场都投入了数万兵力、发起了战术进攻，然而收效不大。目前看，俄军仅在巴赫穆特实现了突破，有较大可能在3月中旬以前迫使乌军放弃巴赫穆特。然而，即便俄军占领巴赫穆特，依然面临着突破利曼—斯拉维扬斯克—克拉马托尔斯克—康斯坦丁诺夫卡防线的沉重任务。自开战以来，俄方在前线已损失超过10万人（除顿巴斯傀儡军外，俄军已有15000人阵亡），但这个数字尚能通过动员来弥补；俄方损失了2000辆以上的坦克，其坦克存量估计仅能继续维持到2024年；远程导弹已消耗殆尽，炮弹消耗也远远超过产量；所以，俄帝能否体面结束战争，很大程度取决于今年能否突破上述防线并重创乌军的有生力量。
+
+此外，自从普里戈津的瓦格纳集团（及其盟友卡家军）在前线“大放异彩”以来，不仅俄罗斯军部对此不满，其他势力更纷纷效法，组织自己的私兵。例如，俄气集团近日就开始组织自己的雇佣军。随着这些官僚、寡头私军的纷纷崛起，俄罗斯的政治生态恐进一步恶化。若俄帝最终战败，可能出现企业国家内战的局面。
+
+#### 2、乌克兰当局方面
+
+至于乌克兰当局方面，自然也是不容乐观。
+
+乌方的人力资源问题尚在其次，由于买办资产阶级当道20年，其军工系统的瓦解和库存装备的流失在苏联解体后比俄方更加严重。仅去年一年，乌克兰就损失了600辆以上的坦克（占战前现役装备的三分之二以上）等技术装备，仅能依靠预备役和东欧国家的援助（合计700辆）勉强维持，且难以靠自身的军工业弥补。今年乌克兰能获得的军事装备援助仍然是有限的：虽然美国施压德国迫使其同意提供豹-2坦克，但今年有望得到的坦克援助（排除不靠谱者）仅有：豹-2系列坦克约100辆（其中18辆较现代化的A6型，其余均为冷战末期水平的A4型），T-72系列及其改型（如波兰的PT-91坦克）约200辆，豹-1系列坦克（多为1980年代初升级而成的A5型）100—200辆，M1A2坦克50辆，挑战者-2坦克14辆，合计不过500辆左右。这就限制了乌军发动进攻战役的能力。
+
+因为政治上高度依赖外援，结果就是乌方在军事上也不得不始终按照外援时间表来安排战争进度，无法做到独立自主地进行战争。仍以坦克为例，欧洲各国在2023年1月底敲定了上述援助方案，2月初开始安排乌军训练，2月底开始陆续交付坦克，这就导致乌军不可能在4月以前把这些坦克投入作战。可想而知，乌军在2023年4月以前是无法发动进攻战役的，因此在未来的一个月内，俄军依然能够掌握主动权，而乌军则只能被动防御。
+
+高度依赖外援还带来了腐败问题，最近乌克兰国防部食品采购中被揭露的弊案就是一个例子。而腐败案件的曝光，本身又会阻碍乌克兰获得外援的能力。因此，泽连斯基政权不得不展开声势浩大的反腐行动（当然未尝没有借机排斥异己的打算），然而结果是又触及到了政权内的核心人物（比如国防部长列兹尼科夫），导致反腐无法进行下去。
+
+#### 3、其他国家方面
+
+西方列强依然分为两个集团，内部矛盾重重。英、美二帝同东欧国家里应外合，力主援助乌克兰，但实际上却不肯掏出多少装备，而是施压德、法给予援助。德、法二帝一方面抠抠索索，一方面又忍受不住内外压力，不得不掏出真金白银的装备。总体来看，西方列强因内部矛盾而各怀鬼胎，再加上自身军工产能的恢复也需要时间，目前给予乌克兰的军事援助仅能勉强满足继续作战的需要。
+
+同时，西方列强又不断施压另一帝国主义大国及印度，试图促使这两国转变立场，但这两国迄今不愿改变在经济上援助俄联邦的“中立”态度。俄帝的战争经济也因此得以继续运转。
+
+
+### 四、战争趋势
+
+因为国家机器的固有经济基础，乌方不得不依赖外援来保卫民族国家的独立，其结果就是乌军不可能在2023年4月以前转入进攻。无疑，只要自身的兵力、兵器尚未耗尽，俄军在此之前就能够继续其重点进攻。目前看来，俄军攻占巴赫穆特的概率较大，然而，接下去利曼—斯拉维扬斯克—克拉马托尔斯克—康斯坦丁诺夫卡防线才是对其真正的考验。乌军目前则只能进行被动防御，甚至在4月也不一定会发起进攻战役（考虑到部队训练以及汛期等气候因素），因此，他们只能寄希望于到进攻战役开始之前能通过防御尽可能地消耗和削弱俄军了。
+
+[](https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/609502886)
+▲ 原载《知乎》链接。
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-02-27-russo-ukrainian-war-anniversary-strategies-and-weapons.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-02-27-russo-ukrainian-war-anniversary-strategies-and-weapons.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..17b8a426
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-02-27-russo-ukrainian-war-anniversary-strategies-and-weapons.md
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "俄乌战争一周年・战略与武器"
+author: "吴昆玉"
+date : 2023-02-27 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/rCyX33l.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "自俄军于2022年2月24日正式入侵乌克兰以来，一年的战争已经造成了大量死伤和难民，对交战双方，以及整个欧洲安全局势都造成了巨大的影响。"
+---
+
+> 战场上，时间与科技应用成果呈反比，甚至说时间是高科技战果的敌人。
+
+
+
+俄乌战争一周年前夕，美国总统访乌克兰，中国外长赴俄罗斯，但中美早在慕尼黑见了面，外界猜测美、欧、俄各国都打不下去了，于是各自努力，试图说服交战双方接受谈判，让全世界都能喘口气。
+
+姑不论俄乌战争中的大国政治角力，纯就军事战略角度，俄乌战争是二战以后，第一场东西方正规军的大规模地面对抗，且其过程亦已颠覆若干传统军事常识，逼使全世界军队加速朝向21世纪现代化迈进。
+
+而且，这种改变并不只是增购无人机、海马斯（HIMARS）、肩射飞弹这么简单的答案。整个军队的组织与战役进行方式，甚至指挥管制的模式，都产生了深远的影响。因此本文尽量依著时序，提出若干问题，描述这些影响与改变，供读者们参考。
+
+
+▲ 2022年12月3日，乌克兰哈尔科夫，两名警员视察一堆俄军炮弹壳。
+
+
+### 俄军“速战速决”为什么失败？
+
+2022年2月24日，俄军南北多线同时向乌克兰发起攻击，空降精锐（VDV）突袭基辅西北不到10公里的安托诺夫机场（Antonov Airport），但很快便被乌军国民警卫队第四旅及附近的国土防卫部队（TDF）联手击败。第二天俄军在装甲部队支援下再次发起攻击，终于占领了安托诺夫机场，但已失掉突袭基辅的宝贵时间，安托诺夫机场也遭到严重破坏，暂时无法使用。后续俄军仍想依赖装甲部队快速突袭基辅，却在霍斯托梅（Hostomel）、布查（Bucha）等地遭遇乌军伏击，几乎全灭，斩首行动宣告失败。
+
+在其他战线，俄军的突入也相当不顺。北部战线，俄军补给车队仅能沿著有限道路前进，使乌军很好预期其路线。在基辅以北的某个村镇，TDF找上了一个刚买无人机来玩的15岁青少年，由他爸爸带著，半夜中定位了俄军卡车位置，一顿砲击便打烂了整个车队，使前进俄军无弹、无油、无粮，不得不停止在基辅郊外转入阵地防御，等待补给。同样的故事在多处上演，造就了大批俄军在路上遗弃战车、装甲车，让乌克兰农民开拖拉机拖回来拍卖的画面。
+
+哈尔科夫（Kharkiv）、苏梅（Soumy）等方向的俄军也前进受阻，东部顿内茨克（Donetsk）、卢甘斯克（Luhansk）本有乌军重兵驻防，自然也难前进。只有南部战线的俄军，自克里米亚（Crimea）跃出后，北冲札波罗热（Zaporizhzhia），西指赫尔松（Kherson）较有战果，但也未能快速攻占第一大港敖德萨（Odesa），完全封锁乌克兰海岸。本想速战速决，“首战即终战”的俄军，在第一个星期结束时，便已失掉速决战机，全线陷入胶著。
+
+俄军的打法，源自于2000年后车臣战役、乔治亚战役、2014夺占克里米亚的经验，组建“营级战术群”的操典教范。在战役开始前，先以网路战瘫痪敌方的网路通信及关键基础设施，远程火力打掉基辅电视塔、4G、5G基地台与通信中心，造成社会混乱与指挥炼中断。再以特种部队轻装突入，进行斩首或制造后方混乱，然后才是以营级战术群作为矛头快速突入，后续大部队跟上扩张战果，完成占领。这套打法用了快20年，几乎无往不利。
+
+但俄军没有料到的是：北约国家早已探知俄军企图，微软（Microsoft）等公司早就帮乌克兰建置好应对网路攻击的各种对应方案，不论电子情报、图像情报、人员情报均已到位，随时侦知俄军动态，并能整合进C4ISR系统（指挥、管制、通讯、计算、情报、监视、侦察）。且在开战前一个月，英国已预知战争将爆发，于是将数千枚NLAW反战车飞弹输入乌克兰，教会乌军使用，同时进来的还有美国的标枪与刺针。其布署重点即是基辅，搭配特种部队指导的伏击战和TDF的游击战，挑掉了俄军的手筋脚筋，使其斩首行动停在基辅前面，成了项庄舞剑。
+
+整个俄乌战争的关键，便决定于最初这一个礼拜。速战速决的失败，使得此后一年的战争型态，均属于某种型态的消耗战与阵地战，直至乌军9月开始的哈尔科夫与赫尔松反攻，才有点机动作战的样貌，但随即又转入战略僵持。
+
+俄乌战争第一周的战斗过程，是很值得台湾研究的。“速战速决”、“斩首行动”的成功要件有二：其一是绝对的“奇袭”，一旦丧失奇袭优势，便会大幅降低成功机率。其二是“兵力优势”，在技术质量、兵力数量、火力当量上必居其一，能够快速“辗碎”敌军有组织抵抗，才能达成速战速决，否则必归失败。
+
+而在防守的一方，成功抵挡的关键要素也有三个：一是精确且迅速的掌握情报，并能快速运用应对调度。二是善用技术、兵力、与火力，击中敌军致命弱点，而这个弱点通常就是敌军引以为傲的骄傲迷信。例如：用肩射飞弹打烂了俄军对战车的迷信，用无人机加砲兵戳中了补给车队这条软肋。
+
+最后，则是坚定的抵抗意志，和保卫后方稳定与军事运转的物理能量。精神战力与物质战力两者是分不开的，精神战力动员了TDF等民兵进行抵抗，以及民众参与民防、军工生产、修理等工作，提供作战能量。前方合理的兵力配置与后方关键基础设施保卫，则护卫了作战能量的持续运转，而其连结即是通讯系统，稳定的通讯才能确保情报与指令的传递，让军队与人民在危机中不慌不乱。这也是战争开始两天内，乌克兰便向马斯克（Elon Musk）喊话提供“星炼（Star Link）”的原因。
+
+
+▲ 2022年8月22日，乌克兰顿涅茨克地区，俄罗斯与乌克兰的战事期间，乌克兰士兵乘坐战车。
+
+
+### 纯粹是补给与成本的消耗战
+
+当第一波奇袭失败，俄乌便转入了战略僵持，其实就是消耗战与阵地战。消耗战比的不是什么新鲜武器或伟大战术，而是谁的人力、物力撑不下去而放弃。于是，既斩不了泽连斯基（Volodymyr Zelensky）的脑袋，又截不断基辅后援的俄军，不得不在3月底开始从基辅撤退，将主力转用于乌东与乌南。而这一转，就磨掉了11个月。
+
+在此阶段中，不论马里乌波尔（Mariupol）、北顿涅茨克（Severodonetsk）、以至近日的苏莱达尔（Soledar）战役，俄军的围城战与攻坚战均遵循同样的打法：砲兵与火箭弹火海洗地——战车与步兵突袭——发现敌军据点后召来砲兵与火箭砲夷平敌阵地——步兵不惜伤亡冲锋——再召来砲兵轰击，如此反复循环。非常二战式的打法，却简单、粗暴、有效，从两次在车臣打格罗兹尼（Gronzy），到叙利亚内战，再到现在乌克兰，都是同一套打法。差别只是，由于乌军防空飞弹布得太密，俄军战机与直升机较少上天轰炸。
+
+乌军与俄军系出同源，原本也是同样打法，但随即发现乌军根本吃不消这样的消耗战。乌克兰只有4000万人，但俄罗斯有1.4亿人，虽说师出无名，使普京不敢征召动用全国男丁上前线，但光是瓦格纳佣兵召集的囚犯军，就够让乌军头痛了。
+
+于是，在美国与北约纷纷解囊提供155砲、海马斯火箭等新式武器后，乌军也玩起了美军“阻绝战术”。机动化长程砲兵可以在俄军火砲射程外游走，专打俄军的补给基地、兵营、雷达、电战设施，以及指挥中心，实施所谓的“点穴战”。俄军的物质辗压战术，需要大量的砲弹、油料供应，乌军便专挑这些穴道下手。只要得手，俄军至少在一段时间内动不了，甚至因此崩溃，赫尔松反攻就是这么打赢的。
+
+但美、欧等国的高科技现代装备，其成本是很高的。一枚标枪飞弹要价18万镁，刺针飞弹4万镁，M982神剑精准砲弹要7万镁，海马斯用的M30或M31制导火箭弹，一枚便要20万美金。在30年来没有大国大战，仅有对付小国反恐战争的环境下，欧美各国自己的武器载台与弹药库存都很有限，援乌已经援到口袋见底，使得乌军能够取得的高科技武器虽然质量过硬，但数量不足。因此“阻援打点”尚可，用于大规模会战则有心无力，使得这些高科技武器纷纷入乌，却也无法帮乌军创造绝对优势，打一场决定性会战。
+
+所谓决定性会战，是将敌我双方主力集结，在短时间内包围歼灭其中一方的大部份有生战力，使其无力再战，但现今俄乌双方都无法做到这点。其关键原因就是人力、物力，都无法达到大规模会战的要求，无法在狂轰滥炸之后，立即继之以大规模装甲部队与步兵的突进，以完成巩固与整顿，有效占领。最接近此种会战标准的战役是赫尔松反攻，但其结果仍是让俄军主力逃脱到第聂伯河（Dnipro）东岸，乌军仅是收复了失去的土地。
+
+一如一战、韩战、越战，一场没有决定性会战的消耗战，其结局必然是在谈判桌上，取得双方都不满意却还可接受的停火妥协。即使谈判条件不可接受，也必须忍受，因为双方都打累了，更不能忍受无穷无尽的消耗。杀敌三千，自损八百，每天三千又三千，八百再八百，不论那一方都会被拖垮。
+
+
+▲ 2022年12月23日，乌克兰顿涅茨克，一名乌克兰士兵向俄军防线发射火战炮。
+
+
+### 防御是较强的战争型式
+
+俄乌战场颠覆了许多传统军事概念，洗刷不少军人的三观。例如：从二战闪击战以来，不论美军、俄军，开战第一优先便是夺取“制空权”。此名词的定义，就是我空军可以自由的在天上飞行，滥炸地面目标，而敌军无法奈我何。夺取制空权的第一要件是消灭敌军空军，第二是消灭敌军防空飞弹。但在乌克兰战场，双方都没能取得完整的制空权，也打不光敌军防空飞弹，于是双方被迫打一场缺乏制空权与空中密接支援的现代战争。
+
+同样的场景也出现在地面。步兵曾被誉为“战场的女王”，但俄乌战场上的步兵，大多数时间都在躲砲弹，连开枪的机会都不常出现，遑论拼刺刀。战车在二战后被当成无敌的铁骑，但在肩射式飞弹面前脆弱得像片饼干，“战车无用论”在俄乌开战后声量大增。
+
+砲兵虽是俄乌战场的主角，但固定阵地的砲兵却迟早被敌军反砲战或无人机打烂，机动砲兵与精准弹药的游击式打了就跑，反成砲战主流。战壕所组成的战线原本是难以攻克的障碍，但常常被绕过包围。高地与反斜面向来是防御者的圣地，但在无人机、游荡炸药（Loitering Munition，也被称为自杀式无人机[Suicide Drone]），与精准砲弹出现后，反斜面不再是安全处所。“进攻就是最佳的防御”这句铁则也加上了问号，因为进攻几乎必定得付出高伤亡的代价，其CP值远不如防御。
+
+也就是说，虽然战争定律仍逃不出克劳塞维茨（Carl von Clausewitz）那句“防御是较强的战争型式”，但防御的型式也在改变。加固碉堡、战壕线迟早会被绕过与攻破，更有效的防御是后方有装甲部队支援逆袭的机动防御，或由TDF与游击队组成的沼泽式防御。其作战目标不是死守至最后一兵一卒，而是袭击敌军侧背，或攻击其脆弱的补给线。守中带攻，攻中带守，是这场俄乌阵地战与消耗战的特色。
+
+换言之，分散布署，却能迅速集合，火力集中，像“水”一样聚散自如，难以一举消灭，却又不至于备多力分，成为现今“沼泽式防御”的主流。乌军防御虽仍以“拒止”为主，但有时乌军被俄军打开一个缺口，逆袭切断反能成建制的“歼灭”俄军营级战术群。
+
+乌军与俄军的防御经验是台湾必须深入研究的课题，从防空到地面都是。因为台海作战的主题就是“防御”。我们没有能力与对岸争夺制空权，但我们只要有足够数量与良好配置的防空系统——包括飞弹与机砲——一样能让共军无法取得制空权。在地面上，死守阵地拒止敌军，不见得是最好的选项，诱出敌军再歼灭其有生力量，可能是更好的防御手段。
+
+
+▲ 2022年12月24日，乌克兰哈尔科夫，一辆炮弹装甲车向俄军战线发射炮弹。
+
+
+### 时间是高新武器的最大敌人
+
+俄乌战争成为各国高科技武器的展示场，时时让人眼睛一亮。但这些亮点往往只是昙花一现，没有集结足够数量形成“决定性”力量，不久之后便让俄军找到对应方案，予以反制，于是又归于沉寂。就像库斯克会战时的虎式坦克一样，2000米外击杀T-34，吓到俄军腿软，但数量太少（据说只有一个营），不足以产生决定性，终究还是得含恨吞败。“战果 = 技术 × 数量 × 战术”，这条定律谁都逃不过，在俄乌战场上便是如此。
+
+一开始，乌军步兵肩射式飞弹令人惊艳，于是俄军战车尽量不进入城镇，也不带头猛冲，只要退到2至4公里外朝乌军开砲，步兵也就没皮条了。其次是无人机，先是消费级无人机监侦敌军动态，再来是载货无人机带火燄瓶与60迫砲弹投进俄军阵地，给俄军带来不少困扰，一个多月后，俄军取得大疆机（DJI）的后门权限，找到乌军飞手位置，再以砲兵歼灭，造成不小的损失。乌军则找人写了程式，把每一台弄到手的大疆机都用程式覆盖，使其不向后台传送位置资讯。于是俄军转向星炼下手，经过数月摸索，找到抓住星炼接收端讯号定位的办法，又把乌军野战小组胖揍一顿。土耳其造的“拜卡”（TB-2）侦打一体无人机曾在战场上大放异彩，但后来便销声匿迹，据说是被俄军找到反制方法给打光了。
+
+开战约六个月后，俄军的库存压箱底飞弹都差不多打光了，于是向伊朗买了大批见证者-136自杀无人机，每台约2至5万欧元，制导精确度颇差，但攻击发电厂这种大目标还是很划算的。乌克兰雷达一开始很难发现低空飞掠的见证者，后来用欧美飞弹防御，成本实在太高且不对称，即使较便宜的NASAMS飞弹系统，其使用的AIM-120飞弹，一枚要价超过100万美元。地面防空火砲的数量与涵盖面又不足，使得见证者频频得手，乌克兰人民必须度过一个没有电的冬天。等到欧美防空火砲系统与较便宜的飞弹逐渐到位，见证者便又不灵了。
+
+海马斯也是一样，起初海马斯的70公里射程，让俄军补给基地与指挥中心损失惨重，于是俄军将弹药库往后放，同时改进了无人机防御系统，乌军就打不到这些高价值目标了。这些战例，完整演示了高科技武器在战场上的生命历程。一开始，高科技武器会令敌人手足无措，但若无足够数量，便无法在会战中产生决定性。只要无决定性的消耗战拖上3至6个月，敌军一定能找到反制方法，让高科技无用的低科技土法炼钢（例如后撤补给站），可能一个月内就想出来了。所以，高科技武器、新式武器与战法，必须在平日便大量屯储，而且第一次出场时，便要搭配战术进行决定性会战，才能在敌人震惊恢复前，便拿到预定的战役圣杯。等到敌人学会应对之法，再强的高科技也将趋于无用。
+
+在产业上，时间与科技成长成正比；但在战场上，时间却与科技应用成果呈反比，甚至可说时间是高科技战果的敌人。我们不能把真实战场当作高科技的实验室，那会让我们犯下“逐次用兵”的错误。没有人也没有任何大国，受得了无穷无尽的消耗战，要打，就要将所有好东西一次投入，迅速取得决定性战果，逼使敌军放弃或投降。这在台海的海空作战中，更为关键。
+
+
+▲ 2023年2月18日，乌克兰顿涅茨克，一场俄罗斯对乌克兰的袭击中，一支步枪和弹壳。
+
+
+### 结语：台湾不是乌克兰，但须从乌克兰学到教训
+
+俄乌战争中可以讨论的事项非常多，篇幅所限，此处仅能列出若干议题与思考供参。比较大的问题是，自俄乌战争开始，便流传著“今日乌克兰，明日台湾”的口号，这句话在政治上当作警语也许没错，但在军事上却离现实甚远。
+
+台湾不是乌克兰，乌克兰打的主要都是陆战，但台湾则多是海战、空战。反而乌军击沉莫斯科号（Moskva），以无人快艇突入港内重伤马卡洛夫号（Admiral Makarov）的战例，更值台湾参考。
+
+而且中国不是俄罗斯，中国是富有的制造大国，是无人机的王牌生产基地，台湾要面对的状况更为复杂。当我们研究俄乌战争战例时，时时要谨记两者环境的不同，弄清楚其运作机制与原理、效果、限制，不能照搬照抄。否则错误的问题必会得到错误的答案；在战场上，错误是会让人国破家亡的。
+
+最后，提醒台湾的政军高层，抗敌意志不是叫大家支持政府而已，政府必须让人民的热情有个出口，有个贡献、付出、参与的管道，否则很快会因战损而转为抱怨和失望。乌克兰的国土防卫部队（TDF）成份复杂，有亚速营那种战力超强的，也有大批老弱妇孺加入的带枪民兵，仅能协助维持后方秩序。乌克兰女性纷纷拿枪捍卫祖国，不全是因为爱国意识，而是她们拿起枪才能保障自己不至遭俄军性侵，俄军军纪之坏是有名声的，布查惨案仅是其中一例而已。所以，千万不要看不起民兵，适当运用的民兵，同样能产生奇效。
+
+我们不期待战争，但必须搞懂战争，从战略战术到每一个士兵的运作细节，坦然面对残酷的画面与现实，才能让我们制定出贴近现实的作战方案，应对敌人的武力威胁。我们不只要知道“为谁而战？为何而战？Who？Why？”更须理解“如何作战？（How？）”如此才能帮我们做出正确的决策，精确的完成战备，以吓阻敌人的侵犯。
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-02-27-sunlight.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-02-27-sunlight.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..92ea6827
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-02-27-sunlight.md
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "阳光"
+author: "江南藜果"
+date : 2023-02-27 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/iBDedeN.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+太阳照不到我的海棠
+
+海棠在楼房的北侧
+
+依然成长
+
+开花
+
+
+⠀
+
+阳光被楼房们夹扁了
+
+每天中午约两个小时
+
+漏下来的时光和
+
+阳光
+
+我舍不得浪费 早早
+
+⠀
+
+搬出茶桌和椅子
+
+看书写诗刷微信
+
+和抽烟
+
+有时光着膀子
+
+让我的更大面积
+
+和阳光相拥
+
+⠀
+
+这就是我的
+
+小确幸
+
+在外面紧张危险
+
+又无所事事的
+
+人潮之外
+
+躲在楼房挤压的
+
+阳光里
+
+幸存
+
+⠀
+
+就像那六株海棠
+
+虽然在阴暗角落
+
+虽然逃不过
+
+倒春寒
+
+在冷风里
+
+也没瑟瑟发抖
+
+⠀
+
+活着
+
+就是我作为一名
+
+中国人的
+
+幸福
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-02-27-twitter.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-02-27-twitter.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..42939bb9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-02-27-twitter.md
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "鸟鸣"
+author: "江南藜果"
+date : 2023-02-27 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/ZrkhyRi.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+鸟鸣声
+
+在我的想象里
+
+天不亮就开始叽叽喳喳了
+
+我窗户封着三层玻璃
+
+在床上听不见外面的声响
+
+
+⠀
+
+这就像我在用的互联网
+
+隔着一堵厚厚的墙
+
+听不到外界的声音
+
+⠀
+
+我夜里睡得少
+
+本该喜欢赖床
+
+晒太阳也还早
+
+但我经常迫不及待
+
+移椅出户
+
+舒舒服服地听
+
+那些鸟鸣
+
+那些各式各样的
+
+鸟鸣声
+
+⠀
+
+据说某地公共场所比如地铁
+
+在查行人的手机
+
+看有没装不合适的
+
+墙外的app
+
+装了就要删掉
+
+还要被教育一番
+
+必要时
+
+可上（强制）手段
+
+⠀
+
+（人问为什么
+
+我答在开会了呗）
+
+⠀
+
+培训指南上说
+
+有一种叫推特
+
+twitter的
+
+图标就是一只
+
+蓝色的
+
+飞鸟
+
+⠀
+
+（Twitter的中文意思就是
+
+鸟鸣）
+
+⠀
+
+我余生最大的愿望
+
+只剩下了
+
+在纽约
+
+和已润的亲人相聚
+
+并且
+
+舒舒服服地晒
+
+那个更纯净天空里的
+
+太阳
+
+自由自在地听
+
+各式各样叽叽喳喳的
+
+鸟鸣
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-02-28-ignored-role-of-ccp-in-february-28-incident.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-02-28-ignored-role-of-ccp-in-february-28-incident.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c10bbbc8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-02-28-ignored-role-of-ccp-in-february-28-incident.md
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "二二八事件中被忽視的中共角色"
+author: "William"
+date : 2023-02-28 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/ltYkAJy.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+台灣紀念二二八事件年復一年，來龍去脈已基本為人周知。然而，每次二二八受難團體總是強調當時的國民政府對他們的迫害，卻幾乎很少提及事件中那些所謂的反抗暴政起義軍中凡是規模較大的都和中共有說不清道不明的關係。當然，這其實不是什麼秘密，很多公開資料已經披露出這一鐵證，也有不少學者寫過相關論文和資料，但是由於一些自相矛盾的原因，這一事實始終不為大眾傳媒所報導，不為普通民眾所熟知。
+
+
+
+提到二二八，有一個名字始終繞不過去，那就是事件中實力最強影響最大的反政府武裝二七部隊的領導者，謝雪紅。
+
+按照中共官方公布的資訊，謝雪紅的關鍵經歷如下：
+
+> 谢雪红1901年出生于台湾，1925年加入中国共产党。1947年11月，台湾民主自治同盟在香港成立，谢雪红担任主席。
+
+
+▲ 中共黨報有關謝雪紅生平介紹。
+
+1928年，在中共的大力指導和協助下，謝雪紅等關鍵人物在台灣成立台灣共產黨。當時，絕大多數台灣共產黨員也同時是中共黨員。不過在日本政府的強力鎮壓下，台灣共產黨很快就消亡在了歷史中。謝雪紅也被日本當局關押了9年。
+
+1945年台灣光復，但國民政府入主台灣後忽視了本省人的利益訴求，引發了省籍矛盾，最終造成了1947年的二二八事件。其中，沈潛多年的謝雪紅終於嗅到了機會，在台中公開叛亂，宣布成立「台中人民政府」（多麼「中共」的名字），並組織二七部隊佔領了整個台中。謝雪紅所領導的反國民政府力量也是事件中最大的一支力量。當時還有很多其他的反抗組織也和中共眉來眼去，比如台灣省自治青年同盟的綱領第一條就宣稱「建設高度自治，完成新中國模範省」。這個新中國在當時的語境下，就是呼應中共的一直在宣稱的那個「新中國」。
+
+最後，二二八所有「起義軍」被鎮壓，謝雪紅在中共相關組織的接應下，從香港逃入中共控制區域，出任中共內部多個高級職位。當然，她最後中共在的內部清洗之中悲慘度過一生。中共官方評價她即使被迫害仍然心向黨國。
+
+> 庆祝中国共产党成立三十九周年，建设社会主义大跃进，人民恐后争光。共产党是东升的太阳，照遍全国，光芒万丈。照到那里，那里有诗篇，照到那里，那里有歌唱。歌唱毛泽东，歌唱共产党。——《“七一”书感》谢雪红这是1960年中国共产党成立39周年之际，台盟首任主席谢雪红回首往昔，感慨万千，所作的诗作，以诗言志，表达对党的真切情感。谢雪红的晚年，应该说是曲曲折折。彼时作诗的谢雪红已于1957年被划为“右派”，并被解除了一切盟内外职务。但即便如此，谢雪红也没有就此消沉，仍然心怀着对中共的一片赤胆忠诚，保持着一份中共党员的坚定信仰。
+
+
+▲ 中共至今還在紀念二二八事件。
+
+順便一提，國民政府在所謂的「台灣白色恐佈時期」抓過不少共諜。裡面確是有牽連的無辜民眾，但更多卻是貨真價實的中共間諜。為此，中共專門建立了一個西山無名英雄紀念廣場來紀念這些隱蔽在台灣戰場上的中共英雄。
+
+> 由于叛徒出卖，岛内地下党组织遭到严重破坏，大批地下党员被捕，其中被国民党当局公审处决的有1100余人。
+
+當然，時至今日，這些被中共刻在石碑上的共諜很多已經被台灣政府平反搖身一變成為了所謂的白色恐怖的受難者。
+
+其實，這些也是現如今很多人可以忽略所謂二二八和白色恐佈的那些與中共有關事實的原因。因為，這些所謂的威權受難者在當時有不少都是不折不扣的中共黨員，甚至是共諜。誠然，按照如今民主自由的觀念來講，並不能這樣簡單給這些人定罪，甚至處以死刑。可是，現實卻是，面對被中共威脅的台灣，很多今天的深綠和獨派卻又巴不得將統促黨之流的中共在台側翼剝皮抽筋。所以如果將這些所謂事實都攤開來放在民眾面前，估計很多深綠獨派又不得不承認按照他們平常的言論，這些人就是該殺。這就是矛盾的根本來源。
+
+一方面，綠營要繼續在如今早就和平轉型，民主化的台灣拿當年的二二八或者白色恐怖當成政治提款機，一方面按照他們如今的言論和做法似乎又不得不側面印證當年老蔣殺得沒有什麼問題。所以為了兼顧兩者平衡，他們往往在提到這些歷史時，要麼片面強調，要麼直接編造，祇留下對他們來說有好處的部份。
+
+《返校》就是這麼一個例子。返校的原型鐘浩東和傅煒亮都是貨真價實的認同中共的中共黨員，並幫助中共在台宣傳。但是電影改編時，卻忽視他們本身的身分，將事件也改為了「因為閱讀從來沒被禁過的《泰戈爾詩集》而被處死」的故事。或者原創團隊也知道，如果挑明了這一切，今時今日飽受威脅的台灣觀眾會不會覺得這些共產黨殺得好，老蔣幹的好？
+
+綠營其實有兩條路，要麼遵循自由民主的路線到底，平反這些共諜譴責威權國民黨的同時，也要容忍和尊重統促黨王炳忠這類的側翼，不要動不動就對他們喊打喊殺，恨不得生啖其肉。要麼就喊肅清內奸，同時也要承認老蔣當年殺共諜有其特殊的歷史背景，不要老是拿這些共諜事件來當提款機。
+
+不然，過去和現在，整個行為，看起來仍然分外滑稽。
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-03-01-russo-ukrainian-war-anniversary-changes-in-russia.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-03-01-russo-ukrainian-war-anniversary-changes-in-russia.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..8762ca43
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-03-01-russo-ukrainian-war-anniversary-changes-in-russia.md
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "俄乌战争一周年・俄罗斯的变化"
+author: "龚珏"
+date : 2023-03-01 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/XqwImYP.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "自俄军于2022年2月24日正式入侵乌克兰以来，一年的战争已经造成了大量死伤和难民，对交战双方，以及整个欧洲安全局势都造成了巨大的影响。"
+---
+
+> 民众因反战而被判刑，更恶毒的人登上权力舞台。
+
+
+
+精英失声，暴徒崛起，冷漠依旧：开战一年，俄罗斯发生了哪些变化？
+
+
+### 精英变成小卒
+
+2022年2月21日，俄罗斯召开联邦安全会议（Sovbez），讨论承认乌克兰东部亲俄傀儡武装控制的顿涅茨克和卢甘斯克这两个“人民共和国”“独立”的问题。后来我们知道，正是在这场会议上，普京跨出了最终决定入侵乌克兰的收不回的一步。通常闭门进行的安全会议这一次却被镜头记录并报道，许多评论者后来认为，这是普京把自己的决策与并不知情的上层精英捆绑在一起的计谋。
+
+会议上的几个细节似乎能够佐证这种论断。普京的亲密战友，安全会议秘书帕特鲁舍夫（Nikolay Patrushev）使用了一连串委婉的虚拟语气，谨慎地“提议”说，如果美方能满足俄方的各种条件，那么“响应一下”拜登的提议也“算是合理”。普京对此没有特别回应，然而随后当对外情报局局长纳雷什金（Sergey Naryshkin）委婉地附和帕特鲁舍夫，指出“可以”给西方“最后一个机会”时，普京失去了耐心，当着全体高官和媒体镜头，用一连串嘲讽和逼问把自己的这另一位战友吓得语无伦次。
+
+这诡异的一幕让人可以推断，哪怕是帕特鲁舍夫、纳雷什金这样通常被认为普京极为信赖的情报机构掌门人，对于入侵乌克兰这样重大决策的出台，也不仅没有发言权，甚至都未必有知情权。而全面入侵一周年以来，各家媒体深度调查普京决策过程的报道不断往这个不知情者名单中写入了越来越多大人物的名字——俄罗斯名义上的二号人物总理米舒斯京、三号人物总统办公厅主任瓦伊诺（Anton Vaino）、主管宣传工作的第一副主任格罗莫夫（Alexey Gromov）、外交部长拉夫罗夫……尽管几乎所有报道都将入侵称为普京及其“小圈子”的秘密决定，但如果连上面这些人物全都与之无缘，那么现实让人不禁怀疑，猜测到底谁在这个小圈子里是否还有意义，抑或我们应该直接承认，俄罗斯的政体已完全滑入普京的个人主义专政（personalism），而如果用专门报道俄罗斯精英政治的记者佩尔采夫（Andrey Pertsev）的话来形容，那一天安全会议上发生的就是“集体普京之死”。
+
+可想而知，为什么观察家在开战伊始预测的“精英分裂”迟迟没有发生，相反，许多原先仕途见顶的中高层官员发现，发表好战言论或穿上迷彩服去战场（实则往往是摄影棚）拍一些战地写真很可能引起普京的特别关注，从而重启自己的升迁可能。其中最夺人眼球的当属前总统、总理，现安全会议副主席梅德韦杰夫。一向以西化、开明著称的他摇身一变，成为嗓门最响亮的鹰派之一，时不时在自己的电报频道上羞辱国外政要，对西方和乌克兰进行频繁到令人腻烦的核威慑，或为俄罗斯的入侵赋予费解的神学使命。就连战后始终回避相关评论的莫斯科市长索比亚宁（Sergey Sobyanin）在去年年底也意识到继续沉默的危险，便加入了这场军装cosplay大赛。
+
+
+▲ 2023年2月9日，国安会议副主席兼统一俄罗斯党主席梅德韦杰夫，参观位于鄂木斯克的交通工程厂。
+
+起初被期待会集体辞职抗议的所谓“体制内自由派”——央行行长纳比乌林娜（Elvira Nabiullina）、财政部长西卢阿诺夫（Anton Siluanov）等才华横溢的金融技术官僚不仅始终保持沉默，还迅速投入战斗，为普京政权的金融体系抵挡住开战后的制裁组合拳冲击。这种职业成功与道德失败的结合被拿来与纳粹经济部长沙赫特（Hjalmar Schacht）相提并论。当大家把讨论的焦点聚焦于技术官僚的道德困境时，专注于挖掘俄高层腐败的媒体“项目”网刊登的针对另一位体制内自由派代表人物，储蓄银行（Sberbank）行长格列夫（German Glef）贪腐与滥权的长篇调查向我们揭示了理解事实的另一个维度——这些“体制内自由派”精英的个人利益早已和腐败的普京政权捆绑在一起，一旦普京决定走向战争，那么除了当一个忠诚的小卒，他们不会有别的选择。
+
+
+### 大锤变成象征
+
+如果说真存在这样的“分裂”，它更多发生在主导战争的各支势力内部。
+
+例如，以FSB（联邦安全局）前上校、顿涅茨克傀儡政权前“国防部长”、因参与击落MH17航班被缺席判处终身监禁的斯特列尔科夫（Igor Strelkov）为代表的一系列“战地记者”、军事博主开战后在俄罗斯获得大量关注，他们不断在自己的电报频道上抨击俄军缺乏果断、指挥无能，并唱衰俄军作战前景。
+
+但这与其说是“分裂”，毋宁说是围绕利益分配产生的分歧，如斯特列尔科夫背后通常被认为有极右翼寡头马洛费耶夫（Konstantin Malofeev）与FSB派系撑腰，由于情报严重失实导致俄军贸然出兵的后者自然乐于通过贬低国防部的作战水准来挽回自己的形象。国防部亦逐渐布局防御，通过各种收买手段，将大量军事博主“招安”。克里姆林宫同样非常乐于利用乃至激起这种可管控的分歧，为外界营造一种言论多元、自由的幻相，并确保民意对战事不利的不满情绪始终集中于个别指挥官，而非战争本身乃至普京的统治，当事人也各自凭着自己的政治嗅觉领会这种“小骂大帮忙”游戏的红线所在。一个绝佳的例子就是斯特列尔科夫前不久与一位曾志同道合的作家进行的对谈直播，两人“畅想”着俄罗斯战败后的未来，然而当作家表示自己坚定支持狱中的俄罗斯反对派领袖纳瓦利内（Alexey Navalny）后，斯特列尔科夫很快就忿忿地中止了节目。
+
+
+▲ 2016年6月17日，圣彼得堡，俄国商人普里戈金（Yevgeny Prigozhin）在圣彼得堡国际经济论坛出现。
+
+开战一年来俄罗斯阵营涌现的最耀眼“明星”，也堪称这场残酷侵略战争精神之道成肉身的，当属人称“普京厨子”的普里戈金（Yevgeny Prigozhin）。
+
+这名曾有十年牢狱经历，靠卖热狗起家的彼得堡商人同时坐拥“瓦格纳”雇佣军、有数千员工的“水军工厂”（Troll Factory），以及包括了“联邦新闻社”（RIA FAN）在内至少十几家可疑新闻网站的“媒体工厂”，构成了克里姆林宫对外发动混合战争、干涉他国内政的组合拳。
+
+随着俄军表现疲软，这位高调的商人决定不再满足于只做政权的代理人，而是正式登上政治舞台展开厮杀。他大方地承认自己与雇佣军和水军工厂的关系，克里姆林宫的官僚建制和法制秩序则成了他发动混合战的战场。每当俄正规军战事不利，普里戈金及其下属就会极尽辱骂俄军最高指挥层之能事。普里戈金在克里姆林宫的默许下，从俄罗斯的监狱系统中非法招募了数万名重刑犯前往乌克兰作战，大量媒体调查和战场分析讲述了这些刑犯如何被用作炮灰，而违抗命令或开小差者往往会遭到法外枪决。
+
+今年一月，首批服役期满的囚犯雇佣兵由普里戈金本人亲自宣布赦免，在他发布的照片和视频中，俄罗斯媒体识别出了大量盗抢惯犯、杀人犯，乃至弑亲犯，他们中的一位武装抢劫犯甚至受到普京本人授勋。在俄新社发布的一段视频中，普里戈金对这些曾经的重刑犯，如今的“国家英雄”传授了重返社会的人生经验：“少喝酒，别碰毒品，不要强奸女人，别惹是生非，警察应该尊重你们。”
+
+最能够体现普里戈金残忍作风和俄罗斯法制秩序荡然无存的当属“大锤事件”——2022年11月13日，普里戈金旗下的一家电报频道发布了一段视频，显示囚犯雇佣兵努任（Yevgeny Nuzhin）被不明身份人士用大锤活活砸死，显然是为了报复他此前在战场上投降乌克兰，并接受乌媒采访发表对瓦格纳不利的言论。对于这种明显的公开法外处决，俄罗斯当局没有做出任何回应，总统发言人佩斯科夫（Dmitriy Peskov）甚至直接表示“这不关我们的事”。普里戈金收到了默许乃至赞赏的信号，迅速将大锤变成瓦格纳的公关符号，宣称将一把沾血的大锤寄给了宣布“瓦格纳”为恐怖组织的欧洲议会，西方国家驻俄使馆被不明人士投掷大锤，普里戈金自己甚至在新年来临前推出了一款兔子舞大锤造型的奶油蛋糕。
+
+其他官员和宣传员也嗅到了风向变化。议会第三大党“公正俄罗斯”党主席米罗诺夫（Sergey Mironov）发布了与普里戈金签名款大锤的合影，“今日俄罗斯”（RT）电视台总编西蒙尼扬（Margarita Simonyan）赞美普里戈金的“极端礼貌”，而部分国家杜马议员则公开支持“瓦格纳”招募的重刑犯雇佣兵火线入党并参选议员。如政治观察家科列斯尼科夫（Andrey Kolesnikov）所言，作为法外暴力象征的大锤受到如此欢迎，意味着展示性的不道德行径已上升为俄罗斯的国家教条。
+
+
+▲ 2022年9月21日，莫斯科，俄总统普京下令“局部动员”后，防暴警察于一次抗议活动中拘留示威者。
+
+
+### 良心变成抹黑
+
+如果说2022年的俄罗斯法制秩序对于“战争党”的态度是无限纵容，那么其对于“和平党”的态度就是无限压制。
+
+根据俄维权组织“警局信息”（OVD-Info）的统计，自开战以来，俄罗斯共有19586人因参加反战集会或表达反战立场而被拘捕。为了让镇压机器有形式上的开动理由，当局创立了“抹黑”（discreditation）和“造谣”（fake）两种罪名，前者往往处以罚款、拘留等行政处罚，后者则最高可判十五年徒刑。著名维权律师奇科夫（Pavel Chikov）认为，这是当代俄罗斯历史上首次可以仅仅因一个人的立场与官方立场相悖而将其逮捕、起诉、监禁：“你可以亲眼看到战争中发生了什么，可以阅读联合国等国际权威机构的文件和官方声明，可以阅读国际刑事法院及其调查材料。但如果你说出来，那你就违背了国防部的立场，你就会被判七、八年刑。”
+
+“警局信息”记录了一年以来的5846起“抹黑”立案和447起反战相关刑事立案（其中“造谣”罪139起）。点赞某个政治不正确的帖子、把指甲涂成乌克兰国旗色，或给乌克兰诗人纪念碑献花都足以构成“抹黑”。而一些最广为人知的“造谣”刑案则包括：反对派政治家亚申（Iliya Yashin）因在线上直播中讨论布查屠杀而被判八年半徒刑；记者波诺马连科（Maria Ponomarenko）因发帖提及俄军轰炸马里乌波尔剧院而被判六年徒刑；莫斯科区议员戈里诺夫（Alexey Gorinov）因在议会讨论时称在战争期间举行儿童绘画比赛不合时宜而被判近七年徒刑；艺术家斯克奇连科（Alexandra Skochilenko）因将一家超市的价签替换为马里乌波尔平民遇难数字而被求刑十年……值得一提的是，根据一些统计，在俄罗斯普通杀人罪判罚的平均刑期为八年半。
+
+独立媒体同样遭到致命打击。广播、报纸、电视和网络媒介领域各自最有代表性的独立媒体——“莫斯科回声”电台、《新报》（Novaya Gazeta）、“雨”电视台（Dozhd）、“美杜莎”网（Meduza）全都遭遇关停或屏蔽，几乎所有报道战争真实情况的外媒、独立媒体和地方媒体也都被赋予羞辱性的“外国代理人”法律地位，并且遭到关停或屏蔽。Facebook、Instagram、Twitter这样的国外社交媒体均被屏蔽，前两者所属的Meta公司甚至被宣布为“极端主义组织”。但这种极限打压仍不能满足普京政权，2023年1月，“美杜莎”网被进一步赋予了“不受欢迎组织”的法律地位，意味着任何“参与”这家俄语世界最受欢迎独立媒体“活动”的行为（包括但不限于撰稿、受访、打赏、分享）在俄罗斯都会成为违法乃至犯罪举动。
+
+
+▲ 2023年2月25日，莫斯科郊外，“祖国保卫者日”的武器展览会。
+
+网络审查在2022年的急剧增长可以通过去年11月被黑客获取、今年2月大规模发酵的俄罗斯大型网络监控部门“射频总中心”（FGUP GRChTs）的诸多内部数据证实。例如，2021年，该中心分别删除或屏蔽了3586条“虚假信息”和7274条“煽动集会和骚乱”信息，到了2022年，这两个数字分别暴增到110684条和30596条。2022年9月，该中心将既往向上级每日报告涉普京网络负面舆情的频率改为每周报告，因为发布普京负面消息的信息源已“急剧减少”。此外，中心员工还在报告中抱怨可以使用的VPN越来越少，影响了他们的工作效率。讽刺的是，当该中心员工发现中心数据被黑，自己的存在大白于天下后，他们在员工群内表示：“下一步就是‘射频中心’雇佣军，再然后就是大锤。”
+
+而在文化界，2022年底通过的全面禁止LGBT“宣传”法案给俄罗斯的文化界带来苏联解体以来从未有过的审查压力。但凡公开表达反战的作家、音乐人、导演、演员几乎悉数被赋予“外国代理人”头衔，著名作家格鲁霍夫斯基（Dmitriy Glukhovsky）甚至因反战贴“抹黑”俄军而遭通缉。莫斯科的图书馆流出了若干份禁书清单，除了那些反战的“外国代理人”俄罗斯作家外，还有许多知名海外作家乃至经典作家，如村上春树、迈克尔·坎宁安（Michael Cunningham）、斯蒂芬·弗莱（Stephen Fry）、莎拉·沃特丝（Sarah Waters）、让·热内（Jean Genet）、吉本芭娜娜、乔治·奥威尔、斯蒂芬·金、乔·阿克罗比（Joe Abercrombie）、尼尔·盖曼（Neil Gaiman）、J.K.罗琳。在音乐界，演出场所乃至卡拉OK都收到了上级发放的问题艺人黑名单。在戏剧界，剧院将反战导演的作品被从剧目中撤除，或是虚伪地在导演的姓名栏里写上“导演”，而隐去他们的本名。反战演员被剧院开除，集体反战的剧院则直接被关停。而在电影界，西方电影退出后，本已为数不多的新片中又有不少因演员反战而无法上映，正当制片人尚在犹豫是否需要重拍有关段落的时候，影院已经迎来了史无前例的倒闭潮，一些影院开始铤而走险，播放未经授权的好莱坞大片。
+
+
+### 只有冷漠不变
+
+诡异的是，无论是战场上的颓势、大量兵员伤亡、经济的萎靡，还是法制溃烂、自由遭到碾压，都无法改变俄罗斯民调数字中战争和普京近乎一成不变的高支持率。
+
+即使是独立民调机构列瓦达中心（Levada Center）做出的结果，对战争的支持率也始终在70—80%的高位徘徊。这一结果也常被乌克兰各界解读为“80%的俄罗斯人支持普京的战争”。然而，对战时状态俄罗斯民调在方法论上的可靠性一直存在巨大争议。如著名社会学家尤金（Grigoriy Yudin）就指出，俄罗斯民调的回应率本身就极低，战争时期更是如此，换言之，绝大多数人根本不愿回答民调问题，因此做出的结果也应该打一个很大的折扣。另外，也有诸如Russian Field这样的新式民调机构尝试采用更私人的问题提法（“如果能够回到过去并取消开战决定，您是否会这么做”），这样评估出的战争支持率就会下降到52%。
+
+
+▲ 2023年2月23日，莫斯科，“祖国保卫者日”全国庆祝活动期间，俄总统普京出席无名烈士墓献花仪式。
+
+此外，许多社会学家和政治科学家都指出，普京政权的长期威权统治在俄罗斯造就了一个政治冷漠的沉默大多数，他们与当局之间存在不成文契约——当局不干涉他们的生活，而他们则假装支持当局。在被问起意见时，他们会选择从众或挑选他们认为当局期待的答案。
+
+许多民调数据可以佐证这种观点，比如在列瓦达中心的民调中，关心乌克兰战争动态者的比例（50—60%）远低于战争支持者的比例（70—80%），换言之，大约有20%的战争“支持者”其实根本不关心战争局势。此外，根据Russian Field的调查，多数人既会在普京宣布重新进军基辅的情况下支持他的决定（59%），也会在普京宣布和谈止战的情况下支持他的决定（66%），可见多数人对于战争走势和俄罗斯的战争目的并没有自己的想法，他们更多只是支持普京的每一个决定而已。在这种情况下，只要尽量不去触碰这冷漠的大多数，让他们觉得这只是一场在电视上发生的遥远战争，那么普京就可以持续坐享这种高支持率。
+
+
+▲ 列瓦达中心数据；端传媒制表。
+
+然而当战争的态势迫使普京在2022年9月宣布进行“部分”动员，战争开始走入大多数人的生活，民调数字就出现了明显的波动，9月的战争支持率较8月下降4%，关心战争者的比例上升了15%，普京的支持率则骤降6%——自2014年吞并克里米亚以来，如此大幅度的下跌只发生在2018年的养老金改革期间（三个月跌15%）和2020年的大流行封城期间（两个月跌10%），而这三次猛跌的共同之处都在于，发生在国家插手干预了多数人私生活之际。
+
+然而，由于普京政权将动员的目标区域尽可能对准阻力最小的贫困和少数民族地区，外加多数俄罗斯人在最初的震惊后继续选择尤金所说的“自然的适应性反应”——“闭目塞听、低头做人，把头在沙子里埋得更深些”，战争和普京的支持率以及对战争的关心比例在一两个月内就分别涨和跌回了正常区间。
+
+按照这个逻辑推测，若想撼动俄罗斯社会，激发其起来反抗，最好的办法似乎只能最残忍的——期待乌克兰军队在战场上消灭尽可能多的俄军，从而引发俄罗斯的下一轮动员。
+
+然而，考虑到乌俄两国的人口数量差距，乌克兰很难做到在不损伤自己的情况下动摇俄罗斯社会，近期乌克兰新一轮动员潮带来的不满情绪就是一个例证。再者，如政治科学家罗戈夫分析的那样，亲友被动员、阵亡也有可能将随大流支持者推向狂热支持阵营。Russian Field的民调显示，2月初支持继续战争者和支持和谈止战者的比例（49/40%）比起12月初（45/44%）有所拉大，或许就反映了这种心理趋势。罗戈夫认为，主流民意翻盘本就是一个与精英分裂互相作用的漫长的过程，哪怕越战时的美国，从全民支持战争到反战抗议潮迫使政府撤军也用了八年时间，而在精英与民众的反抗情绪被极力压制的俄罗斯，这一过程很可能会更为缓慢、复杂。
+
+（龚珏，俄罗斯科学院博士生，俄罗斯文学研究者、译者）
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-03-03-kants-view-of-the-mind.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-03-03-kants-view-of-the-mind.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..3b137639
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-03-03-kants-view-of-the-mind.md
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "康德的心靈觀"
+author: "艾碩讀哲學"
+date : 2023-03-03 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/8FEMs3M.jpg #https://i.imgur.com/gGW72Wp.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "本文梳理康德於《批判》中的哲學理論預設，以心靈問題為軸了解先驗觀念論和經驗實在論的立場；其後會討論康德於〈先驗辯証論〉（Transcendental Dialectic）中批判有關心靈問題的謬誤推理（Paralogism）；透過以上部分的鋪排，再討論康德的心靈觀念。"
+---
+
+心靈（Mind）的問題，貫穿整個哲學史，亦是很重要的形上學問題，康德在他「解決一切哲學問題」的哲學意圖下，自然對心靈相關的問題亦提出了自己的批判與洞見。 然而，康德於《純粹理性批判》（Critique of Pure Reason）（下稱批判）中，在有關心靈的問題於他的整個理論脈絡下，是帶有張力的，而此張力取決於如何理解論証心靈存在和心靈本質所需要相關的不同概念，以及康德在他的知識論及存有論立場，亦即其先驗觀念論（Transcendental idealism）及經驗實在論（Empirical realism）立場。
+
+
+### 一、心靈作為一個哲學問題
+
+暫且先不進入特定哲學家對心靈問題的討論，而先從概念分析的角度出發。人（作為心理主體）的本質是什麼？作為一個形上學人性論問題，它其實有一個更根本可被追問：心理主體是否存在？從一般人的日常經驗中，自我（self-identity）的存在是自明的，由感官，以至情緒及抽象思考等不同的認知活動，似乎都需要有一個持續存在的自我才得以可能。另一個可能性則是，人的所謂心靈就是種種認知活動的總和而已，除卻這些活動，談不上有什麼東西剩餘下來，更枉論有某些能夠稱之為心靈的東西存在。那麼如果假設認知活動並非心靈的全部，並在理論上把具體的認知活動懸擱，一個能夠讓這些認知活動得以展開的可能性條件到底是什麼？
+
+從不同的角度或側重點出發，回應以上問題所得出的可能答案都會不同：心靈（mind）、主體（subject）、思維物（thinking thing）、自我（self）、意識（consciousness）、我思（cogito）、靈魂（soul）；先不論及西方哲學以外的理論，即使在西方哲學長久以來的理論發展當中，還有很多不同的概念被發明及使用於了解那個「人（作為心理主體）的本質是什麼？」的問題。單論前一句提及的種種心靈概念的「變體」及討論他們是否或多大程度上指涉同一個對象，已經是一個需要很多篇幅處理鋯大哲學計劃，但這個變體的問題並非本文的主題，故此先把用詞集中於心靈，並以主體及思維物為輔，減少使用其他用詞所產生的歧義問題。
+
+回到西方哲學，特別是現代哲學史的脈絡，由笛卡兒開始，「心靈」一直是西方哲學發展的核心，由此開展有關存有論（Ontology）或知識論（Epistemology）等哲學問題經過長久以來的發展，仍然充滿活力。笛卡兒透過「普遍懷疑」的哲學方法論證主體作為心靈實體（mind substance）的不可懷疑性，並把人的身體排除於思維主體之外，而被僅視為廣延之物的客體（object）存在，其立場稱為心物二元論（Dualism in mind-body problem）。他的理論不單論證心靈作為實體存在，亦建構出一個述說「什麼東西存在」的形上學存有論立場。
+
+由笛卡兒起，現代哲學的主要戰場可粗略理解為理性主義（rationalism）及經驗主義（empiricism）的爭論，前者由史賓諾沙（Spinoza）萊布尼茲（Leibniz），後者以洛克（Locke）及休謨（Hume）為主要代表。當中休謨作為一個徹底的懷疑論者（scepticism），提出一個與笛卡兒完全相反的心靈觀，主張自我只是眾多知覺的集合體，並不能形成一個統一的自我、人格觀念，亦沒有作為實體的存有論地位。人在不同時間中出現的不同知覺，只是不斷流轉變化的心理狀態，這些心理狀態在時間上相繼接續，形出各個狀態出現又消失的流程。縱然人總是認為自我同一性是存在的，但休謨則認為自我同一以及人格的概念只是被發明的，為了讓日常生活的中的自我變化更符合人所需的常識，但並非關於心靈的真相。
+
+在懷疑主義的猛攻下以及科學精神的助攻下，理性主義的主張看似難以站得住腳，又甚或陷入獨斷的理論封閉困境。哲學問題，特別是形上學問題，在這個爭持下似乎變成所謂的無解問題，而康德的哲學任務則是去解決這些哲學問題。縱然事實上他未必能真正地解決所有這些宏大的哲學問題，但他所建立的哲學體系卻的確為哲學建立起新的範式，讓後學處理相關問題時，無法完全繞過他所留下的哲學成果去發展理論。
+
+康德於批判時期（Critical period）所建立的哲學體系，以他所追問的四個哲學問題作為其問題意識的代表：「人能夠知道什麼？」（What can I know?）、「人應該做什麼？」（What should I do?）、「人能夠希望什麼？」（What may I hope?），而最徹底的綜合問題則是：「人是什麼？」（What is man?）。以下的部分將進入他的哲學系統，並以此系統去說明他對心靈問題的處理。
+
+
+### 二、康德的知識論及存有論立場
+
+一個哲學體系的知識論及存有論立場，決定了該哲學認知主體所能夠認識的對象的界限，以及該哲學肯定什麼東西存在。於傳統哲學當中，形上學一直被視為所有學科中最為根本的學科，因為它所探討的是世界的根本真相，亦即所謂的終極真相（ultimate truth），而其他學科所探討的，只為在終極真相下於世界展現的個別現象，在存在序列下從屬於形上學的存有論真相。而康德的哲學計劃則是以知識論重新界定及規範形上學，超越往日形上學戰場上紛亂卻難有進展的理論問題，建立一套新的、科學的、可靠的形上學。
+
+以此哲學目的作為起點，便能夠理解《純粹理性批判》作為一本探討「人能夠知道什麼」這個問題的著作，是去為往後的形上學建立基礎的預備工作，因為界定清楚人的認知能力的界限，方能知道人能夠在什麼樣的範圍內建立客觀知識，而又有什麼的哲學宣稱因為超過人的認知能力界限而不能建立有效的客觀宣稱。為處理這個問題，康德提出了他自己的哲學立場，即作為知識論立場的先驗觀念論（Transcendental idealism）及作為存有論立場的經驗實在論（Empirical realism）。但進入先驗觀念論的說明前，需要先說明的是，康德的哲學立場可分為存有論立場及知識論立場，既然康德的哲學以知識論重新界定、規範形上學，那麼作為康德存有論立場的經驗實在論，其理論空間也理所當然地，是由先驗觀念論的知識論框架來界定及規範。
+
+#### 2.1 康德的知識論立場：先驗觀念論（Transcendental Idealism）
+
+先驗觀念論學說的基礎是顯象（appearance）與物自身（thing in themselves）的區分。這個區於早於《批判》的序言已然引入，它就依照對象與我們認知方式關係來得以解釋：被認為是必然符合於人的認知模式的東西即是一個顯象（先驗上觀念的），而人的認知必須與之符合的東西則是物自身（先驗上實在的）。在《批判》的〈先驗分析論〉中，康德主張人類的感性（sensibility）是由空間—時間性來辦別的，我們直觀的一切對象要麼是在時間中（內在對象（inner object）），要麼是在空間和時間中（外在對象（outer object））。因此一切在時間—空間中的對象是顯象，而離開感性來加以思考的對象則是物自身。
+
+而物自身與顯象的關係問題上，則是此學說所面對的一大爭議，大致可分為三大派別：一、形上學的兩層世界詮釋（metaphysical two-world interpretation），把顯象與物自身視為兩種不同的存在領域，亦即各自有其存有論地位（ontological status）；二、方法論的兩種面向詮釋（methodological two-aspect interpretation），把顯象與物自身僅視為理解事物的兩種不同方式，取決於對事物狀態的思考，是涉及還是抽離我們的認知形式；三、形上學的兩種面向詮釋（metaphysical two-aspect interpretation），把它們區分作事物的兩種不同類型的性質，把物自身視作事物不可知的內在面向（intrinsic aspect），而顯象則是事物可知的外在、關係性狀態（extrinsic and relational properties）。而本文則基於對先驗觀念論及經驗實在論作出知識論及存有論立場的區分，故此自然應用方法論的兩種面向詮釋。
+
+驟眼看康德的先驗觀念論與以往其他觀念論立場並沒有什麼分別，因為但此處現留意的是先驗觀念論作為一種知識論的立場，所判斷的事為知識的界限問題，即「能夠認識什麼」的問題，故現象與物自身的區分在於人作為主體的認知能力與對象之間的關係，而有關對象的存在問題，即「什麼東西存在」的問題，則需要透過存有論的立場進行表述，亦即康德的經驗實在論立場。
+
+#### 2.2 康德的存在論立場：經驗實在論（Empirical Realism）
+
+在立場的結論上，康德是肯定主體以外的外在對象存在的。對起初接觸康德哲學立場的人來說，有機會對康德這個存有論立場感到難以理解，因為一般的觀念論立場都被理解是以思維主體作為存有的基礎，並懷疑主體以外的外在對象的存在，而康德於顯象與物自身區分的立場下，在時間—空間中的對象明明只是在認知形式的框架下被給予，何以又會同時肯定外在對象的實存地位呢。回到「什麼東西存在」存有論的基本問題，康德認為在時空框架內的個別經驗對象和事實都是真實的存在。要論證康德這個立場，需要經過他對「存在」這個概念的解釋、他在範疇論中的模態（modality）範疇的內容與特殊性、以及他的「觀念論的反駁」（refutation of idealism）等不同理論進程去理解，本文無法一一闡述，但在進入康德有關心靈的討論時，仍然會觸及這些問題。
+
+然而，康德作為知識論先驗觀念論者及存有論經驗實在論者的哲學立場，是進入心靈問題前的所需要知悉的理論預設，不然他的立場很容易被誤解為一般的觀念論或十分靠近過往的經義主義者，而忽視了他在理性主義與經驗主義之間取長補短的迂迴理論路徑。
+
+
+### 三、康德就心靈問題的批判及處理進路
+
+於整部《純粹理性批判》當中，心靈問題最具體最具針對性的處理，是在〈先驗辯証論〉（Transcendental Dialectic）論中〈純粹理性的謬誤推理〉（On the Paralogisms of Oure Reason）中出現，在兩個版本的《批判》中他共提出五個相關的謬誤推理，以述說相關的先驗幻象（transcendental illusion）。而從更廣義的心靈問題理解上，其實〈先驗分析論〉（Transcendental Analytic）甚或整部的批判，都是一個建立心靈觀念，建構主體內容的理論，故此直至閱讀到〈先驗分析論〉為止，便會察覺他所提出的先驗統覺（transcendental apperception）可以被理解為康德版本的主體及自我，但先驗統覺的概念果斷地與笛卡兒式的主體分割，它是形式性的認知結構，並沒有具體的內容，更枉論是心靈實體。
+
+而進入〈純粹理性的謬誤推理〉前，必須要先理解康傳在〈先驗分析論〉說明了感性（sensibility）及知性（understanding）的形式結構、運作方式及對象內容後，如何說明理性（reason）這種更高層次的智性能力，以及本體與現象的關係。以此為中介，結合對他哲學立場的理解，會更容易進入他在謬誤推理中處理心靈問題的進路。
+
+#### 3.1 作為最高認知能力的理性（Reason），以及作為理性對象的理念（Idea）
+
+康德於〈先驗分析論〉中已界定了「真理之國度」（land of truth），說明了經驗的可能性條件，這些條件作為知識必要且充分的條件，為人所能正當判斷具對象的知識，以及不能認知的物自身之間，定下「現象與物自身」的先驗觀念論基調。然而，康德的批判並未就此完成，而在〈先驗辯証論〉，在〈分析論〉的基礎上，對形上學問題作出深入探討。由〈先驗感性論〉及〈先驗分析論〉中所說明有關主體「感性-直觀」（sensibility-intuition）及「知性-概念」（understanding-concept）兩種智性能力的內容，而在〈先驗辯證論〉中，有關形上學批判的內容須要以之前所建立的內容為預設，以接續說明他認為可能的形上學可以如何開展，以及主體「理性-觀念」（reason-idea）的智性能力。
+
+康德在這個預設下，要處理他的哲學系統與形上學問題的關係，遠較以往經驗主義及理性主義哲學的為複雜，因為他概認為人只能夠認識經驗對象作為顯像的知識，又認為非經驗對象的宣稱縱然不能夠成為確知知識卻並非無意義的，因為這是人類理性的自然傾向，對經驗對象背後的東西感到好奇，甚至傾向相信一些關於超驗實在（transcendentally real）的東西。而無視這種傾向顯然並非康德的選擇，因為他整個批判哲學的系統是宣稱能夠全面解決所有哲學問題，並達到人類理性永久平衡的狀態。
+
+根據康德的說法，傳統形上有三個最重要的問題：靈魂不朽、自由意志、上帝存在。而〈辯證論〉就通過三種辯證證推論去闡述康德對相關問題的批判，分別是謬誤推理、背反（antinomy）及純粹理性的理想（ideal of pure reason）。而進入這三個辯證推論之前，康德先以先驗幻象去說明有關理性能力的機能。需要留意的是，此處的理性與貫穿全書的廣義理性所指稱的有所不同。廣義之理性指稱的是智性（intellectual faculty）的整體機能，有關感性及知性的能力亦包含其中。而在〈辯證論〉中，狹義理性與廣義理性被區分開來，狹義理性指涉一種獨立的概念機能，主要是進行一種特殊類型的推理，也就是中介三段論的推理（mediate or syllogistic inference）。
+
+三段論推理由兩個前提及一個結論組成，三段論作為邏輯系統說明某一知識推導的一般條件，一個常見的例子如下：1、所有人都會死。2、康德是人。3、康德會死。
+
+康德把這種從既有前提推導至受制約結論的「縮小型任務」為理性的下降（descending）功能。值得留意的是，康德另一方面亦賦予理性一個上升（ascending）功能，即從既有受制約對象上升到它們所來自的種種前提（條件）的功能。這種功能可以被理解為理性能力的動力，讓理性能力的指涉對像由受制約的對像出發，往上向種種受制約對像之條件探問，最終指向這些條件的全體性（totality），而這個終點亦會是無條件的全體性，因為條件的全體性不能依賴於任何條件，換言之它是無條件的。
+
+這裡可以更清楚理解康德哲學中對知性及理性的區別，可以這樣說：理性所關注的是發現對象的最終解釋（無條件的），而知性則處理對象的受制約解釋（有條件的）。由理性所產生出的概念，不同於知性的概念，是無條件的全體性的，康德稱這些概念稱為「先驗理念」（transcendental ideas）或「理性的理念」（ideas of reason）。由知性概念到理性理念的探問，是由經驗範圍內思考某單獨經驗，轉而思考整體經驗，而經驗的整體是離開經驗範籌的，故此理性理念是不能夠被經驗所給予的。
+
+從上述有關理性理念的簡述，有機會讓人覺得康德提出了與以往理性主義哲學並無差異的觀點，即理性有其天生觀念，與獨立於經驗的超驗對象直接接觸，但這樣顯然有違康德先驗觀念論的立場。康傳對理性能力的上升機能的描述，理念（無條件者）作為條件的總和，是需要由種種受制約的對像條件匯合產生的，故此理性不是直接與超驗對像連繫，而是需要透過知性的仲介，與知性提供的判斷連繫的。承接〈分析論〉的脈絡，由於人是無法對經驗範圍以外的東西作出有效的知識判斷，故理性理念作為超驗概念，人亦無法知道有關於它的本體知識。然而，理性理念的提出正如物自身的提出一般，縱然有關於它的正面內容是無法得知，但它作為一個概念對象，能夠成為哲學工作的參照物，讓人可以踏在先驗與經驗的邊緣，探問形而上學的可能性條件及相關知識內容的界限，康德在往後的章節中就是繼續他認為有可能的形上學工作，「揭露先驗幻象，預防我們受它欺騙」。
+
+而本文所關注的，是康德所提及的第一個形式的先驗幻象，是關於自我的幻象，即康德話語中理性心理學（rational psychology）宣稱關於「自我作為物自身」的知識（B409-410）。
+
+#### 3.2 先驗辯證中的誤推（Paralogism）
+
+有關自我的先驗幻象，其重點的針對對象自然是以笛卡兒為代表的學說，其宣稱能夠認識自我是一不可分的非物質實體，一個不腐朽的靈魂。理性心理學不同於經驗心理學，它本身心須只建立在統覺之上：「我思」（cogito）提供其「唯一文本」（A343/B401），所有它的學說要建立在這上面。因為我思是一個非經驗性的表象，理性心理學產生一個在先天的基礎上，詢問「一個思考的事物是由什麼所構成的？」問題的嘗試（A398）。由於篇帳所限，本文將集中討論第一個謬誤推理，即有關我思作為心靈實體的部分。
+
+有關心靈實體性的謬誤推理（B410-411）：
+
+- 大前提：作為判斷的主詞並且無法被其他任何東西所斷言的是實體。
+
+(What cannot be thought otherwise than as subject also does not exist otherwise than as subject, and therefore is substance.)
+
+- 小前提：一個思維的存在，僅僅作為本身來看，只能被思考為主詞。
+
+(Now a thinking being, considered merely as such, cannot be thought otherwise than as subject.)
+
+- 結論：所以，它也只能作為一個主體，也就是作為實體而實存。
+
+(Therefore, it also exists only as a subject, i.e., as a substance.)
+
+以上的推論看似令人信服，但康德則指出這個推論是無效的，其原因主要在於「主詞」的模稜兩可，即混淆了該語詞的邏輯意義，以及其超出邏輯的，包含客體的意義。換句話說，它把大前提中的「實體」與小前提中的不同意義的「實體」混淆了，因而得出謬誤的結論。在大前提中，實體是指「實體範疇在經驗中運用的實體，」，這樣的實體概念會指涉存在，例如說「這個榴槤是臭的」，這個榴槤是通過直觀所得的對象，直接指涉它作為經驗對像的存在，並在知性通過實體範疇而得出的。然而，在小前提當中希望指涉的實體，即作為思維物的我思，則理性作為最高認知能力，對實體範籌進行超驗（transcendent）的運用而得出的產物，它只是一個客觀知識成立的最高統一形式條件，而不指涉任何實存的東西。縱然在小前提中的我思，如大前提的實體一樣，在命題由只能作為主詞而不能作為謂詞，但它們在實體的意義上有完全不同涵意。對康德而言，過去的哲學家就是混淆了兩者的意義，基於對理性無條件知識的追求，而產生了這樣的先驗幻象。《批判》中其他有關自我作為物自身的先驗幻象，其根源皆來自於對心靈實體性的謬誤推理，縱然本文未有述說其他的部分，如心靈單純性、心靈不滅等，但可以理解在心靈實體性被論證為誤後，其他的部分的根基亦已被動搖。
+
+
+#### 四、論證謬誤以外，如何理解康德的心靈觀立場
+
+縱然康德就心靈實體性問題的謬誤推理，明顯是反對笛卡與的心靈實體觀念，但另一方面，康德亦不反對笛卡兒建立其主體理論的出發點，就是我們能夠意識到自我存在。試想當我下一個客觀普遍判斷時，這判斷其實會先行假定了一些意識的的運作：這判斷是一個「思想」，但思想心先假定了「主體」，因為沒有主體就產生不了思想，所以一地的判斷都是一個「主體的思想」。這裡所指的主體並非殊別的，存在於時間空間中的主體（小我），而是一切的人的主體（大我），因為此判斷為客觀普遍的，自所有作為主體的人皆有效，由此可知，「作為大我的主體」是一切客觀普遍知識的最高統一的條件；這種統一，康德在〈範疇的先驗演繹》中，稱之為「統覺的綜合的統一」。要注意的是，因為一切經驗對象都只是「現象」，不是「物自體」，我們的一切知識都是由我們的先天認識條件所構成的。客觀知識的存在是事實，而且這知識對人人有效也是事實；然而這事實本身就是現象，就是我們的先天認識條件所構成，「我」只是構成這知識的最高的形式條件而已，而不是什麼實存的東西。與此同時，康德澄清了兩種「自我」的區別，一是「經驗的我」—可以作為經驗的對象於實體範疇中被思考，可以作為謂詞被表述。而另一個則是「作為理念的我」，永遠只可作為思維的主體，而不作為思維的客體。
+
+但即使我們能夠意識到自我存在，並不得同於康德認同自我是一個擁有獨立存在地位的實體存在，自我的存在基礎亦不能單靠內感（inner sense）自身，而需要透過經驗，即有其他外在事物在時間空間中存在，才能反過來確認自我存在，這樣與康德的經驗實在論立場相符合。特別是按照康德的存在概念，所有真實的存在事物都必須在時間空間之中，以致於任何時空以外，不能以實體及因果範疇去應用的事物都不是真實存在，因此對於所有如共相或數學對象等的抽象對象，康德理應會直接地否定它們的存在，因此屬反柏拉圖主義（anti-Platonist）的唯名論（nominalism）。再進一步，康德有關於認知能力結構所需要假設的超驗統覺，作為康德理論中的主體，亦沒有實存地位亦即並非真實存在；正因為超驗統覺作為經驗的可能性條件，是屬於先驗層次的，自然並非在經驗層面真實存在。
+
+而這個存在問題，套用《批判》中對理性神學有關上帝存在問題的批判，得知「存在」並不是一般的謂詞，而是「所有謂詞的謂詞」，因為它並非直接應用於對像上，而在後下層次應用於有關對象的謂詞或概念身上。換句話說，「說某事物存在」並不如「說某物是紅色的」一般，有為主詞所指稱的對象增加其本身內容的屬性（property），或表述了對象的一些性質；說某事物X「存在」，只是述說了世上有一物擁有X所擁有的一切屬性。而心靈實體與上帝、宇宙相類似，都是超趣經驗範圍的東西，故此雖然上一段的結論中得出康德會認為「先驗統覺、心靈、思維物」並不存在，但更準確的意義下，應該說「存在」概念於它們這些超驗對象（transcendental object）身上並不適用，對於這些超驗對象根本沒有所謂是否存在的事實可言)。
+
+總括而言，在康德的知識論先驗觀念論及存有論經驗實在論立場下，固然並沒有肯定心靈作為實體，擁有獨立存有論地位的位置；作經驗實在論立場下更是反對心靈作為抽象事物的真實存在；但在知識論先驗觀念論對存有論立場的規範性地位上，又需要建立先驗統覺作為其認知能力理論的理論假設；而在綜合其哲學立場下所得出對先驗幻覺的批判以及對「存在」概念的解釋下，則得出一個沒有「心靈存在與否」的事實可言的立場。但問題是，基於人對理性無條知識的內在需求，顯然無法輕易接受康德所得出的結論，即使相關問題於當代哲學仍然無法得出有效的解答，但筆者仍難以接受心靈的存在與否及存在本質是不可言說之事。
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-03-06-the-people-do-not-self-weaken-to-adapt-to-dictatorship.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-03-06-the-people-do-not-self-weaken-to-adapt-to-dictatorship.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..7697ffbf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-03-06-the-people-do-not-self-weaken-to-adapt-to-dictatorship.md
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "人民無須弱智來遷就獨裁"
+author: "陶樂思"
+date : 2023-03-06 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/UgzuFy9.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+最近看了YouTube網課短片，心癢癢很想試用ChatGPT，最主要想測試一下自己問問題的能力。因為聽說問題問得好的使用者，能透過ChatGPT這個極方便、極高效的工具，為自己建立深且廣的知識體系。
+
+
+
+於是今天我就透過Google搜尋引擎，找到了ChatGPT網頁。可是就在註冊過程中，我就被擋在門外了。
+
+第一步用Google郵箱註冊沒有問題。問題就出在第二步電話號碼認證。我開始時把地區設在香港，但網站的回饋是他們不能為我身處的國家提供服務。因為我是有使用VPN，而且把所在地方設於加拿大。於是我用了二百多元買了一個加拿大的虛擬電話號碼。這個虛擬電話號碼服務是Google提供的，而且說得明明白白是為了讓用戶登入不同網站時做認證用的。可惜當我用買來的號碼在ChatGPT做認證時，系統卻說該號碼已經連結了最多的帳戶。我真的有被詐騙金錢的感覺。
+
+之所以要記錄這件事，主要當然是因為實在火冒三丈！發火的對象是誰呢？當然騙了我金錢的Google是其中之一。當他們彈出了三至四個號碼給我選擇時，不是應該給我沒人用的號碼嗎？若是的話，為什麼ChatGPT的網頁回饋會說那個號碼已經連結了帳戶呢？不過Google還是其次。始作俑者令我用不到ChatGPT的是誰呢？當然是那個以小學雞為首的統治集團啦！是的，若大多數人民都懂得使用這麼好用的工具為自己建立知識體系，有效率地自學，知識與智慧都一日千里。小學雞們還不被甩到十萬九千里以外的後後後方了嗎？
+
+是的，坐在最高位置的人自卑又焦慮。為了照顧這些人的自卑以及因自卑而起的焦慮。人民就只能愚蠢，甚至最好愚蠢到弱智了。
+
+香港人向來是勤奮好學的一群，一有新知識，很快就會有人自發地去學去試。但今時今日的香港，就連學習一套新的人工智能工具的自由都被剝奪了。原因呼之欲出，就是遷就頂端的小學雞們。我希望有兒有女的香港人，認真考慮一下香港是不是值得繼續留下來的地方。你希望自己的兒女以弱智弱能來遷就獨裁者的自卑嗎？
+
+
+### 用不到ChatGPT可以怎樣
+
+現時香港人無法在沒有用VPN以及沒有國外電話卡的情況下，註冊到Open AI提供的ChatGPT服務。但其實也有其他方式能用到ChatGPT。就是安裝一個叫POE的手機應用軟體。POE是由一家叫Quora的公司開發，用的也正是ChatGPT的模型。香港人無須使用VPN，而且只須香港的手機號碼就能註冊使用。不過現時這個應用只有iOS版本。蘋果手機用戶在App Store搜尋「Quora」，然後在彈出的選項中選取「POE Fast AI Chat」點進下載便可。下載之後，軟體會要求用戶以電話和電郵作出認證。完成認證之後，便能開始使用聊天機器人了。這個軟體提供了三個機器人供用戶選擇。其中「Sage」就是用了ChatGPT模型。
+
+依我自己用了兩天的初步體驗，問答的界面十分直觀，聊天機器人回答問題也十分快速。我問過不同國家的咖啡傳統，機器人就以一篇二三百字的短文，簡單列舉了意大利、土耳其、巴西、越南等七個國家的人，沖煮和品嚐咖啡的傳統習慣。我抽取了土耳其咖啡作為品質檢定（檢查資訊是否準確）的樣本，到維基百科查閱相關資料，發現聊天機器人給的資訊大致準確。不過現時聊天機器人只能用英文給予答案，要用戶得到答案後問它能否把這個答案翻譯成中文，它才會翻譯。這算是美中不足的地方吧！
+
+ChatGPT問世後，科技公司們真的好像賽跑似的，紛紛發明新的人工智能聊天機器人。而且站在ChatGPT肩膀上，聲稱性能會比ChatGPT更優勝。其中一個例子就是「ChatSonic」。這個工具聲稱能為用戶提供更實時的資訊。大家若有興趣，也可以試用一下。只要在Google搜尋ChatGPT的替代，便能找到。
+
+
+### 為何在如此爭議的情況下我們仍然要學習使用人工智能
+
+坊間某些輿論把人工智能視為洪水猛獸。說它會使無數人失去工作，它會操控人類，甚至取代人類。但科技發展是不可違逆的趨勢。而科技發展確實真的改善了人類的生活，使人能更有效率、用更少時間完成各項工作，然後把省下來的時間用在自己喜歡的事情之上。若正面看待人工智能，把它用作改善工作效率的工具，對人類發展或許會是一件好事。問題只在我們能否妥善地運用它而不倚賴它。
+
+
+### 人類能如何善用人工智能而不倚賴它
+
+說回上文我問聊天機器人問題找到答案的例子。我並沒有照單全收機器人給的答案。我會抱著一個想法：它提供的資訊不一定全部準確。於是我就會把得到的訊息抽查驗證。試想像，若你的上司指派你寫一篇文案，而你轉個身就命令聊天機器人做，再把聊天機器人寫的文案直接交給上司，後果將會怎樣呢？若它寫得一塌糊塗，顯出的是你自己的無能。若它寫得非常棒呢？那麼正表示你應該被它取代了。因此即使運用人工智能，本人的校正修改，以及最重要者，人對工作的責任心是不可缺少，更是無法被取代的。
+
+
+### 在反智的國度裡更應該增進知識和智慧
+
+中華五千年的歷史，大部分都是人民受到專制統治的歷史。而專制的程度是越到近代越變本加厲。於是大多數的普通人一方面希望自己擁有知識出人頭地，但另方面卻終日活在「槍打出頭鳥」的惶恐當中。個人知識與智慧的成長也終日為這樣的恐懼所轄制。社會的集體恐懼日積月累形成了反智文化。而反智文化卻更加鞏固專制統治。要打破這個惡性循環，人們自發自主的終身學習才是解方。人工智能聊天機器人可以成為其中一種幫助自學的工具。我們能透過由淺入深的提問，為自己有興趣學習的領域建立知識體系。而這種建立知識體系的過程，會比未有這種工具之前，來得更有效率，更有系統。我之所以這麼熱衷於運用聊天機器人，並不是我太無聊太孤獨，沒人跟我聊天所以要打聊天機器人的主意。而是我想透過與聊天機器人的互動，訓練自己問問題的精確性，以及更緊密的邏輯思維。回到本文的主題，雖然活在專制統治之下，人民不但無須以弱智弱能遷就獨裁者的自卑，反而應該更積極地增進知識，累積智慧，好讓自己有能力為周遭帶來更好的改變。
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_heros/1924-01-01-RenzoNovatore-a1_r-toward-the-creative-nothing.md b/_collections/_heros/1924-01-01-RenzoNovatore-a1_r-toward-the-creative-nothing.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..5ee3274a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_heros/1924-01-01-RenzoNovatore-a1_r-toward-the-creative-nothing.md
@@ -0,0 +1,1130 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title: "走向创造性的虚无"
+author: "伦佐·诺瓦托瑞"
+date: 1924-01-01 12:00:00 +0800
+image: https://i.imgur.com/PiBNQcc.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+position: right
+---
+
+我们堕落的时代，资产阶级、基督教、平民文明很早就走到了进化的死胡同。
+
+民主文明已经到来！
+
+但在民主文明的虚假辉煌下，更高的精神价值已经沦陷，支离破碎。
+
+
+
+任性的力量、野蛮的个性、自由的艺术、英雄主义、天才、诗歌被蔑视、嘲弄、诽谤。
+
+而且不是以“我”的名义，而是以“集体”的名义。不是以“唯一者”的名义，而是以社会的名义。
+
+因此，基督教谴责原始，狂野的本能的力量，扼杀了活泼的的异教的“概念”，即大地的欢乐。民主作为它的后代，为这一罪行辩护并陶醉于其残酷和粗俗的暴行，并以此为荣。
+
+我们已经知道了！
+
+基督教残忍地将毒刃插入人类健康的肉体；以神秘残忍的怒火激起了黑暗的寒潮，使我们异教祖先安宁欢乐的酒神精神变得黯然失色。
+
+在一个寒冷的夜晚，冬天致命地降临在一个温暖的夏日正午。正是基督教，用“上帝”的幻觉取代了“我”的充满活力的现实，宣称自己是生活乐趣的劲敌，并向尘世的生活发起可恨的复仇。
+
+随着基督教的兴起，生命被送进了最痛苦的消极的可怕深渊；她被推到了否定和死亡的冰川上。在这个否定和死亡的冰川上，民主诞生了。
+
+因此，民主——社会主义之母，是基督教的女儿。
+
+⠀
+
+随着民主文明的胜利，精神上的暴民得到了荣耀。由于民主因为无法理解个人主义，以对强烈的反对践踏了所有反集体主义和创造性的“我”的英雄之美。
+
+资产阶级和无产阶级群氓在共同的精神基础上紧紧握住对方的手，虔诚享用着从铅杯中的圣餐，铅杯中盛着粘稠的圣酒，而这些粘稠液体正是民主递给他们每个人的社会谎言。
+
+资产阶级和无产阶级在他们的精神交流中所唱的歌，对胜利者和象征胜利的鹅来说，是一种普通而喧闹的颂歌。
+
+当颂歌的歌声高亢地迸发出来时，民主将平民的帽子压在她的额头上，向人们宣告人的平等权利。这真是一个可怕而野蛮的讽刺。
+
+就在那时，鹰在他谨慎的意识中，迅速地拍打着他巨大的翅膀，朝着冥想的顶峰翱翔，表示对琐碎的表演的厌恶。
+
+因此，民主仍然是世界的女王、万物的贵妇、帝国的女王和君主。
+
+⠀
+
+从福音书上看，基督是一个自相矛盾的误解。他是一个因异教徒的疲惫诞生的一个悲哀的颓废现象。
+
+反基督者是所有大胆的仇恨的健康之子，在基督教秩序的二十多个世纪里，生命在自己肥沃的胸膛里隐秘地孕育着。
+
+因为历史会回归。
+
+因为永恒复至是统治宇宙的法则。
+
+它是世界的命运！
+
+它是生命本身所围绕的轴心！
+
+为了使自己永续发展。
+
+让自己运转起来。
+
+自相矛盾。
+
+追求自我。
+
+为了永生。
+
+因为生活是一种运动，一种行动。
+
+追求思想的人。
+
+渴望思考的人。
+
+热爱思考的人。
+
+他们走路、奔跑、忙碌。
+
+生活想要在思想的王国里激荡。
+
+但当这条路行不通时，思想就会哭泣。
+
+它哭泣绝望……然后疲倦使它虚弱，使它成为基督徒。
+
+然后，它将其姐妹的生命握在手中，并试图将她限制在死亡的领域。
+
+但是反基督者——最神秘、最深刻的本能的灵魂——把生命召唤回自己，野蛮地对她喊道：让我们重新开始！
+
+生活又开始了！
+
+因为它不想死。
+
+如果基督象征着生命的疲惫，思想的日落：思想的死亡！
+
+反基督者象征着生命的本能。
+
+他象征着思想的复兴。
+
+反基督者是新黎明的象征。
+
+⠀
+
+如果垂死的民主（资产阶级-基督教-平民）文明成功地平衡了人类的思想，否定了超越它的一切崇高精神价值，那么幸运的是，它没有成功地平衡阶级、特权和种姓的差异，正如我们已经说过的那样，种姓的差异只在利益问题上存在分歧。
+
+既然对一个阶级和另一个阶级来说，利益问题还在，就有必要承认它，而不仅仅是承认它是最高的理想。而社会主义了解这一切。
+
+它明白这一点，而且由于它是一个熟练的——而且最后也许是实际有用的投机者，它把它的粗糙的平等学说（在主权国家的神圣威严面前，虱子平等）的毒药投进奴隶制的井里，在那里，纯真的人幸福地解了渴。
+
+因此，通过社会主义，无产阶级群氓再次感到自己与资产阶级很亲近，他们一起转向地平线，忠实地等待着未来的太阳！
+
+这是因为，虽然社会主义无法将奴隶颤抖的双手变成如此多的反传统、无情和贪婪的爪子，但它也无法将暴君的卑鄙贪婪变成慷慨的高尚美德。
+
+有了社会主义，由基督教创造、由民主发展起来的腐败和粘性的循环没有被打破。相反，它更好地巩固了自己。
+
+社会主义仍然是暴君和奴隶之间的一座危险而不切实际的桥梁；是一种虚假的联系；是“是”与“非”的模糊性，它的荒谬的基本原则从中混杂。
+
+而且，我们又一次看到了令我们厌恶的致命的淫秽笑话。我们看到社会主义、无产阶级和资产阶级，一起重新进入最低限度的精神贫困的轨道来崇拜民主。但是，民主——作为用棍棒敲打来治理人民的人民，就像奥斯卡·王尔德有一天打趣说的那样，为了爱人民，真正的自由精神，伟大的思想流浪者，是合乎逻辑的。更强烈地感到有必要果断地把他们对孤独者的偶像崇拜推向极端的边界，以便在寂静的沙漠中准备好训练有素的人鹰方阵，那些人将愤怒地参加社会黄昏的悲惨庆祝，以便在他们的钢爪之间推翻民主文明，并把它投入一个古老时代的空白。
+
+⠀
+
+当资产阶级在民主的神圣殿堂里向社会主义的权利下跪后，他们安详地在期待的床上伸了个懒腰，睡他们荒唐的安乐觉。但是，因喝下社会主义毒药而失去幸福的纯真的无产阶级，从左边喊了起来，打乱了白痴的、犯罪的资产阶级的宁静的睡眠。
+
+同时，在更高的思想之山上，思想的流浪者克服了恶心，查拉图斯特拉的雷鸣般的笑声久久回荡。
+
+类似于飓风的精神之风不得不穿透人类的心灵，并在思想的旋风中急速提升，以压倒所有来自时间黑暗中的旧价值，使升华了的本能的生命随着新思想在阳光下再次升华。
+
+但是，资产阶级醒了过来，他们明白，一些难以理解的东西在高处呼喊，威胁着他们的基本存在。是的：他们明白，有一种东西从高处飞来，像一块巨石，一声怒吼，一种威胁。
+
+他们明白，狂热的时代先驱者的撒旦之声宣布了一场狂暴的风暴，它来自于少数孤独者的新意志，在社会的内脏中爆炸，将它夷为平地。
+
+但他们不明白（在他们被击垮之前永远不会明白这一点），在世界上空掠过的是自由生活的强大翅膀，在它的拍打下，“资产阶级”和“无产阶级”都死了，因为所有的人都可以同时是“独一无二”和“普遍”的。
+
+正因为如此，世界上所有的资产阶级才会集体敲响他们用虚假的理想主义金属制成的钟声，号召自己参加一个伟大的集会。
+
+这个集会是普遍的……
+
+所有的资产阶级都聚集在一起。
+
+他们聚集在从他们共同的谎言的泥潭中生长出来的粘稠的芦苇丛中，在那里，在沉默的泥浆中，他们决定消灭无产阶级群氓，他们的仆人和他们的朋友。
+
+在这场凶残的阴谋中，各方都是基督和民主的信徒。
+
+所有群氓的前使徒也都参加了。战争已经决定了，黑毒蛇的王子以说“不要杀戮”的神的名义为自相残杀的军队祝福，而象征性的死亡代理人则恳求他的女神来到地球上跳舞。
+
+然后，社会主义——作为熟练的杂技演员和实用的杂耍者一跃而起。他跳上了多愁善感的政治投机的紧箍咒，他的眉毛被黑色包围着，或多或少地疼痛和哭泣着说：“我是暴力的真正敌人。我是战争的敌人，也是革命的敌人。我是血的敌人。”
+
+在再次谈到“和平”和“平等”、“信仰”和“殉道”、“人类”和“未来”之后，他以“是”和“不是”为主题吟唱了一首歌曲，低下头，哭了。
+
+他流下了犹大的眼泪，这甚至不是彼拉多的“我洗手不干了”。
+
+群氓们离开了……
+
+他们向着人类最卑劣的境界出发了。
+
+他们向着所有战壕的泥土出发了。
+
+他们离开了……而死亡来临了！它醉心于血，在世界中可怕地跳舞。漫长的五年里……
+
+就在那时，伟大的精神流浪者被一种新的厌恶所吸引，再次骑着他们自由的鹰，在遥远的冰川的孤独中晕眩地翱翔，嘲笑和诅咒。
+
+即使是查拉图斯特拉的精神——最真实的战争爱好者和最真诚的战士朋友，也必须保持足够的厌恶和蔑视，因为有人听到他感叹：“对我来说，你们必须是那些伸展你们的眼睛寻找敌人的敌人的人。而在你们中的一些人身上，仇恨在第一次看到就燃烧起来了。你们必须寻找你们的敌人，为你们自己而战。为了你们自己的思想而战！”
+
+如果你的思想屈服了，你的正直就会发出胜利的呼声！
+
+但可惜的是！解放野蛮人的英勇说教毫无用处。
+
+群氓既不知道如何辨别自己的敌人，也不知道如何为自己的思想而战。（群氓没有思想！）
+
+他们既不认识自己的敌人，也没有自己的思想，他们为他们在基督里的兄弟的利益而战，为他们在民主中的平等而战。
+
+他们为自己的敌人而互相争斗。
+
+亚伯复活后，第二次为该隐而死。但这一次，是死在他自己的手里！
+
+自愿的……
+
+自愿的，因为他本可以反抗，但他没有这样做……
+
+因为他可以说：“不！”
+
+或者说“是的”。
+
+因为说“不”，他可能会很坚强！
+
+因为说“是”，他可以表明他“相信”他为之奋斗的“事业”。
+
+但他既没有说“是”也没有说“不是”。
+
+他离开了！
+
+从懦弱中走了出来！
+
+像往常一样！
+
+他离开了……
+
+他走向了死亡！……
+
+不知道为什么。
+
+像往常一样。
+
+而死亡的到来……
+
+它来了，在这个世界上跳了五年之久的舞蹈！
+
+它在世界各地的泥泞战壕里跳着狰狞的舞蹈。
+
+它用闪电般的双脚跳舞……
+
+舞蹈和欢笑……
+
+它笑着跳舞……
+
+长达五年之久！
+
+啊！死亡是多么的庸俗，它的背上没有思想的翅膀在跳舞。
+
+不知道为什么就死了，这是多么愚蠢的事情……
+
+我们看到它跳舞的时候——死亡。
+
+那是一个黑色的死亡，没有透明的光。
+
+那是一个没有翅膀的死神！
+
+它是多么的丑陋和粗俗……
+
+它的舞蹈是多么的笨拙。
+
+但它仍然在舞蹈！
+
+它是如何屠杀所有多余的人和所有多数人的人。所有那些伟大的解放者说：国家是为他们发明的。
+
+但不幸的是，它并不只为这些人割草……
+
+死亡——为了报复国家，甚至割掉了那些并非无价值的人，甚至那些必不可少的人！……
+
+但那些不是无价值的人，那些不属于大多数人的人，那些倒下的人说“不！”
+
+他们将得到报复。
+
+我们将为他们报仇。
+
+我们将为他们报仇，因为他们是我们的兄弟！
+
+我们要为他们报仇，因为他们眼里有星星，已经倒下了。
+
+因为死亡，他们喝下了太阳。
+
+生命的太阳，斗争的太阳，理念的太阳。
+
+⠀
+
+这场战争改变了什么？
+
+精神的英雄式的转变在哪里？
+
+他们在哪里悬挂了新价值的磷光表？
+
+在哪座寺庙里，摆放着神圣的金瓶，里面装着至高无上的创造性英雄的发光和炽热的心？
+
+伟大和新的正午的光辉在哪里？
+
+可怕的血河冲刷着所有的草皮，覆盖着世界的所有道路。
+
+恐惧的泪水在整个地球的漩涡中回荡：骨山和人肉在阳光下到处发白，到处腐烂。
+
+但没有什么被改变，没有什么被进化。
+
+资产阶级的肚子只是因饱食而打嗝，无产阶级的肚子则因太过饥饿而哭喊。
+
+而且够了！
+
+随着卡尔·马克思的到来，人类的思想降到了肠子里。
+
+今天在世界范围内传递的吼声是一种腹腔的吼声。
+
+我们的意志可以把它变成心灵的呼喊。
+
+变成一场精神的风暴。
+
+变成自由生命的呐喊。
+
+变成一场闪电的飓风。
+
+我们的雷电可以解开目前的现实，撕开我们渴望的梦想的未知的神秘之门，显示出被解放的人的最高的美。
+
+因为我们是时代的疯狂先行者、火葬场、烽火、信号、第一个公告。
+
+⠀
+
+战争！
+
+你还记得它吗？
+
+战争创造了什么？
+
+就在这里。
+
+女人出卖自己的肉体，并将这种卖淫行为称为“自由恋爱”。
+
+男人“躲避”制造子弹，宣扬战争的崇高之美，称自己的懦弱为“微妙的艺术性和英雄的狡猾”。
+
+总是生活在无意识的耻辱中、懦弱中、谦卑中、冷漠中和软弱的放弃中的人，诅咒着小的胆量——他一直厌恶这些胆量——因为它们本身没有力量阻止他的肚子被那些他自己为一粒卑鄙的面包建造的武器撕碎。
+
+因为即使是精神的乞丐——那些总是留在外面取暖，而人类中更高尚的部分进入生活的地狱的人——这些卑微而忠实于他们的暴君的仆人，这些无意识地诽谤优越思想的人，即使这些，我们说，也不想离开。
+
+他们不想死。
+
+他们痛苦，他们流泪，他们恳求，他们祈祷！他们不愿意离开。
+
+但这一切都来自于无能和兽性的自我保护的低级本能，被剥夺了每一个反抗的英雄的吼声，而不是来自于高级的人性、精致的感情深度和精神上的美感的问题。
+
+不，不，不！
+
+这一切都不是！
+
+利益！
+
+只有兽性的利益。
+
+资产阶级的理想——无产阶级的理想——利益！
+
+但与此同时，死亡也来了……
+
+它来了，在这个世界上跳舞，却没有背上思想的翅膀！
+
+而它的舞蹈……
+
+它舞蹈并大笑。
+
+漫长的五年里……
+
+当边境上没有翅膀的死神在血泊中跳舞时，在国内内部战线的圣殿里，在庸俗的谎言“公报”中——我们的妇女在道德和物质上的奇迹般的进化被传诵和歌唱，同时我们英勇而光荣的步兵登上了精神高峰。那个在不知“为什么”的情况下哭泣着死去的人。
+
+民主社会和国家的残酷头脑在“公报”中吐出了多少凶残的谎言，多少庸俗的嘲讽。
+
+谁还记得那场战争？
+
+乌鸦是如何呱呱叫的……
+
+乌鸦和猫头鹰！
+
+同时死神也在跳舞！
+
+它在跳舞的时候，背上没有思想的翅膀！
+
+一个危险的想法，结出果实和创造。
+
+它在跳舞……
+
+它在跳舞，在欢笑！
+
+它是如何屠杀多余的人。所有那些属于多数人的人。那些国家是为他们发明的。
+
+但不幸的是，它不仅杀掉了这些人。
+
+它还杀死了那些眼中有太阳，那些瞳孔中有星星的人！
+
+⠀
+
+史诗般的艺术，英雄般的艺术，战争向我们承诺的最高艺术在哪里呢？
+
+自由的生活，新的黎明的胜利，正午的辉煌，太阳的节日荣耀在哪里？
+
+从物质奴役中获得的救赎在哪里？
+
+为了告诉我们人类心灵所感受到的无声而残酷的折磨，不得不在这个悲惨而可怕的血腥和死亡的深渊中痛苦地发芽，创造出精美而深刻的诗歌的人在哪里？
+
+谁对我们说过甜美的好话，在可怕的飓风之夜之后呼唤一个清晨？
+
+谁说过让我们像我们的悲伤一样伟大、纯洁的美和深刻的人性的高级话语？
+
+谁是，谁曾经是知道如何用爱和忠诚在我们生命的活生生的肉体中的开放伤口上弯曲自己，从它们那里接受所有高贵的眼泪，以便救赎者精神的最高笑声可以从我们过去的错误的饥饿的怪物身上撕开爪子，以使我们上升到一个高级伦理的概念。在那里，通过在鲜血和悲伤中净化的人类之美的光辉原则，我们可以提升自己，强大而威严——就像意志之弓上绷紧的箭——向尘世生活唱出我们所有希望中最深沉和最温柔的旋律！
+
+在哪里？在哪里？
+
+我没有看到！
+
+我感觉不到它！
+
+我环顾四周，但我只看到庸俗的色情和虚假的愤世嫉俗……
+
+至少我们可以得到一个艺术的荷马，和一个战争行为的拿破仑。
+
+一个可以有力量摧毁一个时代，创造一个新历史的人……
+
+但是，什么也没有！
+
+战争既没有给我们带来伟大的歌唱家，也没有带来伟大的统治者。
+
+只有说谎的幽灵和严峻的模仿者。
+
+⠀
+
+战争已经过去，它用泪和血洗刷了历史和人类，但时代仍然没有改变。
+
+这是一个破碎的时代。
+
+集体主义正在消亡，个人主义却尚未站稳脚跟。
+
+没人知道该如何服从，也没人知道该如何发号施令。
+
+但考虑到这一切，懂得如何自由地去生活，目前仍是一个深渊。
+
+一个只有用奴隶制和权威的尸体才能填满的深渊。
+
+战争无法填满这个深渊，它只会使它变得更深，但战争无法做到的，革命必须要做到。
+
+战争使人们变得残暴，庸俗，粗糙且丑陋。
+
+革命必须使人类变得更好。
+
+革命必须要让人类变得高贵起来！
+
+⠀
+
+从社会角度来说，我们已经滑下了致命的斜坡，再也没有回头的可能了。
+
+独自尝试将是一种犯罪。
+
+然而，这并不是一种伟大而崇高的罪行。
+
+而是一种庸俗的犯罪。一种比无用和虚荣更多的罪行。是对我们思想的肉体的犯罪。
+
+因为我们不是血的敌人……
+
+我们是庸俗的敌人！
+
+现在，义务和奴役的时代令人痛苦，我们要关闭理论和沉思的循环，以便打开暴力行动的缺口，这仍然是生命的意志和扩张的兴致。
+
+在虔诚和宗教的废墟上，我们想竖起我们骄傲的心灵的创造性的硬度。
+
+我们不是“社会权利”的“理想主义者”的崇拜者，而是“实际个人”的宣扬者，社会抽象的敌人。
+
+我们为个人的解放而奋斗。
+
+为征服生命而战。
+
+为了我们思想的胜利。
+
+为了我们梦想的实现。
+
+如果我们的想法是危险的，那是因为我们是那些喜欢危险生活的人。
+
+如果我们的梦想是疯狂的，那是因为我们是疯子。但我们的疯狂是最高的智慧。
+
+但我们的思想是生命的核心；但我们的思想是人类的灯塔。
+
+而战争没有做到的，革命必须做到。
+
+因为革命是我们意志的火焰，是我们孤独的思想的需要；它是自由的贵族的义务。
+
+要创造新的伦理价值。
+
+要创造新的审美价值。
+
+使物质财富公共化。
+
+使精神财富个人化。
+
+因为我们同时是暴力的脑力劳动者和热情的情感主义者，所以我们理解并知道，革命是在底层受苦的无声的悲伤的需要，是在高处的人受苦的自由精神的需要。
+
+因为如果在底层受苦的悲哀想要与太阳的快乐微笑一起升起，在高处受苦的自由精神就不再想感受到围绕着他们的庸俗奴役的耻辱的轻微冒犯。
+
+人类的精神分为三个流向。
+
+奴役之流、暴政之流、自由之流！
+
+随着革命的进行，这三股力量中的最后一股需要在其他两股力量中迸发，并将其压倒。
+
+它需要创造精神上的美，让穷人知道他们贫穷的羞耻，让富人知道他们财富的羞耻。
+
+所有被称为“物质财产”、“私有财产”、“外部财产”的东西都需要变成太阳、光、天空、海洋、星星对个人来说的样子。
+
+而这将会发生！
+
+它将会发生，因为我们——破坏偶像主义者，将违反它！
+
+只有道德和精神财富才是不会被侵犯的。
+
+这些是个人的真正财产。其余的都不是！
+
+其余的都是脆弱的！而所有脆弱的东西都会被侵犯！
+
+它将由“我”的不偏不倚的力量来完成。
+
+通过被解放者的英雄力量。
+
+并超越每一条法律，每一个暴虐的道德，每一个社会，每一个虚假的人性的概念……
+
+我们必须设定我们的努力，将推进的革命转化为“无政府主义犯罪”，以推动人类超越国家，超越社会主义。
+
+走向无政府主义！
+
+如果说，随着战争的进行，人们无法在死亡中升华自己，那么，死亡已经净化了堕落者的血液。
+
+而死亡净化的血液，土壤贪婪地喝下的血液，现在从地下呼啸而来！
+
+而我们独居者，我们不是腹中的歌者，而是死人的听众；是死人从地下呼喊的声音的听众！
+
+倾听在死亡中被净化的“不纯”血液的声音。
+
+堕落者的血也在哭泣！
+
+来自地底下的哭声！
+
+这血的哭声也叫我们走向深渊……
+
+它需要从监狱中被释放出来！
+
+哦，年轻的矿工们，准备好了！
+
+我们准备好火把和帕拉瓦尼。
+
+有必要耕种大地。
+
+是时候了！是时候了是时候了！是时候了！
+
+死者的血必须从其监狱中释放出来。
+
+它想从阴暗的深处站起来，向天空投掷自己的力量，征服星星。
+
+因为星星是死者的朋友。
+
+他们是见证他们死亡的好姐妹。
+
+他们是每天晚上光着脚去他们的坟墓，告诉他们的人。
+
+明天！……
+
+而我们——明天的孩子，今天来告诉你们。
+
+是时候了！是时候了！是时候了！
+
+我们在黎明前的时刻来到……
+
+在黎明和最后的星星的陪伴下！
+
+在死者之外，我们又增加了更多的死者……
+
+但所有倒下的人都有一颗金星在他们的瞳孔中闪耀！
+
+一颗金色的星星说：
+
+“剩下的兄弟们的懦弱被转化为创造性的梦想，转化为复仇的英雄主义。
+
+因为如果不是这样，人就不配死！”
+
+死亡该是多么悲哀的事。
+
+心中没有希望……脑中没有火堆；脑中没有梦想；没有一颗金星在我们的瞳孔中闪耀！。
+
+死者的血，我们的死者，从地下呼喊。
+
+我们清楚而明确地听到了这一哭声。这哭声让我们沉浸在痛苦和悲伤之中。
+
+我们不能对那声音充耳不闻，我们也不想……
+
+我们不想对它充耳不闻，因为生活已经告诉我们。
+
+谁对血的声音充耳不闻，就不配做我的朋友。因为血是我的酒，死人是我的秘密。
+
+只有听从死者声音的人，我才会揭开我伟大奥秘的谜团！
+
+而我们将对这个声音作出回应。
+
+因为只有那些知道如何回应来自深渊的声音的人，才能征服星星。
+
+我向你致意，哦，我的兄弟！
+
+我向你致意并告诉你。
+
+如果你是那些跪在半圆中的人，请在黑暗中闭上你的眼睛，跃入深渊。
+
+只有这样，你才能反弹到最高的山峰，在阳光下睁大你的大瞳孔。
+
+因为一个人如果不属于潜水员，就不能属于鹰。
+
+一个人如果没有能力进入深海，就不能翱翔于山峰。
+
+在底层居住着悲哀，在高处居住着苦恼。
+
+在所有时代的日落之上，一个独特的黎明在两个不同的黄昏之间升起。
+
+在这独一无二的黎明中，在我们体内的潜水员的悲伤必须与同样生活在我们体内的鹰的痛苦结合在一起，以庆祝永久更新的悲剧性和富有成效的婚姻。
+
+个人的“自我”在集体风暴和社会飓风中的复活。
+
+因为永恒的孤独只属于那些在上帝那里认识到自己见证的圣人。但我们是孤独的无神论者的后代。
+
+我们是没有见证的孤独的恶魔。
+
+在底层，我们想活在悲伤的现实中；在高处，我们想活在梦想的悲伤中……
+
+为了把所有的战斗、所有的失败、所有的胜利、所有的梦想、所有的悲哀和所有的希望都活得强烈而危险。
+
+我们要在阳光下歌唱；我们要在风中怒吼！。
+
+因为我们的大脑是一个闪亮的火堆，思想的大火在那里噼里啪啦地燃烧，在疯狂和快乐的煎熬中燃烧。
+
+因为所有黎明的纯洁、所有中午的火焰、所有日落的忧郁、所有坟墓的沉默、所有心灵的仇恨、所有森林的杂音和所有星星的微笑都是神秘的音符，构成了我们心灵的秘密音乐，洋溢着生命的旺盛。
+
+因为在我们的心灵深处，我们听到了一个讲述人类个体化的声音，这个声音是如此的高超和有力，以至于很多时候，在聆听它的时候，我们感到恐惧和害怕。
+
+因为说话的声音是他的声音：来自我们深处的长着羽翼的恶魔。
+
+⠀
+
+到现在，已经证明……
+
+生命是一场悲剧！
+
+但我们已经学会了热爱悲剧，以便热爱生活！
+
+因为在热爱悲伤的过程中，我们已经学会了反抗。
+
+而在反抗中，是我们生活的快乐。
+
+半途而废不是我们的任务。
+
+半圆象征着古老的“是与非”。
+
+生与死的无能为力。
+
+它是社会主义的圆，怜悯和信仰的圆。
+
+但我们不是社会主义者……
+
+我们是无政府主义者。还有个人主义者，虚无主义者，以及贵族。
+
+因为我们来自山区。
+
+来自接近星星的地方。
+
+我们来自高处：欢笑和咒骂！
+
+我们来点燃地球上的火堆森林，在大中午之前的夜晚照亮它。
+
+当太阳的火光在海面上雄伟地迸发时，我们的火堆将被熄灭。如果这一天没有到来，我们的火堆将继续在永夜的黑暗中悲惨地燃烧。
+
+因为我们热爱所有伟大的事物。
+
+我们是每一个奇迹的热爱者，是每一个神童的推动者，是每一个奇迹的创造者！
+
+是的：我们知道！
+
+对你们来说，伟大的事情在善与恶中都有。
+
+但我们生活在善与恶之外，因为所有伟大的东西都属于美。
+
+甚至是“犯罪”。
+
+甚至是“叛逆”。
+
+甚至是“悲剧”。
+
+而我们想成为像我们的罪行一样伟大的人！
+
+为了不被诽谤。
+
+我们要像我们的叛逆一样伟大！
+
+为了使它自觉。
+
+我们要像我们的悲剧一样伟大。
+
+为了配得上它。
+
+因为我们来自高处。来自美丽的家园。我们来到地球上，在大中午之前的夜晚，在地球上升起一片火堆的森林，照亮地球。
+
+直到太阳之火在海面上庄严地迸发的那一刻。
+
+因为我们要庆祝伟大的人类神童的节日。
+
+我们想让我们的思想在新的梦想中振动。
+
+我们希望这个悲惨的社会黄昏能给我们的“自我”带来一些平静而惊心动魄的宇宙之光的火种。
+
+因为我们是社会幽灵的虚无主义者。
+
+因为我们听到了从地下呼喊的血的声音。
+
+哦，年轻的矿工们，我们准备好帕拉瓦尼和火把。深渊在等待着我们。我们最终会跃入它：向着创造性的虚无前进。
+
+⠀
+
+我们的虚无主义不是基督教式的虚无主义。
+
+我们不否认生命。
+
+不！我们是伟大的谎言的破坏偶像主义者。
+
+而所有被宣布为“神圣”的东西都是谎言。
+
+我们是“神圣”的敌人。
+
+对你来说，法律是“神圣的”；社会是“神圣的”；道德是“神圣的”；思想是“神圣的”！这就是“神圣”。
+
+但我们—无情的力量和坚强的意志之美的主人和爱好者，以及令人陶醉的思想，所有神圣事物的破坏者，我们像撒旦一样笑着，带着美好的广泛和嘲弄的笑声。
+
+我们的笑声！
+
+在笑声中，我们保持着我们异教徒的意志之弓，始终向着生命的完全完整而努力地享受。
+
+我们用笑声书写我们的真理。
+
+我们用血写下我们的激情。
+
+而我们的笑声！……
+
+我们笑得很健康，笑得很红，笑得很恨。
+
+我们笑的是爱的蓝色和新鲜的笑声。
+
+我们笑着！我们笑着！
+
+但笑的同时，我们记得，我们是一个伟大的自由的贵族的后代和贵族价值的继承人，这个贵族向我们传递了血液中疯狂英雄主义的撒旦式爆发，以及肉体中的诗歌、独唱和歌曲的浪潮
+
+我们的大脑是一个闪亮的火堆，噼里啪啦的思想之火在快乐的煎熬中燃烧。
+
+我们的心灵是一片孤独的绿洲，总是开花结果，心情愉悦，在那里有一种秘密的音乐，唱出了我们羽翼的神秘的复杂旋律。
+
+在我们的大脑中，所有的山风都在向我们呼喊；在我们的肉体中，所有的海洋风暴都在向我们呼喊；所有的邪恶的仙女；我们的梦是实际的天堂，居住着令人兴奋的处女缪斯。
+
+我们是真正的生命之魔。
+
+时代的先行者。
+
+第一批公告！
+
+我们生命力的旺盛，使我们陶醉于力量和蔑视。
+
+它教会我们蔑视死亡。
+
+⠀
+
+今天，我们已经到了一个伟大的社会黄昏的悲伤庆典。
+
+黄昏是红色的。
+
+夕阳是血色的。
+
+焦虑在风中扇动着悸动的翅膀。
+
+羽翼被鲜血染红，被死亡染黑！
+
+在阴影中，悲剧组织了她不知名的孩子们的军队。
+
+美人在生命的花园里，正在编织花环，为英雄们加冕。
+
+自由的灵魂已经在暮色中投下了他们的雷电。
+
+如同火的第一声宣告：战争的第一个信号！
+
+我们的时代在历史的车轮下。
+
+民主文明转向坟墓。
+
+资产阶级和平民社会被致命地、不可阻挡地打碎了！法西斯现象是最确定和无可辩驳的证据。
+
+为了证明这一点，我们只需要回到过去，质疑历史。
+
+但这是没有必要的！
+
+现在的人以丰富的口才说话！
+
+法西斯主义不过是一个平民社会的抽搐和残酷的痛楚，它被阉割和庸俗，痛苦地淹没在自己的缺陷和自己的谎言的泥潭中。
+
+它——法西斯主义，用火焰的火堆和邪恶的血腥狂欢来庆祝它的这些狂欢。
+
+但从它那阴郁的噼啪声中，它并没有闪烁出哪怕是一丝充满活力的、创新的精神火花，而它流下的血却将自己变成了酒，被当时的先行者默默地收集在仇恨的红色酒杯中，将其作为英雄的饮料，以便与所有被召唤到黄昏庆典的社会悲伤的后代进行交流。
+
+因为伟大的时代先驱者是悲伤的后代的兄弟和朋友。
+
+反抗的悲剧。
+
+崛起的悲剧。
+
+创作的悲剧。
+
+我们将牵着这些不知名的兄弟的手，一起前进，反对所有否认的“不”，并一起爬向所有肯定的“是”；走向新的精神曙光；走向新的生命之日。
+
+因为我们是危险的爱好者；是所有事业中的鲁莽者，是不可能的征服者，是所有“努力的推动者和先驱者！”
+
+因为生命是一种努力！
+
+在否定社会黄昏的庆典之后，我们将庆祝“我”的仪式：完整和实际的个人的伟大正午。
+
+这样，黑夜就不再胜利了。
+
+这样，黑暗就不再包围我们了。
+
+这样，雄伟的太阳之火在天空和海洋中延续着它的光明盛宴。
+
+⠀
+
+法西斯主义是一个短暂和无力的障碍，无法阻挡人类思想的进程，它冲出每一道堤坝，溢出每一道边界，在途中激起行动。
+
+法西斯主义是无能的，因为它是野蛮的力量。
+
+它是没有精神的物质；它是没有黎明的黑夜。
+
+法西斯主义是社会主义的另一种面貌。
+
+它们都是没有思想的躯体。
+
+⠀
+
+社会主义是一种物质力量，它作为教条的影子，在精神上的“不”中解决并消解了。
+
+法西斯主义是精神上的“不”的消耗者，其目的是可怜的物质上的“是”。
+
+两者都缺乏意志的品质。
+
+他们都是时间的无聊者；是行为的临时者！他们都没有意志力。
+
+他们是反动的和保守的。
+
+他们是结晶的化石，历史上意志坚强的活力会把它们一起扫除。
+
+因为，在道德和精神价值的意志领域，这两个敌人是平等的。
+
+而众所周知，当法西斯主义诞生时，只有社会主义是它的直接帮凶和负责任的父亲。
+
+因为，如果当民族，如果国家，如果民主的意大利，如果资产阶级社会在造反的“无产阶级”的结实有力的手中痛苦地颤抖时，社会主义没有卑鄙地阻碍悲剧性的死守，在它睁大的眼睛面前失去理性之灯，法西斯主义甚至不会诞生，更不会活着。
+
+但是，没有思想的笨拙巨兽就被允许占据了，因为担心思想的流浪者会把造反运动推到指定的标志之外，在一个最庸俗的游戏中，沉闷的保守主义怜悯和虚假的人类之爱。
+
+因此，资产阶级意大利非但没有消亡，反而产生了……
+
+它带来了法西斯主义！
+
+因为法西斯主义是资产阶级对社会主义无能的爱所产生的发育不良的畸形生物。
+
+他们当中的一个是父亲，另一个是母亲。但两者都不愿意承担这个责任。
+
+也许他们觉得这个孩子太畸形了。
+
+这就是他们称其为“私生子”的原因！
+
+而它得到了报复。
+
+出生时就已经够可怜的了，它反叛父亲，侮辱母亲……
+
+也许它有理由……
+
+但我们，我们把这一切带出了历史。
+
+为了历史，为了真理，而不是为了我们自己。
+
+对我们来说，法西斯主义是一个有毒的蘑菇，很好地种植在社会的腐烂的心脏里，这对我们来说就足够了。
+
+⠀
+
+只有伟大的思想流浪者才能成为，而且必须成为动荡的革命的发光的精神支点，它在阴暗中向世界推进。
+
+鲜血需要鲜血。
+
+这就是古老的历史！
+
+它不能再回头了。
+
+试图逆行——就像社会主义所做的那样，将是一种无用和虚妄的罪行。
+
+我们必须跃入深渊。
+
+我们必须回应死者的声音。
+
+那些死去的人，他们的瞳孔里有巨大的金星，已经倒下了。
+
+必须耕耘土壤。
+
+要把血液从地下解放出来。
+
+因为它想到星星那去。
+
+它想燃烧它的好姐妹，发光的和遥远的，谁看到他们死亡。
+
+死者，我们的死者，会说话。
+
+“我们已经死了，眼睛里有星星。
+
+我们死时，瞳孔里有太阳的光芒。
+
+我们死的时候，心中充满了梦想。
+
+我们死的时候，脑海里有最美丽的希望之歌。
+
+我们死的时候，脑子里有一个想法的火焰。
+
+我们已经死了……”
+
+死亡一定是多么可悲，因为其他人的死亡——不是我们的死亡——没有这一切在大脑中，在思想中，在心脏中，在眼睛中，在瞳孔中！这就是死亡。
+
+哦，死亡，哦，死亡！哦，我们的死者！哦，发光的火炬！哦，燃烧的灯塔！哦，噼里啪啦的火堆！哦，死亡……
+
+现在，我们在黄昏。
+
+伟大的社会黄昏的悲剧性庆典临近了。
+
+我们伟大的心灵已经向伟大的地下之光敞开了，哦，死亡！我们的心灵已经向伟大的地下之光敞开了。
+
+因为我们的眼睛里也有星星，我们的瞳孔里有太阳，我们的心中有梦想，我们的脑海里有希望之歌，在我们的大脑里有一个想法。
+
+是的，我们也是，我们也是！
+
+哦，死亡，哦，死亡！我们的死者哦，我们的死者！哦，火把！哦，灯塔！哦，火堆！
+
+我们已经听到你在我们深夜的庄严寂静中说的话。
+
+你说。
+
+我们想在自由太阳的天空中升起……
+
+我们想在自由生命的天空中飞升……
+
+我们想在异教诗人的透视眼曾经凝视的地方升空。
+
+在那里，伟大的思想升起，像不可侵犯的橡树一样矗立在人们中间；在那里，美丽降临，被纯洁的诗人所召唤，宁静地矗立在人们中间；在那里，爱创造生命，呼吸快乐
+
+在上面，生命在完全和谐的辉煌中欢呼和扩张……
+
+为了这个，为了这个梦想我们奋斗，为了这个伟大的梦想我们牺牲……
+
+我们的斗争被称为犯罪。
+
+但是，我们的“罪行”必须被看作是泰坦尼克号的勇气，是为解放而作出的普罗米修斯式的努力。
+
+因为我们是所有物质统治和所有精神层面的敌人。
+
+因为，在所有的奴役和每一种教条之外，我们看到了生命在自由地、赤裸地舞蹈。
+
+而我们的死亡必须教会你们英雄的生命之美！
+
+哦，死者，哦，死者！哦，我们的死者……
+
+我们已经听到你的声音……
+
+我们听到它在我们深夜的庄严寂静中这样说话。
+
+深深的，深深的，深深的！
+
+因为我们是敏感者。
+
+我们的心是火炬，我们的思想是灯塔，我们的大脑是火堆！……
+
+我们是生命的灵魂！……
+
+我们是喝着花杯中露水的黎明前的人。
+
+但花儿在黑暗的土地上有发光的根系相连。
+
+在那喝过你的血的大地。
+
+哦，死者！哦，我们的死者！
+
+这是你的血液，它在呼喊，它在咆哮，它想从监狱中解放出来，向天空投掷自己，征服星辰！这就是你的血液。
+
+那些，你的遥远而光亮的姐妹们，他们已经看到你的死亡。而我们——精神的流浪者，思想的孤独者，希望我们的思想，自由而伟大，在阳光下张开它的翅膀。
+
+我们要在这个资产阶级社会的黄昏中庆祝社会的黄昏，以便最后的黑夜被血色染成朱红色。
+
+因为黎明的孩子必须从血中诞生……因为黑暗中的怪物必须被黎明杀死……
+
+因为新的个人思想必须通过社会悲剧诞生……
+
+因为新的人民必须在火中锻造！
+
+而只有从悲剧中、从火中、从血中才能诞生真正的、深刻的人类和思想的反基督者。
+
+大地和太阳的真正孩子。
+
+反基督者必须从冒烟的革命废墟中诞生，以使新的黎明的孩子们充满活力。
+
+因为反基督者是来自深渊的人，要超越每一个边界而升华。
+
+他是结晶、预设、保存的意志坚强的敌人！……
+
+他是一个将驱使人类穿过神秘的未知洞穴，走向生命和思想的新来源的常年揭幕的人。
+
+而我们——自由的精神，孤独的无神论者，没有见证的沙漠中的恶魔——自己已经把自己推向了山峰的最高处。
+
+因为对我们来说，一切都必须被推到其最大的后果。
+
+甚至是仇恨。
+
+甚至是暴力。
+
+甚至是犯罪！
+
+因为仇恨给人力量。
+
+暴力使人放松。
+
+犯罪使人更新。
+
+残忍的行为创造了。
+
+而我们要解脱，要更新，要创造！
+
+因为一切相形见绌的庸俗必须被克服。
+
+因为所有活着的东西必须是伟大的。
+
+因为所有伟大的东西都属于美！
+
+而生命必须是美丽的！
+
+⠀
+
+我们杀死了“责任”，使我们对自由兄弟关系的热切渴望在生活中获得了英雄般的勇气。
+
+我们扼杀了“怜悯”，因为我们是能够拥有大爱的野蛮人。
+
+我们杀死了“利他主义”，因为我们是慷慨的利己主义者。
+
+我们杀死了“慈善的团结”，以便社会人发掘他最秘密的“自我”，找到“唯一者”的力量。
+
+因为我们知道。生活已经厌倦了有发育不良的恋人。
+
+因为地球已经厌倦了感受自己被长长的矮人方阵践踏，吟唱基督教的祈祷词。
+
+最后，因为我们厌倦了我们的兄弟，这些没有能力进行和平和战争的尸体。对仇恨和爱来说都是低级的。
+
+我们厌倦了，也厌恶了。
+
+是的，相当累，相当厌恶！
+
+然后死者的声音。
+
+我们的死者！
+
+血液的声音，从地下呼喊的声音！
+
+血液想要从监狱中解放出来，向天空投掷，征服星辰！这就是血液的声音。
+
+那些星星，祝福他们，在死亡的最后一刻在他们的瞳孔中闪烁，将他们梦幻般的眼睛变成巨大的金盘。
+
+因为死者的眼睛，我们死者的眼睛，是金色的圆盘。
+
+他们是发光的流星，在无限的空间里徘徊，为我们指明方向。
+
+那条没有尽头的路，是通往永恒的道路。
+
+我们死者的眼睛告诉我们生命的“原因”，向我们展示在我们神秘中燃烧的秘密之火。在我们的神秘中，至今没有人唱过……
+
+但今天的黄昏是红色的……
+
+夕阳被鲜血覆盖……
+
+我们接近伟大的社会黄昏的悲剧性庆典。在历史的钟声中，时间已经敲响了新一天的第一声黎明前的敲击声。
+
+够了，够了，够了！
+
+现在是社会悲剧的时刻！
+
+我们将摧毁笑声。
+
+我们将笑着放火。
+
+我们将大笑着杀人。
+
+我们将大笑着征用。
+
+而社会将堕落。
+
+祖国将沦陷。
+
+家庭会垮掉。
+
+在自由人诞生后，所有的人都会堕落。
+
+那个在泪水和悲伤中学会了快乐和笑声的戴奥尼亚艺术的人诞生了。
+
+将敌人淹没在血泊中的时刻已经到来……
+
+用鲜血洗涤我们心灵的时刻已经到来。
+
+够了，够了，够了！
+
+就像诗人把他的琴变成了一把匕首！
+
+就像哲学家把他的探针变成了炸弹！
+
+如同渔夫将他的船桨变成一把可怕的斧头。
+
+当矿工带着他闪亮的铁器从黑暗矿洞的难以忍受的洞穴里走出来。
+
+当农夫把他丰硕的铲子变成一把战矛。
+
+当劳动者把他的锤子变成镰刀和菜刀时。
+
+而向前，向前，向前。
+
+是时候了，是时候了——是时候了！
+
+而社会将沦陷。
+
+祖国将沦陷。
+
+家庭会垮掉。
+
+在自由人诞生后，所有的人都将堕落。
+
+前进，前进，前进，哦，快乐的破坏者。
+
+在死亡的黑色边缘下，我们将征服生命！。
+
+欢笑吧！
+
+我们将使它成为我们的奴隶！
+
+笑吧！
+
+我们将爱上它的笑声！
+
+因为唯一严肃的人是那些知道如何积极从事笑的人。
+
+而我们仇恨的笑声……
+
+红色的笑声。前进！前进！前进
+
+前进，为了毁灭谎言和幽灵！前进，为了彻底征服个性和生命！前进，为了毁灭谎言和幽灵。前进！为彻底征服个性和生命而前进！
diff --git a/_collections/_heros/1996-01-01-AlfredoBonanno-a1_l-the-anarchist-tension.md b/_collections/_heros/1996-01-01-AlfredoBonanno-a1_l-the-anarchist-tension.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..51aa29b3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_heros/1996-01-01-AlfredoBonanno-a1_l-the-anarchist-tension.md
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title: "无政府主义的张力"
+author: "Alfredo M. Bonanno"
+date: 1996-01-01 12:00:00 +0800
+image: https://i.imgur.com/8glCSco.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+position: left
+---
+
+一次又一次拿起“什么是无政府主义”这个问题，甚至是“说几句也可以”。为什么呢？这通常不会在生活的其他表现形式中发生，在其他活动或思想中，它们以某种基础定义自己为某种东西。
+
+
+
+所以无政府主义者一直在问自己同样的问题。什么是无政府主义？成为一个无政府主义者意味着什么？为什么？因为这不是一个可以一劳永逸的定义，放在保险箱里，被认为是可以一点一点挖掘的遗产。作为一个无政府主义者并不意味着一个人已经达到了一个确定性，或者一劳永逸地说：“在那里，从现在开始我掌握了真理，因此，至少从思想的角度来看，我是一个有特权的人”。任何像这样思考的人，仅从字面上看是一个无政府主义者。相反，无政府主义者是一个真正把自己作为一个人放在怀疑中，并问自己的人。根据我所做的和我所想的，我的生活是什么？我每天在我所做的一切中，设法使自己成为一个无政府主义者的方式不断地和“不”达成协议，做出小小的日常妥协等等，有什么联系？无政府主义不是一个可以像墓碑一样被锁在一个词里的概念。它不是一种政治理论。它是一种构思生活的方式，而生活，无论我们是年轻还是年老，无论我们是老人还是孩子，都不是最终的东西：它是一个我们必须日复一日地玩耍的赌注。当我们早上醒来，把我们的脚放在地上时，我们必须有一个很好的理由，如果我们不这样做，我们是否是无政府主义者并没有什么区别。我们还不如呆在床上睡觉。为了有一个好的理由，我们必须知道我们想做什么，因为对无政府主义来说，对无政府主义者来说，我们所做的和我们所想的之间没有区别，但有一个理论到行动、行动到理论的持续逆转。这就是无政府主义者与那些拥有另一种生活概念并将这种概念具体化为政治实践、政治理论的人不同的原因。
+
+这就是通常不对你说的东西，这就是你从未在报纸上读到的东西，这就是没有写在书上的东西，这就是学校嫉妒地保持沉默的东西，因为这就是生活的秘密：永远不要把思想和行动分开，我们知道的东西，我们理解的东西，和我们做的东西，我们用它来执行行动。
+
+这就是区分政治家和无政府主义革命家的原因。不是文字，不是概念，请允许我，在某些方面甚至不是行动，因为区分和描述行动的不是它们在攻击中的极端——让我们说是激进——的结论。甚至不是对目标的选择的准确性来限定它们，而是进行这些行动的人、同志成功地使它们成为他们生活的一个表达时刻的方式，一个具体的特征、意义、生活质量、快乐、欲望、美，而不是实际的实现，不是对一个本身就是目的的行为的沉闷的实现，使人能够说：“我今天做了一些事情”，远离我自己，在我存在的边缘。
+
+在那里，这是一个区别。从这个区别中又出现了另一个区别，在我看来是一个相当大的区别。任何认为要做的事情是在我们自己之外，并作为一些成功和失败来实现的人——生活是一个楼梯，有时你会上升，有时你会下降。事情有顺利的时候，也有不顺利的时候。在那里，谁认为生活是由这样的事情组成的：例如，民主政治家的典型形象（看在上帝的份上，一个你可以和他交谈的人，一个友好的人，宽容的人，他有放任的一面，相信进步，相信未来，相信一个更好的社会，相信自由）好吧，像这样的人，可能不穿双排扣外套，不打领带，如此随意，一个近看像一个同志的人，他自己宣布他是一个同志，这个人很可能是一个警察，这没有区别。为什么不呢？有民主的警察，统一镇压的时代已经过去了，今天的镇压有友好的一面，他们用很多精彩的想法来镇压我们。那我们怎么能识别这个人，这个民主人士，我们怎么能识别他？如果他用毛线蒙住我们的眼睛，不让我们看到他，我们怎么能抵御他？我们可以通过这个事实来识别他：对他来说，生活就是实现，他的生活是由做事组成的，是在他眼前展开的定量的做事，而不是其他。
+
+当我们与人交谈时，我们不能要求看他们的会员卡。他们的想法往往使我们最终完全困惑，无法理解任何东西，因为我们都是善良的、进步的话匣子，都在赞美宽容之美，诸如此类。我们怎么能看到我们面前有一个敌人，是我们最坏的敌人？因为至少我们可以在老法西斯面前自卫。他打出来了，如果我们有能力，我们就回击他，更用力。现在情况变了，形势变了。今天甚至可以说很难钓出一个法西斯暴徒。但是，我们试图描述的个人，这个我们在学校、议会、街道或警察制服中随处可见的民主人士，一个法官或医生，这个家伙在这里是我们的敌人，因为他考虑生命的方式与我们考虑生命的方式不同，因为对他来说，生命是另一种生命，不是我们的生命，因为对他来说，我们是外星人，我不明白为什么我们也应该把他看作是我们星球的居民。这就是我们之间的分界线。因为他的生命概念是定量的，因为他衡量成功或，如果你愿意，失败等事情，但总是从定量的角度出发，而我们衡量它们的方式不同，这就是我们应该思考的问题：生命在什么方面对我们有不同的意义，这种意义在质量上不同？
+
+所以，这位和蔼可亲的先生对我们进行了批评，他说：“是的，无政府主义者是好人，但他们是无效的。他们在历史上做过什么？哪个国家曾经是无政府主义者？他们曾经实现过没有政府的政府吗？一个自由的社会，一个无政府主义的社会，一个没有权力的社会，难道不是一个矛盾吗？”而这块砸在我们身上的批判性石头当然是一致的，因为事实上，如果你仔细观察无政府主义者接近实现他们的自由社会乌托邦的任何地方，比如西班牙或俄罗斯，如果你仔细观察，你会发现这些构造在某种程度上是可以批评的。它们当然是革命，但它们不是自由意志革命，它们不是无政府主义。
+
+所以，当这些先生们说，“你们是乌托邦，你们无政府主义者是梦想家，你们的乌托邦永远不会成功”，我们必须回答，“是的，这是真的，无政府主义是一种张力，不是一种实现，不是明天早上带来无政府状态的具体尝试”。但是我们也必须能够说，但是你们，政府中尊敬的民主绅士们，他们管理着我们的生活，认为你们可以进入我们的头脑，我们的大脑，通过你们每天在报纸、大学、学校等地方形成的意见来管理我们，你们这些绅士完成了什么？一个值得居住的世界？还是一个死亡的世界，一个生命是平淡无奇的事情，没有任何质量，没有任何意义的世界？在这个世界里，一个人到了一定的年龄，即将拿到养老金，然后问自己：“但我这一生都做了什么？这么多年来生活的意义何在？”
+
+这就是你们的成就，这就是你们的民主，你们对人民的想法。你们在治理人民，但人民是什么意思？谁是人民？他们也许是那一小部分，甚至不是很重要的一部分，他们投票，参加选举，投票给你，提名一个少数人，而这个少数人又提名另一个比第一个更小的少数人，以法律的名义管理我们？但是，如果这些法律不是少数人利益的表达，那又是什么呢，首先是为了有利于他们自己的致富前景，重新加强他们的权力，等等？
+
+你们以一种力量的名义进行治理，这种力量来自于什么？从一个抽象的概念出发，你们实现了一个你们认为可以改进的结构……但是在历史上，它是如何，以何种方式被改进的？如果不是死亡，不是质量的扁平化，我们今天所处的是什么状况？这就是我们需要向民主的支持者提出的批评。如果我们无政府主义者是乌托邦，我们是作为一种对质量的紧张；如果民主派是乌托邦，他们是作为一种对数量的减少。而反对减少，反对在一个对他们来说损害最小、对大量被剥削的人来说损害最大的层面上生活的萎缩，对于这个悲惨的现实，我们反对我们的乌托邦，它至少是一个质量的乌托邦，是对另一个未来的紧张，一个将与我们现在的生活完全不同的未来。
+
+因此，所有以政治现实主义的名义与你们交谈的人，国家人员、教师（他们是国家人员的仆人）、理论家、记者，所有像这样穿过教室的知识分子，在他们的演讲中用现实主义的冷静、宽容的话语说话，说在任何情况下都不可能有别的东西，现实就是这样，必须做出牺牲；在这里，这些人在骗你们。他们在骗你，因为你可以做别的事情，因为我们中的任何一个人都有能力以我们受伤的尊严的名义在这种骗局面前站起来。因为我们任何一个人都能意识到我们被骗了，因为我们终于意识到什么是对我们不利的行为。而在反抗这一切的过程中，我们不仅可以在可能了解的范围内改变事物的现实，而且可以改变一个人的生活，使其值得被生活。一个人可以在早晨起床，把自己的脚放在地上，看着镜子对自己说：“我终于设法改变了事情，至少就我而言”，并感到自己是一个值得过自己生活的人，而不是一个你甚至看不清楚的木偶人手中的傀儡，可以在他们脸上吐口水。
+
+因此，这就是为什么无政府主义者不断回到无政府主义是什么的问题上。因为无政府主义不是一个政治运动。或者说它是，但只是在一个小方面。无政府主义运动在历史上呈现为政治运动的事实，并不意味着这就穷尽了无政府主义的所有生命潜力。无政府主义不会在库内奥的无政府主义团体，或都灵、伦敦或其他地方的团体中解决自己。这不是无政府主义。当然，那里有无政府主义者，或者至少应该假设有，那种已经单独开始自己的叛乱的同志，已经意识到他们被迫生活的义务和胁迫的背景。但无政府主义不仅仅是这样，它也是一种张力，是生活的质量，是我们设法从自己身上汲取的力量，是改变现实事物的能力。无政府主义是这个转变项目的整体，与我们在实现自己的个人转变时在自己身上实现的东西有关。因此，它不是一个可以被历史化的可量化的事实。它也不是一个将在时间过程中简单发生的事件，通过特定的理论、人、运动以及为什么不呢，精确的革命行为出现。总是有比这些元素的总和更多的东西，而正是这种更多的东西继续使无政府主义以其他方式继续存在。
+
+因此，我们不断地需要在这种走向绝对其他的东西、不可想象的东西、不可说的东西（我们必须在不很清楚如何实现的情况下实现的维度）的张力与我们能够和正在做的事情的日常经验之间维持一种关系。一种精确的变化、转变的关系。
+
+关于这个问题，我想到的第一个例子是另一个矛盾的因素。想一想“有问题要解决”这一说法背后的概念。这是一个经典的短语。我们都有问题要解决。生活本身就是一个有待解决的问题。生活是一个问题，我们的社会条件，必须突破限制我们的圈子，直到简单的日常事务。我们认为所有这些都是一个问题。
+
+这里存在着巨大的误解。为什么？压迫我们的结构（我想在座的很多人都是学生）坚持认为问题是可以解决的，他们可以为我们解决这些问题。此外，他们还用几何学、数学等方面的问题作为例子来解决。但是这种问题，那些被认为是可以解决的数学问题是虚假的问题，它们根本就没有真正得到解决。它们的答案只是以另一种形式重复同一个问题，用技术术语来说就是同义反复。一个人说了一件事，却以另一种方式重复同一件事来回答。所以，基本上，问题根本没有得到解决，它只是被重复。
+
+而当我们谈论解决一个涉及我们所有人的生活、我们的日常生存的问题时，我们谈论的是如此复杂的问题，以至于它们不能简化为对问题本身的简单重述。以“警察的问题”为例。警察的存在对我们许多人来说是一个问题。毫无疑问，警察是国家用来阻止我们做某些事情的压制工具。你如何解决这样一个问题？警察的问题能解决吗？这个问题本身就显示出它的荒谬性。不存在解决警察问题这样的事情。然而，从民主的角度来看，有可能通过某些结构的民主化、改变警察的态度等来解决一些问题。现在，认为这可能是解决控制和镇压问题的办法，既愚蠢又不符合逻辑。实际上，这只不过是一种符合权力、国家利益的调控镇压的方式。如果今天的民主政治是有效的，那么未来的控制和镇压的远非民主的结构可能会像过去一样有效，任何在这个问题上有其他想法的罕见的、边缘的少数人都会被驱逐或从队伍中淘汰。
+
+当我说警察时，我指的是任何镇压结构，从军事警察到司法机构，所有为控制和镇压服务的国家表达。所以，正如你所看到的，社会问题是无法解决的。民主结构运作的骗局正是他们声称要解决这些问题。这个骗局显示了民主政治是如何不以现实为基础，甚至不以最低限度的具体性为基础。一切都建立在这样的暗示上：事情可以被改善，可以及时解决，可以被纠正。权力的力量就在于这种拨乱反正的概念，也正是在这种改善的基础上，权力才得以存在并在中期和长期持续。权力关系在我们等待他们承诺的事情发生时发生了变化，但它永远不会发生。因为这些改进从未实现。因为权力在历史上不断变化和转变，却始终保持不变。一小撮人，少数拥有特权的人，他们掌握着权力的杠杆，照顾自己的利益，维护谁碰巧在指挥的优越条件。
+
+现在，我们有什么手段来对抗这种状况？他们想控制我们？所以我们拒绝控制。当然，我们可以这样做。我们无疑是这样做的，试图将伤害降到最低。但在社会背景下拒绝控制只在一定程度上有效。我们可以限制它的某些方面，当我们受到不公平的打击时大喊大叫；但显然在某些权力领域，规则被称为法律，路标指示围墙，自称为警察的人阻止我们进入。毋庸置疑，试着进入议会，看看会发生什么。我不知道。某些级别是不能超越的，某些控制是不可避免的。
+
+那么，我们该如何反对这种情况？只是做梦吗？有一个自由的想法，而且这个想法必须仔细制定，因为我们不能说：“无政府主义者想要的自由只是控制的减少”。在这种情况下，我们会发现自己面临的问题是：“但这种控制的减少在哪里结束？”也许是在一个最小的水平上？例如，如果国家不再是今天的压迫者国家，而是成为，比方说，自由主义者的理想的最小国家，那么对无政府主义者来说，国家会变得正当吗？不，当然不会。所以这不是思考的方式。这不是一个试图限制控制的问题，而是一个完全废除控制的问题。我们不赞成更多的自由。当奴隶的锁链被拉长时，他就会得到更多的自由。我们是为了废除锁链，所以我们是为了自由，而不是更多的自由。自由意味着没有所有的锁链，没有限制以及由此产生的一切。
+
+自由是一个困难的、未知的概念。它是一个痛苦的概念，但它却被兜售为美丽、甜蜜、安逸的东西。就像一个遥远的梦想，它让我们感觉很好，就像所有的东西，由于遥远，构成了希望和信仰，一种信念。换句话说，这些表面上解决了今天的问题的无形资产，实际上并没有解决这些问题，而只是把它们迷住了，把它们改变了，使我们无法对我们时代的所有困境有一个清晰的认识。好吧，总有一天我们会获得自由。好吧，事情是一团糟，但在这团糟中，有一种地下的力量，一种独立于我们自己的非自愿的秩序，它代替我们工作，它将逐渐改变我们所处的痛苦条件，把我们带到一个自由的空间，在那里我们都将幸福地生活。不，那不是自由，那是一个骗局，悲惨地类似于旧的上帝观念，这种观念经常帮助我们，而且今天仍然帮助许多人受苦，因为他们对自己说，“很好，我们今天在受苦，但我们在来世会更好”。事实上，正如福音书所说，最后的人将会是第一个，使今天最后的人感到振奋，因为他们把自己看作是明天的第一个。
+
+如果我们把这种自由的想法当作真实的，那么我们所做的不过是通过给社会伤口上药来抚慰今天的痛苦，就像牧师治疗那些听他布道的穷人一样，欺骗自己说上帝的国度将拯救他们的痛苦。无政府主义者不能这样想。自由是一个破坏性的概念，它涉及到对所有限制的绝对消除。现在，自由是一个我们必须牢记在心的概念，但同时我们需要明白，如果我们渴望自由，我们必须准备好面对破坏所涉及的所有风险，所有破坏我们所处的宪法秩序的风险。自由不是一个可以把自己搂在怀里的概念，希望改善会独立于我们的实际干预能力而发展。
+
+为了理解这种概念，意识到挥舞这种危险概念所带来的风险，我们必须能够在我们内部形成这种想法。
+
+在这一点上也存在着相当大的混乱。人们习惯性地认为，任何经过我们头脑的东西都是一种观念。人们说“我有一个想法”，然后试图去理解这意味着什么。这是笛卡尔式的观念，与柏拉图式的观念相反，后者是一个抽象的遥远的参考点。但是，当我们说到理念时，这并不是我们所指的内容。理念是一个参照点，是一个能够改变生活的力量要素。它是一个充满价值的概念，成为一种力量的概念，是能够发展并使我们与他人的关系不同的东西。所有这些都是一个概念。但是，使阐述这种想法成为可能的元素的来源是什么呢？学校、大学、报纸、书籍、教师、技术人员、电视等等？从这些信息和文化阐述的工具中，有什么东西到达我们手中？大量的信息堆积在我们身上，像大锅一样在我们体内沸腾，使我们产生意见。我们往往不是有想法，而是有意见。
+
+这就是悲剧性的结论。什么是意见？它是一个扁平化的想法，一个为了让最多的人接受而变得统一的想法。意见是大众化的想法。对权力来说，维持这些意见是很重要的，因为正是通过意见，对意见的控制，他们才获得了既定的结果，更不用说通过媒体的宣传和选举程序的机制。新的权力精英的形成不是来自思想，而是来自意见。
+
+那么，反对舆论制造意味着什么？它是否意味着获取更多的信息？也就是用反信息来反对信息？不，那是不可能的，因为无论你怎么看，你都不可能用反信息来反对我们每天被轰炸的大量信息，反信息能够通过调查隐藏的原因来“揭开”被所有信息性谈话掩盖的现实。不，我们不能朝这个方向操作。每当我们试图这样做的时候，我们就会意识到这是毫无意义的，我们无法说服人们。
+
+这就是为什么无政府主义者总是批判性地考虑宣传的问题。是的，当然，正如你所看到的，这里有一张摆放整齐的桌子，在这种倡议或会议上总是如此。这里总是有我们的小册子，我们的书。我们有大量的论文，而且非常善于推出这样的出版物。但这并不是我们需要做的唯一工作，而且无论如何，它们都不包含反信息的内容，或者说，如果它们包含的话，也纯粹是偶然的。这项工作的目的主要是，或者说应该是，建立一种思想或一些主导思想，一些强有力的思想。
+
+让我们只举一个例子。在过去的三四年里，发生了一件事，报纸用“tangentopoli“或“clean hands”（在法律程序中，许多政治家因接受资本家的金钱以换取公共工程部门的合同而被判刑）等可怕的术语进行报道。现在，这一行动在人们的头脑中灌输了什么？它建立了这样一种观点：法律能够纠正错误，能够对政治家进行判决，能够改变条件，因此能够把我们从意大利第一共和国的典型旧观念带到第二共和国的新观念。这种意见，这种过程，显然是非常有用的。例如，它允许出现一个“新“的权力精英来取代旧的权力精英。在一定程度上是新的，但具有某些特征，是旧习惯和旧人物的可悲重现。这就是舆论的运作方式。
+
+现在，请考虑将这种仅对权力有相当大好处的舆论制造过程与可能是对正义概念进行深入分析的思想力量的构建进行比较。差距是深渊般的。但什么是正确的呢？例如，对许多人来说，前社会主义党领导人克拉克西被迫继续被关在突尼斯的别墅里，这当然是正确的，我们自己也认为是正确的。整个事件相当有趣，它甚至让我们发笑，让我们感觉很好，因为当这种级别的猪最终被淘汰的时候是相当不错的。但这是真正的正义吗？例如，安德烈奥蒂就遇到了困难。似乎他亲吻了里纳[黑手党老大]的脸颊。
+
+这样的消息当然会让我们微笑，让我们感觉更好，因为像安德烈奥蒂这样的猪，即使在简单的身体层面也是令人讨厌的，只是在电视上看到他就足够了。但这种正义的想法是什么呢？起诉方的法官迪皮耶罗和博雷利有一大群支持他们的粉丝。数以百万计的人被卷入这个统一意见的过程。
+
+我们需要思考的正义概念有什么不同吗？它应该导致什么？它应该让我们认识到，如果克拉克西或安德烈奥蒂有责任，那么像迪皮耶罗或博雷利这样的人也有同样的责任。因为如果前者是政治家，那么其他人都是地方官员。正义的概念意味着在支持和维护权力的人和反对权力的人之间划定一条分界线。如果权力的存在本身就是不公正的，如果所有的尝试（其中一些我们刚刚看到）都显示出它们不过是自我辩护的骗局，那么任何有权力的人，无论他多么民主，无论他做什么，总是站在正义的错误一边。
+
+建立这样一个正义的概念显然意味着形成一种思想，一种你在报纸上找不到的思想，一种在教室或大学礼堂里没有深入研究的思想，它不能成为舆论的要素或引导人们投票。事实上，这样的想法会导致内部冲突。因为在自己的法庭面前，人们会问：“但是我，以我对社会正义的想法，当迪皮耶罗所做的事情看起来不错时，我怎么看？我是不是也被人利用了？我是否也是舆论的工具，是维护权力的伟大进程的终端，不仅成为他们的奴隶，也是他们的帮凶？”
+
+我们终于到了那里。我们已经达到了我们自己的责任点。因为如果对无政府主义者来说，理论和行动之间真的没有区别的话，只要社会正义的想法在我们心中亮起，照亮我们的大脑，哪怕是一瞬间，它就永远无法再熄灭了。因为无论我们怎么想，我们都会感到内疚，会觉得我们是帮凶，是歧视、镇压、种族灭绝、死亡过程的帮凶，这个过程我们将永远无法再感到脱离了。否则我们怎么能定义自己是革命者和无政府主义者？如果我们把我们的同谋交给当权的暗杀者，我们会支持什么自由？
+
+你看，不管是谁，通过对现实的深入分析，还是仅仅因为偶然或不幸，成功地让一个像正义的想法这样清晰的想法进入他们的大脑，情况是多么不同和关键？有许多这样的想法。例如，自由的理念也是类似的。任何思考过自由究竟是什么的人，哪怕是片刻，都不会再满足于仅仅做一些事情来稍微扩大他们所处环境的自由。从那一刻起，他们会感到内疚，并试图做一些事情来减轻他们的痛苦感。他们会担心自己做错了，因为直到现在还没有做任何事情，从那一刻起，他们的生活将完全改变。
+
+基本上，国家想从意见的形成中得到什么？权力想要什么？是的，当然，它想创造大众舆论，因为他们能够从中实现某些操作，如投票、形成权力集团等等。但这并不是他们想要的全部。他们想要我们的共识。他们想要我们的认可。而共识是通过精确的工具获得的，特别是那些文化性质的工具。例如，学校是实现共识的水库之一，未来的知识分子，而不仅仅是知识分子，是由学校建立的。
+
+今天，资本主义需要的是与过去不同的人。直到最近，人们还需要具有专业能力的人，对这种能力和特殊资格感到自豪。现在的情况则完全不同。工作世界要求的资格水平很低，而过去不存在的、甚至是不可想象的品质，如灵活性、适应性、宽容、在会议上干预的能力等等，都需要取而代之。
+
+例如，基于装配线的巨大生产单位现在使用机器人，或建立在岛屿的概念基础上，小团体一起工作，他们互相认识，互相控制，等等。这种心态不仅存在于工厂中。他们正在建造的不仅仅是一个“新工人”，而是一个“新人”；一个灵活的人，想法不多，欲望相当不透明，文化水平大大降低，语言贫乏，阅读标准化，思考能力有限，有很大的能力快速做出是或不是的决定。他们知道如何在两种可能性之间做出选择：一个黄色按钮，一个红色按钮，一个黑色按钮，一个白色按钮。这就是他们正在建立的一种心态。他们在哪里建立这种心态呢？在学校，但也在日常生活中。
+
+他们会用这样的人做什么？他们将利用他们来实现所有的修改，这些修改是重组资本所必需的。他们将有助于更好地管理明天的资本主义的条件和关系。而这些关系将是什么呢？它们将建立在越来越快的变化上，呼吁满足不存在的欲望，这些欲望是由越来越多的小团体试行和决定的。这种新的人与我们能够想象或渴望的东西截然相反，与质量、创造力相反，与真正的欲望、生活的快乐相反，与这一切相反。我们怎样才能与这种技术人的实现作斗争？我们怎样才能与这种情况作斗争呢？我们能不能等待某一天的到来，一个将颠覆世界的伟大日子？上个世纪的无政府主义者称之为“伟大的夜晚”（la grande soirée）？伟大的夜晚或伟大的一天——“le grand jour”——其中没有人可以预见的力量将最终接管，爆发出我们都在等待的社会冲突，称为革命？那么一切都会改变，会有一个完美和快乐的世界？
+
+这是一个千禧年的想法。现在我们已经到了千禧年的尾声，它可能再次扎根。但条件已经改变。这不是现实，我们感兴趣的不是这种等待。我们感兴趣的是另一种干预，一种更为温和的干预，但它能够取得一些成果。作为无政府主义者，我们被召唤去做一些事情。我们被我们自己的个人责任和我们前面所说的所召唤。从这个想法照亮我们头脑的那一刻起，不是无政府主义的想法，而是正义、自由的想法，当这些想法照亮我们的头脑，我们看到我们面前的骗局——今天我们比以往任何时候都更能定义一个民主的骗局——我们能做什么？我们必须着手工作，而这种着手工作也意味着将我们自己组织起来。这意味着在无政府主义者之间创造参考和联系的条件，这些条件必须与过去的条件不同。
+
+现实已经改变。正如我之前所说，他们正在建造一个不同的人，一个不合格的人，他们正在建造他，因为他们需要建造一个不合格的社会。他们把工人的形象从政治社会概念的中心移开，因为他被取消了资格。在过去，工人是剥削的最大受害者。这就是为什么人们认为这个社会形象必然会催生革命。只要想到马克思主义的分析就够了。马克思的《资本论》致力于工人的“解放”。当马克思说到人时，他指的是工人。在他对价值的分析中，他是在谈论工作节奏；在他对异化的分析中，他是在谈论工作。没有什么是不涉及工作的。但这是因为在马克思主义分析发展的时候，工人是其核心。工人阶级可以被看作是社会结构的中心。
+
+无政府主义者利用不同的分析，也接近于认为工人的地位是社会世界的中心。想想无政府工团主义的分析。对无政府主义者来说，这是一个将工会斗争的概念发挥到极致的问题，将其从工会谈判的狭隘层面中解放出来，并通过总罢工将其发展到革命的实现上。因此，根据无政府工团主义者的观点，未来的社会，即自由的无政府主义社会，无非是现在的社会从权力中解放出来，但具有相同的生产结构，不再掌握在资本家手中，而是掌握在共同管理它们的集体手中。
+
+由于各种原因，这一概念在今天是相当不可行的。首先，因为技术改造已经使我们不可能从现在的社会简单地进入到我们希望生活的未来社会中。一个直接的通道是不可能的，原因很简单，就是不可能以解放的形式，以解放的方式使用信息技术。新技术和计算机技术的应用并不局限于在特定的工具中带来某些修改，它们也改变了所有其他的技术。例如，工厂并不是简单地将过去的结构加上计算机技术，而是变成了一个计算机化的工厂，这是很不同的。考虑到这一点，我们只能以非常笼统的方式提及这些概念，因为要充分了解它们需要时间。所以我们必须认识到，不可能使用这一遗产。这段话与工人阶级的中心地位的神话的结尾平行。
+
+现在，在工人阶级实际上已经解体的情况下，征用生产资料的可能性已经不存在。那么，结论是什么呢？唯一可能的结论是，我们面前的这套生产工具被摧毁。唯一可能的办法是通过毁灭的戏剧性现实。如果我们想象中的革命，而且我们不能确定它是否会发生，那么它就不会是过去那种把自己看作是一个单一事件的革命，甚至可能在一天或一个美好的夜晚发生，而会是一个漫长的、悲惨的、血腥的事件，可能会经过难以想象的暴力、难以想象的悲惨过程。
+
+所有这些都是我们正在走向的那种现实。不是因为那是我们所渴望的，不是因为我们喜欢暴力、血腥、破坏、内战、死亡、强奸、野蛮。并非如此，而是因为这是唯一合理的道路，是那些统治我们的人和指挥者所希望的转型所必需的道路。他们已经走上了这条道路。我们不能用简单的幻想、简单的梦想来改变这一切。在过去存在强大的工人阶级的假设中，人们可以对这段话自欺欺人，并据此进行组织。例如，无政府工团主义的组织建议看到了一个强大的工会主义运动，它渗透到工人阶级并组织了几乎整个工人阶级，要实现这种征用和通过。这个从一开始就可能是神话的集体主体，即使在其神话版本中也不再存在，那么革命性质的联合主义运动有什么意义呢？在无政府工团主义运动中又有什么意义呢？完全没有。
+
+因此，斗争必须从其他地方开始，从其他思想和方法开始。这就是为什么我们15年来一直在发展对工会主义和无政府-工会主义的批判。这就是为什么我们是，并把自己定义为叛乱的无政府主义者。不是因为我们认为解决方案是街垒——街垒可能是不属于我们自己的选择的悲剧性后果——而是我们是叛乱主义者，因为我们认为无政府主义行动必然要面对非常严重的问题。这些问题不是无政府主义所希望的，而是那些当权者所建立的现实所强加的，我们不能仅仅通过希望它们消失来抹杀它们。
+
+因此，一个将自己推向未来的无政府主义组织应该是灵活的。它不能以过去结构的繁琐特点和数量上的沉重感来展示自己。它不能像过去的组织那样以综合的形式出现，在过去，无政府主义组织声称要在“委员会“中总结现实，处理所有的问题，在定期的大会上根据甚至可以追溯到上个世纪的论文做出决定。所有这些都已经过时了，这并不是因为它的想法已经过去了一个世纪，而是因为现实已经发生了变化。
+
+这就是为什么我们坚持认为有必要在亲和力的概念基础上形成小团体，甚至是由极少数同志组成的小团体，他们相互了解并加深这种了解，因为如果一个人不了解另一个人，就不可能有亲和力。一个人只有通过深入了解决定自己差异的因素，通过经常接触对方，才能认识到自己的亲和力。这种认识是个人的事实，但它也是一个思想、辩论、讨论的问题。但就我们今天晚上提出的第一点而言，如果你们记得，如果没有带来行动的实践，就不可能有深入的想法。因此，有一个持续的互惠过程，即进入想法和实现行动。
+
+一小群同志，一个仅仅在晚上见面聊天的小团体，不会是一个亲和团体，而是一群朋友，酒吧里的伙伴，他们在晚上见面，谈论阳光下的任何事情。相反，一个团体开会讨论事情，并在讨论中为行动做准备，并通过行动促进发展讨论，将自己转化为对要做的事情的讨论，这就是亲和团体的机制。那么，亲和团体如何与其他存在于单一团体中的深化知识的团体进行接触？这种接触可以通过非正式组织来保证。
+
+但什么是非正式组织？各个亲和团体之间可能存在着非正式的关系，它们为了交流思想和共同做事而相互接触，因此存在着一个组织，这个组织在全国范围内也非常普遍，甚至由几十个，或者为什么不，几百个组织、结构、基于讨论、定期分析、共同做事等的非正式性质的团体组成。起义无政府主义的组织逻辑与我们前面提到的关于无政府主义的组织不同。这里提到的组织形式值得深入研究，这是我现在在会议的范围内无法做到的。但在我看来，如果不是为了实现无政府主义运动以外的关系，也就是通过建立外部团体、外部核心，也有非正式的特点，这样的组织方式将仅仅停留在无政府主义运动内部。这些团体不应仅仅由无政府主义者组成，只要他们考虑到一些基本条件，任何打算为实现特定目标而斗争的人，即使是有限制的目标，都可以参加。首先是永久的冲突，也就是具有攻击他们所处的现实而不等待其他地方的命令的特点的团体。然后是“自治“的特点，即完全不依赖政党或工会组织，也不与之有任何关系。最后，他们的特点是逐一面对问题，不提出一般要求的平台，这些平台将不可避免地转化为小型政党或小型替代性工会的管理。对这些想法的总结可能看起来相当抽象，这就是为什么在结束之前我想举一个例子，因为其中一些东西可以在实践中更好地理解。
+
+80年代初，在试图阻止美国在科米索建造导弹基地的过程中，就使用了这种理论模式。干预了两年的无政府主义者建立了“自我管理的联盟”。这些自我管理的联盟正是在该地区活动的非无政府主义团体，其独特的目的是通过在实现过程中破坏该项目来阻止基地的建设。
+
+这些联盟是自治的核心，其特点是他们的唯一目标是攻击和摧毁基地。他们没有处理一系列的问题，因为如果他们这样做了，他们就会成为工团主义者的团体，目的是，比方说，保护工作或寻找工作或解决其他直接问题。相反，他们的唯一目标是摧毁基地。第二个特点是长期冲突，即从这些团体成立的那一刻起（它们不是专门的无政府主义团体，但其中有无政府主义者），它们就与参与建设基地的所有力量发生冲突，而这种冲突并没有由任何代表机构或推动这一倡议的无政府主义者决定或宣布。第三个特点是这些团体完全自治，也就是说，它们与任何政党或工会等没有联系。反对基地的斗争，一部分人知道，另一部分人不知道。我也不知道在这里是否要再接再厉，我只是想把它作为一个例子来提一提。
+
+所以叛乱的无政府主义必须克服一个基本问题。它必须超越一定的限度，否则它就只能停留在起义无政府主义的思想上。这就是我们前面提到的那些经历过个人性质的起义的同志，那种在我们内心产生一种思想力量以反对意见的喋喋不休的照明，并形成亲和团体，通过一种非正式的结构与其他地方的同志建立关系，只实现了一部分工作。在某一点上，他们必须决定，必须超越分界线，迈出不容易回头的一步。他们必须与不是无政府主义者的人建立关系，涉及一个中间的、有限制的问题（例如，摧毁科米索的基地）。不管这个想法有多么奇妙或有趣，它肯定不是无政府主义的实现。如果人们真的设法进入基地并摧毁它，会发生什么？我不知道。可能什么都没有，也可能什么都没有。我不知道，没有人能说得清。但实现破坏性事件的美妙之处，并不在于其可能的后果。
+
+无政府主义者不保证他们所做的任何事情。他们指出个人和结构的责任，是基于他们决心采取行动的决定，从那一刻起，他们对自己感到有把握，因为他们的正义观念照亮了他们的行动。它指出了一个人的责任，或更多人的责任，一个结构或更多结构的责任，以及这种责任导致的后果。正是在这里，我们发现无政府主义者的行动决心。
+
+但是，一旦他们与其他人一起行动，他们也必须努力建立能够在反对权力的斗争中保持团结并创造后果的有机体。我们决不能忘记这一点。而这是需要反思的重要一点：权力在时间和空间中实现自己，它不是抽象的东西。如果警察局不存在，如果监狱不存在，控制是不可能的。如果议会不存在，或者没有小的地区议会，立法权就不可能存在。如果没有学校和大学，就不可能有压迫我们、制造舆论的文化权力。现在，学校、大学、警察局、监狱、工业、工厂，都是在特定的地方实现自己的东西，在限定的区域内，我们只有在接受特定的条件和玩游戏的情况下才能在这些地方活动。我们此刻在这里，是因为我们同意玩这个游戏。否则我们就无法进入这栋楼。这很有意思。我们可以使用这种结构。但在攻击的时候，这种地方是禁止我们进入的。如果我们是抱着攻击的目的进入这里，警察显然会阻止我们。
+
+现在，由于权力在物理空间中实现自己，无政府主义者与此的关系很重要。当然，叛乱是一个单独的事实，因此在我们内心深处的那个地方，在我们即将入睡的时候，我们会想“……好吧，最后分析一下，事情还不算太糟糕”，一个人对自己感到平静，并睡着了。在那里，在我们内心的那个特殊地方，那个私人空间，我们可以随心所欲地活动。但随后我们必须把自己转移到社会现实的物理空间中。而物理空间，当你考虑到它时，几乎完全在权力的控制之下。因此，当我们在这个空间里活动时，我们带着这种叛乱的价值，这些革命的价值，并在冲突中衡量它们，而我们并不是唯一在场的人。
+
+因此，我们必须对重要的目标进行分类，并核实它们的存在——幸运的是，这些目标永远存在，无处不在——并为创造条件做出贡献，使人们，即这些目标在其身上实现的被剥削者，做出一些事情来摧毁它们。
+
+我认为这个革命过程具有叛乱的性质。它没有数量上的目标（这一点很重要），因为对一个目标的破坏或对一个项目的阻止不能用数量来衡量。有时会发生这样的情况：有人对我说；“但我们获得了什么结果？当某件事情完成后，人们事后甚至不记得无政府主义者。“无政府主义者？这些无政府主义者是谁？君主主义者？他们是这些支持国王的人吗？”人们记得不是很清楚。但这有什么关系呢？他们必须记住的不是我们，而是他们的斗争，因为斗争是他们的，我们只是这场斗争中的一个机会。我们是额外的东西。
+
+在自由的社会中，无政府状态已经达到了相当理想的程度，无政府主义者在各个层面的社会斗争中都是不可或缺的，他们的作用只是把斗争越推越远，消除哪怕是最小的权力痕迹，始终完善无政府状态的张力。无政府主义者在任何情况下都居住在一个不舒服的星球上，因为当斗争进展顺利时，他们会被遗忘，而当斗争进展不顺利时，他们会被指责为负有责任，指责他们以错误的方式对待它，指责他们把它带到错误的结论。因此，不要对任何量化的结果抱有幻想：如果从叛乱的角度实现的斗争是正确的，进展顺利，如果有任何结果，也可能是对促成它的人有用，当然不是对无政府主义者有用。重要的是，不要陷入许多无政府主义者不幸所做的幻想，即相信斗争的积极结果会导致我们团体的增长，因为事实并非如此，这将系统地导致幻灭。我们团体的增长和同志人数的增加是很重要的，但这并不是从所获得的结果中产生的，而是通过建立、形成这些思想力量，即我们先前谈到的澄清。斗争的积极结果和无政府主义团体的数量增长是两件事，不能被看作是一个因果的过程。它们可能有联系，也可能没有。
+
+最后我想说的是，我已经谈到了什么是无政府主义，什么是民主，以及我们不断面临的不理解；谈到了我们称之为现代资本主义、后工业资本主义的权力结构被改造的方式；谈到了一些今天不再被接受的无政府主义斗争结构，以及人们可以反对权力现实的方式，最后，我提到了传统无政府主义和当今的叛乱无政府主义之间的区别。
diff --git a/_collections/_heros/2022-03-08-JoePateman-a1_c-vi-lenin-on-alienation.md b/_collections/_heros/2022-03-08-JoePateman-a1_c-vi-lenin-on-alienation.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..30f76b35
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_heros/2022-03-08-JoePateman-a1_c-vi-lenin-on-alienation.md
@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title: "列宁论异化"
+author: "乔·帕特曼"
+date: 2022-03-08 12:00:00 +0800
+image: https://i.imgur.com/CBLmG5Z.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+position: center
+---
+
+列宁是最早在马克思著作中发现并独立分析这个概念的人。像马克思一样，列宁批判了资本主义中的异化并把共产主义认定为无异化的社会。十月革命后，列宁也奋力想要实现这一目标。然而，面对欧洲社会主义革命的失败和国内残酷的内战形势，加之大饥荒和国民文化素质落后的因素，列宁在消除异化上做了妥协。尽管如此，列宁的遗产也为理解今日之异化提供了重要洞见。
+
+
+
+### 引言
+
+长期以来，有一种观点认为苏联马克思主义的缔造者——弗拉基米尔·列宁——忽视了马克思主义中的异化论。对马克思而言，异化指的是“人的全部能力与类属性被直截地对象化为资本、科技、市场、历史规律和神祇之类的东西，而活生生的人（主体）成为了他们对象化了的力量的奴隶”。许多人认为“列宁不懂异化，也没能使之在其理论中发挥作用”。这一观点的主要依据在于，列宁没有读过马克思的《1844年经济学哲学手稿》，而这篇手稿中承载着马克思对于异化论的最详细的论述。直到1927年，即列宁去世后3年，布党的大卫·梁赞诺夫（David Riazanov）才将手稿第一次发表出来。马赛罗·穆斯托（Musto）指出，1927年前，确实有少部分人探讨过异化论在马克思主义中的意义，不过列宁不在其中。相反，他认为“异化论重新被认识主要归功于卢卡奇，他在《历史与阶级意识》中引述了《资本论》中的部分章节的内容，尤其是有关商品拜物教的部分…他还引入了‘物化’一词的概念”。当然，实际上商品拜物教和物化虽然它们确有密切的联系，卻并非异化的形式。不过，大多数人还是会认同慕斯托的观点。只有在1932年《1844年经济学哲学手稿》德文版付梓之后，异化才成为了社会学关注的流行主题。此后，虽有大量的研究对这一概念做出解析，但他们很少承认列宁与之有关。
+
+有些人把异化论放在马克思主义的中心位置，那么对他们而言，列宁对《1844年手稿》的忽视无异有着重大的影响。这证明，列宁“漏掉了马克思理论的核心，马克思主义体系中的基本概念”。这种观点催生出了一种社会主义流派——马克思人本主义（Marxist Humanism）。马克思人本主义诞生于1932年《1844年手稿》发表之后，对他们而言，正是异化论构成了马克思思想的解放之推动力，而列宁的追随者对此的忽视使得苏共政权没能让苏联的工人阶级当家作主。
+
+法兰克福学派的批判理论家们有着类似的观点。马尔库塞（Herbert Marcuse）利用马克思的《1844年手稿》批判资本主义和社会主义中的异化现象，声称马列主义忽视了马克思的异化论。这也就是为什么说马克思主义派的批判理论在历史上是和马克思人本主义同根同源的。法兰克福学派的创始人之一，埃里希·弗洛姆（Erich Fromm），也支持马克思人本主义并于1965年编纂了《社会主义的人本主义》（Socialist Humanism）一书。
+
+一些学者认为列宁是马克思列宁主义的创始人。如果接受了这一观点，列宁的理论想必要遭到马克思人本主义者的批评。事实也确实如此，一些人声称列宁违背了马克思人本主义精神，他的理论导致了以马列主义为指导思想的社会中异化的产生。
+
+有些人则对此不以为然。铁托统治下的南斯拉夫虽属社会主义阵营，但对苏联的马列主义持批评态度。一个叫做“实践学派”（Praxis School）的马克思人本主义社团就坚决捍卫列宁思想的解放性，而把苏联社会的异化归咎于斯大林。当南斯拉夫引入工人自治制度来增强工人对于经济企业的控制时，无论是执政的南共联盟还是实践学派都为之摇旗呐喊，并且不仅仅引用了马克思的《1844年手稿》，还引用了列宁的著作来证明其正确性。
+
+在1953年斯大林去世之前，正统的马列主义政权下很少有思想家研究异化。官方的口径是：异化论对于马克思主义来说无关紧要。因而，马克思的《1844年手稿》在有些国家并未发行。随着1956年去斯大林化的开始，人本主义变成了新潮流，尤其是它成为了批判斯大林主义的利器。苏联的学者开始更加认真地对待异化论的问题，从而，他们反对说苏联的社会是异化的社会，也不承认列宁是这个异化社会的始作俑者。尽管他们承认列宁并没有了解过《1844年手稿》，但是苏联依然声称异化的概念处于列宁思想的核心地位。马·鲍·米丁就是这一派的代表人物，据他所说，“列宁漏掉了异化论的说法是站不住脚的”。事实上，“列宁一向强调，马克思主义必须要求一个真正的革命人本主义来建设共产主义，这种人本主义就要把消灭一切压迫和人对人的剥削当作最高目的”。为了进一步佐证这个观点，苏联人把异化和人本主义收录到列宁选集的主题当中。梅塞罗斯（Mészáros）也支持这个立场。显然，在他看来，“在列宁成长为马克思主义者的过程中，他对异化的重要意义的把握起到了关键作用”。
+
+显然，搞清异化在列宁思想中的地位不仅有助于理解列宁本人的思想的发展历程以及其与马克思的思想之间的关系，同时，有利于揭示异化这个概念从马克思的文本之中被发掘出来的历史过程，也有利于揭示列宁与马列主义和马克思人本主义间的关联以及马列主义、异化、异化论本身之间的联系。“考虑到异化论在批判社会学中的重要意义和核心地位”，这些问题与社会学的研究者们息息相关。
+
+不过，本文深入讨论并最终否决了列宁忽视了异化论的说法。相反，异化论处于列宁理解的马克思主义的核心位置。事实上，列宁是第一批理解了马克思文本中概念的人，他也曾独立地分析过这些概念。这说明，列宁忠实地坚持了马克思人本主义的信条，远非人们宣称的那样。
+
+本文同样要说明，列宁也像马克思一样批判了资本主义中的异化并把共产主义认定为无异化的社会。在十月革命之后，列宁也奋力地实现这一目标。然而，面对欧洲社会主义革命的失败和国内残酷的内战形势，加之大饥荒和国民文化素质落后的因素，列宁只好在消除异化上做了让步。尽管如此，认识到列宁与异化的联系对于理解列宁的马克思主义的解放解放之推动力有着关键作用，列宁的遗产也为理解今日之异化提供了重要洞见。
+
+在概述这些论点之前，有必要先说明的是本文探讨了列宁所思考的是马克思的文本中的两种异化：异化劳动（Alienated Labour）和政治异化（Political Alienation），而前者在不仔细的阅读中常和异化本身混为一谈。事实上，这两种异化并不总是联系在一起，应该分开来单独分析。不过，马克思和列宁认为不消除后一种异化就没办法消灭前一种异化，二人对于社会主义的理解也融会了经济和政治两个领域。因此，本文在谈到社会主义的语境下把两种异化都简称为“异化”，但不管是在哪种情况下，都应当很好区分所讨论的具体是二者中的哪一种。
+
+接下来，本文将首先略述马克思的异化论。接着，探讨列宁与这个概念的联系，包括他对资本主义异化的批判。再者，本文将考察列宁对于如何在社会主义下消灭异化的理论纲要，以及1917年十月革命后列宁在落实这个纲要时所作的尝试。。最后本文将得出，理解列宁与异化的联系有着重要意义，列宁的遗产对于理解和克服今日之异化仍有长足的影响。
+
+
+### 马克思论异化
+
+对于马克思而言，异化指的是人类劳动以一种近乎超自然、超人类的方式转变为统治社会的力量。这就是说，“人类被一种外在的力量所控制，而这种力量实际上是他们自身力量的总和”。最关键的一点是：“这种力量继续以我们自身的形式存在，随着我们的活动被对象化/物化，异化之力摇身一变，产生了新的形式”。就其本质而言，异化发生在人们创造得以控制人类活动的固实的外力（对象化的人类活动）之时。因为是人类创造并维持这些控制性的力量，异化就意味着人类受到自己或是由人类创造并保持的社会结构、社会关系、商品、组织的统治。马克思认为，人类在阶级社会的产生之中被异化，有产阶级此时可以控制和剥削无产阶级。他尤其关注资本主义下的异化。
+
+资本主义中异化的核心特点是资本对于人的控制。在此过程中，工人在价值生产过程中外化自身。资本家们则利用私有制的生产方式剥削工人，窃取他们的剩余价值以实现盈利和资本积累。通过维持和重复这一套剥削制度，人类变成了资本增值的奴隶，因为资本主义制度只有在资本的不断增值中才能存在。人们根据资本的需求生产，而非自身的需求。
+
+对马克思而言，“资本主义的问题就在于人们被人类生产的商品迷住了——这就是异化最根本的结构”。然而，“这其中的一个基本元素是外化，这就是说人类存在（任何人在一定环境下的‘主体’本质）和其本质（在一定的‘客观’的知识和能力基础上人类可能成为的样子）相分离”。简而言之，人类需要一定的特质才能过上“人”的生活，而外化就指的是人类同这些特质相分离。更准确的来说，外化描述了一种颠倒的关系，一边是人类的主体人性，另一边是蕴含于他们客观化属性的人性。在外化过程中，人类所失去的人性都对应地在转移到对象化的活动中。
+
+马克思在《1844年手稿》中分析资本主义时指出，资本家窃取了工人生产的产品，让工人永久性地失去了自我。因此，工人生产地越多，他们就越发被外化。他们所处的世界，从事的生产活动，制造的产品以及他们所遇见的人无不是陌生、疏离和敌对的。对工人们自身而言，“一切都与他们分离，变得敌对而陌生”，工人们被自我外化了，因为“他们的人性、能力、活动和社会性都成为了这个疏离的世界的元素，这个世界从工人和外界榨取的越多，就越有能力进一步压迫他们”。
+
+外化和异化间的重要区别在于，前者主要关注的是对象化的人类活动的外在性和陌生性，即人类与之能力的分离。外化发生在人类将自己的属性对象化的时候，这一对象化的力量转而形成对抗他们自身的疏离的外力。与之对应的是，异化不仅包括由对象化导致的陌生性，还包括统治性。人们面對对对象化了的领域不仅变得陌生，而且这种自我外化还反过来束缚了人类，从而统治了他们。相应地，异化在马克思的思想中基本是一个负面的概念，而外化则是相对中立的。马克思认为，外化只有在以下条件下“才变为恶的”：（1）法律使工人的外化属性变得遥不可及，使得工人只剩下“一副躯壳”；（2）外化和异化同时发生。
+
+在《黑格尔法哲学批判》中，马克思将其对资本主义异化的批判延伸到了政治领域。自由民主制宣称要在公众事务中展现民治，但实际上它做不到这点，因为国家已经与市民社会所分离，而资本剥削和竞争掌握了市民社会。大众并不能充分发挥他们的才智，在政治上决定涉及他们的事务。另外，既然国家是阶级对立的公开表现，它所号称的统一政治共同体就是一纸空文，因为在市民社会中人们已经按照阶级利益被分割开来了。民主国家所推崇的团结、平等不过是海市蜃楼，用来掩盖社会中普遍的阶级对立和不平等。事实上，国家之所以存在就是为了稳定和巩固这些具体的现象。它将大众排除在外并踩在他们头上，形成了他们异化的社会力量。
+
+在《论犹太人问题》中，马克思认为只有当政治民主充分展开到市民社会中，生产方式的私有化被废除之时，异化才会结束，因为这样一来，工人们就能清醒、自觉、民主地集体管理他们的政治、经济活动。这种不存在异化的国家最终就会消亡，因为全体人民都参与公众治理，就不需要一个从市民社会中分离出来的政体了。在他的《1844年手稿》中，马克思把这种存在政府的情形称之为共产主义，一个能让任何个体充分发挥才能的无阶级社会。“对马克思而言，共产主义的理念就在于消灭异化”。
+
+马克思并不指望外化随着异化的终结一起消失。在1847年后，马克思开始把工厂劳动和机械技术当作共产主义的必要成分，而两者无疑是外化的明显表现。马克思认识到，人类的解放“需要非常可观的对象化了的人类劳动，它由大批的人类活动产生，并毫无疑问地能让任何一个个体力量相形见绌”。在共产主义下，马克思认为生产者依旧会将自身对象化会以现象的形式出现：譬如先进的科技，面向消费者的产品，工作纪律和政治权力。但重要的是，这种对象化并没有被异化。生产者们会联合起来掌握他们的技术，并根据人们的需求分配产品，他们还会以民主的方式决定工作纪律和政治权力的形式。对于1847年后的马克思，目标不在于克服外化而是在于消灭异化，这种生产和公务中无组织、不民主的现象。马克思认为，在无异化的社会中外化会减弱，但不会消失。这一点是十分关键的，因为列宁也把工厂劳动、面向消费者的产品，机器科技、工作纪律和政治权力与共产主义联系起来。列宁对于共产主义的理念并不包括外化的消失。
+
+最后，值得一提的是，马克思理解异化的方式也随着时间发生过改变。在早期（1845年前）写作中（包括前述的三篇文章），马克思分析的重点落在人类身上，他有时称之为“类存在物”。在后来的著作中，包括《资本论》中，马克思则用阶级分析的观点讨论异化。他不再谈异化的人，而谈异化的阶级。阿尔都塞和他的追随者们在这个事实上钻了牛角尖，他们错误地认为马克思抛弃了异化这个概念，事实上，马克思是找到了更加科学的分析方法。下面的分析也将指出，列宁也从人类和阶级两个角度探讨了异化。
+
+
+### 列宁论异化
+
+据米丁所说，“列宁不熟悉马克思的早期著作（中对于异化的论述）是板上钉钉的事情”。这句话正确与否有赖于如何定义马克思的早期著作。大多数学者将之定义为马克思在1845年完成《关于费尔巴哈的提纲》以及《德意志意识形态》两篇文章之前的所有著作。在这些马克思写于1845年前的涉及异化的文章中，列宁对于其中的两篇——《黑格尔法哲学批判》一书和论文《论犹太人问题》——是十分熟悉的。在列宁曾在《卡尔·马克思》一文中称赞此文是马克思1844年所发表的文章中“最杰出的”。不过，发行的文献中没有包含列宁对于这两篇文章的评述的，但可以肯定的是，列宁确实读过它们，因为他曾在包括《卡尔·马克思》一文在内的好几处地方引用过《关于费尔巴哈的提纲》。列宁将之称为“最杰出的”著作也证明他认可了文中马克思对异化的看法。
+
+更重要的是，在1895年列宁写了一篇名叫《马克思和恩格斯〈神圣家族〉一书摘要》的文章。马克思和恩格斯于1844年着手此书，1845年二月，本书先于《关于费尔巴哈的提纲》和《德意志意识形态》发表。因此《神圣家族》是马克思早期著作的典型。负责发表马克思、恩格斯、列宁著作的苏联委员会认为这一点十分关键。据他们所说，“列宁不可能读过马克思的《1844年手稿》，但在《马克思和恩格斯〈神圣家族〉一书摘要》中，列宁引用了相当一部分谈及异化的重要的文段，而这些是出自于《1844年经济学哲学手稿》的”。事实上，《神圣家族》一书也包含对于异化劳动和异化政治的描述，这些概念可能是发源于《黑格尔法哲学批判》和《论犹太人问题》的，因为这些文章内容有相近之处。因此，不同于米丁所说，这些证据表明列宁直接地学习过三篇马克思论异化的早期著作（即《黑格尔法哲学批判》《论犹太人问题》《神圣家族》），而且间接地了解过第四篇文章（即《1844年手稿》）。鉴于此，列宁不了解马克思论异化的文章实属无稽之谈，事实上他对其中一些还相当熟悉。
+
+梅塞罗斯认为列宁对异化论的接触始于1895年的《概要》，在他看来，这个时间点至关重要，因为“列宁全部的理论著作都创作于1895年之后”。事实上，这个时间甚至早于《1844年手稿》发表的1927年，从而说明列宁是最早强调马克思异化论重要性的人。
+
+列宁的《概要》大量引用了马克思和恩格斯对于皮埃尔·蒲鲁东的批判。蒲鲁东自称无政府主义者，他提倡所谓的“互助经济”，即让每个工人都拥有各自的住宅和生产工具，并可将之与其他工人交换。马克思认为此举并不能消除异化，因为互助主义仍然保留了部分私有财产。工人仍将以私人生产的形式实现其个人的经济目的，而非为集体的需求共同生产。由于个体的工人会把生产过程分化、私有化，就不可能集体地规划社会的经济发展。工人仍同他们自己和他人分隔起来。列宁援引马克思解释这个道理的文章并评述说“此文展现了马克思是如何解剖他整个体系中的基本概念，即生产的社会关系的。很具有代表性”。列宁认识到这一点有着重要意义，梅塞罗斯解释说，“列宁正确地理解了‘马克思整个体系的基本概念正是生产的社会关系’，而这个观点正是马克思对于异化的认识”。
+
+接着，列宁继续引述马克思和恩格斯对于黑格尔的异化论的批判。黑格尔是唯心主义哲学家，他认为依靠思想启蒙就可以破除异化，而马恩是唯物主义哲学家，他们认为异化的核心是物质性的。异化只有在改变了生产的社会关系后才会消失。列宁在这里划了重重的一条线，表明他认为此很重要。
+
+列宁还引用了马克思和恩格斯的观点，即资产阶级和无产阶级经历异化的方式不同。资产阶级由于其优势经济地位，在异化中仍然保持着“人类存在的表象”，而受剥削的无产阶级则“在自我异化中感到痛苦，发现自己的无力和非人的残酷事实”。列宁认识到了马克思的异化观，异化是一种客观情况，根植于阶级关系之中。在资本主义下，所有人都被异化，无论他们是否认同这点。当然，他们可能表现出不同的症状来，这取决于他们在阶级架构中的位置。
+
+最后，列宁讨论了马克思和恩格斯对于政治异化的批判。自由民主制的国家号称在公共事务上群策群力，但它实际上是分离于人民的异化社会力量。资本主义经济体有着影响每一个人的力量，而由于国家同经济体相分离，民治的原则只能部分得以实现。列宁同意马克思对于“建立在现代资产阶级社会上的唯心主义民主代表制国家”的批判。资本主义下的民主是唯心的、异化的，而非唯物的、非异化的，因为经济领域超出了政治掌控，由民主保证的集体团结感变得虚无缥缈，国家从人民中分离开来。
+
+尽管列宁在《概要》中论述不多，但从他引用的内容以及对此的评述来看，列宁已经理解了异化的重要性。他不仅在1895年盛赞《神圣家族》的论点，之后也经常如此。1896年，列宁发表《弗里德里希·恩格斯》一文，他称赞《神圣家族》正是因为此文发展了异化论的观点。他解释说：在19世纪40年代，鲍威尔兄弟（Bruno Bauer & Edgar Bauer）认为马克思反对人本主义，因为马克思所设想的解放不是基于人性的，而是源于工人阶级的。马克思和恩格斯对此的回应是，正是无产阶级真正代表着人类解放。因为工人是所有社会群体中最受剥削而失去人性的，他们才能最好地理解异化，并会为了全人类的福祉消灭之：
+
+> 这班先生鼓吹一种批判，这种批判超越一切现实、超越政党和政治，否认一切实践活动，而只是“批判地”静观周围世界和其中所发生的事情。鲍威尔先生们高傲地把无产阶级说成是一群没有批判头脑的人。马克思和恩格斯坚决反对这个荒谬而有害的思潮。为了现实的人，即为了受统治阶级和国家践踏的工人，他们要求的不是静观，而是为实现美好的社会制度而斗争。
+
+列宁称赞《神圣家族》，不仅是因为它包括了“革命的唯物社会主义的基础”，而且它是以“真正的、人性的人”——也即工人——的名义完成的。这直接表明，异化论处于马克思主义中的中心地位。梅塞罗斯指出，同样的论点也出现在《1844年手稿》当中。这些文章说明了“关键的几个论点——‘工人被统治阶级和国家踩在脚下’；无产阶级与‘有产阶级’相对立，而后者在自我异化中心满意足地承认这一点…这就是列宁和马克思在提到‘真正的、人性的人’时想到的东西”。列宁认为恩格斯也意识到了这点。他在《弗里德里希·恩格斯》一文中捍卫了《神圣家族》的旗帜，是少数认识到恩格斯与异化的联系的马克思主义者。
+
+梅塞罗斯认为“列宁在《概要》中表达的中心论点继续成为了他后续写作的核心”。虽然没有挖掘下去，但梅塞罗斯的判断是正确的。列宁继续从各个方面探讨了异化，只不过没有采取很正式的形式。他尤其关注他的祖国——半封建的专制主义俄国的情况。从列宁的一部分论述中可以鲜明地看出马克思的影响，不过有些论述则足见列宁对异化的独到见解。
+
+1895年秋天，列宁强硬地表示“工人应当表明，他们认为自己和厂主一样，也是人，不允许别人象对待不会说话的畜牲那样来对待他们”。马克思也在《1844年手稿》里有过类似的表述，他说异化劳动把工人变成“动物”，并使他们愈发“愚钝”而“痴呆”。1895年底，列宁在狱中写道：“工厂可以随心所欲地支配雇来的工人，根本不管他们的习惯、日常生活方式、家庭状况和精神上的需要”。工厂“要求工人完全放弃自己的意志”，因此“工人逐渐成了庞大机器的一部分：他不得不象机器本身一样，任人摆布，任人奴役，没有自己的意志”。类似地，马克思在《1844年手稿》中谈到，异化的工厂劳动把无产者的一部分“变成了机器”。列宁在1907年表达了同样的观点，他发现“农民是为摆脱奴役制、工役制和农奴制剥削而斗争。农民斗争的目的是希望能够多少象人一样地生活”。列宁反复批判资本主义灭绝工人的人性，这也自然是马克思异化论中的核心。
+
+说到这儿，我们有必要来看看一种不同的说法，这可以帮助我们更好地理解异化。本文认为，列宁是站在讨论异化的立场上，探讨工人和农民的人性问题的。但这本身的逻辑确有值得商榷之处。探讨社会中的人而不涉及异化也并非没有可能。比如，可以把非人化定义为一种主观的感受或者个体的情感，这就不是从马克思的角度来讨论异化了。但列宁不是这样做的。列宁把工人和农民当作人来对待，是考虑了他们在社会关系所反映的客观现实中的非人化，这可马克思本人在《1844年手稿》中的做法如出一辙。
+
+
+### 异化与社会主义
+
+马克思认为消灭私有制下的生产方式并建成社会主义是消灭异化的的必要条件。列宁也支持这点。早在1895年，他就指出马克思致力于构建“由工人自己进行管理的共同的社会主义生产”。在这个制度下，“共同劳动的产品将由劳动者自己来享用，超出他们生活需要的剩余产品，将用来满足工人自己的各种需要，用来充分发展他们的各种才能，用来平等地享受科学和艺术的一切成果”。和马克思一样，列宁认为资本主义的灭亡还不足以同时消灭异化。工人必须集体地领导生产过程。只有他们可以发展人类的才能。在针对社会民主党纲领草案的说明中，列宁清楚地表达了这个观点。俄国的马克思主义之父格·瓦·普列汉诺夫曾提出一种设想，即有计划地组织社会生产过程来满足整个社会及社会各个成员的需要。列宁认为这还不足够：
+
+> 托拉斯大概也能这样组织。如果说“由整个社会承担”（因为这既包括计划性又指出计划的指导者），不仅满足社会成员的需要，而且保证社会全体成员的充分福利和自由的全面发展，这会更明确些。
+
+与普列汉诺夫不同，列宁强调了工人民主地讨论他们共同事宜的必要性。
+
+1904年之前，列宁在异化问题上的哲学愿景和他的政治纲领确有冲突。在发表于1909年的《唯物主义和经验批判主义》一文中，列宁坚持物质决定意识，经济基础决定上层建筑的哲学立场。从这个观点来看，人类的思想、力量以及行动都是对经济能力的被动反应。有意识的思想活动无非是社会中客观物质条件的附庸，而后者是独立于人类意志的。这种庸俗的唯物主义限制了人类的主体性。列宁认定，社会主义的诞生源自于结构性的经济因素，是“自然历史“的过程，而不受有意识的人类活动的干预。
+
+在1914年-1915年间，列宁改变了这一说法。通过学习黑格尔的著作，特别是《逻辑学》，他重新为异化和社会主义间的关系找到了哲学基础。安德森认为，在列宁评黑格尔的文章里，也即苏联在其死后以《哲学笔记》为标题发表的册子中，列宁用更纯粹的辩证唯物主义更新了他庸俗唯物主义的认识。在更认真地学习了黑格尔的观念论后，列宁肯定了主观因素在历史中的作用。他坚持认为，人类意识“不仅反映客观世界，还能改造它”。虽然在他的观点中经济力仍然限制着人类活动，但一旦群众能形成革命的意识，就有能力改变这种力量并决定历史的进程。这是列宁思想发展过程中第一次确立了人民群众是历史的决定因素这一哲学基础。群众有能力改变所处的客观物质条件，而不是只能接受被其奴役的命运。这自然是马克思人本主义的核心原则。
+
+少有人注意到的是，列宁的哲学发现是他对于社会主义和异化的理解的思想基础。列宁既然主张人类可以改造世界并决定自己的命运，他就从而肯定了工人阶级反抗并推翻资本主义，建立社会主义并消灭异化的可能性；因为掌控自身的命运是克服异化的根本所在。
+
+列宁《哲学笔记》中充溢着的马克思人本主义进而影响了他的社会主义理论的重要著作——《国家与革命》。这本书写于1917年8月-9月间，其中，列宁强调了社会主义的无异化特征。在回首马克思《黑格尔法哲学批判》的一节中，列宁把资本主义国家描述为“是站在社会之上并且‘日益同社会相异化’的力量”。为了消灭异化，就必须消灭“统治阶级所建立的、体现这种‘异化’的国家政权机构”。简而言之，就必须要让工人们通过苏维埃、通过议会直接地管理自己，而这就是弱化国家、从而最终使之消失的过渡阶段。实践学派的哲学家鲁迪·苏佩克（Rudi Supek）捕捉到了这一设想中的人本主义精神，他如是说：“列宁认识到，革命的无产阶级作为人类解放中的新力量必须建立起人民间的平等关系，使人能直接从他们的意志出发，通过工人委员会参与国家管理。这样就自然消灭了以国家形式存在的异化的社会力量”。
+
+列宁认为，在社会主义下工人委员会可以在集体决定的纲领的指导下组织生产。他“认为社会经济基础中存在的决策和管理方面的异化都会彻底被民主化的自治系统所克服”。随着帝国主义的崛起，大规模的资本主义生产中的科技进步简化了经济管理机制，以至于工人自己就可以控制小到局部大到国家层面的生产过程，而不需要资本家的参与。虽然很多人都发现了《国家与革命》中的人本主义愿景，尼尔·哈丁最为准确地将其阐述为对异化的克服：
+
+> 这是一种普罗米修斯式的构想，人类能主动地决定他的命运并控制其所处的环境。这当然和马克思在《1844年手稿》中所提倡的人类愿景不谋而合——这个愿景是在克服了异化后的逻辑必然，而要克服异化，超越国家就起着决定性的作用。
+
+列宁在《国家与革命》中提出的社会主义革命理论就是消灭异化的理论，因为它设想的正是终结资本对于社会的控制，以及终结资本家对于工人的束缚。列宁的目标是在建设社会主义同时建立起有识工人的经济、政治控制权。他认为这可以满足每个人的需要并提供个体充分发展的条件。列宁将这些因素认定为理解社会主义和共产主义本质的关键。当然，他也坚持社会主义的到来不会是一团和气的，而必然有对资本家、剥削者以及其他工人阶级的敌人的镇压。不过，社会主义革命依旧代表着人类从异化劳动到自由劳动的飞跃，达到了工人可以获得“创造灵感和满足”的境界。因此，破除异化之道从马克思的《1844年手稿》一路传承到列宁的《国家与革命》，而后者提出了人类在建设共产主义，从异化中解放出来的“具体纲领”。
+
+政治上的忘我投入让列宁没能完成《国家与革命》，因此，他在这部作品中对苏维埃的看法还不成熟。然而，列宁在其之后的作品中详细阐述了他对这些组织的想法，比如他写于1917年十月革命前夕的小册子《布尔什维克能保持国家政权吗？》。列宁在这里列出了六个苏维埃的特点，它们有助于克服异化。首先，由无产阶级和农民大众组成的工人民兵队取代了常备军这种站在人民之上的异化力量。第二，由于是群众自己创立和组织了苏维埃，他们与大众有着密切的联系。第三，由于苏维埃代表是由普选产生的，随时可以罢免，苏维埃制度是高度民主的。第四，通过动员了来自不同专业背景的人，苏维埃能在没有官僚阻碍的情况下建设多样、有创造性的政策。第五，苏维埃是革命先锋队的组织形式：具有阶级意识的工农先锋队可以“训练、教育、和领导”其余的被压迫者。第六，通过赋予苏维埃代表立法权和行政权，苏维埃可以“把议会制的长处和直接民主制的长处结合起来”。每一个特点都增加了劳动群众对于公共事务的集体掌控，从而减少了异化。
+
+同样在这篇文章中，列宁针对苏维埃无力执政的反对意见提出了批驳。这种说法认为没有受过教育的工人和农民缺乏必要的训练和经验。列宁从两方面进行了反驳，一方面，他认为布尔什维克不是“空想家”，他们知道到这些工人无法立刻履行公务职能。毕竟，工人的大部分时间消磨在了资本主义制度下，且不允许参与政务。在这种情况下，又怎么指望他们能无师自通呢？列宁不同意“只有富人或者富人家庭出身的官吏才能管理国家，才能担任日常管理工作的偏见”。有阶级觉悟的无产者和士兵会训练尚无经验的人学习基本知识，这做，使最贫穷、最受压迫、文化最低的工人也能够参与集体管理。话虽如此，但列宁也承认，即使是有阶级觉悟的工人也不能一夜之间就学会承担专业的行政、经济岗位。经济学家、工程师、农学家和其他具有资质的专业人士仍是必要的。但是，这些人的岗位最终会在工人的监督被工人取代，并且工人还要要求他们为了劳动的利益，按照社会主义民主的原则工作。
+
+列宁认为，苏维埃政权“一开始是免不了犯错的”，因为对于工人而言，这是他们历史上第一次掌握全国的真正政治、经济权力。但是，除了他们从错误中吸取教训，并没有更好的实现工人自治的方法。所以必须要使被压迫的劳动者“相信自己的力量”，相信自己能够集体管理社会的政治、经济生活。如果完不成这样的目标，俄国的社会主义革命就算失败了。
+
+列宁强调，工人要掌握“全部政权”，即支配政治和经济的全部过程。稍微知道一点历史经验以及有关政治同经济的关系的人都不会“忘记”这个“小小的”情况。从这句话中可以看出，列宁意识到了克服异化包括消除政治异化和异化劳动两个方面。
+
+对于那些宣称工人革命不可能胜过资本家抵抗的人，列宁回应说他们还没有看到在苏维埃领导下工人阶级爆发出的完全力量。只有当曾经“被资本奴役压榨”的劳动群众掌握政权的时候，他们才会发挥出全部的才能。数以百万的“战士过去在政治上还没有觉醒…不敢相信他们也是人，他们也有生活的权利”，现在他们就要把握住决定他们自身命运的机会，并消灭挡在路上的一切障碍。
+
+
+### 异化与十月革命
+
+和马克思不同，列宁并不是仅仅思考了如何克服异化，在1917年十月，他还把他的想法付诸行动。布尔什维克在俄国夺得了政权，开始了社会主义建设。有些人认为布党的革命终结了工人解放的任何可能，因为建立一个一党制的国家就阻碍了工人的自治。但列宁和同志们不是这么想的。他们宣称自己获得了大部分工农的支持，并且在历史上第一次建立起了如此利于人类发展的客观条件。
+
+在布党治下的前几个月里，这种说法不无道理。在十月革命的准备中，布尔什维克在苏维埃内部赢得了广泛的支持，而苏维埃正是工人和农民的主要权力机关。列宁既支持工人利用工厂委员会控制企业的想法，同时也赞成农民没收地主的土地。列宁知道构建社会主义的经济基础并且改变人民对于工作的态度绝非易事，但尽管如此，他依旧相信工人有这样的能力，因为社会主义是为他们自身的发展创造条件的。
+
+1917年12月，列宁在《如何组织竞赛》用具体的例子说明了这个道理。他说，“资本主义的著作家们”粉饰资本主义，认为这是唯一适合人类发展的制度。因为布尔什维克代表着社会主义，这些“著作家们”就批评他们“不顾‘人的本性’”。列宁并不是这么做的。相反，帝国主义阻碍人民群众控制生产，从而束缚了人类发展的天性。俄国的资本主义意味着“空前残暴地压制广大的、占绝大多数的居民，即百分之九十九的劳动者的进取心、毅力和大胆首创精神”。因此，苏维埃政权对这个资本主义的支持者不会心怀慈悲。这帮人鼓吹的社会中“贫困驱使成千上万的人走上流氓无赖、卖身投靠、尔虞我诈、丧失人格的道路”。
+
+列宁认为，苏维埃非但没有压制人性，而且苏维埃人民还在为实现人类全面发展创造客观条件。工人们接管了工厂，从而开辟了“表现进取心、进行竞赛和发挥大胆首创精神的可能性”。在每个赶走了资本家或是用工人的监督制服了资本家的工厂，又或是每个地主被推翻的农村，“劳动者可以稍微直一点腰，可以挺起胸来，可以感到自己是人了”。苏维埃人民是在消灭资本主义的竞争，这种竞争的目的是喂饱资产阶级，结果确是加强了剥削。取而代之的是在工人的控制和计划下展开的社会主义竞赛。它反而能激励工人们履行自己制定的经济计划，它能“把真正大多数劳动者吸引到这样一个工作舞台上来，在这个舞台上，他们能够大显身手，施展自己的本领，发现有才能的人。有才能的人在人民中间是无穷无尽的，可是资本主义却把他们成千上万乃至成百万地摧残、压制和窒息了”。
+
+可是一段时间后，列宁与异化的斗争变得越发困难起来。实践学派的哲学家米哈伊洛·马尔科维奇（Mihailo Marković）认为客观条件不佳是主要原因。和前辈马克思一样，列宁也指望着发生一场全欧洲的社会主义革命作为一国建成社会主义的先决条件。很快，现实就表明这场革命根本不可能发生。第一次世界大战结束时，苏俄是资本主义国家的汪洋大海中唯一一个工人国家，几乎没有其他国家与之结盟。许多人不支持布尔什维克而转向了反革命，致使国家陷入一场血腥的内战。祸不单行，致命的大饥荒又肆虐在俄国的土地上。此外，列宁还认为工人们的文化水平欠佳。由于大部分时间生活在资本主义压迫下，他们缺乏生产的知识。这些情况最终无可避免地导致工人无法统治国家。苏佩克写道，列宁不得不“放弃了他人道主义的念想，转而求助于压迫人的机关——国家——来保证革命无产阶级专政的实现。然而国家的性质仍然是那个样子”。但要说清楚的是，列宁并不是放弃了把共产主义社会建设为无异化社会的理想，只不过他确实做出了一些现实的让步作为实现共产主义的必要手段。列宁从未否认过这些让步的必要性，也没有对此遮遮掩掩。在1914年阅读了黑格尔的书籍后，他转向了辩证法的观点，既一切发展都蕴于矛盾之中。
+
+因此，列宁虽然在苏联统治的早期支持工人治国，但他后来则开始给予日趋融合、日益官僚化的国家-政党一体化机关更多的经济权力，包括企业管理的任免权和制定纪律的权利。由于工人们经常缺乏经营工厂的能力，布尔什维克在用高薪聘请了资产阶级的技术人员代为运营。列宁还想过要削弱工会的自治权。他打算逐步地将它融入国家-政党机构中，这样有助于调控经济，教育工人，而且能作为“共产主义的学校”。现实中，这还能防止工会不听党的指示。
+
+此外，列宁还主张泰罗制。泰罗制是一种科学的资本主义经济管理方法，通过最大程度的压榨工人劳动力来获得最佳经济效益。泰罗制要求在管理和控制中实行森严的等级制度，几乎不给工人任何权力。列宁并不总是支持泰罗制。在十月革命之前，他说这是“人被机器奴役”。然而，当苏联政权陷入困境时，列宁又说泰罗制是防止俄国经济崩溃的必要手段了。“俄国的社会经济危机迫在眉睫，解决问题成为了当务之急。这种情况下几乎没有尝试的余地让俄国走与工业资本主义截然相反的道路”。列宁的政策与官僚主义的、自上而下的、限制工人对生产的集体控制权的国家资本主义经济是一致的。
+
+一些社会主义者认识到了这种体系正在成形，他们对此表示反对。1920年，面对日益严重的官僚化，一个叫做“工人反对派”的党内集团应运而生。工人反对派主要提倡把国家的经济管理交给工会，他们认为工会才是工人经济权力的真正代表。列宁驳斥了他们的主张。在内战和饥荒的大环境下，他认为，如此颠覆性的举动无疑是自取灭亡。此外，列宁批评工人反对派没有考虑到俄罗斯的群众主要是农民这一事实。将权力移交给代表工人阶级的工会，就意味着苏维埃政权失去了部分社会基础。出于这些原因，列宁说工人反对派有“无政府工团主义的倾向”，他的支持者在1921年3月的俄共（布）第十届代表大会上战胜了反对派。
+
+同时，列宁在俄共十大上宣布了新经济政策，为私营企业和自由市场亮了绿灯。当然，新经济政策最关键的地方是国家依旧保留对经济命脉的控制——包括银行、大型工业和外贸。它只是允许小型企业和农民进行自由贸易。列宁的新经济政策是一种暂时性的让步，而不是要确立其为永久的制度。内战和饥荒已经把苏联的经济推到了崩溃的边缘。发展受限制的自由企业是救国家于水火的必要手段。虽然新经济政策实现了这一目标，但它则无助于克服异化。
+
+到了1924年列宁去世的时候，苏联对抗异化的斗争还在襁褓之中。列宁本人也很清楚地知道这点。随着他的健康状况逐渐恶化，列宁开始担心官僚制度会限制工人权力，在苏维埃中过度干涉，并且滋生腐败。列宁批评这些作法是对社会主义的歪曲。与此同时，他又试图加强国家及其暴力机关，以压制异见者和不守规矩的人。正如实践学派的哲学家斯维托扎尔·斯托亚诺维奇（Svetozar Stojanović）所说，“列宁显然在两种想法间左右为难，一种是他在《国家与革命》中表达出的自治理念（他就是借此猛烈抨击日益严重的官僚主义制度，并声张工人的统治权），另一种则是利用国家重整秩序，解决反革命、贫困和饥荒造成的混乱的必然需求”。
+
+列宁死后，马列主义国家都吸纳了列宁论共产党的先锋队角色，新经济政策，国家的暴力机关，集中的政治制度，以及泰罗制的观点。它们据此证明自己的社会主义体系是合理的，而马克思人本主义者则认为是被异化的。不管人们是如何评判这些观点的，但如果把列宁的思想仅仅与马列主义，或者至少是苏联的解读当作是一回事，那就大错特错了。在铁托治下的南斯拉夫，共产党人用列宁的理念批评苏联的异化，捍卫南斯拉夫独有的工人自治体系。但正如实践学派所说，南斯拉夫采取的工人自治体系的尝试也没有根除异化。工人委员会自上而下的本质滋生腐败、降低效率，造成愤世不恭的情绪，最终影响工人的统治。但话虽如此，如果要评价南斯拉夫或者其他更加正统的马列主义政权下的异化，也不能把它抽离出社会条件批判一番；而是必须与其他资本主义国家的情况进行比较，而后者中异化仍旧猖獗。
+
+
+### 结语
+
+读到这里，读者可能要问：证明列宁讨论了异化，并且认为共产主义是无异化社会真的有那么重要吗？说明到他把共产主义当作一个大家共同商议公共事务的无阶级社会难道不就可以了吗？这其实是一个重要的问题，尤其是考虑到列宁本人很少使用“异化”这个术语这一点。本文的立场是，证明列宁讨论了异化是相当关键的。因为相比其他马克思主义的观点，异化与人类发展的关系更加密切。反对异化的人会希望每个人都能充分实现自己的潜能，掌握自己的命运，真真正正地活得像个人。像阶级斗争、剥削、民主，乃至于共产主义这样的概念，它们本身是不能直接、充分地说明这个道理的。只有异化这个词充分展现了人类自我实现所需要的必要条件。因此，任何一种罔顾异化，将其庸俗化乃至贬低的马克思主义理论，都可以说是忽视了人类解放的意义和条件。从历史上来看，这一直是正统（苏联）马克思列宁主义的问题所在。马克思人本主义者宣称正统马列主义忽略了异化，而其他人，比如罗斯，则声称“马列主义把马克思的反异化理论矮化为计划的必要性”，但只有计划也是不够的，因为“有计划的生产仍然解决不了任何问题，只要异化还没有被消除，工人还不是生产乃至于其他一切的主人”。列宁在西方马克思主义者中并不受待见，因为他们认为列宁是一个冷酷无情的机会主义者，不顾异化创立了马列主义。相信在认识到列宁也了解异化，并且曾尝试克服异化之后，更多的社会主义者或许会理解他的理论与实践中的解放驱力。
+
+除此之外，列宁的遗产也为理解今天的异化提供了一个简单却重要的洞见。在讨论过去、现在和未来的社会主义社会时，异化常常被人忽视了。列宁提供的启发是，消灭异化是一个渐进而矛盾的过程，不可能一蹴而就。十月革命的历史向我们证明，即使是一次彻底的社会剧变也未必能够一劳永逸地消除异化。马克思曾预言道，社会主义“还带着它脱胎出来的那个旧社会的痕迹”。他认为，社会主义起源于资本主义，而不是凭空产生的，所以不可避免地会继承资本主义的某些经济、社会、政治、思想和文化方面的特征。列宁的斗争表明，异化也是资本主义的痕迹之一。虽然工人国家的建立为克服异化提供了客观条件，但这不能保证异化立即被消灭。最重要的是要使群众得以民主地控制社会政治经济的主要方面，赋予他们人类历史上前所未有的权力。这就需要用一场持续、艰苦的斗争反抗几个世纪以来的压迫和漠视。从国际的角度看，在一国建设社会主义的地方，对抗异化的斗争则尤其困难，因为这个国家还得采取紧急措施保证自己的生存。这些措施中可能包含加剧异化的内容，比如允许私营企业受限制地经营、给予利润刺激、增长官僚权力乃至国家本身。学者和社会主义者都应该在评价社会主义社会中的异化时记住这些问题。尽管异化在这些社会中可能没有消失，但也不能指望它们很快就消灭这种存在已久的现象。在资本主义的虎视眈眈下，这些社会经历了考验并还要继续成长，而且依旧年轻。由于重重因素的阻碍，能做的也只有减轻异化的程度而已。
+
+列宁面对十月革命的挑战对异化做出了现实的让步。从某些方面来看这确实算是倒退，但它们反映了辩证发展的一般规律。更重要的是，它们保住了共产主义的火种。今天的社会主义者应该从列宁的遗产中学习经验；接受他的观点，认识到一个无异化的社会仍需要一段时间才能建成，即使是在一个由工人阶级统治的社会中也是如此。
diff --git a/_collections/_heros/2015-08-08-WilliamGillies-a1_c-highly-derivative.md b/_collections/_heros/_0x19/2015-08-08-WilliamGillies-a1_c-highly-derivative.md
similarity index 100%
rename from _collections/_heros/2015-08-08-WilliamGillies-a1_c-highly-derivative.md
rename to _collections/_heros/_0x19/2015-08-08-WilliamGillies-a1_c-highly-derivative.md
diff --git a/_collections/_heros/2022-05-13-SaraCampbellEthanNelson-a1_l-the-power-of-metaphor.md b/_collections/_heros/_0x19/2022-05-13-SaraCampbellEthanNelson-a1_l-the-power-of-metaphor.md
similarity index 100%
rename from _collections/_heros/2022-05-13-SaraCampbellEthanNelson-a1_l-the-power-of-metaphor.md
rename to _collections/_heros/_0x19/2022-05-13-SaraCampbellEthanNelson-a1_l-the-power-of-metaphor.md
diff --git a/_collections/_heros/2022-12-06-VitalikButerin-a1_r-dapps-emerging-on-ethereum.md b/_collections/_heros/_0x19/2022-12-06-VitalikButerin-a1_r-dapps-emerging-on-ethereum.md
similarity index 100%
rename from _collections/_heros/2022-12-06-VitalikButerin-a1_r-dapps-emerging-on-ethereum.md
rename to _collections/_heros/_0x19/2022-12-06-VitalikButerin-a1_r-dapps-emerging-on-ethereum.md
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-01-19-european-security-realities.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-01-19-european-security-realities.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..137a5f62
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-01-19-european-security-realities.md
@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : European Security Realities
+author: Ed Arnold
+date : 2023-01-19 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/s2hCuHP.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "New European Security Realities Following the War in Ukraine"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_On 30 November 2022, the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), in partnership with the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence, held a roundtable on the future of European security following Russia’s war against Ukraine._ _The purpose of the roundtable was to facilitate discussions between Estonian and UK officials and experts on preliminary lessons identified from the war for European security and specifically the areas on which Estonia and the UK can continue to cooperate to enhance the security of Europe._
+
+_The speakers were senior UK and Estonian government officials with significant experience in foreign and defence policy, alongside experts on Russian foreign and military policy. The first session considered lessons identified at the political, strategic, operational and tactical levels of warfare. The second session focused on options for better managing Russia in the future and what changes to the European security architecture might be required (see Annex for discussion points). This report contains a non-attributable summary of the discussions._
+
+
+### Summary of Roundtable Themes
+
+Participants agreed that much of the future of European security is dependent on how the war on the ground in Ukraine ends. There was a general sense that Russia was likely ultimately to lose the war and must incur significant costs for deterrence to be re-established. The best-case scenario was that a future Russia would wish to buy into a rebuilt collective security system. The worst-case scenario was that Russia turns inwards and continues an aggressive and isolated path, and a North Korea-type scenario develops.
+
+Russia has been significantly conventionally weakened by the war thus far and will need a further period of defence modernisation and doctrine development into the future. However, this does not mean that Russia will become a less dangerous defence and security actor. Therefore, Russia is likely to use unconventional and hybrid means more prominently in the short to medium term.
+
+The confrontation with Russia remains a long-term struggle. All NATO nations, individually and collectively, need to understand that there is no return even to the 23 February 2022 security relationship with Russia.
+
+Unity of purpose is the Western centre of gravity and must be maintained and protected at all costs. Moreover, the war has also highlighted NATO weaknesses and there must be a mutual recognition of these if the Alliance is to address them to be strong enough to guarantee the security of its member states.
+
+
+## The Estonian–UK Defence and Security Relationship
+
+The Estonian–UK relationship and current levels of defence and security cooperation were described as ‘exemplary’ in terms of the bilateral relationship, multinationally through NATO and minilaterally through the Joint Expeditionary Force and other initiatives. The level of strategic integration is unprecedented. Each side could not wish for more from the relationship, with very few countries seeing eye to eye in the defence and security sphere to the same extent as Tallinn and London. However, there is still scope to build on this relationship – an example provided was the Estonian (as well as other Baltic and Nordic countries’) operation of a ‘total defence model’ that the UK could learn from in terms of building its own resilience.
+
+
+### A Joint Strategic Assessment on the War in Ukraine
+
+The war in Ukraine has already changed the fundamentals of European security. Russia has not only attacked Ukraine, but the very principles of European security itself – national sovereignty, the inviolability of national borders and the use of aggression as a tool of statecraft, particularly directed at the civilian population. Moreover, the war has animated a common threat assessment for Europeans across all the defence and security dimensions – conventional, hybrid, nuclear, energy, protection of critical national infrastructure (CNI), emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs), and food. As the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (AFRF) have been exposed as poor compared with perceptions of them prior to the conflict, participants unanimously agreed that it is likely that President Vladimir Putin will ‘double down’ on non-conventional threats, such as nuclear and hybrid, as Russia does not delineate between conventional and unconventional levers or war and peace as separate constructs, and will always prioritise its defence and security policy over domestic considerations. Conversely, NATO’s significant challenges have also been exposed to its potential adversaries and competitors.
+
+Russia has demonstrated a flagrant disregard for international norms for years. Conference speakers agreed that the current war, while ultimately Putin’s decision, should be considered as ‘Russia’s war’. Strategically, this is a war between Russia and the West, and it will not be won, or ended, kinetically on the battlefield in Ukraine. However, what happens on the battlefield will determine the foundations for the architecture which will follow. Despite multiple operational and tactical setbacks, Russia is not yet facing strategic defeat, although it is paying a heavier price than anticipated, both domestically and externally. Russia is still progressing its strategic intent. Its forces currently occupy approximately 20% of Ukraine and Moscow has established greater control over Belarus. Sanctions, while having an impact, are unlikely to bring Russia to its knees in the near future – Iran and North Korea were offered by one of the Estonian speakers as examples of states still functioning following decades of sanctions, capable still of developing advanced weaponry and military technology.
+
+Estonian and UK officials agreed that Russia will likely be strategically weakened in the short term if Ukraine comes out of this war without concessions on its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Should Russia gain any territory as a result of the war, it is the West and rules-based order that will be strategically weakened, not Russia. The poor Russian military performance presents opportunities for the Euro-Atlantic community. Yet, there needs to be a conscious understanding and effort if NATO is to take full advantage of the AFRF’s current weakness and the valuable insights on Russian vulnerabilities that the war has produced. Merely taking the additional time afforded to NATO to rectify weaknesses is insufficient and will not produce genuine strategic advantage. Moreover, NATO has been strengthened through unity and the adoption of its New Strategic Concept, and the imminent accession of two new members – Finland and Sweden. However, NATO must also be wary of the global context. While Ukraine has gained significant support through its informational campaigns in the West, the picture is more mixed elsewhere, such as in the Global South (broadly, the regions of Latin America, Asia, Africa and Oceania). It is important that the West recognises this and that the Russian narrative and propaganda gains traction outside English-speaking and other Western nations, which are actively targeted through its global network.
+
+Europe must be resilient. Ukraine fatigue must not set in among the electorate or political leaderships.
+
+Putin is likely using the winter and the shift of the ‘Special Military Operation’ to a stalemate on the ground to buy time to recover and enable ‘Ukraine fatigue’, as Western governments grapple with other political imperatives such as inflation, recession, and energy and other cost of living pressures.
+
+
+### Lessons Identified from the War in Ukraine
+
+The war in Ukraine has challenged the strength of the AFRF and exposed its rigid command structures and culture, in direct contrast to Ukraine’s adaptability, flexibility and innovation. Despite a poor tactical and operational performance by the AFRF, however, Russia will continue to be a direct military threat. Previous underperformance of the AFRF, such as in Georgia in 2008, did not sufficiently prompt the requirement for change, but the strategic shock of its performance in 2022 may finally provide the recognition, and acceptance, of the necessity for wider cultural changes throughout the Russian defence and security community.
+
+Participants highlighted that the Western assessment community had previously overestimated Russian capabilities and underestimated Ukraine and there is a risk that the reverse may now occur. It was also noted that this was also true in assessments of the relative strengths of the Taliban and Afghan National Security Forces and could reflect a strategic weakness in how NATO assesses its adversaries and partners.
+
+There was a debate on the timeframes for NATO transformation and when the AFRF will pose a legitimate and credible conventional threat to Europe again. There was a warning that future credibility, for example, between 2030 and 2035, relied on decisions being made now and therefore there was actually not much time for action. The earliest assessments were that Russia could recover conventionally by 2023, with the caveat that additional personnel and equipment would be ‘operationally useful by Russian standards’ as its industry had retained industrial capacity and was able to secure components through illicit procurement and Iranian networks.
+
+There is a serious risk that Ukraine runs out of ammunition, due to expenditure rates and limited stocks of NATO states, as well as a lack of spare industrial capacity to ramp up production in the short term. However, it was noted that ‘Ukrainians are good at sustaining momentum’ and were receiving more military aid before winter 2022 and continue to win the hearts and minds of Western media, people and thus governments to act on the relevant demand signals.
+
+On the same day as the conference, RUSI published a report, ‘Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022’ which one of the authors discussed in detail. The main findings pertinent to NATO defence planners are:
+
+- There is no sanctuary in modern warfare. The enemy can strike throughout operational depth.
+
+- Warfighting demands large initial stockpiles and significant slack capacity.
+
+- Unmanned aerial systems and counter-UAS are essential across all branches and at all echelons.
+
+- The force must fight for the right to precision. Precision is not only vastly more efficient in the effects it delivers but also allows the force to reduce its logistics tail and thereby makes it more survivable.
+
+- For land forces, the pervasive ISTAR on the modern battlefield and the layering of multiple sensors at the tactical level make concealment exceedingly difficult to sustain.
+
+
+### Implications of the War in Ukraine for NATO
+
+NATO, thus far, has responded well and in unity to a war which has been a real test for the Alliance. While not directly involved militarily, NATO is a critical actor and it was noted that the Russian pre-war proposals of December 2021 were primarily concerned with the US and NATO, not Ukraine. Words and non-military means did not deter Russia from launching a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and NATO, or its membership, must not self-deter and allow Russia the initiative to manage escalation. There was a recognition among the speakers that NATO did not do enough to deter Russia from its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Moreover, all NATO members need to understand, both individually and collectively, that there is no return to the relations with Russia that existed on 23 February 2022.
+
+NATO’s New Strategic Concept, unveiled at the June 2022 Madrid Summit, drastically altered the NATO defence and deterrence posture in Europe and rebalanced away from the other core tasks of crisis management and cooperative security. The priority is now implementation and the delivery of the Madrid commitments quickly and fully to ensure credibility. Defence and reinforcement plans need to be resourced, with fighting formations stocked, trained, equipped and ringfenced for their mission.
+
+All participants agreed that the unity demonstrated at Madrid is the Alliance’s centre of gravity and must prevail, as it would be naive to think Russia will not test Europe again. But Madrid is only the starting point and increased investments in defence and security should become the norm, not just in financial terms but also in manufacturing capabilities to obtain better outputs and therefore outcomes. The demand signal is there, and contracts need to be signed for long-term requirements to bring industry on board and ensure European strategic advantage. Increased defence spending and investment is predicated on political will and Allies have a duty to help. The transformation that NATO requires is not just process driven but one of mindset and culture. It needs to jettison the counterinsurgency mindset that has dominated the past 20 years of Alliance activity and get back to preparing for conventional warfighting as the requirements are very different.
+
+Participants agreed that the NATO Vilnius Summit in June 2023 would be critical and hoped its outcome would be increased resilience and full implementation of the Madrid vision for the future of the Alliance. NATO plans need to be approved, the defence investment pledge revised and Finland and Sweden need to be welcomed as full members. NATO cannot and should not be scared of success.
+
+
+### The Future of Russia as a European Security Actor
+
+The 70 years of general peace that Europe has experienced since the end of the Second World War was built on the presence of the US and its security umbrella and transatlanticism – an assessment that participants from both Estonia and the UK shared. By 1945 appeasement and the use of aggression were discredited on the European continent, but now appear again.
+
+Russia’s war in Ukraine is pivotal, due to its scale, how it will change Ukraine as a nation, and how it will establish new norms of European security and reinforce the principle that larger states do not get a veto over smaller ones. Putin’s aggression cannot pay off, in any way, as other authoritarian states, especially China, are watching.
+
+It was reinforced that Russia has no intention of losing its war in Ukraine and has identified Western unity as a centre of gravity which must be attacked, through producing economic pain, scaring the West into paralysis through nuclear and hybrid escalation, and providing false-hope narratives as traps to damage unity. Russia’s national strategy has been to deter responses by NATO while taking slices out of its neighbourhood, and the war has now changed attitudes and beliefs in Russia’s neighbourhood. Participants agreed that the status of Crimea is fundamental to the security future of both Russia and Ukraine and cannot be treated separately.
+
+It was further noted that the West must also learn from its past mistakes to manage Russia better in the future – both the strategic failure to deter Russian designs on Ukraine from 2014 to 2022 and the grand strategic failure to deal with Russia adequately since the end of the Cold War and understanding the realistic military threat it poses. There must be a recognition that the West is stuck with Putin or ‘Putinism’ for some time. It would be a mistake to think that democratising Russia, such as the manner of Western engagement in the 1990s, will be possible. The imperialistic mindset is entrenched in Russian society that the West has only a very limited ability to influence.
+
+
+### Managing What Comes Next?
+
+Participants were unanimous in agreeing that managing what comes next depends on how this phase of the war ends. However, regardless of the ultimate outcome, it was agreed that existing security frameworks need to be rethought and what can be salvaged and built upon needs to be identified.
+
+The conference participants disagreed as to how the war on the ground would play out in 2023 and beyond but were steadfast in their belief that Russia must be defeated. Regardless of how the war ends, the European security order has transformed as Russia has flagrantly violated European and international norms by brutally invading a neighbouring country entirely unprovoked. Also, the significant write down in Russian combat power due to poor AFRF performance, with only modest investment from NATO Allies (primarily the US), has provided time and space for Europe to undergo its own military transformation as demanded by NATO’s Strategic Concept. Yet this investment to date has already strained Allied military capability and readiness, exposing NATO weaknesses, which must be urgently rectified. The multitude of Russian weaknesses on the battlefield must be decoupled with assessing the change in relationship between Russia and its partners, including Belarus, Iran and China.
+
+A key aspect raised was that it is currently difficult to assess what has genuinely changed in Russia as a result of the war. The strategic intent – to occupy the whole of Ukraine and disrupt the European and international order – remains. Moreover, the values, world view and approach that Putin incarnates are likely to endure beyond Putin himself. Most of the criticism in Moscow is about not going hard and fast in the war, rather than the legitimacy of the war itself. The speakers agreed that while Russia might experience some destabilisation, there would be no ‘colour revolutions’ and that any challenge to Putin’s power would likely come from the right and not the liberal centre.
+
+Linked to this was a sense among participants of a growing disconnect between Russian capabilities and the country’s ambitions and self-identity as a great power, which is fundamental to national identity. The foundations are built on Russia’s permanent seat at the UN Security Council and its nuclear status, its military might and its ability to act as a regional hegemon. Following the war, the last two are now under threat, which could cause Russia to act more aggressively and in an unpredictable manner, especially to compel its neighbours to act in certain ways and influence behaviours. In this context, it is likely that Russia will continue to exploit differences among NATO, and EU, members. Frozen conflicts are Russia’s comfort zone and their manipulation is key to Moscow’s exercise of power; therefore anything that is pushed on Ukraine towards that status is counterproductive, will look like a win for Russia and will therefore be unacceptable to NATO.
+
+
+### Assessing the European Structural Relationship with Russia
+
+The discussions highlighted that European security, and the architecture underpinning it, must now be rethought. In terms of arms control, the war in Ukraine feels like the closing of an era, akin to the end of the Cold War. Certain components, such as the OSCE, especially the Vienna Document, endure, and New START is robust and remains critical. However, participants agreed that the era of cooperative security agreements that have characterised the previous 30 years do not feel like tomorrow’s world.
+
+It was emphasised that Estonia and the UK are part of a community of democracies which take longer to make decisions, but make stronger decisions collectively, with legitimacy, transparency and accountability. Estonia and the UK want the war to end as soon as practically possible, but no concessions can be given to Putin. Therefore, these decisions must be made with a rational and coherent strategy which will benefit European security. There was doubt that this is moving quickly enough as Western countries are experiencing economic pain (inflation in Europe is currently highest in Estonia). A strategic breaking point of unity is approaching and some speakers believed it to be unsustainable, giving a particular warning about the pain of next winter for Europe, in addition to the current one.
+
+The speakers all agreed that security guarantees must be provided to the future Ukrainian state, including a capable and integrated Ukrainian military, linked to industry, that can match Russia. However, there was no consensus on the form those guarantees should take. It should not be the uncertain assurance of NATO’s 2008 Budapest Summit commitment to eventual Alliance membership for Ukraine but must include an honest and realistic assessment of what kind of assistance Allies can supply to Ukraine in the long term, including force modernisation and NATO standardisation, and resupply for a future crisis. Strengthening Ukrainian deterrence of future Russian threats is critical and can be done through intelligence support, sanctions, military technical assistance and training programmes, which are all measures that would support Ukraine on its journey to join NATO.
+
+
+## Annex: Roundtable Discussion Points
+
+### Session 1: Defence Policy and Military Lessons from Russia’s War in Ukraine and Their Impact on European Security
+
+- What are the principal military lessons to date of the war in Ukraine? What do these lessons mean for the UK, Estonia and NATO defence policy and posture?
+
+- What is the UK strategic assessment of the war in Ukraine? How does this assessment change UK priorities in the Euro-Atlantic? What are the key takeaways and action items?
+
+- What is the Estonian strategic assessment of the war in Ukraine? How does this assessment change Estonian priorities in the Euro-Atlantic? What are the key takeaways and action items?
+
+- How best can NATO’s new Defence and Deterrence posture, as outlined within the Strategic Concept, be implemented? Where are the ongoing challenges? What are the realistic timeframes? Which additional adaptions seem necessary? What are the longterm consequences and challenges for NATO?
+
+- What military threat does Russia now pose to Europe? How does this vary by subregion (Arctic, High North, Baltic Sea, Baltic states, Central and Eastern Europe, Black Sea, Caucasus)?
+
+
+### Session 2: Managing What Comes Next – The Future of Russia as a European Security Actor
+
+- How has the European security environment changed following the war in Ukraine (politically, diplomatically, militarily)? What kind of threat environment is the West facing in the longer term? How can the West safeguard Euro-Atlantic security? What are the key challenges?
+
+- Within this environment, how best can Russia be managed in the future? Which extant agreements can be salvaged? What are the requirements for new agreements?
+
+ - Helsinki Final Act 1975.
+
+ - Charter of Paris for a New Europe 1990.
+
+ - NATO–Russia Founding Act 1997.
+
+ - OSCE Istanbul Document 1999.
+
+ - OSCE Vienna Document 2011.
+
+ - Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 1990.
+
+ - Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty 1987.
+
+ - Treaty on Open Skies 1992.
+
+ - Chemical Weapons Convention 1993.
+
+ - New START 2011.
+
+- How might Russian security policy towards Europe change due to the war in Ukraine? What will be the key indicators and warnings to identify these shifts?
+
+- Which organisations, frameworks and initiatives within the European security architecture are most valuable for the UK and Estonia in managing Russia? Which initiatives are most productive for UK–Estonia cooperation? How can the UK and Estonia cooperate to meaningfully advance European security?
+
+---
+
+__Ed Arnold__ is a Research Fellow for European Security within the International Security Studies department at RUSI. His experience covers defence, intelligence, counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, within the public and private sector. His primary research focus is on British defence, security, and foreign policy, specifically relating to the European security architecture and transatlantic cooperation. Ed has a particular interest in UK National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Reviews.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-01-23-empty-bins-in-wartime.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-01-23-empty-bins-in-wartime.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..6833c9a7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-01-23-empty-bins-in-wartime.md
@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Empty Bins In Wartime
+author: Seth G. Jones
+date : 2023-01-23 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/xBFCc18.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Empty Bins in a Wartime Environment: The Challenge to the U.S. Defense Industrial Base"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_The U.S. defense industrial base is not adequately prepared for the competitive security environment that now exists. It is currently operating at a tempo better suited to a peacetime environment. In a major regional conflict — such as a war with China in the Taiwan Strait — the U.S. use of munitions would likely exceed the current stockpiles of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), leading to a problem of “empty bins.”_
+
+
+
+According to the results of a series of CSIS war games, for instance, the United States would likely run out of some munitions — such as long-range, precision-guided munitions — in less than one week in a Taiwan Strait conflict. These shortfalls would make it extremely difficult for the United States to sustain a protracted conflict — and, equally concerning, the deficiencies undermine deterrence. They also highlight that the U.S. defense industrial base lacks adequate surge capacity for a major war. These problems are particularly concerning since China is heavily investing in munitions and acquiring high-end weapons systems and equipment five to six times faster than the United States, according to some U.S. government estimates.
+
+In addition, some U.S. programs and regulations, such as the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program and International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), are outdated for a wartime environment and need to deliver weapons systems more rapidly to key allies and partners. Growing strategic competition with countries such as China and Russia, which are attempting to export weapons systems and technology, threatens to offset the United States’ competitive advantage.
+
+___`The U.S. defense industrial base is not adequately prepared for the competitive security environment that now exists. It is currently operating at a tempo better suited to a peacetime environment.`___
+
+The war in Ukraine has also exposed serious deficiencies in the U.S. defense industrial base. U.S. assistance to Ukraine has been critical to halting Russian revanchism and sending a message to China about the costs and risks of aggression — and needs to continue. But it has also depleted U.S. stocks of some types of weapons systems and munitions, such as Stinger surface-to-air missiles, 155 mm howitzers and ammunition, and Javelin anti-tank missile systems (especially the command launch units). The United States has been slow to replenish its arsenal, and the DoD has only placed on contract a fraction of the weapons it has sent to Ukraine. Many U.S. allies and partners in Europe also have defense industrial bases that are unprepared for major war, heavily reliant on the United States, and chronically underfunded.
+
+The history of industrial mobilization suggests that it will take years for the defense industrial base to produce and deliver sufficient quantities of critical weapons systems and munitions and recapitalize stocks that have been used up. It might take even longer to materialize facilities, infrastructure, and capital equipment, making it important to make changes now. The long timelines are manageable in peacetime but not in the competitive environment that now exists. The U.S. military services have underinvested in weapons systems and munitions for a conventional war, and the DoD’s acquisition system faces challenges in creating the incentives for industry to invest in sufficient stockpiles of key weapons systems.
+
+As the war in Ukraine illustrates, a war between major powers is likely to be a protracted, industrial-style conflict that needs a robust defense industry able to produce enough munitions and other weapons systems for a protracted war if deterrence fails. Effective deterrence hinges, in part, on having sufficient stockpiles of munitions and other weapons systems. These challenges are not new. What is different now, however, is that the United States is directly aiding Ukraine in an industrial-style conventional war with Russia — the largest land war in Europe since World War II — and tensions are rising between China and the United States in the Indo-Pacific. Timelines for a possible war are shrinking.
+
+To better understand the scale, scope, and implications of these challenges, this study asks several questions. First, what is the production capacity of the U.S. defense industrial base in light of U.S. aid to Ukraine? Second, what are implications for U.S. involvement in one or more major theater wars, including the state of U.S. stockpiles of key weapons systems and munitions? Answers to this second question need to consider the state of contracts, stresses on the supply chain, inflation, and time requirements needed to meet surging demands. Third, how have FMS and other policies and regulations helped fill gaps, and what are the main challenges? Fourth, what are possible solutions to help fix these challenges? In short, the goal of this study is to briefly highlight current challenges, suggest possible next steps, and encourage more research and analysis — including with additional data — about defense industrial base issues and possible solutions.
+
+To answer these questions, this study relied on several sources of information. It collected and analyzed publicly available data on weapons systems and munitions, including data compiled by the DoD. It also relied on interviews with dozens of officials from the DoD, Congress, the defense industry, and subject matter experts. Finally, the study utilized the results of war games and other analyses.
+
+The rest of this study is divided into four sections. It begins by examining the status of the U.S. defense industrial base in light of the Ukraine war. It then examines the implications for one or more major theater wars, with a particular focus on the munitions industrial base. Next, it assesses FMS and support to the defense industrial base. Finally, the study outlines potential recommendations to fix identified problems.
+
+
+### UKRAINE AND THE GREAT AWAKENING
+
+U.S. military assistance to Ukraine — along with aid from U.S. allies and partners — has been critical in allowing the Ukrainian military to prevent a Russian overthrow of the government and in helping Ukraine conduct offensive and defensive military operations. U.S. military assistance has included over $24 billion and hundreds of weapons systems and munitions — from M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) launchers to Javelins. This assistance — along with training, intelligence, and other U.S. and Western aid — has helped Ukraine defend itself; provided Ukraine with the tools to retake some territory from Russian forces in Kharkiv, Kherson, Donetsk, Luhansk, and other oblasts; and highlighted the potential costs and risks for China of military action in the Indo-Pacific. U.S. and other Western aid should continue in order to prevent Russia from retaking Ukrainian territory in the future, dissuade Russian aggression elsewhere, and deter Chinese military aggression.
+
+Nevertheless, battlefield consumption rates in Ukraine have strained the defense industrial base to produce sufficient quantities of some munitions and weapons systems. Since many of the weapons systems and munitions have come directly from U.S. inventories, U.S. assistance has depleted some stockpiles that could be used for training, future contingencies, or other operational needs.
+
+For example, the quantities of Javelins transferred to Ukraine through late August 2022 represented seven years of production at fiscal year (FY) 2022 rates before recent reprogramming actions. The number of Stingers ferred to Ukraine is roughly equal to the total number built for all non-U.S. customers in the last 20 years. One of the most lethal weapons the United States has sent are 155 mm howitzers that fire high-explosive ammunition weighing about 100 pounds each and are able to hit targets nearly 20 miles away. As of January 2023, the U.S. military has provided Ukraine with up to 1,074,000 rounds of 155 mm ammunition, significantly shrinking the availability of 155 mm rounds in storage. Because of the limited availability of 155 mm howitzers and ammunition, the U.S. military began sending 105 mm howitzers and ammunition instead.
+
+As Figure 1 shows, the problem of depleted stockpiles — or “empty bins” — is not uniform. In some instances — such as M113 armored personnel carriers and 105 mm howitzers — the amounts given to Ukraine are relatively small compared to U.S. inventories and production capabilities. But in other cases — such as Javelins (particularly the Javelin’s command launch unit), Stingers, 155 mm howitzers and ammunition, and counter-artillery radar — transfers to Ukraine and procurement rates suggest that inventories for some systems are low.
+
+Despite these challenges, there is some good news. There are early signs of a “Great Awakening” about the state of the U.S. defense industrial base — especially the munitions industrial base — in light of U.S. assistance to Ukraine. Senior U.S. defense officials, such as Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment William LaPlante, have publicly acknowledged industrial base challenges and outlined steps to help fix them.14 U.S. Army officials such as Christine Wormuth, secretary of the army, and Doug Bush, assistant secretary of the army for acquisition, logistics and technology, have committed to tripling the production of 155 mm shells over the next few years. The U.S. Army also awarded a $431 million contract for full-rate production of HIMARS to support the U.S. Army and several U.S. partners overseas.
+
+In addition, the FY 2023 National Defense Authorization Act was a helpful step by authorizing the DoD to establish multiyear contracts for some munitions that are critical to aid Ukraine and, potentially, Taiwan. Examples include Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missile segment enhancement interceptors, FIM-92 Stingers, AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAMs), 155 mm rounds, long-range anti-ship missiles (LRASMs), Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSMs), Standard Missile-6 missiles (SM-6), and Sidewinder missiles (AIM-9Xs).
+
+But problems remain. As a DoD study concluded, one difficulty includes “onerous business processes and regulations” in which DoD accounting requirements and other actions create “imposing uncompensated additional costs compared to more profitable commercial procurement opportunities.” Years of acquisition policy, culture, and behavior have prioritized efficiency and cost control over speed and capacity, and it will take time to find a more appropriate balance.
+
+In some cases, there are discussions between industry and the U.S. military — including the services — about new purchases. But inquiries do not always turn into contracts, which generally happen through the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process. The Pentagon’s buying process generally starts with the military determining its requirements, which are then reviewed before bids are solicited from the private sector. But since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February, the Pentagon has not always communicated those requirements clearly, which often change. These changes create delays and leave defense contractors unable to prepare for more production.
+
+The United States is working simultaneously to replenish Stinger stocks and replace the Stinger with a follow-on, next-generation interceptor for short-range air defense capability. But both replenishment and replacement have been slow. BAE Systems is considering restarting production of the M777 155 mm howitzer following possible renewed interest from the U.S. Army and several foreign countries. To make the business case for restarting production of the M777 155 mm howitzer, however, BAE Systems would likely need at least 150 unit orders over several years. In addition, the United States has provided Switchblade 600s to Ukraine, but Switchblades are still in development and not yet a program of record with plans for production. Low numbers of munitions and related systems pose risks to U.S., allied, and partner forces, which need them to equip deploying units, train forces, and ensure sufficient maintenance pipelines. Unlike most of the commercial sector, there is only one domestic customer in the United States for weapons systems — the U.S. military — creating a monopsony (a market situation where there is only one buyer). Once orders drop off, manufacturers may close production lines to cut costs, unless there are options for foreign sales. Small businesses may exit the defense sector or close entirely. Supply chain issues can also be challenging because components or sub-components may be produced by a subcontractor that goes out of business or retools for other customers. A subcontractor may also rely on parts from overseas companies that have other priorities, face sanctions by the U.S. government, or are owned by — or situated in — hostile countries.
+
+
+_▲ __FIGURE 1: Status of Selected Weapons Systems and Munitions Provided to Ukraine.__ SOURCE: [“Fact Sheet on U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine,” U.S. Department of Defense, January 6, 2023](https://media.defense.gov/2023/Jan/06/2003141218/-1/-1/1/UKRAINE-FACT-SHEET-JAN-6.PDF); and [Mark Cancian, “Is the United States Running Out of Weapons to Send to Ukraine?,” CSIS Commentary, September 16, 2022](https://www.csis.org/analysis/united-states-running-out-weapons-send-ukraine)._
+
+More broadly, the war in Ukraine has demonstrated that competition and conflict between major powers will require a strong industrial base in the United States and in key ally and partner countries. The effort to deploy, arm, feed, and supply forces is a monumental task, and the massive consumption of equipment, systems, vehicles, and munitions requires a large-scale industrial base for resupply. Ukraine also suggests that war between major powers — as well as credible deterrence — will likely require several specific types of weapons systems, such as long-range strike from air, land, and maritime platforms.
+
+___`The war in Ukraine has demonstrated that competition and conflict between major powers will require a strong industrial base in the United States and in key ally and partner countries.`___
+
+To be clear, the problem is not U.S. assistance to Ukraine. U.S. and Western aid are essential to prevent Moscow from seizing additional territory in Ukraine and deter future military aggression by Moscow and Beijing. In most cases, the types of weapons systems needed in a U.S. war with China in the Indo-Pacific (which would likely be an air-sea war) are not the same as those the United States is providing to Ukraine (which is primarily an air land war). For example, a war in the Indo-Pacific faces a tyranny of distance. Guam is 1,600 miles from Taiwan and Hawaii is over 5,000 miles. The main problem is that the U.S. defense industrial base — including the munitions industrial base — is not currently equipped to support a protracted conventional war.
+
+
+### EMPTY BINS AND MAJOR WAR
+
+Ukraine is only a small part of the picture. A more disturbing challenge is the state of the industrial base for one or more future wars, including in the Indo-Pacific. With growing competition between the United States and China — along with continuing threats from Russia, Iran, North Korea, and terrorist groups — the U.S. military needs to be prepared to fight at least one major war, if not two.
+
+The requisite capabilities for fighting are essential for a credible deterrent. There are two main types of deterrence in the context of this study. Deterrence by denial involves preventing an adversary from taking an action by making the action infeasible or unlikely to succeed, thus denying the adversary confidence in achieving its objectives. Deterrence by punishment involves preventing an adversary from taking an action by imposing severe costs if the action occurs. In both cases, a strong U.S. industrial base — with sufficient munitions stockpiles and weapons systems — is critical for deterring Chinese action.
+
+Yet the United States is not prepared for war, which undermines deterrence. With Xi Jinping in his third term, most likely confident and emboldened, it is unclear what the timelines are for a Chinese invasion of Taiwan — if it happens. For planning purposes, the United States needs to be ready now. As the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine highlighted, it is difficult to predict timelines months or years ahead of time. Given the lead time for industrial production, it would likely be too late for the defense industry to ramp up production if a war were to occur without major changes.
+
+Major regional conflicts will expend significant quantities of munitions, likely exceeding current DoD planning efforts. In nearly two dozen iterations of a CSIS war game that examined a U.S.-China war in the Taiwan Strait, the United States typically expended more than 5,000 long-range missiles in three weeks of conflict: 4,000 JASSMs, 450 LRASMs, 400 Harpoons, and 400 Tomahawk land-attack missiles (TLAMs). One of the most important munitions to prevent a Chinese seizure of all of Taiwan were long-range precision missiles, including missiles launched by U.S. submarines. The same is true of ship-based munitions, such as the SM-6, which would be expended in large quantities.
+
+LRASMs offer a useful case study. In every iteration of the war game, the United States expended its inventory of LRASMs within the first week of the conflict. These missiles were particularly useful because of their ability to strike Chinese naval forces from outside the range of Chinese air defenses. As the war game showed, Chinese defenses are likely to be formidable — especially early on in a conflict — thus preventing most aircraft from moving close enough to drop short-range munitions. Bombers used in the war game generally employed these munitions because they could be based outside of the range of Chinese missiles. The B-21 Raider, which has long-range strike capabilities, will likely be an exception when it becomes operational over the next several years.
+
+In addition, it takes nearly two years to produce LRASMs, creating a time lag to fix the shortfall. The FY 2023 budget proposes buying only 88 LRASMs. Figure 2 shows the results of one analysis of munitions inventories during a possible future air campaign. Much like in CSIS’s war games, it shows how LRASM, JASSM, and Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile-Extended Range (JASSM-ER) inventories the U.S. Air Force may produce in the future could be depleted in a war against a major power in roughly one week.
+
+A future war will also likely be different from past and current wars. For example, the war in Ukraine illustrates the growing use of unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) for domain awareness, early warning, targeting for standoff attacks, strike, electronic warfare, and information operations. Future wars may include various types of loitering munitions, unmanned underwater vehicles, hypersonic missiles, and other weapons systems that could impact U.S. and allied production and stockpiling.
+
+
+_▲ __FIGURE 2: Use of Munitions in a Possible Air Campaign.__ SOURCE: [Mark A. Gunzinger, “Affordable Mass: The Need for a Cost-Effective PGM Mix for Great Power Conflict,” Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, November 2021, 19](https://mitchellaerospacepower.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Affordable_Mass_Policy_Paper_31-FINAL.pdf)._
+
+The United States is not the only country facing a munitions challenge. In a recent war game involving U.S., UK, and French forces, titled Warfighter 21-4, the United Kingdom’s 3rd Division exhausted national stockpiles of critical munitions in just over a week. U.S. lieutenant general (ret.) Ben Hodges, former commanding general of U.S. Army Europe, remarked that “in about eight days of exercise, every bit of important ammunition in the British Army’s inventory was expended.” He continued that the United States and its allies “absolutely do not have enough of the critical munitions that we need, especially what is called the preferred munitions — the ones that are precise in targeting.” Other analyses have come to similar conclusions.
+
+The problem is not just running out of munitions, which is challenging enough. Unlike in Ukraine, where the country’s western border is wide open for weapons shipments, Taiwan is an island. A Chinese blockade and long-range fire capabilities will make it difficult — and perhaps impossible — to get weapons systems and munitions into the area once war has started. A war in the Indo-Pacific will likely require more long-range munitions, as well as a greater inventory of munitions in theater to account for the difficulty of flowing munitions in once a war has started.
+
+There are several challenges with quickly fixing some of these problems.
+
+First, defense companies are generally unwilling to take financial risks without contracts — including multiyear contracts — in place. It is not a sound business decision to build more munitions or weapons systems without a clear demand signal and financial commitments, especially given the large capital investment and personnel requirements. This risk aversion is compounded if companies have to make additional capital investments — especially investments for facilities, infrastructure, and tooling. As one DoD study concluded, “Producers benefited from steady or predictable orders, so the DoD’s inconsistent procurement and concurrent production ramps (both increases and decreases) exacerbate the challenges suppliers face across the [defense industrial base].” There has been an inconsistent demand signal from the DoD to build up stockpiles, which risks production lines being shut down. Part of the challenge is the difficulty of predicting future demand. For example, what if the war in Ukraine winds down following a negotiated settlement? What if the current or future administration loses interest in supporting another “forever war?” Or what if Congress refuses to obligate funds?
+
+While the DoD signs multiyear contracts for ships and airplanes, it does not sign multiyear contracts for most munitions. In 2022, the DoD requested congressional approval to reprogram some of its funds to increase production capabilities for HIMARS, Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS), and 155 mm ammunition. While this is a step in the right direction, the DoD needs to consider making commitments for multiyear acquisitions to justify industry investment in surge capabilities, including necessary infrastructure. After all, the services — such as the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps — sometimes cut munitions from their budgets to make room for platforms and other priorities or to fix problems that arise during the acquisition of those systems.
+
+Second, there are also workforce and supply chain constraints to increase the supply of weapons systems and munitions required for major war. Companies need to hire, train, and retain workers. The DoD needs healthy, resilient, diverse, and secure supply chains to ensure the development and sustainment of important capabilities. Supply chains for the U.S. defense sector are also not as secure as they should be, with some businesses shutting down or moving supply chains overseas to unfriendly countries. Notable vulnerabilities include kinetic capabilities (such as hypersonic weapons technology and directed energy weapons), energy storage and batteries, castings and forgings, and microelectronics.
+
+
+_▲ __FIGURE 3: Volume of Global Casting Production by Country.__ SOURCE: [“Volume of Global Casting Production from 2018 to 2020, by Country,” Statista, April 26, 2022](https://www.statista.com/statistics/237526/casting-production-worldwide-by-country/)._
+
+In some cases, there are single sources for key components and sub-components. The Javelin, for instance, relies on a rocket motor — the Aerojet Rocketdyne’s advance solid-propellant rocket motor — without a second source at the moment. There is one company, Williams International, that builds turbofan engines for most cruise missiles, such as the JASSM, JASSM-ER, and LRASM. There is also one main company, PacSci EMC, that produces the energetics for most missiles. There is one foundry that can produce the large titanium castings for some important weapons systems.
+
+There are also significant vulnerabilities with some rare-earth metals, which China has a near monopoly on, that are critical for manufacturing various missiles and munitions. China dominates the advanced battery supply chain across the globe, such as lithium hydroxide, cells, electrolyte, lithium carbonate, anodes, and cathodes. As Figure 3 shows, China is the global leader in cast products and produces more than the next nine countries combined, including over five times as much as the United States. The DoD depends on foreign governments, including China, for large cast and forged products, which are utilized in some defense systems and machine tools and manufacturing systems on which the department is dependent.
+
+In addition, there are supply chain vulnerabilities with titanium, aluminum, and other metals; semiconductors; missile propulsion; high-temperature materials; and a range of microelectronics. Several industrial sites — such as the Holston Army Ammunition Plant in Kingsport, Tennessee, and the missile plant in Troy, Alabama — produce capabilities that have few or no substitutes. A future war with China over Taiwan could also trigger a global shortage of semiconductors with broad ramifications, including upsetting chip supply and demand dynamics, creating cost spikes, and causing supply chain shortages.
+
+Third, lead time is a significant constraint. According to one CSIS study, for example, it would take an average of 8.4 years to replace Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) inventories at surge production rates. Missiles, space-based systems, and shipbuilding face the longest replacement times. As Figure 4 shows, it can take roughly two years to produce some types of missiles — such as the PAC-2/PAC-3 air and missile defense system, Tomahawk Block V, JASSM, and PrSM long-range precision strike missile. These lead times are generally to deliver the first missiles — not the last ones. Filling inventories requires sustained multiyear investment as well as accurate projections of the rate of use. Missile obsolescence, tooling, and sub-tier capacity have not been a priority and are a major constraint.
+
+In addition, it can take at least 18 to 24 months to implement investments in some factories to develop capacity to meet surging demands. Lead times have increased with Covid-19, the war in Ukraine, and personnel challenges such as hiring and retention. Inspections, shipping, and logistics can impact lead time as well.
+
+There are also potential challenges in expanding some facilities, such as munitions assembly plants, since companies are required to have sufficient standoff space — or “quantity-distance” — between the plant and surrounding area to protect civilians from accidental explosions. Building a larger plant can involve purchasing additional land, securing permits, buying additional insurance, and taking other steps that require time and money. There are also only a few munitions assembly plants, such as Camden, Arkansas; Huntsville, Alabama; Rocket Center, West Virginia; and Elkton, Maryland.
+
+As the head of Lockheed Martin Corporation recently remarked, the changing security environment in Europe and the Indo-Pacific has raised questions about the state of the defense industrial base and the timelines involved in fixing key problems:
+
+> The value of deterrence has never been greater really at this point now. And that shift happened over literally three or four months. What that requires is the Department of Defense to shift gears, okay? And I can tell you the clutch isn’t engaged yet. And the clutch engaged means there are contracts in place. There’s a demand signal out there that’s clear. There’s funding appropriated by the U.S. Congress in the case of the United States. . . . To get the clutch to engage is going to take two to three years. And that’s for our allies as well because they not only have to go through their own processes internally. They then have to go through generally the Foreign Military Sales process.
+
+
+_▲ __FIGURE 4: Selected Munitions Production Timelines.__ SOURCE: [U.S. Department of Defense data from “DoD Budget Request,” Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)](https://comptroller.defense.gov/Budget-Materials/); and author interviews with multiple individuals in the U.S. government and defense industry._
+
+Fourth, inflation has increased the costs and risks for defense companies and suppliers, especially for firm-fixed-price contracts signed several years ago. The inflation rate in 2022 was over 7 percent, which impacts multiyear commitments by making it unprofitable to produce the promised number of weapons systems. After all, parts of the U.S. defense industry are already struggling. Shipyards, for example, are battling to retain workers, including welders.
+
+___`The reality is that the timelines for a conflict — and consequently for credible deterrence — are shrinking in an increasingly competitive international security environment.`___
+
+There are some trade-offs that need to be considered. One is the extra cost of excess inventory if the U.S. government buys munitions at higher rates. While the costs for missile sustainment are likely lower than other platforms, these costs could rise with unused excess inventory based on the need for expanded storage facilities and increased spending on maintenance to make sure munitions are ready to be used. There is also a trade-off between capacity and advanced capability, such as between procuring existing munitions and developing more advanced munitions such as hypersonic capabilities. For example, should the DoD restart production of old Stingers in the short term, wait and buy inventory of a new capability, or try to do both? In some cases, such as Stingers, it likely does not make sense to wait for new capabilities that could take between five to seven years to produce and would undermine deterrence and warfighting. In some of these cases, it may make more sense to restart production either in the United States or overseas in Europe, Asia, or other locations through licensed manufacturing or co-production arrangements.
+
+These trade-offs are important to think through on a case-by-case basis. But the reality is that the timelines for a conflict — and consequently for credible deterrence — are shrinking in an increasingly competitive international security environment. The defense industrial base — including the munitions industrial base — is struggling to replenish some of its stockpiles and is unable to meet wartime needs.
+
+
+### FOREIGN MILITARY SALES AND OTHER PROGRAMS AND PROCEDURES
+
+FMS can be useful for the U.S. defense industrial base, but foreign sales take too long — particularly for key allies and partners. The FMS program is a form of security assistance in which the United States can sell defense articles and services to foreign countries. The U.S. Department of State determines which countries will have programs, the DoD executes the program, and Congress ultimately approves all foreign sales. Foreign sales have several benefits.
+
+First, U.S. arms exports to allies and partners help support the U.S. defense industrial base. FMS orders can help establish predictable, efficient production rates, as well as increase economies of scale and reduce production costs. Foreign sales defray the cost of weapons systems to the United States and keeps production lines warm.
+
+Second, foreign sales can reinforce U.S. allies and partners with U.S.-made weapons systems or parts. Foreign sales allow allies and partners to deter and fight so that the United States does not have to take action alone — or even to fight directly at all in some cases, as in Ukraine. Foreign sales can also improve interoperability between the United States and its allies and partners by providing the same types of munitions and systems.
+
+Third, arms exports can prevent the sale of adversary systems, such as those of Russia and China, to potential markets. Growing competition with nations such as China and Russia, which sometimes develop advanced weaponry at lower cost than the United States, has threatened to offset U.S. competitive advantage in the race to support allies and partners around the world.
+
+Currently, however, the U.S. FMS system is not optimal for today’s competitive environment — an environment where such countries as China are building significant military capabilities and increasingly looking to sell them overseas. FMS is risk-averse, inefficient, and sluggish — a particular concern with key allies and partners that need to play a critical role in deterrence and warfighting against countries such as China. In one case, the decision to sell a specific weapons system to Taiwan through FMS, rather than a direct commercial sale, added two years to the delivery date — on top of a two-year production timeline — for a total of four years. This is a significant and problematic difference given the ongoing tensions in the Taiwan Strait.
+
+___`The U.S. FMS system is not optimal for today’s competitive environment — an environment where such countries as China are building significant military capabilities and increasingly looking to sell them overseas.`___
+
+Concerns about selling a piece of sensitive technology can slow a sale for years. Officials can scrutinize a country’s military to see if it has competent troops to operate the equipment and safeguards to keep it secure. That slow pace can leave some countries unsure if the United States really wants them as partners, and it risks pushing them to other countries to buy weapons systems and technology. But the United States must deepen its relationships in a global competition with China that is often measured by who can sell the best, most sophisticated military gear the quickest, and at the cheapest price.
+
+A related issue is ITAR, the U.S. regulation that controls the manufacture, sale, and distribution of defense- and space-related articles and services. But in the current environment, the ITAR process is currently too slow for sharing defense-related technical data with key allies and partners — even ones such as Australia and the United Kingdom. The ITAR process, with all of the paperwork, can take 12 to 18 months. In trying to prevent military technology from falling into the hands of adversaries, the United States has put in place a regulatory regime that is too sluggish to work with critical frontline countries.
+
+There are other procedures, such as the Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA), that are important to ensure that the DoD purchases supplies and services from responsible sources at fair and reasonable prices. But the process can be inefficient and slow. The burden of providing a TINA-compliant proposal can extend the contracting period by at least six months.
+
+FMS, ITAR, and other programs and procedures are important to protect sensitive U.S. technology and ensure fairness. But they need to be nimbler in the current security environment. As demonstrated by AUKUS — the security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States to cooperate on sensitive technologies, including nuclear-powered submarines — there is an urgent need to find ways to cooperate more efficiently and effectively between key allies and partners.
+
+
+### GETTING AHEAD OF THE PROBLEM
+
+None of these challenges have quick or easy solutions. But the clock is ticking. The United States needs to be ready before a conflict starts, in part to maximize deterrence.
+
+The most significant demand on the defense industrial base in a major war would likely be from munitions expenditures and the wear and tear of weapons systems and equipment. This makes it important now for the DoD to assess the wartime demands on a limited set of weapons systems and munitions, as well as to establish a more certain production future for weapons manufacturing. The broad goal should be to support the production capacity required to enable the United States and its allies and partners to deter and, if deterrence fails, fight and win at least one major theater war — if not two. “Just in time” and lean manufacturing operations must be balanced with carrying added capacity to enable a surge in case of a war. Added capacity is also important to deter adversaries, such as China, and credibly demonstrate that the United States and its allies and partners have the capability to conduct a sustained military campaign if necessary. Greater industrial capacity would also support the DoD’s efforts to provide additional capacity to European and Indo-Pacific allies and partners.
+
+The DoD, in coordination with Congress, should develop a “break glass” plan now that involves taking steps in an emergency wartime situation to streamline production, acquisitions, replenishment, FMS, ITAR, and other policies and procedures. The United States cannot afford to develop this plan after a war has started. More specifically, several steps should be considered to build a more resilient defense industrial base. A sense of urgency is critical.
+
+___`None of these challenges have quick or easy solutions. But the clock is ticking. The United States needs to be ready before a conflict starts, in part to maximize deterrence.`___
+
+__Reassess total munition requirements.__ Key munitions questions that should be asked — and answered — include whether service planning is aligned to the realities of high-intensity combat in one — or more than one — theater, such as Europe, the Indo-Pacific, or potentially both. This might include, for example, modeling the expenditure rates of critical guided munitions among land, naval, and air forces in a major conflict at various levels of intensity, including how long it would take to restart production of critical guided munitions or to increase production. Instead of asking industry their capacity to produce specific munitions or weapons systems, a better question may be asking what the DoD needs, based on operational plans (OPLANS) and wartime scenarios and analyses.
+
+Congress could be helpful in holding hearings, as well as requiring the DoD and independent entities to conduct a classified study to assess how many days it would take before the U.S. military exhausted its stockpiles of key munitions in one or more major wars. The study should include supplies to allies and partners since their war plans often involve using U.S. stockpiles. The 2023 National Defense Authorization Act took some useful steps to improve the DoD’s capability and capacity for munitions production and stockpiling — including through reports to Congress — though Congress will need to hold the DoD’s feet to the fire over the next several years.
+
+__Reassess replenishment requirements.__ Important questions need to be asked — and answered: What is the defense industrial base’s ability to replenish critical weapons inventories? What is the status of missile and munition inventories, supply chains, and the U.S. ability to replenish those inventories if needed? Similar to reassessing total munition requirements, Congress could be useful in holding hearings, as well as requiring the DoD to conduct a classified study of requirements to replenish critical weapons inventories in a major war.
+
+In addition, Congress and the DoD should consider ways to shorten the timelines for reprogramming requests — which involve a change in the application of funds — for munitions and other weapons systems, which the United States did during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
+
+__Create a strategic munitions reserve.__ Buy one or two lots of long-lead subcomponents — such as metals, energetics, and electronics — for critical munitions to reduce the 12 to 24 months of lead time in times of crisis. Since production timelines are so long, it would be helpful to consider a strategic munitions reserve. Various authorities, such as the Defense Production Act, exist to facilitate strategic stockpiling and improve response times in cases of urgent need. The authorities outlined in the Defense Production Act can assist in increasing the supply of critical and strategic materials for use by the industrial base.
+
+__Determine a sustainable munitions procurement plan to meet current and future requirements.__ There is a growing need to focus on investments in specific weapons systems — such as strike, air defense, and missile defense — to deter and fight major powers to maximize rates. Munitions needs to be a priority, and they need to be protected in whatever processes the military services use to set priorities. The good news is that there is significant production capacity now for some types of weapons programs, such as the medium-range AMRAAM, SM-6, JASSM, JASSM-ER, Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM), LRASM, GMLRS, ATACMS, AIM-9X Sidewinder short-range air-to-air missile, TLAM, and Stormbreaker air-launched precision-guided glide bomb. Congress could also, for example, make the undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment responsible for weapons stockpile sizes and submit an annual classified report to Congress about the size of the U.S. stockpile and its sufficiency for expected contingencies.
+
+The U.S. military services should also streamline guidelines and methods for contracting precision-guided munitions by tailoring them to weapons procurement. Many of the data and compliance requirements for DoD procurements for ships and aircraft are being levied on precision-guided munitions, even though precision weapons have little to no sustainment costs and are expendable. The DoD should also examine the viability of prudent wavers to TINA to speed up the contracting process and jumpstart production.
+
+__Broaden acquisition approaches and take advantage of flexibility in the contracts process.__ It is important to buy missiles and munitions smarter to take advantage of scale and market power, including using tools such as advanced procurement, multiyear procurement, and economic order quantity processes. These tools have been limited to large programs such as ships and aircraft, but they could help with missiles and munitions. This should include signing multiyear contracts for munitions that maximize production rates. As Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment William LaPlante acknowledged:
+
+> We buy munitions and many of these things in a single year. We don’t do multiyear contracts. We do multi-year contracts for ships, we do it for airplanes, [but] we don’t do it for these other munitions. We need to do it because that will stabilize the supply chain. That’ll send a signal to industry to say they’re in it for the long haul, and we can make the commitment.
+
+__Invest in sub-tiers.__ The DoD needs to focus on building the capacity of sub-tier companies, particularly first tiers, to surge with targeted investments. Modest funding would significantly increase rates. Tooling and test equipment requirements at major defense primes vary by program. In most cases, these are investments that install in factories 18 to 24 months out, so investment is needed now to ramp up 24 months later. Enduring investments also support future surge requirements. These steps could potentially be accomplished by considering updating and expanding the authorities of the Defense Production Act to provide additional funding for longer lead times, expand and modernize production lines, and maximize efficiency.
+
+__Streamline FMS and ITAR for key allies and partners.__ The FMS system badly needs to be reformed. FMS should deliver capability to key allies and partners as quickly as possible, though the United States still needs to keep sufficient stocks for its own use in a war. There is a growing need to speed up sales of U.S. arms to specific foreign allies — especially in Europe and the Indo-Pacific — in an effort to better compete with China and Russia and refill the arsenals of friendly nations that have given military aid to Ukraine.
+
+The same is true with ITAR, which should be more efficient for key allies and partners. For example, what if there were approvals for FMS and ITAR for specific munitions or defense articles over a specific period of time for certain allies and partners, which would create an easier pathway for mutually beneficial sales? Congressional oversight would be important. Another idea might be to develop a program where older weapons that exit the U.S. inventory — such as Harpoon anti-ship missiles — would be given to certain allies and partners by prearrangement. They would know to plan for it on a schedule, and it could create a better flow for industry.
+
+__Create more co-production facilities and look for opportunities for “ally-shoring.”__ Co-production facilities can have multiple benefits, including strengthening allies and partners, increasing economies of scale, and supporting the U.S. industrial base. There have been several recent co-production examples worth exploring in more detail, including HIMARS with Poland, PrSM with Australia, Naval Strike Missile with Norway, and SM-6 components and Tomahawks for Japan and Australia. These are examples of what has been called “ally-shoring” — supporting economic partnerships with key allies and partners. In addition, the DoD should assess the pros and cons of creating multiple production lines for key weapons systems and munitions.
+
+___`The ongoing war in Ukraine and escalating tension with China — including in the Taiwan Strait — highlight that the United States is no longer in a peacetime environment.`___
+
+The good news is that there appears to be a great awakening in some areas of the Pentagon and Congress about challenges with the U.S. defense industrial base and the lack of preparedness for the wartime environment that now exists. The Pentagon recently created a task force of senior officials to examine long-standing inefficiencies in U.S. sales of weapons to foreign countries. The team is looking at ways for the DoD to streamline parts of the program, with the aim of putting U.S. weapons systems more quickly into the hands of partners and allies. There is also a growing recognition of acquisition process challenges that limit outcomes.
+
+These steps are helpful. But there is still more talk than action at lower levels of the DoD and the military services. The ongoing war in Ukraine and escalating tension with China — including in the Taiwan Strait — highlight that the United States is no longer in a peacetime environment. In 2022, President Biden indicated that the United States would support the use of force now to defend Taiwan if it were attacked by China, though much would ultimately depend on the context of a crisis. A failure to make adequate changes today would fall into the category of what U.S. defense analyst Frank Hoffman called a “pink flamingo,” which he defined as a “predictable event that is ignored due to cognitive biases of a senior leader or a group of leaders trapped by powerful institutional forces.
+
+In his history of U.S. defense production during World War II, titled Freedom’s Forge, Arthur Herman documents the critical role of the U.S. defense industry in defeating Germany and Japan. But a revitalization of the defense indsutrial base did not happen overnight for the United States or its allies. As the stresses to the defense industrial base already highlight, it is time to prepare for the era of competition that now exists.
+
+
+### EQUIPMENT COMMITTED TO UKRAINE AND REPLACEMENT CONTRACT(S) ISSUES
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+_▲ SOURCE: [“Fact Sheet on U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine,” U.S. Department of Defense, January 6, 2023](https://media.defense.gov/2023/Jan/06/2003141218/-1/-1/1/UKRAINE-FACT-SHEET-JAN-6.PDF); and [“Ukraine Contracting Actions,” U.S. Department of Defense, December 5, 2022](https://media.defense.gov/2022/Dec/06/2003126931/-1/-1/0/UKRAINE-CONTRACTING-ACTIONS-DEC-5.PDF)._
+
+---
+
+__Seth G. Jones__ is senior vice president, Harold Brown Chair, director of the International Security Program, and director of the Transnational Threats Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He focuses on defense strategy, military operations, force posture, and irregular warfare. He leads a bipartisan team of over 50 resident staff and an extensive network of non-resident affiliates dedicated to providing independent strategic insights and policy solutions that shape national security. He also teaches at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and the Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS) at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-01-31-ccp-inc-reshaping.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-01-31-ccp-inc-reshaping.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..90b4e672
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-01-31-ccp-inc-reshaping.md
@@ -0,0 +1,303 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : CCP Inc. Reshaping
+author: Barry Naughton and Briana Boland
+date : 2023-01-31 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/XVs2eUl.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "The Reshaping of China’s State Capitalist System"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_This report distills key observations about the changing nature of China’s domestic economic management and the international behavior of Chinese companies, state organizations, and financiers._ _Changing national mechanisms for extending Chinese Communist Party (CCP) authority over the economy and a proliferation of new financial institutions underpin a CCP Inc. ecosystem with a unique internal logic and new adaptability to respond to policy shifts. The strength of this ecosystem allows CCP Inc. to compete internationally as a well-resourced group of coordinated actors. However, recent changes to the operation of CCP Inc. — and the external environment in which it operates — foreshadow major challenges for the ecosystem._
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+__Framing “CCP Inc.”__
+
+“CCP Inc.” is a framework for analyzing and conceptualizing Chinese international economic behavior. Over the past two years, this CSIS project has examined the behavior of Chinese companies, state-owned banks, diplomatic officials, and other party-state actors through five in-depth case studies on different industries and national contexts. These cases provide a substantial empirical foundation for better understanding China’s dynamic state capitalist system. Drawing on this new repository of information, this report explains what CCP Inc. is, how it is changing, and the challenges it poses to the international system.
+
+The project’s detailed case studies are premised on two fundamental ideas: first, that the features of the domestic Chinese economic system are key to better understanding China’s international behavior and, second, that the CCP Inc. system is not static, but rather the outcome of a constant process of adaptation and institutional tinkering. The term “CCP Inc.” evolved in the wake of two related, more general concepts. “Japan Inc.” gained currency during the 1970s to describe the close cooperation in Japan between a few large zaibatsu (major business conglomerates) and government agencies, especially in pursuit of export-driven industrialization. By the late 1990s, China’s rapid growth brought the term “China Inc.” into use, to describe concerted international action by Chinese state-owned firms or as an omnibus term to encapsulate China’s economic success. In both cases, the “Incorporated (Inc.)” term primarily described a pattern of informal coordination based on common national interests and long-term relationships.
+
+“CCP Inc.” is different. This concept describes a system with an intentionally designed hierarchical structure that facilitates coordinated action, as well as elements of informal coordination. It includes state-owned and private firms, and its architecture is designed to allow top Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders to achieve priority goals with a wide variety of instruments. As a system, it employs financial tools — some of them highly sophisticated — to achieve some aims indirectly. The system labeled “CCP Inc.” did not grow up accidentally but is the result of careful institutional design, thoughtfully considered and systematically implemented. As the ambitions of Chinese leaders have soared in the twenty-first century, CCP leaders have given much attention to strengthening and honing the CCP Inc. system. This has been done in part to restrain insider opportunism and corruption and improve efficiency, but also to increase the party’s ability to steer behavior within the corporate sector.
+
+___`As the ambitions of Chinese leaders have soared in the twenty-first century, CCP leaders have given much attention to strengthening and honing the CCP Inc. system.`___
+
+Despite this careful and purposeful attention, the system does not always work well. Moreover, Chinese policymakers also, on occasion, subject this system to new and unanticipated types of stress. A critical example occurred in summer 2021, during the “regulatory storm,” when the government introduced policies that severely constrained the actions of a number of China’s most prominent private high-tech firms, notably Alibaba. These “regulatory storm” policies have since become the new normal, with only minor recalibrations. Such abrupt top-down changes — discussed further below — demonstrated clearly that CCP Inc. is not a static institutional setup. Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s actions may have disrupted the internal functioning of the CCP Inc. model — and certainly subjected it to new types of stress — but did not change its basic elements or its fundamental objectives. Indeed, Xi’s increased domestic ambitions show that the fundamental trends producing and sustaining CCP Inc. also produce internal stresses that may provide new opportunities to understand how it works. Since outsiders cannot directly observe the inner workings of CCP Inc., the opportunity to observe the system’s response to shocks like the ones administered by Xi Jinping is especially valuable.
+
+This research project is primarily concerned with the impact of CCP Inc. on international business and, by extension, on international economics and politics. However, to understand the emergence of CCP Inc. — and its difference from vague and informal notions of “China Inc.” — it is essential to understand its institutional basis. These fundamental arrangements are, of course, primarily domestic. The first half of this report therefore examines the domestic institutional foundations of CCP Inc., paying particular attention to changes in the Xi Jinping era. The second half then considers the international behaviors that proceed from the CCP Inc. system, drawing significantly from the case studies conducted for this project. These two very different types of evidence are combined to provide insights into the operation and impact of CCP Inc.
+
+CCP Inc. is rooted in existing Chinese institutions and evolved gradually from the looser “China Inc.” model. This evolution reflects the different demands Chinese leaders have placed on the system, as well as the persistent modifications they have made in pursuit of those demands. As it exists today, CCP Inc. is distinctive in the following dimensions:
+
+1. Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, the CCP has set more ambitious goals that extend far beyond economic growth and profit maximization, explicitly including national greatness and strategic positioning. These goals are not just different, they are broader and more inclusive, incorporating a diverse set of both domestic and international objectives.
+
+2. The expanded CCP agenda includes “market steerage,” not just economic growth. That is, the party now seeks to achieve very concrete and specific economics-related outcomes. Of these, it is prioritizing high-tech industrial development, but it also aims to shape a broad range of key “strategic” areas. In other words, party objectives are not just “add-ons” that can be analogized to corporate social responsibility or the requirements of a public-interest stakeholder. They include the pursuit of concrete economic and strategic outcomes.
+
+3. Corporate governance institutions in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have been restructured in ways that dramatically enhance CCP control. These changes specifically enable the party to transmit its goals directly to enterprise leadership.
+
+4. New financial channels have been created that multiply options and substantially enhance leaders’ ability to steer resources toward specific objectives.
+
+5. The CCP has heightened its direct and indirect influence over private businesses. Party leaders have explicitly endorsed “mixed ownership” so that state agencies and enterprises with small equity stakes in private firms have greater visibility into firms’ decisionmaking and more instruments with which to influence their decisions. Leaders and government agencies can then use ownership stakes, along with financial and regulatory tools, to shape a private firm’s decisionmaking to ensure it conforms to party strategic objectives.
+
+Taken together, these five changes mark a qualitative shift away from traditional notions of “China Inc.” or “Chinese state capitalism” and toward a substantially different and more ambitious system. It will become clear that the institutional features sketched here give Chinese leaders the capacity to send a range of policy instructions through the CCP Inc. system. But do they actually do so? Is the system in fact used this way? And if the system is used this way domestically, is it also deployed internationally to achieve strategic goals? Since the internal operations of the CCP Inc. system cannot be observed, there is no straightforward way to prove that this is the case. However, the preponderance of evidence from the case studies performed in this project shows that the goals and institutions created in the CCP Inc. system are almost certainly used in coordinated ways to achieve China’s strategic objectives.
+
+This report first examines the broadest system-level features of CCP Inc., particularly the specific institutionalized elements that can be tracked with relative confidence; these are all domestic institutions and are well documented. It then briefly examines tacit and less explicit elements of coordination within the domestic economy, which appear to have been severely shaken by the sudden “regulatory storm” of summer 2021.
+
+More specifically, Chapter 1 describes Xi Jinping’s shift from “growth” to “greatness” as the ultimate objective of policymaking and argues that this is a long-run driver of the changes in CCP Inc. While the “regulatory storm” and Xi’s other recent disruptive actions were unexpected, they are consistent with his intensification and shift in objectives. Chapter 2 examines the changes in SOE corporate governance that have helped strengthen the CCP Inc. system. These were intentional changes carried out as part of a structural reform. As such, they are intended to reduce agency loss and make the system more efficient, as well as to increase the ability of policymakers to steer market actors. Chapter 3 describes some of the new financial instruments that Xi’s government has created. These complement the strengthening of direct administrative tools within the state sector and allow control to be exerted on a broader canvas. Chapter 4 looks at the way structural reforms have blurred the boundaries between private and state-owned business, again as part of an intentional effort to improve policymakers’ ability to steer private sector activities more effectively. These innovations in governance and finance were already changing the landscape for private business even before the “regulatory storm” of 2021. Chapter 5 concludes the first half of the paper with a more speculative assessment of the role of private business in CCP Inc. It argues that there had, in fact, been a set of norms that governed party-state behavior prior to 2021 and that those norms demonstrated a degree of restraint by top political leaders. The willingness to abandon this restraint made the events of 2021 troubling and disruptive — and augurs poorly for CCP Inc.
+
+The second half of the paper extends the analysis to the international arena, drawing on case studies to show how the international evidence, though often indirect, provides a lens through which the operation of CCP Inc. can be inferred. Chapters 6–8 make no attempt to summarize these rich case studies, instead drawing on them selectively as a source of insight. The case studies were chosen with sectoral diversity in mind. None of them can be considered “typical,” but they reflect midrange conditions with respect to three important dimensions of host country conditions: government capacity, financial stress, and strength of civil society. This is largely because cases were selected for which significant information was available in public press accounts. This selection process tended to exclude two types of economies: those countries with strong government capacity and little financial stress, who manage their relations with CCP Inc. carefully, producing fewer instances when miscalculations expose the inner workings of the system; and those countries under extreme financial stress and with limited government capacity (such as Sri Lanka or Pakistan), who often provide less information about specific Chinese projects and are less transparent overall. For these reasons, midrange cases were more likely to provide the detailed information sought by the research team.
+
+As Chapter 6 discusses, the cases display abundant evidence of the CCP Inc. ecosystem of related companies at work. Cooperation lies on a spectrum from tight subordination to Chinese state goals (as with space activity in Argentina) to loose coordination of economically interested actors, with private firms playing leadership roles (as with telecommunications in Malaysia and finance in Portugal). Each of the case studies shows evidence of cooperative behavior of the type that characterizes CCP Inc. These can be summarized as (a) firms assisting other Chinese firms that are nominally their competitors to enter international markets; (b) a (seemingly intentionally exploited) division of labor between different kinds of public and private firms; and (c) reliance on a wide variety of funding sources that facilitate rapid expansion while obfuscating the total magnitude of government support.
+
+Chapter 7 draws on case studies to sketch a pattern of international activity that derives from the institutions of CCP Inc. An important aspect of this pattern is what this report labels a “peripheral strategy.” For all the talk of “belts and roads,” the actual pattern that emerges is one of building assets in regions that are peripheral — that is, adjacent to important economic centers and transportation networks but institutionally relatively weak and vulnerable themselves. This pattern holds in Eastern Europe, Asia, and Latin America. The electricity sector provides a telling example of how this works.
+
+Chapter 8 draws together evidence of backlash against CCP Inc. that emerges from the case studies. China’s economic advance has generated negative reactions in many countries, often playing a role in national elections in democratic nations. Ironically, this backlash tends to intensify the peripheral strategy pattern noted in the previous section. Developed countries are more likely to react negatively to the evidence of collusion and noneconomic motives manifested by CCP Inc. actors. In those countries, CCP Inc. behavior has already emerged as a political issue and a significant (if intermittent) liability to party objectives. Less developed countries are often less sensitive to these issues and thus more welcoming to CCP Inc. actors. Indeed, the low prices and subsidization of activity provided by CCP Inc. makes it welcome in nations that struggle with their own financing needs and desperately need infrastructure. Thus, such activity in the periphery is not solely an intentional strategy; it also emerges in an evolutionary process, from the interaction between CCP Inc. opportunism and the vulnerability and poverty of less developed countries, in particular from the inadequacy of their infrastructure.
+
+The final section concludes and brings together different strands. It is clear that CCP Inc. is not a seamless, well-oiled machine that rolls through strategic parts of the world. Rather, it is a complex assemblage of actors who face substantial challenges, two of which are especially important. First is the difficulty of coordinating market actors when the CCP is quite literally changing the rules on a day-to-day basis. These rules shape the actions of qualitatively different actors, so abrupt changes make coordination more complicated and, on balance, more difficult. Second, the character of CCP Inc.’s noneconomic objectives and obvious collusion are creating a substantial backlash in many parts of the world.
+
+However, despite these challenges, CCP Inc. is still a formidable and well-resourced group of coordinated actors. The CCP Inc. ecosystem has an internal logic, consistency, and adaptability that allow it to achieve significant objectives. This report argues that recent changes will make the operation of CCP Inc. more troubled and less successful in the next few years. Yet that does not mean it will pose less of a challenge to a global rules-based order. On balance, that challenge may increase. As Covid-19 fades globally, China will resume and intensify its international activities — including, undoubtedly, by making adjustments designed to strengthen and fortify the CCP Inc. ecosystem.
+
+
+### From Growth to Greatness
+
+__Xi Jinping’s Changing Goals for China__
+
+For decades, analysts understood China as a political economy in which all other policy goals were subordinate to economic growth. This was the hallmark of Deng Xiaoping’s vision for China. “Development is the only hard truth,” Deng famously stated in his valedictory Southern Tour of 1992. In turn, market-oriented economic reform was essential precisely because it was seen as necessary to sustain high-speed growth. With the creation of a market economy after the turn of the century, as well as the end of the special conditions powering “miracle growth,” this set of priorities began to change by 2010 at the latest. Under the leadership of Hu Jintao and Li Keqiang (2002–2012), the priority given to market reform was somewhat lessened, and demands for improvements in social welfare and the physical environment, as well as deeper human capital accumulation, were increasingly heard. Under Xi Jinping, however, these diverse goals have increasingly been subordinated to the drive for national greatness and the strengthened political and ideological hegemony of the CCP.
+
+A key part of these shifts has been the steadily increasing role for techno-industrial policy and the steadily increasing desire to heighten direct government intervention in the economy. Originally introduced in 2006 as part of a vaguely defined effort to find “new growth drivers” and support “indigenous innovation,” the industrial-policy push has gained strength, emphasis, and resources ever since. The 12th Five-Year Plan, promulgated in early 2011, still stated that “development is the key to solving all of our problems,” but declared the intention of the plan was to “make technological progress and innovation the fundamental support for the accelerated transformation of the economic development mode.” What was plausibly a moderate shift in development strategy at first has increasingly become part of the drive to become a great nation, achieve technological primacy, and attain a heightened level of global security.
+
+In a broad sense, the drive for national greatness is consistent with economic growth, since only an economic power can be a global power. But the shift from economic power to national greatness in all dimensions (not just economic) nonetheless yields three important macro-level changes, which correspond to imperatives that Chinese leaders believe they must pursue.
+
+First, Chinese leaders are not merely more ambitious; they increasingly identify concrete policies and programs that they have determined are consistent with greater national power. While some of these policies are amorphous and constantly redefined (such as the Belt and Road Initiative), many are clearly defined strategic initiatives. These programs show up frequently in the project case studies: Chinese leaders have committed to the Global Energy Interconnection Initiative (Greece); to the cultivation of Portuguese-speaking countries (Portugal); to the support of technical standards that privilege Huawei’s fifth-generation (5G) wireless telecom ambitions (Malaysia); and so on. These policies do not always originate in the ambitions of Xi Jinping and other top leaders; they sometimes emerge from system insiders, such as state-owned utility giant State Grid, who use their direct bureaucratic connections to lobby for their own programs (in this case, longdistance, ultra-high-voltage systems that tie together international power grids). However, they become CCP Inc. policies when they are adopted at the top and stamped with the central leadership’s imprimatur.
+
+Second, because objectives are more diverse, Chinese leaders are seeking more diverse and separate levers of power. It is no longer the case that various instruments are close substitutes in contributing to economic growth and therefore all more or less adequate. Rather, leaders need a range of instruments to achieve discrete objectives. CCP Inc. is an agglomeration of various institutions that allows Chinese leaders to achieve this greater flexibility.
+
+Third, Chinese leaders seek to “go out” and shape the environment outside China, first nearby and then globally. “Going out” is not only expected to contribute to economic growth, but also to create an international environment that is favorable to China in multiple dimensions. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is the obvious example; while uniting a plethora of economic objectives, it is a clear expression of China’s geopolitical ambitions as well. The impact of such overarching initiatives is multiplied by the ability to have different, apparently independent actors cooperating, whether tacitly or explicitly. The CCP Inc. ecosystem also enables enhanced impact due to its ability to harness various kinds of capabilities (an effect evident in the Malaysia and Portugal case studies).
+
+Of course, the CCP has sought a higher degree of control domestically as well. Whether this is driven by insecurity about party rule, as some think, or by a desire to maximize power for external objectives is to some extent an unanswerable question. What is clear is that Xi Jinping has sought a vastly higher degree of political and ideological hegemony over Chinese society than has been seen since Mao Zedong. This affects how CCP Inc. actually functions. Whereas in the past, a tacit cooperation undergirded by a joint interest in economic growth would be enough to unite state and private firms, Xi insists on a higher degree of discretionary control over diverse actors.
+
+___`Xi Jinping has sought a vastly higher degree of political and ideological hegemony over Chinese society than has been seen since Mao Zedong. . . . Whereas in the past, a tacit cooperation undergirded by a joint interest in economic growth would be enough to unite state and private firms, Xi insists on a higher degree of discretionary control over diverse actors.`___
+
+
+### The New SOE Corporate Governance System
+
+The foundational element of CCP Inc. has been the development of new formal institutions of party control within the state sector. These formal institutional mechanisms give the CCP the ability to oversee state-owned businesses directly. Formal institutions not only permit the occasional direct exercise of authority, but also backstop all forms of indirect and tacit coordination. There have been dramatic changes in formal SOE governance since 2013.
+
+#### The Communist Party’s Role in Enterprise Decisionmaking
+
+Changes in the governance structure of state-owned companies have brought them much more directly under the control of the CCP. The “factory-manager responsibility system,” which had guaranteed the superior authority of the chief executive officer (CEO) over the party secretary since the 1980s, has been gradually abolished. The party committee was first given a “strategic” role in the firm that overshadowed that of the board of directors, which is itself now routinely chaired by the party secretary. Implementation began during the late 2010s, and the new rules were finally formally approved and publicly released at the beginning of 2020. As part of these changes, existing elements of corporate governance were reorganized to such an extent that the fundamental nature of firm-authority relations has transformed. In a sense, “state ownership” has been replaced by “party ownership,” except that the CCP does not get to harvest the revenues produced by “its” firms.
+
+From the 1980s through the 2000s, the SOE corporate governance system went through important changes as genuine corporations were created. However, throughout this time, the power relationship between managers and party officials was quite stable. First, the manager was the acknowledged top authority within state-owned industrial and commercial enterprises, which is no longer the case. Second, the decisionmaking chain has been radically restructured. The party committee used to occupy an intermediate and relatively powerless position in the chain, reviewing strategic decisions made by the CEO before they were passed on to the board of directors. Today, the party committee’s position has been doubly enhanced. In the first place, it is now supposed to initiate key strategic decisions in the enterprises, then pass them on to the CEO to draw up a concrete proposal. Furthermore, this proposal must then be approved by the board of directors, whose chairman is now routinely the party committee secretary. With party control at both ends of the decisionmaking chain, there is no ambiguity about who is in charge.
+
+Beck and Brødsgaard recently laid out these changes and described their initial implementation in an article for China Quarterly. The role of party committees in SOE corporate governance has been dramatically strengthened and institutionalized. Crucially, these changes have been widely implemented not only in wholly state-owned firms, but also in mixed-ownership firms where the state has a significant minority stake. Xi Jinping himself has explicitly declared the fundamental importance of this shift in SOE governance, calling the integration of party leadership in “all aspects of corporate governance” and the embedding of the Communist Party in the corporate governance structure “the distinctive elements of the modern state-owned enterprise system with Chinese characteristics.” As is true in many other aspects of Chinese society, party rule has become institutionalized, and channels of control have become more direct, shorter, and more monopolistic in character.
+
+To be sure, there are important elements of continuity. The basic building blocks of standard international corporate governance systems remain. There is a separation between the board of directors and the chief executive officer. The board has ultimate responsibility for the firm’s overall direction and strategic choices, while the CEO oversees day-to-day operations. However, the operational function of these governance elements has changed fundamentally. The party committee chairman now explicitly takes the chair of the board of directors, and the CCP assumes many of the board’s functions in corporate governance. The party’s existence is no longer shrouded in secrecy. It declares itself to be the representative of a broad spectrum of society’s interests — broader than just that of profit — so a new “stakeholder” has been introduced into the corporate governance system.
+
+Although the party is no longer operating in secret, there are no disclosure requirements, so outside observers routinely know nothing about the meetings and decisions of the top body in the firm. External (“independent”) directors still exist, but their role in the decisionmaking process will have changed, since they now discuss proposals that have already been approved by the party committee. Clearly, this process reduces the extent to which the board of directors brings together stakeholders who are united by their interest in profitability and makes it far easier to impose a diverse set of objectives on the firm (indeed, this is presumably the purpose). The board of directors tends to be a locus of consultation and ratification, rather than the prime decisionmaker per se.
+
+#### Setting Performance Indicators
+
+The new rules are explicit that the party committee’s pre-decision powers should include the “three importants and one big,” referring to all major strategic decisions, appointments, and projects, as well as largescale capital operations. Clearly, this means the large-scale foreign operations that are the focus of this report are directly decided by party committees, which are themselves sworn to take direction from higher-level party organizations. More broadly, this process opens the way for the party to impose its multiple objectives and priorities on state-owned firms directly. In calm times with a benign leadership, this means social and environmental considerations could be introduced into corporate decisionmaking. In turbulent times with an activist leadership, this means any consideration or priority that the CCP adopts can be directly translated into state-enterprise decisions. This obviously has relevance for fighting Covid-19, disaster relief, and numerous other issues. It inevitably indicates that profit and efficiency do not have a presumptive claim on enterprise decisionmaking. To present a current example: Should an energy company set coal and oil prices to world levels, increasing profits but importing inflation?
+
+The implementation and consolidation of this new system is being guided by the SOE Reform Three-Year Action Plan (2020–2022). This document does not describe the end state of the new corporate governance system but rather outlines specific steps and actions SOEs are supposed to take before the end of 2022 in order to implement the system. It is carefully designed to make sure that the institutions adopted are compatible with the incentives that policymakers want to create. Throughout, the objective is to regularize and institutionalize the new SOE corporate governance system. It is intended to give firms greater stability and greater freedom within a clearly defined (but expanded) scope of operation, while permanently building in the new noneconomic objectives that are to be the hallmark of — and justification for — CCP control. Three features of the new system help demonstrate this.
+
+First, the regulations encourage greater freedom of operation and stronger incentives for firms within carefully specified ranges. Managerial performance contracts with clear key performance indicators (KPIs) are an important component. China Energy Investment Corporation, a model of implementation, reports that all 4,059 managers among its 1,076 subsidiaries have signed performance contracts with fixed terms and annual and monthly KPIs. This is part of an overall system of labor contracts, performance agreements, and evaluation of success indicators in which “floating wages” linked to KPIs make up 60 percent of the company’s wage bill. Designated high-tech firms are allowed to be listed on the stock market and pay managers with stock options, SOEs in ordinary commercial sectors are allowed to invest in private firms, and superiors are not supposed to administratively intervene in subordinate firms or subsidiaries. Supervision is to primarily take the form of a shareholder preserving the value of their firm. Other new regulations cover SOEs investing abroad: The China State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) will designate each firm’s main line of business and put together a “negative list” of restricted investments. Firms are required to avoid the negative list and, “in principle,” not invest outside their main line of business without special permission.
+
+Second, besides profit and capital value, there is a separate set of public goals that are now incorporated into managers’ performance contracts and incentive systems. According to the Three-Year Action Plan, “Macroeconomic adjustment, technological innovation, and development of strategic emerging industries should be included in the managerial performance indicators.” For example, for China Energy Investment, KPIs include reductions in carbon emissions and anti-poverty actions benchmarked against global leaders. In principle, every top manager in the entire state-enterprise system should now have a set of policy KPIs in addition to their profit, revenue, and value indicators.
+
+Third, the party’s role in the SOE has been strengthened in multiple, overlapping ways. In the most obvious sense, the party committee is given the dominant voice at key steps in the decisionmaking process (as described above). In addition, a manager’s employment contract must include “party building” as one of their KPIs. Finally, the KPIs of the party officials themselves must also include the firm’s profitability and preservation of capital. As the action plan notes, “At present, there is a degree of integration between party building and operational decisionmaking. For example, the decisionmaking of the party committee comes before decisionmaking of the board of directors, but the integration of work at the basic level still needs further exploration.” In other words, party committees are explicitly being told not to limit themselves to ideology and training but to actively guide the enterprise. This is an effort to ensure that the incentives of party officials and managers are unified, not spread across separate tracks.
+
+These three features together make clear that this corporate governance system is carefully designed to give SOE managers stronger incentives and greater freedom within a clearly defined scope. Contracts and KPIs make the incentive system more precise about what firms’ obligations are in terms of policy objectives. This makes sense because one of the objectives of the redesigned system is to reduce insider control — that is, to reduce the extent to which SOE managers, through opportunistic and outright corrupt methods, have been able to exploit their positions for private gain. Increased oversight by the CCP is intended to restrict managerial opportunism as well as increase the party’s ability to steer certain sectors.
+
+#### Organization and Competition
+
+A third important change in state-owned firm governance is to the principles by which SOEs have been organized. During the 2000s, central SOEs were consolidated and the total number shrunk toward 100, but two principles were followed: (1) each firm was supposed to concentrate on its core business, and (2) competition between at least two firms was maintained in each sector. After about 2008, a new emphasis on “big and strong” SOEs prevailed. Firms were still merged, but without respecting the need to maintain competition, such as among railway equipment and airplane manufacturers, two sectors where head-tohead competition was eliminated. Moreover, gigantic firms were created by merging, for example, coal and electricity giants, in the hope that these new firms would internalize the costs of energy transition. In this particular case, the merger did not reduce competition in the coal or electricity industries, but it did create a larger, more powerful firm that could extend its reach into numerous areas and serve as a more effective conduit for central government priorities.
+
+These changes in industrial organization were designed to make SOEs more effective and powerful, in part by reducing the market competition that would otherwise drive them to focus on speed and profitability. It was understood that these more effective and less market-constrained entities would also be more useful instruments for policymakers. This approach further supported an implicit functional division of labor between public and private firms. State firms were more able to take on policy and regulatory functions, while private firms could pursue their competitive advantages.
+
+
+### New Channels for Government Financial Resources
+
+Chinese policymakers have created a series of new financial channels over the past decade that have greatly enhanced the ability of CCP Inc. decisionmakers to steer businesses indirectly. The first component consists of new financial regulations, introduced along with the revised SOE corporate governance, that aim to move toward a more “financialized” system — part of a broader shift toward an “investor state.” The second component consists of a variety of special purpose funds designed to help achieve state aims. The third component is a new approach toward managing (or “steering”) the process by which new firms raise money on capital markets. These three new components come on top of the longstanding state dominance of the banking sector in China, which had already put in place a robust system of policy banks and state-run commercial banks. Put together, these channels provide ample flexibility to CCP Inc. policymakers.
+
+Figure 1 provides a visual representation of this complex financial system. The range of channels and key actors provides a combination of discretion and massive scale. There are three all-encompassing state hierarchies that are relevant to the provision of financial support for privileged firms or projects. The first is the ownership governance hierarchy of the state sector, which was the focus of the previous section; the second is the fiscal (government budget) hierarchy; and the third is the state-run financial system. Figure 1 also highlights five important strategic actors, scattered across all three state hierarchies, who have a specific strategic responsibility to shape enterprises’ investment and decisionmaking. Financing can be provided in other ways, of course, but these five highlighted actors have special strategic roles in the system. Several of them straddle the line between government and capital markets (which should not be thought of as an arena separate from government control or influence).
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 1: Channels of Government Preferential Financing.__ Source: Authors’ research based on multiple sources cited in the text of the report._
+
+#### Internal Financial Channels of the State Sector
+
+The institutions most strategically located within this hierarchy are the state capital investment and operations companies (SCIOs). Introduced as pilots in the mid-2010s, the SCIOs were intended to take over an active role within the investor state — that is, not just to serve as passive holders of a government stake, but to actively restructure state firms as an investment bank might. For example, Guoxin (rendered into English as China Reform Holdings) is a “state capital operation company” subordinate to the national ownership agency, SASAC. Initially established to help central SOEs restructure by shedding “non-core” and unprofitable assets, Guoxin has become a permanent, robust actor. Among its portfolio of objectives is to help SOEs looking to expand abroad: in the past 10 years, it has invested 187.2 billion yuan ($26.9 billion) in projects outside China. The SOE Reform Three-year Action Plan strongly emphasizes the diffusion of SCIOs beyond the initial pilots. In quantitative terms, these companies are likely a drop in the bucket compared to funding from massive state-owned financial institutions, including China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank. However, SCIOs work in close coordination with big SOEs and provide a direct, discreet channel to achieve large-scale objectives.
+
+#### Government Guidance Funds
+
+Government guidance funds (GGFs) are a new type of financial entity that has proliferated rapidly in the past decade. GGFs have roots in preexisting local government funds and financial linkages to state-owned enterprises, state-owned banks, and even fiscal authorities. However, they are standalone entities, funded from public and (theoretically) private sources. An individual GGF is set up with a managing agency — which is responsible for day-to-day operations, like the manager in a venture capital firm — and limited partners, who provide funds and participate in an annual or semiannual board meeting. This institutional setup allows the managing partner to bear responsibility and be rewarded for successful investments. GGFs took off in 2014 and grew rapidly until 2018, when the growth rate cooled. By mid-2020, their combined registered investment totaled 11.27 trillion yuan ($1.62 trillion). Actual fundraising and investment lagged behind the growth of the approved scale, but investments have continued to increase through the first half of 2022. Each GGF has a declared purpose, as well as a designated scope. Most are directed toward specific industries, especially hightech ones targeted in China’s industrial policies.
+
+Many GGFs, such as the National Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund (known informally as the “Big Fund”), are huge and unique. As should be apparent from Figure 1, one important feature of GGFs is that they receive funding from all three of the main channels, as well as the complete spectrum of government actors. They are also empowered to raise private sector money, but thus far seem to have been overwhelmingly dependent on direct and indirect government financing. Nevertheless, from the perspective of CCP Inc. policymakers, GGFs have a useful combination of legal independence and an explicit policy mandate. Many of these funds operate internationally and fly under the radar as independent, potentially mixed-ownership entities.
+
+#### Manipulation of Capital Markets
+
+Capital markets are generally considered to be the most dispersed form of financing — and the one least subject to government control. Since start-ups and firms with contrarian business strategies can potentially find a few “believers” among the multiple entities that transact in capital markets, these flexible and independent institutional frameworks are often praised for enhancing exchange at the expense of government control. The growth of capital markets in Japan after the 1980s was one of the chief causes of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry losing dominance and the end of the extreme forms of “Japan Inc.”
+
+China is different because of the numerous state-controlled entities that operate in its enormous capital markets. Within the broad swathe of capital market operations, there are scores of state-owned venture capital funds that raise financing from all three of the main channels shown in Figure 1. These markets provide funds directly (to start-up companies and projects) and indirectly (through GGFs). Government entities’ increasingly ambitious and targeted programs inevitably mean there is more direct government support to new firms — and more efforts to shape their development trajectories.
+
+The most recent initiative by the government to shape new, generally private, start-up firms takes the form of the “Little Giants” (小巨人) program, which offers strong government support to companies in technological niches where China has traditionally had a weak presence and relied on imports. This program kicked off in July 2019, and there have been three batches of firms selected for investment as of the end of 2021, reaching 4,762 in total (with solicitations for a fourth batch launched in June 2022). The central government aims to nurture 10,000 such firms over the 14th Five-Year Plan period (2021–25), with provincial governments fostering another 100,000 that will serve as a seedbed for national-level designation. Predominantly small and hightech, 90 percent of these firms are in manufacturing. Originally, the government budgeted 10 billion yuan ($1.4 billion) to support around 1,000 national-level “Little Giants,” but since the program appears to be expanding rapidly beyond that amount, the cost is undoubtedly much bigger — and growing quickly.
+
+The Little Giants program represents an important extension of government influence into a realm generally dominated by private firms. Analogous industrial policy in Japan and South Korea, by contrast, mainly privileged a relatively small number of existing firms, issuing them policy preferences so they could ramp up production quickly, reach economic scale, and become national champions. Even Chinese policymakers have often worried about the potential for “excess entry” by firms seeking to profiteer off government preferences, which can lead to a serious waste of resources. Chinese industrial policies have traditionally managed these issues by pursuing a threefold strategy: (1) take a relatively hands-off policy in the early stages of a market; (2) have a modest bias toward state-owned firms; and then (3) rally behind whichever firms emerge triumphant from the early stages of competition and anoint them as “national champions.”
+
+The Little Giants program departs sharply from this traditional orientation. It explicitly involves government intervention at an early stage of the firm creation process. New firms are supported both by direct subsidies (typically modest) and by tacit protectionist policies — for example, requiring established firms that rely on foreign, high-tech components to purchase a minimum 20 percent of total supplies from domestic firms (where Little Giants are often the only available domestic suppliers). Such policies can be found in major national-level projects, including space exploration and high-speed railways, according to the Chinese Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT). Finally, because of the potential for fraud and misrepresentation, Little Giants are supposed to be reviewed after three years, creating additional paperwork and opportunities for government intervention.
+
+In addition to expanding the scope of government intervention, the Little Giants program also exemplifies a new channel of government influence. Beneficiaries of the program are being rushed into listing on China’s stock markets, especially the “Second Boards” in Shanghai and Shenzhen, as well as the “New Third Board” over-the-counter system in Beijing. For example, at the Beijing New Third Board, national-level Little Giants comprised 40 of the 203 newly listed firms in the first half of 2022. In short, the state is pushing relatively new firms to list on the market with an explicit government imprimatur, then inviting investors to buy in, thus providing finance for the firms. This verges on market manipulation, raising clear moral hazard risks, as government bureaucrats “pump” the stocks while insiders prepare to “dump” them when they underperform.
+
+#### Overview of Financial Channels
+
+The past few years have seen a proliferation of dedicated financial institutions that facilitate the party’s direction of resources to priority sectors and projects. To be sure, in terms of overall volume, the state-owned banks still provide the largest share of resources. State-owned commercial banks provide low-cost credit to favored borrowers, but the bulk of their lending goes to support ordinary daily business. Policy banks — whose entire mission in life, after all, is to support government development financing, including abroad — play an enormous role in financing CCP Inc.’s foreign activities. The Export-Import Bank has a special remit to support Chinese projects, particularly in Africa; China Development Bank operates all over the world. Moreover, as shown in Figure 1, state-owned banks not only provide enormous volumes of direct financing, they all have standalone investment bank subsidiaries (sometimes labeled “securities companies”) that take a much more proactive role in structuring and providing finance. These subsidiaries are important in establishing and funding GGFs and underpin virtually all state efforts to steer capital markets.
+
+These multiple financial channels can be used with subtlety and discretion to achieve almost anything. In the most extreme case, the government can utilize financial instruments with no apparent link to the state, in essence laundering the funds. But far more common is a blend of financing from a variety of indirect channels, all of them apparently acting through capital markets and in line with market opportunities. This proliferation of financial channels and strategic financial actors complements the changes made within the state sector, which — while remaining of roughly constant size relative to the economy — is now a more effective instrument of party wishes. Long gone are the days when the state sector was seen as a problem or burden, a bunch of loss-making “dinosaurs” dependent on infusions of aid to stanch the red ink. As their maneuverability and responsiveness increase, state institutions are obviously becoming more effective instruments through which the party can create pressure and impose its will on the broader economy, including on private enterprises.
+
+Thus, changes within state sector governance made the realization of CCP Inc. more feasible. The channels of CCP control over SOEs became more direct and more institutionalized while also remaining extremely discreet. Simultaneously, the number of state-run financial channels proliferated, giving policymakers more tools to influence private sector actors as well. Today, strategists have many different options for supporting business actions that align with CCP strategic objectives. Offering a greater variety of particularistic benefits — and more channels through which to deliver them — has made it much easier for CCP Inc. strategists to bring the interests of private firms into alignment with their own. It is no longer a question of whether the state sector in China is unusually large, but rather an issue of whether the entire economic system is subject to state guidance and whether the Chinese economy functions in a way that is compatible with multilateral institutions and the legal systems of other economies.
+
+
+### Institutions of Influence in the Private Sector
+
+For over a decade, the penetration of private firms by government and party actors has been increasing. Focusing on shares of equity ownership, one recent paper by Chong-en Bai et al. used registration records for all companies in China to show that while private owners’ share of total registered capital increased by 22 percentage points between 2000 and 2019, almost all of this (19.4 percentage points) came from the expansion of the state-connected private sector. These firms, which either have direct equity ties with state owners or indirect ties with other private firms that have such connections, represent the growth sector of the economy. These are also generally large firms: of the 1,000 largest, 78 percent have direct or indirect links with the state; of firms not in the top 100,000, only 6 percent are connected. In this sense, the Hongqiao Group, which plays such an important role in the Guinea case study, exemplifies a broader phenomenon. As Bai et al. put it, “The net effect is that a large share of the Chinese economy is neither completely state owned nor completely privately owned but is rather this gray zone with mixed ownership.” This was not a significant feature of the Chinese economy 20 years ago, in the heyday of “China Inc.”
+
+It is important to stress that these changing patterns of ownership are the outcome of intentional policy choices, in particular the promotion of “mixed ownership,” which was first prominently put forward during the November 2013 Third Plenum of the Party Central Committee. At that time, the specific policies meant to support mixed ownership were only vaguely alluded to. The party encouraged private firms to take stakes in state-owned enterprises and state-owned firms to take stakes in private firms. It is not possible to trace which pathway has been more significant, but state-connected private firms are much more common in sectors where SOEs are also more dominant, such as the aerospace industry. Some proportion of connected private firms have doubtless been set up to allow private parties to share in the privileges maintained by existing stateowned firms, while some proportion may reflect the extension of state controls to successful private firms. The ownership data does not reveal what these shares are, but it does clearly show that the conditions of interpenetration have been steadily increasing over the past 20 years. The increase in mixed ownership means that there is abundant scope for CCP Inc. managers to employ the expanded state instruments described in the preceding sections to steer private firms as well, even if less directly.
+
+The CCP Inc. system reflects institutional innovations that are designed to allow mixed-ownership private firms to operate with less direct control and fewer restraints than state-owned firms. In the first place, SOEs are allowed — even encouraged — to profit from their stakes in private firms. Indeed, since one of the KPIs of SOE managers is to maximize the total value of the enterprise’s assets, the greater freedom given to mixed-ownership subsidiaries encourages them to maximize the overall value of the state’s ownership stake in the economy. Furthermore, policy designers are less worried about SOE managers engaging in opportunistic and corrupt behavior when dealing with private firms because private firms have shareholders who act as a check on insider dealing and protect the value of their company. Again, this is an intentional part of the state sector corporate governance reform. For example, the SOE Reform Three-Year Action Plan says that when outsiders have at least a 30 percent stake in a state-majority subsidiary, then outsiders must be given board representation so they can voice their interests. Similarly, provisions that allow SOE managers to receive stock options and other high-powered compensation are designed to smooth the way for mixed-ownership firms with similar mechanisms. Thus, mixed-ownership firms can take risks and explore lines of business that would not be available to a state-owned firm, with significant implications for both high-tech sectors and in the international arena. All this is part of a system designed to streamline oversight and increase transparency for corporate partners within designated spheres.
+
+___`The CCP Inc. system reflects institutional innovations that are designed to allow mixed-ownership private firms to operate with less direct control and fewer restraints than state-owned firms.`___
+
+There have been substantial changes in the relationship between CCP Inc. and private firms since 2019. Changing international conditions have interacted with the increasing ambition of policymakers (described in Section 2), who have introduced new tools and shifted the arenas in which these tools are employed. First, in the wake of heightened tensions between China and the United States, particularly regarding U.S. sanctions against Huawei, China’s industrial policy objectives have tilted sharply toward self-reliance. That means not only that the intensity of industrial policy (the overall claim on resources) has increased, but also that the specific sectors and subsectors that are the focus of industrial policy have changed. In particular, to achieve self-sufficiency, China has to invest in numerous economic subsectors in which there is currently almost no domestic presence, such as semiconductor production machinery. This inevitably calls for a more interventionist government approach since the broad, generalized encouragement of high-tech enterprise that has long been a feature of Chinese industrial policy has not spontaneously generated entrants into these subsectors. Indeed, the Little Giants program should be seen as a response to this particular challenge. CCP Inc. is now demanding more specific forms of behavior from private firms than it has been accustomed to demanding in the past.
+
+Second, there has been a shift in the way that key actors within CCP Inc. — especially Xi Jinping — view nonpriority private-firm activities. In the past, the party’s general attitude toward private business has been encouraging, at least since the promulgation of the “three represents” by Jiang Zemin in 2000. Outside of a few high-priority technologies, the party would presumptively support a wide swath of economic activity since it generates employment, increases gross domestic product (GDP), and — in higher-tech sectors — builds capabilities that strengthen China’s technological drive. China has long protected its private, homegrown “national champions,” especially in the high-tech space. Firms such as Alibaba, Tencent, and Huawei have benefited from protectionist policies that allowed them to grow from infant industries to global giants. As the Malaysia case study discusses, their domestic fortress markets make them more profitable and provide other resources that have facilitated their international expansion. Holding company Fosun’s profitable domestic operations also backstop its expansion in Portugal.
+
+This presumptive support for private enterprise has now changed. For a variety of reasons, CCP Inc. has begun to actively discourage certain types of private sector activity, even when they signify high technological capacity. In summer 2021, building on previous regulatory actions restricting Alibaba’s subsidiary Ant Financial, Xi Jinping unleashed a flurry of actions that actively discouraged a wide range of internet-based services, including finance, ride hailing, and gaming, among others. At the same time, his political objectives appear to have changed as well. The desire for stronger ideological and political hegemony over society seems to have led Xi and his followers to adopt a much harsher attitude toward “capitalists” (private entrepreneurs). The regime initially seemed untroubled when its actions led to a dramatic destruction of stock market wealth later that year. Thus, in a set of actions complementary to the increase in tools to positively induce compliance by private business, there has also been an increase in the regime’s willingness to impose negative sanctions on ordinary private business activity.
+
+The economic implications of these two shifts are significant. While CCP Inc. has always displayed a de facto focus on high-tech manufacturing, it is now working to prevent an overall transition toward a postindustrial, service-based economy. The 14th Five-Year Plan explicitly calls for maintaining the industrial share of the economy. As a development focus, hardware is now officially preferred to software. This is sometimes considered to be support for a “German model,” as opposed to an “American model,” of the high-income economy — reflecting the contrast between the relative prominence of German manufacturing firms and the global dominance of American internet firms — and it has a certain popular appeal (“real men make tangible things,” to quote a version of a popular saying). Chinese propagandists even suggest an analogy between the Little Giants and the specialized, medium-sized manufacturing firms that make up the German Mittelstand. However, these comparisons are extremely inaccurate. German Mittelstand firms are traditional, generally family-run firms that have developed strong specializations over generations, often developing out of craft traditions in the nineteenth century. The German specialization in manufacturing is the result of accumulation of human capital over decades, not of government policy that prioritizes that type of firm. The kind of intense preferential policies favored by China for its new start-ups is quite foreign to German practice. Ironically, if anything, it mimics the Silicon Valley approach to launching and rapidly scaling new, “disruptive” firms.
+
+
+### Behavior
+
+__Restraint and Violation of Implicit Norms__
+
+Thus far, this report has discussed the policy changes of the last few years as incremental changes within the framework of CCP Inc. — while also acknowledging that their implementation has caused consternation and confusion among many Chinese actors. CCP Inc. has already afforded enormous power and discretion to Chinese policymakers, seemingly providing them with many of the things they wanted. Yet the actual exercise of discretionary power by Xi Jinping set off a kind of crisis, leading foreign and domestic capitalists to wonder, “Is China investible?” The scramble to readjust policy positions in 2021 — not a definitive rollback, but certainly an important rearrangement of policy — can only be understood in this light. Clearly, Xi’s actions in 2021 violated an implicit understanding that facilitated the operation of CCP Inc. Perhaps this disruption can help reveal some of the “hidden rules” (潜规则) at work in the framework.
+
+While it may not be immediately apparent, the effectiveness of the traditional (pre-2021) CCP Inc. depends on a degree of restraint by officials and policymakers. CCP Inc. is not merely an extension of party control into new arenas; it also represents a kind of compelled alliance that binds private firms to government and party actors in business realms. To keep such an alliance in robust health, the party has to be flexible and make occasional concessions. It also needs to respect the fundamental interests of the private business class, even as it wields the tools to insist that the private business class respect the fundamental interests of the party. More generally, there are three kinds of restraint that implicitly underly the “classic” model of CCP Inc.
+
+1. Private firms are accepted as legitimate, successful private firms are allowed to grow, and entrepreneurs are allowed to get rich. The extension of this principle is that private firms are fully qualified to be “national champions” — to both serve as instruments of national greatness and profit from the achievement of national goals. For example, Alibaba’s success in Malaysia was supported by CCP Inc., and CCP Inc. was strengthened by Alibaba’s success.
+
+2. The instruments used to guide private business and bring about alignment among the commercial interests of private firms and CCP strategists are market-conforming. The instruments described in the previous section are generally deployed as positive pressures to bring about voluntary compliance through incentive alignment. Private businesses can basically continue to operate as profit maximizers and leave it to the strategists to manipulate the market environment. Private firms simply need to be alert to the signals sent by strategists, who provide important information about favored business opportunities. In other words, from the position of private firms in any mixed-market economy, this is different in degree but not in kind.
+
+3. Strategic direction adheres to a broad vision that can be readily communicated to a very diverse set of actors. Despite the proliferation of specific instruments and incentives, all actors need to be able to “get with the program.” In the case of CCP Inc, that program is one of national greatness, national security, and technological primacy.
+
+These principles are not written down; rather, they had been taken for granted because they were characteristics of the system as it evolved in the early 2000s, when China finally emerged from decades of market-oriented reform and state sector downsizing with a functioning and rapidly growing market economy. China’s leaders understood the value of what they had achieved and were in no hurry to undermine the achievement with ill-considered policies. Tacit cooperation was in place, and planners were not interested in disrupting it. As China’s commitment to technological development intensified after 2006, new industrial policies were steadily added, layered on each other, and made more generous, but they all generally took market-conforming configurations. Tax exemptions, subsidies, low-interest loans, and government-supported funds were all piled one upon the other. While none of the instruments were perfectly (or even elegantly) applied, on balance the instruments achieved a minimum standard of “at least, do no harm.”
+
+Despite adhering to these principles, China’s policymakers would sometimes apply harsh negative sanctions to private companies. Threats and punishment have always been part of CCP relations with private firms. For example, in 2017, Chinese regulators took dramatic steps to dismantle the corporate empires of Hainan Airlines and Anbang Insurance Group, as well as Fosun, the private conglomerate at the center of the Portugal study. These actions were designed to send a signal to private businesses, as demonstrated by the People’s Daily article cited in the Portugal study. For a signal to be effective, it must be publicized, and Fosun’s compliance and return to the fold was clearly laid out in this People’s Daily editorial, which included specific praise for how the firm facilitated the entry of state-controlled UnionPay into Europe. This signaling and publicizing of both the sanction and the resolution should been seen as systemic features. Readers of this editorial would also understand that the redemption of Fosun’s CEO, Guo Guangchang, was in stark contrast to the fates of the Hainan and Anbang CEOs, both of whom were sent to prison and saw their corporate empires dismantled. The events of 2017 did not signal a crisis of the CCP Inc. model: the corporate moguls were plausibly guilty of financial manipulation, and an astute owner like Guo Guangchang could be welcomed back into the club of national champions once he displayed sufficient contrition. The threat of coercive action was always in the background and retained its effectiveness because it was only rarely and intermittently deployed.
+
+The “classic” form of CCP Inc. provided important payoffs. The private firms with the greatest technological expertise — including Alibaba, Tencent, and Baidu — were inducted into the national team. Market forces remained strong enough that obviously failed projects could be identified and terminated relatively easily (companies and projects in China go bankrupt when they cannot meet their targets and funders tire of losing money). During 2020, hundreds of failed semiconductor projects were closed down. This commitment to market instruments prevented planners from pouring resources into bottomless pits of failed investments. In short, adherence to norms of restraint made the operations of China’s planners more effective and less costly — and underpinned a generally cooperative relationship between the state and private actors.
+
+Xi Jinping’s bundle of new policies in 2021–22 violated all three of these understandings of implicit restraint. The position of big private companies in China is less secure than it has been since 1989–91. Official spokespeople have issued various veiled and not-so-veiled warnings to Alibaba cofounder Jack Ma that he is not indispensable. This is an abrupt shift from the idea that all companies are Chinese companies and all are members of the national team. As a result, the message is muddied. It is not clear what is demanded from private companies except absolute compliance to the boss’s will. For the first time in recent memory, a company can get in serious trouble for getting too far out ahead of the CCP Inc. program. In political terms, the degree of consensus underlying joint actions by the party and private business has been thoroughly shaken.
+
+___`Xi Jinping’s bundle of new policies in 2021–22 violated all three of these understandings of implicit restraint.`__
+
+The commitment to market-conforming instruments was noticeably absent in the rush of policy. As described earlier, this was perhaps most clearly displayed in the apparent lack of concern when new regulations destroyed billions of dollars of stock market value. But the same indifference was in evidence across the board as policy objectives were rushed forward without any consideration of appropriate instruments to achieve them. Indeed, even designating an appropriate regulatory agency was not thought out in advance, leading to conflicts between two and sometimes three competing agencies. Perhaps the most striking was the sudden adoption of the “common prosperity” narrative without any movement (or even apparent effort) to address the regressive elements in the Chinese tax code. No country has ever achieved common prosperity without a progressive tax code.
+
+In economic terms, the government’s waning commitment to market-conforming instruments is probably the most damaging of the recent “rules changes.” Even as the commitment to industrial policy is becoming broader and more costly, the quality of the information coming back to policymakers is likely to deteriorate. Consider the case of the Little Giants one more time. It is likely that these firms can list on public markets and attract funding. But it is not because of the judgment of investors that these firms are viable or especially productive, but rather because they are known to have policymakers’ imprimatur. It may be an astute shortrun move to buy these stocks, but the purchaser will be looking to dump the shares once the policy-led bubble has peaked. The quality of the information coming from the stock market can only decline. The crucial tacit and informal relations that underpin relations between the state and private business are changing; negative sanctions have become more prominent and are likely to induce more defensive and protective behaviors. The internal relations of CCP Inc. have been weakened.
+
+
+### International Economic Coordination
+
+The case studies carried out as part of this project display abundant evidence of the CCP Inc. ecosystem at work. In the first place, CCP Inc. is clearly prioritizing a variety of concrete strategic goals and achieving them through a diverse “team” of interrelated corporate actors. These strategic goals lie on a spectrum from most to least specific government priority. Argentina’s Espacio Lejano Deep Space Ground Station is tightly subordinated to the Chinese objective of filling a temporal gap in the country’s satellitetracking capabilities and enable further deep space missions. Geography and geopolitics limit the options Chinese policymakers have (since continuous satellite tracking requires a Southern Hemisphere outpost), and the CCP Inc. team delivered a successful project under these highly constrained conditions. In the Greek electricity and Portuguese finance sectors, CCP Inc. mobilized actors to achieve entry into the EU economic zone through peripheral economies (see Section 8). The Greece case also shows strategic action in promoting intercontinental electric-grid connections, a specific program that serves both China’s strategic interests and the specific economic interests of State Grid (one of China’s largest SOEs). In Guinea, China has mobilized various actors to ensure access to a key mineral resource. At the other end of the spectrum, in both Malaysia and Portugal, it has pursued a more diverse set of objectives, in which there is less of a concrete strategy for achieving the broader goal of economic penetration. Dynamic private firms take the lead (as Alibaba did in Malaysia and Fosun in Portugal).
+
+Each of the case studies shows evidence of cooperative behavior among Chinese state-owned, private, and mixed-ownership firms, although to varying degrees. The Malaysia case shows Huawei taking the lead in providing fourth- and fifth-generation telecommunications infrastructure to Malaysia, but also assisting its nominal domestic competitor ZTE to gain a share of government contracts. Alibaba moved forward in Malaysia with multiple business projects, but many of these require close cooperation with Chinese state firms that serve key roles. For both the e-Logistics Park built at the Kuala Lumpur airport and the Smart Cities program rolled out for the city of Kuala Lumpur, Chinese state-owned firms provided crucial hardware (physical infrastructure investment) to complement Alibaba’s software. Indeed, this general pattern is repeatedly demonstrated by CCP Inc.’s international operations: the big Chinese state-owned construction companies play a powerful role in establishing beachheads, building physical infrastructure, and creating conditions for expansion of other Chinese businesses, including private firms. This is evident in state-owned shipping giant COSCO’s investment in the Greek port of Piraeus, which served as a foundational business deal for China’s growing footprint in Greece.
+
+In Portugal, a study of CCP Inc. revealed a less common pattern of a private financial company taking the lead in penetrating a market, then facilitating entry by a broad range of Chinese companies. BCP Millennium, the private bank controlled by China’s Fosun, helped state-owned giant China Three Gorges Corporation take a controlling interest in utility company Energias de Portugal (EDP). However, it is worth noting that BCP Millennium’s financial resources were substantially bolstered by its relationship with Chinese state-owned commercial bank ICBC, with which it signed a memorandum of understanding and which underwrote Fosun’s important insurance policy with Fidelidade in 2014. In turn, BCP Millennium became the first issuer of UnionPay bank cards in Europe, fulfilling a strategic objective of Chinese policymakers — dating back to China’s World Trade Organization accession agreement — to create a domestic and global competitor to Visa and Mastercard.
+
+In all these cases, there is a de facto division of labor between different kinds of public and private firms. In Guinea, the private Hongqiao Group, with its own roots in the state sector, plays a particular kind of bridging role, in a sense, keeping one foot in each camp of public and private. Often, private firms are left to pursue their own profit-oriented projects, while state-owned firms (with their cost competitiveness bolstered by a range of implicit and explicit subsidies) build the physical and financial infrastructure necessary for the realization of those profitable projects.
+
+The cases also show CCP Inc.’s ability to draw on an exceedingly rich and diverse suite of financial channels to support international operations. This abundant financing allowed Chinese state actors to outbid other suitors for strategic assets. This is evident in the case studies, which detail bids for stakes in privatizing electric grids in Greece and insurance businesses in Portugal. This predominantly shows the massive financial power of China’s commercial and policy banks. In other situations, businesses can call on a wide variety of financial conduits, as discussed in Section 4. China’s government guidance funds (GGFs) were important sources of money for overseas acquisitions, including in the United States, where their relatively independent legal status made them subject to fewer suspicions and controls. This has faded since the United States set up a formal process to vet more investments as the nature of GGFs became better known.
+
+Expanding Chinese businesses can call on a wealth of financial channels to carry out their overseas projects. A private firm like Fosun — once it has reestablished its compliance with government objectives — can draw on a wide range of implicit government financial support. Alibaba, a financial powerhouse on its own, does not need direct financial support but does require a friendly regulatory environment so it can move money across China’s borders (something that, for ordinary citizens, is tightly constrained). The benefit of these financial channels lies precisely in their diversity. They attract less attention since many tranches of different types of financing can be mobilized for a strategic initiative, each one seemingly of modest size and well-suited to a specific project. They provide funding in a dizzying variety of forms and at different terms, making it difficult to establish whether the overall terms are favorable and what the total amount of state support is. Finally, the presence of these different financial channels provides implicit insurance to Chinese firms venturing abroad, which have reason to believe that such financing streams exist to support them in the event their overseas business ventures founder.
+
+Much of the cooperation between SOEs and private firms in third-country markets could equally be the result of tacit cooperation: simple strategies of mutual assistance based on common interest and the understanding that superiors will look benevolently on such cooperation. This is easy to achieve when companies are working hand in glove with the government to penetrate new markets. But it should also be clear that the institutional changes described earlier facilitate such cooperation. They make SOEs more disciplined (focused on their assigned tasks); they provide abundant, diverse financing; they make it easier for SOEs and private firms — to say nothing of mixed-ownership firms — to cooperate; and they help nimble private firms explore new market opportunities abroad. These changes in the internal structure of CCP Inc. and the financial institutions available to serve it were initially driven by domestic policy considerations and the desire to shape the domestic economic system. They also inevitably have an impact on international operations. These are not accidental outcomes but rather intentional, hoped-for results of the institutional design process — the purpose of which has been, from the beginning, to enhance the CCP’s ability to effectively steer the system toward priority objectives.
+
+
+### Peripheral Strategies
+
+The institutional design of CCP Inc. might be said to underly a pattern of operations known as a “peripheral strategy.” In a peripheral strategy, CCP Inc. organizations target a relatively small, peripheral market or country, then use the ability to coordinate among affiliated organizations to strengthen their position by “stringing together” operations. It is true that the evidence for this pattern is largely circumstantial; it is difficult to come by direct evidence of coordination. However, there is indirect evidence: China often officially announces initiatives it supports, and (according to case study evidence) these are concentrated in peripheral economies. China’s friendship initiatives with Portuguese-speaking countries comprise one such example, in which Brazil — the most populous Portuguese-speaking country by far — is curiously underemphasized. This diplomatic approach is echoed by other initiatives in which China focuses attention on smaller, relatively weak countries that are more distant from the center of regional affairs (and perhaps unused to such lavish attention). This is obviously true in Southeast Asia, where Cambodia and Laos receive intensive Chinese support while Singapore and Vietnam maintain a much more formal and prickly relationship with China (with Malaysia falling somewhere in between).
+
+Europe is an especially interesting case. China’s peripheral strategy has been incorporated into a formally designated “forum,” the China and Central and Eastern European Countries (China-CEEC) cooperation framework, initially known as 16+1. While the China-CEEC grouping does have a Beijing-based secretariat, it is essentially a noninstitutionalized umbrella concept grouping together countries, each of which is essentially in a hub-and-spoke bilateral relationship with China. (In this, it is like the Belt and Road Initiative, which it pre-dates by one year.)
+
+For the purposes of this study, China-CEEC cooperation is significant because it reflects a peripheral strategy on two levels. First, the forum obviously presents a channel to deepen relations with a set of European countries without dealing with either the EU bureaucracy itself (12 of the 17 historical members, including the most economically significant, are EU members) or the stronger, more advanced countries that dominate EU decisionmaking and foreign policy. Second, the China-CEEC countries receiving special attention have much smaller economies than the EU principals, with significantly lower average GDP per capita; they are far less important economic partners for China than any of the major EU players. The cooperation framework is often considered a challenge to the European Union — even though EU norms clearly encourage a multiplicity of cooperation frameworks — because China seeks to cultivate special relations with weaker partners in a way designed to undermine EU solidarity and collective decisionmaking.
+
+In an additional sense, the China-CEEC framework also facilitates a peripheral strategy because it throws a cloak of common amity over a cluster of very dissimilar bilateral relationships. This provides some cover for the much closer relations that China has with Serbia, Hungary, and Greece than with others in the group, constituting a kind of periphery within the periphery. In early 2022, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine caused a shift in attitudes and diplomacy among all the CEEC countries toward a more pro-Western stance, exemplified by Czechia, which assumed the EU presidency for the second half of 2022. Whether a shrunken China-CEEC framework will survive China’s pro-Russia “neutrality” after the Ukraine invasion remains to be seen. The context of peripheral strategy is important when considering the CCP Inc. case studies examining Greece (a latecomer to the China-CEEC framework) and Portugal (through the Portuguese-speaking country initiative).
+
+A peripheral strategy can also emerge through more complex evolutionary processes. A domestic Chinese business venturing abroad may seek to “test the waters” and learn how to operate in a smaller, less competitive market. With lower stakes, the company’s risk is reduced and assistance from friendly financial institutions is greater. If the approach works in the smaller markets, it can be scaled up in larger, more competitive markets after experience is gained. In addition, peripheral countries are more likely to be under financial stress and less likely to have robust alternatives to Chinese funding that are founded on strong domestic governance. An ironic feature of both the Greece and Portugal case studies is that initial Chinese entry was greatly facilitated by the economic conditions in both countries in the wake of the 2008–10 global financial crisis. Both countries were forced to privatize state-owned utilities to qualify for financial support from the “troika” (the joint action of the International Monetary Fund, European Central Bank, and European Commission). In such an evolutionary process, the periphery emerges as a privileged center of Chinese firms’ attention because of the less demanding nature of business in the peripheral economy, both in terms of market competition and regulatory scrutiny.
+
+#### Electricity Investment as Part of a Peripheral “Going Out” Strategy
+
+Some of these same principles can very clearly be seen at work in the electricity sector — also the subject of the CCP Inc. case study on Greece. Electricity has two characteristics that make it especially interesting. First, all the major Chinese players are state owned, which is generally not the case with other electricity multinationals. However, these state-owned firms seem to seize opportunities created by privatization of public electricity assets abroad. Second, the electricity industry can be divided into generation, transmission, and distribution components. Generation is (potentially) a broadly competitive sector, while transmission is prone to natural monopoly and is thus typically highly regulated. Countries carrying out robust programs of privatization and market regulation usually prevent any company from straddling the boundary by holding assets in both generation and transmission. This is because it is relatively easy for transmission companies to create economic benefits for related parties in the generation business. In China as well, electricity transmission is the monopoly of two state-owned companies, State Grid (in 27 provinces) and Southern Power Grid (in 4 provinces) — which are, in theory, not allowed to hold generation assets. In terms of international operations, non-Chinese electricity multinationals are based in many different countries, but almost all of them are concentrated in the generation subsector. State Grid and China Southern Power Grid, in contrast, tend to invest in transmission and distribution.
+
+Thus, Chinese electricity investment is quite different from that from other countries. The primary entry point has been funding for transmission or distribution in overseas projects. Through its wholly owned subsidiary State Grid International Development Ltd. (SGID), State Grid owns stakes in transmission and/or distribution networks in nine electricity markets: Brazil, the Philippines, Portugal, Australia, Italy, Greece, Oman, Chile, and Hong Kong. State Grid’s trackable overseas investments stand at $28.6 billion, and it self-reports overseas equity of $65 billion. Despite its enormous ambition, it initially limited its overseas investment in electricity generation projects. This was partly because well-regulated economies (such as Chile’s) rigorously police the boundaries between generation and distribution. For these reasons, State Grid initially focused almost exclusively on the acquisition, development, operation, and passive equity investment in transmission and distribution (T&D) assets in liberalized electricity markets.
+
+Yet while State Grid’s investments were initially restricted to T&D, other Chinese state-owned firms have invested in generation. In Chile, four major Chinese electricity SOEs are present, including China Southern Power Grid and State Grid, which has a 57 percent share of electricity distribution. In addition, Chinese state-owned power generator State Power Investment Corporation obtained five operating hydropower plants in Chile (through acquisition of an Australian company) in 2016. In 2018, large hydroelectric developer and operator China Three Gorges Corporation bought an existing Chilean company, giving it control over a range of renewable energy projects in development. This has created fertile ground for additional Chinese manufacturers and developers, such as Jinko Solar and Xinjiang Goldwind, to sell equipment and become actively involved in the engineering and construction of renewable energy projects in Chile. There is no evidence of collusion among these firms, and Chile’s regulatory capacity is comparatively strong. Still, it is impossible to ignore how entry by diverse state and private firms has created a supportive environment for all Chinese enterprises in Chile, giving them collectively a dominant position in the industry.
+
+In Brazil, State Grid has a big presence in electricity transmission through its subsidiary State Grid Brazil Holding, which represents a 12 percent share of Brazil’s total transmission and distribution market. In addition, State Grid has a controlling interest in the publicly listed CPFL Energia, the second-largest private energy company in Brazil. The biggest private energy group in Brazil is Enel (a subsidiary of the Italian “green super-major” company of the same name). State Grid thus controls the third- and twenty-second-largest Brazilian energy companies. The tenth-largest is EDP Brazil, a subsidiary of Energias de Portugal, which in turn is minority owned (but arguably controlled) by China Three Gorges Corporation.
+
+Despite its initial entry strategy and substantial technological expertise in electricity transmission, State Grid seems to be nibbling at the edges of regulatory regimes in numerous countries. State Grid’s ambition of gaining a stake in Greece’s electricity generation sector is a strategic business innovation that also raises various unresolved regulatory issues. Already, as the Portuguese case study makes clear, China Three Gorges Corporation’s stake in EDP gives it access to the largest Portuguese industrial group and one of the largest European players in the electricity sector, operating in 20 countries. Clearly, this participation also skirts the boundary of the regulatory principle of separation between generation and transmission. The entry of Chinese electricity giants often seems to be driven by opportunistic considerations: Liberalized and privatized markets present opportunity, and Chinese firms have the abundant financing to be able to step in as buyers. In so doing, they end up taking positions in some surprising segments, notably transmission and distribution, but also in generation, sometimes carried out by other Chinese state-controlled groups.
+
+
+### Backlash and Coordination Failures in the International Arena
+
+The record of CCP Inc. in the international arena, examined across five case studies, presents some striking patterns. On the one hand, penetration of new markets (particularly in weak, peripheral economies) has been dramatic, surprising, and — at least in some cases — remarkably successful. Chinese firms seem to be very good at identifying new opportunities in developing countries, then exploiting the opportunity with help from other Chinese partners. This implies that foreign governments and businesses should be wary of the colocation of many Chinese firms and track their behavior. This lesson is relevant to the electricity sector discussed above, where unusual patterns of subsector concentration and state-firm clusters can be observed.
+
+At the same time, CCP Inc.’s activities overseas are marked by numerous coordination failures. This should not be surprising. Even with the most sophisticated instruments, it is still difficult to precisely control the actions of hundreds of disparate actors in the service of scores of different strategic objectives. There are two main sets of problems: coordination failures and backlash.
+
+#### Coordination Failures
+
+A persistent weakness in the performance of CCP Inc. is a pattern of overpromising but underdelivering state aid in infrastructure construction. In many countries, there is a sense that China promised substantial help for major projects that never materialized. This is certainly true in the CEEC, where — despite high hopes — significant investments have been modest in countries besides Greece, Serbia, and Hungary (even though most of these countries are also Belt and Road affiliates). Even in Greece, promises of investment and project development across the energy sector have not been fully realized, creating a pattern of underperformance that cannot be explained solely by EU pushback against Chinese influence in critical sectors. More examples can be found in Central America, where a wide range of ambitious projects have fallen through, including for high-speed railways in Costa Rica and Mexico and canals in Nicaragua and Panama. Similarly, in Guinea, Chinese companies failed to meet promised development timelines for the country’s massive Simandou ironore mine, even as the same players logged successes in other mining ventures.
+
+These outcomes highlight that CCP Inc. is a vast economic entity composed of a range of heterogeneous actors with different short-run incentives. The agencies promising are not generally the same as the ones delivering; firms that are expected to deliver certain results will refuse or stall if they anticipate suffering significant losses. To be sure, the CCP leadership can induce — or compel — those actors to work in concert in the highest-priority cases, but it can only exercise this kind of explicit and particularized control in times of need. In other situations, it needs to rely on implicit cooperation and internalization of strategic objectives or simply on mutual interest and understanding of the broader rules of the game. Indeed, the part of the system that is theoretically most subject to direct state control — the provision of subsidized infrastructure projects by government development banks — is actually an area where coordination and follow-through appear to be relatively weak. In some respects, it is easier for CCP Inc. to discipline and steer Fosun than it is to discipline State Grid. Fosun is more vulnerable, and its owners have more at stake; State Grid is an indispensable and highly resourced part of the national system. State Grid’s individual leaders and managers can be disciplined, but that will not necessarily bring the organization as a whole under control. Coordination is not necessarily easier when people are in direct command relationships, as the outcomes of innumerable government and military operations throughout human history clearly show. The concrete coordination needed delivering specific state projects may in fact be a weakness of the CCP Inc. system.
+
+___`The CCP leadership can induce — or compel — those actors to work in concert in the highest-priority cases, but it can only exercise this kind of explicit and particularized control in times of need. In other situations, it needs to rely on implicit cooperation and internalization of strategic objectives or simply on mutual interest and understanding of the broader rules of the game.`___
+
+#### Backlash
+
+Activity by CCP Inc. firms often leads to a backlash in host countries. This theme of wariness about state connections was evident across this project’s case studies examining CCP Inc. in Malaysia, Greece, Portugal, and Argentina. Coordination among these firms and their local allies has become a red flag to many countries. Suspicion leads them to stall and sometimes cancel CCP Inc. initiatives.
+
+- GLOBAL PUSHBACK
+
+Pushback has impacted projects differently, depending largely on host-government relationships with China versus their relationships with the United States and European Union. In Greece and Portugal, EU concerns about China’s reach — particularly in Greece’s electricity grid — served as a counterweight to Greek and Portuguese efforts to pursue China as a needed financier of infrastructure and privatization projects. In the Argentina and Malaysia case studies, U.S. concerns about the expansion of CCP Inc. affected the prospects of Chinese projects. In Malaysia, this arose in the form of pushback against Huawei, which ended up limiting the telecom giant’s global operations in countries that were more closely aligned with the United States. In Argentina, both U.S. and Argentinian protests clouded the construction of the Espacio Lejano Deep Space Ground Station, which was marked by Chinese military ties and secrecy around terms of use. Moreover, Argentine startup Satellogic, a leading private-owned purveyor of satellite imagery, pivoted away from partnerships with Chinese firms in favor of ones with U.S. firms, likely driven by an understanding that it would need to do so to remain eligible for Western defense and intelligence contracts. The variation among cases clearly shows that there is a global backlash against Chinese collusive behavior led by developed nations, including the United States and the large EU countries.
+
+- LOCAL PUSHBACK
+
+All politics are local. Backlash has a significant impact in host countries, based on their specific domestic politics. Idiosyncratic power relations create unpredictable dynamics that often make CCP Inc. ties a political liability — even when they provide economic assets. Since CCP Inc. actors are often unfamiliar with local politics and generally have little expertise and no experience understanding democratic processes, they are often clumsy in handling these relations. In many cases, including those represented in the CCP Inc. case study reports, charges of corruption linked to discomfort over close ties with Chinese actors have led to the fall of governments. Most spectacularly, the 60-year reign of the United Malays National Organization was brought to a crashing end in 2018 by corruption charges against Prime Minister Najib Razak, leading to the party’s electoral loss that year. While Razak’s worst corrupt act was looting the 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) state investment fund, allegations that Malaysia overpaid for Chinese infrastructure projects in return for kickbacks to politicians figured prominently in the election. In Malaysia, the pushback was predominantly based on local issues, and Razak’s successor promptly negotiated substantial reductions in the price Malaysia was paying for Chinese projects.
+
+A similar pattern is evident in many democratic countries. Out-of-power parties make nontransparent China ties an issue in electoral campaigns, which does seem to help them in cases where they displace the governing party. This was likely true in Argentina in 2015, when Mauricio Macri (temporarily) ousted the regime of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner and Alberto Fernández. Other countries in Latin America, including Panama and Costa Rica, have experienced similar dynamics. Sri Lanka’s spectacular economic crisis has been brought on in part by unstable alternation between political parties who have made ties with China a central issue. In Africa, the multidimensional Chinese economic presence often creates political backlash, as in Zambia, where politicians have rallied anti-China sentiment as a populist strategy across multiple election cycles. Each of these cases, however, displays very particular — even idiosyncratic — patterns linked to the local exercise of political power and the types of interest groups that wield influence.
+
+Nondemocratic countries — and fragile democracies — can also pose challenges to CCP Inc. because of the complexity of interests at play. In Guinea, Beijing’s close ally President Alpha Condé was deposed in a military coup in 2021, and Chinese efforts to develop the Simandou iron-ore mine were stalled by the new military government, which took issue with failures to meet promised development timelines. Concerns about the state-commercial connectivity of CCP Inc. did not feature as an explicit, public issue in Guinea, but CCP Inc. nevertheless had to make an adjustment to the new post-coup structure of power, which took time and resources. So while the ecosystem faced less scrutiny linked to Western concerns about China’s international reach, CCP Inc. in Guinea had to handle a different set of challenges tied to poor governance.
+
+- REBOUND FROM BACKLASH
+
+Despite major losses caused by local pushback, CCP Inc. has shown great resilience and an ability to rebound from these reversals. In Malaysia, for example, after Razak’s 2018 defeat, former prime minister Mahathir Mohamad assumed power. Mohamad succeeded in reducing the price of several Chinese infrastructure projects, notably the Kuala Lumpur–Singapore high-speed railway, but also promptly resumed business relations with Alibaba, sealed with a friendly visit to Hangzhou to visit Jack Ma. Political instability has continued in Malaysia through the November 24, 2022, appointment of Anwar Ibrahim as prime minister, so it is difficult to make firm conclusions. However, it appears that new leaders have strong incentives to ignore past tensions and normalize relations with China. CCP Inc. is quite capable of providing individualized goods for the new leaders, just as they did with the old, and perhaps in less conspicuous and blatantly illegal forms.
+
+A similar dynamic was visible in Argentina. Despite Macri’s anti-China rhetoric ahead of his election in 2015, his policies quickly assumed a less hostile stance. China’s deep space ground station was built and continues to operate today. Moreover, after the return of a Fernández-led government in 2019, Chinese-Argentine economic relations are again gaining momentum, buoyed by Argentina signing on to the BRI, as well as a new spate of major bilateral infrastructure deals and even discussion of allowing Argentina to join the BRICS grouping. The different outcomes underline that potential coordination among CCP Inc. firms and state actors is only a red flag in certain contexts, highly dependent on the state of political relations with China. Similar sequences were evident in Panama and Costa Rica, where new leadership groups promptly moderated their critical rhetoric and resumed cooperation with China. CCP Inc. policymakers seem to understand this process reasonably well. They adopt flexible, short-run policies, then wait for relations to resume.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+This report has made clear that CCP Inc. refers to a fundamental set of institutional arrangements for managing and steering the Chinese economy. These arrangements are novel and different enough from previous ones to warrant a new label; this project proposes “CCP Inc.” The report has also shown that important changes in the CCP Inc. model have occurred in the past few years, following a consistent logic of strengthening the CCP’s direct control over state actors, diversifying available instruments of influence, and increasing indirect controls over private actors. Despite heightening the party’s capabilities, the changes have, on balance, increased the challenges faced by CCP Inc. decisionmakers and perhaps made the model less effective. There is more risk and less certainty or unity of purpose among the constituent actors of CCP Inc. Information flows about economic actions are less smooth and provide less useful information. There is an unusually high level of policy uncertainty in China today and an increased global (and local) backlash against its activities. These changes suggest that the CCP Inc. system will be less efficient and face more obstacles going forward.
+
+This lower efficiency, however, is complemented by party leaders’ greater ambition. CCP Inc. has committed to an even more ambitious form of industrial policy and to achieving technological self-reliance. The way the Russian invasion of Ukraine has intensified the global East–West split has put new pressure on Chinese activities worldwide. This will undoubtedly have an enduring impact in Europe, destroying China’s peripheral strategy among Eastern and Central European states. Paradoxically, it will also intensify China’s global peripheral strategy because most developing countries have declined to join the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries in their effort to isolate Russia and will continue to be receptive to Chinese overtures. Presumably, China will seek to establish deeper and more intimate ties with a range of developing countries, going beyond its initial market penetration to establish more mature trading and investment relationships. This will require greater coordination among diplomats and development banks, areas that (paradoxically, as noted above) have not been strong in the past. The coming phases will provide new tests as well as new opportunities for CCP Inc.
+
+As Xi Jinping continues to amplify rhetoric of national greatness — which he has used to support his selection to a third consecutive term as president — he is likely to resume assertive diplomacy and initiatives as the postCovid-19 world reduces barriers. Flexibility and adaptability are potential strengths of the CCP Inc. system, but it remains unclear whether policymakers have the will to roll back damaging, overassertive policies and then commit to the long-term, patient investment of policy resources required to reestablish lost credibility. It may be easier for them to simply continue to swing into direct command-and-control techniques — despite the damage to economic performance this implies.
+
+CCP Inc.’s challenge to the rules-based international order is undiminished. China seeks not only to maintain and expand the trade and investment flows tying it to the rest of the world, but also to ensure that those links incorporate more Chinese bargaining power and contribute to national security and economic interests. China seeks to be part of more bilateral relationships in which it has the upper hand and to participate in more production networks in which it controls the scarce links with prized technologies. This is a recipe for increased tension with many economic partners since it downplays the benefits of market-driven production networks, while security considerations spread to previously ordinary economic relationships. To make matters worse, there is every indication that China will defend these new concepts within the international organizations in which it plays an important role. CCP Inc. is constantly reformulating itself and adapting to changing internal and external demands. In turn, this steady self-reformulation reveals tensions and contradictions but also requires a deepened understanding of this formidable economic system.
+
+---
+
+__Barry Naughton__ is the So Kwanlok Chair of Chinese International Affairs at the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies at the University of California, San Diego. Naughton is an authority on the Chinese economy, with an emphasis on issues relating to industry, trade, finance, and China’s transition to a market economy. Recent research focuses on regional economic growth in the PRC and the relationship between foreign trade and investment and regional growth. He is also completing a general textbook on the Chinese economy. Recently completed projects have focused on Chinese trade and technology, in particular, the relationship between the development of the electronics industry in China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, and the growth of trade and investment among those economies.
+
+__Briana Boland__ is a research associate for the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), supporting the program’s research on party-state governance and evolving political discourse in China. Prior to joining CSIS, Briana worked as a political risk analyst at Dentons, where she researched China’s economic policy and shifting trends in U.S.-China relations for firm leadership and international clients. She holds a BA in international studies with minors in economics and Chinese language from Fordham University.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-01-uk-asean-relations.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-01-uk-asean-relations.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..783e4a87
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-01-uk-asean-relations.md
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : UK–ASEAN Relations
+author: Laura Southgate
+date : 2023-02-01 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/C89bWTQ.jpg
+image_caption: "HMS Queen Elizabeth at Changi Naval Base in Singapore, October 2021."
+description: "The UK seems to recognise the important role of Southeast Asia in the wider region’s geopolitics."
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_The UK has adopted a ‘Global Britain’ foreign policy strategy since the 2016 Brexit. This policy seeks to maintain the UK’s standing internationally while strengthening existing global relations. UK relations with Southeast Asia and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) form an important component of this new policy._
+
+
+
+This article examines the achievements made in deepening engagement between the UK and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) since the publication of the UK’s Integrated Review in 2021. It assesses the obstacles that are impeding greater cooperation, and argues that the UK has achieved significant success in enhancing UK–ASEAN relations by adopting a position of trusted extra-regional power in Southeast Asia. In a 2021 ‘State of Southeast Asia’ survey canvassing the opinions of ASEAN policymakers, academics, researchers, businesses and civil society activists, the UK came in sixth as most ‘preferred and trusted strategic partner’ for ASEAN to hedge against the uncertainties of the US–China strategic rivalry. The UK also replaced New Zealand and Russia as preferred strategic partner for Southeast Asia in the event of US unreliability. In 2022, the UK strengthened its position as preferred strategic partner, overtaking South Korea and India to claim fourth place. The UK also ranked joint sixth as ‘the most influential economic power in Southeast Asia’ and joint fifth as country with the ‘most political and strategic influence’, after failing to rank under either metric in 2021. This is indicative of the future role regional states envision for the UK in Southeast Asia. This analysis suggests ways in which the UK can capitalise on these growing sentiments.
+
+A UK security presence can promote stability in Southeast Asia. This will help the UK to achieve its aims of upholding an open international order and maintaining access to vital international trade routes, while supporting the autonomy of regional allies. The UK can also leverage the advantages offered by its recent Dialogue Partner status to gain membership of other multilateral forums, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), in addition to formalising economic relations through regional trade partnerships. As Dialogue Partner, the UK gains deeper access to ASEAN and its other dialogue partners, in addition to enhanced practical cooperation in areas of mutual economic and political interest. Dialogue Partner status benefits the UK by providing it with a voice at Indo-Pacific security and defence forums, helping the UK to strengthen bilateral relations with forum members, which could then be used as a stepping-stone to greater economic cooperation. Further success in these areas is dependent on several factors. In the security realm, regional states will be looking to the UK to help mitigate, rather than exacerbate, US–China security competition. Economically, ASEAN’s recent success finalising the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) means that it now has access to the world’s largest free trade zone. ASEAN can therefore enter any future trade negotiations with the UK from a position of strength. Critically, the states of Southeast Asia will be looking for a sustained UK commitment to the region that upholds and respects ASEAN centrality in Southeast Asia. The challenge for the UK will be meeting these expectations while securing its own interests in a region of geostrategic importance.
+
+
+### UK Relations in Southeast Asia: An Overview
+
+The UK began to seek closer relations with the Asia-Pacific region during the 2010–15 Coalition government led by David Cameron. The 2015 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review committed to strengthening security and prosperity partnerships throughout Asia. It recognised that the region presents ‘significant economic opportunities for the UK, and considerable influence on the future integrity and credibility of the rules-based international order’. In a 2012 speech in Malaysia, then Prime Minister Cameron heralded a new era in UK–Southeast Asia relations, stating that the ‘era of benign neglect is over’. The statement coincided with UK accession to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, the regional organisation’s legally binding code for inter-state relations. The government’s Asia-focused strategy gained significant momentum following the Brexit referendum in 2016. Then Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson announced: ‘Britain is back East of Suez’ in a speech in December 2016. In the referendum’s wake, the UK announced a ‘Global Britain’ strategy that ‘intended to signal that the UK will … continue to be open, inclusive and outward facing’ to respond to global challenges in an ‘increasingly complex, interconnected and volatile world’.
+
+ASEAN and Southeast Asia are a critical component of the UK’s ‘tilt’ to the Indo-Pacific, as explained in the government’s 2021 Integrated Review. The strategy confirms that ‘the Indo-Pacific region matters to the UK: it is critical to our economy, our security and our global ambition’. As part of this strategy, the UK will ‘adapt to the regional balance of power and respect the interests of others’ while seeking ‘to work with existing structures such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’. The UK confirms a strategic approach that uses ASEAN as a vehicle to enhance relations with its 10 member states. It also capitalises on areas of mutual interest, citing a deep commitment to multilateralism and a desire to work with existing bodies such as ASEAN to strengthen institutions and the international order.
+
+Prior to Brexit, the UK’s relationship with ASEAN was mediated through the EU; an independent relationship is vital following the country’s exit from the EU. ASEAN’s rapid growth and young workforce make it an area of significant opportunity for UK businesses and investors. The states that constitute ASEAN vary significantly economically, politically and culturally. There are vast differences in wealth across the group – Singapore and Laos are both ASEAN member states. Despite these disparities, all member states have experienced significant growth since 2000. ASEAN is the world’s fifth largest economy. In 2020 it had a combined GDP of US$3 trillion and population of 661.8 million. Its total merchandise trade has multiplied by over 3.5 times, reaching more than US$2.6 trillion in 2020. Southeast Asia also has growing geostrategic significance. It is the site of great power security competition between the US and a rising China, and heightened maritime tensions in the South China Sea, both of which have destabilised the international order.
+
+
+### UK Strategic Plans and Successes
+
+The UK began to prioritise a greater regional presence in Southeast Asia post-Brexit. This included the establishment of a British Defence Staff in Singapore in 2016, a regional trade commissioner based in Singapore from 2018, a dedicated ambassador to ASEAN in 2019 and new trade deals signed with Singapore and Vietnam in 2020. Trade reviews have also been conducted with Indonesia and Thailand, with a view to future bilateral agreements. A September 2021 Joint Ministerial Declaration on Future Economic Cooperation between ASEAN and the UK identified areas for future cooperation. These included: Covid-19 economic recovery; UK–ASEAN supply chains and maintaining open markets; regulatory frameworks and standards; digital innovation; sustainable growth; skills and education; and public–private sector partnership. A programme of extensive economic cooperation raises the possibility of a future UK–ASEAN free trade agreement (FTA), something that the EU has been attempting to implement, unsuccessfully, since 2007. A UK–ASEAN FTA does not appear to be a current priority for the regional bloc, however. This is likely due to its focus on establishing RCEP, the world’s largest free trade zone that covers a third of world trade. The UK formally applied to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) in February 2021, of which four ASEAN states are currently members. If successful, it may also seek deeper engagement or accession to RCEP. However, the UK is not currently prioritising RCEP. In a UK Parliament debate in the Lords Chamber, the RCEP was described as ‘a much shallower and less significant partnership than the CPTPP’. The CPTPP was cited as a priority for the UK, representing a ‘significantly deeper agreement that will set standards globally in a large number of areas’.
+
+Frameworks for greater UK–ASEAN relations also include becoming an ASEAN Dialogue Partner ‘to work together on global challenges, support ASEAN’s central role in regional stability and prosperity and enable sustainable development in South East Asia’. The UK was granted Dialogue Partner status in August 2021. The Dialogue Partnership with the UK was the first to be concluded in 25 years, paving the way for cooperation on trade, investment, climate change, the environment, technology and education. Following its application to become Dialogue Partner, the UK foreign secretary attended two UK–ASEAN Ministerial Meetings and hosted the ASEAN Chair at the G7 Foreign and Development Ministers meeting in May 2021. As Dialogue Partner, ASEAN will expect the UK to help to fund and support joint projects and commit funding and technical support for ASEAN initiatives. The UK can also use its Dialogue Partner status to increase its multilateral engagement with ASEAN through participation in the ARF and the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus). Membership of these forums is not guaranteed, requiring the approval of all states and a lift on the moratorium on new members. The UK applied for ADMM-Plus Experts Working Groups (EWGs) observer status in 2018, although this was vetoed by Russia and China. As part of an August 2022 Plan of Action to implement UK Dialogue Partnership, the UK will explore UK engagement with the ADMM-Plus, including where it can add value to EWGs through proposed observer programmes.
+
+The UK already had a modest security presence in Southeast Asia prior to its exit from the EU. This included a permanent military presence in ASEAN members Brunei and Singapore, and membership of the 1971 Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) pact alongside Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore. The UK regularly participates in joint FPDA exercises, including one hosted by Singapore in August 2021 designed to enhance interoperability between the five members. Post-Brexit, the UK aims to strengthen Indo-Pacific ‘defence and security cooperation, including in maritime security’. In a March 2021 Defence Command Paper, the UK government committed itself to a more ‘proactive … persistent presence’ in regions of interest, including the Indo-Pacific. The UK has enhanced its security presence in the region to achieve this goal, providing counter-terrorism expertise to Southeast Asian security and law enforcement agencies, and establishing a regional counterterrorism and extremism unit at its High Commission in Kuala Lumpur.
+
+Security cooperation with ASEAN member states has paved the way for greater UK power projection in Southeast Asia. On 24 July 2021, HMS Richmond undertook an exercise with the Royal Thai Navy. In April 2021 HMS Queen Elizabeth, along with a UK carrier strike group comprising 10 warships, began its first operational deployment in Asia and the contested waters of the South China Sea. Defence Secretary Ben Wallace said: ‘When our Carrier Strike Group sets sail next month, it will be flying the flag for Global Britain – projecting our influence, signalling our power, [and] engaging with our friends’. The Carrier Strike Group is an important demonstration of the UK’s tilt. Engagements with ASEAN members including Brunei, Cambodia, Vietnam and Thailand show a commitment to regional security and Southeast Asian allies. UK security policy in Southeast Asia supports US strategy for the region. Like the US, the UK has an interest in maintaining freedom of navigation for international trade through the region’s waters and upholding an international order in Asia. Maritime activities will include training and capacity-building for regional states, humanitarian and disaster relief operations, and UK power projection.
+
+
+### Obstacles, Challenges and the View from ASEAN
+
+The ASEAN states have navigated different power configurations in Southeast Asia since the end of the Cold War, implementing strategies that allow them to coexist among the great powers, while resisting hostile balance-of-power politics. They have achieved some success in this regard by adopting a strategy that combines some elements of great power acceptance through collaboration or partnership with some power rejection, particularly with regards to formalised security and defence cooperation. By adopting this strategy, ASEAN has been able to pursue greater regional integration, while ‘embarking on an ambitious economic and diplomatic effort to give regional actors a stake in regional cooperation, growth and stability’. Growing geopolitical competition in Southeast Asia has strained ASEAN’s ability to hedge between the great powers. As a result of China’s increasingly assertive behaviour in areas such as the South China Sea, US President Joe Biden has called on regional allies in Southeast Asia to help counter China’s influence. This increased competition has given new impetus to the UK–ASEAN relationship. ASEAN’s desire to maintain the status quo in Southeast Asia through a non-aligned strategy has coincided with the UK’s desire to re-engage with the Indo-Pacific.
+
+In light of these geopolitical considerations, ASEAN ultimately welcomes greater cooperation with the UK in areas of mutual interest. The UK is ASEAN’s 12th largest trading partner and sixth largest source of foreign direct investment. A UK Mission to ASEAN looks to extend UK soft power into the region by working with member state embassies to deepen engagement and explore new political-security, economic and socio-cultural collaboration. The UK is also engaging with ASEAN on the region’s post-Covid-19 pandemic recovery through an ASEAN–UK Troika Dialogue. Troika dialogues consist of meetings between ASEAN and UK ministers with the aim of developing friendly relations and holding mutually beneficial discussions. As part of the troika, Singaporean Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishan ‘reiterated Singapore’s strong and consistent support for the UK’s continued engagement of ASEAN post-Brexit’. The UK benefits from regional champions that support a UK presence in Southeast Asia. It will need to develop bilateral relations beyond historic allies such as Singapore, Malaysia and Brunei if it is to be fully accepted into the region. Strengthening relations with Indonesia will be crucial in this regard. ASEAN’s most populous country has traditionally been viewed as de facto leader of ASEAN, in addition to being a secular democracy. Recognising the importance of Indonesia for Southeast Asia, the UK unveiled a UK–Indonesia Partnership Roadmap in 2022 to deepen relations by 2030. Stronger relations with Vietnam are also important, as Asia’s fastest growing economy and one of the ASEAN states under threat in the South China Sea. UK–Vietnam engagement has increased significantly in recent years. Vietnam supported British membership in regional diplomatic and economic blocs such as ASEAN and the CPTPP. Both agreed a joint refreshed strategic partnership agreement in September 2020. They have also strengthened trade partnership through a Joint Economic and Trade Committee in 2022.
+
+The achievement of Dialogue Partner status is testament to UK–ASEAN deepening engagement. It is likely the UK will seek an FTA with the bloc, in addition to bilateral FTAs with ASEAN member states. As noted by Jürgen Haacke and John Harley Breen, ‘building a formal relationship may be a pre-requisite for strong and effective UK-ASEAN relations in the future and could affect the extent to which HMG [Her Majesty’s Government] is able to promote the interests of UK business in the region’. Formalising an FTA with ASEAN will come with significant challenges, however. These include navigating disparities in intra-ASEAN development, managing member state protectionist policies and foreign ownership restrictions, and tackling issues of democracy and governance considering the dubious human rights records of some ASEAN member states. ASEAN’s recent success with RCEP means it may also be less receptive to an FTA with the UK. ASEAN ‘will likely bargain hard and press Britain to make certain concessions in exchange for its greater access into their markets. ASEAN members’ demands may be too much for Britain to accept’.
+
+UK admission to additional ASEAN-led institutions such as the ARF or East Asia Summit may also impact the regional power balance. Ian Storey and Hoang Thi Ha argue that ‘admission of the UK is seen as tipping the balance in favour of the US and its allies and partners within these mechanisms’, a point that risks antagonising China. This makes the 2020 announcement of a trilateral security pact between Australia, the UK and the US (AUKUS) for the Indo-Pacific region a potential challenge for Southeast Asia and ASEAN. AUKUS has exposed the lack of common interests and threat perceptions within the regional organisation. The Indonesian Foreign Ministry stated it was ‘very concerned about the continued arms race and projection of power in the region’. This view was shared by the Malaysian Prime Minister Ismail Sabri Yaakob, who feared it would ‘provoke other powers to act more aggressively in the region, especially in the South China Sea’. Despite a risk-averse approach to AUKUS, both Malaysia and Indonesia have continued to pursue closer relations with the UK. The UK has also solidified its position as a trusted extra-regional power as shown in the 2022 Southeast Asia survey. This suggests that AUKUS has not unduly damaged regional perceptions of the UK, particularly among ASEAN internal actors. Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong welcomed the AUKUS arrangement by stating that it would ‘contribute constructively to the peace and stability of the region and complement the regional architecture’. The Philippines’ Rodrigo Duterte was similarly positive in September 2021, stating ‘the enhancement of a near abroad ally’s ability to project power should restore and keep the balance rather than destabilize it’. Despite AUKUS members vocalising their support for ASEAN and its central role in the region, there is a fear that AUKUS risks undermining ASEAN centrality in favour of externally driven security arrangements.
+
+The UK’s ability to commit the necessary resources for a permanent security presence in Asia has also been questioned. For Storey, ‘the UK’s strategic focus will remain on the Euro-Atlantic area, and especially the requirement to respond to an increasingly assertive Russia’. This argument is particularly salient following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The counterargument is that the UK has other methods of upholding security in the Euro-Atlantic region, including nuclear deterrence, land-based missile systems and fast naval power redeployment if necessary. As such, there does not need to be a trade-off between maintaining a security presence in the Indo-Pacific and the Euro-Atlantic. Southeast Asia has been broadly receptive to an increased UK security presence due to deteriorating US–China relations and increased great power security competition. As Lynn Kuok observes, the states of Southeast Asia view a greater UK security presence as a means to ‘maintain the balance of power, take the edge off US–China rivalry and expand the region’s strategic options’. This includes training on security and maritime law to help regional states assert their maritime rights, building domestic and regional capabilities to support regional states in combating transnational organised crime, and cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear technology.
+
+However, this optimism was tempered by ‘lingering doubts about the UK’s staying power in the region’ caused by the economic impact for the UK of Brexit and the Covid-19 pandemic. While it is hoped that the UK may help to mitigate security competition in Asia and assist regional states in hedging the great powers, the announcement of AUKUS and China’s response risk inflaming, rather than diffusing, regional tensions.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+UK economic, diplomatic and security commitments towards Southeast Asia are a notable post-Brexit success story. The UK’s Dialogue Partner status with ASEAN is a significant diplomatic achievement, which can pave the way for greater integration and entry into regional multilateral forums. Regional power projection through the UK Carrier Strike Group has been largely welcomed by ASEAN states due to increasing US–China tensions and ongoing sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea. Economically, the UK’s assistance in regional
+
+Covid-19 recovery and funding for ASEAN projects and initiatives benefits the region while allowing the UK access to a dynamic and growing market. This has resulted in the UK adopting a ‘preferred and trusted strategic partner’ status for ASEAN members.
+
+The next step for the UK is to flesh out its relationship with ASEAN through joint projects and diplomatic negotiations. The UK and ASEAN share several areas of mutual interest, including a respect for multilateralism and the international, open order, and a desire to maintain stability in Southeast Asia. There are areas of divergence however, including differing perspectives on governance, democracy and human rights. The challenge for the UK is to balance its core economic, security and political interests in Asia against those of ASEAN. The UK can overcome these challenges through soft power initiatives and practical economic support for humanitarian projects and infrastructure in the region. Examples include support for Covid-19 recovery, including the donation of vaccines, grants and funding to promote education, arts and cultural exchanges, UK investment in renewable energy sources and capacity-building for clean transport and urbanisation, and funding and provision of humanitarian assistance in the wake of natural disasters.
+
+The greater challenge will be navigating US–China security competition and the UK’s position within the existing balance of power. As an ally of the US and a member of AUKUS, the UK risks destabilising UK–China relations and upsetting those ASEAN members that support China or favour regional neutrality. The UK can allay regional fears by focusing on regional state maritime capacity-building and cooperation, freedom of navigation, and peaceful maritime dispute resolution. There is significant potential for the UK to capitalise on its existing success to achieve deeper integration with ASEAN and Southeast Asia. This will be predicated on a sustained commitment of diplomatic, economic and security resources to the region. Of these, funding initiatives will be particularly welcomed by ASEAN, in addition to the UK’s vocal support for ASEAN centrality in Southeast Asia.
+
+---
+
+__Laura Southgate__ is a Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at Aston University, UK, where she specialises in Southeast Asian regional security, Southeast Asian regionalism and international relations theory. Her monograph on ASEAN Resistance to Sovereignty Violation was published by Bristol University Press in 2019.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-02-the-inhospitable-sea.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-02-the-inhospitable-sea.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..5448cec0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-02-the-inhospitable-sea.md
@@ -0,0 +1,250 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : The Inhospitable Sea
+author: Lisa Aronsson and Jeffrey Mankoff
+date : 2023-02-02 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/WWaPYvf.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "The Inhospitable Sea: Toward a New U.S. Strategy for the Black Sea Region"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_The Black Sea region (BSR) has become a central fault line in the strategic competition between Russia and the West. It is also the crossroads for a security space that encompasses the South Caucasus, eastern Mediterranean, Middle East, and the Western Balkans and an important transit node between Europe and Asia._ _While some of the littoral states have secured NATO and European Union membership, all are to varying degrees caught in the middle of the unfolding strategic competition between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic West. Even before Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the growth of Russian military power and political influence in and around the Black Sea posed a significant threat to regional security, including that of NATO allies and partners. Having failed in its initial goal of overrunning Ukraine entirely or ousting its government, Russia’s aims during the present war have included attempting to consolidate control over Ukraine’s Donbas region, seizing control of Ukraine’s coastal regions, demoralizing the rest of Ukraine, and achieving wider political and military dominance over the BSR._
+
+The war in Ukraine is forcing the United States and NATO to devote more attention to the region, one which NATO secretary general Jens Stoltenberg recognized has “vital strategic importance” to the alliance. Yet the United States cannot assume a robust NATO or EU strategy, nor can it rely on the littoral states (or other Western NATO allies) to restore the balance of power and open lines of communication in the BSR. With China seen as the United States’ pacing challenge in the Indo-Pacific, an updated U.S. Black Sea strategy will be resource constrained, and its objectives will likely be defined by regional allies and partners’ perspectives. Based on field work throughout the Black Sea region, the authors conclude that an effective U.S. strategy should
+
+- further strengthen the U.S. presence across the region through force deployments, weapons sales, investments, and diplomatic engagements;
+
+- bolster NATO’s eastern front while enhancing flexible and “minilateral” cooperation among allies and partners, including with Ukraine;
+
+- seek a new equilibrium with the region’s most potent ally, Turkey, while reassuring other regional states worried about Turkish ambitions;
+
+- prioritize democratic resilience among vulnerable frontline states inside and outside of NATO; and
+
+- support and secure projects to enhance regional connectivity that bypass Russia.
+
+
+_▲ __The Greater Black Sea Region.___
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+The Black Sea region (BSR) has become a central fault line in the strategic competition between Russia and the West. It is also the crossroads for a security space that encompasses the South Caucasus, eastern Mediterranean, Middle East, and the Western Balkans and an important transit node between Europe and Asia. Abutting North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey, partner states Georgia and Ukraine, and an increasingly aggressive and revisionist Russia, the Black Sea remains vitally important for security and stability both in and beyond southeastern Europe. Along with the wider BSR — which also includes nearby Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova — it has been deeply fragmented since the collapse of the Soviet Union. While some of the littoral states have secured NATO and European Union membership, all are to varying degrees caught in the middle of the unfolding strategic competition between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic West. And as Maximillian Hess points out, “an astonishing ten wars have taken place on or near the Black Sea littoral since the end of the Cold War, more than any other maritime space in the world” — including the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine.
+
+Even before Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the growth of Russian military power and political influence in and around the Black Sea posed a significant threat to regional security, including that of NATO allies and partners. Before Russia began its full-scale invasion, Moscow was seeking a “new nautical sphere of influence” by way of its upgraded Black Sea Fleet and maritime claims. Having failed in its initial goal of overrunning Ukraine entirely or ousting its government, Russia’s aims during the present war have included attempting to consolidate control over Ukraine’s Donbas region, seizing control of Ukraine’s coastal regions, demoralizing the rest of Ukraine, and achieving wider political and military dominance over the BSR. By mid-2022, Russia’s invasion and blockade of Ukrainian ports disrupted half of Ukraine’s exports both within the United States and in NATO leading to sharp rises in food and energy prices in Europe and fears of famine in parts of Africa. Ukraine’s anti-ship and coastal defense capabilities have exacted a toll on Russia’s Black Sea Fleet: sinking the cruiser Moskva, the fleet’s flagship; forcing the withdrawal of the fleet’s submarines; and bottling up many of the remaining platforms in port. However, Russia retains the capacity to strike targets on land and impede navigation at sea, while Russian strategic ambitions in and around the Black Sea remain unchanged.
+
+The expansion of Russian influence has implications for international security and the global economy more broadly. As Ukraine fights for its survival, Moldova, Georgia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey all worry about the potential for future Russian aggression. They nevertheless maintain widely diverging perspectives on the conflict and relations with Moscow. Turkey remains committed to working with Russia despite their strategic competition in multiple regions, and Bulgaria faces significant Russian malign influence in its economy, media, and political system, as in different ways do Georgia, Romania, and Moldova. Regional NATO partners are vulnerable to Russian military aggression and remain uncertain about the extent of NATO’s commitment to their security. Many also suffer from domestic weaknesses that constrain cooperation with the United States, NATO, and the European Union. The Black Sea exists, moreover, along the seams between regional and functional structures within both United States and in NATO. In part because of these cleavages, the Black Sea has rarely been a top-level priority for either. The U.S. 2022 National Defense Strategy, for instance, does not prioritize the BSR, and U.S. strategic objectives in the region remain unspecified.
+
+The war in Ukraine is forcing the United States and NATO to devote more attention to the region, one which NATO secretary general Jens Stoltenberg recognized has “vital strategic importance” to the alliance. At an extraordinary summit in March 2022, the NATO allies agreed to reset their “longer-term deterrence and defense posture across all domains, land, sea, air, cyber and space,” increase support for Ukraine, and deploy four new multinational battlegroups to the region — in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia. At the June 2022 summit, NATO adopted a new Strategic Concept, which identified Russia as the “most significant and direct threat to allies” and updated its core tasks accordingly. Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoană described a “broader competition between revisionist and brutal and aggressive Russia and our democratic world” around the Black Sea.
+
+In July 2022, U.S. senators Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH) and Mitt Romney (R-UT) introduced legislation in Congress calling for a more robust U.S. foreign and security policy toward the BSR. It called for more reporting on interagency efforts in the region and, within a year, a new Black Sea strategy “to increase military assistance and coordination with NATO and the EU, deepen economic ties, strengthen democracy and economic security, and enhance security assistance with Black Sea countries.” Yet the United States cannot assume a robust NATO or EU strategy, nor can it rely on the littoral states (or other Western NATO allies) to restore the balance of power and open lines of communication in the BSR. With China seen as the United States’ pacing challenge in the Indo-Pacific, an updated U.S. Black Sea strategy will be resource constrained, and its objectives will likely be defined by regional allies and partners’ perspectives. Indeed, the National Defense Strategy describes alliances and partnerships as an “enduring strength for the United States . . . critical to achieving our objectives,” and it commits the United States to incorporating allies and partners’ “perspectives, competencies, and advantages at every state of defense planning.”
+
+With that objective in mind, the authors conducted field research in Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, and Turkey in the spring of 2022 shortly after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began and follow-up meetings in Washington throughout the remainder of the year. Through meetings with government officials, parliamentarians, journalists, scholars, and civil society activists, this research sought to better understand how these countries view their security interests in and around the Black Sea, including the impact of the war in Ukraine, and to determine what they would like to see from the United States and NATO going forward.
+
+Based on these conversations and analysis of regional geopolitics in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion, an effective U.S. strategy for the BSR should
+
+- further strengthen the U.S. presence across the region through force deployments, weapons sales, investments, and diplomatic engagements;
+
+- bolster NATO’s eastern front while enhancing flexible and “minilateral” cooperation among allies and partners, including with Ukraine;
+
+- seek a new equilibrium with the region’s most potent ally, Turkey, while reassuring other regional states worried about Turkish ambitions;
+
+- prioritize democratic resilience among vulnerable frontline states inside and outside of NATO; and
+
+- support and secure projects to enhance regional connectivity that bypass Russia.
+
+
+### Russia’s Revisionist Challenge
+
+The war in Ukraine and the violent conflicts elsewhere in the BSR have all been driven by Russia’s revanchist ambition, advanced through multiple instruments of national power. The collapse of the Soviet Union ended a long period of Russian and Soviet domination of the wider BSR. While Moscow was from the beginning deeply engaged in the ethno-territorial conflicts that broke out following the Soviet Union’s collapse, growing strategic competition with the West (i.e., the United States, Canada, and their European allies and partners) increasingly led Russia to regard the post-1991 era of “geopolitical pluralism” in and around the Black Sea as contrary to its interests. As Nikolas Gvosdev suggests, the resurgence of Russian military power in the BSR “challenges the West’s default strategy in the region since the Soviet Union’s collapse: the inexorable expansion of Euro-Atlantic institutions to encompass the entire Black Sea littoral and contain Russia within its then-limited northeastern coast.” Though Moscow has justified its 2014 and 2022 invasions on the basis of internal developments in Ukraine, they are also consistent with Russia’s long-standing ambitions to roll back U.S. and NATO influence in the region while consolidating what former president Dmitry Medvedev termed a sphere of “privileged interests.”
+
+From the mid-2000s, Russia began taking advantage of the protracted conflicts around its borders to bolster its own military presence, prevent its smaller neighbors from achieving Euro-Atlantic integration, and deter outside involvement in the region. After Russia invaded Georgia in August 2008, it deployed more than 4,000 troops (including border guards) to the breakaway coastal region of Abkhazia, which Moscow proclaimed to be an independent state (plus another 4,000 to the breakaway region of South Ossetia/Tskhinvali on the Russo-Georgian border). Russia soon began upgrading the border guard facilities at the Abkhazian port of Ochamchire, which could also be used to host naval assets. Under the State Armaments Program to 2020, the Black Sea Fleet received six new submarines and three new frigates, all capable of firing anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) or Kalibr land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), as well as numerous smaller craft. The deployment of Kalibr-capable platforms is a source of particular concern for NATO given their range (around 2,500 kilometers) and nuclear capabilities. In the coming years, the Black Sea Fleet is also scheduled to receive three additional frigates, six corvettes, and around a dozen small missile ships — though it is now doubtful that these plans will be fulfilled amid the war with Ukraine.
+
+The annexation of Crimea in 2014 transformed the regional balance of power more decisively in Russia’s favor. NATO halted cooperation with Russia, cooperative mechanisms such as the BLACKSEAFOR naval task force broke down, and both NATO and Russia stepped up the scale and tempo of their operations and exercises in and around the sea. With the annexation of Crimea, Moscow took over Ukraine’s naval assets on the peninsula; since 2014, it has also built up new capabilities in Crimea as well as at its eastern Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. Prior to the renewal of hostilities in early 2022, Crimea reportedly hosted at least four battalions operating the advanced S-400 air defense system. Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles, advanced radars and medium-range air defense systems (Pantsir and Buk), Su-24 attack aircraft and Su-30 fighters, along with enhanced Bastion coastal defense systems were all deployed on the peninsula as well. Moscow also dramatically scaled up the presence of its ground forces in Crimea, including tanks, artillery, and combat vehicles. In May 2016, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan lamented that NATO is “absent from the Black Sea. The Black Sea has almost become a Russian lake.”
+
+Employing smaller naval ships, coastal artillery, and aircraft, Russia has since 2014 aimed to prevent Ukraine from employing asymmetric capabilities to challenge Russian control of the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea littoral between Crimea and the Russian border. At the same time, the Russian Black Sea Fleet employed its larger platforms (submarines, frigates, and missile ships — some normally deployed in the Caspian Sea or the Volga and Don rivers) to implement an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy against NATO forces across much of the Black Sea. Even before the outset of the 2022 war, these capabilities allowed Russia to dominate the maritime space within the Black Sea, choke off access to Ukraine’s ports in the Sea of Azov, and project power through the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits to the eastern Mediterranean. As Gustav Gressel notes, because of the rapid post-2014 buildup, “Russia’s current conventional military posture [in the Black Sea] is already far beyond a defensive one.”
+
+The Black Sea is also instrumental to Russia’s military operations in Syria and wider ambitions in the eastern Mediterranean. Prior to Turkey’s decision in May 2022 to close the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits to warships, the Russian Black Sea Fleet provided the bulk of the capabilities for its Mediterranean Squadron, which Moscow reconstituted in 2013 for the first time since the end of the Cold War. During the conflict in Syria, Soviet-era landing ships from the Black Sea Fleet (and reflagged civilian vessels) dispatched troops and matériel from Novorossiysk through the straits to Russia’s Syrian bases at Tartus and Latakia. Moscow also used ships from the Black Sea Fleet to “show the flag” in the eastern Mediterranean in an effort to deter NATO or other outside powers from intervening in Syria. With Russia also seeking permanent bases in Libya and Sudan, the eastern Mediterranean risks becoming a contested zone between Russia and NATO as well.
+
+With the growth of such tensions, it was hardly a surprise that the Black Sea became a primary theater when Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. According to Secretary of State Antony Blinken, “Russian naval operations have demonstrated the intent to control access to the northwestern Black Sea, the Sea of Azov, to block Ukrainian ports.” In the first hours of the war, Russian forces carried out amphibious assaults on Snake Island (Острів Зміїний) and near the port of Mariupol on the Sea of Azov. With support from naval artillery, Russian ground forces then sought to take control of Ukraine’s entire coastline. The fall of Mariupol, Berdyansk, and Kherson consolidated a “land bridge” from the Russian border to Crimea, completely isolating Ukraine from the Sea of Azov. Russian forces have also struck Odesa, the largest port remaining under Ukrainian control, on multiple occasions, though a planned amphibious assault in the first days of the war failed to materialize.
+
+Prior to the signing of a UN and Turkish-mediated agreement creating a grain export corridor in July 2022, a Russian naval blockade had effectively choked off Ukraine’s grain exports, 95 percent of which were shipped from Black Sea ports before the war. Despite efforts by the United States and European Union to organize rail transport, as well as the opening of the export corridor (guaranteed by Turkey), the security of maritime transit to and from Ukraine remains in doubt. The Russian blockade contributed to significant food price inflation around the globe, raising fears of famine in parts of Africa and Asia. Even with the signing of the grain corridor agreement, Moscow’s ability to choke off trade from Ukraine’s Black Sea ports still provides it leverage to press for an end to (or at least a rolling back of) sanctions imposed since the start of the war. Indeed, Russian officials have suggested they are unhappy with the agreement’s implementation, though pressure from Turkey and countries in the Global South forced Moscow to abandon threats to leave the agreement.
+
+The larger geopolitical implications of the blockade and Russia’s control of the northern Black Sea littoral are significant as well. Despite military setbacks on land and sea in the summer and fall of 2022, Russia continues to limit Ukraine’s access to the global commons through the Black Sea and the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits — and Russia’s strategic ambition remains to eventually capture more of Ukraine’s coastline, including the port of Odesa. Even with the losses suffered by its Black Sea Fleet and the recapture of Kherson by Ukrainian forces, Russian control of Crimea and the Sea of Azov allow it to carry out attacks on Ukraine and interfere with maritime traffic across the Black Sea. The further extension of Russian political or military domination of the northern Black Sea coast would leave Ukraine effectively landlocked. If Ukraine cannot export raw materials or import finished products through its Black Sea ports, it will of necessity become increasingly dependent on less efficient land routes — including, in the event of a military defeat, on trade with and transit through Russia. These outcomes would carry significant costs not just for Ukraine but for the Black Sea littoral states and purchasers of Ukrainian agricultural and other goods as well.
+
+Russia is similarly taking advantage of the war in Ukraine to pressure the South Caucasus and Central Asian states — as well as NATO ally Turkey — to constrain their economic, political, and strategic cooperation with Europe. Snap military drills that can close off critical sea lanes for months at a time, exclusive economic zone (EEZ) claims, and harassment of civilian vessels risk leaving the states on the Black Sea’s southern and eastern rims increasingly vulnerable and isolated. Volatility in and around the Black Sea also leaves foreign companies more reluctant to invest in new projects, such as the planned deep-sea port at Anaklia, Georgia, or the development of oil and gas reserves in Turkey or Romania’s EEZs. Moscow is meanwhile using financial, informational, and other tools to shape public opinion and political decisionmaking, taking advantage of weak governance, democratic backsliding, and state capture in much of the region.
+
+By the end of 2022, the combination of Western-supplied weapons, Ukrainian ingenuity and resilience, and Russia’s military operational ineptitude had eroded the combat capabilities of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, badly damaged the bridge linking Russia to occupied Crimea across the Kerch Strait, and driven Russian forces from the major cities of Kharkiv and Kherson. Increasingly bottled up at Sevastopol and Novorossiysk to avoid the anti-ship missiles that sank the Moskva, the Black Sea Fleet now risks being cut off from combat operations on land — more so following the delivery of additional U.S. long-range rocket artillery and anti-ship missile systems. Yet the blockade persists, and Russian forces still control the key ports of Mariupol and Berdyansk. Nor have Russian ambitions been moderated, as the announcement of “partial” mobilization on September 21 suggests — even as rising prices and political volatility indicate that many European states’ appetite for an enduring confrontation with Moscow may be limited.
+
+Even with Ukraine’s tactical successes, the combination of military uncertainty in the Black Sea plus littoral states’ weaknesses and hedging heralds further pressure if Russian influence in the wider BSR remains intact. U.S. and NATO interests in the region are thus not confined to Ukraine — though the outcome of the war in Ukraine will have an enormous impact on future security and stability across the wider BSR — and will likely be the most important factor affecting future U.S. strategy toward the region. Even as the United States and its allies continue their support for Ukraine, they need to maintain a wider perspective that recognizes the importance of a free and open BSR and of strengthening connectivity among the Black Sea littoral states and between the littoral states and Euro-Atlantic institutions, including both NATO and the European Union. Doing so requires understanding how the littoral states — all of which (apart from Russia) are NATO allies or partners — perceive the war and their own evolving interests in the Black Sea.
+
+
+### The Perspectives of Black Sea Littoral States
+
+The war in Ukraine profoundly affects the wider Black Sea region. The impact is particularly acute for the littoral states and their immediate neighbors because the war directly threatens their security and because the region’s preexisting fissures mean that they will continue to struggle to define a common vision for how to respond. NATO allies Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey have not found common ground among themselves, much less agreed on a regional strategy that might also encompass Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Except for Turkey, the littoral states are relatively weak countries, and all face significant challenges related to the rule of law, corruption, Russian influence, economic dependence on Russia (particularly for energy), and democratic backsliding. Russia’s war in Ukraine and its attempts to militarize the Black Sea pose significant challenges for all of them, as well as for neighboring states in the Western Balkans, eastern Mediterranean, South Caucasus, and Central Asia.
+
+So long as the littoral states are not directly involved in the war, adopting a comprehensive Black Sea strategy with regional leadership is unlikely. Romania plays an important role as an anchor for the United States and NATO in the BSR, while Turkey has the military capabilities but not the political incentives to take on more of a leadership role. As a result, the United States and NATO have had to work with the regional states on a piecemeal and sometimes ad hoc basis. It is therefore critical for policymakers in Washington (and Brussels) to have a nuanced and comprehensive understanding of how these littoral states conceptualize the threats in and around the Black Sea, what forms of assistance they prioritize, and how they might respond to enhanced U.S. engagement in the region.
+
+#### Turkey
+
+With NATO’s second-largest military (after the United States), control of the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits, and a political elite committed to bolstering the country’s strategic autonomy, Turkey remains the linchpin for U.S. and NATO strategy in the BSR. Though Turkey has been a NATO ally since 1952, it has since the end of the Cold War positioned itself as an increasingly independent regional power, leaning into the alliance only when it serves a narrower set of national interests. Especially in recent years, this commitment to an independent foreign policy has included looking to Moscow for economic opportunities and political support.
+
+Russia’s expanding military footprint in and around the Black Sea nevertheless constrains Turkey’s own options and poses risks to its security; as one former official pointed out, a missile launched from Crimea could hit Ankara in a matter of seconds. While Turkey remains wary of confronting Russia directly, the shifting power balance around the Black Sea provides an incentive for Ankara and its NATO allies to seek common ground as they prepare for what is likely to be an enduring strategic competition — even as Turkey continues pursuing a multifaceted relationship with Russia. The United States and NATO will have to strike a careful balance, encouraging Turkey to be more forward leaning without abetting President Erdoğan’s efforts to undermine Western sanctions on Russia.
+
+A key element in Turkey’s pursuit of strategic autonomy is its emphasis on maintaining a kind of regional condominium over the Black Sea, based on Ankara’s strict interpretation of the 1936 Montreux Convention. This agreement limits the number, tonnage, and duration of stay of non-littoral state warships in the Black Sea and allows Ankara to restrict or prevent the passage of naval ships through the straits in wartime. While U.S. and other allied officials sometimes bristle that Turkey’s strict adherence to Montreux limits the deployment of NATO assets, Turkish officials see the convention as a cornerstone of regional security. Above all, it provides international recognition of Turkey’s ownership of the straits, which the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union repeatedly challenged. Ankara views firm adherence to Montreux as a guarantee against an expansion of regional conflicts and sees it as consistent with a rules-based international order. By reinforcing a localized détente with Russia in the Black Sea, Montreux also allows Turkey to prioritize maritime operations in the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean, where its aims are frequently at odds with those of other allies, especially Greece and France — not to mention Cyprus, whose government Turkey does not recognize and has blocked from joining NATO.
+
+Ankara’s pursuit of what one academic called “competitive cooperation” with Moscow — including Turkish efforts to bypass U.S. and EU sanctions imposed over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine — remains a source of tension with other NATO allies as well. For historical and geographic reasons, Turkey identifies the conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which extends into Syria and Iraq, as a larger threat than Russian expansion around the Black Sea. Given Russia’s role as the guardian of the Syrian regime and principal power broker in Syria, cooperating with Russia in and around the Black Sea helps Ankara secure Russian acquiescence to its red lines with respect to the PKK and its affiliates. Ankara also understands that it needs to maintain a working relationship with Moscow to secure its bottom-line objectives in the conflicts stretching from Libya to Syria to the South Caucasus, where Russian and Turkish forces remain engaged on opposite sides. As a senior Turkish official put it, productive relations with Russia “are a necessity, not a choice” for Turkey.
+
+Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has also become a critical economic partner for Turkey. It supplied 44 percent of Turkey’s gas and around one-fifth of Turkey’s oil in 2021 and is constructing Turkey’s first nuclear power plant at Akkuyu. Russia is also an important source of tourists and a market for Turkish agriculture and construction firms, many of which are close to Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP). Moscow has often used Turkey’s economic vulnerability and dependence on Russia as a source of leverage — restricting tourist travel in 2015 and again in 2021 and freezing work on Akkuyu for several years.
+
+With a depreciating currency and inflation that could exceed 80 percent in 2022 ahead of presidential elections next year, Turkey further seeks to position itself as an outlet for Russian trade and investment, even as its U.S. and European allies tighten sanctions; in the months following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the value of Turkish exports to Russia increased 46 percent relative to the previous year. Nor has Turkey closed its airspace to Russia — apart from military flights to Syria — or limited the ability of Russians to enter the country. Indeed, many Russian oligarchs fleeing personal sanctions in the United States or European Union have been spotted in Turkey — along with a much larger number of young, well-educated Russians (and Ukrainians). Ukrainian officials have accused Turkey of facilitating, and even profiting from, the sale of stolen grain. In August 2022, Putin and Erdoğan reached an agreement for Turkey to pay for energy deliveries in rubles and facilitate operation of the Mir payment system in Turkey, to the consternation of many other allies (Ankara later walked back its support for Mir under U.S. pressure). Ankara also welcomed Russia’s offer to use Turkey as a hub for gas sales to Europe following the explosion that shut down the Nord Stream 1 pipeline in September 2022.
+
+This pursuit of economic cooperation amid sanctions reflects Ankara’s broader strategy of cultivating ties with Moscow as a hedge against dependence on what many Turkish officials and analysts view as an unreliable West. While the roots of this Turkish-Russian rapprochement go back to the 1990s, it has become more salient since 2015–16 owing to (1) Erdoğan’s dissatisfaction with U.S. support for groups aligned with the PKK in Syria and (2) Washington’s seemingly lukewarm response to the July 2016 coup attempt by elements in the Turkish Armed Forces associated with the U.S.-based cleric Fethullah Gülen (Turkey regards both the PKK and the Gülenists as terrorists, and officials react with equal parts bewilderment and anger to what they see as U.S. support for both groups). Erdoğan’s decision to purchase the Russian S-400 air defense system in the wake of the coup attempt was a particular triumph for the Kremlin — resulting in Turkey’s expulsion from the U.S.-led F-35 fighter program and preventing the deployment of NATO-standard air defense capabilities along the Turkish-Syrian border. The S-400 remains one of the key stumbling blocks to a full reconciliation between Ankara and its NATO allies. Yet for reasons of prestige — and because it aligns with the pursuit of strategic autonomy — Ankara now considers the S-400 issue a “closed chapter” that NATO has to accept.
+
+Despite its complex relationship with Russia and increased skepticism toward NATO within the Turkish elite, Turkey has consistently supported Ukraine’s territorial integrity, including Crimea. Since 2014, Ankara has also taken steps to bolster its own capabilities and those of its allies. It continues investing in new surface and coastal defense capabilities (notably the TCG Anadolu-class light carrier/amphibious assault ship). Turkey’s navy has also increased its presence in the Black Sea while deploying maritime patrol aircraft, tankers, and fighter jets to frontline allies and partners, some of whom (notably Romania) are also seeking to purchase Turkish drones. Ankara has also nurtured a long-term defense industrial relationship with Kyiv that has facilitated joint production of drones, engines, ships, and other capabilities. The most visible product of this relationship is the TB2 Bayraktar armed drone that Turkey continues supplying to the Ukrainian military, though Turkish officials are at pains to describe these as purely commercial transactions. During President Erdoğan’s visit to Kyiv in February 2022, the two countries agreed to establish a production facility for Turkish drones inside Ukraine; this deal seems to remain in place despite the Russian invasion.
+
+Turkey’s traditional balancing act between Russia and NATO has become more complex since the outbreak of full-scale war in Ukraine, even as the war has bolstered Ankara’s perception of its own importance for NATO. Ankara has prioritized avoiding being drawn into the conflict while using its ties to both Moscow and Kyiv to position itself as a mediator. Turkey’s most notable contribution may be brokering and guaranteeing the agreement to export grain from Ukrainian ports, which established a maritime coordination center in Istanbul, and which the Turkish navy is charged with enforcing. Turkey was also instrumental in negotiating a September 2022 prisoner swap. Turkish officials often claim that their Western NATO allies do not sufficiently appreciate either its support for Ukraine or its larger diplomatic role.
+
+Ankara now recognizes that the war has made its traditional preference for a condominium approach to security among the Black Sea littoral states impossible. Thus far, however, Ankara has been reluctant to articulate a vision for what could replace this approach. Jealously guarding its status as custodian of the straits, Ankara remains opposed to a permanent NATO presence in the Black Sea. It also worries that other allies will push NATO into adopting a needlessly confrontational approach to Moscow — and it still promotes the idea of a negotiated settlement to the war in Ukraine. While Turkish officials believe that Ankara can protect its own security interests in the Black Sea (including by maintaining a working relationship with Moscow), some of the other littoral states are wary of Turkish intentions and reluctant to see Ankara take on greater responsibility for regional security outside a NATO framework.
+
+Despite the importance Ankara assigns to its relationship with Moscow, Russia’s militarization of Crimea and attempts to sever lines of communication across the Black Sea represent a significant challenge to Turkish interests and could have implications for Turkey’s long-term commitment to NATO. For now, they provide a strong argument for the importance of NATO as a cornerstone of Turkey’s security, despite growing anti-Western sentiment among much of the Turkish elite and the attempt to balance between NATO and Russia. Helping Ukraine emerge from the conflict victorious would therefore bolster the pro-Western elements in the Turkish elite who have seen their influence erode since the failed coup. At the same time, pushing Turkey to adopt a more forward-leaning posture in the Black Sea should be part of a broader effort at improving relations between Washington and Ankara.
+
+#### Georgia
+
+Russia’s campaign to dominate the Black Sea could have a particularly significant impact on Georgia, where political volatility and state capture have exacerbated existing vulnerabilities as the competition in and around the Black Sea deepens. With around one-fifth of its territory and almost two-thirds of its coastline under Russian occupation, Georgia has limited agency in shaping regional security dynamics. Yet, with its pro-European orientation, NATO partner status, and location astride key transit routes connecting Europe to the Caspian Sea and Central Asia, Georgia’s sovereignty and independence matter; as NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept states, the “security of countries aspiring to become members of the Alliance is intertwined with our own.”
+
+The occupation of South Ossetia/Tskhinvali and Abkhazia in August 2008 deepened Georgia’s political fragmentation and complicated the Georgian government’s efforts to regain control over the entirety of its internationally recognized territory. Since 2008, Russian forces have continued chipping away at Georgian territory through the process of “borderization,” or moving the de facto boundary lines further into Georgia proper. Russian control of Abkhazia constrains Georgia’s connectivity across the Black Sea, holding at risk Georgia’s remaining ports of Batumi and Poti, which Russian forces targeted in 2008, as well as nearby road, rail, and pipeline infrastructure. Since 2008, Russia has reinforced its military presence in Abkhazia, deploying S-300 air defense systems, Tochka missiles, and other capabilities that many Georgians see as part of Russian preparation for a renewed offensive. Even without further kinetic operations, officials perceive Russian “hybrid sea control and sea denial” activities, such as snap exercises that disrupt shipping, as an imminent threat. Because Georgia’s military spending remains low (around $300 million per year) and Russian forces sank or captured the whole Georgian navy during the 2008 war, Tbilisi lacks significant maritime capabilities of its own. It therefore prioritizes deepening multilateral cooperation, especially through its coast guard, as a vital part of its maritime and coastal security.
+
+Since the 2003 Rose Revolution, Georgia’s security strategy has centered on achieving rapid political and strategic integration with the Euro-Atlantic West. Under former president Mikheil Saakashvili (2004–13), Georgia carried out extensive privatization, security service reform, crackdowns on official corruption, and other steps aiming to transform Georgia along “European” lines. Under the auspices of NATO’s Partnership for Peace and its own Integrated Partnership Action Plan, Georgia developed deep institutional ties with NATO and contributed significant numbers of troops to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Along with Montenegro (which would join NATO in 2017), Georgia was one of only two states to adopt an Annual National Program to pursue its NATO membership aspirations. These steps were rewarded with NATO’s 2008 Bucharest Declaration stating that Georgia (and Ukraine) “will become” members of the alliance; the U.S. military also came to Georgia’s aid during the 2008 Russian invasion, airlifting Georgian troops back from Iraq and dispatching a destroyer with humanitarian aid after a ceasefire was in place.
+
+Georgia also positioned itself as a vital transit state connecting Europe to the Caspian Basin and thence to Asia. Beginning with the opening of the Baku-Supsa oil pipeline in 1998, construction of new oil and gas pipelines, roads, and railways knitted Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey to European markets. This new infrastructure helped Georgia, along with Azerbaijan, reduce its dependence on Russia while giving Europe a stake in its political and economic success. Securing these transit routes is therefore critical to Tbilisi’s ability to maintain its pro-Western orientation. Russia has made repeated efforts to undermine them through investments that would give Moscow a veto over their operations or construction of bypass routes such as the TurkStream gas pipeline. Russia also maintains the capability to disrupt critical infrastructure across Georgia through cyber or kinetic operations, such as a cyberattack that caused an explosion on the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline during the 2008 war.
+
+Moscow’s ability to sever these transit routes represents a threat not only to Georgia but to Europe’s strategy of energy diversification and to the broader project of consolidating a liberal order in Eurasia. Because of Georgia’s limited military capacity and vulnerability to Russian coercion, Tbilisi would like to see a much more robust NATO presence both in and around the Black Sea, including joint exercises, port visits, and intelligence sharing, to deter further Russian aggression. Georgian officials emphasize that Tbilisi has done all that NATO has asked of it as far as enhancing readiness and contributing to NATO missions (including in Afghanistan) but worry that the alliance is not taking its concerns seriously enough.
+
+Georgian worries about the extent of Western support are mirrored by growing concern in the United States and Europe that Georgia’s domestic politics are moving in the wrong direction and that, as a result, Tbilisi cannot be counted on as a reliable partner. Georgia therefore risks finding itself caught in a vicious circle, with Tbilisi’s internal problems encouraging the United States and NATO to adopt a strategy of hedging, despite perceptions of a mounting Russian threat. The war in Ukraine has made these concerns acute, with Tbilisi seeking reassurance from the West even as it scrambles to avoid giving Moscow any justification for renewed aggression. Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili and other officials have called for a rapid end to the war, declined to impose sanctions, welcomed large numbers of Russian expatriates, and obstructed efforts to provide military assistance to Ukraine.
+
+Equivocation over the war in Ukraine also reflects the larger processes of democratic backsliding and state capture that have accelerated since the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party came to power in 2013. GD remains closely tied to the ambitions of the oligarch and former prime minister (2012–13) Bidzina Ivanishvili, who made the bulk of his fortune in Russia, including through a large stake in the Russian gas monopoly Gazprom. While Ivanishvili claims to have left politics since stepping down as head of GD in early 2021, members of the opposition and civil society continue to regard him as the power behind the throne and to see his influence in Tbilisi’s reluctance to fully support Kyiv. Regardless of Ivanishvili’s impact on Georgian foreign policy, the decade since GD has come to power has seen growing corruption, deepening polarization, state capture, and a resurgence of authoritarian tactics, including persecution of Saakashvili and his supporters. These shifts have made Georgia’s political system less responsive to public opinion, which remains strongly pro-Western and pro-Ukrainian. They have also helped entrench a community of interest between kleptocratic elites in Georgia and in Russia; in that sense, state capture is itself a vehicle for Russian influence. Beyond state capture, Moscow has also had success promoting its narrative about a conflict between its so-called traditional values and a “decadent” West, including within the hierarchy of the Georgian Orthodox Church.
+
+Corruption, democratic backsliding, and state capture also complicate Georgia’s relationship with the United States and its European allies. U.S. officials note that state capture limits Georgia’s capacity to absorb and employ foreign assistance or to mount the kind of decentralized defensive campaign that Ukraine is currently undertaking. These concerns, in turn, limit Washington’s willingness to provide military and other assistance to Tbilisi, reinforcing the threat of Georgia’s strategic decoupling from the West. Georgian officials worry that they will be left out of whatever package of measures the United States, NATO, and the European Union adopt to help secure Ukraine. Notably, Georgia was not included when the European Union announced in June 2022 that Moldova and Ukraine would be granted candidate status. Tbilisi similarly worries that any bilateral or multilateral security guarantees that Ukraine obtains as part of an agreement to end the war will not extend to Georgia and that, as a result, Georgia will emerge less secure even in the event of a Russian defeat.
+
+Despite its attempts to stay on the sidelines, the war in Ukraine and Russia’s campaign to dominate the Black Sea will have dramatic implications for Georgia’s security and strategic orientation. Tbilisi’s pro-Western course — including its role as a transit state for energy and other goods to Europe — depends on maintaining secure communications across the Black Sea. Regardless of whether Moscow intends to carry out further military operations against Georgia, its ability to hold at risk Georgia’s outlet to Europe through the Black Sea imposes a powerful check on Western influence not merely in Georgia but in the South Caucasus and Central Asia more generally.
+
+#### Romania
+
+Romania is the largest littoral state that is a member of both NATO and the European Union, and it has pushed the United States to develop a Black Sea strategy for some time. Bucharest broadly shares the U.S. assessment of the threat posed by Russia, and the Romanian National Defence Strategy identifies the BSR as of “paramount strategic interest” and Russia as an “aggressive” threat. Romania aspires to play a leadership role for NATO in the southeast, and it provides humanitarian and military support for Ukraine, though the latter has been limited by a decade of underinvestment in Romanian defense modernization between 2006 and 2016. It calls for a “comprehensive approach” to the BSR that covers both military and economic issues, transport, energy, environment, and resilience.
+
+Senior Romanian government officials describe Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine as an escalation of the conflict that began in 2014 and an attempt to demoralize Ukraine, strangle its economy by cutting it off from the Black Sea, and destroy the civilian and military infrastructure that Kyiv has relied on to engage with the West and operationalize its military support during the conflict. They see Russia’s continuing aggression in Ukraine as dramatically affecting Romanian national security. They worry about Russia’s attempts to control Ukraine’s southern coast and, especially, Snake Island. Russia made multiple attempts early in the war to destroy the Zatoka bridge — the only road and rail route from Odesa to the West — and to capture Snake Island, which sits just 45 miles off the Romanian coast. These attacks suggested that Russia’s overarching strategic aim was to extend its land bridge through the Odesa Oblast, potentially connecting to Transnistria, the 250-mile-long strip of land in Moldova controlled by a Russia-backed de facto administration, creating a land border with Romania for the first time in thirty years.
+
+Since Ukraine’s counteroffensive began in August 2022, Russia’s operational setbacks offer Romania only a temporary relief. Many in Romania believe that Russia’s strategic aims for the region remain unchanged. If Russia were to achieve eventual control over Snake Island, it could further disrupt commercial shipping in and out of Odesa as well as in and out of the Danube delta ports and, hence, threaten Romanian ports in the delta and along the coast. The port of Galaţi, for example, proved essential for shipping agricultural products out of Ukraine while Odesa was blockaded during the summer. Russian control of Snake Island could create renewed legal uncertainty around the delimitation of the continental shelf and the EEZs between Romania and Ukraine, which were settled in 2009 after a decades-long bilateral dispute. Such uncertainty would have implications for both countries’ minerals as well as for oil and gas exploration and extraction. Ukraine’s rockets and artillery have pushed Russian forces off Snake Island, and Russia has since suffered further military operational setbacks. Romanian officials hint, however, that unless Russia’s strategic ambition is defeated in the BSR, they expect Moscow to regroup, rearm, and try again.
+
+Russia’s dominance in the BSR has depended on its naval capabilities as well as on increasing hybrid attacks and influence operations. Naval hybrid attacks have become a major concern for Bucharest. Moscow has closed off large swathes of the Black Sea for exercises, some of which disrupted Romanian commercial shipping. Moscow has also in some cases announced and then canceled such exercises, presumably to demonstrate political control and ability to disrupt freedom of navigation at will. The vulnerability of Romania’s offshore energy assets is another source of concern — especially in the wake of the September 2022 attack on the Nord Stream 1 pipeline in the Baltic Sea. Russia has also increased cyber and information campaigns against Romania since the start of the war, targeting democratic institutions with anti-Western narratives; it continuously portrays Romania’s hosting of Aegis Ashore launchers, part of NATO’s ballistic missile defense systems, as provocative. Russia has violated Romania’s air space with increasing frequency, and officials expect these events to continue even if a ceasefire for Ukraine is put into place.
+
+Romania has long sought a stronger NATO presence in the region, but the political geography is complex. Not only do threat perceptions diverge among NATO allies in the BSR, but Bucharest has concerns about pro-Russian forces among its neighbors, including in Hungary and Serbia, and about a vulnerable Moldova on its northeastern border. Moldova west of the Dniester was once part of Romania, and there is still some segment of the population in both countries — possibly as high as 35 percent in Moldova and 70 percent in Romania — that favors eventual reunification. Moldova is precariously located along Ukraine’s western border; it has achieved EU candidate status, but socioeconomic fallout from the war and an influx of refugees could still threaten Moldova’s security and its stability. Russia maintains approximately 1,400 troops in Transnistria, officially to protect ammunition depots, which store up to 20,000 tons of mostly expired and some still usable armaments; Russian officials have stated that any attacks on these forces will be a casus belli. Bucharest fears any miscalculation or political or military destabilization of Moldova proper, Transnistria, or the volatile Gagauzia region, where Russia also stokes separatist sentiment.
+
+Since 2015, Romania significantly increased defense spending, accelerated its defense modernization, especially for land and air, and has attempted to elevate Black Sea security to a priority issue for the United States, NATO, and the European Union. Romania’s modernization began in earnest between 2015 and 2018. It made significant investments in F-16s, acquiring 17 in 2016 from Portugal and accelerated plans to procure an additional 32 from Norway. It also invested in armored vehicles, Patriot surface-to-air missiles, and High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS). Bucharest is now focused on continued modernization; acquiring naval capabilities; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); and coastal defense. It is also shoring up resilience, including through the new Euro-Atlantic Resilience Centre, and addressing challenges in the information environment. Russia’s campaigns push anti-Western messages, including over the fuel and vegetable oil shortages and the grain crisis last year. It has had less success in exploiting the Romanian Orthodox Church; the church’s leadership largely rejects Putin’s narratives, though some factions push Russian narratives at lower levels in the church.
+
+Romania has continuously sought to elevate Black Sea security as a priority for the United States. Bucharest consistently called out Russia’s aggression in the region and has made significant investments in infrastructure, including at the Mihail Kogălniceanu base, with its strategic location on the northwest shores of the Black Sea; at the Câmpia Turzii base, a new hub for NATO in the region; and by hosting missile defense systems at the Deveselu air base. Bucharest has also sought to promote regional cooperation in the NATO frameworks. In 2016 it proposed a Black Sea Fleet for NATO, but it proved unsuccessful, Iulia-Sabina Joja argues, in part because of differences in threat assessments vis-à-vis Russia with NATO allies Bulgaria and Turkey. Romania stood up the Multinational Brigade South-East in Craiova, and then the Multi-National Division Southeast Headquarters (for NATO’s tailored Forward Presence), and the Multinational Corps in Sibiu should be operational by 2024. Bucharest has supported NATO’s new battlegroups for Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. It sought approval to buy Bayraktar drones from Turkey and is open to increased air and maritime cooperation with Ankara and with Sofia, which hosts a maritime coordination center in Varna, Bulgaria.
+
+Some officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs suggested their threat assessments can at times be compounded by concerns that the United States and Western European allies still have a “superficial” understanding of the threat from Russia. For Bucharest, the war in Georgia was a wake-up call, and some officials were frustrated that the United States responded with an attempt to “reset” relations with Russia. Then, Russia’s annexation of Crimea provided further evidence of Russia’s aggression in the southeast, but NATO focused its reassurance efforts on allies in the the northeast. NATO’s tailored Forward Presence in Romania was a smaller and less capable force than the Enhanced Forward Presence in the Baltics and in Poland. Some Romanian officials fear that some Westerners are still reluctant to confront Russia in the region. These fears run deep: they date back to the failure of Western security guarantees during World War II when the fall of France nullified the security guarantees Bucharest received as part of the These fears run deep, dating back to the failure of Western security guarantees during World War II when the fall of France nullified the security guarantees Bucharest received as part of the Little Entente: in July 1940, Romania was forced to give up....rest of the country.” If Ukraine is asked to accept territorial concessions, it would trigger these fears and increase strategic uncertainty for Romania.
+
+#### Bulgaria
+
+Alongside Romania, Bulgaria is the only other Black Sea littoral state that a member of both NATO and the European Union. Sofia is committed to addressing Black Sea regional security challenges together with its NATO allies and EU member states. It has generally supported the steps that NATO has taken to strengthen regional defense and deterrence in southeastern Europe since 2014 — with one prominent exception. Bulgaria opposed Romania’s 2016 Black Sea regional fleet proposal after initially agreeing to it; then Bulgarian prime minister Boyko Borisov was effectively caught up in a power struggle between Moscow and Ankara and, likely bowing to Russian pressure, rejected Romania’s call for a joint regional Black Sea flotilla. Bulgaria generally sought to preserve good relations with Russia since the end of the Cold War, and Russia has exploited that good will and Bulgaria’s economic and energy dependence to strengthen its influence and undermine democratic institutions.
+
+Bulgaria has not been able to imagine itself as a net contributor to regional security. It struggled to modernize its defense forces for years because of weak institutions, limited funds, and recently, political instability and fragile coalition governments. Also, it paid relatively little strategic attention to the BSR in the past. Historically, Bulgaria has not identified as a maritime state despite its coastline; its post–Cold War orientation looked westward toward achieving NATO and EU membership and addressing instability in the Western Balkans. For much of the post–Cold War period, Bulgarians sought friendly relations with Moscow, and saw no direct threat from the East. Implicit in NATO’s enlargement waves after the Cold War were assumptions that Bulgaria’s eastern neighbors — Ukraine, Georgia, and possibly even Russia — might be next to join the Euro-Atlantic institutions and that some kind of partnership with Russia was possible. During Bulgaria’s transition to democracy, officials saw NATO as a stepping-stone to the European Union and as a “finish line” for Bulgaria’s national security. NATO had no requirement and there was no incentive for Sofia to undertake major defense reforms or invest in modernizing its equipment after joining the alliance.
+
+Bulgaria’s place in NATO and the European Union is widely accepted by the Bulgarian people and by all major political parties, including the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), the legal successor to the Bulgarian Communist Party. And yet there is also a sense of ambivalence in Bulgaria with respect to the Euro-Atlantic institutions that affects Bulgaria’s defense and security policies. Bulgarian scholar Rumena Filipova argues that ambivalence reflects the role of identity politics in Bulgaria as well as the country’s process of “Europeanization.” She describes Bulgaria’s Europeanization as “thin” or “ambivalent” and argues that both Western Europe and Russia were treated as “others” in Bulgaria’s national identify formation. Western Europe was seen at times as a “utopia to emulate” and, at others, as a “hostile, exclusive and distant entity that [did not] appreciate the states on its periphery.” Russia, on the other hand, was seen as Bulgaria’s liberator from centuries of Ottoman domination, though disappointment with Moscow remains a constant theme. As a result, Bulgaria has developed both pro-Russia and Russia-critical segments of society and it is particularly vulnerable to anti-Western and anti-democratic narratives.
+
+In contrast to Romania and other smaller states in the BSR, Bulgarians experienced no widespread “awakening” to Russia’s revisionist threat, influence operations, or hybrid warfare after Moscow illegally annexed Crimea and then destabilized eastern Ukraine in early 2014. Even in the wake of Crimea’s annexation, Bulgaria still sought to preserve good relations with Moscow for domestic political reasons and because of Russia’s significant influence resulting from historic and cultural ties and Bulgaria’s political, economic, and energy dependencies. A small group of academics did begin sounding the alarm, however, about Russian hybrid attacks. In 2015, Russia was suspected of poisoning a Bulgarian arms dealer, Emilian Gebrev, and there were reports of suspicious explosions in his factories, including as recently as July 2022. These incidents were not properly investigated at the time, in part because of corrupt interests. As Bulgaria’s then-president Rosen Plevneliev said in 2015, Bulgarian intelligence was “not willing to counter Russian intelligence and hybrid warfare” in the country.
+
+Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine however, could mark a major turning point in Bulgaria’s bilateral relationship with Russia and also in its relationships to the Euro-Atlantic institutions. Russia’s invasion and brutality have reverberated powerfully in Bulgaria. Bulgarians were deeply shocked by Moscow’s aggression against Ukraine, and they turned out in droves to publicly protest the war in the early weeks after the invasion. At the time, Bulgaria’s pro-Western prime minister Kiril Petkov hoped to demonstrate Bulgaria’s unequivocal support for Ukraine and express full solidarity with NATO and EU partners in opposing the war. He was partially successful: the government joined EU sanctions, expelled several Russian diplomats, and offered to repair military equipment for Ukraine. Pro-Western officials hoped to do more, but internal political divisions between pro-Russia and Russia-critical politicians as well as narratives about Bulgaria’s supposed “neutrality” in the conflict (despite membership in NATO) limited the government’s initial response.
+
+Indeed, Petkov’s coalition government nearly collapsed over a parliamentary debate in April 2022 over whether Bulgaria should send weapons to Ukraine in the aftermath of the invasion. Pro-Western politicians in parliament hoped Bulgaria might do more for Ukraine, including, for example, by donating some of Bulgaria’s legacy Soviet equipment — which could have made a difference in the conflict — and then perhaps gaining credit to recapitalize Bulgaria’s national capabilities (as Slovenia did). However, Bulgarian president Rumen Radev and the BSP — part of the four-party governing coalition — refused to allow shipment of ammunition to Ukraine, arguing that it could drag Bulgaria into conflict and make it a direct party to the war. Ultimately, Ukraine’s president Volodymyr Zelensky offered a path for compromise by requesting only the repair of military equipment. This proposal allowed Bulgaria to publicly side with Ukraine without sending ammunition. Since then, Bulgaria found ways to quietly ship weapons to Ukraine, and in November 2022 lawmakers finally voted to send heavy military aid to Ukraine.
+
+Bulgaria generally shares concerns with the other littoral states about Russia’s attempts to dominate the Black Sea and undermine freedom of navigation. The Bulgarian navy has pointed to the Russian revisionist threat for some time, citing Russia’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities in Crimea and its closures of international waters for military exercises as threats to Bulgaria. The government in Sofia sees some limits, however, to what NATO can do to counter Russia in the Black Sea maritime space, in part because of Bulgaria’s attempts to preserve good relations with Russia and because of Turkey’s commitment to strictly upholding the Montreux Convention. For Bulgaria, which has a very small navy, inter-allied cooperation at sea has been complicated by Sofia’s efforts to preserve good relations with Moscow and by its deep-seated suspicions of a militarily strong and politically independent Turkey, which it fears could use its position in NATO for national purposes. (Pro-Russian forces and nationalists in Bulgaria also exploit this narrative for their own purposes). A Bulgarian defense official claimed he feared the Black Sea could become a “Turkish-Russian lake.”
+
+While Romania has focused on addressing a direct threat from the east, Bulgaria has increased its focus on addressing Russia’s channels of influence in Bulgaria, especially through corruption and rule of law challenges. Former prime minister Petkov said in a recent interview that his government had managed to “curb corruption locally but found we had a bigger enemy: Russian influence,” noting “corruption and Russian influence in Bulgaria are the same thing.” Interlocutors in the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense spoke at length about how Russia exploits corrupt interests in the economy and in the media and elsewhere for influence; they mentioned that even Facebook’s content moderator in Bulgaria has opaque ties to Russia. Russia benefits from corruption and also from preserving political instability in Bulgaria. When Petkov’s government fell in June 2022, President Radev appointed a caretaker government and instructed it to avoid “getting caught up in the conflict” with Russia.
+
+The war in Ukraine has shed light on domestic political divisions and on Bulgaria’s significant political, economic, and energy dependencies on Russia. Early in the conflict, Petkov’s government was able to manage the politics and begin to significantly reduce the dependencies, especially in energy, and chip away at Moscow’s channels for malign influence in Bulgaria. Perhaps the most important of those channels since the end of the Cold War has been the Bulgarian people’s general goodwill and trust in Russia. After Russia’s full-scale invasion in February, public attitudes in Bulgaria changed markedly. A majority of Bulgarians had begun to view Russia as the main threat to their security; more than 60 percent favored tougher sanctions against Moscow, and Putin’s approval rating more than halved to 25 percent. Whether these public opinion trends continue in Bulgaria depends on what happens in the war in Ukraine and on whether Russia can recover its goodwill by stirring nationalist and anti-democratic sentiment in Bulgaria, exploiting prolonged political instability or reconstituting some of Bulgaria’s dependencies on Russia.
+
+Bulgaria also reduced its dependence on Russia as a source of energy. In late April 2022, Russia cut gas supplies to Bulgaria and Poland after contracts came up for renewal and both countries refused to make payments in rubles. At the time, Bulgaria was dependent on Russia for approximately 90 percent of its gas supply. Petkov called Russia’s decision “blackmail” and pursued plans to diversify Bulgaria’s energy sources, including by striking a deal with Azerbaijan and accelerating progress on a Bulgaria-Greece interconnector. The United States can help Bulgaria and Greece (and others in the Western Balkans) diversify by providing liquefied natural gas through a new facility in Alexandroupolos, Greece. In the nuclear sector, Bulgaria struggled to transition its Kozluduy nuclear power plant to alternative fuels, but fuel for the plant will likely come from non-Russian suppliers in the future. Petkov’s efforts met some domestic resistance, however. BSP leader Korneliya Ninova called for negotiations with Gazprom to resume supply, and future governments will face pressure to demonstrate that it is both possible and cheaper to diversify.
+
+Since the 2022 escalation of the war in Ukraine began, the Bulgarian government has expelled several Russian diplomats and dismissed senior Bulgarian officials on counts of espionage, including the former defense minister Stefan Yanev. While in office early in the war, Yanev repeated the Russian verbiage about a “special military operation” and attempted to prevent Sofia from expressing full solidarity with Ukraine and with Bulgaria’s NATO allies. Yanev is also reported to have tried to stall progress on NATO’s battlegroup for Bulgaria, insisting on national leadership for the battlegroup and calling on NATO only to fill any necessary gaps. After resigning, Yanev started a new political party, Bulgaria Rise, with some support from within the military, to focus on traditional conservative values. The short-lived coalition government under Petkov managed to generally strengthen Bulgaria’s contributions to NATO and the alliance’s presence in Bulgaria, but it had to do so while managing the optics for domestic political purposes.
+
+The war in Ukraine has brought a stronger NATO to Bulgaria. Bulgaria now hosts one of the new NATO battlegroups and has taken steps to increase cooperation with Romania, its most important regional ally. Bulgaria supported NATO’s Headquarters Multinational Division Southeast and the tailored Forward Presence after 2016, and it hosts a NATO Force Integration Unit and a Center of Excellence. It engages in cross-border air policing missions and training at Novo Sela, and it has stood up a new Maritime Coordination Center in Varna, which could take over the coordination function from Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM) in Northwood, United Kingdom if opposition from allies, such as Turkey, can be overcome. The summer 2022 blockage of the sea lines of communication also brought a new openness in Bulgaria to potential cooperation with Turkey and a new sense of urgency for Bulgarian defense modernization. The country’s Soviet-vintage MiG-29s cannot be serviced in Russia or Ukraine and will soon come out of service; the next generation will be U.S. F-16s, just as in Romania. Once Bulgaria operates F-16s, it will cut the ties with Russia that shaped a generation of air force generals’ perspectives (including that of President Radev) and open channels for closer cooperation with Romania.
+
+Political instability in Bulgaria persists, however, and Russia has an interest in perpetuating it. A stable majority seems out of reach and there is no guarantee that a next government will be any stronger or more stable than Petkov’s four-party coalition. Bulgaria has more work to do to address corruption and rule of law challenges, cut dependencies on Russia, and address Russia’s influence in the media and information environment. Academics and analysts who follow Bulgarian politics closely, however, believe that the war in Ukraine dealt a serious blow to Russia’s traditional channels of influence. Even those Bulgarians who still support cooperation with Russia are having to review their position; the Kremlin simply cannot keep them on its side.
+
+
+### Toward a New U.S. Black Sea Strategy
+
+Many of the building blocks for a comprehensive U.S. Black Sea strategy are already in place. Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine has focused U.S. and European attention on the region. At an extraordinary NATO summit in March, the allies agreed to strengthen defense and deterrence in southeast Europe and the United States has significantly expanded its force presence in Europe. Through diplomacy and intelligence sharing, the United States succeeded, in the first phase of this war, in restoring leadership in NATO and generating solidarity across the alliance and more broadly. Sweden and Finland decided to apply for NATO membership, and the alliance has adopted a new Strategic Concept that identifies Russia as the “most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.”
+
+The challenge now, as the United States implements its National Defense Strategy and as NATO implements a new Strategic Concept, is to continue support for Ukraine while developing a framework to address Black Sea security in a comprehensive way. The framework should go beyond hardening NATO’s borders to include military, economic, energy, information, security assistance, and other measures, and it should marshal the capacities, capabilities, and experiences of the littoral states and relevant organizations, including NATO, the European Union, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). It should work across seams, including in the United States between the United States European Command (EUCOM) and United States Central Command (CENTCOM) (whose areas of operations cover the Middle East and Central Asia) and across NATO and EU members and partner states.
+
+The centerpiece should be learning to think about the BSR as a coherent space that is deeply interconnected to surrounding regions — Europe, as well as the Caspian and eastern Mediterranean. Because the BSR comprises states with varying relationships to Euro-Atlantic institutions, building a comprehensive strategy based on a shared understanding of the Black Sea security environment has proven difficult. Allied defense planning, particularly in the context of a major war against Russia, also remains challenging. The littoral states that are NATO allies or NATO partners, however, all share interests in regional cooperation to improve shared situational awareness, restore the balance of power in the Black Sea, and ensure that the international norms and rules that governed the region in the past are upheld. These include national sovereignty, territorial integrity, freedom of navigation, open lines of communication for telecommunications and energy, and connectivity among the Black Sea littoral states and between the region and the neighboring European Union, Caspian, Middle East, and eastern Mediterranean.
+
+The war in Ukraine now plays a critical role. The conflict raised the salience of the BSR for Europe. It has highlighted regional vulnerabilities in the face of an expansionist Russia as well as the West’s challenge of safeguarding its interests in a region where states have different perceptions of the Russian threat and varied relationships with NATO and the European Union. Concerned about the potential economic consequences and terrified that the war will spread, some states — Bulgaria, Georgia, and Turkey — are more reluctant to implement measures that Moscow might perceive as provocative. Their reluctance is of different degrees and for different reasons but is at least in part bound up with Russian influence and challenges with corruption, rule of law, and democratic resilience. It also reflects wariness about how the war will play out and the danger that a resentful, expansionist Russia could regroup, rearm, and seek other targets.
+
+The United States and its allies should in the short term focus on scaling up security assistance to Ukraine in a way that suggests they are serious about enabling Kyiv to push Russian forces from its territory and end the war on favorable terms. Though the outcome of the war remains unclear, a long-lasting confrontation between Russia and the West is almost certain to ensue. While the Black Sea has arguably been a secondary consideration for U.S. and NATO planners since 2014, the prospect of sustained confrontation in the region requires the alliance to place a higher priority than in the past on (1) deterring Russian aggression against NATO allies, while increasing support for neighboring partner states Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine and encouraging cooperation between allies and partners; (2) maximizing the free movement of goods, people, and ideas in all directions around and across the Black Sea; and (3) maintaining robust ties with governments and people east of the Black Sea.
+
+Because of the war in Ukraine and its wide-ranging impact on the BSR, the United States has an opportunity to strengthen its leadership in the region and put a new strategy in place that includes a comprehensive approach to regional security, strengthens deterrence and defense, improves regional allies and partners’ resilience to Russian influence across domains and across the spectrum of conflict, and builds on advantages against Russia’s coercive actions. The new U.S. Black Sea strategy should include several main pillars:
+
+#### 1. STRENGTHEN U.S. LEADERSHIP AND PRESENCE.
+
+The United States demonstrated decisive leadership in generating unity in Europe in response to the outbreak of war in Ukraine through diplomacy, consultations with allies, and intelligence sharing. U.S. attention and presence in the region matters; it signals to Black Sea allies and partners as well as to Russia that the United States remains focused on the BSR even as it prioritizes other regions and issues. Indeed, U.S. resources and bandwidth will be limited by priorities in the Indo-Pacific and elsewhere, but there is still no regional ally or group of allies that can substitute for U.S. leadership or catalyze regional cooperation. As Jim Townsend argued in his 2021 congressional testimony, “it does not have to be the U.S. that shoulders this burden alone, but it does fall to the U.S. to lead the way.” U.S. leadership and presence can facilitate burden sharing and support the development of a comprehensive strategy, even if the United States is not always at the forefront operationally.
+
+In the military realm, the United States should incentivize regional cooperation and accelerate the modernization of regional forces. The United States has already dispersed forces to Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and elsewhere, and it should ensure that enablers are in place should NATO’s battlegroups need to be supplemented by additional forces. The United States should ensure NATO makes progress toward military mobility and readiness goals and incentivize cooperation among regional allies, including in maritime ISR, coastal defense, and air policing. The United States should accelerate F-16 deliveries for Bulgaria and authorize third-party transfer for Romania’s F-16 deal with Norway. It should attempt to secure congressional authorization for F-16 sales to Turkey while being open to sharing other capabilities with Ankara.
+
+The United States’ financial, economic, and diplomatic presence are equally important because regional security challenges are multidimensional. The United States should put pressure on NATO and the European Union to coordinate military activities with economic, energy, information, and other initiatives designed to address regional states’ weaknesses and dependencies that Russia has exploited for decades (and which China is also able to exploit). Such programs include the Three Seas Initiative, which supports infrastructure and connectivity within the BSR as well as with neighboring regions and the global economy. The United States should support closer cooperation between NATO and the European Union as well as with the OSCE and others in support of a comprehensive approach to BSR security.
+
+The United States has a particularly important role to play in ensuring support for NATO partner states, which cannot count on the protections of Article 5. With both Moldova and Georgia suffering from political uncertainty and instability, U.S. options are limited. Nevertheless, continued, visible engagement, especially through military channels, remains an important tool for reinforcing Georgia and Moldova’s alignment with Euro-Atlantic institutions. At the same time, Ukraine’s impressive resistance against Russian aggression has highlighted the value of relatively small, inexpensive air and coastal defense systems, drones, and other low-end capabilities that can be shared with partner states without compromising NATO readiness. The alliance should also do more to integrate Chișinău and Tbilisi into a shared situational awareness framework through information sharing and provision of sensors and other tools. Regional connectivity initiatives (see below) should also encompass Georgia, Moldova, and other vulnerable partner states where possible.
+
+#### 2. BOLSTER NATO IN THE SOUTHEAST.
+
+The United States should push NATO to go beyond strengthening defense and deterrence for the three allies in the southeast flank along the Black Sea littoral. NATO should also sustain and strengthen support for Ukraine and other regional partners and enhance flexible and “minilateral” security cooperation among allies and between allies and partners within and outside of NATO structures. NATO recognized that its presence in the southeast was inadequate after 2014 and has since taken steps to rebalance its attention and resources from the Baltic states and Poland to the southeast. These efforts included the deployment of four new battlegroups for the region and a significant increase in high-readiness forces to 300,000 troops, which reflects the vision and recommendations laid out by Center for European Policy Analysis authors in 2020 in their report, One Flank, One Threat, One Presence.
+
+To defend “every inch” of NATO territory, the alliance should also take steps to strengthen the weaker allies along the Black Sea littoral — especially Romania and Bulgaria — by facilitating their modernization, by making more frequent senior-level visits, and by incentivizing bilateral cooperation between Romania and Bulgaria as well as among the allies along the wider eastern flank, including Poland and Greece. To be credible, defense plans for Turkey must be synchronized with national plans, capabilities development, training, and exercises — and plans must be in place to surge multinational forces along the coast, including with air and missile defense and prepositioned equipment. Modernization need not entail enormous financial outlays. Relatively inexpensive uncrewed systems (both aerial and maritime) and coastal defense capabilities can have a significant impact, including for protection of vulnerable offshore energy assets.
+
+Deterring attack on the NATO allies is inadequate for the southeast, however. NATO must sustain its support for Ukraine and Georgia and enhance cooperation among allies and partners both within and outside of NATO structures. NATO and its partners should strengthen their sea power in ways that are consistent with the Montreux Convention, which does not restrict non-littoral states’ ability to dispatch land or air assets to the region. NATO can enhance its sea power through more mobile coastal defense capabilities, through cooperation among the littoral states’ navies and coastguards for situational awareness, and by building on NATO’s maritime presence with the annual U.S.-led Sea Breeze exercise and others open to partner participation. The United States should take advantage of an opportunity to strengthen cooperation between Romania and Turkey at sea and encourage the transfer of NATO’s maritime coordination function from MARCOM in Northwood, United Kingdom, to Varna, Bulgaria.
+
+#### 3. PURSUE A NEW STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIUM WITH TURKEY.
+
+Enhancing NATO sea power will depend on improving relations between the United States and Turkey. Given resource constraints and the need to focus on the Indo-Pacific, any U.S. strategy for the Black Sea will have to encompass a larger role for Turkey; as one U.S. defense official put it, NATO’s options for a stronger defense posture in the Black Sea are “Turkey or nothing.” With its improving naval capabilities (including sea-launched uncrewed aerial vehicles) and strong relationships with most of the other regional states, Turkey seems like a natural cornerstone for an enhanced allied presence in the Black Sea. Ankara, however, remains wary of taking on a more prominent role not just because of internal political and economic difficulties but because it seeks to avoid an escalation of the conflict with Russia, prioritizes other theaters and threats, and questions the extent to which NATO will back it up in any clash that does occur. Other allies and partners, meanwhile, remain wary of a more assertive Turkey. Washington’s challenge, therefore, is to encourage Ankara to do more for regional security while ameliorating other states’ concerns.
+
+Regardless of the state of its relationships with Washington or Brussels, Turkey’s interest in preventing Russian domination of the Black Sea and commitment to deepening ties with Ukraine and the states of the South Caucasus are broadly consistent with U.S. and NATO priorities. The United States should therefore seek opportunities to work with Ankara on enhancing regional security, leveraging Turkey’s special relationships, especially with Kyiv and Tbilisi, to promote shared objectives. Whether under the NATO umbrella or outside it, Turkey can provide partner states additional capabilities that bolster their resilience and military capabilities — drones in the first instance but also naval platforms, air defense, domain awareness, and others.
+
+A more active partnership in the Black Sea can be one component of a broader effort to revive pragmatic cooperation with Turkey. Such cooperation will require the United States to account both for Ankara’s interests outside the North Atlantic space and for its pursuit of greater strategic autonomy, while also offering reassurance to allies wary of a more ambitious Turkey. Many of the sources of Turkish mistrust toward the United States and NATO are almost ontological and therefore beyond the scope of any specific policy to resolve; others are exacerbated by preelection campaigning. However, at least some problems in the bilateral relationship can be addressed — including securing congressional approval for the sale of F-16s, lightening export restrictions, and downgrading U.S. involvement with PKK-linked groups in Syria. Likewise, the United States could do more to meet Turkey’s requests for air defense capabilities, perhaps in the context of a deal to sideline the S-400 and exempt Turkey from sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act. Reducing support for PKK-aligned forces in particular would send an important signal that the United States takes Turkish security concerns seriously, which would be critical for getting Ankara to be more forward-leaning on U.S. priorities elsewhere, including in the Black Sea and southeastern Europe.
+
+Enhancing Washington’s own operations and basing in the eastern Mediterranean, while working diplomatically to ameliorate some of the tensions between Ankara and Sofia — and between Ankara and Athens — would also allow Turkey to shift more of its existing assets to the Black Sea. Turkey’s offer of its Anadolu-class ships to the alliance as a shared NATO capability should also be seriously considered.
+
+Such steps should be offered as part of a broader agreement to improve U.S.-Turkish strategic cooperation, with Washington continuing to press Ankara over its provocations toward NATO allies and undermining of U.S. sanctions (on Russia as well as on Iran). Rather than seeking complete agreement with Ankara, the United States should focus on securing Turkish buy-in on a handful of key issues — including ensuring a forward presence in the Black Sea. Given Ankara’s emphasis on Montreux, any enhanced allied presence in the region will have to remain within the convention’s restrictions. In addition to rotational naval deployments and patrols allowed under Montreux, NATO should emphasize joint operations in the land and aerial domains. Improved situational awareness, air policing, and coastal defense would all enhance regional security while remaining compliant with Montreux. To ensure greater buy-in from the other littoral states, the United States should also encourage Turkey to participate in multilateral operations and initiatives wherever and whenever possible. Such cooperation need not take place under the NATO umbrella; “minilateral” cooperation with states like the United Kingdom and Poland can act as both a force multiplier and a source of reassurance for the other littoral states. A Turkey that is more embedded in multilateral initiatives and on better terms with Washington will be a better partner for both the smaller littoral states and other NATO allies.
+
+With the AKP emphasizing nationalist posturing and pursuing trade and other deals with Russia to shore up Turkey’s flailing economy, more serious efforts to reset U.S.-Turkish relations will have to wait until Turkish domestic politics have — hopefully — calmed down following presidential elections this spring. Either a reelected Erdoğan or a new leader from the opposition might be more pragmatic about NATO and the United States, especially if Washington is willing to address Ankara’s ongoing concerns about Syria and the PKK. Yet Turkey’s transformation into a major regional power with priority interests along its southern border and in the eastern Mediterranean will continue, regardless of whether Erdoğan and the AKP remain in power.
+
+#### 4. EMPHASIZE AND STRENGTHEN DEMOCRATIC RESILIENCE.
+
+The United States and NATO must consider regional security and resilience in a comprehensive and inclusive way. Russia’s expanding footprint was the result of not only military deployments but success in establishing points of leverage in the political and economic systems of NATO allies and partners alike through corruption, dependencies, and other forms of malign influence. This problem is particularly acute in the wider BSR (along with the Western Balkans), with its constellation of states burdened with weak institutions, ethnic rivalries, and post-Communist political systems. State capture is a significant problem in Georgia, while disinformation and Russian financial flows have further eroded democratic governance in Bulgaria and Moldova. Romania is endangered by persistent cyberattacks, naval hybrid warfare, and disinformation targeting its democratic institutions. State capture, Russian disinformation, and malign influence make BSR states less secure and less capable partners for the United States and NATO.
+
+Economic and democratic resilience are the responsibility of individual states, but the United States, NATO, and the European Union play an important role in pushing Black Sea states to strengthen the rule of law and counter corruption, two of the main vehicles for Russian malign influence. They can increase the share of funds devoted to democratic resilience, support efforts to reduce economic or energy dependence on Russia, and help allies and partners move away from legacy Soviet military equipment. The United States and its allies and partners should also keep a watchful eye on the media environment in the BSR, ensure transparency around ownership of mass media, and facilitate exchanges and other programs to build media literacy skills across the region. NATO must continue to demonstrate benefits of Euro-Atlantic integration, deploy counter-hybrid support teams to address diverse threats, and build on local initiatives such as the Euro-Atlantic Resilience Center in Bucharest.
+
+#### 5. PROMOTE REGIONAL CONNECTIVITY.
+
+Equally important is reducing these states’ vulnerability to Russian economic coercion. Because of the war and sanctions on Russia, a growing share of east-west transit is already moving through Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and southeastern Europe (a regional trade association expects the yearly volume of cargo moving through Central Asia and the Caucasus to increase sixfold in 2022). Not only does that shift allow regional states to capture greater transit revenues, it also creates an opportunity to accelerate the development of critical infrastructure and accelerate economic decoupling from Russia. Sustaining that decoupling over the longer term requires investment in new roads, railways, pipelines, fiber-optics, port facilities, and other infrastructure. As with the Anaklia port project, geopolitical complexity (including Russian influence) and high up-front costs act as a brake on investment. Even China is pulling back because of debt concerns.
+
+This environment provides an opportunity for the United States and its allies to revive the effort to enhance connectivity that animated U.S. and European policy in the late 1990s. Governments and international financial institutions such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Asian Development Bank should prioritize projects of strategic significance, such as a Georgian deep-sea port and additional Caspian pipeline capacity, by providing loan guarantees, insurance, and offers of security assistance to encourage investment. The European Union took an important step in this direction in July 2022 when it agreed with the government of Azerbaijan to boost gas imports and enhance the capacity of the Southern Gas Corridor. These institutions should similarly be willing to assist Turkey with the development of new hydrocarbon sources in the Black Sea and (subject to agreement with its neighbors) the eastern Mediterranean. That approach would require an acknowledgment that projects of strategic significance cannot always be left to the market and that a greater degree of state support will likely be necessary to hedge risk and mobilize the necessary investment. It also requires thinking about infrastructure and connectivity as strategic initiatives in parallel with military support. Using existing frameworks like the Three Seas Initiative and the Southern Gas Corridor for building out connectivity across the wider BSR can ensure synergies between new projects while prioritizing those that enhance regional security and stability.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+The Russian invasion of Ukraine has brought to a head long-standing concerns among U.S. allies and partners about the deteriorating security environment across the greater BSR. Regardless of how the war concludes, the Black Sea and its environs will remain on the front lines of strategic competition between NATO and Russia. How the United States manages its commitments to regional allies and partners will have a decisive impact on the outcome of that competition. Because of the region’s fragmentation and location on the far edge of NATO’s zone of responsibility, it represents a particularly challenging environment, but one whose importance the United States should not underestimate. Ensuring a more secure and stable Black Sea would offer a substantial benefit not just to the region itself but to Europe writ large — and to states further east that depend on the Black Sea as an outlet to the West.
+
+Despite the risks they face from a more aggressive Russia, regional states’ caution in the face of the invasion of Ukraine reflects their own anxieties, above all about the extent to which they can count on NATO protection in a crisis. The alliance’s comparative neglect of the Black Sea, even after 2014, has contributed to these anxieties. Fearful of Russian revanchism, keen to preserve friendly relations with Russia, or uncertain about NATO’s ability to protect them, allies such as Turkey and Bulgaria and partners such as Georgia have walked a careful line in their dealings with Moscow. This understandable caution, has in turn, created openings for Russian information and other influence operations. NATO now faces something of a vicious circle: fearful governments have gone out of their way to avoid provoking Russia, in the process complicating U.S. and other allied efforts to adopt a more robust response. Uncertainty prompts strategic hedging, which only creates further uncertainty.
+
+Cutting this Gordian knot requires recognition that the Black Sea can no longer be peripheral to the campaign of checking Russian aggression. Regional allies and partners need to resolve their own disputes and adopt a more cooperative approach to regional security. Doing so, however, will require an infusion of at least some U.S. leadership, forces, equipment, and attention. The Black Sea should not be a distraction from the pacing threat of China or other security challenges, but it ought to be seen (and resourced) as a crucial theater in its own right.
+
+---
+
+__Lisa Aronsson__ is a research fellow for Europe and NATO at National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies and a non-resident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. Her research focuses on European defense and security, NATO, and transatlantic relations. Previously she worked as an analyst at the Congressional Research Service and at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London.
+
+__Jeffrey Mankoff__ is a distinguished research fellow at National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies and a non-resident senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). His research focuses on Russian foreign policy, Eurasian geopolitics, and the role of history and memory in international relations.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-06-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-1.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-06-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-1.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..e348efef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-06-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-1.md
@@ -0,0 +1,245 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第一日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-02-06 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 18被告答辯 伍健偉認罪：我顛覆極權國家政權未成功 梁國雄：無罪可認，對抗暴政無罪
+- 區諾軒、趙家賢、鍾錦麟和林景楠4人將任控方證人 料下周一傳召
+- 控方：被告承諾無差別否決財政預算、迫特首解散立會 圖顛覆國家政權
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，32人已還柙至今逾23個月。其中16人不認罪，今（6日）於西九龍法院（暫代高院）正式開審，預計審期90日。16名不認罪被告，及原擬不認罪、後改為認罪的林景楠和伍健偉應訊，於庭上正式答辯。其中伍健偉說：「法官閣下，我顛覆極權國家政權未成功，我承認控罪 」，鄒家成逐字高喊：「不！認！罪！」，梁國雄則說：「無罪可認，爭取普選無罪，對抗暴政無罪。」
+
+此外，何桂藍質疑今早才收到最新的開案陳詞，發現控罪詳情已刪去指控被告「威脅使用武力」，與控罪字眼不一，說「你 charge 都唔清楚叫人 plea，點 plea 啊大佬」，法官指其律師會向她解釋。此外，庭上有被告在控方發言時發出聲音，法官陳慶偉警告被告勿干擾法庭程序，否則會安排他整個審訊都坐在囚室門後。
+
+#### 吳政亨右手紮三角繃帶 認罪6被告列席
+
+審訊不設陪審團，由3名國安法指定法官陳慶偉、李運騰及陳仲衡審理。控方代表為副刑事檢控專員萬德豪及周天行，辯方代表包括大律師沈士文、張耀良、黃宇逸、關文渭、馬維騉、盧敏儀、石書銘、黃廷光、Trevor Beel 等，本身是大律師的劉偉聰則會自辯。而審前覆核由大律師沈仲平代表的林景楠，早前透露因沈「沒有根據我的指示向法庭傳達我要求傳達的訊息」而將他解聘，今改由大律師吳漢輝代表。
+
+不認罪被告，包括獲准保釋的鄭達鴻、楊雪盈、彭卓棋、何啟明、劉偉聰、黃碧雲、施德來、陳志全、柯耀林、李予信10人，及還柙的何桂藍、吳政亨、鄒家成、林卓廷、梁國雄及余慧明6人，及原擬不認罪、後改為認罪的伍健偉和林景楠出席。另外，認罪的岑敖暉、馮達浚、黃之鋒、袁嘉蔚、吳敏兒、毛孟靜6人亦有列席。
+
+
+▲ 劉偉聰
+
+
+▲ 李予信
+
+
+▲ 鄭達鴻
+
+還柙被告於約10時陸續入庭，林卓廷向獲保釋的黃碧雲揮手，梁國雄入場時有人喊「毛哥！」，法庭職員稱「唔好叫」。早前因做運動意外受傷的吳政亨，身穿西裝出席，右手紮三角繃帶，有旁聽人士讚「幾靚仔」，袁嘉蔚剪了「冬菇頭」，鄒家成則頻頻笑着向旁聽席揮手和比劃手勢。梁國雄妻子陳寶瑩、民主黨劉慧卿、社民連曾健成等均有旁聽。
+
+#### 改認罪兩被告答辯 伍健偉：我顛覆極權國家政權未成功，我承認控罪
+
+萬德豪先表示，原擬不認罪、後改為認罪的伍健偉和林景楠，須再作答辯。法官陳慶偉指那所有被告都要答辯，萬指認為不需要，惟陳慶偉重申看不到為何部分人不需答辯。
+
+法庭書記其後向被告讀出控罪，被告逐一答辯，就改為認罪的林景楠和伍健偉，伍健偉說：「法官閣下，我顛覆極權國家政權未成功，我承認控罪 」，林景楠則說：「我認罪。」
+
+#### 鄒家成：不！認！罪！ 梁國雄：無罪可認，對抗暴政無罪
+
+至於不認罪被告，自辯的劉偉聰在律師席稱「My Lord, not guilty.」，陳志全高聲說：「不認罪！」，鄒家成亦逐字高喊：「不！認！罪！」，身旁被告起鬨。林卓廷面帶凝重說：「法官閣下，我不認罪」，余慧明堅定說：「我不認罪！」，梁國雄則說：「無罪可認，爭取普選無罪，對抗暴政無罪」，有旁聽人士發笑。法官陳慶偉嚴肅向旁聽席說：「這是一個很莊嚴的場合，我一直都尊重每個被告及公眾，所以也希望你給予同樣的尊重，多謝。」
+
+#### 何桂藍質疑控罪詳情已改：你 charge 都唔清楚叫人 plea，點 plea 啊大佬
+
+輪到何桂藍時，她表示，「唔好意思我有個問題，因為律政司好鍾意做 deadline fighter，我今朝先攞到最新嘅 opening」，並指剛發現控罪詳情已刪除指控被告以「threat of force（威脅使用武力）」的非法手段犯案，但剛讀出的控罪仍有相關字眼，問「我係認緊邊條？」，「咁你仲告唔告我哋威脅使用武力㗎而家？」法官陳仲衡問何的大律師 Trevor Beel 是否已向何解釋修訂，Beel 稱稍後會解釋。
+
+其後到吳政亨答辯，他指在答辯前，認為何桂藍希望發言。法官陳慶偉指他不是要求答辯，何桂藍即喊：「你 charge 都唔清楚叫人 plea，點 plea 啊大佬？」陳慶偉指其代表律師會向她解釋，何桂藍重申她是不認罪，又指「我都好尊重法庭」，但「我唔明點解問人答辯嗰日條 charge 都唔清唔楚，總之我 not guilty 嘅，唔使嘥時間，多謝」。Trevor Beel 稱因控罪同時提及武力及其他非法手段，但控方在開案陳詞的指控修訂為武力以外的非法手段，故何有此混淆，會再向她解釋。吳政亨最後說：「I plead not guilty my Lord.」
+
+#### 法官稱被告不應在位上叫嚷 警告或安排審訊時坐囚室門後
+
+法官陳慶偉其後一度指，理解何桂藍是不認罪，何桂藍即在被告欄高喊：「係啊！」官指她「不需叫嚷（no need to yell）」，何再回應自己是「正常講嘢聲量」。法官李運騰並指，法庭的慣常做法，是當被告有法律代表，便應透過律師作出指示，此時何桂藍與身旁懲教人員發生推撞。
+
+法庭其後討論被告在審訊期間使用電子器材及專家證人等安排，期間有被告發笑，伍健偉並在欄內嘲「too simple, sometimes naive」，此時陳慶偉指：「你可否停止？我不會容許被告打斷法庭程序，你不應在位上叫嚷」，又指法庭有規矩和程序，警告若被告再打斷法庭程序，會安排他審訊期間坐在囚室門後。陳又指，他過去曾在另一宗案件中下令被告於整個審訊期間坐在囚室門後，因該被告不斷騷擾作為控方證人的女兒。
+
+法庭於11時20分左右休庭，法官並指已認罪的林景楠及伍健偉可先行離開，惟伍健偉代表律師指他希望繼續留下。散庭前，岑敖暉舉手欲發言，惟法官不作理會，繼續離庭，陳慶偉並說「Counsel（律師）」，着他找律師。散庭時，曾健成高喊：「大家頂住啊，阿毛！阿廷！」
+
+#### 吳政亨申審訊遷就物理治療 官批被告用電腦做筆記
+
+此外，代表吳政亨的大律師石書銘指，吳現時每星期約有一個早上需前往醫院做物理治療，但不希望錯過審訊，望法庭在其治療時間不會安排審訊。法官陳慶偉聞言即提議懲教安排吳於星期六或日求診，石書銘表示懲教也考慮過此做法，但公立醫院的物理治療部一般不會於星期六日辦公。陳慶偉重申，不會為了一名被告而延遲審訊，更何況物理治療的日子未定，指示律師團隊與懲教再進一步溝通。
+
+法官亦應辯方申請，批准被告審訊期間使用電腦閱讀文件及做筆記，但禁止他們以電腦來與外界溝通。他又表示，知道因安全原因，懲教或不會准許被告帶電腦回到監房，但法庭不會干預懲教的決定，他亦無權如此做，籲各被告自行考慮。
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，32人已還柙至今逾23個月。其中16人不認罪，今（6日）於西九龍法院（暫代高院）正式開審，預計審期90日。控方今透露，區諾軒、趙家賢、鍾錦麟和林景楠4人將任控方證人，控方需時2至3日讀出開案陳詞後，將首先傳召他們作供。有辯方律師表示，直至上月及上周始分別收到1萬3千頁新文件及1,200項沒有標題的未被使用材料，望申請下周一前不會傳召控方證人。
+
+18名被告今早正式答辯，當中伍健偉說：「法官閣下，我顛覆極權國家政權未成功，我承認控罪 」，鄒家成逐字高喊：「不！認！罪！」，梁國雄則說：「無罪可認，對抗暴政無罪，無罪可認。」
+
+#### 控方上周始交專家證人證供 官質疑會對被告不公
+
+控辯雙方現時未能同意所有承認事實，控方望傳召有關社交媒體的專家證人，就 Facebook 及 YouTube 等內容作供，並指僅9名被告同意將相關內容納為承認事實（admitted facts）。主控萬德豪指於1月收到相關證供後，已盡快將證供交予辯方考慮，頭兩份證供於1月16日提交、第3份於2月3日提交，並將於今天提交第4份證供，涉警長6533。
+
+法官李運騰多次追問，控方會否認為延遲向被告提供證供會造成不公，又指若控方一直未能收到相關證供，直至控方案情完結前最後一天才交予辯方是否有問題。萬稱那會非常不公，但強調現時沒有出現此情況，因控方已盡快提交，又重申辯方有至少一至兩星期準備。
+
+李運騰續指，控方將專家報告交辯方後，辯方需時找專家審視能否同意該供詞；若被告正申請法援，更需時報價決定尋找哪位專家，該專家亦需時撰寫報告以審視能否同意控方專家報告，反問該些程序是否能於兩星期內完成。萬德豪重申現時情況並非如此，李運騰反指他似乎頗「樂觀」，萬再稱控方案情共有55天，辯方會有足夠時間準備最終回應。控方其後又一度指，望能與所有被告就承認事實達成共識，惟陳慶偉指這只是妄想。
+
+#### 辯方稱上周始收大量文件 申下周一前不傳召控方證人
+
+代表黃碧雲及林卓廷的大律師沈士文表示，直至上月才收到來自控方的1萬3千頁新文件，包括同案被告的證供，並於上周三（2月1日）才收到1,200項沒有標題的未被使用材料（unused materials）。他又引控方指，將會一邊讀出開案陳詞，一邊播放影片，預料需時2至3日才能完成。
+
+沈士文指，辯方需時索取指示及調整其案情和盤問，望申請下周一前不會傳召控方證人，並指大部分被告均望下周一始傳證人。控方續指，若今午開始讀出開案陳詞，預料下周一可開始傳召證人，首4名出庭的控方證人為已認罪的區諾軒、趙家賢、鍾錦麟和林景楠，預料辯方需要頗長時間盤問。
+
+辯方大律師馬維騉一度申請先處理不受爭議的議題，稍後才傳召首名證人區諾軒，因區諾軒無論對控辯雙方而言都是重要的證人，他了解案發經過所有階段，而辯方於上周才收到部分證供，需時準備盤問內容。惟申請遭陳慶偉拒絕，又指輪到他盤問時，或已餘下不多的東西需盤問。
+
+#### 岑敖暉申每日列席審訊 稱朱凱廸亦望列席惟不獲懲教安排
+
+已認罪的岑敖暉今日亦被帶往法庭列席，他在午休前以英語親自向法官申請審訊期間每日列席，要求法官向懲教每日簽發提犯令（body order）。岑又提到朱凱廸同樣希望審訊期間列席，但因為沒有提犯令，所以懲教今天未有把他帶往法庭。法官打斷，指岑不能代表朱凱廸作出申請，著朱自行去信法庭申請。審訊現時休庭，下午將讀出開案陳詞。
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，32人已還柙逾23個月。16人不認罪，今（6日）於西九龍法院（暫代高院）開審。控方開案陳詞指稱，由前港大法律系副教授戴耀廷所提倡的「35+」計劃旨在「攬炒」及顛覆國家政權，民主派初選為其中關鍵一步，透過取得立會過半作為「大殺傷力憲制武器」，迫使政府回應訴求。控方續指，被告提倡及參與初選、承諾無差別地否決政府財政預算及其他議案，構成串謀實行犯罪計劃，當中33人簽署「墨落無悔」，而被告在《國安法》生效後仍按初選結果參選或不參選立法會，亦顯示他們遵守初選協議。
+
+控方以約一個半小時讀出開案陳詞首22段，明天再續，期間施德來、鄭達鴻、鄒家成等抄寫筆記，有部分被告則閉目養神。散庭前，法官陳慶偉特意提醒公眾人士有序及安靜地離開，又指不論立場如何，皆不可以騷擾控辯雙方團隊。陳表示暫無意指示庭內安裝閉路電視，但若任何人作出上述行為，便有可能干犯藐視法庭和判罰。散庭後，被告紛紛向旁聽席揮手，黃之鋒及伍健偉等說「辛苦晒！」，伍健偉則揮手說：「記得睇《一人婚禮》啊！」
+
+此外，何桂藍上午答辯時曾表示，今早才收到控方修訂的開案陳詞，刪去指控被告「威脅使用武力」，惟控罪仍保留相關字眼，問「我係認緊邊條？」，「咁你仲告唔告我哋威脅使用武力㗎而家？」法庭翻譯今午翻譯相關段落時，仍一度讀出控罪詳情內「威脅使用武力」的字眼，有被告起鬨，法官提醒開案陳詞沒有提及暴力，翻譯稱她或與原有版本混淆。
+
+#### 控方：被告同意以非法手段 嚴重干擾、阻撓香港政權機關
+
+被告今早進行答辯，控方透露區諾軒、趙家賢、鍾錦麟及林景楠將任控方證人。主控周天行下午讀出2月修訂的開案陳詞。他指，本案涉及一群政治人物，與他人串謀組織、策劃、或參與以非法手段，嚴重干擾、阻撓、破壞香港特別行政區政權機關依法履行職能的行為，旨在顛覆國家政權。
+
+
+▲ 控方代表 律政司副刑事檢控專員 周天行（資料圖片）
+
+本案涉及47名被告，案發時戴耀廷為法律系教授，區諾軒為前立法會議員及區議員，毛孟靜、黃碧雲、譚文豪、胡志偉、朱凱廸、郭家麒、楊岳橋及陳志全為立法會議員，尹兆堅、林卓廷為立法會議員兼區議員，梁國雄則為前立法會議員。
+
+而趙家賢、鍾錦麟、袁嘉蔚、梁晃維、鄭達鴻、徐子見、楊雪盈、彭卓棋、岑子杰、何啟明、劉偉聰、李嘉達、施德來、張可森、伍健偉、譚凱邦、范國威、柯耀林、岑敖暉、王百羽、李予信21人均為區議員。
+
+吳政亨、馮達浚、劉澤鋒、黃之鋒、譚得志、黃子悅、吳敏兒、何桂藍、劉頴匡、鄒家成、呂智恆、林景楠及余慧明13人則為政治人物、工會領袖或商人等。
+
+控方指，本案串謀的重要元素，是被告同意透過武力或威脅使用武力外的非法手段，嚴重干擾、阻撓、破壞香港政權機關依法履行職能的行為，即贊成無差別地否決政府提出的任何財政預算或公共開支，迫使特首解散立法會及辭職，以達致顛覆國家政權的目的。
+
+#### 控方邀法庭就「反送中」事件引用司法認知
+
+就本案發生的背景，控方指自2019年6月起，香港經歷由示威、暴力升級、破壞和縱火所造成的嚴重社會騷亂，暴力升級令大量財物被損壞、有人受襲擊，主要交通幹道和設施亦遭嚴重破壞和干擾。
+
+控方邀請法庭就該段時期的政治及社會事件引用「司法認知」，即法庭毋須證據便可接納為事實，包括：
+
+- 2019年2月，政府提出《逃犯條例》修訂草案；
+
+- 同年6月12日，立法會被示威者包圍，要求政府撤回草案；
+
+- 同年6月15日，行政長官宣布暫緩草案；
+
+- 同年7月1日，大批市民上街抗議《逃犯條例》修訂草案，其後部份示威者強行闖入立法會大樓；
+
+- 同年9月4日，行政長官宣布撤回《逃犯條例》修訂草案。
+
+#### 控方將依賴同案被告證供、初選文章及片段
+
+控方指，本案被告均是串謀參與者，並將主要依賴同案被告（accomplice witnesses）證供、有關初選的文章、廣告和宣傳、從被告搜獲的文件和材料，以及多段記者會、訪問、遊行和選舉論壇等公開影片作檢控。
+
+控方指，上述證據會顯示前港大法律系副教授戴耀廷，於約2019年12月發起「35+」計劃。他當時在《蘋果日報》首度撰文，宣揚奪取立法會大多數議席，以解散立法會迫使政府回應訴求；並在翌年1月30日，在 Facebook 呼籲民主派盡快透過初選達成共識，強調奪取過半議席的重要性，其後又與區諾軒在社交媒體發布大量文章爭取他人支持。
+
+#### 控方：戴耀廷稱35+目標抗衡中國政府、頻撰文提倡「攬炒」
+
+2020年3月26日，戴耀廷與區諾軒舉行記者會，解釋「35+」和初選的計劃，指取得立法會過半議席的目標，是取得足夠影響力，以抗衡中共及中國政府。庭上播放片段，戴表示雖然他或來自民主派光譜的不同部分，但「我諗大家都有一個幾強烈嘅共同理念，就係希望能夠立會過半」，取得「大殺傷力嘅憲制武器」，迫使政府接受其訴求，如問責警暴和重啟政改。戴指他與區諾軒正進行協調工作，強調望在5個選區分別爭取「6 6 4 4 3」議席，並呼籲市民登記做選民。
+
+同月31日，戴在《蘋果日報》發文〈立會過半是大殺傷力憲制武器〉，解釋無差別否決財政預算案，可觸發《基本法》機制解散立法會及迫使特首辭職，「符合這階段抗爭的大策略，就是令現有制度出現極度不穩」，而配合國際社會施壓，便有機會迫使中共在香港民主化上讓步。他並鼓勵公眾盡快取得商業登記證，以爭取功能組別議席。
+
+至2020年4月，戴耀廷再在《蘋果日報》發布題為〈攬炒的定義和時間〉和〈攬炒的時代意義〉的文章，進一步提倡攬炒議程。當中提及如何通過初選實現「攬炒」、實施「攬炒」的時間、以及如何利用攬炒作為顛覆的大策略（grand strategy）。他又指若中共解散立法會，會宣告「一國兩制」的終結，而街頭運動不足以使政權讓步，很多市民的心態已轉化，「準備來一次真正的攬炒，決心要死而後生。」同月28日，戴再發表〈真攬炒十步 這是香港宿命〉，訂下「真攬炒十步」，提及要無差別否決政府財政預算案。
+
+#### 控方：戴耀廷等5人為組織者 初選參選者均公開承諾盡力提倡「35+」目標
+
+控方指，串謀的關鍵一步是取得立法會的大多數議席，因此被告組織初選，透過在全港各區設立票站，讓選民以紙張或電子方式投票，分別在地區直選（港島、九龍東、九龍西、新界東、新界西）和功能界別（超區、衞生服務界），選出支持率最高的候選人參選立法會，以提高民主派當選機會。
+
+控方指，首5名被告：戴耀廷、區諾軒、趙家賢、鍾錦麟和吳政亨，是初選的組織者，他們設立初選的框架及與參與者討論協議條款，在不同範疇上有不可或缺的角色，包括監察、安排及管理財政、後勤和宣傳初選。民主動力和香港民意研究所則獲委託執行初選，並協助後勤安排。
+
+餘下42名被告則是初選的候選人，控方指他們公開承諾及同意盡力提倡「35+」的目標及遵守初選結果，亦同意若有候選人正式參選後被「DQ」，其他候選人可以「Plan B」身份代為參選，以提高奪取立法會大多數議席的可能性。
+
+
+▲ （資料圖片）
+
+控方並指，2020年2月至7月之間，戴耀廷和區諾軒舉辦一連串協調會議，與初選候選人討論如何實行初選，議題包括「35+」及無差別否決財政預算案的共同目標、在地區直選的目標議席數目，及候選人因應初選結果而須遵守的承諾和協議。
+
+#### 33不認罪被告簽「墨落無悔」 12人不認罪
+
+控方指，33名被告另簽署「墨落無悔 堅定抗爭 抗爭派立場聲明書」，承諾遵守初選協議，動用權力否決財政預算案以迫使特首回應「五大訴求」，包括17名認罪被告：袁嘉蔚、梁晃維、馮達浚、劉澤鋒、黃之鋒、李嘉達、譚得志、朱凱廸、張可森、黃子悅、伍健偉、吳敏兒、劉頴匡、呂智恆、岑敖暉、王百羽、譚文豪、郭家麒、楊岳橋、譚凱邦、范國威，及12名不認罪被告：楊雪盈、彭卓棋、何啟明、劉偉聰、施德來、何桂藍、陳志全、鄒家成、柯耀林、余慧明、鄭達鴻及李予信。
+
+其中譚文豪、郭家麒、楊岳橋、鄭達鴻和李予信5人，是以公民黨的名義簽署；譚凱邦和范國威則以新民主同盟的名義簽署。
+
+#### 控方：吳政亨發起「三投三不投」 確保候選人遵守協議
+
+控方並指，為確保候選人遵守協議，吳政亨於3月19日發起「三投三不投」聯署，籲選民不要投票給不支持初選、不參與初選及拒絕遵守初選結果的候選人，其聯署於《蘋果日報》廣告及吳政亨的社交平台廣泛傳播。
+
+#### 控方：被告於《國安法》生效後 仍如期進行初選
+
+控方續指，即使《國安法》於2020年6月30日實施，時任政制及內地事務局局長曾國衞亦作出公開聲明，但被告為了推動串謀，仍繼續原定協議，於7月11日及12日舉行初選。當中戴耀廷、區諾軒和趙家賢更舉辦了6場初選論壇，以宣傳其顛覆性主張，除尹兆堅和余慧明外的被告均有參與。論壇於網上播放，吸引共39萬8千次觀看次數。
+
+
+▲ （資料圖片）
+
+最終初選於7月11及12日舉行，逾60萬人在251個票站投票。74名參選人之中，31人當選，其中27人為本案被告，當中20人認罪，包括袁嘉蔚、梁晃維、岑子杰、毛孟靜、黃之鋒、譚文豪、李嘉達、譚得志、胡志偉、朱凱廸、張可森、黃子悅、伍健偉、尹兆堅、郭家麒、劉頴匡、楊岳橋、范國威、岑敖暉和王百羽；7人不認罪，包括鄭達鴻、何啟明、何桂藍、陳志全、鄒家成、林卓廷和余慧明。控方指，在所有關鍵時間，被告提倡初選並為選舉宣傳。
+
+#### 6人任「Plan B」、9人不參選立會 控方：遵守初選協議
+
+控方續指，中聯辦於7月14日公開譴責初選違反《國安法》，但所有勝出者仍根據承諾和協議，於7月20至29日報名參選立法會。其後9人被指非真誠擁護《基本法》及對香港特區忠誠，被取消參選資格，包括認罪的袁嘉蔚、梁晃維、黃之鋒、郭家麒、劉頴匡、楊岳橋及岑敖暉；及不認罪的鄭達鴻和何桂藍。
+
+控方續指，落選的15人中，6人以「Plan B」身份代替被 DQ 的被告報名參選，包括不認罪的楊雪盈和李予信；9人則沒有參選，包括不認罪的彭卓棋、劉偉聰、黃碧雲、施德來、梁國雄和柯耀林6人。控方指，顯示被告根據串謀計劃行事，遵守初選協議。
+
+#### 控方：若非選舉延期 涉案計劃將實現、嚴重影響公共服務及市民生活
+
+至2020年7月31日，政府以新冠疫情嚴重為由，宣布延遲立法會選舉。控方指，選舉事務處職員當時仍在考慮22名被告是否符合資格，包括認罪的徐子見、岑子杰、毛孟靜、馮達浚、譚文豪、李嘉達、譚得志、胡志偉、朱凱廸、張可森、黃子悅、伍健偉、尹兆堅、范國威和林景楠15人，及不認罪的楊雪盈、何啟明、陳志全、鄒家成、林卓廷、李予信和余慧明7人。
+
+
+▲ （資料圖片）
+
+#### 提倡及參與初選等 列推動串謀言行
+
+控方續指，本案被告推動串謀的行為和言論，包括：
+
+> (a) 透過協調會議，設計和訂立具約束力的協議，落實「三投三不投」以確保參與者遵守承諾，並於初選前透過傳媒和社交平台作出宣傳；
+
+> (b) 提倡初選，包括主要組織者所建立的機制和協調；
+
+> (c) 承諾將會無差別地否決政府的財政預算及其他議案，以圖實現「35+」計劃；
+
+> (d) 宣布參與初選，並呼籲公眾積極參與初選投票；
+
+> (e) 重申在取得立法會大多數控制權後，實行「35+」計劃的決心。
+
+控方將於明天繼續讀出案情。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
+
+
+
+### 24被告今出席
+
+不認罪被告，包括獲准保釋的鄭達鴻、楊雪盈、彭卓棋、何啟明、劉偉聰、黃碧雲、施德來、陳志全、柯耀林、李予信10人，還柙的何桂藍、吳政亨、鄒家成、林卓廷、梁國雄及余慧明6人，及原擬不認罪、後改為認罪的伍健偉和林景楠今出席。另外，認罪的岑敖暉、馮達浚、黃之鋒、袁嘉蔚、吳敏兒、毛孟靜6人亦有列席。林景楠於上午休庭後離開法庭。
+
+審訊不設陪審團，改由3名國安法指定法官陳慶偉、李運騰及陳仲衡審理。控方代表為副刑事檢控專員萬德豪及周天行，辯方代表為大律師沈士文、黃宇逸、關文渭、馬維騉、盧敏儀、石書銘、黃廷光、Trevor Beel 等。
+
+### 47人被控以非法手段 嚴重干擾、阻撓、破壞政權機關
+
+47人被控在2020年7月1日至2021年1月7日，在香港一同串謀及與其他人串謀，旨在顛覆國家政權而組織、策劃、實施或者參與實施，以威脅使用武力或其他非法手段，即：
+
+- 一、為以下目的宣揚、進行或參與一個謀劃，旨在濫用其在當選立法會議員後根據《基本法》第73條所受託的職權；
+
+> （A）在立法會取得大多數控制權，藉以對香港特區政府提出的任何財政預算或公共開支，不論當中內容或內容的利弊如何，均不予區別拒絕通過；
+
+> （B）迫使香港特區政府根據《基本法》第50條解散立法會，從而癱瘓政府運作；
+
+> （C）最終導致行政長官因立法會解散和重選的立法會拒絕通過原財政預算案而根據《基本法》第52條而辭職；
+
+- 二、為達致該謀劃，參選或不參選立法會選舉，及/或促致、煽動、引致、誘使他人參選或不參選該選舉；
+
+- 三、承諾或同意當選立法會議員後，及/或煽動、促使、引致、誘使他人當選立法會議員後，在審核或通過政府提出的財政預算或公共開支時，按照該謀劃，行使或不行使其根據《基本法》第73條所訂的職權；
+
+- 四、承諾或同意在該選舉中當選後，及/或煽動、促使、引致、誘使他人在該選舉中當選後，故意或蓄意不履行，或故意或蓄意疏於履行其立法會議員職責，即擁護《基本法》，效忠中華人民共和國香港特別行政區，盡忠職守，遵守法律，廉潔奉公，為香港特別行政區服務；
+
+- 嚴重干擾、阻撓、破壞香港特別行政區政權機關依法履行職能的行為。
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-07-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-2.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-07-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-2.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..9e76bb9d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-07-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-2.md
@@ -0,0 +1,234 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第二日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-02-07 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 控方播新西協調會議「枱底」片段 疑為偷拍所得
+- 控方：初選提名表格列明須同意「35+」共識、額外簽共同綱領證對協議忠誠
+- 控方指吳政亨擔當關鍵角色 發起「三投三不投」、助設計安排初選
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（7日）於西九龍法院（暫代高院）續審。控方今續讀出開案陳詞，提及戴耀廷於其中一次新界西協調會議，向與會者表示除了「五大訴求」外，協議應明確表明會無差別否決財政預算案，及落選者不應再參選。庭上播放相關片段，當中鏡頭晃動，大部分時間置於枱底下，有時舉機拍攝桌子對面戴耀廷的發言情況，疑為偷拍片段。此外，控方又指戴耀廷提出「真攬炒十步」，終引致政府停擺、外國制裁中共，當中法庭傳譯主任一度沒有譯出文中「indiscriminately（無差別）」一字，遭法官要求重譯，指為本案「重要字眼（important word）」。控方又指，戴耀廷曾表明不希望製作列表列出各候選人的承諾，以免留下證據。
+
+#### 戴耀廷提「真攬炒十步」 官指「無差別」為本案重要字眼
+
+控方昨於開案陳詞提及，戴耀廷發起初選推動「攬炒」議程，透過取得立會過半議席，成為「大殺傷力憲政武器」，抗衡中國政府，及迫使政府回應特赦政治犯、追究警暴、雙普選等訴求。
+
+控方今續指，為了進一步推動其抗爭的「大策略（grand strategy），戴耀廷於2020年4月28日發表〈真攬炒十步 這是香港宿命〉，詳列攬炒十步的時間表和路線圖：
+
+- 第一步（2020年7至8月）。政府廣泛取消民主派人士參選立法會資格，包括現任議員。民主派由Plan B繼續參選。
+
+- 第二步（2020年9月）。因兩辦干預及DQ，刺激更多港人投票支持民主派，及配合策略投票，使民主派成功取得35席或以上。
+
+- 第三步（2020年10月）。特首及律政司開展司法程序DQ民主派議員，但因法庭需時處理，故民主派繼續主導立法會。
+
+- 第四步（2020年10月至2021年4月）。政府向立法會提出的所有撥款申請都被立法會否決。政府只能維持一般運作。
+
+- 第五步（2021年5月）。立法會否決政府《財政預算案》，特首解散立法會，並以臨時撥款方式維持政府運作。
+
+- 第六步（2021年10月）。立法會重選，民主派或要派出Plan C參選，因Plan B也可能被DQ，但仍取得35席以上。
+
+- 第七步（2021年11月）。立法會再次否決《財政預算案》，特首辭職及特區政府停擺。
+
+- 第八步（2021年12月）。全國人大常委會宣佈香港進入緊急狀態，中央政府把國家安全法直接適用於香港，解散立法會、成立臨時立法會、下屆特首由協商產生，大舉拘押民主派領袖。
+
+- 第九步（2021年12月後），香港社會街頭抗爭變得更加激烈，鎮壓也非常血腥，港人發動三罷，令香港社會陷入停頓。
+
+- 第十步（2022年1月後）。西方國家對中共實行政治及經濟制裁。
+
+法庭傳譯主任將陳詞譯成中文時，法官陳慶偉一度打斷，指她兩度沒有譯出文中「indiscriminately（無差別）」否決財政預算一詞，指認為該字為本案的「重要字眼（important word）」，傳譯主任後再次翻譯。
+
+#### 控方播新界西協調會議片段 鏡頭晃動、疑為偷拍
+
+就戴耀廷和區諾軒舉辦的協調會議，控方指在5月8日的第二次新界西協調會議，戴耀廷向與會者表示當時只餘下「新界西」和「超級區議會」兩區尚未達成協調機制，並指除了「五大訴求」外，協議應明確表明會無差別否決財政預算案，及落選後不會參選。
+
+庭上播放會議片段，似乎為其中一名與會者偷拍所得，當中鏡頭晃動，大部分時間置於枱底下，有時舉機拍攝桌子對面戴耀廷的發言情況，戴有時會被其他人影遮蓋。
+
+當中戴向與會者指，否決財政預算案是令解散立法會出現「最緊要」一步，「如果否決財政預算案呢，我哋先至會行到去下一步」，望協議能訂明「會運用《基本法》賦予立法會的權力」達到「五大訴求」，以爭取「特赦、懲戒警暴同埋重啟政改」。戴提議新界西跟隨新界東的協議，僅剔除「積極（運用）」的字眼，認為與會者均能同意。控方指，張可森、伍健偉、尹兆堅的代表、譚凱邦和王百羽等人有份參與該次會議。
+
+#### 戴耀廷召記者會交代初選安排 稱不望列出承諾免留下證據
+
+控方指，2020年6月2日，戴耀廷將寫有初選目的及時間表的新聞稿草稿給予區諾軒、趙家賢及鍾錦麟，趙家賢並承諾進行修改。翌日，戴耀廷、區諾軒及趙家賢決定於一星期後召記者會交代初選的時間和詳情。記者會前夕，在區諾軒提醒下，趙家賢草擬採訪邀請，戴耀廷並向其他人傳閱各個選區初選協議的最後版本。
+
+2020年6月9日，戴耀廷、區諾軒，與民主動力的趙家賢和鍾錦麟召開「民主派35+ 公民投票及眾籌行動」記者會，自我介紹為初選組織者及協調者，並交代初選安排。戴確認就地區直選、超級區議會及衞生服務界別，曾召開超過10次會議，以達成35+共識，並稱有信心得到「有規範性嘅結果」，又表明不希望製作列表列出各候選人的承諾，以免留下計劃的證據。庭上播放片段，戴耀廷一度稱「大貪啲，唔係講35+，係講40+㗎啦」，何桂藍等被告發出笑聲。
+
+
+▲ （資料圖片）
+
+戴耀廷又確認香港民意研究所會提供技術支援；趙家賢則確認戴及區委託民主動力協助統籌。戴及趙計劃為初選眾籌，戴稱預計需400萬，趙則稱需要350萬，又提醒支持者捐款勿超出1千元，才能歸類為「小額眾籌」，避過相關選舉條例。戴及區亦呼籲各區黃店及區議員協助組票站。
+
+#### 趙家賢草擬提名表格草稿、戴耀廷與區諾軒就尋找票站討論
+
+同日，鍾錦麟經趙家賢指示發帖，提及初選的路線圖及行動計劃、不同階段目標及所需資源。在6月11至12日，趙家賢向戴耀廷、區諾軒和鍾錦麟發出提名表格草稿，戴耀廷和區諾軒協助審閱並給予意見，戴、區和趙並就表格的提交方法和死線討論。在6月至7月期間，戴耀廷與區諾軒常就尋找合適票站作討論，戴並於6月14日向其餘3人表示已找到100個票站，目標為200個。
+
+#### 控方：民主動力很早以前已尋求外國勢力協助和關注
+
+就協助籌辦初選的民主動力，控方指它提供平台，協調初選參與者、招募義工、為眾籌宣傳，及準備器材及物流安排，包括招募逾180名義工和辦簡介會。控方又指，民主動力是成立於2002年的政治團體，根據其2019至2020年工作報告，它除作為民主派平台，亦在很早以前已尋求外國勢力和團體關注和協助香港內部事務，及散播對政府、立法和行政機關的不滿。
+
+控方指，案發時趙家賢為民主動力召集人，鍾錦麟為副召集人，譚文豪和尹兆堅則擔任委員。其中趙家賢、鍾錦麟和同案被捕但無被控的人權律師關尚義（John J Clancey），是民主動力銀行戶口的簽署人，透過網上眾籌平台「GoGetFunding」等為初選籌得逾348萬元。
+
+控方指，款項在趙家賢和關尚義同意下可動用，以向初選提供各項服務。民動將提供的服務名為「製作及宣傳服務」，細分為「提名及核實」、「投票計劃及實行」、「傳媒論壇製作」、「宣傳：廣播軟件、網站、報章、Facebook」、「服務站運作及管理」及「結果點算及公布」，民動就服務向參選人派發收據，但他們不需繳費。警方並從趙的辦公室搜得提名表格等文件。
+
+#### 22被告今出席
+
+不認罪被告，包括獲准保釋的鄭達鴻、楊雪盈、彭卓棋、何啟明、劉偉聰、黃碧雲、施德來、陳志全、柯耀林、李予信10人，還柙的何桂藍、吳政亨、鄒家成、林卓廷、梁國雄及余慧明6人今出席。另外，認罪的岑敖暉、馮達浚、黃之鋒、袁嘉蔚、吳敏兒、朱凱廸6人亦有列席。
+
+
+▲ 鄭達鴻
+
+
+▲ 陳志全
+
+被告入庭時，吳敏兒向旁聽席揮手，又微笑做出心心手勢，岑敖暉則拉下口罩與妻子做手勢交流，有懲教人員着揮手被告「放低手」。前香港眾志黃莉莉帶同兒子到場，黃之鋒和袁嘉蔚等向他揮手。
+
+審訊不設陪審團，改由3名國安法指定法官陳慶偉、李運騰及陳仲衡審理。控方代表為副刑事檢控專員萬德豪及周天行，辯方代表為資深大律師潘熙、大律師沈士文、黃宇逸、關文渭、馬維騉、盧敏儀、石書銘、黃廷光、Trevor Beel 等。
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（7日）於西九龍法院（暫代高院）續審。控方今續讀出開案陳詞，指初選提名表格、「共同綱領」和「墨落無悔」為本案「關鍵文件」，其中初選提名表格和保證金收據，均列明所有參選人須同意協調會議的「35+」共識；九龍東和新界西候選人額外簽署的「共同綱領」，承諾否決財政預算案以落實五大訴求，顯示被告對遵守協議的忠誠；「墨落無悔」則證被告不顧法律後果，仍堅定承諾達成本案串謀目的。控方又指，初選後15名出線被告發布「抗爭派」聲明，顯示他們堅定反抗政府。不過庭上展示「共同綱領」正本時，法官陳慶偉指，該中文原文並無提及「無差別」否決財政預算，主控周天行指會修改開案陳詞。
+
+#### 初選提名表格及保證金收據列明須同意「35+」共識
+
+控方今續讀出開案陳詞，本案第6至47名被告，於2020年6月19日至22日，向民主動力提交100個選民提名報名參選。控方指，提名表格屬「關鍵文件（key documents）」，當中要求參選人簽署聲明，確保「同意及支持戴耀廷和區諾軒所帶領的協調會議裡達成的共識，包括『民主派35+公民投票計劃』及其目標」。
+
+控方指，該協議確保所有參選人支持及遵守戴耀廷草擬的共同綱領，包括動用權力否決財政預算，並確保他們支持「五大訴求」及遵守各區達成的共識。參選人亦須提交1萬元保證金，並獲發收據，同樣列明須同意及支持協調會議的共識，若違反將被沒收保證金。而在選舉延後的9月7日，民主動力向被告發出退還1萬元保證金的收據。
+
+#### 新界西及九龍東參選人簽額外「共同綱領」 控方：顯示被告忠誠
+
+此外，新界西及九龍東參選人亦在提名表格附上額外簽署的「共同綱領」，承諾無差別否決財政預算迫特首回應五大訴求，並承諾若無法取得該區前5名（九龍東）或前6名（新界西），應即時停止選舉工程及籲選民支持同區的勝出者，控方同列為「關鍵文件」。控方指，該綱領顯示被告對遵守協議的忠誠，而在本案8名新界西及6名九龍東參選被告中，僅施德來一人不認罪。
+
+庭上同時展示該「共同綱領」的正本，惟法官陳慶偉指，該中文原文並無提及「無差別」否決財政預算，主控周天行指會作出修改。根據文件，綱領僅提及會「積極運用」《基本法》賦予的權力，否決財政預算案。
+
+控方並指，區諾軒是於6月14日通知戴耀廷、趙家賢和鍾錦麟，九龍東候選人達成共識，公開發布共同綱領，承諾爭取積極運用權力否決財政預算案，迫使特首回應五大訴求。
+
+#### 控方：被告簽墨落無悔 證不顧法律後果 堅定承諾達成串謀目的
+
+同列為「關鍵文件」的，還包括由鄒家成、梁晃維及張可森發起的「墨落無悔」聲明。控方引述聲明內容，要求參選人承諾認同「五大訴求，缺一不可」，及承諾行使《基本法》權力否決財政預算案以迫使特首回應「五大訴求」，包括撤回示威者控罪、追究警暴及重啟政改；亦要求承諾若支持度「跌出各區預計可得議席範圍」，須表明停止選舉工程。
+
+聲明提及擬定原意「僅為確保抗爭陣營參選人，有最基本的抗爭意志」，並呼籲港人「拒絕支持抗爭意志飄忽不定的參選人」。控方指，聲明證明簽署的33名被告不顧法律後果，仍堅定承諾達成本案串謀目的。
+
+控方庭上展示鄒家成 Facebook 專頁發布的「墨落無悔」聲明時，有被告起鬨稱：「嘩」、「嘩」。
+
+#### 區諾軒回應墨落無悔 稱即使無文件 協調協議仍實然存在
+
+發起「墨落無悔」聲明的梁晃維、張可森和鄒家成，於6月19日重申簽署協議的重要。控方指，區諾軒發文回應，重申「就算沒有一份文件出台，但協調的協議實然存在」，並具有約束力，不公開不等於參與者沒有承諾遵守，亦「不見得有參與者對運用權力否決財政預算案態度保留」。
+
+#### 戴耀廷屢稱初選不違《國安法》、民研被搜仍如期舉行初選
+
+控方指，《國安法》於6月30日生效，戴耀廷翌日向區諾軒、趙家賢和鍾錦麟提起《國安法》下的罪行，又就他對初選會否違法的回應徵詢毛孟靜的意見。戴耀廷和區諾軒其後於7月6日，與兩名香港民意研究所職員召開記者會，解釋初選安排和投票系統，戴並稱作為法律學者，認為初選不會違反《國安法》第22條顛覆國家政權及第29條勾結境外勢力。區諾軒同意，並指「35+計劃」只屬協調，並不會違反《國安法》。
+
+
+▲ （資料圖片）
+
+7月9日，時任政制及內地事務局局長曾國衞接受《文匯報》訪問，指初選有可能違《國安法》第20條、22條及29條，控方指即使如此，戴耀廷、區諾軒及趙家賢仍於同日，與楊雪盈和余慧明等被告召記者會，戴表明35+目標爭取立法會控制權，行使《基本法》賦予的權力向政府「問責」，並重申初選不違《國安法》。會上朱凱廸特別指出，初選向世界展示香港人不會屈服於北京殘暴統治，籲香港人勇敢站出來揭露中共暴行。會後戴耀廷3人帶領呼喊「支持民主派 35+」等口號，候選人亦舉起「支持民主派35+公民投票」及「7月11-12齊投票」的紙牌。
+
+
+▲ （資料圖片）
+
+為初選投票提供技術支援的香港民意研究所，於7月10日被警方搜查，惟控方指，戴耀廷4名組織者討論後仍同意初選按原定計劃進行，鍾錦麟在趙家賢指示下，在民動專頁發文批搜查民研令初選籌備工作延誤，工作人員會加密保安系統。戴同日提醒提供議辦作票站的區議員，或會違反租約並有法律後果。
+
+初選於7月11至12日舉行，庭上播放片段，顯示戴耀廷公布初選進度和結果時，重申相信參選人會遵守協議承諾作參選決定。控方續指，中聯辦於7月14日公開譴責初選違《國安法》，但所有被告仍根據協議參選或不參選立法會。
+
+#### 15抗爭派簽立場聲明 控方：重申對政府堅定反抗
+
+控方續指，13名勝出的本土派被告於7月15日召開記者會，包括袁嘉蔚、梁晃維、黃之鋒、李嘉達、馮達浚、何桂藍、劉頴匡、鄒家成、張可森、伍健偉、岑敖暉、王百羽及余慧明，重申對抗政府的立場不會動搖。翻譯讀出上述段落後，有被告起鬨。其後庭上播放片段，顯示岑敖暉指一眾抗爭派若進入議會，「會好堅定地行使《基本法》賦予畀代議士嘅權利」，「無論咩內容都會否決否財政預算案」，期間鄒家成等人望向岑敖暉，岑則笑了笑。
+
+控方指上述13人，同日與朱凱廸和黃子悅一同發布「抗爭派立法會參選人立場聲明」，並指該聲明重申及確認被告在記者會上聲言作堅定反抗。
+
+不過翻查資料，朱凱廸和黃子悅當日均有出席記者會，而伍健偉並無出席，由林進代替。
+
+
+▲ （資料圖片）
+
+#### 控方：若非選舉延期 涉案計劃將實現
+
+政府其後延後選舉一年，控方指稱，若非選舉延期，涉案串謀計劃會繼續執行直至實現，並會嚴重影響對維持香港運作和穩定重要的公共服務及市民的日常生活。
+
+本案被告於2021年1月6至7日被捕，控方指，望法庭考慮上述證據，裁定被告有罪。控方其後開始讀出附件內針對各被告的言行。
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（7日）於西九龍裁判法院（暫代高院）續審。控方下午讀出開案陳詞附件，列出各被告言行，其中發起「三投三不投」聯署的吳政亨，控方指他是戴耀廷支持者，不但宣傳初選目標，亦在策劃、組織和推動串謀計劃上擔當關鍵角色。其涉案行為包括自資在《蘋果日報》頭版賣廣告，宣傳具約束力的初選；並透過提倡舉辦初選論壇、製作簡報向戴耀廷提議不同的初選機制、響應香港民研派出觀察員監察初選，協助設計及安排舉行初選。
+
+庭上播放吳政亨製作的宣傳片段時，吳與馮達浚隨音樂節奏擺動身體，鄒家成忍不住發笑。播放其自拍片段時，何桂藍、馮達浚、黃之鋒等望向吳，吳做出聳肩動作。現時已剃去鬍子的吳又應鄒家成要求除下口罩，向旁聽席展示其樣貌，鄒並摸一摸其下巴。
+
+#### 吳政亨被指為「初選組織者」
+
+被指稱為「初選組織者」的5人中，只有吳政亨不認罪受審。控方指稱，吳是戴耀廷的支持者，曾協助戴於2016年發起的「雷動計劃」，並在案發時期以「李伯盧」名義行事，不僅宣傳戴耀廷和區諾軒提出的目標，亦在策劃、組織和推動串謀計劃上擔當關鍵角色，包括發起及宣傳「三投三不投」、提倡舉辦初選論壇，及協助策劃和安排初選。
+
+#### 控方：吳政亨發起「三投三不投」聯署 目標協調候選人爭35+
+
+控方指，為回應戴耀廷和區諾軒有關初選的倡議，吳政亨於2020年3月19日發起「三投三不投」聯署，呼籲選民不要投票給三類人士：不支持舉辦初選、不參與初選及拒絕遵守初選結果的人，以確保候選人遵守協議。吳並於4月9日在《獨媒》撰文〈親共派都叫停初選，民主派有無初選空間？〉，解釋「三投三不投」作為獨立民間運動幫助初選，是為了減少宣傳開支及避免招致選舉經費。
+
+控方指，吳提出聯署目標，即以設計良好的初選協調候選人，以爭取立會議席35+。吳於其「李伯盧」Facebook 專頁宣傳聯署，亦管理聯署專頁，曾形容戴「從佔中、雷動、風雲、初選，為香港，一直挑最難的路而行」，感激戴為其聯署「加持」，「我們會繼續努力，凝聚民間力量，全力支持戴教授，爭取議會過半，35+！」吳又設立 YouTube 頻道宣傳，當中有影片指責不願遵守初選結果的政黨，包括街工，又重申其聯署能令候選人遵守初選結果。
+
+控方指，吳於5月曾在《獨媒》、《立場新聞》等，發布一系列支持戴耀廷主張及批評拒絕遵守協議者的文章，吳亦於2020年7月3日自資在《蘋果日報》頭版賣廣告，宣傳其聯署及初選，又向公眾人物發信尋求對初選及其聯署的支持。
+
+#### 控方：吳提倡舉辦初選論壇 顯示協助安排初選
+
+控方又指，吳透過提倡舉辦初選論壇，協助安排初選。控方指稱，為響應戴耀廷3月在〈齊上齊落 目標35+〉一文就舉辦選舉論壇的提議，吳政亨於4月撰文〈點解要初選？臨選前退選唔好咩？（二）〉，當中稱：「初選競選時間至少需要有五至六個禮拜，曝光方面需要各友好媒體努力配合，初選辯論亦可在友好電視台或在網上直播。」控方指，其後在區諾軒的協調下，一系列的選舉論壇於2020年6月25日至7月4日期間舉行。
+
+#### 曾製作簡報提議不同機制 控方：吳政亨協助設計及安排初選
+
+控方續指，吳政亨協助策劃及安排初選。控方指，於尚未對外公佈舉辦初選的階段，戴耀廷、區諾軒和趙家賢曾與不同人士開會作宣傳，而吳曾於2020年3月製作詳盡的宣傳簡報，提議不同的初選機制。而吳的電腦亦儲存了2020年6月題為「採訪邀請」的文件，提及吳「其實遠於推動聯署前，已開始推動初選工作。佢有份同戴（耀廷）設計初選計劃」，又指聯署運動是令初選能成功的「骨幹」，亦是提供初選「約束力」的支架，並指經過聯署後有選區由「無約束力」變成半約束力，顯示吳協助宣傳具約束力的初選，「聯署已有實際影響力。」
+
+此外，其 YouTube 頻道發布一段影片「三投三不投全力協助初選投票」，宣傳初選票站地圖和資訊，又稱響應香港民意研究所的「觀察員運動」，派出多名義工擔任「觀察員」監察初選，包括他自己。控方指，吳透過全力支持觀察員運動，協助初選舉行。
+
+#### 控方：初選結束後 吳政亨繼續宣傳
+
+控方指，初選投票結束後，吳政亨繼續透過不同社交媒體平台，宣傳「三投三不投」，包括在 YouTube 發布影片稱「多謝戴耀廷同區諾軒兩人牽頭，令到今次初選成事」，又承認已透過戴向所有候選人發出「三投三不投」的聲明，指不同意無約束力的初選。
+
+吳又發文〈N以內係正選，N以外係後備，就係咁簡單〉，呼籲所有候選人遵守初選結果，並發布影片總結「三投三不投」如何促進初選進行。
+
+#### 鄭達鴻被指向歐洲議會游說設「救生艇」、稱35+是光復法治最好方法
+
+此外，控方亦讀出時任區議員、公民黨黨員鄭達鴻所涉行為，指公民黨於2020年3月召開記者會，黨魁楊岳橋承諾會無差別否決政府法案，其後所有成員均簽署「墨落無悔」，公民黨並在初選前夕發文稱《國安法》不會阻擋港人對抗極權的決心，籲公眾投票。
+
+控方指鄭明知《國安法》將實施，仍於初選論壇稱爭取「35+」可「由制度根本改革」，亦是「光復法治」最好方法；又強調否決財政預算案可對抗「極權」，迫特首回應「五大訴求」。他又指在《國安法》陰霾下，一直代表公民黨向歐洲議會游說設立「救生艇計劃」，讓年青人有機會刪除案底。另外，開案陳詞誤稱東區區議員的鄭為「南區區議員」，惟控方並無更正。
+
+案件明天續審，控方將繼續讀出開案陳詞。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
+
+### 22被告今出席
+
+不認罪被告，包括獲准保釋的鄭達鴻、楊雪盈、彭卓棋、何啟明、劉偉聰、黃碧雲、施德來、陳志全、柯耀林、李予信10人，還柙的何桂藍、吳政亨、鄒家成、林卓廷、梁國雄及余慧明6人今出席。另外，認罪的岑敖暉、馮達浚、黃之鋒、袁嘉蔚、吳敏兒、朱凱廸6人亦有列席。
+
+被告入庭時，吳敏兒向旁聽席揮手，又微笑做出心心手勢，岑敖暉則拉下口罩與妻子做手勢交流，有懲教人員着揮手被告「放低手」。前香港眾志黃莉莉帶同兒子到場，黃之鋒和袁嘉蔚等向他揮手。
+
+審訊不設陪審團，改由3名國安法指定法官陳慶偉、李運騰及陳仲衡審理。控方代表為副刑事檢控專員萬德豪及周天行，辯方代表為資深大律師潘熙、大律師沈士文、黃宇逸、關文渭、馬維騉、盧敏儀、石書銘、黃廷光、Trevor Beel 等。
+
+### 47人被控以非法手段 嚴重干擾、阻撓、破壞政權機關
+
+47人被控在2020年7月1日至2021年1月7日，在香港一同串謀及與其他人串謀，旨在顛覆國家政權而組織、策劃、實施或者參與實施，以威脅使用武力或其他非法手段，即：
+
+- 一、為以下目的宣揚、進行或參與一個謀劃，旨在濫用其在當選立法會議員後根據《基本法》第73條所受託的職權；
+
+> （A）在立法會取得大多數控制權，藉以對香港特區政府提出的任何財政預算或公共開支，不論當中內容或內容的利弊如何，均不予區別拒絕通過；
+
+> （B）迫使香港特區政府根據《基本法》第50條解散立法會，從而癱瘓政府運作；
+
+> （C）最終導致行政長官因立法會解散和重選的立法會拒絕通過原財政預算案而根據《基本法》第52條而辭職；
+
+- 二、為達致該謀劃，參選或不參選立法會選舉，及/或促致、煽動、引致、誘使他人參選或不參選該選舉；
+
+- 三、承諾或同意當選立法會議員後，及/或煽動、促使、引致、誘使他人當選立法會議員後，在審核或通過政府提出的財政預算或公共開支時，按照該謀劃，行使或不行使其根據《基本法》第73條所訂的職權；
+
+- 四、承諾或同意在該選舉中當選後，及/或煽動、促使、引致、誘使他人在該選舉中當選後，故意或蓄意不履行，或故意或蓄意疏於履行其立法會議員職責，即擁護《基本法》，效忠中華人民共和國香港特別行政區，盡忠職守，遵守法律，廉潔奉公，為香港特別行政區服務；
+
+- 嚴重干擾、阻撓、破壞香港特別行政區政權機關依法履行職能的行為。
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-08-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-3.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-08-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-3.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..48992ef3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-08-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-3.md
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第三日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-02-08 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 辯方指彭卓棋從未稱「無差別」否決財案 控方稱將刪去
+- 控方：黃碧雲指如否決財案可爭五大訴求「一定會做」、施德來稱入議會「攬炒呢個政府」
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（7日）於西九龍裁判法院（暫代高院）續審。控方繼續讀出開案陳詞的附表，列出各被告的涉案行為。其中3名不認罪獨立候選人，包括劉偉聰、楊雪盈及彭卓棋，均有簽署「墨落無悔」並落選，楊雪盈曾以「Plan B」身份報名參選。此外，何啟明被指散播對政權和警察無根據的不滿，指控警暴導致大量原因不明的死亡，又曾發文呼籲捐出 iPad 和 iPhone 等電子器材，以協助初選票站運作。
+
+不認罪的被告包括獲准保釋的鄭達鴻、楊雪盈、彭卓棋、何啟明、劉偉聰、黃碧雲、施德來、陳志全、柯耀林、李予信10人，及還柙的何桂藍、吳政亨、鄒家成、林卓廷、梁國雄及余慧明6人。認罪的袁嘉蔚、吳敏兒、朱凱廸、岑敖暉和黃之鋒等亦有列席，開庭前被懲教帶往被告欄。
+
+#### 控方：鄭初選前後向逾2千人拉票、搜獲「論壇天書」
+
+控方昨日開始讀出開案陳詞的附表，列出各被告的涉案行為，當中誤稱鄭達鴻為「南區區議員」。今日甫開庭，控方更正鄭的身份為「東區區議員」，然後繼續作開案陳詞。
+
+此外，法官陳慶偉發現旁聽席上有人戴白色帽，要求該人士脫帽，並提醒所有旁聽人士法庭內不得戴帽和太陽眼鏡。
+
+控方指，公民黨於2020年7月10日在 Facebook 發布一段名為「【7.11 7.12 初選】兩分鐘睇初選點投票」的影片，稱「即使有國安法都唔會阻擋到香港人對抗極權嘅決心」及不會放棄議會戰線。
+
+警方在鄭的住所和電子器材中搜得他為論壇準備的「論壇天書」及競選單張，當中承諾他會否決預算案迫特首回應「五大訴求」；又搜得公民黨簽署「墨落無悔」的截圖、初選前後他向逾2千人拉票和謝票的 WhatsApp 訊息、「Michael Cheuk Ki P…」及「區兄」就初選協議的 WhatsApp 討論截圖等。
+
+
+▲ 鄭達鴻
+
+#### 楊雪盈稱否決議案向政府「問責」、被指錯誤指控國安法
+
+就獨立候選人、時任灣仔區議會主席楊雪盈，控方指她堅定支持初選計劃，在初選競選單張中稱：「五大訴求、議會過半是我們共同呼喚的將來。」她在論壇指自己清楚知道18區區議會民主派被當局及建制派的打壓，並提倡連結民主陣營力量，以不同角色「一齊上」。
+
+控方指，她曾在6月9日的記者會表示「35+」目標是爭取立法會控制權，透過行使《基本法》賦予的憲制權力要求政府「問責」，又承諾否決預算案逼使特首回應「五大訴求」。
+
+初選結束後，楊在個人 Facebook 發布題為「民主路上見！」的文章，表示自己票數不足以出線，但她會遵守初選結果，承諾不參選正式立法會選舉，並呼籲她的支持者投票給民主陣營的其他候選人，以達至立會議席過半。當港島區3名民主派被「DQ」後，楊雪盈曾以「Plan B」身份報名參選。
+
+警方在楊辦事處的電腦中發現「35+」立會過半港島區的協調機制草擬文件。其競選單張寫有「國安壓境 兩制已毀」，控方指她透過錯誤指控引起對《國安法》的強烈反對。
+
+#### 彭卓棋稱不惜以肢體抗爭癱瘓政府、以議員身分支援街頭抗爭
+
+就獨立候選人、時任南區區議員彭卓棋，控方指他在論壇提倡街頭、議會及國際戰線，包括將中共標籤為「敵人」，表明面對極權及《國安法》打壓，仍會「聲討賣港派、港共派、中間派」，並全力對抗共產黨；亦會於議會「不惜以肢體抗爭」癱瘓政府並否決財政預算案，並透過於社運現場出現和與執法部門溝通，以其區議員身份和資源支援街頭抗爭。他亦同意建立「香港民族」，並展現反對《基本法》第23條的決心。
+
+此外，他於競選宣傳品自稱「本土抗爭派」，並形容香港警察為濫權及視港人為敵的「極權劊子手」，要求改革警隊及為「手足」帶來公義，並指初選最終目標是「35+」及「攬炒」，逼使政府回應「五大訴求」。
+
+代表彭卓棋的大律師一度指出，彭卓棋從沒講過「無差別」地否決財政預算案，惟控方在開案陳詞中指他聲言無差別地（indiscriminately）否決財政預算。控方表示稍後會修正開案陳詞。
+
+
+▲ 彭卓棋
+
+#### 控方指何啟明散播對警察無根據不滿、倡「打倒共產黨」
+
+就時任民協副主席、深水埗區議員何啟明，控方指他在論壇提倡議會及街頭戰線，包括提及2019年8月曾於深水埗警署外與「70+手足」一起「反暴政」、「食TG（催淚彈）」；控方又指他散播對政權和警察無根據的不滿，指控警暴導致大量原因不明的死亡、「極權」透過任意拘控針對年輕人，並指控中共濫用《國安法》打壓港人及導致香港「攬炒」，港人必需反抗到底、「打倒共產黨」，並透過國際線等反抗。
+
+控方又指，何啟明曾發文呼籲捐出 iPad 和 iPhone 等電子器材，以協助初選票站運作；並批評警方搜查香港民研辦公室，指政權會用盡一切方法打壓初選，但他仍無畏無懼。而何啟明勝出初選後，控方指他承諾於議會抗爭，又強調不會容許「犯罪集團」警隊接受任何公帑資助。
+
+警方於其辦公室搜出民協2019年3月至2020年4月有關初選的會議紀錄，提及「選舉主軸」包括達至35+，及表達民協在35+的角色以游說選民支持。何的競選口號亦包括「反暴政 衛我城」、「立會過半 光復香港」。
+
+
+▲ 何啟明
+
+#### 劉偉聰稱議會戰線與前線「裏應外合」 批極權攻擊司法制度
+
+另一名獨立候選人、時任深水埗區議員劉偉聰，控方指其政治宣言提及「反惡法 抗警暴 民權重光」，而他在論壇提倡議會及街頭戰線，稱透過爭取「35+」便可修訂打壓人權的惡法，又美化前線抗爭者和「暴徒」為「手足」，讚賞他們展示建制外改變歷史的力量，並指留守後方的人可參與議會戰線，與前線「裏應外合」反抗政權。
+
+劉亦批評政府為獨裁，指律政司司長及政府委任的代表令公眾對司法獨立嚴重失去信心，其競選單張亦表明港人公民權利被打壓，他目睹極權持續不斷打壓及攻擊香港司法制度。
+
+警方又搜得名為「623 Debate 要點」的筆記，載有劉擬於論壇詢問其他候選人的問題，包括：「黃碧雲：為何不簽署初選立場確認書？是否連否決財政算案，這樣制度內的抗爭都不願意承諾？」他又擬向何啟明指出，即使初選無要求他們簽署共同綱領，他亦自發簽署立場聲明書，確保抗爭陣營參選人有最基本抗爭意志，並問有簽署的何啟明如何看無簽署的候選人。
+
+庭上播放一段九龍西初選論壇片段，劉偉聰回答何啟明質詢時提及律政司司長為司法人員推薦委員會的當然成員，所委任的法官缺乏市民信任，在法治風雨飄搖的時候，法官的質素和認受性至關重要，「當然我會知道 Sunny（張崑陽洋名）會話，法治唔值得再提，但係我唔係 Sunny，但我依然見到陽光，我見到 the sunny sky。」被告欄有人發出笑聲。
+
+
+▲ 劉偉聰
+
+#### 法官提醒列席被告不是參與社交聚會
+
+早休後再開庭時，法官陳慶偉表示，審訊開首時批准被告使用電腦作筆記，此為電腦的唯一用途，但若果有任何被告使用電腦作筆記以外的用途，這項權利便會被剝奪。辯方大律師石書銘一度解釋稱，早前曾向法庭申請允許下載法律文件於電腦中，以方便被告閱讀，但與懲教溝通後，已確認不准電腦連結 Wi-Fi 或數據上網。
+
+此外，陳官強調不需受審的被告只是以列席者的身份出庭（acting simply as an observant），提醒他們不是來參與社交聚會（“You’re not attending social gathering.”），若果作出任何干擾，便會安排他們到另一處聽審，不要濫用可以列席的權利。
+
+審訊下午續。
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（7日）於西九龍裁判法院（暫代高院）續審。控方下午繼續讀出開案陳詞的附表，列出民主黨黃碧雲和民協施德來的涉案行為。其中黃碧雲沒有聯署「墨落無悔」，在初選論壇中遭質疑，她則回應稱會用盡憲制內所有權力和手段爭取「五大訴求」，若否決財政預算案能夠促成此目標，「我哋一定會做」。施德來則被指競選單張內容與「墨落無悔」相當相似（substantially similar），在論壇中聲言與中共「冇討論嘅空間、冇談判嘅餘地」，若當選會否決所有政府議案。二人最終在初選中落敗，之後遵守「35+」協議，沒有報名參選。
+
+不認罪的被告包括獲准保釋的鄭達鴻、楊雪盈、彭卓棋、何啟明、劉偉聰、黃碧雲、施德來、陳志全、柯耀林、李予信10人，及還柙的何桂藍、吳政亨、鄒家成、林卓廷、梁國雄及余慧明6人。認罪的袁嘉蔚、吳敏兒、朱凱廸、岑敖暉和黃之鋒等亦有列席，開庭前被懲教帶往被告欄。
+
+#### 黃碧雲稱民主黨具議會國際街頭戰線技能、中共獨裁需團結反抗
+
+就民主黨時任立法會議員黃碧雲，其競選口號為「反抗專權 緊抱自由」，政治宣言提及對抗極權和不公法律、追究警暴及全面改革警隊，監察教育局以抵抗白色恐怖及洗腦教育。
+
+控方指，黃在論壇提倡議會戰線，強調透過「35+」對抗暴政和「全力抵抗惡法」，又承諾會用盡憲制所有權力和手段爭取「五大訴求」。控方又指，她形容中共為「專制獨裁」、「不公義政權」，表明要團結民主派力量抵抗，又指民主黨曾用盡各種方式反對《逃犯條例》修訂，可展現其反抗決心。
+
+庭上播放九龍西選舉論壇片段，另一參選人劉澤鋒指黃碧雲沒有簽署「墨落無悔」聲明，又質問黃碧雲：「民主黨係咪應承一齊攬炒先？」黃碧雲回應：「我哋係會用盡憲制裡面所有嘅權力同埋手段係爭取五大訴求，如果否決財政預算案能夠促成呢一樣嘢，我哋一定會做。」
+
+控方又指，其競選單張指控「健康碼」會將個人私隱及所在傳去中國、大灣區票站受監控，亦提及「民主黨反對國安法」，民主黨會於港人並肩對抗極權。黃亦曾撰文〈有平台 才有博奕之地〉，指民主運動包括國際、街頭和議會戰線，若在議會戰線輕言而退會「三線盡失」，留有一地才能續與威權政府博奕。
+
+黃最終在初選中得票不足落敗，她在 Facebook 發布一篇題為「#記者會發言 願榮光歸香港！」的文章，表示尊重初選結果和選民決定，她會為了達至「35+」而遵守協議，不報名參選立法會，並承諾全力支持其他參選的民主派。同日，黃把民主黨的新聞稿張貼在其個人 Facebook，題為「尊重初選結果 承認落敗，黃碧雲宣布不再參選立法會」。黃又在7月15日的民主黨記者會中指出，民主黨過去二十多年，具有議會、國際及街頭戰線所需的技能和經驗。
+
+
+▲ 黃碧雲
+
+#### 民協主席施德來稱要有「全面攬炒決心」
+
+就時任民協主席、黃大仙區議員施德來，控方指《立場新聞》於2020年3月刊出他所撰的文章〈議會過半 夢可成真 – 回應對民協「N+2初選方案」〉，當中提倡議會戰線及初選協調機制。施於同年6月在 Facebook 發文，表明已簽署「墨落無悔」聲明，並稱若果當選立法會議員，將會按照計劃否決財政預算，迫使行政長官辭職。控方提到，原文並無「無差別」字眼，將會在開案陳詞中刪去「indiscriminately」一詞。
+
+控方指，施的競選單張內容與「墨落無悔」相當相似（substantially similar）。施並在論壇稱：「今日嘅中共，我哋冇討論嘅空間、冇談判嘅餘地，只有抗爭到底」，進入議會後「我哋大家都要否決財政預算案，大家都要否決政府所有議案」、「攬炒呢個政府」。他質詢民主黨胡志偉時，表明「35+」要有「全面攬炒的決心」，但民主黨創黨主席李柱銘卻稱「攬炒好幼稚」，問胡志偉：「嚟緊35+，會唔會全面攬炒政府所有議案呀？」
+
+控方又指，他散播對政權不滿，指控中共打壓香港且不可信、沒討論餘地，又指「真正攬炒香港」的是林鄭和中共，故港人要抗爭到底。
+
+施德來報名初選時附上九龍東的「共同綱領」，控方並指其 Facebook 帖文以競選口號「堅定抗爭」、「抗極權」、「衛我城」、「35＋」作「hashtag」，可見其抗爭決心。而施落選後停止選舉工程，並表示雖預計中共打壓無窮無盡，但相信港人會繼續抗爭。
+
+
+▲ 施德來
+
+案件明日續審。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
+
+
+▲ 此外，西九龍法院大樓其中一幅玻璃外牆被發現破裂，現場所見，玻璃滿佈裂痕但未有碎裂。警方封鎖由3樓通往1樓的扶手電梯，只開放相反方向、距離玻璃外牆較遠的一條扶手電梯，並封鎖西九龍走廊荔枝角方向其中一條行車線。
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-09-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-4.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-09-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-4.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..fdf10039
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-09-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-4.md
@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第四日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-02-09 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 控方：何桂藍出席抗爭派記者會重申否決財案 辯方指何無發言
+- 下周一起傳召四名認罪被告 官警告勿騷擾或干預作供
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（9日）於西九龍裁判法院（暫代高院）續審。控方繼續讀出開案陳詞中，針對5名新界東候選人何桂藍、陳志全、鄒家成、林卓廷和梁國雄的涉案言行。其中何桂藍被指提倡奪取立法會主導權以「破局」，及宣揚攬炒和籲外國更強硬對待中共；鄒家成被指有份草擬「墨落無悔」聲明及宣揚香港民族主義，又稱要進入議會「打交」及「做任何手段癱瘓每一個議會進行」；林卓廷被搜出的初選論壇筆記，寫有「完全同意光復香港，時代革命呢個理念」。
+
+此外，控方指何桂藍出席抗爭派記者會，是重申無差別否決財政預算案，惟其代表律師稱她沒有發言，指控只是鬆散地（loosely）基於其他被告發言。法官李運騰表示開案陳詞中許多事實及宣言都是出自其他認罪被告，特別是戴耀廷、區諾軒及趙家賢，相信控方是依賴「共謀者原則」，至於是否適用會由法庭判斷。
+
+不認罪的被告包括獲准保釋的鄭達鴻、楊雪盈、彭卓棋、何啟明、劉偉聰、黃碧雲、施德來、陳志全、柯耀林、李予信10人，及還柙的何桂藍、吳政亨、鄒家成、林卓廷、梁國雄及余慧明6人。認罪的袁嘉蔚、吳敏兒、朱凱廸、岑敖暉、黃之鋒和馮達浚亦有列席，開庭前被懲教帶往被告欄。
+
+#### 控方指何桂藍倡奪立會主導權爭「破局」
+
+就前《立場新聞》記者何桂藍，控方指她簽署「墨落無悔」聲明，並在參選宣言〈一息尚存，力戰不降〉表示面對《國安法》的逼害及打壓仍不會放棄抵抗，「識時務者，會笑我哋螳臂擋車，作無謂嘅抵抗同犧牲。但佢哋永遠都唔會明白，我哋前仆後繼，係因為我哋知道，反抗，先可以改變到香港嘅宿命」。何又指：「面對極權，我哋的確一無所有，只能夠以我哋嘅人生、前程、甚至肉身同生命作為代價去抗衡國家機器⋯⋯喺今時今日嘅香港，議會要去助燃場運動，而唔係再拖抗爭嘅後腿⋯⋯我哋只可以用盡一切方法同中共周旋到底。」
+
+何其後發布宣傳影片，提及「攞到立法會過半嘅主導權，我哋就可以逼出一個北京冇可能接受到嘅局面，從而令到佢用更加瘋狂嘅方式去應對，要付出更加高昂嘅政治代價」，又在初選論壇奪取立會過半「唔係講緊再投議員入去議事咁簡單」，而是「將立法會變成人民嘅武器」，指「要突破中共set畀香港嘅死局，需要最多嘅抗爭派進入議會」。播放片段時，何桂藍露出笑眼，又一度以雙手掩眼。
+
+何在新界東初選民間論壇，亦重申35+並非最終目的，不應幻想取得35+後可逼使政府實現承諾，並指當選者應「用盡一切嘅方式去繼續個議會抗爭，去繼續施壓」。何其後亦表明不害怕被DQ，並承諾與抗爭派議員站在同一陣線，於議會內進行肢體抗爭。
+
+#### 控方指何桂藍宣揚攬炒、籲外國更強硬對待中共
+
+控方又指，何宣揚及堅定支持「攬炒」，指《國安法》落實和外國介入是香港抗爭者觸發的連鎖效應，透過港人「犧牲」達致「攬炒」。她提倡以「街頭戰線」和「國際戰線」反抗，7月8日為袁嘉蔚助選時向被通緝的羅冠聰的海外游說工作致敬，並發文要求外國以更強硬態度對待中共的威脅。控方讀出何桂藍發言指「所以今日 Tiffany 再次喺《國安法》已經實施咗嘅宜家，國安公署就喺嗰邊，但係佢仍然好勇敢咁樣走出嚟」時，何轉頭望向袁嘉蔚微笑。
+
+何曾表示，為有效達到35+，民主派應團結利用初選配票，又在初選首日籲公眾投票，指在白色恐怖年代，初選投票率可向國際社會展示港人具頑強的反抗意志、無懼《國安法》，亦讓更多抗爭派議員進入議會帶來真正改變。何其後勝出初選並報名立法會選舉，但被DQ，她發文指DQ是要抹殺35+的可能性，呼籲繼續反對中共及中央政府，並要求外國介入，又在《洛杉磯時報》撰文重申在立會獲得多數反對的重要性。
+
+此外，警方搜得她與岑敖暉的競選單張，其中控方指以〈中共推『國安立法』 香港變『一國一制』〉為題的單張推動抵抗中共；〈國安法打到嚟監控有冇得避？〉則指控《國安法》落實後會加強對港人監控，威脅港人安全和私隱。控方又指，何桂藍競選宣言透過指控「香港制度崩壞、法治無存」，鼓吹對政權的不滿。
+
+#### 何桂藍大狀稱何無於抗爭派記者會發言 僅依賴其他被告說法
+
+控方又指，何桂藍勝出初選後，與另外14名被告出席抗爭派記者會，重申會維持對政府堅定抗爭，即無差別否決財政預算以迫使特首回應五大訴求。惟其代表大律師 Trevor Beel 指，何並沒有在記者會發言，控方如有任何指控，亦只是鬆散地（loosely）基於其他被告的發言。
+
+
+▲ （資料圖片）
+
+法官李運騰表示明白，指開案陳詞中，許多事實及宣言都是出自其他認罪被告，特別是戴耀廷、區諾軒及趙家賢。他指，相信控方是依賴「共謀者原則（co-conspirator rule）」，至於該原則是否適用則交由法庭判斷。周天行一度欲回應，但法官指現時為控方提出指控的階段，控方不用回應。
+
+#### 控方指慢必籲議會抗爭升級、筆記稱簽墨落無悔是要有攬炒決心
+
+至於時任人民力量主席、立法會議員陳志全，控方指人民力量曾於2020年3月發聲明，表示全力投入「謀劃」，他於同月與人民力量副主席、譚得志主持的電台節目《人民主場》中，亦承諾人民力量會全力支持「謀劃」並盡力實現，強調參與者應遵守共同綱領，又批評《蘋果日報》錯誤指人民力量反對初選。
+
+控方指，陳志全曾在6月的街站，呼籲在街頭、議會、國際、網上及黃色經濟圈戰線持續抗爭，「每一條戰線如果大家幫到手嘅，都應該盡力而為，係不容有失」，又指「同港共政權，同中共抗爭到底」，並重申不惜否決財政預算案，是要迫使政府重啟政改、回應五大訴求。
+
+陳其後在初選論壇表明，「人民力量過去係走在抗爭最前線，最早，最可靠嘅抗爭力量」，並強調議會抗爭要升級，「令政府要通過啲惡法或者係撥款嘅時候，難度越嚟越高同埋要越嚟越樣衰」，並指自己曾到「前線」及承諾協助流亡者。
+
+控方指，陳志全曾發起眾籌，以支持他在議會戰線繼續抗爭，並與譚得志受訪，稱35+重要性在反對預算案，「乜嘢惡法都可以反對反對反對，大白象工程又反對反對反對，跟住反對埋財政預算案，解散立法會，特首都要下台」。陳被捕後，警方搜得他準備初選的筆記簿，提及「點解要簽“自殺聯署聲明” 攬炒面對強權 要有『置諸死地而後生』決心」，又提及他對議會和街頭戰線互動的理解，籲在所有戰線抗爭。陳最終勝出及報名參選。
+
+
+▲ 陳志全
+
+#### 控方指鄒家成草擬「墨落無悔」聲明、稱參選目的宣揚香港民族主義
+
+就本土派鄒家成，控方指他與梁晃維及張可森，於2020年6月草擬「墨落無悔」聲明，顯示他們堅定承諾否決財政預算案，迫使特首回應五大訴求，亦協助其他參與者作出相同承諾。庭上播放3人受訪片段，解釋發起聲明原因，鄒家成指得悉不需簽署共同綱領後，「我哋第一個感覺就話我哋要簽返啲嘢喎，唔可以畀泛民主派單方面去撕毀約章」，梁晃維則指初選協議鬆散，需有確切文件證明。在張可森指簽署後「絕對唔可以反悔」時，鄒家成邊聽邊點頭，至張稱若其他參選人回應到時代要前進的方向，「其實你唔會覺得我哋係夾你嘅」，有被告發笑。
+
+控方指，鄒家成同月於 Facebook 發文，表示「重光未至，我哋絕無放棄時代革命嘅本錢」，又指「我決定除低面罩投身政治，就係為咗將香港民族嘅理念散播到每一個角落，同殖民者設計嘅議會制度攬炒到底」。
+
+控方指，鄒在論壇宣揚「攬炒」及分離主義思想，並詆毀「一國兩制」，指議會不需「西裝骨骨的政客」議政，而是要選出「具備攬炒意思嘅抗爭者為大家衝擊體制，撕下香港政治上最後一塊畫皮」，籲投選有抗爭意志的代議士進入立會刺穿假象。他又指自己參選目的「非常之旗幟鮮明」，就是宣揚香港民族主義，指「建立一個民族出嚟，我哋先能夠對抗到中華民族嘅入侵」。
+
+控方指，鄒在《國安法》生效後，指控《國安法》將香港變成極權社會，承諾面對打壓仍會繼續抗爭，並指所有參選代議士都應進入議會「打交」，及「做任何手段癱瘓每一個議會進行」。鄒家成其後勝出初選，並出席抗爭派記者會及聯署抗爭派聲明，承諾否決財政預算迫使政府回應五大訴求，鄒家成會上表明許多本土派勝出，要「讓本土成為主流」。他其後報名參選立法會。
+
+#### 控方指林卓廷筆記稱完全同意「光時」、選舉延後仍稱要堅守議會戰線
+
+至於時任民主黨副主席，身兼立法會議員及北區區議員的林卓廷，控方指其競選單張將中共和政府標籤為對人權自由帶來前所未有威脅的「極權」，呼籲團結抗爭及對抗警暴。林並在6月的初選論壇，表示「中共粗暴制訂國安法，全方面鎮壓香港人。我哋香港人惟有用勇敢、智慧，同埋我哋嘅堅毅，去對抗呢個極權」。控方又指他散播對警察沒有根據的指控，承諾當選後會向警察報復。涉擾亂議會秩序案的他亦承諾會繼續在立會抗爭。
+
+警方在林卓廷家中搜得其「初選 Debate Notes」，寫有「完全同意光復香港，時代革命呢個理念」。就會否反對財政預算案，筆記指「（民主黨主席）胡志偉一再公開回應話會『積極運用』（《基本法》權力反對）。況且，其實我立法會四年沒有贊成過財政預算案。」至於為何不簽「墨落無悔」，筆記寫上「因為尊重戴教授，他的決定有他的理據」，並指「如果戴教授真係有份嘢，我哋承諾咗會簽」。筆記最後提及籲港人投票、珍惜每個表態機會，控方後播放初選論壇片段，顯示林最後同樣稱「香港人唔知道幾時我哋嘅投票權會最終被剝奪。我希望各位珍惜手上嘅一票」。
+
+控方又指，林在另一份筆記表明他在議會、街頭及國際戰線抗爭的決心，及解釋三線結合能加強對抗政權的「非法目的」。林最終勝出初選並報名立法會選舉，而在選舉延後之後，控方指林持續詆毀並要求繼續堅定對抗政府， 包括2020年9月與梁晃維出席港大學生會舉辦的「立會委任惹爭議 議員去留利與弊」公開辯論，表明要堅守議會戰線，以配合街頭抗爭及國際聯繫，「延續三線相輔相成的抗爭策略」，又指「棄守議會戰線呢，係會令到我哋嚟緊大開中門，令到啲保皇黨同埋政府不斷打壓我哋香港人」。
+
+控方播放林卓廷初選論壇片段時，亦顯示其他候選人的發言，梁國雄稱「撐手足」後，任控方證人的林景楠說「撐手足，可以捐612或者支持黃色經濟圈」，有被告發笑。
+
+#### 控方指梁國雄稱奪全面否決權、社民連欲組織罷工引國際支援
+
+就時任社民連主席、前立法會議員梁國雄，其競選單張題為「五大訴求 缺一不可 抵抗惡法 您我同行」，並指他「貫徹社民連主張議會、街頭和法庭三面抗爭的策略」，決心落實「五大訴求」。梁又在6月24日的社民連街頭集會表示：「功成不必在我，但係一路我都係喺抗爭路上未缺席過嘅，冇理由而家缺席，亦都冇理由唔係同香港人一齊抵抗，抵抗，抵抗。」
+
+控方指，梁國雄同日轉發社民連聲明〈【爭奪全面否決權 持續不斷抗暴政】一 社會民主連線回應當前香港政治形勢變化的決議文〉，表明要在議會奪「全面否決權」，否決惡法和不義撥款，制衡中共「全面管治權」及迫使政府實現「五大訴求」；又指爭取立會過半與尋求外國制裁同樣重要，社民連亦會嘗試組織更大規模的公民抗爭或總罷工，以引起國際社會支援。
+
+梁國雄沒有簽署「墨落無悔」聲明，在初選論壇被問到為何不簽，他解釋認為只是重複35+初衷，如「一定要否決財政預算案」，但他指自己過往任議員多年，每年均會否決財政預算，「呢個問題對我嚟講已經唔係問題」，故沒有需要簽署。他又在論壇上說：「我哋要攞個全面嘅否決權，操諸我手。」
+
+控方指，梁國雄在初選前呼籲公眾投票，指他們不應懼怕《國安法》，要繼續堅持抗爭。他最終落選，並以社民連副主席身份發聲明，指社民連會遵守初選協議，又形容宣稱初選違法的說法是沒有根據及「有趣（amusing）」。
+
+主控周天行主動提出，開案陳詞有兩處指梁國雄「無差別（indiscriminately）」否決財政預算案，惟原文無提及，會將之刪除。
+
+#### 官提醒法庭內應用杯飲水、只能飲凍水
+
+此外，法官陳慶偉今在聆訊期間提醒，法庭內不可飲用樽裝飲料（“No one should drink directly from glass or bottle.”），着庭內人士使用杯子。法官李運騰補充，這是法庭長久以來的傳統，又指只能飲凍水。
+
+審訊下午續。
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（7日）於西九龍裁判法院（暫代高院）續審。控方讀出開案陳詞中，針對柯耀林、李予信及余慧明3人的涉案言行，指時任醫管局員工陣線主席余慧明提倡全面否決政府議案「攬炒議會」，又倡組織大三罷「令社會停擺」，指「真攬炒」或許才會為香港帶來一線生機。至於柯耀林及李予信均於初選落選，李予信其後以「Plan B」身分出選。
+
+控方完成閱讀開案陳詞，明日將處理控方傳召社交媒體專家證人的申請，預料周一開始傳召4名認罪被告區諾軒、趙家賢、鍾錦麟及林景楠。法官陳慶偉警告，指在座人士均知道將要傳召的證人身分，「如果任何人在證人作供時，嘗試騷擾或干預證人，會被視為藐視法庭及即時帶離法院大樓。」
+
+#### 控方指柯耀林稱中共為極權國家、批警搜民研製白色恐怖
+
+時任區政聯盟召集人、西貢區議員柯耀林是新界東候選人，控方指他簽署「墨落無悔」，並發文承諾參與初選協調，支持本土派參與「議會戰線」對抗政權。控方指，其政治宣言宣揚落實「真普選」，又散播對政權及中共沒有根據的不滿，包括指中共為「極權國家」，指極權對香港打壓加劇、嚴重破壞法治及剝奪港人自由權利、政權的暴力「猶如宣告港人治港正式死亡」，並呼籲團結對抗極權以「光復香港」。柯又表明，即使知道大機會因《國安法》被控，仍不會退縮。
+
+控方又指，柯在論壇呼籲議會和街頭戰線「雙結合」，爭取五大訴求，又美化違法的年輕人，指他們的「付出」值得被記住。柯表明會遵守初選協議，又籲支持有「抗爭意志」的候選人，並指自己是「行動派」，會身體力行參與議會和街頭戰線。他在初選前發文批評警方搜查民研辦公室，指是製造「白色恐怖」，籲公眾透過投票反抗。柯最終落敗並發文籲支持其他勝出者。
+
+庭上播放片段，柯耀林在初選論壇被主持問及，2018年民主黨新東補選出現紛爭，曾形容林卓廷「人格卑劣」，「你係咪都堅持原先嘅睇法？」，柯答「係」。庭上傳出笑聲，柯耀林轉身向林卓廷做致敬手勢，林亦回以致敬手勢。主持再問：「萬一你輸咗，阿廷贏咗，你會唔會都支持佢、成全佢？」柯則表示會服膺初選協議書，支持所有出線候選人。
+
+
+▲ 柯耀林
+
+#### 控方指李予信堅持議會及街頭戰線、以「Plan B」身分出選
+
+至於時任東區區議員、公民黨黨員李予信，是超級區議會候選人。控方指他於2020年3月25日出席公民黨「全面進攻 議會過半 實現五大訴求」記者會，黨魁楊岳橋曾表明，若政府不回應五大訴求，「我哋都會義無反顧咁對預算案投反對票，亦都希望能夠促成35+，一齊否決呢一個預算案」。同日李予信轉發公民黨〈【議會過半 反制政府】立法會過半的願景〉，重申相同承諾。
+
+控方指，李予信以公民黨名義簽署「墨落無悔」，其後報名初選，亦附上認同公民黨宣言的宣傳單張，承諾動用反對權力，促請政府落實五大訴求。控方又指，李予信在7月的初選論壇，強調即使《國安法》生效，仍會堅持在議會及街頭戰線抗爭。
+
+公民黨初選前夕發布名為「【7.11 7.12 初選】兩分鐘睇初選點投票」的影片，稱「即使有國安法都唔會阻擋到香港人對抗極權嘅決心」，籲公眾投票，李予信並在片段解釋議會內要有不同角色和分工，望以初選決定出選人士增加勝算，令民主派奪過半議席。
+
+李予信最終落選，他公開表示不會參選立法會，但後來因3名港島區候選人被DQ，他以「Plan B」身份報名參選。警方並在其辦公室和住處搜得其政治宣言單張，及具煽動性的卡和貼紙。
+
+
+▲ 李予信
+
+#### 控方指余慧明倡攬炒議會、組織大三罷令社會停擺
+
+至於時任醫管局員工陣線主席余慧明，是衞生服務界候選人，自稱本土抗爭派。控方指她在戴耀廷宣布「35+」計劃及「攬炒十步曲」後、宣布初選前，已發文及受訪表達支持。她於2020年3月在《獨媒》撰文〈踏上這攬炒旅途〉，提倡爭取35席後全面否決政府議案，觸發《基本法》第50條，令特首解散立法會及「制造憲政危機」，「攬炒」議會；又透過組織大三罷「令社會停擺」，「務求煞停一切暴政，達致制度性的改革，再共同建構重光後的香港」，表示「真攬炒」或許才會為香港帶來一線生機。她又籲「各路戰線定必要繼續，黃色經濟圈、國際戰線、文宣戰等缺一不可」，並指「要進行這場時代革命，就看大家對光復香港有多大耐性與決心」。
+
+余慧明4月接受《獨媒》訪問，指罷工一役讓她意識到「一定要用任何方法去推翻而家呢個政權、呢個政府，先可以做到一個改變」，亦清楚立會過半目標是透過否決政府所有議案，令立法會停擺，觸發憲政危機，配合罷工等逼使政府正面回應五大訴求。余5月接受《大紀元》訪問亦指「政府提出任何議案我哋都要作出反對」，以迫使政權回應「五大訴求，缺一不可」。
+
+余慧明其後簽署「墨落無悔」聲明並報名初選，提名表格附上單張寫有「我若當選，必定承諾行使反對權利反對一切議案，直至香港政府全面回應五大訴求，決一不可為止」。控方指，余在《國安法》落實後，仍受訪指擁護「攬炒」及抗爭原則，堅持對抗政權直至最後，又籲選民投選會對抗政權的候選人。其帖文提到競選口號「一息尚存 抗爭到底」、「初衷毋忘 決戰無降」，初選後感謝選民的帖文亦有口號「重光香港」。
+
+余慧明勝出初選後，發文指初選只是議會戰線的第一步，承諾會用盡一切方法令政權「付出代價」。她於7月13日出席抗爭派記者會，重申否決財政預算案迫使政府落實五大訴求，並承諾作為功能組別唯一代表，會盡力擴展抗爭戰線，同日簽署「抗爭派立法會參選人立場聲明」。余慧明7月27日報名參選立會，並在8月受訪，指若未能達成35+她仍進入議會，「我要做要做嘅嘢，繼續係要做嘅啫，要全投反對議案嘅，會繼續做，反對財政預算案嘅，我會繼續做。」警方並於其家中搜得寫有「光復香港 時代革命」、「齊上齊落」的文件。
+
+案件明早續審。控辯雙方一直未能就承認事實達成共識，主控萬德豪並指，周一將會準備一份或多份承認事實。辯方大律師馬維騉望控方確認，是否完成讀出承認事實後才傳召證人，法官陳慶偉着他私下與辯方討論。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
+
+### 列席被告早休後遭懲教分開
+
+另外，今日有6名認罪被告列席，他們早上原獲安排與不認罪被告同坐，並由懲教人員分隔。惟早休後，座位被重新分配，6人分成3行坐在被告欄內最盡頭，與所有不認罪被告分隔。
+
+不認罪的被告包括獲准保釋的鄭達鴻、楊雪盈、彭卓棋、何啟明、劉偉聰、黃碧雲、施德來、陳志全、柯耀林、李予信10人，及還柙的何桂藍、吳政亨、鄒家成、林卓廷、梁國雄及余慧明6人。認罪的袁嘉蔚、吳敏兒、朱凱廸、岑敖暉、黃之鋒和馮達浚6人亦有列席，開庭前被懲教帶往被告欄。
+
+審訊不設陪審團，改由3名國安法指定法官陳慶偉、李運騰及陳仲衡審理。控方代表為副刑事檢控專員萬德豪及周天行，辯方代表為資深大律師潘熙、大律師沈士文、黃宇逸、關文渭、馬維騉、盧敏儀、石書銘、黃廷光、Trevor Beel 等。
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-10-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-5.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-10-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-5.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..5053dc8f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-10-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-5.md
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第五日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-02-10 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 官批准傳召兩警長就FB及YouTube作供 料4名同案被告作供需時6周
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（10日）於西九龍裁判法院（暫代高院）續審。控方昨已讀出整份開案陳詞，何桂藍的代表大律師今反對控方傳召兩名警長以「專家證人」身份就 Facebook 和 YouTube 作供，指控方太遲提供證人口供紀錄予被告，導致她難以尋找辯方專家，對她造成不公。控方代表、副刑事檢控專員萬德豪則強調已在切實可行的情況下盡早把證人口供交予被告，況且4名認罪被告出庭作供需時6星期，被告依然有時間尋找辯方專家證人。法官最終批准控方傳召兩名警長作供，但二人的專家資格尚未確立，日後將會處理。案件下周一續審，預料控方開始傳召4名認罪被告區諾軒、趙家賢、鍾錦麟及林景楠。
+
+審訊不設陪審團，由3名國安法指定法官陳慶偉、李運騰及陳仲衡審理。控方代表為副刑事檢控專員萬德豪及周天行，辯方代表包括大律師沈士文、張耀良、黃宇逸、關文渭、馬維騉、盧敏儀、石書銘、黃廷光、Trevor Beel 等，本身是大律師的劉偉聰則會自辯。
+
+#### 控方稱已在切實可行下盡早提供文件 未對被告不公
+
+控方代表、副刑事檢控專員萬德豪指，控方於2022年6月已把交付至高院文件夾給予被告，但當時仍未提供控方證人書面證供。至2023年1月，控方把審前覆核文件夾提供予被告，當中顯示控方有意傳召專家證人，而警長6533分別於1月6日及1月9日錄取口供，分別就 Facebook 和 YouTube 的運作提供證據。然而代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel 卻於1月10日表達反對立場，但其時證人已完成錄取口供。
+
+控方承認未有按《實務指示》在交付程序之前，將專家報告送達辯方，但強調只用了一星期時間把警長證人口供交給被告，乃在切實可行的情況下盡早（as soon as practicable）提交文件，沒有對被告構成不公。至1月16日，被告已收到相關文件。控方強調，由1月16日至今天，被告總共有26日研究及決定是否傳召辯方證人。
+
+控方提及其中一名專家證人為警長6533，但他錄取口供時職級仍是警員（police constable），之後才晉升至警長（sergeant）。法官李運騰指文件顯示他以警長身份簽署，要求澄清他身份是警員還是警長，「他預料到自己會升職嗎？」惹來被告發笑。
+
+#### 控方料4名同案被告作供需時6星期 並會傳召「與協調會議有關的證人」
+
+控方又表示，下周一起將傳召4名同案被告出庭作供，若計算辯方盤問的時間在內，預料合共需時4星期。法官李運騰一度反問控方是否有點樂觀，因合共有16名被告的辯方律師需要盤問。控方其後更正所需時間為6星期。
+
+控方續指，然後會傳召一名與協調會議有關的證人，以及政府官員，包括選舉事務處，因此預料在4月中之前，控方仍未會傳召兩名警長，何桂藍仍有時間準備或尋找辯方專家，若果有任何對她不公的情況，也有時間作出補救。
+
+控方強調，兩名專家證人僅就十分常用的社交媒體的一般運作提供證據，而該些社交媒體可以發布文章、照片和影片等。
+
+#### 何桂藍：控方遲交證供 致遭受不公
+
+代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel 則投訴，控方太遲提供證人口供，以致辯方沒有足夠時間尋找辯方專家，因為他們不像律政司般有自己的專家，而是需要在外尋找學者擔任辯方專家。Trevor Beel 指，被告於1月31日才收到警長6533首兩份口供的英文譯本，至2月6日即開審當日，才收妥所有口供，包括另一警長3137的口供及英文譯本。
+
+Trevor Beel 強調是次並非一般的審訊，可能對辯方構成困難。法官陳慶偉認為此說法只是猜測，但 Trevor Beel 則指此乃合理期望。
+
+Trevor Beel 又表示，若果控方安排兩名警察以專家證人身份作供，便會爭議兩名證人的專家身份；若果二人僅以事實證人身份作供，那便不會提出相關爭議。
+
+他總結指，其當事人因為控方遲來的專家證供，而遭受無法彌補的不公（unredeemable prejudice），要求法庭拒絕控方傳召兩名警長。
+
+#### 法官提醒控方只可就法律陳詞
+
+控方代表萬德豪回應時批評，辯方一直未開始尋找辯方專家，打算等待今日法庭決定是否批准傳召兩名警長作供後，才決定是否尋找。他又指何桂藍的律師團隊懂閱讀中文，能從中文本得知證人身份是警長而不是警員，而毋須等待英文譯本。法官李運騰打斷，此僅為翻譯問題，提醒萬德豪的陳詞應圍繞法律議題。萬德豪其後表示沒有進一步陳詞。
+
+#### 法官批准傳召2名警長就 Facebook 和 YouTube 作供
+
+休庭45分鐘後，法官陳慶偉宣布批准控方傳召兩名警長出庭作供，但不代表法庭接納二人的報告內容，而二人的專家資格是否確立則有待日後處理。稍後會頒布書面理由。
+
+陳官並指，從庭上雙方的陳詞可見，Facebook 和 YouTube 影片的真確性（authenticity）和可呈堂性（admissibility）是一項尚未處理的問題，可是沒有任何人在案件管理階段提出過相關議題，若果有任何人挑戰控方呈交的 Facebook 和 YouTube 影片，便會對審訊有重大影響。陳官表示，若辯方有意提出爭議，法庭期望他們在下周一續審時提出，屆時需研究有什麼選項，包括分拆案件審訊。
+
+辯方另提及控方開案陳詞指稱被告串謀計劃的協議內容涉及4項「非法手段」，然而早於案件進行交付程序時，控方卻指稱協議內容涉及公開行為（Overt acts)，要求控方釐清指控基礎。 法官則指稍後處理。
+
+此外，代表黃碧雲的大律師沈士文申請撤銷宵禁令，其他辯方律師紛紛提出相同申請，皆獲陳官批准，所有早前須遵守宵禁的保釋被告可獲撤銷宵禁令。陳官亦批准保釋的被告在審訊期間不需到警署報到。
+
+
+▲ 黃碧雲
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-10-uas-economic-transformation.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-10-uas-economic-transformation.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..98e64001
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-10-uas-economic-transformation.md
@@ -0,0 +1,230 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : UA’s Economic Transformation
+author: Conor M. Savoy and Janina Staguhn
+date : 2023-02-10 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/2wjAxXH.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Enabling Ukraine’s Economic Transformation: Recovery, Reconstruction & Modernization"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Ukraine must not only win the war of aggression that Russia instigated in February 2022; it must also win the peace._
+
+
+
+_The geostrategic stakes of Ukraine’s reconstruction are such that failure could have disastrous consequences not just for Ukraine but also for the broader region and the world order._
+
+
+
+But successful reconstruction for Ukraine must begin before the war is won. This will require effort from a multitude of donor countries, multilateral institutions, and actors in the private sector. The international donor community will play a critical role in enabling this private sector investment that will fund Ukraine’s reconstruction.
+
+
+
+To secure a truly durable peace, Ukraine must transform itself economically. Corruption must be tamed, governance and the rule of law improved, and the power of oligarchs and vested interests broken.
+
+
+
+Central to this economic transformation will be the political process of Ukraine’s accession to the European Union.
+
+The EU accession experience of other Central and Eastern European countries has shown that most of the benefits of EU membership actually come from the reforms undertaken to enter the European Union.
+
+These reforms will enable transformation of Ukraine’s economy from the old model toward one that incubates innovation, supports entrepreneurs, interconnects with the rest of Europe and the world, and delivers inclusive prosperity for citizens.
+
+
+
+In June 2022, the European Union took the step of formally recognizing Ukraine as a candidate for membership; fulfilling this process after the war, on a clearly defined timeline, is essential to secure Ukraine’s economic and political future firmly imbedded in the Euro-Atlantic community.
+
+To achieve these goals, however, will require a significant commitment by Ukraine and its partners to winning the peace.
+
+
+### The Wartime Economy in Ukraine
+
+
+
+Beyond the initial devastation, in October 2022, Russia began a series of sustained air and missile attacks that have inflicted extensive damage on Ukraine’s electrical grid, water supply, and heating sources. The investment firm Dragon Capital estimated that due to these strikes against Ukraine’s infrastructure, Ukraine’s GDP would decline by 32 percent in 2022.
+
+
+▲ Firefighters put out a fire on the ruins of an electrical products plant following missile strikes in Kharkiv in October 2022.
+
+Despite cutting its budget back to the bare minimum, Ukraine expects a monthly budget deficit of $3 billion in 2023, or $36 billion for the year. In August 2022 the nation reached an agreement with its creditors to suspend interest payments for 24 months.
+
+This included a limited restructuring of its sovereign debt, but until Ukraine resumes payments, it is effectively blocked from accessing international capital markets. On the local capital markets, interest rates have risen to such a level that Ukraine cannot issue additional debt.
+
+
+
+> To cover the fiscal gaps, Ukraine has relied on a large amount of direct budget support supplied by the United States, the European Union, and international financial institutions (IFIs).
+
+> This money has enabled Ukraine to continue to meet its government obligations. However, some have disbursed the money more slowly than others, forcing the government of Ukraine to resort to inflationary financing by issuing additional currency when civil servant salaries must be paid and foreign funding is delayed.
+
+> The scale of destruction and the government’s deteriorating fiscal position suggest that without sufficient outside assistance, Ukraine could win the war militarily but lose economically.
+
+
+### Winning the Economic War
+
+
+
+Foreign assistance will not be enough to rebuild Ukraine and ensure an economic victory for Ukraine and the surrounding region.
+
+The G7 and its European partners must therefore strategically use the money available to strengthen Ukraine’s enabling environment for private sector investment.
+
+
+
+The United States, the European Union, other G7 countries, and the IFIs must find ways to use official finance to mitigate risks and incentivize investment in Ukraine.
+
+However, much of the hard work of governance, rule of law, and other regulatory reforms will need to be paid for with foreign assistance and there are still many variables to take into account when planning reconstruction.
+
+Ukraine and the international community held a series of conferences in 2022 — Lugano (July), Prague (August), and Berlin (October) — to undertake important initial planning for this process.
+
+
+▲ Ukraine’s prime minister Denys Shmyhal delivers a speech at the Lugano conference in 2022.
+
+Ukraine also released a National Recovery Plan (NRP) in July 2022 that lays out the country’s preliminary effort at not only rebuilding but also transforming itself.
+
+The NRP is a bold, expansive plan that covers nearly every aspect of Ukraine’s economy and infrastructure, and it should be at the center of future reconstruction efforts.
+
+The NRPs objectives are
+
+1. Economic, social, and environmental resilience
+
+2. Quick solutions for recovery of the economic, social, and environmental sectors
+
+3. A modernization and growth plan that will “ensure expedited sustainable economic growth and [the] wellbeing of the people”
+
+The Ukrainian government estimates the plan would cost between $750 billion and $1 trillion and ideally would be financed through a mix of grants, soft loans, and private sector investment.
+
+The NRP is divided into three phases:
+
+1. Immediate needs through 2022
+
+2. Medium-term needs (2023–25)
+
+3. Long-term needs for a modernization phase (2026–32)
+
+
+
+To meet Ukraine’s immediate, medium-term, and long-term needs, the United States should announce a multiyear, multibillion-dollar commitment to fund the economic reconstruction of Ukraine.
+
+This announcement would be most effective in early 2023 and if given in tandem with similar commitments by the European Union and other G7 partners like Canada, the United Kingdom, and Japan.
+
+As part of its commitment, the European Union should offer a specific timeline and set of conditions for Ukraine’s accession as a full EU member.
+
+
+▲ Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky and European Council president Charles Michel give a press conference following talks in Kyiv in January 2023.
+
+This offer needs to be genuine on the part of the European Union, and the timeline for accession should be no more than 10–15 years. Anything longer is not serious and could weaken Ukrainian resolve to pursue the needed reforms.
+
+Alongside pledged financial assistance, this offer will ensure Ukraine has a clear, time-defined road map outlining what is required to join the European Union. This in turn will give businesses the confidence to invest for the long term.
+
+
+### A Clear Path Forward
+
+
+
+Ukraine’s NRP should be at the center of reconstruction efforts, and Ukraine must lead in prioritizing reconstruction projects under a joint plan.
+
+There are two cornerstones of this joint plan:
+
+1. A genuine partnership between Ukraine, the United States, other G7 countries, and the European Union
+
+2. Clear planning with assigned roles on a long-term timeline
+
+The scale of reconstruction requires a clear commitment from Ukraine’s partners for at least a decade.
+
+
+▲ A farmer driving a combine harvester near a crater suspected to be caused by an air strike near Kramatorsk.
+
+It also requires IFIs, the World Bank, G7 development agencies, and relevant development finance institutions (DFIs) to work closely to reduce overlap and inefficiency.
+
+
+
+Defining roles and responsibilities for these groups will avoid onerous conditions on aid or duplication of effort. All conditionality requirements should be aligned with the reforms the Ukrainian government must undertake to court the private sector and win the peace.
+
+
+### Reforms Critical for Success
+
+
+
+The private sector needs to engage sooner rather than later for reconstruction to be successful. However, there are four significant barriers to investment and private sector engagement in reconstruction:
+
+1. Governance, corruption, and accountability
+
+2. Inefficient economic sectors
+
+3. Outdated infrastructure and limited trade linkages
+
+4. Access to finance
+
+
+▲ European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen applauds Volodymyr Zelensky as he delivers a speech on screen in front of the European Parliament in March 2022.
+
+> Prioritizing reforms that will strengthen governance and accountability and create the enabling conditions for greater private investment in Ukraine will be an essential first step.
+
+> These reforms can coincide with the requirements of Ukraine’s candidacy as an EU and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) member. The chief priorities of these reforms include
+
+- strengthening rule of law
+
+- increasing transparency, and
+
+- implementing accountability mechanisms.
+
+One critical piece of implementing these reforms is strengthening Ukraine’s judicial system to ensure it is free from corruption.
+
+On the economic front, this will include breaking the power of oligarchs and vested interests. Creating a level playing field for Ukrainian businesses of all sizes free of the undue influence of corrupt actors will also be essential.
+
+Another key step is developing a well-functioning, independent court system that draws upon the dispute resolution and bankruptcy laws of Ukraine’s Western allies. Prewar efforts to decentralize the government should continue, and the international community should work with municipal governments on reconstruction efforts.
+
+
+▲ The Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine. Andriy Kostin, who was appointed as prosecutor in summer 2022, is committed to rooting out government corruption.
+
+The international community can also provide accountability and transparency to support local civil society contractor procurement and investor screening, prevent malign influence, and vet and prequalify companies and contractors.
+
+Working closely with the Ukrainian government, the United States, the European Union, and other international partners can establish an independent monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system so that funds are tracked properly and it is possible to judge the success or failure of projects.
+
+Getting these reforms right will enable Ukraine to modernize and transform its economy in a way that will help guarantee its security.
+
+
+### Ukraine’s Future Economy
+
+
+
+Lenna Koszarny, founding partner and chief executive officer of Horizon Capital, described Ukraine’s future economy as “brains, hands and grains.”
+
+This vision for Ukraine’s economy is structured around its digital and information, communications, and technology (ICT); existing advanced manufacturing; and agriculture sectors.
+
+
+
+Ukraine is already a leading player in the technology and digital sector and should be seen as a source of innovation. Western-based technology and digital service companies — several of which already had a prewar presence in Ukraine — should double down on Ukraine’s well-educated workforce and create additional outposts in the country.
+
+If properly supported, all of these well-established and in-demand sectors could build on Ukraine’s impressive economic foundation and unlock significant equitable economic growth for Ukraine for years to come.
+
+Emphasizing these three economic areas also offer clear opportunities to economically integrate Ukraine with the European Union and the United States.
+
+
+▲ Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky gives a speech via video link to G7 leaders at the G7 summit near Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, on June 27, 2022.
+
+In the past, foreign direct investment by Germany, France, the Netherlands, and other Western European countries into productive sectors of other former Warsaw Pact countries has been critical to their economic success.
+
+Given its geographic location and well-trained workforce, Ukraine is well positioned to serve as an off-shoring destination for manufacturing in a postwar environment.
+
+
+### Winning the Peace
+
+
+
+Since the February 2022 invasion, Ukrainians have increasingly looked to a future in the European Union and the broader Euro-Atlantic community.
+
+There is no reason Ukraine cannot join the ranks of other Central and Eastern European countries that cast off their Russian-dominated pasts and transformed themselves into modern, vibrant democratic economies.
+
+
+▲ A boy wrapped in a Ukrainian national flag stands on top of a Russian military vehicle in downtown Kyiv in August 2022.
+
+Indeed, Ukraine is well placed to be a leader in the region and in Europe more broadly, stabilizing not only the region but also the world.
+
+The United States, European Union, and G7 should do everything in their power to realize this vision after Ukraine wins the war with Russia. With strong partnership, clear planning, and necessary reforms, Ukraine will have the support it needs to win the peace.
+
+---
+
+__Conor Savoy__ is a senior fellow with the Project on Prosperity and Development at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Conor brings nearly 15 years of experience to working on issues at the intersection of U.S. foreign policy and international development. Prior to CSIS, he was the executive director of the Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network (MFAN), a diverse advocacy coalition focused on increased effectiveness of U.S. foreign assistance.
+
+__Janina Staguhn__ is a research associate and program manager for the Project on Prosperity and Development (PPD) and Project on U.S. Leadership in Development (USLD) at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where she supports the projects’ research agenda and coordinates events.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-13-ipef-for-us-india.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-13-ipef-for-us-india.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..9f6bea11
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-13-ipef-for-us-india.md
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : IPEF For U.S.-India
+author: Jayant Krishna, et al.
+date : 2023-02-13 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/IkmXc0a.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Experts React: Can IPEF Be a Watershed Moment for U.S.-India?"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) was launched in May 2022 and has the qualities to significantly strengthen U.S.-India economic partnership. IPEF holds the rare distinction of being a multilateral approach to regional economic integration that includes both the United States and India — two nations often at odds during multilateral trade talks._ _Divided into four pillars — Connected Economy, Resilient Economy, Clean Economy, and Fair Economy — IPEF is aimed at structural economic transformation. The 14-member country arrangement is driven by the political urgency of countering Chinese economic influence in the region. With the special negotiation meetings for IPEF in New Delhi held between February 8–11, CSIS experts provide their analyses._
+
+
+### Managing India’s Supply Chain Disruptions
+
+_Jayant Krishna_
+
+IPEF aspires to rewrite the rules of engagement for the twenty-first century economies and enable them to grow faster and fairer. It is surely bigger than Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in size as well as clout and continues to expand.
+
+Like other nations with a significant industrial footprint, India also experienced serious supply chains disruptions in supply of electronic components, semiconductor devices, minerals, and other raw materials due to the Covid-19 pandemic. The worsening of trade relations among Asian countries, a logistics slowdown, and China’s economic coercion only added to its economic woes.
+
+Supply chain resilience is one of IPEF’s four key themes. Beyond the traditional risk management frameworks deployed by the industry, India could leverage IPEF to develop an adaptive capability of its supply chain to prepare for unprecedented events, become responsive to disruptions, and maintain business continuity at an optimum level of connectivity, coordination, and command.
+
+IPEF already accounts for 40 percent of global GDP and is likely to cross 50 percent soon. With pragmatic supply chain framework understanding expected to be operative among IPEF signatory nations, India would be far better positioned to safeguard its supply chains against the associated vulnerabilities. This would ensure that India’s industrial output does not remain compromised and the GDP continues to grow uninhibited.
+
+
+### Building Consensus on Cross-Border Taxation Issues
+
+_Mukesh Butani_
+
+The IPEF meeting presents a significant opportunity for India to push its key reform agenda on multilateral tax policy and trade, keeping in mind investment and inclusive economic growth. Specifically, it presents an opportunity to move forward with member states for comprehensive free trade agreements and reduction of trade barriers.
+
+The forum will play a critical role in building global consensus on contentious cross-border tax issues, such as taxation of digital services, virtual digital assets, and indirect transfer of capital assets. Most of these are being debated at wider multilateral institutions such as Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), International Monetary Fund, and World Bank — however, there is inertia.
+
+The member states should reaffirm their commitment to transparency by adopting global best practices on a common framework for the exchange of information for tax purposes and crypto trades. The forum is expected to supplement efforts to improve tax administration and mutual cooperation by supporting the ongoing work on the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project’s Two-Pillar Solution and tax inspectors without borders.
+
+
+### Strengthening Leadership in Clean Energy and Improving Domestic Programs
+
+_Kartikeya Singh_
+
+At the upcoming ministerial meeting of the IPEF, leaders will gather to deliberate the next steps on the guiding pillars. India is a participant to pillar three: Clean Economy. To activate meaningful cooperation between India and the other members of this pillar, India can contribute in the following ways:
+
+1. structuring reverse auctions for utility-scale clean energy projects to ensure lowest tariffs;
+
+2. designing bulk procurement programs to reduce cost of energy efficiency, and e-mobility ventures;
+
+3. promoting joint financial and technical partnerships for business transition toward clean energy verticals between state-owned enterprises, including National Thermal Power Corporation, Coal India, and Indian Oil with peer institutions in partner countries (i.e., to foster the growth of offshore wind industry); and
+
+4. consolidating the One Sun, One World, One Grid by designing effective electricity transmission, which would dovetail with the efforts to create an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) super-grid or the proposed undersea interconnection between Australia and Singapore.
+
+In exchange, given the recent line items in India’s 2023 budget where clean energy featured heavily, India should work with IPEF partner countries to add value to these efforts:
+
+1. work with partner countries to develop a green hydrogen ecosystem, including crowding demand for products like green steel to develop an edge in low carbon production;
+
+2. jointly create the supply chains for critical materials that are required for powering the clean energy economy, given countries like Australia, Indonesia, and others with large reserves of these materials are in the coalition, is beneficial;
+
+3. jointly develop and improve the technologies that can dovetail with India’s biogas (GOBARdhan Scheme) to ensure its success; and
+
+4. negotiate how countries in IPEF might create their own versions of the United States’ Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) to ensure healthy competition and joint benefit-sharing of localized job creation from enacting such incentive schemes.
+
+
+### Improving Governance Efficacy and Attracting Foreign Direct Investment
+
+_Alok Gupta_
+
+IPEF is aimed at incentivizing partner countries to contribute to stability, prosperity, development, and peace in the Indo-Pacific region. Inducing cooperation between the countries requires effective governance at the back end. This is to ensure that the commitments made by partner countries are timely and effectively implemented. Several countries in the region suffer from endemic institutional problems such as ineffective bureaucracies and corruption. Addressing these challenges will be crucial for ensuring that development efforts in the region are not in vain.
+
+To contextualize, the United States should look at where India stands in terms of governance. Per the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 2021, published by the World Bank, India occupies 11th position out of the 14 IPEF countries on two measured metrics — government effectiveness and control of corruption. Out of a maximum score of 100, India received 62.5 on government effectiveness, as opposed to index leader Singapore, which has 100, and Philippines, which is at the bottom of the chart with 57.69. Similarly, on control of corruption, India scored 46.63. New Zealand leads the chart with a score of 99.04, and Philippines is at the bottom with 34.13. While India has improved since the previous rankings in 2016, there is a long road ahead.
+
+Better governance and less corruption can enable a more conducive environment for commercial cooperation and technical exchanges which can increase the FDI in the country and growth in economy, thus driving to prosperity and peace. India needs to accelerate its efforts of improving governance and employ technological advances to work towards creating an efficacious environment for collaboration and cooperation. Specifically, India needs to proactively engage the United States on technological exchanges and commercial engagements to enhance trade and mutually benefit both countries.
+
+---
+
+__Jayant Krishna__ is currently the CEO of the Foundation for Advancing Science and Technology (FAST India), an organization dedicated to enabling transformation in India’s science and technology landscape. He was previously group CEO of the UK India Business Council (UKIBC) and led in strengthening bilateral economic ties between the United Kingdom and India. He is also a non-resident senior fellow with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., and between May 2019 and July 2020 served as executive director of public policy at the Wadhwani Foundation, a U.S. nonprofit. Mr. Krishna previously led key initiatives of the prime minister’s Skill India Mission as CEO and as executive director and chief operating officer of the National Skill Development Corporation (NSDC). He previously worked for the Tata Group, India’s largest conglomerate.
+
+__Mukesh Butani__ is a senior associate with the Wadhwani Chair in U.S.-India Policy Studies at CSIS and the managing partner of BMR Legal. With specialization in corporate international tax and transfer pricing, he has significant experience in advising Fortune 500 multinationals and large Indian business houses on a wide range of matters relating to foreign direct investment policy, business re-organizations, cross-border tax structuring, tax controversy, and regulatory policy across a range of sectors. Mukesh participated in the Kelkar Task Force (2002) on tax reforms and was a member of the Indian Ministry of Finance (MoF) committee on e-commerce taxation (2000). He is presently representing the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), Paris on the MoF Standing Committee on Tax Deducted on Source and Foreign Tax Credit.
+
+__Kartikeya Singh__ is director of programmes at the SED Fund, where he manages the portfolio to support energy transition efforts around the world. To inform his strategies, he leverages his extensive experience being in or engaging with government, research institutions, intergovernmental organizations, civil society, and industries in the sustainable development sector. He has also traveled from the Arctic to the Antarctic exploring the challenges of energy geopolitics in a changing climate. Previously, Kartikeya was a senior fellow and deputy director at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) where he was charged with leading the Engaging Indian States initiative.
+
+__Alok Gupta__ is presently the director of technology and policy at the Wadhwani Foundation in New Delhi, India. Based in Noida, Uttar Pradesh, Alok brings in over two decades of experience working in various leadership roles in the private sector, government, and policy. A computer graduate by training, Alok has implemented technology projects in the Indian government across departments and ministries. Alok specializes in strategy, opportunity analysis, solution conceptualization, developing policy frameworks, and conducting program and stakeholder management. His experience includes working in diverse sectors like IT, financial inclusion, identity, health, maternity and nutrition, education, skills, agriculture, transport, labor and employment, and food processing.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-13-russo-ukrainian-war-in-2023.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-13-russo-ukrainian-war-in-2023.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..f252db8f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-13-russo-ukrainian-war-in-2023.md
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Russo-Ukrainian War In 2023
+author: Emily Harding, et al.
+date : 2023-02-13 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/38NUWOB.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Experts React: Factors Shaping the Russia-Ukraine Conflict in 2023"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_As Russia and Ukraine head into year two of a war that has defied expectations, a collection of CSIS experts examined driving factors for the future of the conflict. They borrow the approach from intelligence analysts, who seek to evaluate the possible trajectories of a conflict rather than make straight-line predictions, bounding reality for policymakers._ _Emily Harding discusses the life-or-death question of continued outside aid for Ukraine and the resilience of the Ukrainian people. Ben Jensen discusses cohesion in the Russian military and the potential for catastrophic collapse. Heather Williams evaluates the looming nuclear question. Finally, Eliot Cohen examines how a conflict might end._
+
+
+### Single Point of Failure: Will Outside Support for Ukraine Endure?
+
+_Emily Harding_
+
+The success or failure of Kyiv’s war effort hinges on one unfortunate fact: Ukraine does not have the indigenous capacity to arm itself for this fight. Ukrainian president Zelensky knows it and has devoted considerable time and energy to shoring up relationships and corresponding supply lines — for example, leaving Ukraine to visit Washington and Europe.
+
+The West has responded: despite a slow, hesitant start, marked by hand-wringing over escalation, NATO members have stepped up to provide increasingly effective and potent weapons systems. HIMARS — the light, mobile, precision artillery platforms — are already a hero of the war, and Abrams and Leopard tanks are inbound. Debates over fourth-generation fighter jets and long-range fires are surely right around the corner.
+
+But Zelensky’s work is never done. Russia is working hard to widen any crack in support for Ukraine. Recent Quran-burning protests in Sweden seem to have been bought and paid for by Russian assets, designed to make it impossible for Turkey to support Sweden’s bid for NATO membership. A recent poll by the European Hybrid CoE suggests that segments of the public in key European nations are questioning why Europe is sending so much aid to Ukraine. Those segments are still minorities, but Ukraine is only a year into what most likely will be a very long fight.
+
+NATO allies also have a structural concern beyond the whims of opinion polls. As CSIS’s Seth Jones argued in his recent report, Empty Bins in a Wartime Environment, support to Ukraine has drawn down U.S. stocks of critical weapons systems faster than they can be replenished, in our current peacetime production tempo. The report says “DoD has only placed on contract a fraction of the weapons it has sent to Ukraine. Many U.S. allies and partners in Europe also have defense industrial bases that are unprepared for major war, heavily reliant on the United States, and chronically underfunded.” At some point, U.S. and European military planners will begin to feel the pinch and question what should go to Ukraine and what should be held in reserve for a potential future fight, should this conflict dramatically escalate or China see an opportunity to move in the Pacific.
+
+In this conflict more than most, Ukraine’s chances at victory will be decided by both the weapons themselves and the symbolic value of the commitment to send them. Moscow is betting that time is on its side and it can grind Ukraine into dust. The key assumption in that bet is that Russia can outlast NATO commitment. Instead, Russia needs to fear that, just as it underestimated NATO’s willingness to help Ukraine and Ukraine’s ability to fight, it has miscalculated the West’s resolve to stay with Ukraine all the way to Crimea. The Biden administration has signaled medium-term U.S. commitment with its military aid package and training programs, and in one of his few lines on foreign policy in the State of the Union, Biden pledged that the United States “will stand with you as long as it takes.” On the heels of Zelensky’s trip, European allies need to find ways to signal the same commitment to their people and to Kyiv.
+
+#### Can Ukrainian Resilience Hold?
+
+> On February 24, millions of us made a choice. Not a white flag, but a blue and yellow flag. Not escaping, but meeting. Meeting the enemy. Resisting and fighting. –Zelensky’s New Year address to the nation
+
+President Zelensky has been a symbol of his nation’s resolve and defiance in the face of a brutal enemy. He has been steadfast, but how long can Ukrainian resilience hold? As of January 15, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees recorded 18,358 civilian casualties in the country: 7,031 killed and 11,327 injured. More than eight million Ukrainians have become refugees, at least six million more are internally displaced, and nearly half the population needs humanitarian assistance. Russia has engaged in a ruthless campaign to knock out critical infrastructure, including power and water, in the middle of winter. Ukrainians have suffered greatly and will continue to suffer as a result of Moscow’s blatant disregard for human life.
+
+Meanwhile, reliable numbers of Ukrainian military casualties are difficult to calculate; the Ukrainian government has labeled them classified. In early December, Ukrainian government officials publicly estimated up to 13,000 killed and stridently denied a European estimate of 100,000 dead. Ukrainian soldiers have shown ingenuity and grit and have made clear they will fight to free their country for as long as is necessary with whatever is available.
+
+NATO and other friends of Ukraine should plan for a multiyear conflict and develop sustainable plans for keeping Ukraine’s forces and population resilient. For refugees, those plans look like work programs — in particular support for Ukraine’s women to work remotely in their Ukrainian jobs whenever possible — education for children, and mental health support. A soldier unburdened with worries about their spouse and kids is a soldier better able to focus on the fight. For those fighting, efforts to create sustainable rotations on and off the battlefield for training and rest are a basic start. Fostering the belief that the fight is winnable with public symbols of support — from flags waving over Washington, to the United Kingdom hosting Eurovision on behalf of Ukraine, to NAFO Fellas, to, yes, tanks and HIMARS — will keep determination high.
+
+
+### Is There Cohesion in the Russian Military?
+
+_Benjamin Jensen_
+
+In stark contrast to Ukrainian forces, Russian efforts in Ukraine have been plagued by faulty equipment, lack of winter gear, and reported fights and drunkenness in the trenches. What if the mutinies endemic in the Russian revolutions in 1905 and 1917 are a harbinger for the course of 2023? Military power requires cohesive fighting organizations as much as it does tanks and planes. Soldiers tend to reflect cleavages and power struggles in their societies. The combined stress of battlefield losses and growing crises on the home front can undermine military power through eroding cohesion. Look no further than the Kiel Mutiny in the German navy in 1918 and the cascading protests across that accelerated the end of World War I. Along similar lines, a recent study by Jason Lyall, director of the Political Violence Field Lab, found that military performance is linked to economic and social inequality in a society. The more unequal and stratified a society, the more likely the military is to underperform and even collapse.
+
+Applied to Russia, which has seen a dramatic rise in income inequality over the last generation, alongside a rise in nationalistic xenophobic attitudes and racism against non-ethnic Russians, this finding suggests the winter could be longer for Moscow than it is for Kyiv. The signs are already present given changing sentiments in minority regions like Buryatia and mass emigration by military age males. Sanctions combined with the Kremlin’s rhetoric about historic Russia may bolster the elite that didn’t jump from windows, but it only acerbates the tensions tearing the nation apart and undermining its military performance. Russia has more forced conscripts and prison units than it does volunteers.
+
+The conditions are already present for a large-scale Russian military mutiny. Low morale, cold weather, and high attrition rates alongside nationalist rhetoric and economic decline will continue over the course of the next three months. In this environment, a spark can start a wildfire. Riots, rampant refusal of orders, and even defections and surrenders could spread like a disease through the burnt-out cities and trenches along the battlefield in Ukraine. Though impossible to predict, the most likely catalyst on the horizon is the first offensive of the spring in which mobilized conscripts currently training in Russia and Belarus discover the hell of modern trench warfare.
+
+
+### Will Putin Continue to Make Nuclear Threats?
+
+_Heather Williams_
+
+Whether the war in Ukraine lasts months or years, nuclear weapons will continue to lurk in the background. Russian president Vladimir Putin has come to rely on nuclear weapons for coercion and bullying and will continue to make nuclear threats. Since the start of the invasion, Putin has made explicit and implicit reference to Russia’s nuclear arsenal. On December 21, he stated, “We will continue maintaining and improving the combat readiness of the nuclear triad” and listed Russia’s numerous nuclear delivery vehicles, including the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle.
+
+Putin is relying on nuclear threats for two primary reasons. First, he wants to deter NATO from directly intervening in Ukraine. While the West has gradually increased its military support for Ukraine, Putin’s efforts have arguably had some success preventing direct Western military intervention for fear of escalation. Keeping NATO out of Ukraine will remain a top priority for Putin. But the second reason for Putin’s nuclear threats is even more dangerous and risky. By suggesting a willingness to use nuclear weapons, Putin is also signaling his commitment to winning the war in Ukraine at ever-increasing costs. In the event Russia is facing defeat on the battlefield, Putin may resort to tactical nuclear weapons use in a key strategic region, such as Kherson.
+
+Deterring Putin from using nuclear weapons will require concerted international efforts. The international community should make it clear that any nuclear use in Ukraine would turn Russia into an international pariah and while nuclear weapons might win a battle, they will lose Putin the war. This message would be particularly meaningful coming from Russia’s key strategic partners in Beijing and New Delhi. But U.S. and NATO leaders should also continue to rely on risk reduction measures and crisis communication channels, such as the October call between Secretary of Defense Austin and his Russian counterpart, Sergei Shoigu. The West may not be able to stop Putin from threatening to use nuclear weapons, but countries can work to prevent him from following through on those threats.
+
+
+### How Might This End?
+
+_Eliot Cohen_
+
+The conventional wisdom says “negotiations,” of course. That is the point that the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark Milley, and numerous civilian officials in the U.S. government have often made.
+
+In some sense this is true: a bunch of tired men sitting around a table conclude most wars — but that can be a surrender negotiation (which is not much of a negotiation), or a ceasefire arrangement (which merely creates an interlude until the next round of fighting) or a grand peace-fest like Vienna 1815. “Negotiation,” in other words, covers a multitude of events.
+
+In this case, it is most likely that what will not happen is the kind of negotiation Milley and others have in mind — a genuine compromise that brings about peace. What is more likely is that one side or the other collapses in exhaustion, and that the result is a ceasefire for now, which is the predicate for another conflict.
+
+Conceivably, if the West continues to be dilatory in arming Ukraine, it could be Kyiv that crawls wearily to the table. But it is rather more likely the Russians will be the ones to do so, if (as laid out above) outside support is robust, the Ukrainians maintain their immense capacity to adapt and continue the fight, Russia sees collapses in its fighting force, and the West maintains a united front rejecting nuclear threats. After suffering another hundred thousand or more casualties and feeling the internal strains of an unjust and ill-conceived war, Russia could be driven by Ukrainian grit and Western firepower and battlefield intelligence to slump its way to a table at which it agrees to leave the lands it has pillaged, and the populations it has occupied, violated, and slaughtered. But it depends on us.
+
+---
+
+__Emily Harding__ is deputy director and senior fellow with the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). She joined CSIS from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), where she was deputy staff director. In her nearly 20 years of government service, she has served in a series of high-profile national security positions at critical moments. While working for SSCI, she led the Committee’s multiyear investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 elections.
+
+__Benjamin Jensen__ is a senior fellow for future war, gaming, and strategy in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He is also a professor of strategic studies at the Marine Corps University School of Advanced Warfighting. Dr. Jensen has spent the last decade researching the changing character of political violence, technology, and strategy. He has worked with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, NATO, the U.S. Army, and a range of government agencies and foundations to develop wargames and scenario-driven exercises exploring strategy, defense analysis, crisis response, military planning, and complex emergencies.
+
+__Heather Williams__ is the director of the Project on Nuclear Issues and a senior fellow in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Prior to joining CSIS, she was a visiting fellow with the Project on Managing the Atom in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School and a Stanton Nuclear Security fellow in the Security Studies Program at MIT.
+
+__Eliot A. Cohen__ is the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the Robert E. Osgood Professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), where he has taught since 1990. He received his BA and PhD degrees from Harvard and taught there and at the U.S. Naval War College before going to SAIS, where he has also served as the school’s ninth dean.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-13-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-6.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-13-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-6.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..f7720728
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-13-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-6.md
@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第六日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-02-13 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 官指串謀屬持續罪行 《國安法》前言行可證被告思想狀態
+- 區諾軒開始作供 指2020年1月首與戴耀廷飯局商討 答應合作籌劃
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（13日）於西九龍裁判法院（暫代高院）續審。法官上周提及，相信控方於本案依賴「共謀者原則（co-conspirator’s rule）」，以其他被告的言行推論被告參與串謀。有辯方律師今表示控方開案陳詞從沒有提及相關原則，遭法官質疑控方依賴該原則是顯而易見。此外，有辯方律師表示本案控罪始於2020年7月1日，被告此前言行不屬串謀一部分。惟法官李運騰指他完全錯誤，指所有人都知道《國安法》於7月1日才生效，原本合法的行為也可變成非法，而控罪屬「持續罪行」，《國安法》前的言行可為本案「謀劃」提供一個背景，證明被告的思想狀態。
+
+#### 列席認罪被告全於延伸庭被告欄就坐
+
+審訊不設陪審團，由3名國安法指定法官陳慶偉、李運騰及陳仲衡審理。控方代表為副刑事檢控專員萬德豪及周天行，辯方代表包括資深大律師潘熙、大律師沈士文、張耀良、黃宇逸、關文渭、馬維騉、盧敏儀、石書銘、黃廷光、Trevor Beel 等，本身是大律師的劉偉聰則自辯。
+
+
+▲ 劉偉聰
+
+不認罪被告包括獲准保釋的鄭達鴻、楊雪盈、彭卓棋、何啟明、劉偉聰、黃碧雲、施德來、陳志全、柯耀林、李予信10人，及還柙的何桂藍、吳政亨、鄒家成、林卓廷、梁國雄及余慧明6人。
+
+至於上周列席的認罪被告全部不在正庭，據記者觀察，他們被帶到沒有記者、只有公眾席的1號延伸法庭被告欄就坐，包括黃之鋒、朱凱廸、譚凱邦、馮達浚及梁晃維5人。認罪被告自開審起原與不認罪被告同坐，惟上周四開始已被懲教與其他不認罪被告分開坐。
+
+#### 控方：控罪詳情為「公開作為」、串謀指控被告贊成無差別否決財政預算
+
+辯方上周要求控方澄清，控罪所列的4項協議內容，是各被告的「公開作為」（overt act，即法庭可用以推論被告作串謀的間接證據），抑或視為控罪必要元素的「非法手段（unlawful means）」。
+
+主控萬德豪今重申，本案「謀劃」內容是被告贊成無差別地否決政府提出的任何財政預算或公共開支，以迫使特首解散立法會及辭職，而本案控罪詳情均是該「謀劃」的「公開作為（overt act）」，即法庭可用以推論被告作串謀的間接證據。
+
+#### 辯方質疑須證戴耀廷文章為他所寫 否則僅屬傳聞證供
+
+法官上周批准控方傳召兩名警長就 Facebook 和 YouTube 的運作作供，代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel 今指，他不爭議該些內容的真確性（authenticity），但認為控方在依賴「共謀者原則（co-conspirator’s rule）」前，須先舉證本案串謀協議。
+
+就控方依賴其他被告如戴耀廷撰寫的文章，他認為戴不會出庭作供，無證據文章由他所寫，僅屬「傳聞證供」，控方須證明涉案文章由戴所寫。法官李運騰同意若控方證人並不知悉文章由誰所寫，控方或須就此提出證據；又指其他被告的文章在「共謀者原則」下可以呈堂，辯方屆時可再提出反對。
+
+#### 辯方質疑控方開案沒提「共謀者原則」
+
+代表黃碧雲和林卓廷的大律師沈士文其後表示，控方並沒有在開案陳詞提及意圖依賴「共謀者原則」。法官李運騰指，開案陳詞大量引用戴耀廷文章，已清楚顯示控方會依賴該原則；法官陳慶偉亦質疑，辯方如有疑問為何不在案件管理聆訊提出。沈士文指是控方責任，沒預期控方會依賴該原則，遭法官陳慶偉批評他完全錯誤（totally misconceived），並反問：「難道控方每次開案陳詞都要列明依賴的每項原則？」
+
+沈士文重申，根據案例，若控方依賴「共謀者原則」，辯方需知道控方依賴此原則下，針對每名被告的證據。法官李運騰指，本案所有促進串謀的言行（acts and declarations in furtherance of a conspiracy）均是針對所有共謀者的證據，不論他們於言行作出前或後才加入串謀。沈士文同意，但指控方未必依賴所有證據，不同證據亦可能達致不同結論。Trevor Beel 遂補充，本案或涉多於一個串謀，法官指將會稍後處理。
+
+#### 控罪始於2020七一 官指國安法前言行可證被告思想狀態
+
+大律師馬維騉續指，本案控罪日期為2020年7月1日至2021年1月7日，控方似乎沒有指控被告於2020年7月1日前串謀，故被告此前言行不屬串謀一部分。法官李運騰指他完全錯誤（totally misconceived），指所有人都知道《國安法》於7月1日才生效，在此之前被告不可能干犯任何本案的「非法手段」，而本控罪屬橫跨一段時間的「持續罪行（continuous offence）」，《國安法》後原本合法的行為也可變成非法，故控方才以2020年7月1日為控罪開始日期。
+
+惟馬維騉指，《國安法》生效前並不存在本案的非法串謀，故被告此前的言行最多只是推動一個「協議（agreement）」，而非非法的「串謀」。李運騰回應，被告於6月30日或以前的言行，可為本案「謀劃」提供一個背景（setting），及證明被告的思想狀態（state of mind）。馬維騉同意7月1日前的言行可為本案提供背景，但重申不認為能證被告推動串謀。
+
+萬德豪補充，除了共謀者規則外，控方亦可能依賴「巧合（coincidence）」的規則，指涉案行為於相近時間發生，會邀法庭考慮被告犯案不是「純粹巧合」。
+
+#### 需時處理同意事實 押下午開庭
+
+控辯雙方早前未能同意承認事實，萬德豪指今早4時15分收到辯方要求修改承認事實，需時1小時再商討。Trevor Beel 指，由於需時與還柙被告會面，望能下午再繼續。法官終批准休庭至12時。直至近12時，法庭書記指押後至下午2時半。審訊下午續。
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（13日）於西九龍裁判法院（暫代高院）續審。首名控方證人、被指為初選組織者的區諾軒下午作供，他供稱初選的計劃由2020年1月與戴耀廷、李永達、李卓人和黃浩銘的一個飯局開始，當時戴耀廷提及立會過半願景，及如何在區選大勝後「再下一城」，在立法會為民主派贏取更多議席並爭取「五大訴求」。區指，當時戴耀廷較堅持以公民投票形式舉辦初選作協調，並推想每區可獲的議席數目；又指立會過半是「大殺傷力憲制武器」，可利用《基本法》賦予的權力否決財政預算案和政府議案，並成立獨立調查委員會向警暴問責等。
+
+區又指，飯局上他同意民主派過半及建立協調機制「會係一個好大嘅進步」，並答應以籌劃者身份與戴耀廷合作舉辦初選。他解釋，當時他剛完成立法會公職，打算赴日留學，2020年有約大半年時間在香港，「我認為我當時有時間，能夠貢獻我視之為民主運動嘅工作。」
+
+#### 下午傳首名控方證人區諾軒 官着稍後再處理承認事實
+
+控辯雙方早上就承認事實商討，主控萬德豪下午開庭後，原欲讀出修訂的承認事實，指屬法庭一貫做法，惟法官陳慶偉及陳仲衡均指應立即聽取本案證供，稍後才處理承認事實。
+
+法庭其後於下午約2時45分，傳召首名控方證人、被指為初選組織者的區諾軒作供。他架黑色粗框眼鏡、身穿灰色毛衣，在3名懲教人員押送下手持一疊文件步入法庭，先向旁聽席和被告欄方向微微躹躬，再坐下。法官指他不能攜有文件，區一度問：「我嘅證供係咪可以留低，定係都唔得？」法官指他作供期間不能以書面供詞協助記憶，區其後將文件放在桌上，除下口罩以基督教誓章宣誓。區諾軒宣誓時，被安排在另一法庭觀看直播、已認罪的被告之一馮達浚搖頭。
+
+#### 控方稱控罪日期為2020.7.1至2021.1.7 區：係咪再早啲啊應該？
+
+區諾軒作供時確認，他由2009年12月至2017年9月為民主黨黨員，2012年至2019年任南區區議員，並於2018年3月至2019年12月經補選當選香港島立法會議員。
+
+除串謀顛覆國家政權罪外，他亦於2020年4月涉大聲公襲警被定罪、2021年4月涉組織參與非法集結被定罪，另2021年8月涉選舉舞弊和違反《立法會（權力及特權）條例》獲准守行為。控方指串謀顛覆國家政權罪控罪日期為2020年7月1日至2021年1月7日時，區諾軒一度面露疑惑：「係咪再早啲啊應該？」惟他迅即改口稱「正確」。
+
+#### 2020年1月首度與戴耀廷、李永達、李卓人、黃浩銘飯局商討
+
+主控周天行負責主問環節，要求區諾軒順時序講述本案串謀計劃的發生。區諾軒供稱，2019年12月，戴耀廷於《蘋果日報》發表〈立會奪半 走向真普選重要一步〉一文，他起初有留意但沒有聯絡戴，直至2020年1月，泛民主派亦開始留意到該文章。
+
+區續指，「一切係由一個飯局開始」，指於2020年1月尾，與戴耀廷、民主黨李永達、工黨李卓人和社民連黃浩銘進行飯局作首次見面。
+
+區表示，當時他剛完成立法會公職，打算赴日留學，而該飯局的重要性，在於是他首次與戴耀廷商討有關初選的問題。他形容，李永達和李卓人當時亦很關心在將要來臨的立法會選舉，「民主派可以點樣達到最大勝算。」
+
+
+▲ 李卓人在支聯會一案中被控《港區國安法》煽動他人顛覆國家政權罪，及後一直還押。
+
+#### 飯局目標包括助民主派於立法會爭取更多議席
+
+區諾軒指，戴耀廷在飯局提出有關立會過半的願景及覆述文章看法，並提出三點值得留意，包括：當時民主派於2019年區議會選舉大勝，他們要思考如何「再下一城」，在立法會為民主派贏取更多議席；當時「五大訴求」是反修例運動主要內容，他們要思考如何爭取「五大訴求」；區議會選舉大勝後，要思考如何設立公民參與機制，包括活用民主派贏得的議席，並結合「黃營媒體」及公民社會團體的參與，建立一個平台。
+
+就第一點，區解釋泛民主派要在立法會贏取更多議席，需要一個「協調機制」。他指，立法會地方選區奉行比例代表制，而過往選舉常有一種規律，就是泛民主派獲得比建制派更多選票，但在部分選區無法獲得相應比例議席，因泛民主派有太多名單參選，以致部分選票被浪費。
+
+區續指，建制派自2008年起已建立一套成熟的協調機制，但泛民直至2020年仍未成功建立，故與戴耀廷等人討論如何建立一套協調機制，讓不同黨派，無論是傳統泛民主派、激進泛民主派和本土派，總之任何「黃色陣營」內的政治勢力，參選立法會時均可互相協調，善用選票、按比例當選。
+
+#### 區：戴耀廷堅持公民投票形式舉辦初選
+
+周天行問及，戴耀廷目標是增加民主派於立法會選舉的勝算，那他有否提出任何方案以取得立法會多數議席。區諾軒指戴耀廷當時較堅持用公民投票形式舉辦初選，惟當時其他與會者認為較消耗人力物力，可用其他方法，如以選前民調調查候選人支持度，再讓大家參考。
+
+就戴耀廷當時的提議，區指雖然未有如2020年7月的初選般具體，但也有基本框架，即在不同地方直選選區、及功能組別的區議會第二界別（超級區議會），以公民投票選出泛民主派代表，決定他們出選的優先次序。
+
+他續指，若能建立協調機制，在各選區便理應可獲多數議席，包括在港島區6席贏取4席、九龍西6席贏取4席、九龍東5席贏取3席、新界西9席贏取6席、新界東9席贏取6席、及超級區議會5席贏取3席，再將上述選區議席相加，便可得出還需爭取多少席以達35席。他並指就新界兩區，「如果諗得積極啲，可能（在一個選區內）會攞到7席嘅。」
+
+區指，當時飯局未訂下確實數目，直至與不同團體諮詢後，戴耀廷才在之後的文章及3月底的記者會提出「6 6 4 4 3」的說法。但在法官詢問下，他同意在飯局上戴耀廷已曾作相關推想和推算，「佢有同我講呢一啲數字」，並指對與會者來說，「如果民主派能夠贏，當然係好」，但要推展整個民主派實現就需更多工作，如向不同團體諮詢。
+
+#### 區諾軒承認飯局上答應合作籌劃初選 「貢獻民主運動」
+
+3名指定法官不時加入發問，法官李運騰要求控方順時序發問，並要求區諾軒確實說出飯局當日「誰說過什麼」，又問他有沒有參與討論。區指他無法憶述具體的說話內容，但當時亦同意若民主派能過半，且能建立一個協調機制，「會係一個好大嘅進步」，「而且正正係當時，我答應同戴耀廷合作舉辦初選。」
+
+區解釋，他答應以籌劃者身份參與，因他即將要留學，2020年有約大半年時間在香港，「我認為我當時有時間，能夠貢獻我視之為民主運動嘅工作。」
+
+
+▲ 區諾軒（資料圖片）
+
+#### 區：戴耀廷稱立會過半是「大殺傷力憲制武器」 可否決財政預算案
+
+至於區諾軒提及會上第二點，即思考如何爭取「五大訴求」。區諾軒指，當時原意回應反修例運動，戴耀廷提及若立會過半，將是「大殺傷力憲制武器」，因民主派對政府會有更多議價能力，亦可以利用《基本法》賦予的權力行使否決權。他指，當時沒有特別指定否決對象，但有包括財政預算案。
+
+法官陳仲衡指不明白，如何沒有特定否決對象但又包括否決財政預算案。區諾軒解釋，「五大訴求」包括要求為警暴問責的條款，「若果我哋能夠運用立會過半所得到嘅地位，係可以有好多空間可以做嘅」，如設立獨立調查委員會或否決政府議案，戴耀廷當時正是指出立會過半後「可以做到嘅一啲可能」。他又指，由於當時飯局上的人，「一係就資深議員或前議員，一係就資深嘅政治工作者」，故對他們來說，該些概念都是耳熟能詳，無特別為意戴的含意。
+
+#### 官提醒應就實際所說作供 不應提個人猜想
+
+此時法官李運騰提醒，指「我們正在處理非常嚴重的罪行」，區諾軒應盡量貼近飯局上人們實際的說話，而非對與會者想法作出猜想，又指相信區能分得出兩者分別，區點頭。李續問飯局上有否提及財政預算案，區指戴耀廷有提及過，並談及〈立會奪半〉文章內容，但他們沒有特別回應其說法。
+
+區諾軒最後重申，戴耀廷當時提及立會過半是「大殺傷力嘅憲制武器」，可以運用許多權力爭取五大訴求，包括否決財政預算案、設立獨立調查委員會，以及否決政府議案。
+
+#### 區諾軒糾正法庭傳譯 旁聽席發笑
+
+下午近5時散庭，臨散庭前，法官李運騰重申區諾軒作供時不應保存任何文件，控方着懲教署保管，區諾軒在3名懲教押送下離開，臨走前向旁聽席及律師席注目及點頭。散庭時，林卓廷向母親說「情人節快樂」，吳政亨舉起拇指，旁聽席有女童喊「加油（長）毛伯伯！」，長毛妻子陳寶塋亦高喊：「各位加油！」
+
+此外，以中文作供的區諾軒，今不時糾正法庭傳譯主任的翻譯。其中區提及「公布」，法官李運騰指出翻譯錯誤，應為「make it public」，區說「I suggest to use "announce"」，法官採納，陳志全等被告及旁聽的民主黨劉慧卿發笑。至區提及戴耀廷作出就初選的「推想」，傳譯主任一度猶豫「推想啊……」，區提議「imagination?」，傳譯主任採納，旁聽席再發笑；區亦試過忘記等待傳譯主任翻譯便直接回答控方英文問題。另外，被問及飯局與會者的黨派，區諾軒稱「無黨派」，傳譯主任譯作「individual」，劉慧卿等再發笑，傳譯主任其後更正為「I did not belong in any party.」
+
+區諾軒作供時，正庭內的被告沒有太大反應，大多低頭以紙筆或電腦抄筆記，林卓廷一度閉目養神。
+
+案件明早續審。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
+
+### 列席認罪被告分坐兩延伸庭看直播
+
+審訊不設陪審團，由3名國安法指定法官陳慶偉、李運騰及陳仲衡審理。控方代表為副刑事檢控專員萬德豪及周天行，辯方代表包括資深大律師潘熙、大律師沈士文、張耀良、黃宇逸、關文渭、馬維騉、盧敏儀、石書銘、黃廷光、Trevor Beel 等，本身是大律師的劉偉聰則自辯。
+
+不認罪被告包括獲准保釋的鄭達鴻、楊雪盈、彭卓棋、何啟明、劉偉聰、黃碧雲、施德來、陳志全、柯耀林、李予信10人，及還柙的何桂藍、吳政亨、鄒家成、林卓廷、梁國雄及余慧明6人。
+
+至於上周列席的認罪被告，今全部不獲安排在正庭就坐，需於延伸庭觀看直播，意味無法親睹證人作供及與不認罪被告見面。據記者觀察，他們分別被帶到沒有記者席、只有公眾席的1號延伸法庭，及有記者席和公眾席的2號延伸法庭被告欄就坐，包括黃之鋒、朱凱廸、譚凱邦、馮達浚及梁晃維5人；及岑敖暉、袁嘉蔚、吳敏兒和尹兆堅4人。其中1號庭內設有3個直播熒幕，均面向旁聽席，坐在被告欄的被告均需傾前身體及仰頭望向右，才能觀看直播。
+
+認罪被告自開審起原與不認罪被告於正庭同坐，惟上周四開始已被懲教與其他不認罪被告分開坐，今更被安排到不同法庭就坐。
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-14-atoms-for-sale.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-14-atoms-for-sale.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..8693eb6e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-14-atoms-for-sale.md
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Atoms For Sale
+author: Darya Dolzikova
+date : 2023-02-14 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/H5dAZgw.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Atoms for Sale: Developments in Russian Nuclear Energy Exports"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Western sanctions on the Russian economy have been expanding. Nonetheless, Russia’s nuclear energy exports have not come under economic restrictions._ _The Rosatom State Nuclear Energy Corporation (Rosatom), which has a monopoly over the Russian nuclear industry, has continued exports of nuclear fuel and other goods relevant to the nuclear energy sector. According to Russian customs data, sourced through a third-party commercial trade data provider, Russia has exported just over $1 billion-worth of nuclear energy-related goods and materials since the start of the war in Ukraine._
+
+_Some customers that have historically relied on Russian nuclear energy exports – like Ukraine, Czechia and Bulgaria – have sought to diversify away from Russian supplies. However, contractual obligations and technical challenges make diversification slow and complicated – although not impossible. Additionally, generous Russian financing arrangements make Russia an attractive supplier among its other competitors in the nuclear energy sector._
+
+_The trade data reviewed by the author shows a drop-off in Russian nuclear exports to some countries in Eastern and Western Europe since the invasion of Ukraine, but also a significant rise in the overall value of Russian nuclear energy exports in 2022. Significant increases in value can be observed in Russian nuclear energy-related exports to China, which appear to be the result of Russian exports of fuel for the Chinese CFR-600 reactor at the Xiapu nuclear power plant (NPP). In a year-on-year comparison between 2021–22, the dataset also shows increases in overall Russian nuclear exports to Hungary, Turkey and India. And while the dataset studied by the author does not span a long enough time frame to draw definitive conclusions on longterm trends in Russian nuclear energy exports, or how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine might impact these trends, it does point to the importance for the Russian nuclear energy sector of markets outside North America and traditional European customers._
+
+_The primacy among Russian nuclear energy customers of countries that have proven reluctant to support Western sanctions on Russia so far suggests that any EU and US sanctions on Rosatom and Russian nuclear trade need to be coupled with broader diplomatic efforts if they are to be effective in significantly curtailing Russian economic gains from its nuclear energy exports. Focusing efforts on bringing countries like Turkey and Hungary on board with increasing the political and economic pressure on Moscow – including through the provision of viable and sustainable alternatives to Russian nuclear energy-related supplies – will be key. Securing China’s cooperation will undoubtedly prove more difficult. As it has in other contexts, Russia will find ways to take advantage of these divisions to its own benefit._
+
+
+### Pass Go and Collect $1 Billion
+
+Since Russia’s February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the UK, the US, the EU and others have introduced several rounds of Russia-focused sanctions packages. These measures have targeted both Russian individuals and certain economic sectors in an effort to curb the flow of funds that are enabling Moscow’s war effort and enriching those in Russia perpetrating and supporting it. Western sanctions have targeted Russian energy exports as a major contributor to the Russian economy. However, one component of the Russian energy market – the nuclear energy sector – has been left unsanctioned. This omission of Russian nuclear exports from Western sanctions appears to be – at least in part – the result of persistent dependencies in some countries on Russian nuclear energy fuel and reactor technology.
+
+Russian customs data, sourced though a third-party commercial trade data provider and reviewed by the author in collaboration with Bloomberg shows that, between March and December 2022, Russia exported just over $1 billion-worth of materials and technology of relevance to the nuclear energy sector. This trade included exports to members of NATO and the EU. In fact, not only has the value of Russian nuclear-related exports not shrunk since February 2022, the data reviewed by the author suggests that it may be expanding, with a handful of loyal customers still eager to do business with Russia’s nuclear sector.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 1: Monthly Transaction Values of Russian Nuclear Energy Exports Over Time.__ Source: Russian customs data obtained through a third-party commercial provider, RUSI._
+
+The Russian nuclear energy sector is monopolised by Rosatom State Nuclear Energy Corporation (better known as Rosatom) and its many subsidiaries. The company also appears to have been directly involved in supporting Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Rosatom staff are present at Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya NPP, on the front line of Russia’s invasion. According to Ukrainian reports, Rosatom has taken over the management of the plant and have been pressuring the NPP’s Ukrainian staff to sign employment contracts with the Russian company. A recent report by the Washington Post also detailed apparent offers by Rosatom to provide components, technology and raw materials to the Russian military and Russian weapons manufacturers. However, Rosatom has not come under Western sanctions, despite calls from Ukrainian officials as well as Members of the European Parliament to impose restrictions on Russian nuclear exports. Hungary – which has insisted on maintaining its nuclear cooperation with Russia – has stated that it would veto any such attempt from the EU.
+
+This report presents data and analysis on continued Russian nuclear energy exports since the invasion of Ukraine and highlights some of the difficulties countries may face in diversifying away from Russian supplies. At the same time, it points to the importance of customers outside of Europe and North America for the Russian nuclear energy sector and concludes that Western sanctions on Russian nuclear exports must be coupled with broader diplomatic efforts to curtail dependencies on Russian nuclear energy technology.
+
+
+### Notes on Methodology and Data
+
+The data presented and analysed in this report was sourced from a third-party commercial trade data provider and captures Russian exports between January 2019 and December 2022. The data includes goods that fall under five nuclear-relevant HS codes – numeric identifiers used to internationally standardise the classifications of traded goods. The HS codes, their associated goods and notes on their relevance to the civilian nuclear fuel cycle are included in Table 1.
+
+As with all customs information datasets, the dataset reviewed by the author in this report is incomplete and may include some inaccuracies – including missing transactions or duplicates of transactions. The dataset also clearly excludes certain export destinations – likely because they do not make their customs data publicly available. For instance, Russian nuclear exports to Iran were not captured in the dataset. The author tried her best to validate the available data by comparing it against another commercial trade dataset from a different third-party provider. Some discrepancies are inevitable when comparing any large datasets and were indeed identified when comparing this dataset against a second one. Furthermore, the availability of data over time was inconsistent across the datasets; data was not available in the second dataset past June 2022, meaning the original dataset could not be validated past that date. However, despite these discrepancies, the alternative dataset does not contradict the analysis presented in this report and, within the timeframe of the data available in the second dataset (January 2019–June 2022), confirms the general trends outlined in this piece. Nevertheless, the author has kept her analysis within the bounds of the available data in the original dataset. The reader should also engage with the data and associated analysis presented with an understanding of these limitations.
+
+It is worth noting that lack of data at certain points in the dataset may indicate either a lack of transactions in that instance or missing transaction data in this particular dataset. As detailed above, the author validated – to the best of her abilities – the overall reliability of the data available but is not in a position to make a final judgement on the origin of gaps in the dataset.
+
+The data for Russian nuclear exports to individual countries tends to be characterised by large peaks and troughs. This is unsurprising, as trade in the nuclear sector is often made up of periodic high-value transactions – such as the delivery of nuclear fuel batches or materials for the construction of nuclear plants – instead of a consistent flow of goods. Furthermore, timelines for nuclear energy projects are significantly longer than those in other energy sectors. Well-planned NPP construction projects take about 11 to 12 years to construct and commission. For instance, the agreement between Russia and Turkey for the construction of the Akkuyu NPP was signed in 2010; construction of the first of the four planned reactors did not begin until 2018. Negotiations in advance of the start of an NPP project can also take considerable time. Commissioned reactors will then operate for decades, requiring fuel, maintenance and servicing – all of which is often bespoke to the reactor.
+
+As such, it is difficult to draw any definitive conclusions from a nuclear trade dataset that only spans four years – as is the case in this instance, or to assess the long-term implication of changes observed in the data from the 10 months since the invasion of Ukraine (March-December 2022). The spikes and drops in trade value captured by the data may not necessarily point to persistent trends. Some of the transactions captured in the dataset for the post-invasion period may also represent an acceleration in the delivery of contracts for goods and materials – such as nuclear fuel – in advance of countries’ diversification from Russian supplies. As such, additional data over the coming months and years will be necessary to confirm whether the trade activity seen in the dataset represents persistent trends or one-off occurrences.
+
+As mentioned earlier, the Russian nuclear sector is monopolised by Russian state corporation Rosatom. Due to the volume of transactions, the author could not definitively confirm that all instances of nuclear-related exports from Russia were on behalf of Rosatom and its group of companies. However, nearly all of the transactions reviewed by the author within the database appear to have been conducted either by a subsidiary of Rosatom or on behalf of one.
+
+
+_▲ __Table 1: Nuclear Energy Trade HS Codes.__ Source: Russian customs data obtained through a third-party commercial provider, RUSI._
+
+
+### Global Dependencies
+
+As others have detailed elsewhere, Russia occupies a major share of the global nuclear energy market, with dependencies on Russian nuclear fuel supplies particularly high in Central and Eastern Europe, but also apparent in the US and Western Europe. In 2021, there were 44 Russian or Soviet-built VVERs (water-water energetic reactors – a type of pressurised water reactor) operating outside Russia. Seventeen of them were in Ukraine, with the rest spread across 10 other countries. Many of these were built decades ago. However, Russia is continuing to construct nuclear reactors abroad. According to Rosatom’s webpage as of January 2023, the company had 34 active NPP construction projects ‘at various implementation stages’ (although the accuracy of Rosatom’s reporting on its construction portfolio has been questioned in the past and others have counted 13 reactors actively under construction at the end of 2021).
+
+Russia’s role in the global nuclear market includes not only the construction of nuclear reactors, but also the mining of raw uranium, conversion of uranium ore into fuel-useable compounds, the fabrication of nuclear fuel assemblies, and the provision of other services across the nuclear fuel cycle – ‘from assessing and developing key nuclear infrastructure components in customer countries to NPP decommissioning’, as the company notes in its 2021 annual report. According to the 2021 report – the latest available – Russia occupied the greatest share of the global uranium enrichment market (38%) (other sources show that it had 46% of the world’s total operational and planned uranium enrichment capacity), was second in the world in terms of uranium production (15% of the market) and third in its share of the global nuclear fuel market (17%).
+
+As such, many countries with civilian nuclear energy sectors face significant dependencies on Russian provision of technology, services and fuel for their operation. A May 2022 report by Matt Bowen and Paul Dabbar for Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy assessed the degree of dependency of Western markets on Russian nuclear energy supplies. Bowen and Dabbar highlight in particular the key role Russia plays in uranium conversion and enrichment for global markets, including for American and Western European nuclear energy production. In 2021, subsidiaries of Rosatom provided 31% of enrichment services to EU nuclear utilities and 28% to US ones. They point out that replacing Russian uranium enrichment and conversion capacity possible, but that additional alternative capacity will need to be brought online, likely resulting in higher nuclear fuel prices. Alternative nuclear suppliers will also need to be convinced that the resources they invest in expanding their operations will not be in vain should any restrictions on Russian nuclear supplies be rescinded in a few years.
+
+Alternative suppliers would also have to be found for the fabrication of nuclear fuel. A consortium of Western companies has been conducting work on the diversification of VVER fuel supply for years, focusing mainly on the production and licensing of VVER-440 fuel supplies. According to recent industry media reporting, supplies of VVER-440 fuel produced by a collaboration between US energy company Westinghouse Electric Company LLC (Westinghouse) and Spanish company Enusa should be ready for deliveries in 2024. French company Framatome also produces fuel under licence from a Rosatom subsidiary, which is reportedly identical to Russian-produced VVER fuel. Diversification away from Russian nuclear fuel supplies is time consuming, costly and presents technical challenges. Western nuclear fuel production lines need to be adapted, expanded and licensed for the production of VVER fuel, while customer countries need to license new suppliers which – according to one former senior Westinghouse engineer – can take at least five years. However, despite all this – and as has been demonstrated – diversification is possible.
+
+Finally, Bowen and Dabbar note that reactors often rely on unique components produced by the original equipment manufacturer (OEM), which results in significant dependence on the OEM for replacement parts and servicing. The Russian customs data reviewed by the author shows Russian nuclear energy-related exports going to 21 different countries between January 2019 and December 2022. New reactors being constructed by Rosatom will also need servicing and spare parts over their lifetimes, which is likely to perpetuate future dependencies on imports from Russia. The Rosatom project for the construction of the El Dabaa NPP in Egypt, for instance, explicitly includes provisions for personnel training and reactor maintenance for the first 10 years of the plant’s operations, as well as fuel supply over the plant’s lifetime. Even more extensive long-term maintenance and operation provisions could be built into future NPP construction projects – for instance, the ‘build-own-operate’ model, which is being used for the first time in the construction of the Akkuyu NPP in Turkey and is discussed in more detail later.
+
+
+### Fuelling Up
+
+While the importance of Russia as a supplier of nuclear technology has been well-established, the dataset reviewed by the author points to an increase in the dollar value of Russian nuclear energy-related exports in the last few months, driven by a handful of countries outside of North America, Western Europe and traditional Eastern European customers. According to the dataset, the value of Russian nuclear energy exports increased considerably in the second half of 2022. In a month-on-month comparison, the dataset examined by the author shows values of 2022 nuclear energy exports exceeding 2021 exports in five out of 10 months captured by the data since the invasion (March – December 2022).
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 2: Month-on-Month Value of Russian Nuclear Energy Exports.__ Source: Russian customs data obtained through a third-party commercial provider, RUSI._
+
+Both prior to the invasion and since March 2022, Russia’s primary nuclear-related exports – by a significant margin – came under HS code 840130 – ‘fuel elements, unirradiated’; in other words, fresh fuel for nuclear reactors. According to the trade data reviewed by the author, nuclear fuel exports accounted for about 77% of Russian nuclear exports prior to the invasion, rising to 86% between March and December 2022. Prior to March 2022, the top five destination countries for Russian nuclear fuel in the dataset – by dollar value – were Ukraine, Czechia, China, Bulgaria and Hungary.
+
+Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, some of these customers have sought to diversify away from Russian nuclear fuel. Czechia and Bulgaria have reached agreements with French and US suppliers for the supply of nuclear fuel for some of their reactors. However, the deliveries of this fuel are not expected until 2024 in Czechia and 2025 in Bulgaria. The trade data reviewed by the author shows that Russia has continued exporting nuclear fuel into both countries after the invasion, although the value of those imports dropped from 2021 to 2022.
+
+Ukraine is of course the most obvious case of diversification away from Russian nuclear fuel supplies. Hosting 17 VVER reactors, Ukraine has relied heavily on Russian imports of nuclear fuel to keep the units powered. In the last year – and even before then – it became clear that this dependency was no longer feasible. After Moscow’s initial incursion into Ukraine in 2014, Westinghouse was granted contracts to supply nuclear fuel to a number of Ukraine’s VVER reactors. The company – which has the capability to produce fuel for VVER-1000 reactors – was reportedly supplying fuel for six of the country’s reactors as of April 2022. Ukraine went from being the top export destination for Russian nuclear reactor fuel prior to the invasion to not importing any at all after the end of February 2022.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 3: Year-on-Year Value of Russian Nuclear Fuel Exports (HS 840130) to Ukraine, Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary and China.__ Source: Russian customs data obtained through a third-party commercial provider, RUSI._
+
+In the cases of China and Hungary, the dataset reviewed by the author shows the two countries assuming a larger proportion of Russian nuclear fuel exports since March 2022. In fact, the value of Russian nuclear fuel exports to Hungary in the 10 months between March and December 2022 far exceeds that of any of the previous three years. According to the transaction details captured in the data, the deliveries were for Hungary’s Paks NPP. In August 2022, Hungary controversially decided to go ahead with issuing permits for Rosatom construction of two new nuclear reactors at the site.
+
+The data also shows a clear spike in Russian exports of nuclear fuel to China in the second half of 2022, which appears to be primarily driven by the export – for the first time – of Russian fuel for the CFR-600 fast neutron reactor currently under construction at China’s Xiapu NPP in Fujian Province. The supply of fuel for the CFR-600 reactor is part of a set of 2018 Russo-Chinese agreements on nuclear energy cooperation, which includes Russian commitments for the delivery of fuel, equipment and services for the Chinese-built CFR-600. The trade data shows three separate batches of nuclear fuel assemblies being exported to China in September, November and December 2022. This data corroborates public reporting of the fuel deliveries. Data for December 2022 also shows the export to China of control and protection system assemblies for the CFR-600 reactor.
+
+The CFR-600 is a sodium-cooled fast neutron reactor. According to assessments by the US Department of Defense, the reactor could be used as a breeder reactor; this means that the reactor may be capable of producing more fissile material than it consumes. This has raised concerns that the reactor could be used for the production of plutonium, which could in turn be used for fuel in nuclear weapons, among unconfirmed suspicions that China may be expanding its nuclear weapons arsenal. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that China is diverting – or planning to divert – plutonium from the CFR-600 to nuclear weapons production and some experts have suggested that there are more efficient ways for Beijing to increase its weapons-usable plutonium stockpiles than relying on a breeder reactor designed for civilian energy production.
+
+All other Russian nuclear fuel shipments to China recorded in the dataset appear to be for the Russian-built Tainwan-3 VVER reactor. Rosatom is also due to construct four new reactor units at the Tainwan and Xudabao NPPs. One of these began construction on 25 February 2022 – the day after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – and the other in May 2022.
+
+
+### The Nuclear Family
+
+An analysis of trends in overall Russian nuclear energy-related exports, across all HS categories, also point to the emergence of several loyal customers for the Russian nuclear energy market. As many countries look to diversify their sourcing of nuclear energy supplies, a handful of others appear to be increasing Russian imports of nuclear goods and technology.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 4: Changes in the Value of Russia’s Nuclear Exports Between 2021 and 2022 by Destination Country.__ Source: Russian customs data obtained through a third-party commercial provider, RUSI._
+
+Before March 2022, the dataset shows that the top five destination countries for Russian nuclear exports were Ukraine, China, Czechia, Bulgaria and Hungary, with India not far behind. Since March, exports to Ukraine have stopped entirely according to the data. Other destinations for Russian nuclear exports also disappear from the dataset from March 2022 onwards, including the US, Switzerland, Sweden, Canada and the Netherlands. However, even in the three years prior to March 2022, Russian nuclear energy exports to these countries made up a very small proportion of the entire dataset. As mentioned earlier, it is possible that more significant exports took place before 2019 and materials were stockpiled. However, the relatively small proportion of Russian nuclear energy exports to these countries suggests that Western customers – and retaining access to those export markets – will be relatively less important to Russia than customers in other parts of the world.
+
+Russia’s priority is likely to be focused on retaining and growing business in a handful of apparently loyal customers that remain less enthusiastic about imposing sanctions on the Russian economy. The data shows that both the relative share and net value of overall nuclear exports to China has skyrocketed, driven almost exclusively by the spike in the value of Russian nuclear fuel exports to China in the second half of 2022, which were discussed earlier. The relative and absolute value of Russian exports to Hungary has also grown, consisting – as before the invasion – almost entirely of nuclear fuel exports. The data also shows a significant amount of Russian nuclear exports going to India in the first half of 2022 – consisting of deliveries of nuclear fuel (HS 840130) and nuclear reactor components (HS 840140) – but dropping off after June of that year.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 5: Value of Russian Nuclear Energy Export Transactions to China Over Time.__ Source: Russian customs data obtained through a third-party commercial provider, RUSI._
+
+Another country which – according to the data – continues to import a significant amount of Russian nuclear-related goods and materials, and whose importance in Russia’s nuclear export market has grown since March 2022, is Turkey. The data shows that Russian nuclear exports to Turkey took a dip in the first few months of the invasion but have since rallied in both relative and absolute terms. While future trade data will help to determine whether the importance of Turkey as a market for Russian nuclear exports will continue to grow, such a trend would not be surprising. Rosatom is in the process of constructing Turkey’s first nuclear power plant – the Akkuyu NPP, on the country’s Mediterranean coast. The project is the result of a 2010 agreement signed between the Russian and Turkish governments and – according to Rosatom – is the ‘largest project in the history of Russian-Turkish cooperation’.
+
+The project is the first application of the ‘build-own-operate’ model for nuclear reactor construction; under this arrangement, Rosatom will maintain ownership of the NPP after its construction, selling the generated electricity to a Turkish utility company – thus expecting to make a guaranteed profit off the project. According to the project’s webpage, Rosatom companies own nearly 100% of the project. When completed, the Akkuyu NPP will host four VVER-1200 reactors and is expected to generate 35 billion kWh per year – an estimated 10% of Turkey’s electricity. Construction of the first reactor began in April 2018 and of the fourth in July 2022. Descriptions of Russian exports to Turkey within the dataset reviewed by the author clearly identify shipments of nuclear reactor parts and other technology for the construction of the Akkuyu NPP.
+
+As mentioned in the methodology section of this report, it is difficult to draw any definitive conclusions on long-term trends in Russian nuclear exports just from looking at four years of trade data and especially from any movement in the 10 months following the invasion of Ukraine. The trends observed in the post-invasion trade data align with expectations on shifts in Russian nuclear energy customers, as a result of efforts in some countries – and publicly reported resistance in others – to diversify away from Russian nuclear energy supplies. However, additional data over the coming months and years will help confirm – or disprove – these apparent trends. For now, the observed increases in Russian nuclear energy exports to certain destinations in the reviewed dataset are best viewed as general confirmation of these countries’ commitments to nuclear cooperation with Russia, rather than a rapid expansion of these relationships since the start of 2022.
+
+
+### In For a Penny
+
+Besides the aforementioned dependencies and difficulties in diversifying suppliers, several factors continue to make Russia an attractive supplier for existing and new customers. One key consideration is Moscow’s willingness to extend attractive financing schemes for its NPP construction projects abroad. As Matthew Bowen and Alec Apostoaei highlight in a recent report on government financing of nuclear reactor exports, the debt and equity arrangements that Rosatom is able to provide are government-backed and their conditions are not limited by restrictions placed on US, French and South Korean competitors by the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD). As such, the authors note, Russian financing arrangements are consistently more generous and attractive than other suppliers are able to provide.
+
+Such financing arrangements likely serve as an important motivator for countries that may not be able to front the costs of an NPP construction project themselves. Equally, they create commitments that are financially difficult to disentangle from down the road. For instance, Rosatom’s construction of two new units at Hungary’s Paks NPP is expected to cost €12.4 billion, with Russia providing €10 billion as a loan under a repayment period of 16 years. Russia is also providing Egypt with a $25 billion loan for the construction by Rosatom of the El Dabaa NPP, out of a total estimated cost of $60 billion. The repayment term for that arrangement is reportedly 22 years. In Bangladesh, Russia extended a loan for $11.4 billion, with a repayment term of 20 years for the construction of the Rooppur NPP. The loan represents 90% of the total original cost of the project.
+
+Differences in the regulatory requirements for the export of US nuclear technology versus nuclear exports from Russia as well as other major suppliers may also allow Rosatom to be a more nimble and attractive supplier, at least in relation to US competitors. In instances where the US wishes to make significant transfers of nuclear material or technology, US law generally requires the conclusion of a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (commonly known as a ‘123 Agreement’). These agreements outline requirements around specific non-proliferation criteria that recipient countries must meet in order to receive US technology; 123 Agreements are reviewed – and may therefore be rejected or delayed – by the US Congress. Furthermore, these agreements require periodic renewal. The expiry of the US’ 123 Agreement with South Africa in December 2022 has meant that Westinghouse lost its US Nuclear Regulatory Commission licence to export nuclear fuel components to the country’s Koeberg NPP. As others have outlined elsewhere, while Russia also includes non-proliferation and export-control measures in its nuclear cooperation agreements, they are less extensive than those applied by the US.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+As the trade data reviewed by the author demonstrates, Russia’s nuclear export sector has continued to thrive since Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. This trade in nuclear technology will directly benefit state corporation Rosatom, which appears to be actively supporting Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Some have called for the Russian nuclear industry to be sanctioned. Others have taken it into their own hands to find alternative suppliers for their nuclear energy sectors. On 5 February, Kyiv took the step of sanctioning 200 entities connected to the Russian nuclear sector. A few days earlier, the European Parliament passed a resolution calling for sanctions on Rosatom and an embargo on imports of Russian uranium. Such actions are helpful and should be actively pursued as part of broader national and multilateral efforts to place economic pressure on Moscow and Russian entities supporting Russia’s invasion and atrocities in Ukraine.
+
+By sanctioning Rosatom and its subsidiaries, the US and EU can make it more difficult for the corporation to operate within the international financial system and to access certain services – like insurance – that it would need to move its wares to customers.
+
+Yet, as demonstrated by the trade data reviewed by the author, Russia’s most important customers for nuclear energy exports are located outside Western Europe and North America, and Russia appears to be increasingly reliant on business from countries that have shown less enthusiasm for sanctioning its economy. As such, for any US and EU sanctions on Rosatom and the Russian nuclear energy industry to be effective in significantly curtailing Russian economic gains from its nuclear energy exports, they will need to be coupled with broader diplomatic efforts to encourage and support diversification away from Russian supplies.
+
+Focusing efforts on bringing countries like Turkey and Hungary on side to increase the political and economic pressure on Moscow will be key. It remains unclear to what extent these countries will maintain – or expand – their nuclear cooperation with Russia moving forward although incentives and restrictions to diversification clearly exist, as detailed in this report. Finding ways to support a sustainable shift away from dependence on Russian nuclear fuel and technology and towards alternative suppliers will be key to ensuring that emerging trends suggested by the data assessed for this report do not become permanent ones.
+
+However, securing the cooperation of China – Russia’s most important customer in nuclear energy exports – when it comes to curtailing Russian access to its nuclear energy market is an undoubtedly tall order. As it has already demonstrated, Beijing is likely to remain the persistently weak link in Western efforts to effectively apply sanctions against the Russian economy. As long as international consensus on condemning and sanctioning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine remains divided, Russia will find ways to benefit from these divisions.
+
+---
+
+__Darya Dolzikova__ is a Research Fellow in Proliferation and Nuclear Policy at RUSI. Her work focuses on understanding and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including proliferation financing and other illicit trade by actors of proliferation concern. She also conducts research and publishes on the Iranian nuclear programme and related diplomacy.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-14-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-7.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-14-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-7.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..97e1c7a4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-14-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-7.md
@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第七日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-02-14 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 區諾軒稱黃之鋒「以朋友身分忠告」不必辦初選 黃聞言搖頭苦笑
+- 被問誰出席九東協調會 區諾軒稱「我驚我背漏」 官提醒作供非背誦
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（14日）於西九龍裁判法院（暫代高院）續審。首名控方證人、同案認罪被告區諾軒今繼續作供，供稱戴耀廷2020年1月飯局曾明確提及取得立會過半後要「兩次否決財政預算案，解散立法會，令行政長官下台」，惟因當時不清楚其他團體是否願意參與初選，故與戴耀廷於2月至3月期間，分別或一起與政黨及有意參選者會面，包括公民黨、梁晃維、黃之鋒、朱凱廸、彭卓棋和劉頴匡等。其中公民黨有人曾對電子投票有保留，因認為可能有利較激進的候選人當選；黃之鋒則認為區將要離港留學，認為他「冇必要搞初選」，區解釋黃意見與初選無關，「佢只係以朋友嘅身分去忠告我啫。」在延伸庭的黃之鋒聞言後搖頭苦笑。
+
+區又提及，與梁晃維見面時從無提及戴耀廷否決財政預算案的想法，因「我唔認為初選要係一個綑綁議員當選後工作嘅計劃」，又指當時環境當選人會否用《基本法》權力否決預算案並非值得關心的議題，因該否決權在《基本法》訂明，過往許多民主派議員反對財政預算案亦「一路相安無事」。法官李運騰要求區停止發表演說，以善用法庭時間。
+
+#### 區：戴指「大殺傷力憲制武器」為兩次否決財政預算、解散立會令特首下台
+
+架黑色粗框眼鏡、穿灰色毛衣的區諾軒，今在3名懲教陪同下，經特別通道出庭作供，全程被懲教人員看守。區昨日供稱，於2020年1月尾與戴耀廷、李永達、李卓人和黃浩銘的飯局內，首次談及初選，戴並指若立會過半，將是「大殺傷力憲制武器」，可利用《基本法》賦予的權力行使否決權，包括否決財政預算案。
+
+區諾軒今指，關於「大殺傷力憲制武器」的說法，可參考戴耀廷3月尾在《蘋果日報》發布的文章。惟法官陳仲衡提醒，現時證供仍圍繞1月飯局，尚未到3月的文章，法官李運騰亦要求他直接引述與會者說法，並問戴耀廷在飯局上有否提及「大殺傷力憲制武器」，區確認。
+
+區其後欲再引3月的文章以助闡析戴的論述，惟法官陳仲衡再次打斷，指現時有如問及肥皂劇情節，正在說第一集時，區不應以第20集的內容解釋第一集內容，「我們仍然在第一集。」區遂說，「咁我不如直接講」，指戴耀廷當時闡述「大殺傷力憲制武器」，是指「兩次否決財政預算案，解散立法會，令行政長官下台」。
+
+#### 區：會上討論民主動力負責初選行政工作
+
+區諾軒續指，當時曾討論如何安排初選行政工作，而李永達認為「民主動力」過往曾進行初選和泛民主派協調工作，他們討論民主動力可負責收集報名表及作出宣傳，他遂在會面後聯絡民主動力召集人趙家賢，指「搵佢係順理成章嘅事」。區並指，因當時他完成立法會議員公職，有一段長時間在香港，李永達建議他任初選協調人與戴耀廷合作推動初選，他表明同意。
+
+
+▲ 區諾軒（資料圖片）
+
+#### 對初選構想有分歧 遂接觸其他有意參選者及政治團體
+
+主控周天行問，飯局後區諾軒與戴耀廷有否就推行初選計劃作商討。區指當時面對的問題，是不清楚應用「民調」抑或「公民投票」的機制，並提及飯局有一個「重點分歧」，就是不知道其他政治團體是否願意參與初選，特別是李永達與李卓人都不同意舉行公民投票，「因為當你連其他團體肯唔肯參加都傾唔成嘅時候，公民投票所用嘅資源，一定比淨係做一個民調貴同代價高，選舉申報都會多。」
+
+他續指，當時討論認為需進一步接觸有意參選立法會的民主派人士，而由於對初選構想有分歧，故透過李永達與李卓人聯絡梁家傑，望由他介紹與公民黨會面。最終於2020年2月，他、戴耀廷、李永達和李卓人一起與梁家傑會面，會上戴耀廷重複其立會過半的願景，但不確定有否詳細提及否決預算案令行政長官下台的步驟。區續引述梁家傑稱，由於他已退下前線政治工作，故轉介他們去公民黨執委會會面。
+
+#### 區戴赴公民黨執委會 公民黨對電子票有保留因或有利激進者當選
+
+區諾軒續指，於2020年2月與戴耀廷兩人，往公民黨炮台山總部的執委會介紹初選工作，當時有約10名執委在場，他記得的公民黨成員包括梁家傑、賴仁彪、譚文豪、陳淑莊和余若薇。區指，當時將1月飯局提出的想法諮詢公民黨意見，包括應做民調還是公民投票、公民投票要投電子票還是實體票、他們是否同意協調各區出選等。
+
+區憶述，戴在會上再次提及對立會過半的願景，並提及運用《基本法》權力，兩次否決財政預算案並解散立法會，「最壞嘅後果」是行政長官下台。惟他形容，陳淑莊對戴耀廷說法「有保留」，因公民黨當時望推林瑞華參選功能組別飲食界，而功能組別會因界別利益，在處理財政預案的議題與地區直選有「唔同嘅諗法」，故考慮是否否決財政預算案時「會有較大嘅困難」。他又指，公民黨有人對只用電子票進行公民投票有保留，因若只是網上投票，其政治後果「可能係有利較激進嘅候選人當選」。他表示，對於初選計劃，公民黨「並冇話支持，只係話會後考慮」。
+
+#### 區與梁晃維、黃子悅會面介紹初選 無提及否決財政預算案
+
+區續指，與公民黨執委會面後，在2020年2月至3月期間，他與戴耀廷各自與「有機會參與立法會選舉的民主派人士」會面，他本人曾與梁晃維、黃子悅、黃之鋒、朱凱廸4人會面。此時坐在延伸庭觀看直播的梁晃維、黃之鋒、朱凱迪3人聞言後竊笑，梁晃維轉身望向黃之鋒，再與朱凱廸交談。區指，他分開會見梁晃維及黃子悅，而黃之鋒及朱凱廸則是一同會面。
+
+
+▲ 朱凱廸（資料圖片）
+
+區憶述，他於2020年2月在梁晃維的議員辦事處與他會面，當時可能有梁的議員助理在場，但只有他與梁對話。他當時問及梁有否興趣參與初選，並只是解釋初選是揀選民主派代表的制度，但因為「我唔認為初選要係一個綑綁議員當選後工作嘅計劃」，故從無提及戴耀廷提出否決財政預算案等想法。區指，梁當時並無回應是否參與初選，只是稱如有進一步資訊，區可再與他聯絡。
+
+區續指，他於2020年2月至3月左右於黃子悅會面，向她介紹一樣的內容，並簡單介紹民主派如要在立法會「再下一城」可如何實現。黃向他提及「想知道初選係乜嘢嚟」，他認為據其印象，黃當時「只係想了解初選究竟係乜嘢嚟」。
+
+#### 區與黃之鋒、朱凱迪會面 黃作為朋友認為無必要舉辦初選
+
+區續憶述，他於2020年2月至3月左右，在朱凱廸於立法會的議員辦事處內，與黃之鋒及朱凱廸會面。區形容會面「好唔正式」，因朱當時正參與立法會會議。區續指，他向二人提及他與戴耀廷將會舉辦初選，並指初選是為民主派於立法會爭取最大勝算的計劃。區指，當時朱凱廸「因為掛住開立法會，所以佢唔係好關心（初選）」，而黃之鋒則「直情覺得我冇必要去搞初選𠻹」，因當時區「就嚟去讀書」，「佢直情唔贊成我搞初選𠻹。」
+
+法官李運騰一度問，區只是任初選籌劃者，而非參加者，將要離港讀書與不搞初選有何關係，區遂說：「其實黃之鋒嘅意見係同初選無關，佢只係以朋友嘅身分去忠告我啫。」黃之鋒聞言後搖頭苦笑，梁晃維則望向身旁的譚凱邦，坐在延伸庭的公眾人士則望向被告發笑。區續指，他不記得他當時有何回應。
+
+#### 區：戴稱與張可森、鄒家成等見面 辯方反對「傳聞證供」無效
+
+主控周天行再問及區諾軒，戴耀廷與何人會面。區表示他不肯定戴與誰會面，但指戴提及曾與張可森、呂智恆、鄒家成、天水連線成員、區政聯盟成員、民主黨成員會面。惟他不清楚戴分開或一同與上述人士會面，亦不記得上述政黨有什麼成員參與會面。
+
+周天行續問，戴耀廷有否告訴他會面內容，此時何桂藍的代表大律師 Trevor Beel 起身反對，指屬傳聞證供（heresay），惟法官陳慶偉僅說：「No. Allow.」周天行遂繼續發問，區回應戴沒向他提及討論內容。
+
+#### 區：彭卓棋關心勝算多於否決預算案 稱《基本法》訂明否決權故當時不關心
+
+區諾軒續指，2月至3月期間與戴耀廷會見彭卓棋和劉頴匡團隊，其中彭卓棋團隊包括維多利亞社區協會的李永財，會面在天后的李永財議員辦事處進行。會上他與戴介紹初選計劃並徵詢使用電子票抑或實體票等，戴有提及立會過半願景，即民主派可掌握否決權，但至於有否詳細闡述整個流程，即否決財政預算案及特首下台，則沒有清晰印象。
+
+主控周天行一度要求區諾軒闡述戴有關初選目的之說法。區回應「我相信大家都好關心戴耀廷究竟嗰時具體嘅論述講咗啲乜」，並指2021年8月落口供時憶述戴耀廷對立會過半的表述，初選目的具體而言就是爭取立會過半以爭取否決權，再爭取五大訴求。
+
+周天行遂問，戴初選的目標為何，惟陳慶偉打斷指區已回答是取得立會過半、否決財政預算案及爭取五大訴求；周天行再問有否提及否決財政預算案，官再打斷指區已表示沒有印象。
+
+
+▲ 主控 副刑事檢控專員 周天行（資料圖片）
+
+區諾軒續形容，彭當時「唔關心立會過半點運用權力嘅問題」，但關心使用電子票或實體票，「因為用乜嘢制度對佢嘅勝算係有影響嘅。」被問到為何不關心如何運用立會過半的權力，他指因當時參選立法會的環境，大家並不認為當選人會否用《基本法》權力否決預算案是「好值得關心的議題」，並提出「兩個觀察」，即《基本法》第49條和第52條有提及運用該否決權，「大家就覺得好理所當然」；而且以往許多民主派政黨或議員，「一路都係每一次財政預算案都係投反對票，一路都係相安無事。」
+
+#### 官着區諾軒停止發表演說、善用時間
+
+區在法官陳仲衡詢問下同意，上述均是他的「整體觀察」，並非會面上確實提及。法官李運騰遂指，「區先生，你要了解你作為證人的身份，若你停止發表演說並集中回答問題，可以節省我們許多時間（“It would save us a lot of time if you stop making speeches and concentrate on the question.”）」，又說「我們每天只有4小時審訊時間，所以請協助我們善用時間，否則我們會審到明年（“We only have 4 hours of sitting time every day, so please help us to use the time economically, otherwise we will be here until next year.”）」，有被告發笑。
+
+區續在法官詢問下，指彭卓棋在會上曾表示實體投票會對他「不利」，因他是「政治素人」，相較傳統政黨會較少地區動員能力。
+
+
+▲ 彭卓棋（資料圖片）
+
+至於與劉頴匡的會面，是2020年3月在大圍一間餐廳，區憶述戴耀廷當時介紹初選制度、如何爭取立會過半，亦提及立會過半可以爭取否決權，以爭取五大訴求，但記不清楚他有否談及所撰文章及闡述其他內容。他亦不記得會上說過什麼或劉頴匡會上回應。
+
+案件下午續審。
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，16人否認「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，今（14日）踏入審訊第7天。認罪被告區諾軒今繼續作供，提及因有意參選者就投票方式、替補被「DQ」者機制等有分歧，遂與戴耀廷為5個地方選區及超級區議會選區舉辦協調會議。就九龍東選區，區供稱曾舉行3場會議，會上黃之鋒與譚得志曾就替補機制爭拗，又一度決定搞「棄選」但被推翻。區又指，戴耀廷曾準備名為「35+計劃」的文件於會上傳閱，提及「五大訴求，缺一不可」及初選機制等，戴並曾倡加入「積極運用《基本法》權力否決財政預算案」一句，意指「你可以用，你可以唔用，但若果政府唔聽民意，就要拎呢個憲制權力出嚟」，惟其後被另一份文件取代。
+
+此外，被問及會議出席者，區諾軒一度稱「我驚我背漏」，有被告面露驚訝和發笑，法官李運騰即提醒區：「你不是來背誦任何事情，你是來告訴我們你記得什麼。」
+
+#### 區戴組織6區協調會議 商討辦選舉論壇、替補機制等分歧
+
+區諾軒上午供稱，2020年2月至3月期間，與戴耀廷分別或一同與民主派政黨及有意參選立法會人士會面，解說初選及徵詢意見。他續指，二人在2至3月，於教協商討如何進一步整理有意參選者意見，當中就投票方式，傳統政黨較堅持用實體票，素人或新晉團體則擔心初選只是對泛民有利，較喜歡電子票；而二人當時亦未正式決定舉辦公民投票，因素人特別擔心會「招致好大額嘅選舉開支」。
+
+區又指，有團體質疑是否值得舉辦初選、開支是否合理，而當時多區有多名潛在參選人，「佢哋都未有機會一齊傾。」有見及此，他遂與戴耀廷在香港島、九龍東、九龍西、新界東、新界西及超級區議會6個選區，組織協調會議以商討相關分歧，並指會議目的是「焦聚」各區有意參選民主派人士，「一齊傾一個制度去推行初選」，包括應否舉辦選舉論壇、勝選人被取消資格有何替補機制，及每區當選目標。
+
+周天行向區澄清，該些事項是否均於協調會議討論，區答「的確有」，並問：「因為啱啱咁問，係咪我有任何遺漏內容……？」周天行否認，指僅望了解區的證供，鄒家成低頭搖頭苦笑。
+
+#### 區：邀有意參選者入WhatsApp群 黃之鋒、譚得志等出席九東會議
+
+區諾軒確認，當時與戴耀廷合辦6區的協調會議，並以九龍東為第一個試點。就九龍東協調會議，區供稱，首次會議於2020年3月2日順安邨安逸樓地下會議室進行。控方要求他說出有誰出席，區諾軒說「我驚我背漏，但我先講原則上先……」。被告欄傳出起哄聲音，多名被告探頭望向區，面露驚訝的林卓廷與身旁的鄒家成對視，鄒難以置信地俯身大笑，陳志全等也發笑，區定睛望向被告欄。
+
+法官李運騰即提醒區：「你不是來背誦任何事情，你是來告訴我們你記得什麼。（“You are not here to recite anything, you are here to tell us what you can remember.”）」坐在延伸庭的馮達浚聞言後發笑。區續指，基本上所有最後參選人或其代表都有出席協調會議，另各區的泛民主派區議會主席亦有出席。
+
+區續指，當時他或戴耀廷會透過 WhatsApp 或電話、或委託相熟的區議會主席，逐個詢問有意參選者有否興趣出席協調會議，並在各區設立 WhatsApp 群組商討地區協調事宜。他並主動提及，九龍東的邀請過程「可以參照民主動力被繳獲嗰個 WhatsApp 紀錄」。
+
+控方其後展示從趙家賢手機檢取的 WhatsApp 紀錄，顯示九龍東協調群組名為「35+九東立選座談會」，群組管理員為蔡澤鴻，成員包括區諾軒、趙家賢、施德來、註明來自香港公開大學的黃之鋒、譚文豪、胡志偉、譚得志、民主動力職員黎敬輝。區確認除上述人士外，時任黃大仙區議會副主席黃逸旭、觀塘願景召集人梁凱晴亦有出席首次會議。
+
+#### 區：首次九東會議 戴耀廷未提初選目標 黃之鋒與譚得志就替補機制爭拗
+
+主控周天行問及會議內容，區諾軒指舉行首次會議的意義，在於「如果喺九龍東都冇辦法傾得成一個機制呢，其他區都只會更難」，因九龍東選區只有5席，民主派的目標為3席，可浪費的票數少。
+
+大律師沈士文一度指出，傳譯主任遺漏了「九龍東選區有5席」的部分，法官李運騰遂向區表示，「傳譯主任的工作非常艱難，因為你的句子傾向冗長（wordy），並牽涉不少難以翻譯的人名及政黨名稱」，並着區「逐句逐句回答，這會令傳譯主任的工作更容易，正如我現在一樣」，有被告發笑，區諾軒亦表示「抱歉」，「我會努力。」
+
+區續指，首次會議上商討「3席係民主派喺九龍東勝算嘅目標」，亦討論是否舉辦初選論壇，他表示他將籌備。他並提及，替補機制為初選制度內很重要的元素，而當時會上主要矛盾是黃之鋒與譚得志就替補機制的爭拗，黃認為應採用「靈童制」，譚則認為應採用「排名制」。提及「靈童」時陳志全、鄒家成等多名被告發笑。
+
+區解釋，「靈童制」是指勝出候選人若被取消資格，將有權利指定一位替補者獲35+機制承認繼續參選，而其他不獲該候選人支持的參選人則不會獲承認。惟譚得志團隊不同意，認為應按初選投票結果排名，若勝出者被取消資格，便由次選者，即排後一位的候選人，替補參選。
+
+#### 區：戴準備「35+計劃」文件 寫有「五大訴求，缺一不可」及初選機制
+
+區諾軒並指，雖戴耀廷有出席首次會議，但他只處理是否舉辦選舉論壇、有何替補機制、九龍東勝選目標等事宜，當時未有透露「他相信的」初選目的。而會議上傳閱一份由戴耀廷準備、名為「35+ 計劃／Project 35+」的文件，為35+計劃的「最原初版本」，目的為介紹初選機制。
+
+庭上展示相關文件，控方指文件第一段提及「五大訴求，缺一不可」，而戴耀廷於第二及三段訂下時序，分別說明有意參選者須於2020年5月中公開表明意向，及2020年7月初會舉行公投。戴在文件亦列明，民主派於各地方選區目標議席為「6 6 4 4 3」、替補機制為「排名制」，且若候選人支持度不足，須即時停止選舉工程，並支持其他勝選者。
+
+區指出，除黃之鋒反對「排名制」的替補機制，無印象其他人就文件作任何回應。他並指，蔡澤鴻曾為該會議製作摘要，並傳送到 WhatsApp 群組。
+
+#### 區：第二次會議決議「靈童制」作替補機制、不搞初選搞「棄選」
+
+區諾軒供稱，第二次九龍東協調會議於2020年3月16日晚上7時半舉行，出席人士與上次相若，惟原由譚得志代表的人民力量，改由劉家鴻代表。區提及，蔡澤鴻會前希望邀請地區組織「凝聚觀塘」列席，遭黃之鋒反對。坐在延伸庭的黃之鋒聞言後發笑，並與前一排的譚凱邦交談。
+
+區續指，眾人於該會議達成共識，以「靈童制」取代「排名制」作為替補機制；並決定不舉行初選，轉為舉行「棄選」（即參選人在立法會競選後期透過民調形式決定是否繼續選舉工程）。他不確定會上曾否談及初選目的，但相信不遲於第三次會議前，有更進一步關於35+初選目的之討論。
+
+#### 區：第三次九東會議議決辦初選 惟傳WhatsApp群表決內容「搵唔到」
+
+區諾軒續表示，第二次會議決定不搞初選後，有九龍東的地區人士包括區議員或義工，望能舉辦公民投票，故於4月推動重開會議商討九龍東舉辦初選的可能，第三次會議遂於2020年5月4日舉行，出席人士大致相同，但加入觀塘區議會副主席莫建成及李梓成。
+
+區指，會議議決九龍東可有5名候選人於初選出選，最後有3名爭取當選。李運騰問及是否與「6 6 4 4 3」的計劃相違，區否認，指3席仍是九龍東目標，但容許更多名單參選，是因經會上的人商議，「認為可以浪費嘅選票嘅額度都頗多。」
+
+區確定會上曾討論重辦初選及如何宣傳初選，李運騰問有否任何書面決議，區答「理論上係有」，在 WhatsApp 群組「有個 file 傳到出嚟，但係最後喺呢單案度搵唔到 」，有被告發笑。至於有否討論初選目的，區指「唔排除有，但我唔敢100%確定」，但肯定在其中一次會議一定有討論初選目的。
+
+#### 區：戴耀廷倡文件加「積極運用《基本法》權力否決財政預算案」
+
+區諾軒續提出，在不遲於第三次會議，戴耀廷曾倡議在地區文件加入一句句子，即「積極運用《基本法》權力否決財政預算案」：「佢嘅解釋係：『你可以用，你可以唔用；但若果政府唔聽民意，就要拎呢個憲制權力出嚟。』」陳慶偉問與會者對此句有否任何回應，區指「冇印象邊個有特別回應」，又指該句原於第三次會議前加入九東文件，但到了2020年6月又被一份新文件取代，他亦不肯定在第三次會議上曾否討論該句內容。
+
+李運騰問，是否即會上沒有人對該句表示同意或反對，區表示「我認為呢句係一個公道嘅說話」。他續指，認為該句話與戴耀廷的立會過半願景有關，但要理解則要結合第三次九東會議前其他區的會議情況。法官問及，戴在會上如何解釋該句句子，區稱：「九龍東佢具體點樣推銷呢一句句子，我冇好鮮明嘅印象。但就我記得，佢喺各區都有推動呢句句子成為會議文件嘅一部分。」法官指，明天將會處理該議題。
+
+案件下午4時半散庭，有被告喊「情人節快樂！」，吳政亨亦做出心形手勢。
+
+#### 傳譯主任屢被糾正 辯方批譯漏重要字眼
+
+此外，以中文作供的區諾軒，今再次與法官、主控周天行及辯方大律師等不時糾正法庭傳譯主任的翻譯。其中區供稱戴耀廷於首次九東會議「尚未透露他相信的初選目的」，傳譯主任僅譯出「初選目的」，而未有提「他相信的」，遭代表吳政亨和余慧明的大律師石書銘指出，指該部分「非常重要」。
+
+而區諾軒提及 WhatsApp 群組包含「35+九東」字眼時，傳譯主任直譯「Kow Tung」，周天行指出應是「Kowloon East」，被告欄再傳出笑聲。至區提及「排名制」時，傳譯主任一度猶豫：「排名制即係……」，區提議「ranking」，獲傳譯主任接納。傳譯主任將「就要拎呢個憲制權力出嚟」一句翻譯為「this constitutional power should be “taken out”」，周天行糾正應為「exercised」，陳慶偉則提議「used」，獲眾人接納。
+
+案件明早續審。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
+
+### 列席認罪被告全於延伸庭被告欄就坐
+
+審訊不設陪審團，由3名國安法指定法官陳慶偉、李運騰及陳仲衡審理。控方代表為副刑事檢控專員萬德豪及周天行，辯方代表包括資深大律師潘熙、大律師沈士文、張耀良、黃宇逸、關文渭、馬維騉、盧敏儀、石書銘、黃廷光、Trevor Beel 等，本身是大律師的劉偉聰則自辯。
+
+不認罪被告包括獲准保釋的鄭達鴻、楊雪盈、彭卓棋、何啟明、劉偉聰、黃碧雲、施德來、陳志全、柯耀林、李予信10人，及還柙的何桂藍、吳政亨、鄒家成、林卓廷、梁國雄及余慧明6人。
+
+列席的認罪被告今續被分別帶到沒有記者、只有公眾席的1號及2號延伸法庭被告欄觀看直播，包括黃之鋒、朱凱廸、譚凱邦、馮達浚及梁晃維5人；及岑敖暉、袁嘉蔚、吳敏兒和尹兆堅4人，意味他們無法親睹證人作供及與不認罪被告見面。認罪被告自開審起原與不認罪被告同坐，惟上周四開始已被懲教與其他不認罪被告分開坐，昨更被安排到不同法庭就坐。
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-15-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-8.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-15-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-8.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..24e62187
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-15-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-8.md
@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第八日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-02-15 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 辯方批控方引導性提問 官稱一直等待反對、驚訝無人提出
+- 區諾軒指港島參選人對否決財案「漠不關心」 司馬文明確反對
+- 區諾軒：九西協調岑子杰質疑否決財案 稱支持民生議案如全民退保
+- 區諾軒指鄒家成質問為何不稱「會」否決財案 戴耀廷稱用「積極」冀保留彈性
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，16人否認「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，今（15日）踏入審訊第8天。認罪被告區諾軒今續就九龍東協調會議作供，指有與會者曾製作會議摘要並發送到 WhatsApp 群組，但由於他幾乎每個月有「刪機」習慣，故控方並沒有該檔案作為呈堂證物。區又指無法記得所有文件內容，但指戴提倡「積極運用《基本法》權力，否決財政預算案」一句「應該有喺當時加喺文件裡面」，有被告起哄。此外，辯方屢批評主控周天行以「引導性問題」發問，法官李運騰指他有同樣關注，只是一直等待辯方提出反對，驚訝此前無人提出，惟相信此後控方會更小心。
+
+#### 區指「積極運用《基本法》權力否決財政預算案」一句「應該存在」
+
+控方續就九龍東協調會議提問，區諾軒昨稱第二次會議曾決定不舉行「初選」，轉為舉行「棄選」，但有地區人士反對。控方今展示 WhatsApp 訊息，顯示當時譚文豪、胡志偉和施德來均認同再考慮舉辦初選，黃之鋒亦曾稱「我都支持初選，希望可以促成初選機制順利進行，唔好五區獨欠九東」。而戴耀廷亦於4月中指九西、港島和新東都同意有投票程序，新界西和超級區議會將在月底前開會。
+
+被問及第三次會議內容，區供稱當時決定「重新搞返公民投票」，目標在5席贏取3席，亦有初步討論宣傳策略，他亦有報告選舉論壇進度。周天行問會上曾否提及初選目標，惟大律師沈士文即打斷，指上述內容昨天已問過，法官陳慶偉問：「周先生，你是否在重複自己？」
+
+周遂改為問會議後有否任何文件紀錄。區諾軒確認，會議翌日時任觀塘區議會主席蔡澤鴻曾在「35+九東立選座談會」的 WhatsApp 群組，傳出名為「35+九東final.docx」的會議摘要，指「昨晚戴教授召開九東立選協調會，會上大家同意進行初選，以上是初步協調結果，我會抽時間做份更詳細的給大家」。
+
+
+▲ 蔡澤鴻（資料圖片）
+
+#### 控方指無第三次會議摘要 區解釋有「刪機」習慣
+
+周天行問區是否能確定有人傳送該文件給他，惟李運騰即指，看不到任何文件，只有一連串數字和符號。周說區確認文件有發出，李運騰反問「但我們有那份文件嗎？」，周確認沒有，何啟明、余慧明等發笑。周天行改為問「初步協調結果」為何，區稱無法記得所有文件內容，但至少可以確認，「積極運用《基本法》權力，否決財政預算案」該句「應該有喺當時加喺文件裡面」，話畢被告欄起哄，柯耀林等人發笑，有被告說：「哇，應該有。」
+
+區形容，該摘要是「九龍東咁多次會議黎累積底下嘅一啲討論結果」，而蔡澤鴻兩日後再補發最終版本，並附上戴耀廷就協調會議的補充。李運騰問及，在 WhatsApp 收到文件後，若仍保留手機及該訊息，該文件是否「理應仍然存在」。區解釋，因他「幾乎每個月都有刪機嘅習慣」，「所以起碼我被捕之後嗰個檔案就冇咗。」控方再問他能否確認「積極運用《基本法》權力，否決財政預算案」一句有加入文件，區答：「應該存在。」
+
+#### 辯方關注控方提「引導性問題」、問傳聞證供
+
+代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel 其後表示，關注控方以「引導性」的方式提問，即要求證人確認某些事情曾發生，而非問他記得發生過什麼。法官李運騰指他有同樣關注，只是一直等待辯方提出反對，在場人士發笑。Beel 說如果有引導性問題應立即停止，李再指他其實挺驚訝沒有人反對，以為代表辯方沒有爭議，惟現時辯方提出，相信控方會更小心。
+
+控方其後展示 WhatsApp 訊息提及，戴耀廷於《明報》發布的一篇文章，問區當時有否看過。區指因「隔得太久遠，我都唔實際記得寫嘅內容，我只能夠推斷佢寫呢篇文嘅動機」，陳志全聞言哈哈大笑。控方再問區有否看過文章，惟大律師石書銘質疑，區並不是戴耀廷，他的回答只會屬傳聞證供（heresay）或猜測（speculation），李運騰指要待區諾軒回答才可判斷。
+
+控方其後引 WhatsApp 紀錄，顯示蔡澤鴻曾提及九東35+初選籌備工作小組經3輪協調會議，「各派成員初步達成共識」。周天行要求區確認曾收到該訊息，大律師 Trevor Beel 再次質疑是引導性提問，法官李運騰再囑控方避免問引導性問題。周改問他曾否收過，區確認於5月收到，而蔡當時引述的「共識」便是「35+九東final」文件內的共識。
+
+#### 區諾軒稱無出席九東定下初選制度後的兩次會議
+
+區續指，第三次會議後，九龍東於2020年5月18日及6月中，分別舉行第四次及第五次協調會議，但他沒有出席。他解釋，因當時九東初選制度「已經上咗軌道」，即已決定勝選目標為3席，並會採用公民投票進行初選，「個制度已經喺度啦，咁所以我應該專心做其他事情」，並表示九龍東直至初選投票日前應沒有其他會議。
+
+#### 稱無證據何桂藍出席記招 區諾軒即錄第11份口供 辯方批控方重塑證據
+
+此外，今甫開庭，代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel 即提出，這是他首次參與沒有陪審團、由3名法官審理的高等法院審訊，而法庭任何決定均不應由單一法官作出，惟昨天他反對控方提問時，法官陳慶偉沒有與其餘兩名法官商討便立即拒絕。法官陳仲衡指，若他們有不同立場便會提出；陳慶偉亦指商討並非必須，一般而言會由主審法官決定。
+
+Beel 又提及，上周曾指出控方開案陳詞中，沒有證據顯示何桂藍曾於2020年7月的抗爭派記者會出現，惟控方於上周五（10日）即為區諾軒錄取第11份證人供詞，要求他認出記者會上出現的人。Beel 批評控方似乎是在「重塑（remake）」證據，做法不恰當。李運騰指，他同樣關注控方延遲提交證據，「因控方似乎有數以月計、甚至年計的時間準備這案」，並指會考慮該些證據的比重。
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，16人否認「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，今（15日）踏入審訊第8天。認罪被告區諾軒今繼續作供，指戴耀廷於首次港島區協調會議上，曾倡積極運用權力否決財政預算案，遭與會的南區區議員司馬文反對，戴嘗試「迎合」他並解釋該權力「可以用，可以唔用」。區又指，即使有分歧，戴仍「好堅持」其想法，並將「會積極運用立法會的權力，包括否決財政預算案」一句加入協調機制文件。不過區形容，當時與會者似乎沒有對該想法有積極討論，形容他們對此「漠不關心」。此外，區諾軒稱對與會者取態「冇印象」後，控方一度再追問，惟被法官厲聲打斷：「我知道你不喜歡這個答案，但這就是答案。」
+
+#### 2020年3月港島首次會議 司馬文反對戴耀廷倡積極否決財政預算案
+
+區諾軒續就香港島選區的協調會議作供。他供稱，首次會議於2020年3月26日灣仔富德樓香港獨立媒體進行，當時他、戴耀廷、趙家賢、許智峯、羅冠聰、司馬文、羅健熙、人民力量成員，以及同案被告鄭達鴻、徐子見、梁晃維和彭卓棋團隊均有出席，楊雪盈則派了代表出席，眾人並以「35+港島」的 WhatsApp 群組溝通。他重申絕大部分參與初選者都有出席協調會議，又補充「新界西我冇參與過，所以我唔能夠評論新界西嘅事」。
+
+區表示，會上先由戴耀廷介紹35+計劃，並與九龍東協調會議一樣，傳閱由戴耀廷準備、名為「35+ 計劃」的文件。他指「特別注意到香港島嘅選票係比較緊張」，民主派派出4人參選，「已經好掹掹緊」，會上決定港島要爭取4席後，司馬文曾建議該區以「投4票」的機制進行初選。
+
+區又指，當時戴耀廷已開始建議「積極運用《基本法》權力否決財政預算案」，但遭南區區議員司馬文反對。他指戴當時嘗試解釋「積極」一字，意思是「你可以用，你可以唔用，但如果政府唔聽民意，我就使用呢個憲制權力」，以「嘗試迎合司馬文嘅睇法」。在法官詢問下，他指沒有印象戴如何進一步闡述何為「唔聽民意」，但強調戴每次引述都是他上述所記憶的定義。周天行問及會上有否其他反對聲音，區指「相關嘅討論我再冇其他印象」。
+
+
+▲ 南區區議會副主席 司馬文
+
+#### 官要求區諾軒講述事實 而非「相信」什麼
+
+控方其後展示「35+ 計劃 Project 35+」的文件，問與會者有否就該文件討論。區表示「我相信重點集中喺第5點」，因該點提及港島區議席數目。惟陳仲衡指，法庭並不關注他「相信什麼」，而是「當時發生什麼事」。李運騰亦問區說「我相信」是代表他不肯定，抑或只是一種說話方式（manner of speech），有被告發笑。陳慶偉補充：「假如我是你的話，我會說『對，重點在第5點』。」
+
+區續回應：「我認為當日係有討論第5點」，惹來眾人大笑和起哄，有被告說「哇」，身處第一庭觀看直播的黃之鋒亦不斷搖頭。法官李運騰再提醒：「我們懂得怎麼說廣東話，也懂得外行人如何說話（how laymen speak），但我們現時在專業的法庭，如果你肯定便說肯定，不肯定便說不肯定，不記得便說不記得」。
+
+區諾軒遂改稱「我肯定當日有討論」，並指戴耀廷或許有介紹文件內容，「我相信有部分內容我都有介紹嘅」，解釋會議上凡有關選舉論壇事宜，皆由他介紹，而「有時若果戴耀廷講嘅論點唔足夠，我會作出補充」，但因「時間太久遠」，故沒有印象特別介紹哪一點。
+
+#### 區：首次會議後戴傳港島協調機制初稿 加「積極運用權力否決財政預算案」
+
+區諾軒提及，首次港島區會議後，戴耀廷曾草擬一份名為「35+立會過半計劃 民主派港島協調機制（初稿）」的文件，個別地傳予每個與會者。控方展示該文件，問戴為何準備。區指他理解文件的存在，是戴耀廷為總結首次會議上的想法而設，他不記得文件上是否每點都曾在會議討論，但戴目的是希望所有人知悉文件內容。李運騰問文件有沒有修改、或有人指出有不正確的地方，區指此乃初稿，「喺往後嘅會議，的確有一啲內容係有另一啲變化嘅。」
+
+#### 區諾軒指港島區與會者對「積極否決財政預算案」漠不關心
+
+控方其後將「35+ 計劃」及「35+立會過半計劃 民主派港島協調機制（初稿）」兩份文件並置，顯示後者提及「會積極運用立法會的權力，包括否決財政預算案」，區重申是司馬文在首次會議反對的想法。
+
+法官李運騰續問，若當時有不同意見，為何新一份文件有該說法。區解釋，因戴耀廷在每個會議「都好堅持講佢嘅諗法，然後將佢對35+嘅諗法，加入去協調機制嘅內容裡面」，但區指，當時與會人士並未對該想法有很積極的討論，「我相信係因為大家未意識到⋯⋯」陳仲衡此時再打斷，提醒不是在問他「相信」什麼，區即指：「我只能話喺當時嘅會議，與會人士漠不關心」，又指「如果真係有人關心，我會有好深印象」，他在往後的會議亦會引述有關情況。
+
+法官李運騰問，是否代表第一次會議的出席者對「會積極運用立法會的權力，包括否決財政預算案」這一點沒有共識？區回答：「與會人士諗法存在分歧。」李再指：「那即是沒有共識？」區諾軒確認，但同意該句還是由戴耀廷加入文件。
+
+辯方大律師馬維騉一度指出，傳譯主任將「漠不關心」翻譯為「totally ignored」，希望更正為「indifferent」，惟法官李運騰提議改做「they did not care」。
+
+#### 港島共辦5次會議 羅冠聰料無法入閘提議「靈童制」作替補制
+
+控方後再問及，除司馬文外，港島區會上是否沒有其他人對否決財政預算案提出異議，區同意。法官陳慶偉再問，那有沒有人表明不關心否決財政預算案，區則表示「冇印象」。周天行再追問他沒有印象是什麼意思，惟法官陳慶偉即厲聲打斷：「沒有印象，多謝，我知道你不喜歡這個答案，但這就是答案。（“No recollection, thank you. I know you don’t like the answer, but this is the answer.”）」被告欄傳出笑聲。法官李運騰亦指，「如果證人說沒有印象，我不認為還可以繼續問下去」，周說因不肯定區指「冇印象」是指有否發生，李運騰再反問：「如果已經說了沒有印象，他還怎樣告訴你其他人說過什麼？」
+
+區續指，港島區共有4次協調會議，他有份主持所有會議。第二次和第三次會議分別於2020年4月17日及5月19日舉行，出席人數與首次大致相同，袁嘉蔚於第三次會議才出現，徐子見缺席其中一次，至於戴耀廷則不肯定有否出席。
+
+控方要求他由第二次會議內容說起，惟區指他「真係分唔到邊次係第二次講、邊次係第三次講」，問：「請問我可唔可以兩次一齊講？」他其後指，第二或第三次會議上，關於替補機制有較大爭議，其中楊雪盈和徐子見傾向以「排名制」作為替補機制；羅冠聰則預算自己很大機會無法「入閘」，故傾向採用「靈童制」，在他無法參選時指定袁嘉蔚出選。會議最後協調以「靈童制」作港島替補機制。當區提及羅冠聰指定袁嘉蔚參選，在延伸庭的袁將頭仰後，並摸了一下額頭。
+
+區表示第四次會議於2020年6月舉行，時間很短，基本上有份參加初選的人士都有出席。他指，當時一直有找香港民意研究所合作設計初選投票程式的戴耀廷，與程式公司溝通後，發現無法處理投4票的選項，故望港島有份參與人士「考慮由4票轉返1票」，區形容「與會者無奈接受」。區續指，初選舉行後，於2020年7月有第5次會議。
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，16人否認「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，今（15日）踏入審訊第8天。認罪被告區諾軒續就九龍西的初選協調會議作供，他憶述其中一名與會者張崑陽提及戴耀廷的文章〈真攬炒十步 這是香港宿命〉，戴重申「參選立法會要有心理準備做唔到4年」。張崑陽又表示支持否決財政預算案，惟岑子杰提出質疑，指「講抗爭，邊有人及得上社民連」，但他仍要支持民生議案包括全民退休保障。區諾軒又表示：「當我睇到呢篇文章，曾經同佢（戴耀廷）講，我話佢嘅想法太瘋狂。」
+
+#### 政治聯繫「尷尬」者能否參選？ 戴：只要認同「五大訴求」便可
+
+區諾軒下午就九龍西協調會議作供。他指首兩次會議分別於2020年3月24日及4月26日舉行，首次會議出席者除了他之外，還有戴耀廷、何啟明、劉偉聰、馮達浚、岑子杰、黃碧雲助理、毛孟靜助理、油尖旺區議會主席林健文及前立法會議員劉小麗。社區前進的代表有出席第一次會議，至於趙家賢則不肯定有否出席。區交代上述各人的政治聯繫後，再表示：「依家補充返，有個人都有出席兩次會議：張崑陽。」
+
+區諾軒憶述，會議曾討論的議題包括政治聯繫較「尷尬」的人，例如新思維的狄志遠，是否可以參與初選。傳譯主任一度翻譯「尷尬」為「embarrassed」，惟區諾軒隨即指正應譯為「ambiguous」。區續指，戴耀廷當時回答是，「只要認同『五大訴求』就可以參選。」
+
+#### 區指戴耀廷九西會議提否決財政預算 「未得到太大關注」
+
+區諾軒指，會上亦曾討論九龍西選區的目標，戴耀廷認為6席裡民主派最多可以贏得4席，而與會者認為九西做法可以較寬鬆，可容許初選推薦4至6張名單參選正式的立法會選舉，直至選舉後期才棄選。會上另有討論初選論壇。
+
+區指，戴耀廷亦在會議提及「積極運用《基本法》權力，否決財政預算案」，做法與早前提及其他區的會議差不多，即會上先傳閱「35+計劃」的文件，會後再傳閱另一份九龍西協調機制的文件，並指「就我記憶，當時有關字眼並未得到太大關注」。控方再問戴耀廷是否曾就此「討論」，區更正說法，指準確而言應是戴「介紹」該權力「可以用，可以唔用」，若政府不聽民意就可動用，但他沒有印象其他人參與討論。
+
+
+▲ 左起：岑子杰、毛孟靜、何啟明、張崑陽
+
+#### 區憶述岑子杰質疑否決財案 因需支持民生議案
+
+至於第二次協調會議，區諾軒指出席人士與首次會議相若，其中劉小麗沒有出席。會上曾討論邀請區議員辦事處和「黃店」作為票站，又集中討論應派多少張名單參選立法會，與會者認為應先投票，再於初選後討論推薦出選名單數目，並以5席為目標。
+
+區又指，張崑陽曾提及有留意戴耀廷的文章〈真攬炒十步 這是香港宿命〉，引發戴在該會議重申文章理念，認為「參選立法會要有心理準備做唔到4年」。張崑陽回應他支持否決財政預算案，惟社民連岑子杰即提出質疑，稱：「講抗爭，邊有人及得上社民連」，但他亦要支持某些民生議案，例如全民退休保障，在延伸庭的黃之鋒聞言一度發笑。惟區對其他人有否表達意見沒有印象。傳譯主任打算翻譯「全民退休保障」一字時遲疑數秒，法官見狀即指出「universal retirement scheme」。
+
+#### 區諾軒：「攬炒十步」想法「太瘋狂」
+
+區指就着會議不同看法，戴耀廷再重申他使用「積極運用」字眼的用意，「由此可見，佢用呢個字眼處理會議上面唔同觀點。」控方其後問及，區有否看過〈真攬炒十步〉一文，區指在文章刊出不久後讀過，戴亦曾向他講過一次，並補充「喺度我想加個註腳」：「當我睇到呢篇文章，曾經同佢（戴耀廷）講，我話佢嘅想法太瘋狂。」
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，16人否認「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，今（15日）踏入審訊第8天。認罪被告區諾軒今繼續作供，他提及在新界東第二次協調會議上，鄒家成曾質問戴耀廷，為何初選文件的條款，要稱「積極」運用基本法權力否決財政預算案，而非「會」否決預算案，並引起激烈辯論；而社民連曾稱若有全民退保等民生項目，亦會支持預算案。區又指，鄒家成希望即場投票用「積極」還是「會」字眼，但最後不成事，戴解釋用「積極」一字「比乜都唔用行前一步」，「希望寫得彈性少少。」法官陳慶偉問到，鄒是否想有一個「較確定」運用否決權的說法，區同意。
+
+#### 戴耀廷新東會上提「五大訴求」為目標、無印象有否傳閱35+計劃文件
+
+區諾軒下午就新界東協調會議作供，他指曾出席兩次新界東協調會議，分別於2020年4月14日及5月5日，每次各約20人出席。有參加初選的出席者包括：鄒家成、何桂藍、柯耀林、李芝融、呂智恆及劉頴匡，部分人派助理或代表出席，包括民主黨林卓廷派莊榮輝、社民連梁國雄派陳寶瑩、新民主同盟范國威派關永業、人民力量陳志全派助理、公民黨楊岳橋派助理。而沒有參加初選的與會者，包括：區諾軒、戴耀廷、趙家賢、鍾錦麟、時任沙田區議會主席程張迎、羅庭德、羅庭輝、街工代表盧藝賢。至於參加初選的林景楠兩次均沒有出席。
+
+區表示，第一次會議中，戴耀廷介紹新東當選目標，希望在9席之中贏到6席，亦表示預設公民投票及棄選機制，並討論舉辦選舉論壇，但區沒有印象有否傳閱九龍東和港島會議均有傳閱的「35+計劃」文件。區亦指，「相信」戴曾提及「五大訴求」，指五大訴求是35+初選爭取的其中一個目標，法官陳仲衡提他勿用「我相信」，他遂改稱「佢係有講過」。
+
+#### 黃浩銘曾致電區稱不要答應否決預算案
+
+區供稱，5月5日的第二次會議前，社民連副主席黃浩銘曾致電他，說「陣間開會，唔好應承人哋會否決財政預算案嘅講法」。陳慶偉問黃為何如此說，區解釋其實他當時不太知道會議將發生什麼事，但黃的說話令他思考待會是否有人會討論該問題，他並回應他「知悉（acknowledge）」其意見，但對其餘對話沒有印象。黃最後沒有出席會議。
+
+
+▲ 時任社民連副主席 黃浩銘
+
+#### 鄒家成質問戴耀廷為何用「積極」而非「會」字
+
+區續指，第二次會議開始後不久，鄒家成就質問戴耀廷，為何在35+計劃中，要稱「積極」運用基本法權力否決財政預算案，而非直接表示「會」否決財政預算案。法官李運騰問及他如何理解鄒的話，區指鄒當時應是察悉在協調機制內有「積極運用權力」的條文，並指當時戴耀廷在不同地區的協調會議，「不斷地建議加入『積極運用《基本法》權力否決財政預算案』嘅條款」，他不知道有多少人知悉該句子及當中的爭議，但當時若有人知道並作討論，「喺當時嘅狀況可以理解」。
+
+#### 與會者開始激烈辯論並批評傳統泛民
+
+傳譯主任一度將「質問」翻譯為「query」和「question」，法官李運騰遂問，鄒家成當時的語氣是敵對（hostile）還是普通疑問。區表示「我理解當時候最初都未係好緊張」，只是鄒與戴進行對話，但後來卻引伸到與會人士開始有「激烈辯論」。他指，會上許多其他地區人士亦有參與討論，並對傳統泛民政黨作出批評，包括民主黨、街工以及公民黨。鄒家成邊聽邊點頭。
+
+#### 戴稱用「積極」是望「彈性少少」 區同意鄒家成想更明確運用否決權
+
+區續指，當民主黨被批評時，林卓廷助理莊榮輝表示，民主黨中委會無授權他處理有關問題；而社民連代表陳寶瑩亦質疑，若有民生項目例如全民退保，社民連亦會支持。街工盧藝賢則有回應不同意，但區不記得他實際所說的話。
+
+區指，鄒家成其後希望即場投票，決定文件用「積極」還是「會」的字眼，但最後「唔成事」。而戴耀廷的回應是「不如用『積極』，『積極』都比乜都唔用行前一步，希望可以寫得彈性少少」。
+
+
+▲ 鄒家成
+
+法官陳仲衡續問，「『會積極』運用權力於4時半休庭」，和「『會』運用權力於4時半休庭」 ，哪個意思較為「肯定（certain）」？區指「『會』係較為確定」和直接（straightforward）。法官陳慶偉最後問到，以區理解，鄒是否想更明確運用否決權力（“... he wants a more definitive use of vetoing power?”），區說「係有呢個含意」。陳慶偉續說區可以離席，「我們絕對會休庭。（“We will definitely adjourn.”）」被告欄和旁聽席傳來笑聲。
+
+案件明早續審。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
+
+### 列席認罪被告全於延伸庭被告欄就坐
+
+審訊不設陪審團，由3名國安法指定法官陳慶偉、李運騰及陳仲衡審理。控方代表為副刑事檢控專員萬德豪及周天行，辯方代表包括資深大律師潘熙、大律師沈士文、張耀良、黃宇逸、關文渭、馬維騉、盧敏儀、石書銘、黃廷光、Trevor Beel 等，本身是大律師的劉偉聰則自辯。
+
+不認罪被告包括獲准保釋的鄭達鴻、楊雪盈、彭卓棋、何啟明、劉偉聰、黃碧雲、施德來、陳志全、柯耀林、李予信10人，及還柙的何桂藍、吳政亨、鄒家成、林卓廷、梁國雄及余慧明6人。
+
+列席的認罪被告今續被分別帶到沒有記者、只有公眾席的1號及2號延伸法庭被告欄觀看直播，包括黃之鋒、朱凱廸、譚凱邦、馮達浚及梁晃維5人；及岑敖暉、袁嘉蔚、吳敏兒和尹兆堅4人，意味他們無法親睹證人作供及與不認罪被告見面。
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-16-a-continent-forged-in-crisis.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-16-a-continent-forged-in-crisis.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..f45b6779
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-16-a-continent-forged-in-crisis.md
@@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : A Continent Forged In Crisis
+author: Max Bergmann, et al.
+date : 2023-02-16 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/zcZLhmC.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "A Continent Forged in Crisis: Assessing Europe One Year into the War"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Nearly a year after Russia invaded Ukraine, Europe remains a continent at war. Historians will likely see 2022 as a pivotal year akin to 1989 and 2001 — years that marked the end of an era and the beginning of a new historical phase. Europe’s response to the war has changed the continent._
+
+
+
+The changes in the past year have truly been dramatic. Countries with a long history of neutrality suddenly sought to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military alliance. Almost overnight, the United Kingdom, seemingly irreparably entangled with Russian investment and influence, evicted Russian oligarchs and their wealth. Germany announced a new era, invested massively in defense, sent weapons to Ukraine, and ended its deep dependence on Russian natural gas. The European Union showed itself to be a geopolitical actor, implementing massive economic sanctions and, for the first time, providing billions of euros in lethal security assistance.
+
+Most importantly, the unity forged in Europe in response to the war held. The prevailing assumption that Europe was weak led to constant predictions that this unity would crack. There were concerns that the millions of Ukrainian migrants could trigger a populist backlash and that rising energy prices and a cost-of-living crisis would prompt Europe to push for an end to the conflict, breaking with Ukraine and the United States. Furthermore, there were concerns that Europe would not get through the winter without Russian gas and that its economy might collapse.
+
+But again and again, Europe has held firm and adapted. Its response has often been messy and cacophonous, but this is to be expected in European democracies, where foreign policy debates and divisions play out in public. In the end, Europe’s response has demonstrated both its resolve and the strength and resilience of democracy. European democracies have demonstrated their competence and determination — from rapidly getting weapons to Ukraine to rapidly building liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals. The war has thus strengthened Europe, the European Union, and the NATO alliance. Economically, Europe has performed better than expected and avoided falling into recession in 2022.
+
+However, despite the strong response to the war, comprehensive structural changes to Europe’s economy and security architecture have yet to materialize. Although it is now spending more on defense, the war has revealed that the state of European forces is even worse than realized. Off-the-shelf procurement of military equipment, mostly from the United States, has taken priority over ambitious coordination efforts and investment in common European defense initiatives. Despite the war, none of the three primary Western stakeholders — NATO, the United States, and the European Union — have proposed any transformational initiatives to improve defense cooperation.
+
+___`But again and again, Europe has held firm and adapted. Its response has often been messy and cacophonous, but this is to be expected in European democracies, where foreign policy debates and divisions play out in public. In the end, Europe’s response has demonstrated both its resolve and the strength and resilience of democracy.`___
+
+Momentum toward greater fiscal integration has also stalled. There are growing demands on Europe to invest resources to address common problems. But the European Union lacks the fiscal capacity to address major issues — from defense procurement to providing weapons to Ukraine and from building new energy infrastructure and accelerating the green transition to securing supply chains. Additionally, once the war ends, rebuilding Ukraine will cost hundreds of billions of euros over at least a decade. The European Commission has already stated that the current EU budget, known as the “multiannual financial framework,” does not cover these needs and that new financing sources will have to be identified. Yet, despite the precedent created by the EU Recovery and Resilience Facility — toward which the European Union borrowed about 800 billion euros to help member states recover from the Covid-19 pandemic — European leaders have thus far refused to issue more common debt. It is therefore unclear how Europe will finance addressing its collective challenges, as well as Ukraine’s reconstruction. The year 2023 will no doubt pose significant economic challenges, as Europe’s economy is expected to slow, and the continent will continue to have to cope without Russian gas supplies.
+
+This paper examines the present state of Europe one year since Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine. It gauges the continent’s political response to the war, the sanctions regime, the economy, the energy crisis, Ukrainian migration, and the enlargement and reconstruction of a wider Europe. It then evaluates defense and EU-NATO cooperation before looking ahead to the future of transatlantic relations.
+
+
+### Europe’s Political Response to the War
+
+#### Unity Forged and Maintained
+
+Since Russia launched its brutal invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the high degree of political unity demonstrated by the European Union’s response has surprised many observers, who expected Vladimir Putin to use Russian influence, particularly Europe’s long-recognized dependence on Russian hydrocarbons, to effectively divide and incapacitate the bloc. But Putin’s bet that Europe would not put its economic well-being at risk for Ukraine has proved wrong.
+
+A year after the war began, European unity continues to endure. In mid-December 2022, the European Union passed its ninth sanctions package against Russia, just a few weeks after collaborating with the United States and other members of the Group of Seven (G7) to launch an international price cap on the purchase of Russian oil, in addition to an EU embargo on the maritime shipment of Russian oil. At the start of 2023, France, Germany, and the United States each announced that it would ship armored fighting vehicles to Ukraine — the first time a Western-designed light tank will be sent to the Ukrainian military. The United Kingdom also committed to sending 14 of its Challenger 2 main battle tanks to Kyiv.
+
+Europeans have so far maintained solidarity and enacted robust sanctions to punish Russia. There have no doubt been sharp disagreements within both the European Union and NATO about how to respond, for instance, regarding the proper level of sanctions, the correct way to wean Europe off its reliance on Russian oil and gas, and the appropriate amount and kind of defense support the transatlantic alliance should be providing to its Ukrainian partners. But these are normal foreign policy debates, many of which are also occurring in Washington. The difference is that in Washington, these debates are between government agencies behind closed doors, while in Europe foreign policy decisions and processes play out publicly.
+
+While some prominent European politicians, such as Marine Le Pen and Matteo Salvini, have expressed skepticism of the Western approach toward the war, and some pro-Russian protests have emerged, overall the continent’s political class and public remain supportive of the European response to the crisis. The latest Eurobarometer polls have shown that 74 percent of EU citizens approve of the European Union’s support for Ukraine following the invasion. The value that citizens place on participation in the organization has concurrently increased as well, with 72 percent of EU citizens saying their country has benefited from EU membership.
+
+There has been concern about a new revival of populism and far-right parties in Europe, but such a sweeping narrative proved largely unfounded. European elections throughout 2022 saw far-right parties attempt to moderate their extremist tendencies and normalize themselves in the eyes of voters. In France, Le Pen moved to the center and ran as the change candidate against the establishment, embodied by President Emmanuel Macron. While Le Pen performed better than she did in 2017, she still lost by 17 percentage points to a fairly unpopular incumbent. In Italy, Giorgia Meloni of the Brothers of Italy party, which has its roots in fascism, won the election and became prime minister. However, Meloni also sought to strike a more moderate tone, took a strong Atlanticist stance in supporting Ukraine, and toned down past anti-EU rhetoric. In Sweden, the Sweden Democrats, which has neo-Nazi roots, emerged as the second-largest party, which helped the center-right Moderate Party secure the prime minister position. While the success of the Sweden Democrats is concerning, the party was not formally included in the new government, and the issues that dominated the election were crime and immigration, the very topics that helped bring it to prominence. These elections present no discernable sign of a rise in anti-EU sentiment.
+
+The war in Ukraine also spurred the European Union to get serious about democratic backsliding in Hungary and Poland. In December 2022, Brussels withheld all 22 billion euros of earmarked cohesion funds from the European Union’s 2021–2027 long-term budget for Budapest until the Viktor Orbán government agreed to conditions on judiciary independence, academic freedoms, LGBTQ+ rights, and the asylum system. This was in addition to the 5.8 billion euros in grants already withheld from the pandemic recovery fund until the Hungarian government addresses ongoing concerns about its court system. In the end, a deal was struck, with Budapest largely backing down. The European Union would hold back only 6.3 billion euros from Hungary, which would complete 27 reforms aimed toward addressing corruption and improving judicial independence. Hungary also dropped its vetoes of the 18-billion-euro EU aid package for Ukraine and the global minimum corporate tax of 15 percent. While this has nowhere close to resolved Hungary’s rule-of-law or corruption issues, it does demonstrate that the European Union is increasingly willing to use its considerable leverage.
+
+The European Commission has also not released 35 billion euros in loans and grants from its pandemic recovery fund to Poland and will continue to withhold funds until changes to the judicial system are made. In addition, Warsaw owes 436 million euros as part of a fine of one million euros per day imposed last year by the EU Court of Justice for failing to comply with an EU court order to suspend its controversial disciplinary mechanism for judges. Warsaw needs to pass legislation to unlock the funds — which it desperately requires, as inflation sat at 17.5 percent year-on-year in November, one of the highest levels in the European Union. But a rift exists within the ruling coalition, where the Law and Justice Party holds the majority but needs the support of the smaller, far-right United Poland Party to form a government. Legislation recently passed in the lower house of parliament aims to address the European Commission’s concerns by removing controversial powers of the supreme court, which is one of the objectives stipulated by Brussels to unfreeze the pandemic recovery funds. However, the new bill still requires approval from President Andrzej Duda and it remains unclear whether the European Union will find the changes sufficient.
+
+#### Sanctions
+
+In contrast to the European Union’s limited response to Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, the bloc brought its full economic weight to bear on the Kremlin in 2022. The EU economic response has far exceeded Washington’s expectations. While the Biden administration assumed it would have to push the European Union to adopt more robust sanctions, it has often found itself reacting to surprisingly strong European proposals. For instance, it was the European Union that proposed sanctions against Russia’s Central Bank. EU sanctions against the Russian oil and gas sector prompted concerns in Washington that they would send a shock to global energy markets, leading to compromise proposals such as the oil-price cap that was implemented in December.
+
+___`In contrast to the European Union’s limited response to Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, the bloc brought its full economic weight to bear on the Kremlin in 2022. The EU economic response has far exceeded Washington’s expectations.`___
+
+The European Union has also been constantly updating and strengthening its sanctions regime. Nine sanctions packages imposed by Brussels have targeted a broad swath of the Russian economy, military, and industrial base. These measures aim to punish Russia for its extraterritorial aggression and effectively diminish its ability to continue occupying Ukraine. The initial sanctions targeted individuals with ties to the Kremlin and restricted Russia’s access to European financial markets, while more recent measures have included a price cap on Russian oil and a ban on exports of dual-use goods and technology. Furthermore, several European countries have made a concerted effort to rid their societies of Russian kleptocrats. The United Kingdom alone has frozen over 18 billion pounds of Russian-linked assets, which is almost 6 billion pounds more than the total assets held under all other British sanctions regimes.
+
+The European Union’s nine sanctions packages complement unprecedented sanctions imposed on Russia by a multilateral coalition including the United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and Japan. Since February 2022, Moscow has become a target of more than 10,000 new sanctions, bringing a total number to around 13,000 and making Russia the most sanctioned country in the world. While these have indeed created challenges for the Kremlin, they have not yet contributed to the full collapse of the Russian economy. However, experts believe it will take at least a decade for Russia to return to its pre-war levels of economic activity and quality of life. Limited access to Western technology will also diminish the Kremlin’s ability to manufacture and sustain high-quality defense and military equipment in the long run.
+
+The EU market is roughly equivalent in size to the United States and China. Thus, when the European Union and United States work together on sanctions, whether related to Russia or Iran, they are immensely impactful.
+
+#### Economy
+
+Europe, like most of the world, is experiencing an economic slowdown. However, defying all doomsayers, the EU economy is performing much better than expected and is projected to continue doing so throughout 2023. In mid-2022, many analysts were forecasting a European economic collapse due to energy shortages, price hikes, and increased uncertainty. However, according to the European Commission’s estimates, economic growth in 2022 has exceeded 3 percent. Unemployment is at a historical low of 6.6 percent, an industrial production has fallen much less than expected.
+
+Nonetheless, Europe faces a challenging 2023. Essentially unplugged from Russian energy, some European countries may fall into a technical recession, and inflation will most likely continue to rise. Unlike previous crises (the Covid-19–induced economic catastrophe in 2020 and the 2007–2012 global financial crisis), this economic contraction, if it takes place, will likely be mild and short.
+
+EU member states have made varying economic policy choices and faced some unexpected tailwinds that are likely to continue in 2023. (The situation is different in the United Kingdom, where the effects of Brexit and poor macroeconomic management led to a political crisis and will generate a deep recession in the coming year.)
+
+- __First, EU countries have implemented targeted expansionary fiscal policies.__ On top of the Next Generation EU program of public investments, all member governments have taken measures to shield citizens and companies from the increase in electricity and gasoline prices. This has ensured that domestic demand (investment and consumption) has not drastically declined. These policies will continue in the coming months.
+
+- __Second, monetary policy, while more restrictive than in the past, has still been expansionary.__ With the U.S. Federal Reserve being much more aggressive in terms of restricting liquidity, the euro has depreciated against the dollar, favoring eurozone exports. Moreover, the limited increase in interest rates has generated neither substantial reductions in credit nor a real estate market crash. The downside has been persistent inflation, which probably has already peaked in the United States but not in the eurozone.
+
+- __Third, energy prices have fallen.__ Energy and commodity prices, especially natural gas prices, which skyrocketed following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, have almost returned to pre-war levels, alleviating European economies. Policies to substitute Russian gas with other forms of energy, alternative suppliers, and — above all — savings have worked remarkably well. As a result, European economies will probably ride out the remainder of the 2023 winter with sufficient reserves to avoid energy cuts, especially if temperatures are mild. (Problems might arise in the winter of 2024, but that is still far away.)
+
+- __Finally, there are no signs of a financial crisis.__ Despite slower growth, higher interest rates, and a euro-critical, extreme-right government in Italy, there are no signs of financial fragmentation or complications in the financial sector that could trigger sovereign-debt problems. In fact, the mechanisms put in place over the past decade to avoid financial crises in the eurozone, coupled with the new role that the European Central Bank (ECB) has been playing as a lender of last resort, seem to have convinced investors that the single currency is here to stay.
+
+In the baseline scenario, the International Monetary Fund projects economic growth to be close to 1 percent in both the European Union and the eurozone in 2023, meaning a recession would be avoided. However, there are substantial risks that could undermine economic growth.
+
+- __First, there remains uncertainty about how Europe will meet its energy needs throughout 2023.__ While Russian gas flows have been substantially reduced and almost eliminated, Europe still received sizeable quantities of Russian natural gas throughout much of 2022. How it refills its reserves and prepares itself for next winter is a major economic question. Without adequate energy supply, Europe will have to reduce or ration demand, which could negatively impact major industries and economic growth.
+
+- __Second, there is significant uncertainty around the economic performance of China.__ On the one hand, the end of the zero-Covid policy — potentially leading to the virus’s unchecked spread in China — could generate new disruptions to global supply chains in the first part of the year. On the other hand, if the Chinese economy rebounds in the second part of the year, energy demand will soar, making it more difficult for European economies to continue substituting Russian gas at reasonable prices.
+
+- __Third, inflation could remain high.__ Because of expansionary fiscal policy and higher energy prices, inflation will likely remain elevated, forcing the ECB to increase interest rates more aggressively. This could trigger a more pronounced economic slowdown and a stronger euro, with negative consequences for growth. In fact, a prolonged period of higher-than-expected interest rates would increase financing costs for southern European countries and could lead to financial instability.
+
+- __Finally, an acceleration of deglobalization__ generated by political tensions, protectionism, or the collapse of economic-governance institutions, especially the World Trade Organization (WTO), would seriously damage growth prospects for European countries, which are more export-oriented and more dependent on the rules-based multilateral system than other parts of the world.
+
+Unexpected events can substantially modify economic outcomes. As Covid-19, the war in Ukraine, and U.S.-China tensions have shown, economic performance is increasingly determined by noneconomic events — especially geopolitics.
+
+#### Energy
+
+In 2022, Europe experienced a dramatic energy crisis due to Russia’s weaponization of natural gas. The European Union has had to do whatever it takes to get through the winter and keep the lights on, including expanding its use of coal-fired power plants, increasing its use of LNG, and extending nuclear plants. But despite this, it has strengthened its commitment to combating climate change and accelerated the deployment of renewable energy technology.
+
+Europeans have felt the impact of rising energy prices. Gas prices exceeded 300 euros per megawatt hour (MWh) in August on the Dutch Title Transfer Facility (TTF) spot market, compared to around 20 euros per MWh in 2020. Due to the difficulties French nuclear power plants faced in 2022 and climate change-related limitations on hydroelectric production, there emerged a severe crisis on the EU electricity market.
+
+The European Union responded by launching the REPowerEU plan, a framework that enabled countries to take short-term measures to alleviate the difficulties of households and businesses. It also agreed to an embargo on Russian coal and oil, a price cap on Russian oil exports, and — after intense negotiations — to buy 15 percent of its gas jointly and with an applied price cap. European countries were also able to substantially diversify away from Russian energy. This policy goal receives broad support from EU citizens, with 82 percent in favor of the European Union continuing to take actions to reduce its dependency on Russian fossil fuels and 83 percent agreeing that Russia’s war against Ukraine makes it more urgent to invest in renewable energy.
+
+The European Union has also greatly accelerated the deployment of renewable energy production. For instance, new solar power installations grew by 47 percent in 2022, equivalent to the power needs of 12.4 million European homes. Although volatile costs generated strong headwinds for wind-turbine suppliers, new wind capacity also expanded moderately in 2022, with onshore wind accounting for about 90 percent of this growth. To further increase the bloc’s domestic production capacity, the European Union recently adopted a reform that will rapidly accelerate the permitting process for new renewable energy power plants. It is estimated that growth in wind and solar capacity may have saved it $11 billion in gas imports since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
+
+In addition, in December 2022, the European Union reformed its Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) to deepen its commitment to mitigating climate change. Per the new EU law, the number of emissions in the sectors covered by the EU ETS will be reduced by 62 percent by 2030 compared to 2005 levels, instead of 43 percent under current legislation. Between 2026 and 2034, the European Union will gradually phase out free emission allowances given to EU companies. This much more ambitious target under the EU ETS is one of the key tools that allowed the European Union to raise its greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction targets to 57 percent by 2030 compared to 1990 levels during the 2022 UN Climate Change Conference (COP27) in Sharm el-Sheikh. This commitment is part of the “Fit for 55” and “Green Deal” initiatives, which will be upscaled in 2023 with substantial investments to accelerate the energy transition. In sum, the European Union seems determined to accelerate its energy independence and its focus on renewables.
+
+Finally, a crucial tool of EU climate policy has been the carbon border adjustment mechanism, (CBAM) which aims to ensure a level playing field between European-based companies and their foreign competitors regarding GHG emissions requirements. The CBAM, which is essentially a “green tariff,” will apply to imports of goods produced outside the European Union in countries with lower environmental standards. It will affect sectors most at risk of “carbon leakage,” such as production of cement, iron and steel, aluminum, fertilizers, electricity, and hydrogen. It will not be fully operational until 2026, but its approval has sent a powerful political message to other countries about the European Union’s commitment to fighting climate change. Even though the European Commission claims that the CBAM is WTO-compatible, it may well be perceived by other countries as a protectionist instrument. This could create problems for the European Union, which has itself been complaining about the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), a $369 billion package of subsidies passed in August 2022 to accelerate the energy transition in the United States. In the European Union, there is a growing fear that U.S. subsidies, combined with high energy costs triggered by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, might lead to the deindustrialization of Europe. Although it is unlikely that the trade frictions introduced by the IRA and the CBAM will cause a transatlantic trade war, further diplomatic work will have to happen throughout 2023 to avoid a conflict that could seriously undermine Western unity.
+
+#### Migration
+
+Europe has felt the secondary impacts of the war in ways the rest of the world has not. For one, its geographical proximity to the frontlines means it is facing the worst humanitarian displacement the continent has seen since World War II, with millions of Ukrainians fleeing the conflict. On top of that, worries that the war could spill further into Europe continue to loom. The European Union has responded to the crisis with various instruments, including humanitarian aid, emergency civil protection, and granting immediate protection in its territory.
+
+For the first time in its history, the European Union has activated the Temporary Protection Directive for Ukrainians fleeing war. An estimated 5.3 million Ukrainians have entered the European Union since the beginning of the invasion, and the total number of arrivals (including non-Ukrainians) is estimated at 7 million individuals. Under the Temporary Protection Directive, Ukrainian refugees have the right to residence, healthcare, education, and work in any EU member state until March 2024, per the latest prolongation of the directive. For now, public support for taking in a large number of Ukrainian refugees remains robust across a large swath of EU member states.
+
+#### Enlargement and Reconstruction of Wider Europe
+
+Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has revived the European Union’s pursuit of enlargement. Ukraine’s application to join the bloc was embraced by European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen, who helped convince EU leaders to grant Ukraine and Moldova EU candidacy status in June. Furthermore, after years of waiting, the European Union finally opened accession negotiations with North Macedonia and Albania in July and granted candidate status to Bosnia-Herzegovina in December.
+
+While EU enlargement is gaining momentum, the prospects of full membership for any of these countries are in doubt. Most of all, before the European Union considers another round of enlargement, it will almost certainly need to adopt a new treaty to reform how it functions. This sentiment was echoed in August by German chancellor Olaf Scholz, who suggested the bloc could expand to include as many as 36 member states but not before revisiting, for example, the unanimity requirement that has kept Brussels from acting swiftly on foreign policy, taxes, and holding Hungary and Poland accountable for democratic backsliding. These reforms currently require unanimous support among EU members. However, while countries like Poland and the Baltic states are fully supportive of enlargement, they also oppose efforts by countries like France to reform the European Union. This political deadlock will stand in the way of future enlargement, no matter how much progress countries make in meeting the requirements for joining the bloc. Thus, granting candidate status does not necessarily mean what it has meant before: becoming a member in a fairly short time.
+
+However, the hope for these countries is that a virtuous cycle is formed, wherein the renewed EU interest in enlargement (however distant), leads to momentum for internal reforms within EU aspirant countries, thereby prompting the European Union to grant them greater market access and increase its investment in them. This, in turn, will prompt greater integration of the electricity, telecommunications, and transportation sectors.
+
+
+### NATO and Defense
+
+#### NATO
+
+Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine is one of the most significant tests NATO has faced since the alliance formed in 1949. The challenge is twofold: defending allies and supporting Ukraine. So far, NATO’s response to both has been robust. But the alliance will come under intense pressure in 2023 ahead of the Vilnius summit in July, and with a historic, 75th anniversary Washington summit on the horizon in 2024.
+
+NATO’s foremost commitment is to defend its own members. More U.S. and Western European forces have been deployed to NATO’s eastern flank during the war, significantly strengthening its combat capacity in eastern Europe. There has also been a significant increase in NATO spending commitments, with most allies now either reaching the 2 percent defense spending goal or having a clear path to hit it. As a result, defense investment by EU member states has risen by a third, from 163 billion euros in 2014 to 214 billion euros in 2021 (according to the latest EU figures). The war has also triggered a return to Cold War–style forward defense, which has involved bolstering NATO’s “enhanced forward presence” missions in the east and establishing a new rapid reaction force. After the 2022 invasion, the alliance’s new approach was crystallized in its Strategic Concept, which describes Russia as “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security.” This concept was agreed at a historic summit in Madrid alongside the approval of more forward-deployed and high-readiness forces.
+
+However, this period has seen plenty of challenges to NATO’s integrity, including rising energy prices, an anonymous attack on the Nord Stream gas pipeline, a stray missile that killed two Polish farmers, and the failure of Hungary and Turkey to ratify Finland’s and Sweden’s membership bids. These challenges are likely to intensify in the coming months as Russia doubles down in Ukraine and beyond. Despite these obstacles, support for NATO in European countries has grown dramatically in the past year and remains particularly strong in countries located near Russia or Ukraine. This trend is most evident in Poland, where the share of the public who consider NATO very important has grown from 43 percent to 66 percent since 2021, according to the German Marshall Fund. Even countries that have historically been more skeptical of NATO have embraced the alliance as central to their security; in the same survey, 72 percent of French and 77 percent of Spanish respondents considered NATO somewhat or very important, an increase from 52 percent and 65 percent, respectively, in 2021.
+
+Although Ukraine is not a NATO member, allies have made supporting Ukraine a matter of alliance credibility — providing billions in financial and military assistance, updated equipment, training, intelligence sharing, and a long-term commitment to reconstruction and reform. However, differences have emerged among allies over their political willingness and ability to provide military assistance, and there have also been industrial-capacity challenges (e.g., for manufacturing ammunition). In addition, assistance to Ukraine is further depleting the readiness of European militaries. As stocks of ammunition, artillery, vehicles, and tanks flow to Ukraine, Europe will need to find funding to replace the equipment outflows.
+
+Russia’s invasion of Ukraine also prompted a Scandinavian NATO enlargement that had previously been considered unlikely. On May 18, 2022, Finland and Sweden jointly applied for membership after months of domestic debates, reversing long-standing policies of maintaining military neutrality. The inclusion of the two Nordic countries as NATO members constitutes a major shift in European security and a historic strengthening of the alliance, both politically and militarily, given their geostrategic location and military capabilities. On the one hand, Finnish and Swedish NATO membership will contribute to the collective defense of the Baltic Sea region and help counter Russia’s expansion of Arctic bases in the Kola Peninsula. Furthermore, Finland has valuable experience as Russia’s neighbor, sharing a 1,340-kilometer (832-mile) land border with it, and both Finland and Sweden have valuable practical insights into operating in sub-Arctic climates. On the other hand, the enlargement will bring NATO to Russia’s doorstep and more than double the border between them, locking the alliance into a more strangled relationship with Russia.
+
+To grant membership, the governments of all 30 NATO members must sign and ratify the accession protocols. Following a September 27, 2022, vote in Slovakia, legislatures in 28 NATO countries have ratified the accession, with the exception of Turkey and Hungary. To mitigate risks during the accession period, Finland and Sweden have received security guarantees from France, Germany, the United States, and the United Kingdom. They are expected to join NATO as full members prior to the alliance’s Vilnius summit in June 2023.
+
+#### European Defense and Foreign Policy
+
+The war in Ukraine has prompted European countries to get serious about defense and increase the role of the European Union in defense and foreign policy. The organization has released a raft of initiatives to address some of the issues at hand.
+
+In March 2022, the European Union adopted its first-ever equivalent of a national security strategy, the Strategic Compass. Negotiated and drafted mostly before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, it was hastily revised to take this major shift into account but could not capture the full scale of the war’s impact and consequences. It still puts forth an ambitious yet realistic roadmap for the European Union to become a more responsible and credible security provider. The document lays out a joint threat assessment that presents Russia as severely and directly threatening the European security order and China as a partner for cooperation, an economic competitor, and a systemic rival. It also highlights the need for Europe to develop military capabilities, such as the ability to rapidly deploy up to 5,000 troops in all types of contexts. This goal was a direct response to the difficulties of the withdrawal from Afghanistan, where the European Union was dependent on the U.S. military to get EU citizens out.
+
+For the first time in its history, the European Union has provided lethal security assistance to a foreign partner, providing more than 3.1 billion euros to Ukraine through the European Peace Facility (EPF). The EPF, used to reimburse EU members sending military equipment to Ukraine, was originally intended for use in countries outside Europe. The union has also created the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine), which provides combat training for the Ukrainian armed forces.
+
+European nations have also provided direct military assistance to Kyiv, sometimes on a strictly national basis and sometimes within a multilateral framework. According to the most recent data collected by the Kiel Institute, as of November 2022, EU members had allocated 8.61 billion euros toward military commitments to Ukraine; this number is a combination of both specific weapons and equipment purchases, as well as financial commitments related to a military purpose. EU institutions have added 3.1 billion euros to that tally via the EPF, and the United Kingdom has committed an additional 4.13 billion euros, bringing total European military commitments to Ukraine to 15.84 billion euros as of November. This is less than the U.S. contribution of 22.86 billion euros ($24.44 billion) but is nonetheless significant.
+
+Unfortunately, Europe’s generosity and the resulting need to restock armaments has exposed the hollowness of Europe’s defense industrial base. This vulnerability began to develop after the end of the Cold War, primarily as a result of low defense spending: European governments reduced their military expenditure from roughly 2 percent of GDP annually to 1.3 percent between 1993 and 2014. Other causes include a focus on low-intensity military missions such as counterterrorism operations and the potentially stifling effect of U.S. arms sales that, often for good reason, lure public money away from homegrown European defense companies. Furthermore, while it is widely recognized that more joint procurement would be beneficial, member states regularly fall short of the EU benchmark that 35 percent of total defense equipment procurement expenditure should be spent collaboratively; in 2021, cooperative spending comprised only 18 percent of military expenditure. This leads to redundancies in the defense industrial base, with many individual European states maintaining their own protected industries. Europe now has the will to rearm but perhaps not the capacity.
+
+Consequently, European countries were already lacking in military capabilities, particularly those needed for high-intensity conflict, even before they began sending equipment to Ukraine. This is a liability for NATO, not least because the rate of attrition characterizing the Russia-Ukraine war has underscored the need to rapidly produce basic supplies like munitions and ammunition at scale. Now, Europe likely could not engage in a conventional conflict for more than a handful of days before running short.
+
+Europe’s ability to resolve these problems in a timely manner is in doubt amid reports that its defense industry is already failing to keep up with the demand that Russia’s war has stoked. Fortunately, European countries have pledged to increase defense spending, and the European Union has developed or is developing a raft of initiatives to either reimburse EU countries sending military equipment to Ukraine (such as through the EPF) or to incentivize cooperation (e.g., the European Defense Fund, the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act, and the forthcoming European Defence Investment Program). So far, however, three things are not yet clear: the degree to which national defense-spending pledges will turn into actual procurements; whether member states will allocate sufficient funding to the EU initiatives; and whether the funds that do materialize will be spent efficiently, collaboratively, and in such a way that the European defense industry is revitalized.
+
+The most consequential national development in the defense realm was Germany’s decision to shed its pacifist tendencies and embrace a more active role in Europe’s security order. Chancellor Scholz heralded a Zeitenwende (“change of era”) in his speech to the Bundestag during an extraordinary session only three days after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. He called for a major overhaul of German defense planning, promising to spend 2 percent of the country’s GDP on defense, with the support of an exceptional emergency fund of 100 billion euros to reform the German armed forces.
+
+Since then, critics have claimed the German chancellor and government are not up to the task of following through on their historic commitments. First, they argue that Berlin has insufficiently altered the course of its foreign policy, shied away from taking the lead in supporting Ukraine’s efforts to defend its sovereignty, and conceded to supplying Kyiv with critical military supplies only after facing untenable political pressure. Second, they claim that Germany is repeating the mistakes of its past policy of engagement with Russia in its current diplomatic approach to China, epitomized by Scholz being the first Western leader to visit Beijing after the reelection of Xi Jinping as leader of the Chinese Communist Party in October 2022. Lastly, critics blame Berlin for thus far not taking significant concrete steps to differentiate its current defense overhaul from past failed efforts at reform. It has mostly used the emergency fund to buy off-the-shelf U.S. equipment and folded it into the annual defense budget instead of dedicating this money to ambitious national or European defense projects. As it stands, Germany may only reach the 2 percent spending benchmark it has set for itself by 2025 at the earliest.
+
+What is clear is that 100 billion euros will not solve all the problems plaguing the German armed forces after decades of neglect. Nevertheless, the additional investment will significantly boost the German military and make the country a much stronger defense actor — though how much so remains an open question.
+
+#### Transatlantic Relations: Stronger Than Ever?
+
+The war in Ukraine has significantly strengthened transatlantic relations. In its first year, the Biden administration emphasized the importance of transatlantic ties and struck a significantly more cooperative tone than the Trump administration. Yet it was also clear to Europe that its focus was on China and the Indo-Pacific. Europeans received no warning from the United States regarding the Afghanistan withdrawal; Franco-American relations nearly collapsed over the Australia–United Kingdom–United States (AUKUS) submarine deal in September 2021; and U.S.-German relations were dominated by opposition to the Nord Stream II pipeline.
+
+The war in Ukraine paused this pivot to Asia, and senior U.S. officials descended on Europe. The war also scuttled the Nord Stream II project and prompted Europeans to dramatically increase defense spending. Furthermore, the incredibly robust U.S. response to the war in Ukraine has demonstrated Washington’s indispensable role in European security. The United States has shown its military and intelligence capabilities through massive security assistance to Ukraine. In a September 2022 survey conducted by the German Marshall Fund, a majority of European respondents believe that EU-U.S. relations will remain stable over the coming five years, while more than a quarter expect ties to become closer. Among the same respondents, support for President Biden’s handling of international affairs is robust in European countries, with particularly strong support in Eastern Europe.
+
+However, there is also a danger that 2022 will be a high-water mark for transatlantic relations. The U.S. pivot to Asia is no longer paused, as made clear with the release of the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy this past September. It is unlikely the United States will be able to maintain the tempo of senior-level visits to Europe or the force posture it inserted into Europe when it looked like Russia might take Ukraine. Given Europe’s dependence, it may react with increasing concern if it feels Washington is not adequately focused on the threats to the continent.
+
+
+### The Future
+
+While Europe’s response to the war has been laudable, several questions remain unanswered. Russia’s invasion has accelerated European countries’ plans to distance themselves from authoritarian regimes and decrease dependencies in critical sectors such as semiconductors and renewable energy. Increased defense commitments are also straining national budgets, as EU member states are forgoing the interoperability benefits and lower costs of joint procurement, opting instead for more expensive off-the-shelf solutions (mostly imported from the United States). This has revived both long-standing debates over greater fiscal and defense integration, as well as regional fissures over EU spending. With ambitious new proposals on the docket in both realms, funding challenges will persist in the new year.
+
+It will also be a big year for European countries facing presidential and parliamentary elections. Elections are due in Estonia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, Finland, Greece, and Turkey in the first half of 2023 and in Slovakia, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Poland, and Spain in the second half. The elections in Turkey and Poland are by far the most geopolitically significant since their future governments will set the tone of their relations with the West.
+
+As in Hungary last year, the Turkish elections are unlikely to be fair. The six major opposition parties will probably unite behind a consensus candidate to run against President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Public polling suggests that the the country’s severe economic crisis is the most important election issue, reflecting the impact of Erdoğan’s unorthodox and bizarre economic policies — such as cutting (rather than raising) interest rates in the face of growing inflation, which is unofficially estimated to be as high as 170.7 percent. Furthermore, some of his efforts to gain political support, such as by increasing the minimum wage and pensions, have also fueled inflation. In addition, there is a concern that he may escalate tensions with Greece (which is having its own elections the same month) over a disputed island or provoke a fight with NATO over Sweden and Finland. But while it is clear the election will not be fair, the question is how far Erdoğan can go to manipulate it. There is a general expectation among the opposition that the actual vote will be legitimate. Should Erdoğan attempt to steal the election outright, Turkey may erupt in significant civil unrest.
+
+Poland also goes to the polls in 2023 (likely in October). The populist, right-wing Law and Justice Party is seeking a third term, something no incumbent party has ever done before. According to polling, it is on course to lose its parliamentary majority. Although the Polish government had been on a collision course with the European Union and United States over its efforts to subvert the independence of the judiciary, Polish support for Ukraine, its clairvoyant stance on Russia, its acceptance of millions of Ukrainian refugees, its dramatic increases in defense spending, and its distancing from Viktor Orbán in Hungary have granted the country a temporary reprieve. However, the Polish government has recently turned up the nationalist dial, ferociously attacking Germany, including demanding additional reparations for World War II. The rhetoric will likely stay heated until after the country’s parliamentary elections later this year.
+
+A major question for the European Union is whether it will expand its financial capacity and move toward a “fiscal union.” Although it has already created a monetary union with the establishment of the ECB and the euro, it has so far hesitated to move toward closer, permanent fiscal integration. However, pressure for more EU investment or spending to address common European issues will only grow. Washington has increasingly become supportive of the European Union becoming a fiscal actor, with John Kerry, special envoy for climate change, and U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai both encouraging Brussels to emulate the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act and invest in fostering clean-technology sectors. The United States also wants the European Union to play a leading role in reconstructing Ukraine. This will require additional resources, in turn prompting important institutional debates that will play out throughout 2023.
+
+In addition, the future of European defense is uncertain. The war has revealed huge weaknesses among the continent’s militaries — and although European countries are spending more on defense, this spending is largely uncoordinated. Instead of working together to address common challenges, European defense cooperation has gotten worse over the past decade. Despite the shock caused by the war in Ukraine, there are no major Europe-wide initiatives to significantly improve coordination. Furthermore, the acute threat Russia poses to NATO has dissipated due to the performance of the Ukrainians and the depletion of the Russian military. There is a risk that this will sap Europe’s political momentum to maintain elevated investments in defense.
+
+___`In addition, the future of European defense is uncertain. The war has revealed huge weaknesses among the continent’s militaries — and although European countries are spending more on defense, this spending is largely uncoordinated.`___
+
+The coming year — the last before EU parliamentary elections — will be critical to Europe’s future direction. While the outcome of the war remains uncertain, there are many economic and political challenges that will require significant political leadership, vision, and capital. Transatlantic allies should continue strengthening their relationship, using institutional platforms such as the Trade and Technology Council to its fullest while easing trade tensions created by the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act. The following year, 2024, will be tumultuous, with important elections on both sides of the Atlantic and the war in Ukraine likely entering a critical phase. In this context, the political momentum created by the war should be used wisely to resolve existing issues and prepare a united Europe for the challenges that lie ahead.
+
+---
+
+__Max Bergmann__ is the director of the Europe Program and the Stuart Center in Euro-Atlantic and Northern European Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.
+
+__Ilke Toygür__ is a senior associate (non-resident) with the CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program.
+
+__Otto Svendsen__ is a research associate with the CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-16-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-9.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-16-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-9.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..28f459b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-16-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-9.md
@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第九日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-02-16 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 區諾軒指被捕前已刪WhatsApp協調群組內容 須靠趙家賢紀錄重溫
+- 播九西論壇黃碧雲被質詢 庭上屢傳笑聲
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，16人否認「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，今（15日）踏入審訊第9天。認罪被告區諾軒今續作供，重申戴耀廷在新界東協調會議提及「積極」運用《基本法》權力否決財政預算案，是試圖迎合不同意見，又指會上有人批評泛民過往「行禮如儀」。區又供稱，超級區議會界別曾於2020年5月8日後舉行協調會議，但很快結束，因當時「大局已定」，其他區均已大致就舉行初選、目標議席和替補機制等達成共識，戴亦沒有提及否決財政預算案的主張。區又指，被捕前已刪除手機所有 WhatsApp 紀錄，並在2021年9月獲展示趙家賢手機紀錄才能重溫當時對話，確認那時他已協助警方調查。翻查資料，區諾軒於同月23日的第二次提訊日，首次表明擬認罪。
+
+#### 區重申戴望說服與會者 故提「積極」運用權力否決財案
+
+區諾軒昨供稱，戴耀廷在不同地區的協調會議，不斷建議加入「積極運用《基本法》權力否決財政預算案」的條款，其中港島區司馬文表示反對，社民連指會支持涉全民退保等民生項目的預算案，新界東鄒家成則質問戴耀廷為何用「積極」，而非較確定的「會」字。
+
+主控周天行今續就新界東協調會議情況發問，問戴耀廷在新東第二次會議上，何時提及「積極運用《基本法》權力否決財政預算案」字眼。區指據其憶述，戴是在會上看到相關討論後，在回應時才講述他對積極運用否決權的看法，「試圖迎合唔同嘅意見」，至於與會者在開會前有否討論該字眼，區則稱「我冇再之前嘅印象」。
+
+周天行續問，為何說戴耀廷「不斷加入」該條款，區再解釋，當時會上有人質疑條款字眼，故戴嘗試說服會眾就算只用「積極」，「都比起唔用行前一步」。他指戴沒再闡述何為「再行前一步」，但認為戴「應該係為咗說服鄒家成」。
+
+#### 區稱會上有人批泛民「行禮如儀」 就條款字眼沒有達成共識
+
+區昨又提及，鄒家成的質問引發「激烈辯論」，期間民主黨被批評，林卓廷助理莊榮輝指民主黨中委會無授權他處理有關問題。周天行問「民主黨被批評」是什麼意思，區指會上「有人拎返以前民主黨好多事情出嚟批評」，批評對象亦包括街工，「都係講緊泛民主派過往行禮如儀」，旁聽人士聞言發笑。傳譯主任一度未能翻譯，大律師沈士文提議「just go through motions and rituals」，法官陳慶偉則提議「go through the formalities」。區並補充，莊榮輝的回應是在鄒家成提議即場投票處理條款字眼時發生。
+
+周天行一度續問，相關議題是否指「否決財政預算案」，惟大律師沈士文提出反對，指是引導性問題，「運用《基本法》權力」與「否決財政預算案」是兩個不同字眼。法官李運騰同意，區並補充鄒當時是就「運用《基本法》權力」應用「會」或「積極」作投票。
+
+區續指，相關爭辯花了相當時間，最終沒有共識，其後並轉為討論該區初選應派出6或7張名單，因7張名單是「較為樂觀」的勝選目標。他並指，有與會者認為第7張名單若被界定為初選勝出者，可於正式立法會選舉報名，但不應展開選舉工程。
+
+#### 區稱WhatsApp紀錄於被捕前已刪除 僅靠趙家賢紀錄重溫對話
+
+區諾軒續指，他只出席過新界東頭兩次會議，不清楚有否第三次會議。法官陳仲衡問新界東是否有 WhatsApp 群組，區指有，但對有否收過第三次會議的通知則「冇印象」，「特別係我只能夠覆睇趙家賢嗰部手機有關新界東嗰個群組嘅內容」。
+
+法官李運騰再問他是否身在該群組，及有否被通知有第三次會議，區確認他是群組成員，「但我沒有被知會有任何會議」。李續問，既然他在群組內，為何要看趙家賢的手機？區諾軒解釋：「因為喺我2021年9月收到本案關於趙家賢手機嘅 WhatsApp 紀錄，我先能夠重溫返當時候嘅對話」，李問即是他被捕後，曾被展示趙的手機紀錄？區同意。李問那時他是否已在「協助警方調查」，區亦同意。李再問他自己的手機紀錄在哪？區答：「關於我嘅任何紀錄，關於 WhatsApp 都已經剷走晒，喺我被捕之前。」
+
+翻查資料，本案2021年3月1日首提堂後，區諾軒於2021年9月23日的第二次提訊日，與趙家賢和鍾錦麟首次表示擬認罪。
+
+
+▲ 前排：趙家賢（左）、戴耀廷（右）
+
+#### 新東群組於報名期後由戴耀廷創立 發布初選訊息
+
+區續指，該群組約於2020年5、6月建立，但對有否收過會議摘要則沒有印象。周天行問及群組成員名單，區指「如果向我展示嗰個 WhatsApp group 嘅名單，我能夠睇得返，知道有咩成員參與」，吳政亨、梁國雄等發笑。法官李運騰續指，理解現時在談論多年前的事，亦非測試記憶，但區是否不記得任何成員。區指只能確定包括初選參與者及其代表，要一一數出「恐怕有錯漏」，重申「比較好」的做法是如早前作供時控方展示九龍東的群組紀錄，「我覺得用嗰個方式，會比較恰當回應嗰個問題。」
+
+控方其後展示從趙家賢手機擷取「35+計劃新東訊息發布區」的 WhatsApp 群組紀錄，顯示於2020年6月24日創立。區解釋該群組是「訊息發布的地方」，法官李運騰一度問是否呈上錯誤的群組，惟區諾軒核實是指此群組。控方問新界東是否有另一群組，區更正指應另有一個發送訊息的名單，但「趙家賢先至有」。
+
+根據群組紀錄，區諾軒是群組管理員，他起初稱是由他創立群組，再加入其他與會者，但不肯定是否所有成員都由他加入。惟其後顯示戴耀廷亦是管理員，區則改稱群組應由戴創立，「但我唔敢肯定點解我做咗 admin」，有旁聽人士發笑。區同意，群組是在新界東兩次協調會議及6月19日的初選報名期後創立，「我推斷係因為完成咗報名，先創立呢個群組，發布訊息予參加者。」大律師馬維騉一度指其回應為意見，質疑呈堂性。
+
+#### 區稱協調及訊息發布兩群組不會同時進行 相信九東群組完成協調後關閉
+
+周天行問其他區是否都有類似群組，區確認，並在法官李運騰詢問下確認，有部分選區會於協調會議時創立群組，「但過咗報名期後，無論之前有冇開過 WhatsApp 群組，我哋都會確保每一區開設訊息發布嘅群組」，又指據其印象「冇一個選區嘅群組係有兩個同時間進行」。傳譯主任一度猶豫：「冇一個選區嘅群組係有兩個同時間進行……」，區再主動翻譯：「There is no WhatsApp group running concurrently.」被告欄和旁聽席傳出笑聲。區其後再確認，初選報名日期完結後，參與者便不會再使用協調會議群組，而改用發布訊息的群組。
+
+控方其後重新展示早前呈堂、處理協調會議的九龍東 WhatsApp 群組，於2020年2月創立，5月20日後便沒有任何訊息。區指他沒有去九龍東第四次和第五次會議，不清楚他們進度，「但係我有理由相信，呢個群組處理完協調會議嘅事務之後，佢哋已經完成咗任務，所以就閂咗個群組。」紀錄亦顯示，時任觀塘區議會主席蔡澤鴻最後移除群組成員。
+
+#### 區形容超區協調會議舉行時「大局已定」 各區已大致定替補機制等
+
+控方其後就超級區議會協調會議發問。區供稱，超級區議會曾舉行一次會議，他不記得日期，但肯定是在2020年5月8日新界西第二次協調會議之後，出席者包括他、戴耀廷、涂謹申、鄺俊宇、王百羽、李予信和岑敖暉。
+
+區指，當時由戴耀廷主持討論，而會議「好快就結束」，「因為喺成個協調會議，咁多區嚟講，我會形容為大局已定。」他又指，與會者亦是有政治聯繫人士，故會上只是集中介紹超級區議會目標是「5席贏3席」，及簡介選舉論壇和投票日內容，席間戴耀廷並無提及關於否決預算案的主張。
+
+控方問及何謂「大局已定」，區解釋其他選區的協調會議已完成舉行，並指基本方向是各區都會舉行初選，亦訂下目標勝算議席，但有個別選區則保留彈性，決定初選投票日後才決定確切出選名單數目。法官問還有什麼其他共識，區指除香港島外，其餘選區當時均已決定以「靈童制」作為替補被「DQ」者的機制；當時亦就舉辦選舉論壇達成共識。
+
+至於新界西，區昨天指「新界西我冇參與過，所以我唔能夠評論新界西嘅事」，今重申他並沒有出席過任何新界西協調會議。
+
+案件下午續審。
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，16人否認「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，今（16日）踏入審訊第9天。認罪被告區諾軒今續作供，指早期與戴耀廷商討初選時，已打算舉辦選舉論壇，戴耀廷提議找《蘋果日報》及其他媒體合作籌辦，最終由《蘋果》提供場地，民主動力作選舉申報，區負責籌備。庭上播放九龍西選舉論壇片段，多名候選人對黃碧雲提出質疑，其中馮達浚問黃碧雲如果當選，「你願唔願意同我一齊衝？」黃拍枱高聲答： 「一齊衝，希望一齊贏！」；劉澤鋒問黃「你識唔識得唱《願榮光歸香港》呀？你唱嚟聽吓」，黃答「我哋一齊唱」，均惹來被告欄和旁聽席大笑，黃碧雲則笑着搖頭。
+
+
+▲ 黃碧雲
+
+#### 區：戴耀廷提議找《蘋果》合辦初選 獲回覆可提供場地
+
+區諾軒今就初選論壇作供。他確認負責籌備初選論壇，於6月25日至7月4日舉辦6個論壇，包括5個地方選區和超級區議會。區表示，2020年3月與戴耀廷傾談初選早期，已預期要舉辦選舉論壇。當時戴耀廷曾指可嘗試找《蘋果日報》及其他媒體一起合作，因此他聯絡一位《蘋果日報》記者，表達想搞初選論壇的意見，《蘋果》並回覆可以提供場地。區亦聯絡網台《城寨》、《D100》 和《立場新聞》問有否興趣合辦論壇。
+
+區表示，與4個媒體各派出的一名代表，舉行兩至三次會議準備論壇的工作，會上討論播放模式，決定由《蘋果日報》錄制影像，再分發予上述媒體在同一時間播放；並思考邀請什麼人做嘉賓及主持，「經過幾間媒體物色人選下」訂下名單；並指他們最初憂慮論壇所牽涉的選舉開支，及是否需要作選舉申報。
+
+#### 以「35+」名義辦論壇 民主動力安排申報選舉開支
+
+區提及，就選舉申報曾徵詢《蘋果日報》一方的法律意見，惟法官李運騰即打斷：「我不認為我們需要知道所有細節。」區續指他只是想解釋在6月9日記者會，他曾表示不以「35+」的名義舉辦論壇，但與媒體開會後認為應作選舉申報，故最後還是以「35+」名義舉辦論壇，並由民主動力安排候選人申報選舉開支的資料。
+
+#### 區製作〈35+論壇須知〉文件 擬定論壇流程
+
+區表示，曾準備〈35+論壇須知〉和〈Candidates’ memo（候選人備忘）〉兩份文件，發給每位初選參加者，分別列明6個論壇的錄製和播放日期、發言時間；及論壇流程、嘉賓和主持等資料，並指論壇環節是參考一般媒體的立法會選舉論壇。他並曾將文件發給戴耀廷和趙家賢，指他們知悉該兩份文件，「但都係由我製作。」
+
+區又透露，與戴耀廷、趙家賢、鍾錦麟和民主動力職員黎敬輝有一個名為「PfD 35＋計劃」的 WhatsApp 群組，群組於2020年6月創立，創立者「唔係趙家賢，就係戴耀廷」，群組最後訊息於7月23日發出。
+
+#### 區稱曾去大部分選舉論壇、趙家賢沒去過、戴耀廷只去一次
+
+區確認，論壇於《蘋果日報》大樓舉行，指「當中大部分我都有去，但我唔記得冇去邊一兩個」，形容自己「只係去做觀察」，而戴耀廷只去過一次，趙家賢應沒有去過。法官多次問及區有否參與，他再指大部分都有去，「即使冇去都好，我都有睇晒所有論壇」，但就九龍西論壇「我冇100%確保我有去」，但確定所有選舉論壇流程都由他處理。
+
+控方原不打算播放所有論壇片段，但大律師馬維騉表示，於盤問會播放新界東論壇片段，望庭上能播放所有論壇片段。法庭押後讓雙方商討，控方於午休後指會播放完整片段。資深大律師潘熙一度指大部分辯方律師對論壇沒有爭議，不要求在區諾軒作供時播放所有片段，法官陳仲衡提議先由新界東片段播放，惟馬維騉指他希望順時序播放。法官陳慶偉指交由控方決定，「你們之間永遠不會達成共識。（“There will be no consensus among you all.”）」有被告大笑，林卓廷笑着重複：「There will be no consensus.」
+
+控方播片前，指有部分被告不承認片段，要求區諾軒認出參加者，自辯的劉偉聰表示沒有爭議身份，區並認出黃碧雲、劉澤鋒、何啟明、毛孟靜、馮達浚、岑子杰、張崑陽、安德里和李軒朗，其中劉偉聰、黃碧雲、何啟明為不認罪被告。開始播片時，區諾軒一度回頭望向旁聽席。
+
+
+▲ 劉偉聰
+
+控方其後播放長1小時20分鐘的九龍西初選論壇片段，先是每人30秒的「開場介紹」，劉偉聰提及要將最多同路人送入議會，「裏應外合」；黃碧雲提及「今日上嚟論壇，小心我可能畀人重點招呼」，但重申35+要團結合作抗暴政，有被告發笑；何啟明則提及自2019年8月起，「我同一班70+手足，喺深水埗警署門口，一齊嚟到反暴政，一齊嚟到食TG」。
+
+#### 黃碧雲論壇被多人質問 惹被告及旁聽席大笑
+
+其後進入每人3分鐘的「自由搏擊」環節，多名候選人均質疑黃碧雲立場，其中張崑陽問黃「過去一年，喺抗爭上做過啲咩嘢？」、「七一嘅時候，點解要同勇武手足割蓆？」，又指在「中大保衛戰」時有人曾聽到她說「嘩，咁多人嘅，係咪 open day 呀？」，黃回應時二人疊聲，張說「宜家係我嘅主場，唔好惱羞成怒」，多名被告發笑，林卓廷笑着搖頭。岑子杰問黃如何說服港人她進入議會後會「積極抗爭」，黃指民主黨「一定會抵抗惡法」，指面對《逃犯條例》，「我哋係全部一條心，民主派嘅議員係一齊共進退」，而隨《國安法》來臨，「已經冇得分咩叫和理非，咩叫勇武。」
+
+同案認罪被告馮達浚則指，現時共產黨政權為「共同敵人」，「議事堂內已經係冇任何議事嘅空間」，問黃碧雲：「我見到你用咗8年時間，係學識點樣去捐山窿，但係我想問嚟緊4年，你願唔願意同我一齊，如果一齊當選嘅話，你願唔願意同我一齊衝？」黃碧雲拍枱高聲答： 「一齊衝，希望一齊贏！」引來旁聽席大笑，彭卓棋、柯耀林、鄭達鴻等前俯後仰，黃碧雲亦笑着搖頭。安德里其後問到少數族裔議題，黃碧雲指「過去兩屆，我同 Ms Mo 都喺立法會度有啲關注少數族裔嘅工作做嘅」，惟毛孟靜說「我冇同你一齊做呀」，再惹被告大笑。
+
+另一認罪被告劉澤鋒，則指黃碧雲曾在戴耀廷舉辦的佔中訓練營訓練擋水砲，多次質問：「點解你唔去擋水砲？」，又說「既然你係抗爭者，你識唔識得唱《願榮光歸香港》呀？你唱嚟聽吓」，黃碧雲答「我哋一齊唱」，再引來林卓廷等被告和旁聽人士大笑。其後劉轉為問張崑陽問題，黃碧雲續說「我見到你嗰種憤怒係好明白，不過希望我哋嘅憤怒，係對住呢個政權」，劉即說「我宜家問緊張崑陽呀，你收聲吓」，林卓廷等再大笑，黃碧雲再苦笑搖頭。
+
+
+▲ （視頻截圖）
+
+#### 黃碧雲稱會用盡憲制權力爭五大訴求、何啟明指不簽墨落無悔要「foul走」
+
+劉澤鋒又質疑，黃碧雲拒簽墨落無悔，問黃民主黨「係咪應承一定攬炒」，黃指如戴耀廷認為九龍西要再簽協議，「我哋好樂意」，又稱會用盡憲制內的權力和手段爭取五大訴求，「如果否決財政預算案能夠促成呢一樣嘢，我哋一定會做。」何啟明則稱，35+是要團結入議會，若有人不簽「墨落無悔」，市民「就用佢雪亮嘅眼睛，就用佢手上一票，咪 foul 走佢囉」，又指35+是要「令到立法會成為呢個政府同埋保皇黨嘅地獄」。
+
+何啟明亦提到，過去一年「見證住無數警暴」，指「呢個極權政府，淨係針對年輕人，好多濫捕、濫告，甚至有好多死得不明不白嘅死者」，又指周梓樂是他的中學師弟，該案必須徹查。其後劉偉聰稱，議會是一條戰線，指「首先我哋就炒晒班（立法會）保安，跟住請番晒自己嘅手足」，黃碧雲發笑。
+
+張崑陽則問劉偉聰是否知道議會內「做唔到法治重光」，劉指法治是「制約當權者的權力」，又說「如果大家覺得我哋仲需要制約當權者嘅話，有你，有我哋，大家一齊嘅話，法治係唔會死」。他又指「有35+，我相信好多嘢都可以做，包括修改呢啲惡法。」
+
+至於岑子杰被問為何不簽墨落無悔，他形容「覺得嗰種夾泛民嘅意味太重，佢好似會創造一種撕裂，我唔鍾意」，又指：「社民連有邊一次嘅財政預算案係投過贊成票嘅啫？係咪先？未有你哋，社民連係第一個講議會抗爭嘅！」
+
+
+▲ 何啟明
+
+#### 劉偉聰稱法治未死 何啟明指中共「攬炒」
+
+其後為嘉賓提問環節，嘉賓為資深傳媒人湛國揚及阮穎嫻。問黃碧雲時，阮穎嫻形容「其實我覺得大會，喺現場呢個節數其實都係為咗呢一刻㗎，可能係咁」。湛國揚後提及當時81歲李柱銘和「擺咗喺床下底嗰個楊森」都被捕，問民主黨「大中華」概念是否太天真。黃指回歸前寄望有高度自治，但回歸廿多年，中央插手香港事務，甚至有《國安法》，「的確令我哋對於中共呢個政權，同埋佢過去做出嘅承諾，係幻想破滅」，籲港人團結向專制政權說不、抵抗所有惡法，包括《國安法》。
+
+劉偉聰後被問到法治「死咗未？死定係未死？」，答「梗係未」，又說：「我死唔死唔緊要，我 dead body 係唔重要嘅⋯⋯你哋未死嘅話，法治就未死。」
+
+就何啟明，嘉賓指「攬炒受傷最大嘅就係基層」，但何啟明已簽署「墨落無悔」，「你會選擇背棄堅定抗爭聲明定係背棄深水埗嘅支持者？」何回應基層市民眼睛雪亮，明白「攬炒係中共吖嘛」，又指「真正令到基層市民生活苦，嗰個係共產黨，係呢個極權社會，係呢個極權政府」，他們知道「共產黨係一個殺人政權」，故他要出來「反暴政」。
+
+#### 何啟明倡打倒共產黨、岑子杰指想長毛再參選
+
+到了特選片段和網民提問的搶答環節，被問如何運用議會資源結合街頭抗爭，毛孟靜成功搶答後說，「我呀？啊，好叻叻呀，多謝晒！」林卓廷和施德來等被告大笑。毛指她正支援街頭抗爭；何啟明則指會用資料「請手足」，「打倒共產黨。」岑子杰被問為何任沙田區議員，要選九龍西選區，則指「長毛係第一個喺議會提倡抗爭嘅人，我好想長毛再次出嚟參選」，不認罪的梁國雄專注看片段。其後馮達浚連續成功搶答兩條問題，鄒家成俯身發笑。
+
+最後是各人10秒的總結環節，劉偉聰說「最重要係支持最大多數同路人進入議會，到時 they would fear you，建制會驚你」，黃碧雲指「贏唔到」會全力支持勝出隊伍，何啟明則說元朗 YOHO 商場有8男4女被捕，「不如宜家我哋就一齊去元朗，一齊守護手足，一齊守護下一代，好唔好呀？」
+
+片段播畢，法官指明天會播放其他片段。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
+
+### 列席認罪被告全於延伸庭被告欄就坐
+
+審訊不設陪審團，由3名國安法指定法官陳慶偉、李運騰及陳仲衡審理。控方代表為副刑事檢控專員萬德豪及周天行，辯方代表包括資深大律師潘熙、大律師沈士文、張耀良、黃宇逸、關文渭、馬維騉、盧敏儀、石書銘、黃廷光、Trevor Beel 等，本身是大律師的劉偉聰則自辯。
+
+不認罪被告包括獲准保釋的鄭達鴻、楊雪盈、彭卓棋、何啟明、劉偉聰、黃碧雲、施德來、陳志全、柯耀林、李予信10人，及還柙的何桂藍、吳政亨、鄒家成、林卓廷、梁國雄及余慧明6人。
+
+列席的認罪被告今續被帶到延伸庭觀看直播。
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-17-risk-great-power-competition.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-17-risk-great-power-competition.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..8d8b285f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-17-risk-great-power-competition.md
@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Risk Great Power Competition
+author: Peter C. Combe II, et al.
+date : 2023-02-17 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/jtSlZWQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+In the Future . . .
+
+- Integrated deterrence and active campaigning will create new planning requirements for the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD). Great power competition and efforts to achieve a position of advantage short of triggering dangerous military confrontations will push the DOD to explore alternative methods for assessing risk to force and risk to mission.
+
+- The national defense community will view risks as interdependent and adjust contingency plans according to real-time changes in the global security environment. A new risk assessment methodology that accounts for changing circumstances, uncertainty, and interdependent risks will enable the DOD to understand how militarized disputes and crises in one theater of operations create additional risks in other theaters.
+
+- These new approaches to globally integrated campaigning will integrate Bayesian reasoning and data science to modernize strategic analysis. The DOD will better integrate human capital, technological, and procedural improvements that embrace probabilistic and inductive reasoning. A Bayesian approach to risk assessment and communication will allow policymakers to view risk globally and holistically while having real-time updates to risk assessments that help combatant commanders determine how to reallocate resources across combatant commands (CCMDs) and invest in new capabilities.
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+Between the spring of 2021 and winter of 2022, Russian military forces began to mass combat troops along Ukraine’s eastern border. In anticipation of a “potential imminent crisis,” U.S. European Command (EUCOM) increased intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. During the same timeframe, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) increased the number of aerial incursions into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone to occur on a near daily basis — raising tensions regionally, particularly with the United States. These simultaneous crisis events present the DOD with unique strategic and operational questions: How do ongoing crises change operational plans? When should DOD leadership — from planners in Central Command (CENTCOM) managing a portfolio of options for countering Iran, to teams in U.S. Forces Korea seeking to deter North Korea — adjust their risk assessments?
+
+___`This edition of the On Future War series proposes a new methodology for risk assessment in defense planning. The brief argues that adapting Bayesian reasoning and proven data science methods and concepts to defense planning can help policymakers and planners better assess the risks arising from globally integrated operations. Seeing integrated deterrence and active campaigning in terms of a set of interdependent and continuous risks and opportunities will allow planners to better calibrate operations, activities, and investments in great power competition.`___
+
+Modern military planning differentiates between crisis and contingency planning. Based on strategic direction, including documents such as the National Military Strategy and National Defense Strategy, the Joint Staff prepares the Joint Strategic Campaign Plan, which outlines priorities for CCMD contingency plans, including what potential crises to focus on and how often to update plans. Since these plans are bets about hypothetical futures, they tend to be isolated, static, and deterministic “what if” propositions. During a crisis, the military profession pulls a contingency plan off the shelf and adapts its assumptions about the threat and environment to changing circumstances. This process often includes the Joint Staff convening forums such as a “tank” and soliciting input from service chiefs and CCMDs to codify risk. The process allows the plan to be updated with new information as it is translated into a set of orders for approval by the secretary of defense. However, these updates are generally focused on a single contingency plan or crisis rather than a family of contingency plans, and they occur in an ad hoc manner driven by operational timelines rather than a holistic, data-driven examination of the new operating environment.
+
+The problem the U.S. military faces with respect to risk is not with crisis planning but in how, when, and why to adjust contingency plans. At present, most contingency plans are updated in two-year cycles and, even then, often in isolation of larger changes in the global security environment. Plans exist as massive Word and PowerPoint files with Excel annexes that are disconnected from large data pools tracking changes to the military balance and force posture. As a result, the current DOD risk assessment methodology with respect to contingency planning is hampered by three primary weaknesses in global integrated campaigning:
+
+1. Risks identified during contingency planning are often viewed as isolated or discrete rather than interdependent. This weakness prevents the DOD from assessing and communicating to decisionmakers how changes in the likelihood of one driver of risk can impact other drivers across a portfolio of contingency plans.
+
+2. Assessments in contingency plans tend to be static — updated in isolation every two years — rather than dynamic. This weakness means that DOD risk assessments are not updated as circumstances change or as new information is collected, leaving decisionmakers behind the curve as they update plans often loaded with outdated assessments during a crisis. Someone has to update those massive PowerPoint and Word files to adapt an often two-year-old assessment of risk into a set of viable options for using military force to achieve political objectives, often in crisis environments prone to condensed timelines, friction, and uncertainty.
+
+3. Planners identify risk to force and risk to mission within a contingency plan using a single deterministic approach to probability. DOD risk assessment methodology used in contingency planning and to support global military integration fails to communicate dissenting views and weaknesses in underlying information or models, leaving decisionmakers with a distorted view of the real likelihood of a threat or hazard’s occurrence.
+
+In contrast to a crisis, where the Joint Chiefs of Staff and combatant commanders weigh in and adjust risk assessments, contingency planning tends to treat each risk as isolated, discrete, and deterministic. In a defense strategy driven by multiple, global campaigns seeking to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage, it is untenable to rely on the two-year planning update cycle or wait for a new crisis to update a risk assessment. Instead, active campaigning requires a constant reframing of key assumptions that captures the temporal component of risks identified during planning as they compound, wane, or accrue to new stakeholders over time. As the world changes, the plan should adapt. Furthermore, even when an emerging military crisis isn’t linked to a specific contingency plan, military planners can adapt risk assessments associated with a family of campaign plans involving the same adversary to tailor their response and manage escalation.
+
+> Active campaigning requires a constant reframing of key assumptions that captures the temporal component of risks identified during planning as they compound, wane, or accrue to new stakeholders over time. As the world changes, the plan should adapt.
+
+Sometimes new problems call for old solutions. An eighteenth-century idea about induction and probability — Bayes’ theorem — can help the DOD rethink how it approaches assessing risk in twenty-first-century global competition. Defense enterprise and military professionals can follow many other domains of practice — from insurance and finance to artificial intelligence and machine learning — and integrate Bayesian probabilistic reasoning into the DOD decisionmaking and planning processes. This brief will map out how to make this change. First, the brief will examine the current risk assessment methodology prevalent not just in the DOD but across the military profession. Second, the brief will define the core concepts inherent in a Bayesian approach to rethinking risk. Finally, the brief will specify key changes the DOD can make to bring its planning and decisionmaking processes into the twenty-first century.
+
+
+### Current DOD Risk Assessment Methodology
+
+The DOD’s Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning (JCIC) envisions a security environment in which the United States constantly competes with adversarial great powers and near-peer competitors. This competition takes place along a continuum of actions in which the DOD will often play a supporting role to other elements of U.S. national power. However, rather than seek “victory,” the JCIC identifies that victory is ephemeral — or indeed nonexistent — because states compete for a position of advantage vis-à-vis their adversaries. Absent a strategic goal of regime change, the adversary will do the same. Thus, there is no end to a campaign of competition, only the continued search for windows of opportunity to advance interests short of war. This idea of substituting competition for war is an old idea in the deterrence literature.
+
+In this environment, risk assessment is central to understanding the potential gains and negative outcomes from the DOD and other agencies’ competitive actions. The need to clearly understand the potential gains and losses of a particular action is central to making the decision to assume risk. However, this decision is complicated when the risk assumption is not discrete and must instead consider the effects of past actions, the impacts of and to other stakeholders in the integrated campaign, and the potential consequences for future actions. For example, when crisis response necessitates shifting large ammunition stockpiles to a partner such as Ukraine and increases the number of forward-deployed troops in Europe, it impacts contingency plans to respond to Iranian aggression even if that contingency planning is not due for an update for another year. This creates a dangerous lag in which plans tend not to be updated until either the formal process or a new crisis beckons.
+
+In addition to this bureaucratic dilemma, there is a larger philosophical limitation to how the U.S. military profession approaches risk. The overarching approach to risk assessment within the DOD is governed by three interrelated variables: the likelihood that a threat or hazard will occur, the severity of the threat or hazard, and whether the potential gains of a course of action outweighs the risks. The DOD’s risk assessment methodology begins with the identification of a threat or hazard. An assessor uses their intuition, rather than a systematic method, to guide the identification of risks. Once a threat or hazard is identified, an assessor defines the probability that the hazard will occur and the severity of the resulting outcome. The DOD relies on a subjective approach to assess the likelihood of an event, which is then converted into one of four probability levels, with set levels of certainty ranging from very unlikely (~0–20 percent) to very likely (~81 to 100 percent) Once this probability is established, the assessor seeks to identify the severity of potential harm using four consequence levels ranging from minor to extreme. In combining these two metrics, the DOD formulation allows for an expression of risk. Upon identifying and assessing all risks, an assessor recommends mitigation measures to either avoid risk by forgoing a course of action or control risk by implementing controls to decrease the probability or severity of occurrence. After implementing mitigation measures, the assessor is left with the residual risk. This remaining risk allows an assessor to state the overall risk of an activity or operation, which the DOD defines as either the highest remaining individual residual risk or an undefined composite of remaining residual risk.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 1: Generic Risk Contour.__ Source: [U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Risk Analysis Methodology, CJCSM 3105.01A (Washington, DC: Joint Staff, October 2021), B-6, Fig. 5](www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/Manuals/CJCSM%203105.01A.pdf)._
+
+This approach to risk during contingency planning is flawed in three ways. First, each threat or hazard tends to be viewed independently of other risks to military operations or U.S. strategy. Until a crisis, events in Ukraine and Taiwan — much less requirements to support allies from Japan to Israel — are treated separately by planners. While a forward-thinking commander can order a review of their portfolio of contingency plans relative to an emerging global crisis such as Ukraine, the underlying risk assessment methodology and bureaucratic process for updating plans makes such action the exception, not the rule.
+
+Further complicating assessments, risks are also not tied to positive outcomes, which undermines the ability of contingency planners to assess whether to accept or forego the risk. Contemporary defense planning lacks a clear understanding of opportunity costs and should shift from cost-benefit analysis (i.e., marginal analysis) to seeing decisions in terms of risks and opportunities (i.e., return on assets). Even if these tried-and-true concepts are applied during crisis response, the underlying contingency plans do not see risk in these terms and tend to treat isolated risks as something to be mitigated as opposed to assumed relative to a gain. Absent a concept of opportunities for relative advantage, this tendency can create a bias for plans that are risk averse. As a result, policymakers walk into a crisis with a more limited menu of options. For example, they are hampered in their ability to assess whether the potential gain of arming Ukraine in repelling Russian aggression is outweighed by risk from depletion of munitions stocks in the event of a crisis involving Taiwan, or whether shifting personnel and resources to arming Kyiv with Patriots impacts contingency plans to defend air bases against Iranian missile strikes.
+
+DOD risk assessments also tend to be static. Risk is assessed on an annual basis through a variety of boards, bureaus, working groups, and cells as part of the risk assessment of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as the annual Global Force Management process. However, there is no formal, systematic, and comprehensive process to update risk assessments as force allocations change or as new global threats emerge outside of a crisis. This may leave policymakers with a distorted view of events, such as China’s willingness or potential success in using lethal force to reunify with Taiwan in light of Russia’s relatively dismal performance, or how Iran might alter its use of proxies to challenge U.S. allies in the Middle East.
+
+> Contingency plans detail isolated (i.e., independent) assessments of risk as snapshots of a probable future (i.e., discrete, as opposed to continuous) absent a discussion of opportunities and uncertainty.
+
+Finally, the DOD methodology takes an artificially deterministic approach to risk, seeking to assign a percentage probability to a threat or hazard’s occurrence without properly accounting for uncertainty. This leaves policymakers with a single dimension of risk likelihood, without an understanding of where information might be lacking on Russian or Chinese capabilities or morale, or whether there are dissenting opinions among analysts that could contribute to a more robust understanding. The net result is that contingency plans detail isolated (i.e., independent) assessments of risk as snapshots of a probable future (i.e., discrete, as opposed to continuous) absent a discussion of opportunities and uncertainty. This approach creates additional burdens during crisis response and limits a more adaptable approach to active campaigning and managing global force posture along the lines required by integrated deterrence.
+
+
+### Weakness 1: Risks Are Isolated and Discrete, Not Interdependent
+
+As outlined above, contingency plans view each risk as independent of all others. Even though “comprehensive” risk pictures are presented to decisionmakers during a crisis and the current risk assessment methodology emphasizes the importance of identifying risks across services and CCMDs, each threat or hazard is still assessed and presented independently during planning. However, risk probabilities can be highly interdependent. Within the DOD, risks can be present across CCMDs or affect multiple interagency partners. Events in Ukraine and Taiwan are not seen as related by planners, even though the consequences of military escalation in either affects military planning and force posture in the other. Additionally, new domains present new challenges. Cyberspace operations targeting a rival in one state may spill over into civilian networks in the same state or in neighboring states. This isolated view of risk is incongruent with the nature of contemporary military operations and defense planning.
+
+A wide range of industries and professions have made the leap to seeing risk as interdependent. From pandemics altering supply chains, to a war in Ukraine affecting food prices in Africa, interdependent risks have affected the entire world over the last three years. Yet, the DOD and its current planning framework isolate risk assessments (e.g., risk to force and risk to mission) and struggle to visualize and describe global risk in a real-time manner that supports active campaigning and global contingency planning.
+
+
+### Weakness 2: Assessments Are Static, Not Dynamic
+
+The risk assessment of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs is provided to Congress for any risks the chairman identifies as “significant” or “high.” However, this is a snapshot taken on an annual basis to satisfy a congressional reporting requirement. Similarly, during regular on-cycle reviews of CCMD contingency plans, there is a static and discrete risk assessment presented to inform the secretary of defense’s decision to approve or execute the contingency plan. While the DOD’s risk analysis methodology seeks to assess risk across various timelines, this is in relation to different functions and is still presented as a snapshot at a given time. Changes in U.S. or adversary domestic political circumstances or adversarial behaviors may change the actual probability that an event will occur as well as the combatant commander’s understanding of the likelihood of an event’s occurrence. U.S. actions in the CENTCOM area of operations may change the way China views the costs and benefits of military action against Taiwan on a timeline that renders a plan out of date by the time the natural two-year update cycle rolls around. A decisionmaker may be more apt to accept the potential of a negative outcome of U.S. involvement in Ukraine if, for instance, new or updated assessments indicate that Russia has depleted its stocks of precision-guided munitions and is thus expected to be less militarily effective. Changes occurring from internal DOD processes, such as modifications to the Secretary of Defense Orders Book (SDOB) or to the allocation of resources, and changed actions and perceptions of threat actors continuously affect risk calculations.
+
+Two components of risk in particular demand consistent updating, as risk assessments are perishable and have an indeterminate temporal component, after which their accuracy or relevance degrades. First, the understanding of the likelihood of a risk will change over time. Increased information can lead to a refined understanding of the probability that a threat or hazard will occur, a concept that is critical to a proper application of Bayesian probability. Changed circumstances may also impact the actual probability of a threat or hazard’s occurrence. Second, as time progresses, uncertainty about an event decreases. While uncertainty never goes to zero, the reduction in uncertainty should alter risk assessments in a dynamic manner. This applies as much to planning as it does to crisis response. A plan to defend a non-treaty ally from cruise missile strikes by China should adjust its risk assessment when estimates of stockpiles or the known accuracy of PLA capabilities change. In fact, much like traders at hedge funds, it is conceivable that planners could set thresholds in their plans triggered by events that force a review of the contingency plan. After all, contingency plans are similar to the investment portfolios insurance companies use to ensure they have enough capital to pay out claims in the event of a major crisis. If those firms fail to shift their portfolios as estimates about the impact of climate change on flood and storm damage became more certain, they risk bankruptcy.
+
+
+### Weakness 3: Risks Are Assessed Using a Single, Deterministic Approach to Probability
+
+The DOD’s methodology assesses risk on a single dimension of likelihood, one which does not leave room for uncertainty or communicate the potential gaps or weaknesses in assessment methods or underlying information. For the purposes of global campaigning, joint risk assessments express likelihood using a pseudo-deterministic percentage that a risk will occur. The risk assessor uses their intuition to assess how likely a risk is to occur and then, using a formulistic process, converts that intuition into a percentage likelihood. This gives the false impression of statistical rigor and the sense that an event will occur a certain percentage of the time. This method does not express all the ways that the likelihood of a risk could be assessed and does not include a component to deal with uncertainty. Bayesian theory provides a means to assess the probability of a risk’s occurrence in deterministic, probabilistic, and uncertain environments by leveraging known information and applying experience in conjunction with data analysis to extrapolate the likelihood of an event in the future.
+
+Viewing risks as independent constrains the DOD’s ability to assess the merits and drawbacks of a range of contingency plans across multiple CCMDs. For instance, as the United States provides arms and equipment to Ukraine, including anti-air and coastal defense systems, several interdependent risks are present. The risk of escalation with Russia may present new risks to contingency plans linked to defending a NATO ally in the event that Russian strikes target incoming military supply shipments from Poland. Iran’s recent provision of lethal unmanned aerial systems to Russia also lends a horizontal escalation element to the conflict that creates cascading risk across geographically aligned contingency plans. For example, is Iran more or less confident in their swarming munitions based on their use in Ukraine? And how does it affect their willingness to use military force to achieve their military objectives in the Middle East? Understanding the ways in which these risks are interdependent is critical to maintaining a more viable set of updated contingency plans that reflects changes to the security environment in a more dynamic, as opposed to static, manner.
+
+As bets about possible futures, static risk assessments fail to account for changing circumstances. As Chinese officials observe the Russian invasion of Ukraine, it is unclear what lessons the PLA is learning or what adjustments they might make to operational plans to reunify Taiwan with mainland China. One significant event that will change Beijing’s operational plans is Taiwan’s defense minister indicating that Taiwan should mirror image the Ukrainian resistance in the face of any PLA invasion. Furthermore, while there are no indications that China has provided weapons to Russia, it has enabled Russia to evade economic sanctions and permitted large cargo aircraft to ship hundreds of tons of unspecified “e-commerce and clothing goods” to Russia. With Taiwan learning from the Ukrainian resistance and China potentially depleting its munitions to assist Russia, an accurate risk assessment in contingency planning with respect to Chinese military action in East Asia must be updated with each new piece of information. Planners can no longer afford to wait two years to assess their plans. Worse still, the DOD cannot expect its planners to provide dynamic assessments if its “program of record” for planning remains a bundle of programs such as PowerPoint and Word that leave the military professional downloading large files as opposed to linking data points across documents and running background applications analyzing risk relative to changes in the security environment.
+
+Similarly, risk assessments must both analyze and communicate known and unknown factors to defense leaders. Foreign actors’ perceptions and intentions are notoriously difficult to assess, particularly in authoritarian states. As a result, understanding Chinese escalation thresholds or assessing Chinese willingness to invade Taiwan, as opposed to using other coercive means of reunification, is nearly impossible with any certainty. As a result, risk communication to policymakers should not be presented in terms of “Chinese horizontal escalation in the Straits of Luzon is X percent likely.” Rather, risk communication should be presented as: “We assess Chinese horizontal escalation in the Straits of Luzon is X percent likely. However, we do not understand the decisionmaking process between the Chinese Communist Party Politburo, the uniformed officers of the Central Military Commission, and President Xi and see this decision as altering the escalation threshold.” Sadly, such qualifications tend to be treated as equivocating by a profession trained to see risk as deterministic. What appears as bureaucratic doublespeak is actually an attempt to quantify uncertainty and update forecasts as new information becomes available that replicates key aspects of Bayes’ theorem.
+
+
+### A Bayesian Risk Framework
+
+Reverend Thomas Bayes was an eighteenth-century English Presbyterian minister who postulated a method to ascertain the probability of an event given knowledge of related evidence and assumptions about related events. Bayes’ theorem was published posthumously in his Essay Towards Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances in 1763. Bayes’ theorem is essentially a wager on the relationship between two observed events that seeks to determine the probability of event A occurring when observing event B. In order to inform this wager, the theorem uses assumptions about event B’s occurrence when observing event A and prior evidence of event A’s occurrence independent of any other factor. These are termed “priors,” or “prior probability.” The theorem also uses observed evidence about event B’s occurrence independent of other factors to help inform any relationship between events A and B (termed a “marginal probability”). The result after observation is a “posterior probability,” which is updated to reflect new evidence and conditions as they occur. Applied to modern defense, military planners can integrate assumptions such as how arming Ukraine alters underlying assessments of the security environment in contingency plans linked to China and Iran.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 2: Formula for Bayes’ Theorem.___
+
+A Bayesian concept for risk assessment would incorporate three conceptual underpinnings supported by a suite of new capabilities, competencies, and organizational structures. Probability theory will primarily focus on implementation of the Bayesian concept of probabilistic likelihood in the face of uncertainty. Probability theory involves the assessment of the likelihood of an event’s occurrence using a combination of statistical analysis, holistic expert input, and real-time or near-real-time sampling and updating. In applying these concepts, probability theory can help implement the Bayesian approach to using current knowledge or evidence to model outcomes under relatively known circumstances, extrapolate to reasonably well-understood circumstances, and provide resilient decisionmaking ability in the face of unknown circumstances. In other words, contingency plans could be updated and refined continuously as circumstances change.
+
+Decision theory will support a dynamic and interdependent understanding of risk. Decision theory involves the weighing of potential risks and opportunities in an operational context to provide support to friendly decisionmaking and an assessment of potential adversary decisionmaking. This capability would support greater understanding of adversaries’ competing interests in making risk management and assumption decisions as well as the ability to better assess risks and opportunities across both geographic and functional CCMDs. If updating contingency planning to reflect probabilistic reasoning provides a logic of change, incorporating decision theory translates these insights into a means of evaluating potential courses of action alongside branches and sequels.
+
+Finally, data science can assist with all three aspects of Bayesian risk assessment: seeing the world as probabilistic, dynamic, and prone to interdependence. Investing in human capital to conduct data analysis and build basic models alongside truly digitizing the defense enterprise would enable a range of novel applications. It would allow planners to set alerts in their contingency plans that help notify them to revisit key assumptions and risk estimates. For example, if a contingency plan in CENTCOM assumes the ability to deploy Patriot air defense battalions to defend key air bases on short notice, a planner could set a trigger to alter them if any event indicates there will be a change in the available number of Patriot battalions and munitions. More importantly, the Joint Staff would be able to see risks to global force posture across allocation tables in multiple contingency plans. By digitizing planning and creating a data infrastructure that allows cross-contingency plan queries, the DOD can overcome the challenge of isolated, discrete, and deterministic risk assessments.
+
+
+### Strength 1: Risks Are Assessed and Communicated Using Multiple Dimensions of Likelihood
+
+Risk probability can be expressed in multiple ways, with alternative approaches better suited to different circumstances. A deterministic or frequentist approach may be appropriate for events where there is a large sample size with data coming from multiple sources in which a reasonable understanding of likelihood can be ascertained. In situations that are prone to uncertainty and less frequent, like the war in Ukraine, different approaches to assessing risk are required.
+
+When data sets are less robust and the likelihood of an event is less certain, a Bayesian probability assessment provides a preferable model for risk assessment. A Bayesian approach to risk assessment would be probabilistic and would assess the likelihood of an event’s occurrence based on historical evidence and extrapolation to future or unknown circumstances. This approach has the benefit of being based on knowledge and analysis of past events while accounting for uncertainty. The strength of a Bayesian approach to probability is that it provides a means to assess the likelihood of a future outcome or event without robust prior information. This contrasts with a frequentist approach to probability, which extrapolates the future likelihood of an outcome or event based solely upon past observations.
+
+A comprehensive risk framework should also account for uncertainty by taking a holistic view of the system in which risks occur. To deal with the inherent uncertainty involved with assessing risks in complex systems years in the future, a holistic view that constantly reframes risks should be adopted to build a resilient and responsive system. Holistic approaches have been developed in dealing with financial markets, including a number of adaptations to deal with the 2007–08 financial crisis, which resulted in part from attempts to suppress uncertainty. One author has also advocated an approach that embraces uncertainty in weather forecasting to model operational risk related to DOD flight operations. The value of embracing a holistic approach in uncertain environments is the ability to trust expertise or intuition in situations that are complex or in which data is lacking by simplifying and quantifying decisionmaking processes. Applied to Ukraine, a Bayesian approach would allow decisionmakers to track their “bets” about outcomes in the conflict and the conflict’s relationship to other contingencies, adjusting the risk estimates as new information becomes available.
+
+
+### Strength 2: Risk Assessments Are Dynamic through Constant, Near-Real-Time-Updating
+
+A Bayesian methodology would be dynamic, as updated sampling and real-time integration of new evidence would change the theoretical assessment of an event’s likelihood of occurrence. In essence, the Bayesian assumptions change with every observation, and “prior” observations and forecast probability are updated with “posterior” probabilities. With Ukraine, as battlefield events occur, a Bayesian model would adjust risk assessments and help global contingency planners beyond Europe adjust to new circumstances. For example, as Russia fires more cruise missiles at the Ukrainian electric grid, there may be a lower probability of horizontal escalation and Moscow pursuing military operations against Japan in the disputed Northern Territories.
+
+
+### Strength 3: Risk Models Are Interdependent within and across Organizations
+
+Finally, a Bayesian approach can assess correlation among drivers of risk, identifying where those drivers are interdependent. This approach to risk assessment and communication would incorporate three primary capabilities as components of a Bayesian approach to risk assessment — probability theory, decision theory, and data science — supported by new organizational structures and processes to increase collaboration among stakeholders. It would also ensure continuous updating as circumstances change or new information becomes available. This Bayesian approach to risk assessment would enable a better understanding of risks vis-à-vis potential benefits across CCMDs and the non- DOD federal departments and agencies required to implement globally integrated campaigning. This will enable policymakers to better weigh options, such as the choice between overt DOD assistance to Ukraine or a plan to provide clandestine or covert paramilitary and targeting support through special operations forces or non-defense agencies.
+
+
+### Policy Implications
+
+Based on the insights provided by Bayesian risk assessments, in the future . . .
+
+- Defense planners will be able to leverage prior observations and real-time data to better weigh the risks and rewards of potential military action around the globe.
+
+- The DOD will invest in human capital and create a workforce literate in data science that can harness new information and Bayesian analysis to better understand changing security environments.
+
+- Cross-functional teams — leveraging multiple disciplines and including interagency partners as well as allies — will be created to execute periodic risk audits using Bayesian techniques to help the DOD visualize and describe the distribution of risk across its portfolios of contingency plans.
+
+
+### Real-Time Updating and Holistic Risk Communication
+
+The DOD is awash with initiatives to improve its data practices, though not all have been successful — and the growing pains have at times been messy. These efforts include components of cloud computing, artificial intelligence, command and control (C2), and cybersecurity. What has been missing is a specific process or capability against which to apply those tools. Risk analysis and communication is one such area where “big data analytics” provides promise.
+
+In this vein, dynamic risk assessments should include a methodology to update those assessments as new information is collected. Risk assessments should include a combination of real-time or near-real-time updating as new data is generated or forces are deployed, as well as regular assessments of key drivers of risk for ongoing operations. Risk assessments should provide clear timelines for the sources of risk assessed or expiration timelines for the assessment.
+
+Interdependent risk assessments should leverage cross-functional and interorganizational teams to strive for consensus in risk assessments, but any dissenting opinions should be captured as qualifications to the overall assessment and presented to the approval authority. Risk assessments as part of both operational plans, concepts of operations at the CCMD level, and SDOB requests at the DOD level should articulate when risks are interdependent, how one or more drivers of risk are likely to change given the range of potential outcomes from an operation, and when risks are correlated but data is insufficient or otherwise fails to support interdependence. Where models provide for correlation but causality is weak or uncertain, risk assessments should seek to offer alternative hypotheses as to the cause(s) or relationships between various drivers of risk. Finally, probabilistic assessment supports, and is supported by, an understanding of interdependence and requires dynamic updating to provide maximum utility. The DOD should retain past assessments and update its data and models as information becomes available or circumstances change.
+
+Risk assessments should be informed by a combination of objective analysis and multidisciplinary subjective analysis using well-structured tasks and cues. Risk assessments should employ numerical language to describe the probability of an event’s occurrence. However, those numerical values should not be framed in deterministic terms. This can contribute to a false understanding, for instance, that a 50 percent likelihood of an event means that it will happen half the time; in reality, such a likelihood indicates a 50 percent bet that an event may occur half the time, based upon current information and understanding.
+
+As a result of this inherent uncertainty in probabilistic reasoning, risk assessments should present the approval authority with any weaknesses or uncertainty in the underlying evidence, data, or models.
+
+
+### Enhance Human Capital
+
+To fully implement a Bayesian approach to risk assessment, the DOD should pursue capabilities in three areas. These capabilities should be introduced conceptually at intermediate-level Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) and addressed in detail at senior-level JPME. Specific billets should require additional skill identifiers tied to data science that would be provided in formal short courses (two to four weeks in duration). The DOD and services should also incentivize attaining those skill identifiers, as well as demonstrated proficiency in data analytics, in a manner similar to diver or parachutist pay and foreign-language proficiency.
+
+Intermediate-level JPME is designed to educate future staff officers at the Joint Task Force (JTF) and CCMD level. These officers should have a basic understanding of probability theory, decision theory, and data science to support risk assessment and communication. This will better enable them to work with their counterparts across the DOD and with other federal departments and agencies to understand risk interdependence.
+
+Senior-level JPME is meant to educate officers who will serve as primary staff advisers to the JTF and combatant commanders. These primary staff officers must be well versed in communicating risk — including the weaknesses or lack of information within risk assessments. These officers should have a thorough knowledge of risk assessment methodologies and, perhaps more importantly, communicate to policymakers what those models can and cannot forecast about risk.
+
+Developing and incentivizing a cadre of military professionals who understand data science has the potential to revolutionize military planning. Rather than generalizing from old staff estimates and military theory to develop courses of action, personnel can augment their craft with more inductive approaches — integrating new data and bets about an uncertain future — to calibrate their assessments about underlying risks and opportunities in a plan. Seeing risk and opportunity inductively and prone to constant change will provide policymakers with a more dynamic understanding of the security environment that accounts for uncertainty and complexity.
+
+
+### Cross-Functional Teams and Outside Expertise
+
+The Joint Staff should implement cross-functional teams (CFTs) leveraging expertise from multiple disciplines and external government agencies to support a holistic view of risks within the command. The CCMD designated as the Global Coordinating Authority (GCA) should chair a standing interagency CFT to review and assess risk for the family of plans for which it is the proponent. In the Ukraine scenario, the Joint Staff should enable a CFT chaired by EUCOM that includes representation from other necessary geographic and functional CCMDs, the DOD, the Department of State’s Russia and Ukraine country teams, the Central Intelligence Agency, and all other departments that are components of the National Security Council. In the Ukraine scenario, EUCOM’s CFTs should also include NATO, Ukrainian, policy, and other Baltic state representatives, as well as experts from private institutions (e.g., think tanks and academia) and federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs). In the case of U.S. federal departments and international allies and partners, this CFT will not be a purely consultative body on the topic of risk; each should act as a sort of liaison to the relevant parent organization to maximize shared understanding and decision speed and quality. This type of CFT will enable risk assessments to address unknown circumstances and support the application of both probability and decision theory models.
+
+The GCAs should develop a series of planning baselines for their assigned problem sets to better inform globally integrated planning. This will enable unified campaigns across CCMD geographic and functional responsibilities. Such planning baselines should include, at a minimum, an assessment of the range of adversary courses of action. The GCAs should also provide prioritized contingency plan objectives to guide CCMD-supporting campaign objectives. This will enable combatant commanders to better weigh risks and benefits when making decisions.
+
+Finally, the CCMDs and GCAs should seek input from external experts such as non-defense federal departments and agencies and FFRDCs to assist in understanding and assessing interorganizational risks. Possible fora to provide this input could take the form of liaison personnel between the CCMD and NDFDA, in addition to regular consultative bodies at the action officer, directorate, and chief of staff/deputy commander level — all with a view toward incorporating external risk perspectives into the DOD’s risk assessment model.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+A Bayesian approach to risk assessment can mitigate the weaknesses in current DOD risk assessment methodology through the integration of three mutually supporting concepts. Bayesian risk assessment begins with a probabilistic approach and is supported by analysis of known data, extrapolation to reasonably known circumstances, and holistic expert perspectives to address uncertainty. This probabilistic approach should account for both intra- and interorganizational risk dependence as well as identify correlated risks where the data either does not support — or is insufficient to indicate — an interrelationship. In addition, this probabilistic approach should be supported by dynamic assessments to account for new information, which can impact both the actual and understood likelihood of an event, as well as address decreasing uncertainty as time progresses.
+
+The DOD should adopt a suite of capabilities and processes to implement this Bayesian approach. Probability theory supports all three aspects of Bayesian inference. Decision theory, supported by a combination of technical tools and human capital, can assist in weighing risks against opportunities and understanding potential adversary actions. Finally, data science and near-real-time analytics will enable an improved understanding and communication of risks.
+
+These functional capabilities should be supported by collaboration within and among the CCMDs, GCAs, and the Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense. DOD components should also collaborate with other stakeholders, such as NDFDAs and coalition partners, as well as with relevant subject matter experts. Finally, risk assessments should communicate both the inherent strengths and weaknesses of the data and models upon which they are based. As the data and models improve, risk assessments and assessment methodologies should be updated in near real time.
+
+Incorporating this suite of capabilities, structures, and processes will enable a more accurate risk assessment methodology within the DOD. This Bayesian process is necessary to provide accurate and relevant risk assessments in support of globally integrated campaigning and to support informed risk decisions.
+
+---
+
+__Peter C. Combe II__ is currently assigned as the branch head, Community Plans and Innovation Branch, Judge Advocate Division, Headquarters Marine Corps. He is a graduate of the School of Advanced Warfighting (2022), the Marine Corps Command & Staff College – Resident Course (2021), and the Army Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School (2015).
+
+__Benjamin Jensen__ is the senior fellow for future war, gaming, and strategy in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C., and a professor at the School of Advanced Warfighting at the Marine Corps University.
+
+__Adrian Bogart__ is a research assistant with the International Security Program at CSIS.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-17-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-10.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-17-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-10.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..f179a103
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-17-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-10.md
@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第十日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-02-17 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 九東僅一人不認罪仍播論壇全片 控方指會引「共謀者原則」舉證
+- 重溫港島論壇徐子見被問年紀大 回應稱「有少少年齡歧視」 庭上多人大笑
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，16人否認「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，今（17日）踏入審訊第10天。控方繼續播放各區初選論壇片段，其中在九龍東選區，6名參加者只有施德來一人不認罪，法官李運騰問及控方播片目的，是僅依賴被告言論作為指控他本人的證據，抑或會使用「共謀者原則」，即同時依賴其他被告的言論作檢控。主控周天行表示會引用「共謀者原則」，但未有指出針對各被告的證據，並指會在完成控方案情前交代。庭上片段中，不認罪施德來表明要入議會「攬炒政府」，認罪的快必譚得志、譚文豪等亦表明要否決財政預算案爭取五大訴求。
+
+此外，列席的認罪被告今續被帶到兩個延伸庭觀看直播，其中岑敖暉、袁嘉蔚、吳敏兒和譚凱邦4人在2號延伸庭，另有被告在1號延伸庭，惟因該庭不設記者席，現場輪候的公眾人數亦不足，最終沒有公眾獲准入內旁聽。
+
+#### 官問會否用「共謀者原則」 着控方若依賴其他被告言行需說明
+
+區諾軒昨就籌辦初選論壇的過程作供，提及戴耀廷提議找《蘋果日報》等媒體合資格作，最終6場論壇均在《蘋果日報》大樓舉辦。控方昨播放九龍西初選論壇片段，區諾軒確認流程與其安排吻合。控方問他會否記起曾否出席該論壇，區說「唔確切，但我有肯定我有出席大部分嘅論壇」，有被告發笑。
+
+控方今續播放2020年6月26日九龍東初選論壇片段，播片前要求區諾軒認出所有參加者，包括李嘉達、胡志偉、譚文豪、黃之鋒、譚得志和施德來，其中僅施德來為不認罪被告。
+
+
+▲ 施德來（右）
+
+法官李運騰在播片前指，留意到九龍東論壇只有施德來是不認罪，並指昨日播放九龍西片段時忘記問控方，播放論壇片段時是否僅依賴被告言論作為指控他本人的證據，抑或會使用「共謀者原則」，即同時依賴其他被告的言論。主控周天行回應，會依賴被告言論指控他本人，至於「共謀者原則」的問題，他一度停下與身旁的主控萬德豪商量，稱稍後回覆。
+
+李運騰續指，控方應在完成控方案情前，對在「共謀者原則」下依賴什麼證據表達清晰的立場，辯方才能作出及時的反對，重申辯方有權知道控方到底會依賴其他被告的什麼言行作檢控，法庭或需就此作裁決。周天行回應會引用「共謀者原則」，並將在案情完結前識別出針對每名被告的證據，讓法庭清楚控方的檢控基礎。代表施德來的大律師表示，當提及該議題時，辯方會及時回應。
+
+#### 施德來稱要有「全面攬炒決心」、承諾兩次否決預算案
+
+控方其後播放長74分鐘的九龍東論壇片段，其中施德來指，《國安法》是中共要打壓港人爭取民主自由的決心，直言「共產黨係信唔過嘅」、「今日嘅中共，我哋冇討論嘅空間，冇談判嘅餘地」，「入到議會裏面，我哋大家都要否決財政預算案，大家都要否決政府所有議案，同呢個政府抗爭到底，攬炒呢個政府，因為真正攬炒香港嘅就係林鄭，就係呢一個中共，所以我哋香港人一定要抗爭到底。」施德來邊看片段邊點頭。
+
+嘉賓曾志豪問施德來，如前民協主席馮檢基想參選，會向他說什麼，施表示「馮檢基，如果你要選呢，就要參加初選，唔參加初選嘅馮檢基，我會叫佢唔好選」，又指「唔參加初選你肯定唔係35+嘅一員，肯定唔係同路人」。
+
+被問民協如何擺脫「又傾又砌」的脫節形象，施則重申「今日嘅民協入到議會裏面，我哋一定會兩次否決《財政預算案》，入到議會裏面，今日係要抗爭，唔抗爭嘅就行開」，又表明「35+要一個全面攬炒嘅決心」，最後稱「今日嘅民協同香港人同行，我唔怕DQ，唔怕攬炒，請你重新認識民協，相信民協」。
+
+
+▲ 左起：譚文豪、黃之鋒、李嘉達、譚得志、施德來、胡志偉
+
+#### 快必稱入議會衝撞抗爭、否決財案癱瘓政府
+
+其餘5名出席者均是認罪被告。其中快必譚得志表示議會需要「更加辣，更加衝撞，更加抗爭」的人，「邊個好打、邊個夠辣嘅就入立法會」，「絕地還拖」；又表明會「兩次否決財政預算案、癱瘓個政府、林鄭柒婆落台，嚟到做 bargaining power，爭取五大訴求，缺一不可」，即使全民派樓、派十萬也反對，有被告發笑。
+
+快必亦屢提及不認罪被告慢必陳志全，指陳因「遺臭萬年水」而被罰十多萬；又指進入議會不止「打交」，亦要發言、開會要勤力，「陳志全做乜，我就做乜，議會應該要有兩個陳志全，三個甚至乎」，陳志全、鄒家成等聞言發笑，彭卓棋亦望向陳志全。快必又表示議會抗爭暴力與否視乎定義，「最暴力係邊個呀，沒有暴徒只有暴政，共產黨最暴力」，「打倒共產黨，反對《國安法》。」多次搶答成功的快必，亦引來施德來、彭卓棋等發笑。
+
+
+▲ 陳志全
+
+#### 胡志偉、譚文豪重申否決預算案迫政府落實五大訴求
+
+民主黨主席胡志偉則表示，否決預算案是「最大武器」，有35+政府就必須回應五大訴求。他解釋民主黨不簽署「墨落無悔」聲明，是因參與協調時已經同意「要運用憲制上面賦予立法會嘅否決權，否決《財政預算案》」，並指「所有政府嘅法案，佢剝奪市民嘅人身自由、個人利益、個人意志自由，我哋都一定係會反對」，不過也反問：「起醫院、起學校我哋都要反對咩？」
+
+譚文豪重申公民黨立場，指只要有「35+」，為令五大訴求落實，他們承諾會行使《基本法》權力，「任何嘅政府法案，任何嘅撥款，同埋呢個最緊要嘅財政預算，我哋都會投反對票」，即使解散立法會後亦會再反對，令特首下台。被質疑公民黨在委任終審法院常任法官張舉能議案投下棄權票，他則解釋立法和司法機關一向「河水不犯井水」，法官任命一般不會投反對，又指若投反對票，他日有較開明法官委任，或會打開缺口令「保皇黨」作反對。
+
+#### 黃之鋒稱推動國際線「反擊北京」 李嘉達指將抗爭帶入立會
+
+黃之鋒則表示，明白他會有被DQ的可能，但政府明顯並非只想DQ他，而是想「DQ晒所有反對《國安法》嘅人，甚至DQ晒成個選舉」，並指「面對住被消失、被送中，消滅人身自由嘅狀況，我好希望大家初選一定要出嚟投票，呢一個先係關鍵所在」。他又指除了議會戰線，他一直游說推動《香港人權民主法案》，會守住國際線，「連結世界、反擊北京」。被問其席位應在國際社會，他則指以往到外國游說，會被質疑欠民意授權，故認為初選的民意授權很重要。
+
+李嘉達則表示，進入全民抗爭時代，要「壯大黃色經濟圈，爭取更加多嘅資源投入抗爭」，並「將抗爭帶入立法會」，又指議會抗爭只是其中一條戰線，「攬炒唔係一個手段，唔係一個目標，係一個態度。」
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，16人否認「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，今（17日）踏入審訊第10天。控方今播放港島區初選論壇片段，其中不認罪的公民黨鄭達鴻屢被質疑對法治的立場，但堅稱「我哋唔會放棄法治」，並指《國安法》由特首「完全委任法官」是「絕對唔可取」，三名指定法官聞言沒有特別反應。發起「墨落無悔」的梁晃維則稱難保證所有人不背叛承諾：「既然大家都認同呢啲概念，咁點解唔能夠係真係做一個公開承諾呢？」至於認罪的時任東區區議員徐子見，形容自己是「好老嘅素人」，被問「點解我唔揀個後生嘅呢，而家抗爭係年輕人嘅事喎？」，徐答「有少少年齡歧視喎」，多名被告大笑。
+
+#### 控方稱引用「共謀者原則」舉證
+
+控方今早表示，就初選論壇片段會引用「共謀者原則」，即依賴其他被告言行指證被告，但未有指出針對各人的證據，會在完成控方案情前交代。
+
+控方今續播放2020年6月27日的港島初選論壇片段，要求區諾軒認出參加者包括梁晃維、楊雪盈、徐子見、羅冠聰、鄭達鴻、張嘉莉、彭卓棋、許智峯和袁嘉蔚。其中楊雪盈、鄭達鴻和彭卓棋為不認罪被告，許智峯和羅冠聰則已離港，沒有被起訴。論壇主持為區家麟，林彥邦和袁彌明為嘉賓。
+
+#### 鄭達鴻稱不會放棄法治、批《國安法》委任法官絕不可取
+
+就不認罪的3人，公民黨時任東區區議員鄭達鴻曾表示，「真正去到『35+』，我哋達成議會過半呢……民主派先可以用個選票去迫使行政長官要落實五大訴求」，又指會否決財政預算案。
+
+
+▲ 鄭達鴻
+
+鄭達鴻對法治的立場屢遭質疑，有網民問「法治爛成咁，憑佢點樣光復法治呢？」，又問他是否不敢說「光復香港」。鄭稱他「絕對夠膽講光復香港」，而「光復法治」是每個法律從業員畢生責任，「攞到35+，我哋就可以由制度根本改革，呢個先係光復法治嘅最好方法。」
+
+彭卓棋問鄭達鴻是否認為法治未崩壞，要在制度繼續糾纏，鄭答「我哋唔會放棄法治」，重申一個法律從業員，「佢去到警署見到一個遍體鱗傷嘅手足，佢一定要盡快咁救佢返嚟，呢個先係捍衛法治嘅最好原則。」該環節播放後，彭卓棋傾身向隔一個位的鄭達鴻交談。
+
+梁晃維亦質疑，「成個法律制度入面，充滿一啲所謂嘅紅官、藍官，藍絲斬人就畀人讚情操高尚，我哋嘅手足、社工，佢哋只不過喺防線面前舉高社工證，叫警察放慢腳步，已經要面臨一年監禁，點解公民黨同埋鄭達鴻你，仲未敢講『法治已死』呢？」
+
+會上亦多次有人質疑，公民黨在委任終審法院常任法官張舉能議案中，有人投下支持和棄權，而非反對票。鄭達鴻表示，負責任命法官的司法人員推薦委員會亦曾委任開明法官來港，要尊重該制度，否則未來可能只是「藍絲嘅法官」獲委任；又指制度本身無問題，有問題是「我哋冇民主去 backup 呢個法治嘅制度」。鄭又指，《國安法》下將由特首「完全委任法官」，「呢個絕對唔可取嘅」，三名指定法官聞言繼續觀看電腦螢幕，沒有特別反應。
+
+#### 彭卓棋稱不惜肢體抗爭 「共產黨要我跪，我哋係唔會跪！」
+
+南區區議員彭卓棋則表示：「我哋面臨國安法壓境，我哋抗拒默沉，面對極權嘅奴隸，我哋吶喊高呼，聲討賣港派、港共派、中間派，仲有袁彌昌。我哋嘅敵人就係共產黨，我哋入到議會不惜以肢體抗爭、癱瘓政府、否決財政預算案，亦會用議員身位支援街頭抗爭」，又指他擁護本土尊嚴價值和反對23條。
+
+彭又在最後高呼：「捍自由來齊集這裏，全力抗對，共產黨要我跪，我哋係唔會跪，我哋會全力抗爭，對抗共產黨！」林卓廷聞言發笑。
+
+
+▲ 彭卓棋
+
+#### 楊雪盈稱連結港人能「發光」
+
+時任灣仔區議會主席楊雪盈被問到「區議會主席都未做好，點解要參選立法會？」，指在其任期已反對《國安法》，而在許多政治事件中，「我哋唔怕民政處嘅打壓」，相信無論在哪個崗位，最緊要是幫到香港人和這場運動，「我相信我哋只要將我哋唔同嘅力量，就住唔同嘅人嘅崗位連結埋一齊，我哋一定可以發光，一定可以照亮更加多嘅地方。」
+
+嘉賓林彥邦其後問「發光」一說「即係咩意思？完全聽唔明」，坐在楊雪盈後方的林卓廷發笑。楊解釋在運動中每人有自己角色和能量，「咁每個人就好似發住光咁樣，就算喺我哋而家政治咁崩壞嘅環境之中，我哋都見到彼此，我哋都可以同大家一齊上」，林彥邦最後再說「其實唔係好明」，庭上的林卓廷和楊雪盈亦再次發笑。惟被問當選會否辭任區議會主席，楊則沒有正面回答。
+
+
+▲ 楊雪盈
+
+#### 彭卓棋批楊雪盈「真獨裁假民主」 二人疊聲激辯引笑聲
+
+楊雪盈和彭卓棋論壇上亦就區議會事務爭拗，彭卓棋指灣仔區議會防疫包因寫有「武漢肺炎」而無法報銷，批身為主席的楊雪盈沒有諮詢其他議員。楊雪盈回應時二人多次疊聲，彭卓棋批楊「真獨裁就假民主」，又認為楊無正面回答其問題，一度問「補唔補返時畀我呀？」，主持區家麟說「冇㗎」，彭卓棋自己，及林卓廷、柯耀林、陳志全等多人發笑。
+
+楊雪盈其後邀請候選人選擇4個名單出選，彭卓棋說「anyone but you」，被告欄多人大笑，片中彭解釋楊在文化界最有機會勝出。而許智峯回應「手足A，手足B，手足C，手足D，所有真香港人都值得入議會」，旁聽席亦傳來笑聲。
+
+#### 梁晃維稱用盡手段抵抗惡法 發起墨落無悔為向選民清晰交代
+
+至於另外認罪的3人，被問到在「35+」議會的抗爭，時任中西區區議員梁晃維表示政權一定會用盡手段DQ參選人，甚至拘捕立法會議員，故會用盡一切可行手段，包括肢體抗爭，令街頭、國際戰線引起更大迴響，「抵抗一切惡法。」
+
+梁晃維承認主張香港民族和本土理念，又指「我哋視中國為我哋嘅敵人」，知道中國「一定會用盡佢所有方法繼續壓迫我哋香港人」，「而我哋面對咁嘅壓迫，我哋係一定唔會退讓，我哋一定會再次挺身而出。」
+
+被問發起「墨落無悔」是否「夾緊其他人」，梁否認，指初選協調會議內容只有戴耀廷和出席者知道，無法保證所有人不會背叛承諾，「如果大家都係承諾咗，或者係都認同呢啲理念嘅話，其實點解唔能夠向住全香港市民做一個公開嘅承諾呢？」。他形容簽聲明是「基本責任」，「向選民交代到底我哋會唔會繼續堅定抗爭」，而若有人有「被夾」的「hard feeling」，可能本身就不同意協議內容。在搶答環節，梁晃維4次搶答成功，主持問「梁晃維撳掣咁快嘅你」，被告欄傳出笑聲。
+
+#### 袁嘉蔚稱要光復議會、被問是否羅冠聰「Plan B」
+
+時任南區區議員袁嘉蔚則表示，「議會抗爭唔係單單靠投反對票，係需要一班用盡所有方法抗爭嘅民主派」，而初選是「要為民主派協調最堅實嘅陣容，九月光復議會」，又指要「向極權抗爭」。
+
+被問到是否羅冠聰的「Plan B」，在延伸庭觀看直播的袁嘉蔚即埋頭靠近螢幕，並專注觀看。當袁在片中回應自己是獨立出選時，庭上的她低頭並托眼鏡。其後林彥邦問到每一個民主派是否可完全補上任何位置，袁回答屆時再磋商，又指「要接前人意志」。庭上的袁看到片段後，隨即雙手遮臉，又不斷搖頭及撥頭髮，最後將頭傾側向一邊。
+
+#### 被問為何不選年輕人 徐子見指「有少少年齡歧視」 多人大笑
+
+至於時任東區區議員徐子見，嘉賓袁彌明指他經常提自己是「素人」，徐指相信素人定義是沒有加入任何政黨，而自己應是「好老嘅素人」，有被告發笑。徐稱素人有堅定意志投贊成或反對，袁彌明遂問徐認為候選人中誰是素人，徐稱楊雪盈是素人，而梁晃維和彭卓棋則「一半一半」，因「好早接觸政治嘅嘢」，鄒家成、彭卓棋、林卓廷等多人發笑。
+
+林彥邦多次問徐子見與其他年輕素人分別，又問「點解我唔揀個後生嘅呢，而家抗爭係年輕人嘅事喎？」，徐答「有少少年齡歧視喎」，彭卓棋、柯耀林、楊雪盈等多名被告再次大笑，黃碧雲邊笑邊拍大腿。徐指相信抗爭並非一個年齡層的事，「可以係一啲比較中年人嘅事，甚至乎係老年人嘅事」，認為以他年紀也可有智慧幫助「抗衡呢個不義嘅政權」。徐也提及有簽署「墨落無悔」，但認為「寫得比較怪」，此時發起該聲明的鄒家成亦輕輕發笑。
+
+#### 許智峯稱「議會內外，寸土必爭」 羅冠聰認「預咗畀人DQ」
+
+就沒被控的兩人，許智峯表示「議會內外，寸土必爭」，「無論喺議會抗爭，喺街頭我必出席，同埋喺所有嘅法律訴訟、法律程序，我都做到盡」，指要透過司法制度給予政權最大的壓力，「迫佢哋承認錯誤。」被問到35+後可否有一致投票意向，許指民主黨光譜較闊，有「衝衝子」和「和理非」，要包容不同看法，又指民主黨過去四年施政報告和財政預算案均投反對票。
+
+羅冠聰承認自己「預咗畀人DQ」，望突顯政權打壓的暴虐和不合理，籲選民投票支持他的信念，又指「街頭、議會、國際，缺一不可」。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
+
+### 列席認罪被告全於延伸庭被告欄就坐
+
+審訊不設陪審團，由3名國安法指定法官陳慶偉、李運騰及陳仲衡審理。控方代表為副刑事檢控專員萬德豪及周天行，辯方代表包括資深大律師潘熙、大律師沈士文、張耀良、黃宇逸、關文渭、馬維騉、盧敏儀、石書銘、黃廷光、Trevor Beel 等，本身是大律師的劉偉聰則自辯。
+
+不認罪被告包括獲准保釋的鄭達鴻、楊雪盈、彭卓棋、何啟明、劉偉聰、黃碧雲、施德來、陳志全、柯耀林、李予信10人，及還柙的何桂藍、吳政亨、鄒家成、林卓廷、梁國雄及余慧明6人。
+
+列席的認罪被告今續被帶到兩個延伸庭觀看直播，其中岑敖暉、袁嘉蔚、吳敏兒和譚凱邦4人在2號延伸庭，另有被告在1號延伸庭，惟因該庭不設記者席，現場輪候的公眾人數亦不足，最終沒有公眾獲准入內旁聽。
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-20-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-11.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-20-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-11.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..a1f29df0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-20-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-11.md
@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第十一日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-02-20 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 控方稱引用所有論壇言論舉證 官質疑：Say Hello不能成證據吧？
+- 重溫超區論壇 王百羽稱將親中保皇議員「一個一個車出去」論惹庭上大笑
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，16人否認「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，今（20日）踏入審訊第11天。控方上周確認，於初選論壇片段會引用「共謀者原則」舉證，即依賴其他被告言論指證被告。控方今續播放新界東選舉論壇片段，何桂藍的代表大狀要求控方說明依賴其他被告的哪些言論舉證。控方一度指所有被告的言論都是證據，又望於陳詞階段才回應，惟法官李運騰反問「如果他們只說『Hello』，不能成為證據吧？」，又指以為控方開審前應有明確立場。何桂藍大狀亦指現時已是審訊第11天，被告已還柙兩年，「控方真的是說他們並不清楚他們的案情是什麼嗎？」控方終確認會在辯方盤問前交代。
+
+庭上播放新界東論壇片段，何桂藍表明入立會要奪主導權「破局」，鄒家成亦指要有具「攬炒意志」者入議會。梁國雄提及「《國安法》嚟咗之後，可能我都被控呢個煽動顛覆國家政權罪」，多名被告隨即起哄，梁亦發笑。區諾軒並確認，論壇上「所有環節，包括得罪人嘅環節，都係我設計，我安排」。
+
+#### 何桂藍大狀要求控方指出針對被告的證據 控方指不應此階段處理
+
+控方上周開始播放九龍西、九龍東和香港島的初選論壇片段，並確認會援引「共謀者原則」舉證，即除被告自身的言論外，亦會依賴其他被告的言論指證被告，但未有指出針對各被告的證據，指會在完成控方案情前交代。
+
+代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel 今表示，望控方在播放新界東初選論壇片段前，交代除了何桂藍本人的言論外，還會依賴其他出席者的哪些言論指證她。主控周天行回應，已表明會依賴其他被告的言行（acts and declarations）證明串謀存在。法官李運騰指，法庭並未就此作出裁決，而控方只確認了會引用「共謀者原則」，卻未有說明會依賴其他被告的什麼言論作為指控何桂藍的證據。
+
+周天行續指，現時只是播片，問是否需於現在處理。李運騰指控方一直都必須說明針對各被告的證據，問題只是現時能否做到，又指以為控方在開審前，應該頗清楚會依賴其他被告的什麼言論作為證據。周天行續指就被告言行，控方有3個進路（routes），惟李運騰打斷指並非要知道控方的進路，而是要說明針對各被告的證據。
+
+#### 控方稱所有言論均成證據 官：只說「Hello」不能成為證據吧？
+
+周天行答，基本上所有其他被告的言論都會成為證據。但李運騰指，一定要是促進串謀的言行（acts and declarations in furtherance of a conspiracy）才相關，「如果他們只說『Hello』，這不能成為證據吧？（“If they only say hello, it cannot be evidence against others, isn’t it?”）」有被告和旁聽人士發笑。周天行重申，現時只是舉證階段，認為在陳詞階段指出相關證據會較為合適。
+
+Beel 即指，「現時已是審訊第11天，我的當事人已經還柙兩年，控方真的是說他們不清楚他們的案情是什麼嗎？（“Is the prosecution seriously saying they don’t know what their cases are?”）」周天行反問，是否即在控方證人作供時，控方亦須說明會依賴哪部分證供指證被告，重申應是陳詞階段才提出。但李官不同意，指被告需要知道控方案情，才能決定是否出庭作供或傳召辯方證人。周天行則指已在開案陳詞說明。
+
+#### 控方稱盤問前會交代 官指需處理串謀何時開始和被告何時加入
+
+大律師馬維騉亦有相關關注，堅持控方需在他開始盤問區諾軒前，說明會如何依賴其他被告的言行。周天行終同意會在辯方盤問區前，表明對於「共謀者原則」的立場，即會以論壇上其他被告的什麼言論指證被告。法官陳仲衡一度表示，論壇中每人的發言均需以其他人的言論作為脈絡理解；控方同意，並指在論壇上如果一名被告說話時有其他人在場，他的言論當然可用以指證其他被告。此外，法官陳慶偉和李運騰亦表示，串謀最早於何時開始，及每名被告於何時加入該串謀，是控方將須處理的議題。
+
+控方其後播放2020年6月28日新界東初選論壇片段，區諾軒確認參加者包括不認罪的梁國雄、林卓廷、陳志全、鄒家成、何桂藍、柯耀林；認罪的楊岳橋、林景楠、范國威、劉頴匡、呂智恆；被捕但沒被控的李芝融；及沒被控的黎銘澤和李志宏。論壇主持為黃潔慧，嘉賓為李慧玲和桑普。播放片段時，區諾軒不時回頭望旁聽席，又轉身望向被告上方的大屏幕，一時托腮，一時撓手，不時會隨發言內容微微發笑。
+
+#### 何桂藍：立法會不再是議事殿堂 除下記者證望「破局」
+
+就不認罪被告，前《立場》記者何桂藍表示，「立法會要過半，我哋唔係講緊再投議員入去議事咁簡單，而係要奪取主導權，將立法會變成人民嘅武器，要突破中共 set 畀香港嘅死局，需要最多嘅抗爭派進入議會」，指要「同全香港人一齊抗擊中共極權」，「一息尚存，力戰不降。」
+
+被問到為何要從政而不繼續做記者，何表示在運動中，「相信好多嘅香港人同我有同一樣嘅經歷，就係我哋望住咁多嘅朋友，咁多嘅手足，佢哋付出咗前程人生為代價，去犧牲，咁我都會問番自己，我究竟可以做啲乜嘢？」
+
+何認為，「立法會唔再係一個議事嘅殿堂，亦唔只係一個抗爭嘅陣地」，而在極權和政治打壓下，記者未必能完全履行社會責任，「政治制度一日唔變呢，我哋嘅新聞自由係無辨法爭取番嚟，所以我哋必須有人去改變個制度」。她續指，望推動「破局」的議程，「我必須要放低持平嘅身分」，「我必須親身落水嚟說服大家去參與」。
+
+#### 鄒家成批中共為殖民者 稱要具「攬炒意志」抗爭者
+
+本土派鄒家成則表示，「我今日參選係因為我要代表香港民族嘅意志，對抗中國殖民。法治已死，制度沉淪，呢一刻，香港需要嘅，唔再係西裝骨骨嘅政客為大家議政，而係需要具備攬炒意志嘅抗爭者為大家衝擊體制，撕下香港政治上最後一塊畫皮」。提到「西裝骨骨嘅政客」時，坐在鄒家成旁的林卓廷向鄒指了指自己，鄒家成點頭回應。鄒又表示他參選目的「非常之旗幟鮮明」，「就係要宣揚香港民族主義，因為要建立一個民族出嚟，我哋先能夠對抗到中華民族嘅入侵」。
+
+鄒家成論壇上屢批評中共為殖民者：「香港就係面對緊中共殖民者全方位嘅入侵……一國兩制、《基本法》、立法會通通都係精心設計嘅殖民工具，所謂一國兩制就係一個殖民嘅代名詞，所謂五十年不變就係用緊五十年嘅時間將香港殖民到變成一個香港市，呢一本《基本法》已經係一本中共嘅喉舌文件。」
+
+鄒又認為，35+的機會「非常之低」，但重申參選就是要把握該焦點平台，宣揚其理念。但他重申，初選落敗後不會參選立會：「因為呢個墨落無悔係我鄒家成發起嘅，我發得起，我就會兌現呢個承諾」。
+
+#### 劉頴匡問「臭水」配方惹笑聲 慢必稱議會抗爭要升級
+
+至於人民力量主席慢必陳志全則表示，8年前參選立會，源於對傳統民主黨派的不滿，「個個都話議會抗議，唔通個個都有議會抗議咩？」指初選是要獲取最多議席，「亦都係畀大家有機會挑選真正抗爭派嘅議員代表我哋，人民力量過去係走在抗爭最前線，最早，最可靠嘅抗爭力量」。
+
+慢必曾在立法會潑「遺臭萬年水」，認罪的劉頴匡提及自己2018年被DQ後亦試過「開臭魚」作抗爭，問「究竟你有冇得分享下你用嗰個配方係點樣，或者有冇啲特別嘅經驗可以分享下，等我哋第時入到議會都可以學習到呢？」 ，引來哄堂大笑。慢必指「太過 deatil 呢，就真係唔方便講」，但指「議會嘅抗爭真係要升級……你話我去掟呢個遺臭萬年水究竟係成功定係失敗呢，議會抗爭就係要令政府要通過啲惡法或者係撥款嘅時候，難度愈嚟愈高同埋要愈嚟愈樣衰」。
+
+
+▲ 陳志全
+
+#### 長毛稱《國安法》後或被控煽動顛覆國家政權 被告起鬨
+
+至於前立法會議員長毛梁國雄，表示自己過去「推動議會抗爭，發動五區公投，拉布抗惡法、苛政」，亦因公民抗命發起遊行被拘控，指「35+需要堅定嘅抗爭力量」，「要攞一個全面嘅否決權，操諸我手」。有網民問簽署「墨落無悔」的參選人是否會有Plan B，長毛搶答成功，但指「我就冇簽到嗰份抗爭宣言」，旁聽席發笑。梁續解釋不簽是因該聲明「係重複番35+嗰個初衷」，沒有需要簽，又指自己多年任議員，「年年都」否決財政預算案，「咁我覺得即係呢個問題對我嚟講已經唔係問題。」
+
+梁國雄又被李慧玲多番質疑為何仍繼續參選，不予機會年輕人，梁反問：「我畀到㗎咩？係選民決定㗎嘛。我畀咁呀，兄終弟及呀？」，又說「你問嗰啲投票畀我嘅人吖嘛，你問我有乜用啫？」，多名被告和區諾軒亦發笑。李又質疑梁「戀棧權位」，梁回應：「我又覺得你好怪喎，你正話話立場姐姐（何桂藍）嗰陣時就話人哋資歷淺走咗去喎，你真係你啲邏輯喺邊度呢？」，林卓廷笑着向梁豎起拇指，何桂藍亦發笑。
+
+梁國雄又表示：「其實老實講，《國安法》嚟咗之後，可能我都被控呢個煽動顛覆國家政權罪」，林卓廷、鄒家成等多名被告隨即起哄，梁國雄亦發笑，梁並強調「抗命就無分先後嘅，同心就不分長幼嘅」。
+
+#### 林卓廷批警隊非常不堪、指政府派三萬要投贊成票
+
+至於時任民主黨副主席林卓廷，表示「中共粗暴制訂《國安法》，全方面鎮壓香港人。我哋香港人唯有用勇敢、智慧，同埋我哋嘅堅毅，去對抗呢個極權」，又指過去一年，「香港嘅警隊呢真係非常之不堪，無論係6.12、7.21、8.31，我哋都見到警隊呢，係打市民啦、打記者啦、打議員啦、貪贓枉法啦、畀假口供啦、去屈好多我哋嘅年輕人啦。」
+
+被質疑在委任張舉能任終審法院首席法官的議案投棄權票，是否並非「全面抗爭」，林稱要視乎「具體嘅議案，具體嘅政策」，又指「如果政府話『每個香港人派三萬蚊』，我覺得一定要投贊成票喎，冇理由留返啲錢畀政府去做大白象工程㗎嘛」，強調不能以一個議案，「就講晒我哋過去咁多年喺議會上面監察個政府，抗衡個政權嘅立場。」林卓廷亦提及，他兩度被控違《權力及特權條例》，批當局限制議會抗爭。
+
+#### 柯耀林：議會行動戰線結合 稱要投選有抗爭意志參選人
+
+至於時任區政聯盟召集人柯耀林表示，「我哋好希望行動同埋議會係雙結合」，又指會在衝突現場和前線看到其團隊做支持，「我哋好希望係同大家香港人齊上齊落。五大訴求，缺一不可」，並指望初選「大家支持係有抗爭意志嘅參選人 」。
+
+早前庭上曾播放論壇片段，柯耀林被問2018年民主黨新東補選出現紛爭，曾形容林卓廷「人格卑劣」，是否堅持看法，柯答「係」，但若林勝出而他落敗，「我哋會服膺我哋初選簽嗰個協議書，我哋係會支持所有出選初選嘅候選人」，引來被告大笑，林和柯互表歉意。庭上今播放該片段，林卓廷和鄒家成等亦再發笑。片中主持形容是次答問較長，但「可能大家對個題目都有啲興趣，嘉賓亦都好想問」，再引來林卓廷、柯耀林和鄒家成等多名被告大笑，區諾軒亦展露笑意。
+
+#### 劉頴匡稱完全信任德高望重戴耀廷區諾軒、稱35+不切實但望本土成主流
+
+至於認罪被告，時任民間集會召集人劉頴匡，指過去一直「身體力行」推動遊行、集會、各種街頭抗爭，「喺街頭監察警暴，支援被捕手足」；並強調自己身負暴動罪，「我真係同所有嘅手足係同呼吸，共命運，我希望大家可以投票去支持呢一個政府口中嘅暴徒，讓國際社會知道我哋所有香港人係同呢一班嘅前線手足係從來冇割席」。
+
+劉又被質疑，2017年新東補選曾指會跟隨民主動力初選，但後來「自己跳出嚟選」。劉指他當年不參加初選因對民動不信任，「但係今次呢一個民主派嘅抗爭，成個初選，我哋係願意完全係信任戴耀廷教授，以及係區諾軒前議員，呢兩位德高望重嘅人物」。
+
+劉頴匡又坦言，「完全唔覺得35+係一個切實嘅目標嚟」，形容是「天空樓閣」，但認為初選更重要是在「冇篩選，冇DQ」的情況下，「大家去揀一個你哋覺得最值得去畀票佢嘅候選人」，「所以你話35+又好，35-又好，我好希望有堅定投爭意志嘅本土派可以成為主流，帶領香港」。
+
+#### 楊岳橋稱司法絕對有險可守、承諾如有35+會運用否決權
+
+至於時任公民黨黨魁楊岳橋，屢被重提「dead body」、「案底令人生更精彩」等言論，及質疑他對法治的立場。被問「Dead body 出現先定陳同佳飛台灣自首先」，楊答「Dead body 呢樣嘢跟咗我四年，我亦都明白四年前可能講大咗」，但指作為律師，「過去幾年見證住法治嘅崩塌，係咪就咁一句 dead body，法治無險可守，跟住我哋就行開呢？」。有旁聽人士和何桂藍等發笑。
+
+楊又被問及「被DQ是否使人生更精彩」，他回應「DQ只係令DQ你嗰個變得無恥，下流，賤格」，強調「人生是否精彩當然自己各自嘅判斷」，有被告發笑。楊又強調「司法絕對有險可守」，並指「攬炒」是由當權者造成，「無論嗰個係林鄭定係北京嘅當權者，真正做到攬炒嘅只有佢哋」。被問到《國安法》將落實，「你會唔會又 over your dead body 呢？」，楊答：「我會同香港人一齊，係咪 dead body，到時大家先算。」
+
+楊又表明，公民黨承諾「如果我哋入到去（議會），有35+，我哋就可以運用《基本法》畀我哋嘅否決權」，又指如成功35+，「我哋就能夠有最大嘅力量去畀政府最大嘅壓力，去將一啲佢以前走數唔做嘅嘢呢，可以希望有機會變成事實」。但何桂藍質疑，公民黨「有35+就承諾乜嘢都會做，冇35+就乜都唔承諾」予人「投機」之感。
+
+#### 呂智恆稱攬炒議會癱瘓暴政、范國威表明行使否決權迫政府回應五大訴求
+
+至於社工呂智恆則提及，「會傾其所有去攬炒議會，癱瘓呢個暴政。」被問當選後會否簽署擁護政府和《基本法》的確認書，他表示：「今日割一城，明日割十城。你今次妥協得一次，佢下一次就要你再妥協多另外一次。佢叫你食屎，咁 你係咪去食屎呀？咁我唔會囉。」
+
+時任新同盟召集人范國威則指，初選是讓選民「為民主派、本土派、素人揀選最強嘅隊伍⋯⋯奪取立法會過半議席，行使憲制否決權，迫使政府回應五大訴求」，又提及今時今日，「入去立法會要有充分嘅心理準備，唔單止係要有足夠嘅抗爭意志，要有經驗，仲要有被控、被捕、坐監、滅黨、被逮捕，呢啲咁嘅心理準備。」
+
+#### 林景楠稱抗爭到最尾 林卓廷等發笑
+
+至於由不認罪改為認罪、並任控方證人的林景楠，表示原任海關關員的自己，於2015年因參加光復沙田而被政治打壓，後來成為阿布泰創辦人，「點解我依然尚存到而家呢，係因為我會同大家一齊抗爭到最尾」，林卓廷與鄒家成均發笑。
+
+至論壇尾聲，梁國雄表示「唔好食花生，7月1號上街。7月11號、12號投票，收咗一萬蚊，撐手足、撐手足」，林景楠即謂「撐手足嘅話呢，就可以捐6.12或者支持黃色經濟圈，我覺得係好需要嘅」，林卓廷和吳政亨等發笑，在延伸庭的岑敖暉、袁嘉蔚、吳敏兒及譚凱邦亦不禁大笑。
+
+#### 區指所有環節包括「得罪人」環節均由他設計
+
+播放新界東片段後，周天行問區諾軒，論壇流程是否與他所安排一樣，區邊點頭邊回應：「所有環節，包括得罪人嘅環節，都係我設計，我安排，都係吻合嘅。」至於去過哪次論壇，他則表示：「我唔記得邊次有去，但我有出席大部分嘅論壇。」
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，16人否認「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，今（20日）踏入審訊第11天。控方今續播放初選論壇片段，其中法官李運騰留意到新界西所有被告均認罪，問「播放片段有什麼意義？」，控方指因其他被告都是共同串謀者，其言論可證串謀存在，惟在辯方無反對下，終停止播放。庭上其後播放超級區議會片段，其中不認罪的李予信指會在議會和街頭「同大家並肩作戰」；認罪的王百羽則自稱「超區坦克車」，會將「阻住我哋議事嘅垃圾，立法會親中保皇議員，一個一個車出去議事堂」，正庭和延伸庭多名被告大笑。
+
+#### 新西被告全認罪 官質疑「播放片段有什麼意義？」
+
+控方下午播放2020年7月3日舉行的新界西論壇片段，區諾軒確認出席者為：伍健偉、林進、潘朗聰、朱凱廸、吳敏兒、黃子悅、張可森、郭家麒、吳敏兒，主持為梁家權。其中除林進和潘朗聰沒被控，其餘均是認罪被告，另缺席論壇的尹兆堅亦是認罪被告。
+
+庭上播放各候選人的自我介紹片段後，法官李運騰表示，似乎所有新界西參選人均認罪，周天行確認。李官略顯驚訝，續問：「那播放片段有什麼意義？（“So what’s the point of playing this video?”）」周指因其他被告都是共同串謀者（co-conspirator）。法官陳慶偉問：「So?」周重申該些被告言論可顯示串謀的存在及其程度，惟李運騰指，除非有辯方律師堅持播放，否則不認為應浪費庭上時間觀看。最終在沒有辯方反對下，控方停止播放新界西片段。
+
+#### 李予信指極權滲透要全方位應對、議會街頭並肩作戰
+
+控方其後播放2020年7月4日的超級區議會論壇片段，區諾軒確認出席者包括不認罪的李予信、認罪的岑敖暉和王百羽，以及沒有被控的涂謹申和鄺俊宇，主持人為區家麟。
+
+就不認罪的被告，時任公民黨東區區議員李予信表示，作為社工和區議員的他，於6.12一周年時進行人道支援「都要畀黑警濫暴」，又指7月1日見證《國安法》下「警察成為特權階級，繼續去肆意去欺壓我哋嘅自由」，表明「無論喺議會定還是喺街頭，我都會同大家並肩作戰」。
+
+李又指，「其實當極權要全方位滲透呢個社會嘅時候，我哋嘅戰場就係要全方位地去應對，無論街頭或者議會」，強調議員要用公共身分指證「黑警」濫捕和不跟法規。
+
+
+▲ 李予信
+
+#### 王百羽自稱「超區坦克車」 庭上多人大笑
+
+至於認罪的兩人，時任元朗區議員王百羽，被問到如何懲罰立法會「瞓覺、亂噏同打人」的「保皇黨」時表示：「我可以好大聲咁同大家講，如果當呢啲垃圾嘅議員阻住我喺議會入面議事，甚至乎係做抗爭，我會用我自己嘅身位，超區坦克車，將呢啲咁樣阻住我哋議事嘅垃圾，立法會親中保皇議員，一個一個車出去議事堂，呢個係我對大家嘅承諾。」
+
+王提及「超區坦克車」和「一個一個車出去」時，林卓廷、鄒家成等多名被告發笑，鄭達鴻笑得身體前傾；在延伸庭的岑敖暉、袁嘉蔚、吳敏兒和譚凱邦4人同樣發笑，袁嘉蔚也笑得身體前傾。王其後又指在議會內，「唔會淨係得一架坦克車，我哋會見到好多架坦克車」，嘉賓問他是否「建議大家都一齊增磅」，王表示會建議「健康地增磅，唔好令到自己高血壓、高膽固醇、高脂肪咁樣」，余慧明等多名被告再發笑。
+
+王百羽又表示，「35+或者35-，我哋都要有相應嘅應對，如果係35-嘅話……我哋要做嘅就係要全面抗爭，响個議會入面，用我哋嘅肢體衝突去阻止惡法通過。」被問《國安法》後如何「反守為攻」，他則指現時「光復香港，時代革命」口號已不准講，可能以後「五大訴求，缺一不可」也不能講，「但係我都想話畀大家聽，呢啲恐懼係唔需要自己一個人去孭嘅，呢啲恐懼係我哋香港人一齊去面對。」
+
+#### 岑敖暉不信35+能落實五大訴求 稱極權下議會戰線可爭取破局
+
+時任荃灣區議員岑敖暉則表示，「喺極權底下，議會戰線最大嘅目的就係爭取一個破局嘅機會」，又指「中共用《國安法》去對付香港人，香港人就要喺一切嘅戰線，令到對方都要付出最大嘅政治代價，呢一個係今時今日香港人面對極權，各個戰線嘅意義」。
+
+岑敖暉認為制度內不可能存有任何改變制度的空間：「35+之後會唔會落實五大訴求，我覺得呢一個係冇可能」，亦不認為可改變《警察通例》和查「黑警濫權」，「但係點解我哋仍然要喺議會戰線奮鬥，就係香港人仍然要把握呢個機會」，推動運動延續，「創造一個北京冇可能會接受嘅局面。」
+
+片段播放岑敖暉回答主持問及如何避免犯下學聯的錯誤時，在庭上的岑專注地觀看片段，期間又雙手摸臉。
+
+#### 涂謹申稱有坐監準備 指達到35+「大把嘢可以玩」
+
+就沒有被控的民主黨涂謹申和鄺俊宇，涂認為：「如果我哋有35+，大把嘢可以玩！我哋全部主席做晒！除非政府唔夠膽上嚟，我哋好多嘢可以質詢佢！好多嘢令到佢好尷尬！好多嘢令到佢喺全世界面前出醜！……甚至可以通過一啲議案譴責佢（高官）！傳召佢出嚟！」
+
+涂又指在《國安法》下，「去美國訪問都可以坐監，同埋而家嘅起跳係三年、五年同十年」，但「我要發表嘅意見，我就照講，唔可以退縮，唔可以畏懼」。涂又提及要與世界結合，對中共產生最大的國際壓力，並指論壇上回答該問題，「我已經係冒五年、十年嘅監禁，呢個係我預算付出嘅」，「我有坐監嘅準備。」
+
+#### 鄺俊宇稱惠及基層要投贊成
+
+鄺俊宇則表示，若民主派議席過半，「我哋可以堵截大白象工程，我哋可以幫助窮人基層，我哋可以否決財政預算案」，又指若議案能惠及基層和窮人，「好抱歉，我一定要去幫咗先……呢啲票係要投贊成嘅。」
+
+案件明早續審，將繼續播放超級區議會初選論壇片段。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
+
+### 列席認罪被告全於延伸庭被告欄就坐
+
+審訊不設陪審團，由3名國安法指定法官陳慶偉、李運騰及陳仲衡審理。控方代表為副刑事檢控專員萬德豪及周天行，辯方代表包括資深大律師潘熙、大律師沈士文、張耀良、黃宇逸、關文渭、馬維騉、盧敏儀、石書銘、黃廷光、Trevor Beel 等，本身是大律師的劉偉聰則自辯。
+
+不認罪被告包括獲准保釋的鄭達鴻、楊雪盈、彭卓棋、何啟明、劉偉聰、黃碧雲、施德來、陳志全、柯耀林、李予信10人，及還柙的何桂藍、吳政亨、鄒家成、林卓廷、梁國雄及余慧明6人。
+
+列席的認罪被告今續被帶到兩個延伸庭觀看直播，其中岑敖暉、袁嘉蔚、吳敏兒和譚凱邦4人在2號延伸庭，另有被告在1號延伸庭，惟因該庭不設記者席，現場輪候的公眾人數亦不足，最終沒有公眾獲准入內旁聽。
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-21-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-12.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-21-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-12.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..55827e29
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-21-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-12.md
@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第十二日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-02-21 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 庭上播立會過半記者會 張超雄：如成功中共將學習尊重港人 如失敗打壓將以倍計
+- 控方欲再播片官阻止：如將未烹煮的原材料呈予飢餓食客
+- 區諾軒稱憂簽協議致違法或DQ：搞初選唔應該讓參加者犯法
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，16人否認「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，今（21日）踏入審訊第12天。控方續傳召區諾軒作供，並播放2020年3月戴耀廷與區諾軒就初選召開的首個記者會片段。戴形容立會過半是「大殺傷力憲制武器」，可運用否決權爭取特赦抗爭者及重啟政改等；區諾軒則自稱是「踢唔到波嘅球員」，指勝出功能組別對35+不可或缺，籲業界登記做選民。會上多名時任議員均表示過半失敗將迎來更大打壓，張超雄指若立會過半，共產黨就要學習「尊重返香港人」，否則「相信打壓係以數以倍計嘅力量加諸係香港人身上」；戴耀廷亦形容機會「千載難逢」亦「稍瞬即逝」：「如果我哋今屆唔能夠爭奪到呢個機會，相信中共專制政權一定會做好多功夫，去封殺晒未來嘅可能性。」
+
+此外，列席認罪被告自區諾軒作供起獲安排於兩個延伸庭就坐，但上周五及昨天均因輪候公眾不足而庭內不設記者席，其中一個被告身處的延伸庭沒有任何公眾獲准入內。法庭今更改做法，安排所有列席被告於設有記者席的2號延伸庭就坐，包括馮達浚、朱凱廸、梁晃維、譚凱邦、岑敖暉、黃之鋒、袁嘉蔚及吳敏兒。
+
+#### 戴耀廷：立會過半是「大殺傷力憲制武器」 正與區諾軒進行協調
+
+區諾軒今繼續作供，他確認於2020年3月26日就初選舉辦第一次記者會，目的是講述立會過半的願景，及介紹各區望能贏取的議席目標。控方其後播放該「立會過半」記招片段，區確認出席者包括他和戴耀廷；時任立法會議員張超雄和莫乃光；時任區議會主席程張迎、黎志強；及其他區議員或民間團體代表，包括劉卓裕、蔡雅文、劉志雄、張志偉及張國柱。區諾軒在播放片段時，時而觀看面前電腦螢幕，時而轉身望向被告上方的大屏幕。
+
+
+▲ 資料圖片
+
+戴耀廷會上表示，雖然他們來自民主派光譜不同部分，但「我諗大家都有一個幾強烈嘅共同理念，就係希望能夠立會過半」。戴形容，立會過半是「大殺傷力嘅憲制武器」，可與抗爭運動連結、推動香港改變，包括運用否決財政預算案的權力，爭取特赦抗爭者、向警暴問責、重啟政改爭取雙普選。但戴亦強調如何運用否決權，仍需進一步討論，需時凝聚共識。
+
+戴表示，望在5個地方直選選區分別爭取「6 6 4 4 3」議席，共23席，並指與區諾軒「做緊好多協調工作……希望能夠將光譜咁闊嘅陣營嘅各方，都能夠大家拉埋一齊」。
+
+戴又表示，是次機會「千載難逢」但亦「稍瞬即逝（編按：應為「稍縱即逝」或「轉瞬即逝」）」，「如果我哋今屆唔能夠爭奪到呢個機會，相信中共專制政權一定會做好多功夫，去封殺晒未來嘅可能性」，「我哋都要共同揹起唔能夠過半帶嚟嘅後果」。他又指，立會過半「唔會改變到宜家制度嘅本質，但會加大反制專制政權嘅力量，從而有打破而家困局嘅契機」。
+
+
+▲ 戴耀廷（資料圖片）
+
+#### 區諾軒籲公司登記做選民 張超雄稱否決預算案可令特首下台
+
+區諾軒在會上形容，自己是「踢唔到波嘅球員」，庭上面朝被告席上方大屏幕的區諾軒微微笑了一下。區強調，「喺立法會35+過半嘅戰役上面，功能組別嘅勝出係必要條件，係不可或缺」，籲所有公司都必須登記做選民，「唔理你係白公司定黑公司，總之登記到選民就係好公司。」他又指，《基本法》23條將至，政府亦以「殖民惡法」拘捕時任中西區區議會主席鄭麗琼，指立會過半「正正就係要話畀無論係中共定香港政府聽，我哋係唔要一個咁差嘅香港」。
+
+
+▲ 區諾軒
+
+時任工黨立法會議員張超雄則表示，若立會過半，便可由民主派出任主席，掌握「直接左右政府運作」的權力，又指《基本法》列明兩次否決財政預算案可令特首解散立法會及下台，故立法會並非無權，「只要攞到立法會過半，共產黨就需要學習點樣同香港人相處，點樣尊重返香港人。」
+
+張又指，只望維持香港核心價值，「要中央要政府兌現返佢哋喺《基本法》對香港人嘅承諾」，而這場立會之戰「只許勝，不許敗」，因眼見政府對區議會、整個反送中運動、及對年輕一輩的打壓，如民主派在立會選舉失敗，「我相信呢個打壓係以數以倍計嘅力量加諸係香港人身上。」
+
+
+▲ 張超雄
+
+#### 區議會主席接受戴耀廷邀請助協調
+
+會上亦提到各區區議會主席協助協調，沙田區議會主席程張迎指民主派未能過半或面對更嚴厲打壓，故「義不容辭」接受戴耀廷邀請協助新界東協調工作，籲各派開心見誠和開誠布公討論協調機制。公民黨東區區議會主席黎志強亦指民主派無分裂的本錢，今次「唔成功真係成仁，佢哋嘅打壓會越嚟越犀利」。
+
+片段播畢後，區確認該記者會於日間舉行，而港島區協調會議在同日晚上舉行。
+
+#### 李予信稱香港無法治可言 但不放棄對法治追求
+
+控方今早亦播放餘下的超級區議會初選論壇片段，王百羽問李予信「《國安法》下法治係咪死咗？」，李指「我必須好鄭重咁講，喺《國安法》底下，香港已經冇法治可言」，但指問題是「我哋係咪要放棄對法治嘅追求，我會即刻話，一定唔係，我哋香港係需要法治」，最後表示「香港人頂住，我哋一定要一齊贏，五大訴求，缺一不可」。
+
+岑敖暉則強調，在DQ和《國安法》下，即使達到35+，也不認為否決財政預算案會發生，亦不認為政府會因此回應五大訴求，重申35+是要為港人創造破局機會；王百羽亦表示35+甚至40+是「海市蜃樓」，認為要為最壞情況打算，要有全力抗爭的候選人入議會。
+
+
+▲ 李予信
+
+#### 有被告需醫療診治 11天審訊改半日聆訊
+
+此外，早前辯方為受傷的吳政亨申請缺席聆訊進行物理治療，法官陳慶偉今表示因被告需醫療診治，審訊期間有11天將改為半日聆訊。
+
+大律師石書銘今早亦提出，望控方說明串謀於何時開始，及各被告於何時加入串謀，指相關議題並未在開案陳詞提及，法官陳慶偉着他與控方商量。
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，16人否認「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，今（21日）踏入審訊第12天。控方續傳召區諾軒作供，並播放2020年3月公民黨記者會片段，時任黨魁楊岳橋承諾若政府不回應五大訴求，將否決政府每個法案、撥款和財政預算案，令行政長官解散立法會及辭職。今早已播放首次初選記招片段的控方，其後欲再播放另一條初選記招片段，惟遭法官多番追問播放目的。法官陳慶偉不耐煩指，若控方在播放片段後只是問3、4條問題，播片根本沒有意義，「我們不是來浪費時間看不相關的片段」；法官李運騰亦質疑，若片段「對法庭沒有幫助，亦無助控方案情，我們為什麼需要看？」；法官陳仲衡則打比喻，指他們就像餐廳內飢餓的客人，但控方現時只是將所有原材料放在桌上，而不是呈上煮好的菜餚。控方終沒有播放該片段。
+
+#### 辯方指清楚控方引「共謀者原則」範圍之前 拒承認影片
+
+控方自上周四下午開始完整播放5條選舉論壇片段，並於今早播放2020年3月、長52分鐘的首次初選記者會片段，播畢後要求區確認他是否其中一名參加者，以及片段內容是否與他印象中一致，區確認。
+
+控方其後指出，公民黨曾於該記招前一日，於3月25日舉行記者會，區記得，並指據他所知，沒有公民黨成員曾在記招前與他或其他初選組織者提及相關事宜。控方其後欲播放該片段，指由於林卓廷和黃碧雲兩名被告未能承認片段，故要求區諾軒認出參加者，但在法官詢問下確認區沒有出席該記者會。
+
+代表二人的大律師沈士文回應，該段影片嚴格上與他的當事人無關，但當不清楚控方引用「共謀者原則」的範圍和程度時，他們未能承認一些他們不清楚的東西。沈又指，不反對影片以臨時證物形式播放，若得悉控方不會以此片段指證其當事人時，便不會爭議影片真實性，並強調控方一日不澄清對共謀者原則的立場，同樣問題會一直出現。
+
+
+▲ （資料圖片）
+
+#### 公民黨承諾將否決所有議案及預算案 直至政府回應五大訴求
+
+控方其後播放長36分鐘的公民黨記者會片段，區諾軒確認出席者包括被告鄭達鴻、李予信、楊岳橋、郭家麒、譚文豪，以及林瑞華、郭榮鏗和梁家傑。
+
+時任公民黨黨魁楊岳橋於會上表示，公民黨響應民主派爭取35+的大目標，亦有責任促成該目標。他承諾，若政府不回應五大訴求，公民黨將否決政府「每一個法案，每一個財政撥款」，亦會「義無反顧」否決預算案，令行政長官解散立法會重選及辭職，形容是「莊嚴嘅承諾」。他又指這不是「攬炒」，一切視乎林鄭月娥如何回應港人訴求，若林鄭不聽民意，「攬炒嗰個係林鄭月娥。」
+
+被問到中聯辦主任駱惠寧曾批評爭取立會過半是「奪權」，楊不認同，指中共若切實執行《基本法》高度自治、港人治港，「權喺香港人嘅手裏面，奪咩權呀？」、「呢個永遠都係建制派嘅咩？」，強調《基本法》賦予立法會制衡及監督的權力，他們只是將憲制責任發揮出來。法律界郭榮鏗亦批評，駱惠寧「完全冇民主社會嗰種胸襟，只有極權社會嗰種鬥爭思維」。
+
+郭家麒也表示政府要回應五大訴求的民意；譚文豪亦強調政府若沒有落實五大訴求，將「否決晒所有法案，否決晒所有撥款直至回應」：「你問我下一步會繼續點，就係繼續否決。佢搵邊一個特首上嚟，佢一日唔落實五大訴求，我哋一日反對落去。」公民黨主席梁家傑則表示，知道戴耀廷和區諾軒牽頭進行民間討論，公民黨會義無反顧支持民間協調，一定會服膺機制，絕不會「輸打贏要」。李予信在會上則沒有發言。
+
+
+▲ 資料圖片：梁家傑（左）、楊岳橋（右）
+
+#### 控方欲播初選介紹記者會 官質疑浪費時間
+
+控方播放公民黨記者會片段後，沒有作任何追問，便提及戴耀廷於兩次記者會前的2020年3月21日，曾於《蘋果日報》刊登〈立會過半是大殺傷力憲制武器〉一文，區確認，並確認於2020年6月9日，與戴耀廷、趙家賢、鍾錦麟及數名區議會主席舉行記者會，介紹35+初選計劃。
+
+控方其後欲播放該記招片段，惟法官陳慶偉即問及播放目的。周天行在法官多次追問下，指證人觀看片段後，控方會就記招的安排發問及就錄音謄本的內容作出澄清，亦會要求他確認影片的真實性。惟陳慶偉指似乎沒有人挑戰影片真實性，並多次問：「讓我們看這些片段有什麼目的？」、「你想證明什麼？」，又不耐煩指：「我不想浪費時間看一些不知道有多長的片段，如最終你只是要問3、4條問題，看這些片段根本毫無意義，我們不是來浪費時間看不相關的片段。」
+
+法官陳仲衡着周天行直接問問題，如證人有需要才播放相關部分。法官李運騰亦要求控方善用法庭時間，提醒控方呈上的證據不一定有助確立其指控，而若控方呈上的片段對法庭沒有幫助，亦無助控方案情，「我們為什麼需要看？」，着控方要謹記這點。陳仲衡亦補充，他們就像餐廳上飢餓的客人，但控方現時只是將所有原材料放在桌上，而不是為他們呈上煮好的菜餚（“Me and my brother judges are like hungry customers in a restaurant, but instead of presenting us the dishes, you put all the raw materials on the table for us.”）。控方回應，因林卓廷和黃碧雲爭議影片真實性，亦望證人能依據脈絡觀看片段，但法官指大律師沈士文已表明其立場。控方終沒有播放片段，轉為就區諾軒的文件發問。
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，16人否認「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，今（21日）踏入審訊第12天。控方續傳召區諾軒作供，提及戴耀廷曾向初選組織者發出各地方選區的協調機制文件，內容包括「積極運用《基本法》權力否決財政預算案」，惟戴在其後的記者會上指參與初選者毋須簽署協議，引來不少批評，鄒家成等人亦發起「墨落無悔」聲明書，質疑拒簽聲明者可無視共識。區諾軒其後發文澄清，指「就算沒有一份文件出台，但協調的協議實然存在」，又形容戴「出於善心，不想徒添暴政羅織罪名」。他今解釋，當時憂慮發布文件會令候選人被取消資格或觸犯《選舉條例》，「因為我哋就算搞初選都好，基本嘅倫理係唔應該讓到參加者犯法。」
+
+#### 戴耀廷記者會稱毋須簽協議 翌日鄒家成等發起「墨落無悔」
+
+控方今早完整播放長52分鐘的首次初選記者會片段，及長36分鐘的公民黨記者會片段，惟下午欲再播放另一條初選記者會片段時遭官質疑浪費時間，遂改就區諾軒的文件發問。
+
+控方展示所有從區諾軒電腦及 Facebook 擷取的文件，區確認當中包括在各區協調會議傳閱、早前供稱由戴耀廷準備的「35+計劃」文件，指「第一次（協調）會議我有份睇到呢個內容」。文件列表亦包括由戴耀廷發送的香港島及九龍西的協調機制初稿文件、區諾軒製作並發給初選參加者的「35+民主派協調機制時間表」，及區製作的初選論壇文件等。
+
+控方其後展示區諾軒的 Facebook 帖文，包括2020年6月19日發布的〈以正視聽——假如我有資格回應抗爭派立場聲明書發起人〉一文，內文提及三位抗爭派立場聲明書發起人公開表示：「是否代表部分拒絕簽署聲明書的參選人可以無視我們早前的共識，甚至無視初選的結果？」區在文中表示作為參與過協調的個人，有幾點作澄清。
+
+區諾軒解釋，在2020年6月9日的初選記者會上，戴耀廷曾提及協調會議上有一個協議，但沒有要求參與者簽署，其後於記者會翌日，鄒家成、張可森和梁晃維便於網上發起一份「墨落無悔 堅定抗爭 抗爭派立場聲明書」，他撰文是嘗試說服幾名發起聲明書的人。
+
+#### 區：戴曾發各選區協調機制文件 參與者毋須簽署
+
+控方續引區諾軒文中頭兩點澄清：
+
+1. 由始至終，就算沒有一份文件出台，但協調的協議實然存在，只是當日記者會沒有公開。沒有公開，不等於參與過的人沒有承諾遵守。諸如五大訴求、怎樣停止選舉工程、否決財政預算案，如果協議沒有約束力，那多次會議得來的共識，便毫無意義。
+
+2. 或許我可以承認，當初記者會戴耀廷教授出於善心，不想徒添暴政羅織罪名，不但無法如願，而且受到很多批評。事後他逐個致歉，懇求所有人諒解，強調聯合確立承諾是大家自行決定，無論如何都尊重，就此，請把所有責任怪到主辦單位，作為民主派，最不希望參與者將責任歸咎其他參與者，產生不信任。
+
+區在主問下表示，文中「多次會議」是指各區的協調會議，而「協議」是指各區協調會議後所擬定的地方選區協調機制文件，當中提及「五大訴求、怎樣停止選舉工程、否決財政預算案」等內容，並有「積極運用《基本法》權力否決財政預算案」的字眼，區形容文件是「嘗試總結各區傾出嚟嘅共識」。
+
+區指，該文件是戴耀廷於6月9日記者會前「忽然」發送予各組織者，但不肯定是否有全部發送予其他參與者，該文件亦沒有公開。區又確認，當時除了超級區議會界別外，每個地方選區均有一份協調機制文件，換言之有5份協議；而據6月9日的記者會，參加者毋須簽署任何文件。
+
+#### 區諾軒：憂發布文件致取消資格或犯法
+
+區續指，戴耀廷在記者會表示毋需簽署文件後，受到一定程度批評，並「不斷地搵唔同嘅人致歉」。被問到指戴「出於善心」、不欲「羅織罪名」的意思，他指當時憂慮若發布一份文件，或會導致候選人被取消資格，因當時有輿論指「任何人如果就住否決預算案表達睇法，會有機會被指唔尊重《基本法》」，增加無法參選的風險；他們亦擔心若每區候選人表明因某些決定而不參選，或會被視為阻止人參選，而觸犯《選舉(舞弊及非法行為)條例》。區強調：「因為我哋就算搞初選都好，基本嘅倫理係唔應該讓到參加者犯法。」
+
+#### 長毛要求如廁 官指不能在被告缺席下審訊 提早休庭
+
+法官陳仲衡續問，區諾軒指有5份協議，是否每區文件均有「積極運用《基本法》權力否決財政預算案」的字眼，區指「我嘅表述會有啲複雜，請耐心聽一聽我講」。惟此時梁國雄舉手表示欲去洗手間，法官遂下令散庭。梁國雄一度以英文表示，自己的律師在庭內，「你不需要休庭」，惟法官陳慶偉指：「我們不能在你缺席的情況下繼續審訊，即使你想，我也不可以。」案件遂提早於下午約4時15分休庭。
+
+此外，連日來吳政亨均在審訊途中表示要求小休讓被告如廁，其代表大律師石書銘今午休後表示，那是被告之間的安排，如有人想如廁會透過吳來傳達。法官陳慶偉笑指知道並非吳個人要求。
+
+由於有被告明早有醫療預約，案件明午續審。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
+
+### 列席認罪被告全於延伸庭被告欄就坐
+
+審訊不設陪審團，由3名國安法指定法官陳慶偉、李運騰及陳仲衡審理。控方代表為副刑事檢控專員萬德豪及周天行，辯方代表包括資深大律師潘熙、大律師沈士文、張耀良、黃宇逸、關文渭、馬維騉、盧敏儀、石書銘、黃廷光、Trevor Beel 等，本身是大律師的劉偉聰則自辯。
+
+不認罪被告包括獲准保釋的鄭達鴻、楊雪盈、彭卓棋、何啟明、劉偉聰、黃碧雲、施德來、陳志全、柯耀林、李予信10人，及還柙的何桂藍、吳政亨、鄒家成、林卓廷、梁國雄及余慧明6人。
+
+列席認罪被告包括馮達浚、朱凱廸、梁晃維、譚凱邦、岑敖暉、黃之鋒、袁嘉蔚及吳敏兒。列席被告自區諾軒作供起，獲安排於兩個延伸庭就坐，但上周五及昨天均因輪候公眾不足而庭內不設記者席，其中一個被告身處的延伸庭沒有任何公眾獲准入內。法庭今更改做法，安排所有列席被告於設有記者席的2號延伸庭就坐。
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-22-assess-military-aid-to-ukraine.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-22-assess-military-aid-to-ukraine.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..8ee7830b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-22-assess-military-aid-to-ukraine.md
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Assess Military Aid To Ukraine
+author: Jahara Matisek, et al.
+date : 2023-02-22 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/i6F68hs.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Assessing a Year of Military Aid to Ukraine"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_How has the Western effort to train and equip Ukrainian forces fared in year one – and what might we expect from additional military assistance in the future?_
+
+
+
+In August 2021, several Ukrainian officers relayed concerns about ‘corruption, incompetence, alcoholism, and idiocy’ in their military. However, when we followed up with these same officers this past month, they made clear that these ‘Soviet problems’ are mostly gone because ‘we’re now in a very serious business, a major war. This environment means responsibility and welcomes initiative’.
+
+The approaching anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine means observers are taking stock of the first 12 months of fighting. While battlefield actions certainly warrant in-depth analysis, it is developments away from the front lines – especially regarding Western military assistance – that might eventually tip the balance in the war.
+
+Kyiv is acknowledging the harsh reality of its dependence on Western governments for next-generation weapon systems as it exhausts Soviet-era stocks. One top Ukrainian presidential advisor recently commented that ‘indecision’ over sending extra weapons is ‘killing more of our people’. Similarly, though, concerns about the West not doing enough before the Russian invasion were also expressed by retired British Lieutenant Colonel Glen Grant, who complained about Canadian military assistance only consisting of medical training and ‘defensive stuff’ as ‘Canada didn’t want to be seen to be helping anybody to kill anybody’. In fact, one Canadian officer interviewed in Kyiv in August 2021 by our team was frustrated by Ottawa imposing restrictive rules of engagement when it came to advising Ukrainian personnel on cyber and information operations.
+
+Surprise visits to London, Paris and Brussels on 8–10 February 2023 by President Volodymyr Zelensky rallied European countries to maintain support and aid for Ukraine. In Paris, he said weapons from ‘France and Germany have the potential to be game changers ... The sooner we get heavy long-range weapons and our pilots get modern planes ... the quicker this Russian aggression will end’.
+
+How has the Western effort to train and equip the Armed Forces of Ukraine fared in year one? What were the main roadblocks to getting advanced equipment into the hands of Ukrainian soldiers? What have been the major successes, and what might we expect from additional military assistance in the future?
+
+After dozens of interviews with Western military advisors and Ukrainian personnel over the last two years, we contend that Ukraine is reaching a critical point as Soviet weapons, ammo, armour, vehicles and aircraft are exhausted. Western capitals will need to deftly manage the provision of Western armaments and improve unity of effort in advising and training the Ukrainian Armed Forces in an effective and sustainable way.
+
+
+### The Good
+
+Success in repelling Russia’s invasion reflects years of preparation and assistance, political and military leadership, and the skill and bravery of the Ukrainian people. Without the willpower of Ukrainians resisting Vladimir Putin’s invasion and defending their country, Western capitals would likely be deploying even more forces to the eastern flank of NATO than they are already. Fortunately, Western efforts to build Ukrainian citizen resilience and resistance prior to Russia’s invasion ensured that many Ukrainians found innovative ways of opposing Russian troops, while enabling partisan and Ukrainian special operations units to ambush Russian forces.
+
+Supporters of Ukraine’s war effort have much to be proud of over the past year. Despite dire predictions, Ukraine’s military has fought admirably against the Kremlin’s renewed and expanded invasion. Moreover, informal security assistance to Ukrainian troops through NGOs, civil society, and backchannel communications via Western military personnel has ensured that frontline forces have received proper equipment, intelligence and tactical advice.
+
+#### Manoeuvre, Firepower, Protection
+
+Since Russia’s 2022 invasion, the West has collectively provided over $48.5 billion in security aid to Ukraine, per the Kiel Institute. According to the Russian news agency TASS, this ‘nearly equals Russia’s 2022 defense budget’. The US has led the bulk of the effort to arm and equip the Ukrainians with advanced weapons, technology and intelligence. The US has provided over $27.1 billion in military aid to Ukraine and trained over 3,100 Ukrainian military personnel in 2022. With the approval of collective combined arms training for Ukrainian battalions in December, that number is sure to grow quickly.
+
+___`Success in repelling Russia’s invasion reflects years of preparation and assistance, political and military leadership, and the skill and bravery of the Ukrainian people`___
+
+Other Western countries have made important contributions too. For instance, the UK was the first country to pledge Challenger main battle tanks (MBTs), giving many Western capitals political cover to pledge their own MBTs. Even Berlin and Washington agreed to send their top tracks, but only after Germany made the transfer contingent on the US sending Abrams. Additionally, the UK leads Operation Interflex (composed of trainers and advisors from Western militaries), and trained approximately 10,000 Ukrainians in 2022. Between 2015 and early 2022, the precursor Operation Orbital trained over 22,000 Ukrainian personnel.
+
+While France only coached 40 Ukrainian troops on its soil in 2022, French leaders have pivoted towards training 2,000 Ukrainians and have proposed teaching Ukrainian fighter pilots as well. This decision came after an announcement from the Netherlands on 20 January 2023 offering about 60 F-16s to Ukraine. On 10 February 2023, Ukrainian officials formally requested the transfer of Dutch F-16s to their military, but the success of this transfer and its impact on the Ukrainian Air Force hinges on two aspects. First, the US would have to approve the export and transfer of F-16s to Ukraine. Second, the necessary pilot and ground personnel to fly and maintain F-16s would require training in the US. The logic and pattern of Western security assistance over the last year suggests that President Joe Biden’s ‘No’ to Ukraine receiving F-16s will likely become a ‘Yes’ as the rest of NATO pledges and commits to the next level of escalation by providing Western aircraft and training Ukrainian fighter pilots.
+
+Adding even more international weight to the training effort, the EU recently announced an expanded military assistance programme for Ukraine. With operational headquarters in Germany and Poland, the new organisation – the EU Military Assistance Mission in Support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine) – is slated to train up to 30,000 troops, including crews for the pledged European tanks. All told, 26 member states have offered to either help staff the mission or provide training modules to the Ukrainians.
+
+#### Leadership
+
+But it isn’t just weapons and training that have made the difference. Structural reforms in the Ukrainian military have also borne fruit. Following Russia’s 2014 invasion, then-Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko directed sweeping changes to the military, requesting Western advisers to help implement the reforms and reach NATO standards by 2020. The resulting effort led to a fledgling Ukrainian NCO corps and, relatedly, increased emphasis on junior leader initiative. The post-2014 reforms also drove the creation of the Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SOF) and the establishment of a mechanism to rapidly enlist civilians into territorial defence forces. In the early weeks and months of Russia’s expanded invasion last year, both the SOF and the territorial defence forces played vital roles in Kyiv’s resistance. The value of Ukrainian territorial defence forces cannot be underestimated, as our interviews indicate these personnel are highly motivated to defend their country and spend their own money to procure weapons and gear to be on par with the Ukrainian SOF.
+
+#### Targeting
+
+Although not widely acknowledged by US policymakers, growing evidence suggests that the US and European countries have provided targeting assistance to the Ukrainian military, contributing to the spectacular campaign against senior Russian commanders earlier in the war. Reports from this month go so far as to say that the US either provides or confirms the coordinates ‘on the majority of strikes’ launched by Ukrainian HIMARS units against Russian forces. Ostensibly, this is to ensure that limited ammunition stockpiles are used to maximum effect. More importantly, though, the process created between Ukrainian frontline units and US intelligence targeting centres creates trust between the two countries that may lay the groundwork for the approval of longer-range weapons in the future.
+
+
+### The Bad
+
+Despite impressive achievements, Western military assistance is still often ad-hoc and disorganised. Western trainers quickly stood up new organisations, such as Security Assistance Group-Ukraine (SAG-U) and EUMAM, solely focused on military assistance. Another organisation, Joint Multinational Training Group – Ukraine, was hastily relocated from Ukraine to Germany in the days prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion, forcing trainers to restart instruction all over again in a new country. One US planner likened the effort to ‘building the plane while in flight’.
+
+Western planners seem to recognise the need for standardisation, with one staff officer telling us that many of the states involved in Ukrainian training have agreed to standardise their programmes of instruction (POI). Instead of each country training Ukrainian units in its own style, standardised POIs will help create uniform capabilities across Kyiv’s security forces. Thus, if a Ukrainian completes basic training (or any other type of training) in the UK, Germany or Poland, the result would be the same. Even more encouraging is the fact that Western planners have made strides toward aligning the training of entire Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) brigades, meaning individual companies can be trained throughout Europe, but then come together as brigade tactical groups and UAF brigades ready to fight after undergoing collective training. The push towards standardisation and unity of effort is designed to eliminate ‘assistance fratricide’ and to get all partners on the same path toward the same goal.
+
+Early in the war, Western planners were caught in the tyranny of now, unable to address Ukraine’s long-term security needs due to the acute threat posed by Russia’s expanded invasion. That too seems to be changing. In January, Western planners held their first planning conference to prioritise training based on the advice and requests of the Ukrainians themselves. Staffers tell us these meetings are now expected every six weeks or so, with the next one taking place in March. Each meeting will enable greater unity of effort and more efficient use of resources to maximise the training of the UAF against Russian forces.
+
+
+### The Ugly
+
+#### Public Infighting
+
+When it comes to military assistance, few things are more painful to watch than allies arguing over the details in public. Yet that is what has repeatedly happened over the past 12 months. Recently, the point of friction between allies has centred on the pace of aid and overall strategy. Visiting Washington in January, UK Foreign Secretary James Cleverly argued that it would be possible for Ukraine to score a victory this year if the allies move fast to exploit Russia’s vulnerability. US policymakers, however, pushed back, arguing that it is critical to pace the aid and not overwhelm Kyiv with resources that it cannot put to full use. One of the more egregious splits occurred last month after German Chancellor Olaf Scholz initially refused to send Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine. After deliberations with the US, Germany eventually agreed to send the tanks, but only after the US committed to sending its own Abrams MBT to the front lines. It remains to be seen when Ukraine will receive Abrams because the Biden administration is using the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) fund. USAI money will have to be spent on buying Abrams directly from factories, meaning that it will take months to produce export Abrams for Ukraine; alternatively, the US might have used this as a stalling action, as Taiwan and Poland are also expecting deliveries of Abrams over the next three years.
+
+#### Western Companies Witting and Unwitting Accomplices
+
+Perhaps some of the more disquieting developments in Western military aid to Ukraine relate to the role played by major corporations. Research from Switzerland’s University of St Gallen recently found that 1,404 EU and G7 companies operated a total of 2,405 subsidiaries in Russia at the time of the expanded invasion. By November 2022, only 9% of these subsidiaries have divested from Russia, calling into question Western willingness to decouple from the Kremlin’s war-making economy.
+
+___`When it comes to military assistance, few things are more painful to watch than allies arguing over the details in public`___
+
+Few companies have caused more of a stir in the Russo-Ukrainian war than SpaceX. Elon Musk’s aerospace manufacturer earned praise early in the war for speeding Starlink internet terminals into the war-ravaged country. However, just this month, SpaceX announced restrictions for Starlink that would prohibit Ukrainian forces from using the connections in offensive targeting systems like drones. Our interviews with NGOs, such as Blue/Yellow Ukraine, indicate that such blocking of Starlink internet access actually became a problem much earlier, in the summer of 2022.
+
+
+### The Future
+
+What does the future of Western military assistance mean for Ukraine? As an old US saying goes, ‘You cannot push a river’. Everything has its own timing, and security assistance cannot be rushed or delayed because there is a pragmatic need to assist Ukraine without provoking a nuclear response from Russia. Instead of predictions, we offer four questions to guide Western thinking over future military assistance.
+
+#### Will Putin Escalate?
+
+As Western capitals deliberate over providing fourth-generation combat aircraft (such as F-16s, Gripens, Typhoons and Rafales) to Ukraine, the US and other leading powers must be ever-cognisant of the impact such assistance will have on Russia. Already, the US is considering the option of re-inserting commandos back into Ukraine to revive ‘control teams’, helping Ukrainian forces and partisans to more effectively fight Russian troops. If the effort to arm the Ukrainians can continue to thread the needle between provoking Putin and improving Ukrainian lethality, Kyiv has a real chance of success in the long term. If, however, continued Western support to Ukraine proves too much for Putin to tolerate and the Kremlin dramatically escalates the invasion, perhaps with tactical nuclear weapons, it is hard to see how there will be any real winners.
+
+#### What are China, Iran and North Korea Doing?
+
+Just as the West has buttressed Ukraine against Russia’s onslaught, so too might China, Iran and North Korea – some of the few state actors willing to openly support the Kremlin’s invasion – reinforce Russia’s war effort. Iran and North Korea are providing substantial material assistance to Russian forces, mainly in the form of drones and artillery shells. Although there does not yet appear to be direct Chinese involvement in the war, the Biden administration has identified some Chinese companies as providing non-lethal aid (such as body armour and helmets) to Russia. Xi Jinping’s refusal to condemn Putin’s invasion early in the war does not augur well. Even more troublingly, a recent report from a US think tank found that state-owned Chinese businesses are trading in sensitive technologies with Russia’s defence establishment, including businesses involved in the ongoing invasion.
+
+#### What Do We Expect This to Accomplish?
+
+As Iraq and Afghanistan (and Vietnam a generation before) make clear, training and equipping foreign armies is a fraught endeavour. With Soviet stocks of war matériel becoming more difficult to source for the Ukrainian military, the West will need to shoulder a greater burden of defence production, education and training for the Ukrainian military. Instead of providing aging stocks of Western weapon systems and ammo, at some point, Ukraine will have to receive systems and ammo directly from factories. The inherent tension in this will be its impact on Western military readiness and force postures for potential conflicts and crises elsewhere. This will strain many Western militaries because they will increasingly have to focus on equipping, training and educating Ukrainian military personnel instead of their own. The goal, of course, for Western military advisors will be to achieve sustainability within the Ukrainian military through a ‘train-the-trainers’ approach, where Ukrainian personnel can become proficient enough in certain weapons systems and tactics that they can shoulder the programme of instruction at the institutional level and provide courses to their own forces inside Ukraine.
+
+#### Can Transatlantic Unity and Engagement be Sustained?
+
+With an infrastructure deputy arrested for stealing $400,000 and the discovery of over $1,000,000 in the sofa of a former deputy defence minister, the perception of Ukrainian corruption in Western countries will threaten the future provision of aid. Russian talking points and sociopolitical-information warfare against Western societies focus on undermining domestic support for Ukraine. Hence, Ukrainian leaders should continue political reforms and the outing of corrupt officials, as this liability can be weaponised by Russian propagandists and also by opposition parties in Western countries – leveraging Ukrainian corruption as a talking point to reduce spending and support for Ukraine.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+With Moscow and Kyiv appearing on the verge of launching opposing spring offensives, there are no signs of either side letting up any time soon. But as Russia struggles to replenish its losses, Ukraine may have an opportunity to make significant advances, as long as Western partners can send the right assistance at the right time. The question then becomes, have the US and others learned from the past year of military assistance to Ukraine? Only time will tell.
+
+---
+
+__Jahara Matisek__ is a military professor in the national security affairs department at the US Naval War College, a 2023 Non-Resident Fellow with the Irregular Warfare Initiative (joint production of Princeton’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project and the Modern War Institute at West Point), and a US Department of Defense Minerva researcher. Lt Col Matisek has published over 80 articles and essays in peer-reviewed journals and policy relevant outlets on strategy, warfare, and security assistance. A 2020 Bronze Star recipient for serving as the director of operations and commander of the 451st Expeditionary Operations Support Squadron, Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan, he is a command pilot and previously served as a senior fellow for the Homeland Defense Institute and associate professor in the Military and Strategic Studies Department at the US Air Force Academy.
+
+__Will Reno__ is professor and chair of the Political Science Department at Northwestern University. He has conducted fieldwork and interviews in conflict zones across Africa and the Middle East for over 30 years, and has authored three books: Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone, Warlord Politics and African States, and Warfare in Independent Africa. Dr Reno has published over 100 articles in peer-reviewed journals and policy-relevant periodicals, and edited volumes on civil wars, rebels and military assistance. Finally, he is the principal investigator for the US Department of Defense Minerva-funded program studying how the US can improve foreign military training.
+
+__Sam Rosenberg__ is a PhD student at the LBJ School of Public Affairs, serving as a Goodpaster Scholar through the Army’s Advanced Strategic Planning and Policy Program. His research focuses on national security issues, including how the US builds foreign militaries in partner states. Sam is an active-duty Army officer, serving most recently with US Northern Command on the Commander’s Initiative’s Group and within the Strategy and Policy Directorate. He commissioned in 2006 as an infantry officer and served in a variety of leadership positions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Germany and Eastern Europe. He holds a bachelor’s degree in American Politics from West Point and a master’s degree in National Security Policy from Georgetown University, where he studied as a Downing Scholar.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-22-european-nato-air-forces.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-22-european-nato-air-forces.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c7d0e261
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-22-european-nato-air-forces.md
@@ -0,0 +1,227 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : European NATO Air Forces
+author: Justin Bronk
+date : 2023-02-22 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/WD1mVG4.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Regenerating Warfighting Credibility for European NATO Air Forces"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_This paper examines three challenges for European NATO air forces in deterring future aggression by Russia against Alliance members – the current vulnerability of NATO air bases and options for hardening or dispersal; current shortfalls in NATO aircrew readiness for high-intensity combat and the required changes; and the need for SEAD/DEAD capabilities and appropriate munitions stockpiles._
+
+
+
+### Executive Summary
+
+- The UK armed forces and other European militaries have been sized, equipped and organised around the assumption that air superiority will be quickly achieved and leveraged to defeat state opponents.
+
+- Russia will remain an adversary for the foreseeable future and is likely to continue to rearm and rebuild large-scale conventional forces once the fighting in Ukraine ceases. It is in China’s geopolitical interests to split US and European resources and attention away from the Indo-Pacific. Therefore, China is likely to help Russia rearm once there is some form of ceasefire in Ukraine. This would significantly increase the level of threat Russia can pose in the medium term.
+
+- The Chinese military threat means fewer US military assets available to reinforce Europe in a crisis. A notable risk is that Russia will take advantage of a conflict between the US and China in the Indo-Pacific to renew aggression against European NATO members or Ukraine.
+
+- The likelihood of an enduring military threat from Russia and, increasingly, US commitment to the Indo-Pacific mean that European NATO air forces must take steps to urgently regenerate credible warfighting capability against Russian forces. Medium-term deterrence requires it.
+
+- However, almost all European air forces, including the RAF, currently lack many of the critical capabilities required to credibly be able to gain and exploit air superiority against Russian forces, or indeed any state opponent with modern ground-based air defence systems and long-range strike capabilities.
+
+- The first major area of concern is the vulnerability of air forces that have, due to decades of efficiency-saving measures, ended up in a position where their combat aircraft and the maintenance capacity to support them are concentrated in a small number of main operating air bases with limited hardened shelters or ground-based missile defence systems. This makes them highly vulnerable to Russian long-range strike capabilities and so undermines their deterrence credibility and survivability in any potential conflict.
+
+- Remedying this will require a combination of dispersal, hardening and ground-based air defence protection. The optimal combination will vary depending on each air force’s current laydown, equipment and resourcing. Sweden and Finland both provide examples of air forces that currently maintain a much less vulnerable posture than most European NATO air forces. Not all aspects of their equipment or practices can be universally adopted, but there is much that could be learned.
+
+- The second major concern is a lack of currency and proficiency for high-intensity mission sets among aircrew and other key personnel across most air forces in Europe. The tactics and procedures required to be effective against a state adversary like Russia are very different from those required for peacetime air policing or close air support against insurgent groups.
+
+- To regenerate proficiency in high-end warfighting mission sets, air forces must reduce discretionary commitments such as counterterrorism and international diplomacy-focused deployments. At present, with the scale of ongoing activity, most air forces, including the RAF, lack the necessary maintenance, spares and aircrew capacity to conduct focused warfighting training at scale. Overstretching fast jet fleets by trying to do everything is resulting in increasing problems with aircraft availability, and significant numbers of the most critical experienced instructor pilots and senior engineers are becoming burnt out and resigning.
+
+- The third major area of concern is that no European NATO air forces currently have sufficient expertise or the required munitions stocks to conduct suppression and destruction of enemy air defences (SEAD/DEAD) at scale. The lethality of mobile surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems on both sides in Ukraine is a vivid reminder of the consequences of an inability to conduct SEAD/DEAD at scale. Without such capacity, European NATO air forces cannot credibly achieve and exploit control of the air over a battlefield contested by Russian forces or even by near-peers such as Iran.
+
+- Weapons and aircraft already exist that are well suited to SEAD/DEAD; most notably, in terms of weapons, the GBU-53/B StormBreaker, SPEAR 3 and AARGM-ER, and in terms of aircraft, the F-35. However, these are all expensive capabilities that must be fielded in significant numbers and regularly trained and exercised at scale as part of the joint force if they are to be operationally credible. This means that European air forces that do so will pay a significant opportunity cost in terms of other potential mission sets and capability areas that will need to be disinvested in to generate financial headroom and capacity.
+
+- It is, nonetheless, vital that at least a few of NATO’s larger European air forces do regenerate a SEAD/DEAD capacity at scale against modern, mobile SAM systems. The key warfighting bottleneck standing in the way of generating sustainable European deterrence credibility against Russia (or other regional near-peer threats like Iran) is an inability to credibly establish air superiority due to lack of SEAD/DEAD capacity. Fixing this deficiency should, therefore, be seen as a matter of urgent priority.
+
+- The only alternative – accepting that air superiority is not attainable over future battlefields contested by Russia or another adversary nation – would require a total redesign of NATO’s joint forces towards a force that relies on massed artillery, armour and infantry as the core of its fighting power, rather than air-delivered firepower. That alternative implies demographic, political and financial costs that far outstrip the costs of regenerating warfighting credibility for NATO air forces.
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+The Russian invasion of Ukraine and fears of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan have forced the US, the UK and other NATO nations to once again plan for high-intensity peer warfighting as a core task for the first time since the end of the Cold War. At the same time, experience from the ongoing conflict in Ukraine has reminded air forces everywhere of many often forgotten or ignored features of peer warfare.
+
+First, Russia’s long-range precision strike campaign and successful Ukrainian strike and sabotage operations have confirmed that large fixed air bases are key targets and will be struck with accurate missile barrages during any force-on-force clash. Second, the poor performance of the Russian Aerospace Forces (Vozdushno-Kosmicheskiye Sily, or VKS) due to systemic deficits in aircrew, doctrine, planning and command-and-control (C2) staff competence has graphically illustrated the importance of regular realistic training, not only for aircrew, but for the whole airpower enterprise. Third, the war in Ukraine has graphically illustrated that the scale of weapon use in peer warfighting at scale would rapidly and dangerously deplete Western stockpiles and far outstrip existing surge production capacity. Finally, the mutual denial of air superiority for both the Ukrainian Air Force and VKS by ground-based air defence (GBAD) assets has graphically illustrated the consequences of not being able to conduct suppression and destruction of enemy air defences (SEAD/DEAD) at scale.
+
+The Western way of warfare relies on having air superiority over any potential battlefield to provide ISTAR capabilities and precision firepower at scale through close air support and interdiction. However, if SEAD/DEAD cannot be conducted, then air superiority is impossible to attain, an inconvenient and expensive truth for air forces that have been largely optimised for operations in permissive and semi-permissive airspace for decades, and whose high-end warfighting capabilities are largely air-to-air focused. This mission-based deficit is closely linked to both aircrew training and munitions stockpile challenges, since SEAD/DEAD is a highly demanding mission that requires specialist skills and weaponry to accomplish.
+
+The gap between pre-invasion expectations and the actual performance of both the Russian and Ukrainian armed forces will also have significant long-term implications for deterrence between major powers. The logistics, operational planning and training deficiencies that initially hamstrung the Russian army are likely to make all militaries more inclined to weight assessments of such factors more heavily in future when considering the conventional military capabilities of any would-be adversary. Essentially, Russia has reminded the world quite how difficult it is to plan, execute and provide logistical support and enablement on the scale required for warfighting against a peer nation. As such, in future, states are likely to be less deterred by front line force structures that conspicuously lack realistic training and exercise schedules, enabler support, logistics provision and stockpiles for spares and ammunition. Re-establishing deterrence credibility with conventional military forces, therefore, will require not only regaining key warfighting skills such as SEAD/DEAD, but also regenerating the stockpiles and realistic exercise programmes and training tempo needed to avoid hollow front line forces. For non-US NATO air forces, these challenges are much more severe than for the US since the US Air Force (USAF), US Navy and US Marine Corps all still field airpower on a large scale with a global footprint and large munitions stocks. However, the Pentagon is heavily focused on the Indo-Pacific and the threat from Chinese forces that increasingly pose a major threat to US military freedom of action. The result is that there will be far fewer US forces available to help defend Europe in any future war with Russia. This would be especially problematic for European powers if Russia took the logical step of coordinating any future armed aggression to coincide with the US being occupied by a war or serious armed standoff with China.
+
+In Europe itself, whether the current phase of the war in Ukraine ends in a Ukrainian victory on the ground or a protracted stalemate and eventually an uneasy ceasefire, Russia will remain a serious military threat in the three-to-five-year timeframe. The Russian political leadership class has completely committed to an ideological, and in their view existential, confrontation with the Western-led global order. Military setbacks in Ukraine have led to more extreme rhetoric and demands, and partial national mobilisation rather than withdrawal or moderation. At the same time, Russia’s economy has been badly hit by comprehensive sanctions and the demographic impact of mobilisation, mass casualties and emigration of young people. Its energy supply leverage over Europe is rapidly waning as Germany and other key customers urgently diversify their gas and oil supplies away from Russia. Political parties and media organisations that once took significant Russian funding now face public backlash in most Western countries. All these factors mean that most of the Kremlin’s so-called ‘grey-zone’ tools for competition and influence have been dramatically weakened for the foreseeable future. This will logically increase its reliance on military power to compete, and so rearmament and reconstruction of its conventional forces after the immediate end of hostilities in Ukraine will almost certainly be a priority. In this, Russia is likely to be heavily supported by China in both economic and technical terms. The Chinese government remains extremely uncomfortable with Russia’s war in Ukraine, and has shown limited willingness to provide overt support while hostilities are ongoing. However, once the shooting pauses, the fact that it is in China’s geostrategic interest to have Russia continue to tie down US and European military forces by posing a threat in Europe suggests that Beijing will support Russian rearmament efforts at scale.
+
+To ensure that Russia does not have an opportunity to re-establish the conventional capability to threaten them, European NATO members must urgently regenerate the warfighting credibility of their armed forces. Although the US remains far and away the most powerful NATO member, China will force it to keep the bulk of its forces postured towards the Indo-Pacific in the coming decades. Since the air domain is where the bulk of NATO’s conventional firepower and lethality sits, deterring Russia requires European NATO air forces to regenerate warfighting capabilities so that they can defend NATO airspace and ground forces.
+
+This paper examines three areas of challenge for European NATO air forces facing this task. Chapter I looks at the vulnerability of NATO air bases and the options for hardening or dispersal according to various existing models. Chapter II provides an analysis of NATO aircrew training and exercise practices. Chapter III looks at the twinned challenges of munitions stockpiles and SEAD/DEAD requirements. Finally, the Conclusion lays out several broad recommendations for European NATO air forces in the short, medium and longer term.
+
+
+### Reducing Air Base Vulnerability
+
+In the 30 years since the end of the Cold War, all NATO air forces have significantly reduced the number of aircraft, bases and personnel they operate. This has, however, been accompanied by a significant increase in the theoretical combat power of most air forces, due to dramatic improvements in precision-guided munitions, targeting pods, sensors and avionics. Essentially, the aircraft and weapons have become much more capable and lethal, while also becoming more expensive and complex to maintain. This, combined with declining defence budgets, has led almost all NATO air forces to dramatically reduce the number of air bases from which they operate, and to centralise maintenance and logistics support on the remaining main operating bases to improve cost efficiency. This made sense in the absence of a credible strike threat to those air forces on their bases. However, with the return of Russia as an active adversary, European NATO air forces must confront the fact that their current force laydowns involve potentially very lethal, but nonetheless comparatively small, numbers of fast jets and enabler aircraft on a small number of main operating bases, often alongside the deep maintenance and sustainment facilities for each fleet.
+
+This is a major issue for the conventional deterrence credibility of NATO’s airpower, since it means that much of it is very vulnerable to destruction by Russian long-range precision strike capabilities in the event of any direct clash. Throughout the invasion of Ukraine, Russia has fired thousands of ground-, sea- and air-launched cruise and ballistic missiles against a range of Ukrainian targets with consistently sufficient accuracy to hit individual buildings from standoff ranges. The challenge for the UK and other European air forces is not necessarily that Russia would open any clash with a massive strike wave against NATO air bases (although it could, depending on the perceived stakes and risk on both sides). Rather, the risk is that NATO could be deterred from using its airpower to start degrading Russian IADS (integrated air defence system) coverage and attriting ground forces during any future Russian aggression against an Eastern European NATO member state, due to the chronic vulnerability of its combat air fleets to return strikes. Since most joint-force ISTAR capacity and precision firepower across the Alliance is delivered by air, and Western armies have very limited GBAD capabilities, this is a serious problem.
+
+There are essentially two potential approaches GBAD air forces can take, and in some cases already are taking, to reduce the vulnerability of their air bases. The first is hardening (which can include deploying integrated GBAD capabilities) and the second is dispersal. Both present challenges and have practical limitations and significant extra costs associated with them. Neither are a silver-bullet solution in themselves, but both offer ways to significantly reduce the attractiveness of air forces as targets for finite Russian (or other state) long-range precision strike and sabotage capabilities. Therefore, they are an essential component for NATO air forces trying to reorientate towards great-power deterrence once more.
+
+Hardening involves using both passive and active defences to render air bases and the aircraft, weapons stockpiles, fuel and facilities on them less vulnerable to strikes. Passive Cold War staples such as hardened aircraft shelters (HASs) (see Figure 1) and command facilities have been replaced on many bases by commercial-grade buildings or light shelters that provide no blast protection. Even where they have been retained, the concentration of fleets on small numbers of bases means that generally there are not nearly enough HASs for all the aircraft to be so protected.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 1: RAF Squadron Buildings with Hardened Aircraft Shelters.__ Source: Google maps satellite image, 1 December 2022._
+
+One of the reasons why HASs have gone out of fashion since the Cold War is that precision-guided munitions with unitary warheads can defeat HAS protection with direct hits. However, in the context of long-range Russian missiles, as opposed to comparatively cheap Western laser- or GPS-guided bombs dropped from aircraft, they still provide very significant levels of protection, for several reasons. First, destroying multiple aircraft protected by HASs requires at least one, and sometimes multiple, direct hits with penetrating, unitary warheads on each shelter. This means that a lot of accurate, long-range and therefore expensive munitions are required for an adversary to destroy even a moderate number of aircraft using conventional strikes. Second, it is difficult to tell if a HAS is in use at any given time using overhead or orbital surveillance. Therefore, if there are more HASs than aircraft on a base, an enemy will be forced to assume that they will waste at least some weapons on empty shelters during any strike, and it will also be more difficult to track the dispersal of aircraft both on the air base and off-site for targeting purposes. This effect would dovetail extremely well with the use of realistic decoy aircraft and other deception measures to greatly increase the number of missile strikes Russia would have to plan on to achieve a given level of effect. HASs are also very useful for reducing vulnerability to more unconventional threats, since inside them aircraft are well protected against the light warheads that can be carried by small UAVs and loitering munitions, and are harder for infiltrated saboteurs to reach in general.
+
+By contrast, aircraft parked under unprotected sun shelters, in non-hardened hangars or on hardstands (see Figure 2) are vulnerable to being destroyed or disabled in significant numbers by sabotage or a single missile carrying a large high-explosive fragmentation warhead or submunitions. They are also much easier to find and target using small UAVs or loitering munitions. The risk is heightened further if aircraft parked on hardstands or in hangars are not separated by raised berms to deflect horizontal blast, shrapnel and the spread of fire or secondary explosions. Even with revetments for horizontal blast protection, multiple aircraft can be destroyed or rendered unflyable by both conventional missile strikes and/or special forces using UAVs to drop explosives and cause secondary fuel fires. This was graphically illustrated by the destruction of at least eight Su-30SM and Su-24MR jets from Russia’s Naval Aviation forces at Saki Air base in August 2022 by a combination of as-yet unattributed primary and secondary explosions and fire.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 2: RAF Squadron Hangar with Aircraft Parked on Hardstand Area.__ Source: Google maps satellite image, 1 December 2022._
+
+The construction of HASs is a relatively expensive activity, made more so by the increased space requirements for a given number of aircraft compared to large hangars, and the need to provide the requisite ground support equipment in multiple locations around a squadron site. Line maintenance also becomes more labour-intensive for ground crews if aircraft are to undergo routine maintenance tasks in dispersed HAS sites, rather than in a large central hangar or on hardstands. However, compared to the cost of combat aircraft themselves, it is relatively efficient to construct HASs when doing so will significantly improve their survivability. As an example of the rough cost and continued appeal for air forces who take high-intensity conflict seriously as a planning requirement, in July 2020 the Republic of Korea Air Force and USAF completed a joint programme to construct 20 new third-generation HASs at Kunsan Air Base for a total cost of $125 million. This is around the cost of one modern Western fighter aircraft, including engine and initial servicing contract. The relatively small size of most NATO fighter fleets, and the fact that some HAS capacity still exists at many bases, suggests that resilience against long-range missile and UAV strikes could relatively affordably be significantly improved by national or multinational HAS construction and renovation programmes.
+
+Another crucial element of passive hardening to make air bases more resilient in the face of standoff attacks is the ability to rapidly defuse unexploded munitions, fill in craters and resurface runways that have been damaged. Multiple runways or the ability to take off from taxiways provide additional resilience but ultimately, to remain active under fire, an air force must retain the ability to repair runways rapidly, so that an opponent would have to fire an uneconomical number of missiles on a sustained basis to keep aircraft grounded. Under existential threat from the People’s Liberation Army’s long-range missile arsenal, the Republic of China [Taiwanese] Air Force has long maintained rapid runway repair teams and equipment at each base, and the Israeli Air Force does the same to avoid being grounded by Hizbullah rocket strikes. However, in most European air forces the specialist engineering support units that provided a rapid runway repair capability during the Cold War were disbanded in the 1990s and 2000s due to the lack of an obvious threat.
+
+It is far more expensive to harden C2 facilities, munitions and fuel bunkers. This is not only because they are larger, but also because they need to be assured to a greater degree than each individual HAS due to their value as targets for limited stocks of expensive ballistic missiles able to penetrate significant depths of concrete. Providing such defence requires burying these facilities under large amounts of earth and reinforced concrete. As such, dispersing these functions across smaller, more numerous nodes with reduced signatures may be more viable than buried hardening as a route towards reducing their vulnerability within the budgets available. It is also significantly more difficult to provide HAS protection for large enabler aircraft like tankers and AWACS than for fighters, meaning that a greater reliance on dispersal (including potentially at civilian airports) and active hardening through air defence systems at main operating bases may be a better route for reducing the vulnerability of these critical assets.
+
+Active hardening for airpower on the ground involves the ability to intercept and shoot down incoming missiles, in addition to traditional ground-based force protection such as that provided by the RAF Regiment for the UK against infiltration or special forces attacks. Integrated air and missile defence (IAMD) requires a layered and seamlessly interconnected system of sensors to provide early warning and tracking of incoming threats, and shooters to intercept the missiles. For the defence of facilities in the homeland, IAMD capabilities also require assured and seamless deconfliction with civilian air traffic activities and other military flying. These integration and networking requirements drive up cost and personnel demands on top of the sensors and interceptor systems, which are themselves very expensive. For example, Bahrain recently paid $2.5 billion for 60 Patriot PAC-3 missiles, 36 Patriot PAC-2 GEM missiles, nine M903 launchers and two AN/MPQ-65 radar sets, along with control stations and other associated equipment. This would be roughly sufficient to protect one site from a large-scale ballistic missile attack, or two sites from a smaller-scale attack. In terms of air defence systems focused on cruise missiles, a contract to produce six batteries of medium-range NASAMS systems for Ukraine was valued at $1.2 billion in 2022.
+
+The high cost of providing modern GBAD, particularly in layered form, has itself become a driver of further air base consolidation in recent years. The Royal Norwegian Air Force is closing Air Force Base Bodø and concentrating its F-35 fleet on only one main operating base (Ørland) and one forward base (Evenes). The logic is that with a limited number of bases to begin with, it is better to concentrate forces on one base around which more effective layered air defence can be sited. It is certainly the case that an active hardening approach using layered ballistic and cruise missile defence systems is easier to finance, deploy and sustain if it only has to provide protection to a small number of main operating bases.
+
+However, since Russia has a significant arsenal of advanced ballistic missiles with terminal manoeuvring and decoy-launching capabilities, and the air-launched hypersonic Kh-47M2 Kinzhal and naval hypersonic 3M22 Zircon missiles, even layered defences that have a high degree of efficiency against traditional cruise missiles and less advanced ballistic missiles cannot fully protect air bases. On the other hand, modern advanced quasi-ballistic and hypersonic threats are available to Russia in relatively limited quantities, rely on valuable and scarce launch platforms to get within range of many Western European targets, and would be in demand for a wide range of target sets. The demonstrated ability of modern Western medium- and short-range air defence systems like NASAMS and the IRIS-T SLM to achieve a very high probability of kill against even advanced Russian cruise missiles like the Kh-101 and 9M728 in Ukraine shows what could be achieved in terms of threat reduction against the bulk of Russia’s long-range firepower with even a single battery at each major air base.
+
+The second major approach to reducing the vulnerability of air forces on the ground is dispersal. At the most basic level, this involves increasing the number of targets an opponent has to try to hit, and complicating their targeting process by moving assets between air bases and support facilities regularly. Among European nations, Sweden has taken the dispersal approach the furthest in terms of the ability to operate away from main operating bases for sustained periods under realistic combat conditions.
+
+With a medium-sized fleet of 95 operational Gripen C/D fighters, and 60 new Gripen E jets on order, the Swedish Air Force operates from five home operating bases, but for its wartime posture maintains the ability to operate from 11 main bases, 12 forward operating bases and 21 reserve bases. To further increase dispersal options it also maintains highway strips, and some bases have multiple runways with redundant taxiways connecting them to multiple hardstand areas. Sweden also maintains GBAD capabilities to further increase resilience against Russian strikes. However, this ability to operate dispersed requires an air force and aircraft designed for that purpose from the ground up. The ground support equipment set for a Gripen fighter wing such as F 21 is supplied in 20-ft shipping containers that can be attached to a hangar to form part of a home base maintenance facility, but can also be loaded onto medium-sized trucks in minutes and dispersed at short notice along with the aircraft themselves. The Gripen itself sits relatively low to the ground and has access panels that can be opened with push toggle locks with winter gloves on, greatly facilitating maintenance by ground crews without ladders or specialist tools in dispersed locations. The auxiliary power unit on the aircraft allows it to be started up from cold without ground power if required, and most major operations, including loading weapons and engine changes, can be conducted outdoors with universal winch tools known as ‘fishing rods’. Fuel and ammunition dumps and hides are required at the forward and reserve bases, and must be transported to and loaded on highway strips as needed. To ensure that these sorts of armed flight operations all over the country can be certified and assured from an explosive and flight safety point of view, this must be practised with reasonable regularity.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 3: Swedish Conscript Mechanics Rearm a JAS-39C Gripen Between Sorties at a Remote Dispersal Airstrip, 1 February 2023.__ Source: Swedish Air Force._
+
+For most NATO air forces, however, that fly fighter aircraft not designed specifically with sustained operations from dispersed locations in mind, the Swedish model is difficult to copy. The European air force with the most advanced dispersed basing model that flies non-Swedish fighters is the Finnish Air Force, which has many similarities to its Swedish counterpart and notably makes even more regular use of highway strips for flight operations, with 19 highway strips and the ability to use a range of other civilian airfields and airports for military operations. Due to the higher frequency of drills, the Finnish Air Force has even more recent experience and currency than the Swedish Air Force in flying from dispersed locations. However, Finland’s maintenance and logistics support equipment is more concentrated than Sweden’s, and its 55 F-18C/D Hornet fighters are based in two main operating bases (Rovaniemi and Kuopio) in peacetime. The F-18 Hornet has landing gear designed to cope with hard, short landings on less than ideal surfaces, can take arrestor cables to further reduce landing runs, and is designed to be forgiving to land at high angles of attack and relatively slow speeds due to being designed for operations on US Navy aircraft carriers. Likewise, compared to land-based aircraft, the ground support equipment for the Hornet and other navalised fighters must be relatively compact and transportable to maximise the space available in the cramped hangars onboard aircraft carriers. Therefore, it is logical to expect that Finland can disperse its logistics and maintenance chain relatively easily compared to most Western air forces, even though the F-18 was not designed from the outset for such operations on land like the Gripen was.
+
+For most NATO air forces, however, which fly aircraft such as the F-16, F-15, F-35, Typhoon and Rafale, dispersing maintenance and conducting sustained operations away from main operating bases is more challenging. The ground support equipment, spares packs and tool sets required to diagnose and fix faults, conduct engine changes, load weapons and process mission data from the aircraft for each sortie are generally bespoke and extensive. This is because, with the partial exception of the F-35B, these aircraft were designed around the assumption that they would operate from large, well-equipped bases. Perhaps more significantly, many NATO air forces have contracted a significant part of their line maintenance and fleet support arrangements to civilian industry. This has allowed fighter fleets to be maintained with a lower uniformed personnel headcount by using civilian engineers rather than military ones, and enabled lower operating costs. However, it has also driven further centralisation of maintenance and logistics, often in commercial-standard buildings. Civilian maintainers working for industry also generally have more restrictive hours in their working day and are more expensive to deploy away from home than military personnel. Availability-based maintenance contracts that undertake to simply provide an air force with a given number of airframes and flying hours at main operating bases also tend to lack the flexibility to rapidly generate dispersed operations at short notice or for sustained periods.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 4: Spanish Air Force Maintenance Personnel Working on a Spanish Eurofighter at Albacete Air Force Base, Spain, 2015.__ Source: Cynthia Vernat, Wikimedia Commons._
+
+Consequently, there is a practical limit to the length of time air forces equipped with such aircraft can operate sustainably away from established bases, even when supported by teams and equipment carried by large transport aircraft like the C-17 or the A400M. To ameliorate its air base vulnerabilities, the USAF has developed its Agile Combat Employment (ACE) strategy, initially for the Indo-Pacific and subsequently with an increased focus on ACE exercises in Europe since the invasion of Ukraine began. The doctrinal definition of ACE is ‘a proactive and reactive operational scheme of manoeuvre executed within threat timelines to increase resiliency and survivability while generating combat power’. In other words, it is not about power projection or deployment over distance per se, but rather about being able to move fast jets between bases faster than a peer opponent’s targeting cycle can follow in order to improve the survivability of a force while still flying combat sorties. While tied to large facilities for deep and regular line maintenance, US Air Forces Europe (USAFE) trains its fighter wings to conduct multi-day deployments to operate from dispersed forward-operating locations at 24 hours’ notice. When this occurs, large numbers of fighters disperse to Allied air bases throughout Europe that have been designated as forward-operating locations or additional landing sites, and then draw on a combination of pre-positioned supplies, host nation support and deployable air base systems moved by C-17. The US currently has an unmatched global logistics system including heavy lift and pre-positioned stocks, and can also afford to spend far more money than other individual nations in NATO on conducting ACE at scale and on a regular basis. Even so, US fighter wings remain tied to their main operating bases for maintenance purposes, and C2 functions – especially targeting cells – are still largely centralised in Air Operations centres. Therefore, despite the impressive ability to rapidly disperse fighter aircraft, crews and maintainers to forward-operating locations around Europe, large-scale Russian strikes on USAFE bases and command centres still pose a serious threat to each fighter wing’s ability to conduct warfighting at scale on a sustained basis.
+
+When considering how to reduce the vulnerability of European air forces on their air bases, it is important to prevent the lack of a perfect solution being seen as a reason not to make improvements to the situation as it currently exists. While no affordable hardening or dispersal measures can completely remove the vulnerability of any one air force or location to a concentrated long-range precision strike campaign by Russia, it is still possible to greatly increase the number of weapons required to have a decisive effect. For Russia to undertake a major strike campaign against NATO airpower on its home bases, its military commanders would have to have a reasonable degree of confidence that it would destroy enough combat airpower to justify the resulting political escalation and military retaliation. A combination of active and passive hardening and dispersal/ACE exercises could with reasonable efficiency make NATO’s main operating bases much less attractive targets than they currently are, thus reducing both the temptation to conduct a strike campaign and the credibility of threats to do so. The Russian military has shown the capability to fire large numbers of standoff missiles with acceptable accuracy against Ukraine. However, it only has a limited number of long-range launch platforms, and most would have to expose themselves to at least some risk to reach many key targets in Western Europe. Therefore, presenting Russia with targeting dilemmas and reducing the efficiency of any given successful strike would significantly increase the deterrence value and warfighting credibility of NATO airpower. For most NATO air forces, the practical solution is likely to be a combination of limited investment in hardening main operating bases, investing in more deployable spares kits and forward-operating location exercises, and purchasing small numbers of GBAD assets such as NASAMS or Sky Sabre to provide cruise missile defence at each main operating base.
+
+Of course, any increased spending to increase the survivability of air forces on the ground will come at an opportunity cost, both in terms of money and the capacity of the force to conduct other activities. HAS construction, maintenance and support, and C2 arrangements and exercises to enable ACE-type dispersal, particularly GBAD, are expensive. However, the primary reason why combat air is an extremely expensive business remains the complex sensors, weaponry, defensive systems and high performance required to ensure the aircraft themselves can survive against enemy threats while remaining effective and lethal in the air. Given that most NATO air forces (rightly) judge it essential to pay these costs to be able to contest control of the air, it would seem prudent to also spend the significantly lower sums required to credibly give the aircraft and the maintenance and logistics systems that support them a degree of survivability on the ground. After all, they are much easier for Russia to target on the ground than in the air, and the ground is where they unavoidably spend most of their time.
+
+
+### Aircrew Training and Exercises
+
+Fast jet aircrew, or ‘fighter pilots’ in layman’s terms, remain the most vital human component of any modern air force. However, the skills that combat-ready fast jet crews require to be combat-effective are poorly understood by the majority of non-specialists in the wider military and policy community. The costs and timescales involved in generating the tactical leadership skills essential for fast jet combat operations are widely underestimated, as are the minimum fleet size and flying activity thresholds required to do so on a sustainable basis. Part of this is because producing a cost estimate that can be relied on for use as a rule of thumb is a complex undertaking due to the number of variable factors involved, and because precise figures are seldom deemed suitable for public release due to political and commercial sensitivities.
+
+From the outset, it is important to understand that being good at physically flying the aircraft is one of the least important factors distinguishing a capable modern fast jet pilot. Basic airmanship skills are an important prerequisite, not least from a flight safety perspective, but these are supposed to be largely ingrained in newly trained pilots by the time they graduate from basic fast jet flying training and move on to advanced fast jet flying training. The modern fly-by-wire flight control systems make most advanced fourth- and fifth-generation fast jets comparatively easy to fly from a traditional ‘stick skills’ perspective. An ability to recognise and/or diagnose and then safely cope with a wide range of potential mechanical and software failures in flight remains essential, and requires a mix of synthetic and live flying experience to develop. However, the main focus during advanced fast jet flying training, and subsequently on an operational conversion unit (OCU), is not physical flying skills or airmanship, but rather learning how to tactically operate the many sensors, weapons systems and avionics that will be used on the front line.
+
+The most critical task for the modern fighter pilot is to harness the different sensor and communications systems on their aircraft to generate an accurate and detailed understanding of the battlespace around them in real time. They must then continuously interpret this situational awareness picture and react so as to optimally position their aircraft to survive against known and potential threats, and employ their weapons and sensor capabilities against aerial and ground-based targets. This task is made hugely more challenging by the fact that it must be done while moving at high speeds in three dimensions, often under significant g-forces, dealing with transiting complex airspace boundaries, international borders and weather conditions, and potentially managing a wider formation or even a complex strike package.
+
+These challenges become far greater for missions against a peer adversary like Russia, which can disrupt communications and threaten bases, enablers and fighter aircraft themselves from long range using ground-based and airborne assets. Against a state threat such as that posed by Russia, missions must be planned to include complex, mutually supporting elements working in tandem to detect, suppress and destroy threats. As such, one of the core qualities of a successful fighter pilot is an ability to multi-task and make rapid life-and-death decisions based on information that is often simultaneously overwhelming in volume and incomplete. This is a skill set that is partly affected by innate ability, but is primarily a function of proficiency in the core tasks of flying and navigating the aircraft. As a pilot gains proficiency and currency, the tasks of flying the aircraft, navigating and employing weapons require less mental capacity to perform. This leaves more capacity for communication, tactical awareness building, decision-making and, eventually, formation leadership functions.
+
+As such, it is important to understand that a fast jet pilot is of limited value in most combat scenarios at the point when they first finish training and join a front line unit, due to lack of experience and qualifications. They will start out flying as wingmen in a pair or four-ship formation, providing support to and learning from a formation leader. In most Western air forces, pilots will progress through initial combat readiness in their primary role and later multirole mission sets, night operations and formation leader qualifications during their first tour. Nevertheless, one of the key fighter pilot mantras is that one never stops learning; it takes multiple tours, specialist training courses, a wide range of operational experiences and the right mindset and aptitude to become an effective combat leader in the fast jet world. As such, it is difficult to define exactly what the true cost is to generate multirole-capable front line fast jet pilots, but what is certain is that it costs many millions of pounds, takes the better part of a decade and requires a significant amount of input from existing qualified instructor pilots. Moreover, the skill sets and competencies that make a truly effective multirole fighter pilot also fade rapidly without regular practice, since so many things must become all but second nature for a person to have sufficient mental capacity to be tactically effective as a formation leader.
+
+The poor performance of the VKS fighter fleet during the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 underscores how vital fast jet pilot competency and currency are to effectiveness. In the years leading up to the invasion, VKS (and Russian Naval Aviation) fighter crews were typically flying around 80 hours per year, and had limited access to high-fidelity simulators for synthetic training.
+
+Furthermore, a significant proportion of the flying hours being flown by Russian fast jet crews were relatively simple sorties involving navigation, unguided weapon deliveries on ranges, and target simulation for GBAD operators. Consequently, many Russian aircrew had limited skills across the primary mission set assigned to their aircraft type (fighter, frontal-bomber, ground attack), let alone all the weapons, tactics and procedures involved in potential secondary mission sets. As a result of this, the core VKS inventory of around 350 modern, multirole fast jet aircraft has been shown in practical terms to be fairly inflexible in terms of mission sets, with very limited tactical interoperability between fleets. Though the inability of the VKS to conduct a successful air campaign against Ukraine so far is a positive from a NATO point of view, the difference between the capabilities of the Russian fighter force on paper and its capabilities in practice should be a wake-up call for aircrew training and readiness standards for most European air forces.
+
+Throughout the 2000s and 2010s, annual flying hours accrued by Western fast jet aircrew fell dramatically, with most getting somewhere between 80 and 120 hours per year, as air forces attempted to maintain fleet sizes as far as possible in the face of continued budget cuts. As a result, most Western air forces today have modern, multirole fast jet fleets but risk falling into the same trap as the Russian VKS; failing to invest in sufficient flying hours and the infrastructure required to conduct realistic, complex training sorties. Pilots interviewed for this paper from multiple NATO air forces consistently emphasised that they were permanently ‘behind the drag curve’, with too few flying hours available for both instructor and student pilots, and that this was causing an overall degradation of skills currency and multirole capabilities.
+
+Spreading out smaller aircraft fleets to maintain the appearance of a larger number of front line units has exacerbated the issue, since with fewer aircraft per squadron it is often difficult to reliably generate enough available jets to fly the four-ship formations required to practise the complex tactics required by most warfighting mission sets. The smaller unit complements of aircraft are, the more vulnerable regular realistic training flying is to disruption due to inevitable maintenance issues, depot cycles and operational deployment requirements.
+
+Another commonly expressed theme from pilots across European NATO air forces is that quality and realism in live flying training have been systemically sacrificed on the altar of flight safety, largely due to a refusal at the duty-holder and senior leadership levels to sign off on and hold risk. This was expressed succinctly by one German Eurofighter weapons instructor who stated that: ‘the German approach to training and flight operations is geared towards fulfilling NATO flying hour targets as safely as possible, but with no real concern for how to make us lethal [as fighter pilots].’ The lack of any serious peer threat since the end of the Cold War has permitted air forces throughout NATO to focus on maximising flight safety at the expense of pushing aircrew, aircraft and weapons systems to their limits during realistic training sorties and major exercises. The cost of the latter approach during the Cold War was a steady drumbeat of fatal crashes, especially during low-level training sorties in bad weather or at night. However, against the Soviet Union such tactics were seen as the only viable option for penetrating Warsaw Pact air defences, and so to ensure the operational credibility that was seen as essential to conventional and nuclear deterrence, the risks inherent in realistic regular training at low level in low-visibility conditions were seen as necessary. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the breakup of the Warsaw Pact removed the threat that justified regular aircrew deaths and losses of airframes, so it was not only inevitable but also morally right that a greater emphasis be placed on flight safety during training.
+
+Furthermore, the intervention and counterinsurgency campaigns of the 2000s and 2010s saw almost all combat operations conducted from 12,000 ft or above to remain clear of the anti-aircraft fire and man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) that formed the only realistic threat. They also generally involved close air support against enemies who were often fighting in civilian areas and/or very close to friendly forces. Consequently, training for these medium-level operations generally focused on performing the difficult task of conducting close air support as safely and accurately as possible to minimise collateral damage and friendly fire risks. As a result, aircrew training for combat operations has been focused on flight safety and operations in permissive or semi-permissive airspace for more than a decade. Even among air forces like the RAF and the French Air and Space Force (L’Armée de l’air et de l’espace, or AAE), where a significant proportion of pilots have live combat experience, that combat took place under permissive conditions very different from those they would face against Russia or another serious state adversary.
+
+To return non-US NATO air forces to a state where they are ready and capable of performing realistic combat missions against Russia will require significant changes to the focus of training and exercises and to the policies around how risk is managed, and above all a reduction in operational tempo compared to the current situation. Retraining aircrew for warfighting tasks requires those aircrew to have time, capacity and flying hours to dedicate to developing proficiency in both core and advanced skills that they either have not practised in a long time or in some cases may have never been qualified in before. Furthermore, the tactics employed in most high-intensity mission sets generally require larger numbers of aircraft, supporting enablers and planning to accomplish. To generate competence in them, aircrew must have their capacity and flying hours synchronised to fly exercises together at the same time. Unfortunately, in several NATO air forces (including the RAF), pilots are currently completely overstretched by the concurrent requirements for multiple ongoing operational deployments in the Middle East and Eastern Europe, major exercises and basic currency flying. The same goes for maintenance crews, who are struggling to generate jets reliably to meet the operational and training tempo demanded. This means that there simply is not currently enough capacity, either in terms of aircrew or aircraft availability/maintenance personnel, to conduct large-scale complex warfighting training sorties on a regular basis for most non-US NATO air forces.
+
+The underlying problem is that while most NATO nations have accepted the political need to pivot defence planning towards Russia and a return to state-on-state deterrence as a core planning assumption, few pre-existing deployments or operational commitments have been stopped to generate the capacity for fast jet crews and the maintenance personnel who keep them flying. Instead, the demand signal has been to keep doing everything, while flying additional deterrence and reassurance operations and deploying for new exercise activities. Overstretching fast jet fleets leads inexorably to poor morale across the force, increasingly poor aircraft availability for regular training, and the atrophying of aircrew skill competencies. It also leads to an increase in aircrew and engineers leaving the military, which in the case of experienced personnel creates shortfalls that take many years to rectify. In addition to the expense and time it takes to replace aircrew and experienced engineers who leave air forces due to an unsustainable operational tempo, their loss increases the burden felt by those who remain, since the same workload must be tackled by a smaller cadre of experienced personnel.
+
+#### The Critical Role of Weapons Instructors and Balancing Live Versus Synthetic Training
+
+Arguably the most critical personnel cadre for any combat-focused air forces are weapons instructors (or their equivalents, for the few air forces who do not use that specific role title). Weapons instructor pilots are generally responsible for leading formations in combat and coordinating complex missions in the air. Within each squadron they are also responsible for leading the tactical mission planning, briefing and debriefing stages of any mission. Essentially, while standard instructor pilots are responsible for training and certifying pilots to fly their aircraft in a variety of conditions safely, weapons instructors are responsible for the tactical training and combat effectiveness of a squadron and its pilots. The process to train such instructors is complex and varies somewhat between air forces, but it remains essential for credible combat capability.
+
+In the RAF, pilot conversion to front line fighters such as the Eurofighter Typhoon and F-35 Lightning II takes place at the OCU, alongside basic combat readiness qualifications prior to assignment to a front line squadron. 29 Squadron is the OCU for the Typhoon force, and it is also the unit that conducts qualified flying instructor (QFI) and qualified weapons instructor (QWI) training courses. The process of training new QFIs and QWIs requires a significant pool of pre-existing and experienced QFIs and QWIs; consequently, 29 Squadron has the largest number of instructor pilots of any RAF squadron. Dependence on experienced instructors is one of the hidden fragilities within any air force. If the number of instructors drops below that required to both serve the requirements of front line squadrons and simultaneously train a steady supply of sufficiently qualified new QFIs and QWIs, one process must be truncated at the expense of the other, and the overall pilot training ecosystem will break. If this happens, it is generally extremely difficult and time consuming, or even impossible, to fix without resorting to a dependence on partner-nation training pipelines to shore up numbers. As air forces have become smaller, it has become progressively harder for them to balance recruitment, training, career management and retention to ensure that enough suitably qualified and experienced personnel are retained where needed.
+
+To provide adequate live flying hours for the OCU, QFI and QWI courses, 29 Squadron has by far the largest number of aircraft and maintenance and support personnel of any RAF squadron, with approximately 24 airframes and 300 people, respectively. Nevertheless, the training requirements for both new junior pilots and the instructor cadre, coupled with supply chain disruption caused by the Covid-19 pandemic and Britain’s exit from the EU, have created considerable problems with spares and airframe availability. To try to compensate for the expense and scarcity of live flying hours at all levels of the training pipeline and on the front line, RAF senior leadership has pushed reliance on synthetic training in simulators further than have other NATO air forces.
+
+At present the RAF Typhoon force average sits somewhere between 50% and 70% synthetic flying hours compared to live flying (with significant variation depending on squadron, location and operational deployments). The RAF’s long-term strategy plans to increase that to around 80/20% synthetic/live. There are significant benefits to relying heavily on the synthetic environment for some aspects of training fast jet pilots. Simulators that are linked together to allow at least four aircrew (and ideally more, from multiple bases) to train together simultaneously are an excellent way to efficiently practise complex high-end tactics and mission sets. In the case of certain threat systems, advanced tactics and electronic warfare (EW) techniques, there are aspects of training for high-end warfighting that can only be practised regularly in the simulator due to airspace, security and financial constraints. However, every fighter pilot interviewed for this study thought that 80% was too high as a proportion of synthetic to live flying, and that the simulator should be used to enhance rather than replace the value of live flying training. Despite the benefits of conducting many complex training tasks primarily in the simulator, from an operational effectiveness point of view, the universal view was that if the planning priority were warfighting readiness, then the synthetic/live flying balance across European air forces would be different.
+
+The effects of bad weather, visibility while night flying, the effect of sustained high g-forces when manoeuvring to defeat incoming missiles and the dangers of low flying were all regularly cited by interviewees for this paper as vital elements of flying training for state-on-state mission sets that cannot be replicated accurately in a synthetic environment. Perhaps even more significantly, the psychological and physiological effects of adrenaline and fear caused by sudden spatial disorientation, and the risk of accidents during tactical flying or from enemy action, are almost impossible to accurately train for in the simulator.
+
+Perhaps even more crucially, when missions are not exercised regularly in real life but instead are only practised in simulators, only the aircrew are getting any training value. The maintenance crews are not getting practice generating large numbers of jets for complex sorties or loading live air-to-air and standoff air-to-ground weapons, the logistics chain is not being realistically tested, and none of the practical clearance and authorisation steps are being carried out. In other words, synthetic training does not allow end-to-end testing of the air force as a whole. This also applies for multi-domain or joint warfighting effects. If new doctrinal and tactical assumptions rely on synchronising capabilities from multiple services in real time to solve operational challenges, then to be credible, all the required joint force elements and support structures must be regularly exercised together in real life, from the planning stages through to execution, debriefing and lessons learned.
+
+The picture is different for USAFE, where the practical training and planning focuses more heavily on traditional high-intensity warfighting readiness and credibility than in most European NATO air forces. A key advantage that the USAF has over European air forces is the scale at which it routinely operates in a training and exercise context. Most bases host a fighter wing composed of between three or four squadrons of fast jets, each with between 20 and 24 aircraft. On some bases a typical day will see each squadron launch two or even three waves of eight–12 aircraft in rapid succession. As such, the training airspace used by some USAF fighter wings will regularly be in use by 30 or more fighters simultaneously, usually supported by tankers and sometimes big-wing ISR enablers such as the E-3G AWACS. This in turn means that in locations where they are well resourced, such as RAF Lakenheath, US fast jet aircrew train daily as part of large formations in complex air environments – conditions which most other Allies can only generate for periodic large-scale exercises. Maintenance crews, logistics chains, planners and air traffic and airfield traffic management personnel are also constantly trained to handle operations at a realistic scale for most warfighting scenarios. The resultant complexity of day-to-day training means that USAFE fighter aircrew tend to develop tactical expertise faster than other Western air forces, but as a result may not spend as much time concentrating on technical flying finesse per se.
+
+The philosophy within the F-15E community at RAF Lakenheath on live/synthetic training for new pilots is that skills can be introduced, familiarised and practised through cheap, safe repetition in the simulator, but they must be validated by instructors and then regularly practised during live sorties. The USAFE fighter community in general tends not only to fly more than the RAF or the AAE but also to be significantly less comfortable with the prospect of very heavy synthetic training over live training ratios. Senior instructor pilots noted that newer pilots joining the squadrons with significantly lower live flying hours in basic and advanced flying training had good tactical skills and system knowledge but also generally displayed a poor standard of basic airmanship. This meant that they had to be given significant live flying training time before their airmanship skills were judged to be of an acceptable standard. From a budgetary perspective, this implies the need to compensate for live flying hours in relatively cheap trainer aircraft sacrificed for cost saving during basic training by flying an increased number of live hours in expensive front line jets once at squadron level. It also meant that a lower proportion of live flying hours could be devoted to combat-relevant training tasks.
+
+In the USAF, with the luxury of significantly greater resources than most other NATO air forces, fighter pilots are expected to progress to being qualified to fly as the leader of a two-ship formation around the end of their first year on a front line squadron. For an F-15E Strike Eagle squadron this typically equates to around 250 flying hours, with the higher-than-usual average being accounted for by deployments on combat operations in the Middle East. The general intent is to bring almost all pilots to a stage where they are qualified as four-ship leaders during their first three-year front line tour. There is no hard and fast rule on when this happens, with individual aptitude and temperament, as well as individual squadron situations, influencing how fast each pilot is able to progress. The most promising may begin the process of upgrading almost as soon as they are qualified as a two-ship lead, but for most this typically happens around the one-and-a-half- to two-year mark, with around 500 hours flown. However, these rosy flying hour totals are not representative of the current USAF as a whole. According to General Mark Kelly, speaking at the International Fighter Conference, the average US fighter pilot flew only 81.5 hours in 2021, although other sources suggest that for active-duty fighter pilots, the figure was marginally over 120 hours. It is also vital to note that not all flying hours are created equal, especially in relation to readiness for peer warfighting. For example, a sortie to provide a combat air patrol on NATO’s eastern border with Russia might involve long transits and several hours maintaining a combat air patrol, giving the pilots involved four to six hours in the air, but with little to no tactical training value.
+
+During their second front line tour, many USAF pilots will be expected to train as instructor pilots – able to teach those fresh from the operational training units how to fly the type in question, and conduct basic check flights to assess competency. However, those who are perceived as having a sufficiently advanced grasp of tactical issues and sufficient technical airmanship and operating acumen will be selected for training as weapons officers – the USAF equivalent of RAF QWIs. The selection process is sufficiently robust that by the time aircrew reach ‘weapons school’, the pass rate is very high, despite the complexity and demanding pace of the training. The course involves intense academic study over four to five months, especially on the subject of the aircraft, avionics, weapons and tactics used by both Allied and potential adversary air forces. Actual flying time at weapons school can be as low as 30 hours, with many of the higher-level tactical training and learning exercises necessarily being carried out in the synthetic environment.
+
+Just as in the RAF, when USAF weapons officers, known as ‘patch wearers’, return to the front line they are expected to act as the primary source of tactical and operational knowledge in their squadron, and to lead on planning and operational activities. At first, a weapons officer will act as a Tier 1 patch wearer, and will focus on leadership at the tactical level in the air and often fly as the lead and command ship during complex exercises or combat operations. They are also expected to lead debriefings after each complex sortie to ensure that all mistakes or areas for improvement are identified, dissected and drilled into all pilots. Between a year and 18 months after rejoining the squadron as a Tier 1 weapons officer, a pilot may be upgraded to Tier 2 and be given the primary planning responsibility for complex operations at the squadron or wing level. A Tier 2 weapons officer is expected not only to be an expert on almost all aspects of the aircraft and weapons systems that his or her squadron operates, but also to act as the bridge between the tactical and operational levels of war.
+
+This relationship between experienced fast jet pilots and operational planning and leadership places weapons officers at the core of the USAF’s ability to provide credible warfighting capability. It is a deeply ingrained concept that operational expertise at the planning and policy advice level is based on and relies on extensive tactical understanding. As such, the live flying training and combat flying experiences of aircrew are seen as essential for developing leaders of sufficient calibre to ensure that the USAF can plan and execute complex joint operations, especially in a contested environment.
+
+French fast jet pilots also take around a year from the end of their flight training to achieve basic combat readiness for single-role duties. However, the AAE takes longer than the USAF to qualify front line pilots as combat leaders. There is some variation according to individual aptitude, but around three years is the average to become certified as a two-ship flight lead, and another year after that to become a four-ship leader. AAE fast jet crews typically fly around 150–180 hours per year. The amount of simulator training compared to live flying varies by type, with Rafale crews taking advantage of more modern synthetic training aids to conduct around a 50/50 synthetic/live mix, while the Mirage 2000 crews with more limited simulators fly more at approximately 20/80 synthetic/live.
+
+The AAE is somewhat unusual among NATO air forces in that it has not traditionally had weapons instructors per se. Instead, four-ship leaders have tactical leadership responsibilities when on operations and in training. As part of the four-ship qualification process, pilots must take a course at centres of excellence for their aircraft type and write a paper on a tactical subject that will be analysed and critiqued by senior pilots and brigade-level staff members. In addition, the most experienced four-ship lead pilot in any given squadron will be the appointed expert in air-to-air or air-to-ground tactics and will oversee tactical training in each squadron. With a smaller aircrew pool than the USAF, the AAE has traditionally sought to bring as many four-ship lead pilots to a required tactical proficiency standard as possible, and to create a written tactical debate and database of analytical writing on which all squadrons can draw, rather than concentrating on creating an elite cadre of weapons instructors. In any case, France’s more strategically independent foreign and defence policy stance compared with other NATO countries explicitly prioritises the ability to act independently against near-peer threats, and the AAE also retains a regularly exercised and modernised airborne nuclear deterrent role. Therefore, it has retained a greater focus on hardening, electronic attack and self-protection suites, GBAD and live training for high-intensity missions than many other air forces since the end of the Cold War. The AAE has also recently started to consider moving to a more formalised weapons instructor course and role for aircrew.
+
+The ability to sustain truly dispersed operations places specific demands on aircrew training and tactics. Consequently, Swedish fighter pilots train to be capable of operating in a very independent way compared to most NATO air forces. For any air force to continue to be operationally effective when operating from a widely dispersed posture, even two-ship formation leaders must be highly capable. To meet these requirements, Swedish fighter pilots take around three years to become two-ship leads. This is because they are expected to be capable of conducting mission planning at remote locations with heavily disrupted communications; executing high-intensity mission sets; diverting at short notice into reserve bases, civilian airports or highway strips; conducting rapid turnarounds; and still coming together with other force elements in the air with precise timing to concentrate force in larger formations such as four-ships as required. All Swedish fighter pilots train to be air-to-air mission-capable first and foremost, and then train for additional tasks with priorities set according to the secondary mission specialisation of their particular fighter wing, which might be EW, anti-ship strikes or interdiction. It takes around six years on a front line squadron before Swedish pilots generally qualify as four-ship leads, and at least 10 years before they may be selected to train as either weapons instructors or mission planners.
+
+This much slower progression rate compared with other Western air forces is mostly due to the much greater complexity of mission planning and execution required to be combat-effective against Russian forces from a truly dispersed footprint on a sustained basis. It is also due to the harsh weather requirements of operations in Northern Europe and the Arctic, such as the need to be qualified and current to lead four-ship formations in beyond-visual range and close-in air-to-air combat in full instrument-flying conditions, including launch from and recovery to dispersed highway strips. To allow the development and maintenance of such specialised dispersed warfighting aircrew skills, Swedish (and Finnish) pilots are not rotated every three years between units and other non-flying posts like pilots in most NATO air forces, but instead are expected to stay for 15–25 years with the first squadron, or at least wing, that they join. This gives them reduced career variation and exposure to other parts of their services compared to other Western aircrew. However, this approach also improves pilot retention by allowing more family stability and facilitates a depth of learning and specialist skills development that is hard to match. The latter is further improved by the lack of an expeditionary posture for either the Swedish or Finnish Air Force, which has reduced the operational burden and mission breadth that pilots and ground crews have to meet, allowing a much greater focus on fielding credible deterrence capabilities against Russian aggression.
+
+Regardless of the way in which aircrew, maintenance crews and the other ground trades are managed in terms of training and career management, there are clear trends that are key for regenerating warfighting credibility among the European NATO air forces where it has been allowed to decay. First and foremost, the development, incentivisation and retention of weapons instructors or equivalent tactical experts in every squadron is vital. If more of these individuals can be trained and retained in flying posts, the workload on each individual will be lower and the air force’s tactical expertise, internal training, planning and operational warfighting leadership capacity will be more resilient. Second, if personnel are not regularly trained in representative live missions, the capacity across the force to credibly generate and execute a given capability will rapidly degrade. As noted above, when practice for complex warfighting mission sets is relegated to the simulator, only the aircrew get the training value; the vital maintenance crew, logistical tail, other joint force elements, ground and airspace traffic management and regulatory/permissions aspects are not practised and so will atrophy. Third, no serious increase in aircrew training quality, exercise frequency and thus warfighting readiness and skill sets will be possible without reducing current operational tasking levels. Some fighter forces have already been pushed well beyond a sustainable operational tempo, leading to degrading aircraft availability, worsening retention of key aircrew and maintenance personnel, and fragile morale. Training for warfighting requires capacity, especially when the additional complications of dispersal or ACE-type activities are factored in. It is not a task that can just be added on to existing commitments.
+
+
+### The Need for SEAD/DEAD and Munitions Stocks
+
+In terms of the medium-term threat to Western deterrence and warfighting credibility, it is worth noting that the two components of Russian military power that have performed consistently well during the invasion of Ukraine are its GBAD systems, and its long-range precision strike capabilities. Both are significant for the operational credibility of Western air forces, and they collectively mean that comparative performance between Western fighters and their VKS equivalents is not the key criterion that will determine the potential combat effectiveness of airpower against Russia (or any other peer opponent). Hardening against long-range precision strike capabilities is discussed in Chapter I. However, the need for SEAD/DEAD capabilities is another critical point, and one that has been underlined not only by the highly lethal capabilities of Russian surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems in Ukraine, but also by the striking effectiveness of Ukraine’s much less sophisticated and numerous GBAD capabilities.
+
+One of the defining features of the Russian invasion of Ukraine has been the inability of either side to reliably locate, identify, track and destroy the other’s SAM systems. This has resulted in a mutual denial of the ability to effectively use airpower to shape the war on the ground. Even when not acting as part of a well-coordinated IADS, Ukrainian mobile SA-11 (Russian designation 9М38M1) ‘Buk’ and SA-8 (Russian designation 9K33) ‘Osa’ SAMs have proven sufficiently lethal to deny the much larger and technologically superior VKS the ability to operate above very low altitude inside Ukrainian-controlled airspace. This is despite the fact that the VKS began operations against Ukraine with well over 350 genuinely modern fast jets, a wide range of standoff precision-guided munitions, and potent and widely deployed ground-based and aerial EW capabilities.
+
+The inability to use airpower effectively on the battlefield has significantly limited Russia’s tactical and operational options, and greatly facilitated Ukrainian challenges. However, the Russian and Ukrainian armies are both designed to rely on massed artillery and tanks for the vast majority of their firepower. The Russian army invaded Ukraine with 2,433 tube artillery systems and 3,547 multiple-launch rocket systems, while the Ukrainian army fielded 1,176 and 1,680, respectively. Both the number of artillery pieces and the ammunition quantities involved dwarf NATO stocks, largely because NATO forces (with the partial exception of the US military) are designed around assumed air superiority and the delivery of aerial precision fires at scale over any contested battlefield. However, at present this assumption is deeply flawed against Russia (and China) due to an inability to credibly deal with their IADS in most likely future flashpoint scenarios.
+
+Western planners have been aware of the serious challenge to airpower posed by the IADS deployed by Russia and China for years, especially in terms of very long-range SAM systems such as the SA-21 (Russian designation S-400) and the HQ-9B, linked to advanced radar systems such as the RLM-ME Nebo-M and the 59N6 Protivnik-GE. However, the lesson from Ukraine’s air defence performance against Russia in the air domain is that even successfully degrading an enemy IADS to the point that it stops performing as a unified system is insufficient to allow control of the air over contested areas. The threat posed by mobile medium- and short-range SAM systems such as the SA-17 (Russian designation 9M317) and SA-15 (Russian designation 9K330) ‘Tor’ would still render medium- and high-altitude penetrations unacceptably dangerous for the non-stealth platforms that will continue to make up the vast bulk of NATO’s combat aircraft inventory for the foreseeable future. To be able to establish air superiority, therefore, NATO air forces must be able to not only conduct SEAD but also hunt down and conduct DEAD at scale against mobile and aware medium- and short-range SAMs.
+
+The SEAD/DEAD task requires specialist aircrew training, weapons and sensors that no European air force currently fields at anything like the scale required. Even during the supposedly European-led Libya intervention in 2011 against a largely static and completely outdated air defence system, other NATO partners were dependent on the US to conduct SEAD/DEAD before they could operate effectively. The challenge that would be faced from a near-peer such as Iran, let alone against Russian forces in Eastern and Northern Europe, is almost incomparably more serious, with layered long-, medium- and short-range SAM coverage provided by highly mobile systems linked to a range of multi-static and multi-frequency radar systems by modern C2 vehicles and communications architectures. To give an idea of the threat, Ukrainian fighter pilots have been shot down while flying at altitudes as low as 15 ft by SA-21 SAMs fired from over 150 km away, enabled by active-seeker terminal guidance on the missile itself coupled with launch-cueing and mid-course guidance from a 48Ya6-K1 ‘Podlet’ all-altitude radar relayed through the standard SA-21 battalion 55K6 command vehicle. Russian SA-15 and SA-22 (Russian designation Pantsir-S1) short-range systems also regularly shot down incoming precision munitions, including the AGM-88 HARM and sometimes even the Tochka-U short-range ballistic missile.
+
+At the individual aircraft level, European NATO capabilities are more impressive than in 2011, especially since many European nations have purchased the F-35 to replace previous F-16 and Tornado fleets. The F-35 was designed specifically to be able to operate against modern SAM systems in both the penetrating strike and SEAD/DEAD roles. Its stealth and EW capabilities allow it to operate much closer to hostile SAM systems than non-stealth aircraft for a given level of risk. Just as importantly, the F-35’s superlative active and passive sensor suite can rapidly and precisely geolocate SAM systems when they illuminate their radars, especially when the aircraft is being operated in a four-ship formation. However, despite these very impressive capabilities, simply fielding the F-35 is not sufficient as an answer to European NATO’s SEAD/DEAD problem in itself.
+
+One of the key limitations for some F-35 operators, like the RAF, in the SEAD and more specifically the DEAD role, is a lack of suitable munitions. The radar performance of Russian systems and the overlapping coverage when deployed as intended means that even with its stealth features, the F-35 is likely to be at significant risk if it has to get close enough to drop free-fall bombs. The ability of the SA-15 and SA-22 to intercept incoming munitions also means that free-fall and even glide weapons are likely to have limited survivability when attacking the medium- and long-range SAM units that these short-range systems are designed to protect. Furthermore, anti-radiation seekers such as those found on traditional SEAD weapons such as the AGM-88 HARM will lose the SAM once it stops emitting radar energy, and even if they can store a fairly accurate position fix and hit that, accuracy is usually insufficient to reliably destroy armoured SAMs, and they cannot be tracked if they are moving. Anti-radiation munitions can modify SAM operators’ behaviour and engagement periods to avoid being hit, but they have a very poor track record of achieving hard kills. They are, for the most part, SEAD rather than DEAD weapons.
+
+EW effects are also a vital component of both the threat (since Russia deploys advanced electronic attack assets at scale) and any NATO SEAD/DEAD strategy. Due to the sensitivity of detailed information on EW capabilities, a detailed discussion of their effects and potential is difficult within the bounds of this paper. However, in general terms they can be tailored to offer responsive and much more cost-effective suppressive effects than kinetic munitions against the radars that provide situational awareness and guidance for hostile SAM systems. Doing so requires advanced electronic intelligence collection capabilities to stay up to date on the latest enemy system frequencies and operating patterns, and a responsive mission data-programming capability. It also requires assets capable of delivering the electronic attack (or jamming) effects, such as the US Navy’s standoff EA-18G Growler aircraft, the stand-in F-35, the MALD-X air-launched decoy/jammer, or the proposed MBDA SPEAR-EW missile. However, EW effects are generally temporary, even if certain enemy systems must be reset or components replaced to restore functionality. Therefore, while EW is a vital component of SEAD efforts, it cannot create the conditions for lasting air access in airspace contested by modern air defence systems alone. Instead, it must form part of the mix of SEAD capabilities that can open temporary access opportunities for key strike operations. Only the destruction of a significant portion of the ground-based SAM threat will provide Western airpower with the sustained access it needs with the majority of its conventional aircraft to attain control of the air.
+
+For the DEAD mission, Western air forces need weapons that can first be launched from standoff and can navigate to a SAM’s approximate location using either positional data provided by an advanced sensor suite such as the F-35s, or by homing in on emitted radar energy using an anti-radiation seeker. Then to reliably hit and destroy the SAM during the terminal phase, the weapon must incorporate millimetric radar homing or possibly infra-red imaging-seeker capabilities to find and accurately hit that SAM even after it has stopped emitting radar energy and is on the move to reposition. They also need to be available in sufficient numbers to seriously attrite the multi-layered Russian IADS quickly, both in terms of overall stockpile, and carriage capacity per aircraft. This is an expensive combination of traits and requires specialised designs.
+
+There are three clear options for NATO air forces at present. The first is the Raytheon GBU-53/B StormBreaker glide bomb, which includes a millimetric seeker for terminal target acquisition and precision guidance, and if launched from high altitudes and speeds can strike moving targets over 70 km away. This offers much greater lethality and survivability for launch aircraft than free-fall bombs, but is likely to require multiple weapons per target to saturate SA-15 and SA-22 defences. Another option is MBDA’s similarly sized SPEAR 3 miniature cruise missile, which also offers a millimetric radar seeker capability but with a jet engine that allows a much greater standoff range (especially when fired from lower altitudes and speeds), faster flight time to target and a higher likelihood of each weapon getting past terminal defences. The cost is a significantly higher price per weapon and, therefore, a correspondingly lower number that any air force can purchase. The third SEAD/DEAD weapon option is the Northrop Grumman AGM-88G Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile Extended Range (AARGM-ER). The AARGM-ER is a significantly larger, rocket-powered missile with an anti-radiation seeker and millimetric radar terminal homing capabilities that can be fired from even further away than the SPEAR 3 and travels much faster. Its high peak speed of around Mach 4 results in less time for SAMs to reposition once fired upon at any given standoff launch range, and should also make it more difficult for point defences to intercept the AARGM-ER than other SEAD/DEAD weapons. The downside is a much higher per-weapon cost and, if carried internally on an F-35, being restricted to only two weapons per aircraft per sortie, as opposed to up to eight GBU-53/Bs or SPEAR 3s.
+
+An important alternative option would be to build in a much greater doctrinal reliance on long-range ground-based firepower for DEAD effects, with location and targeting supplied by air assets like the F-35. Long-range rocket artillery systems such as the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) and High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) systems have been used to impressive effect in Ukraine against Russian logistics and vehicle targets in the deep battle area and could potentially offer significant lethality against SAM batteries many tens of kilometres behind the hostile front line. However, there are various requirements to be satisfied before this represents a viable core of a SEAD/DEAD strategy. First, GMLRS/HIMARS systems would require ammunition with appropriate warheads for reliably destroying or disabling mobile, combat-spaced and armoured SAM systems, such as the M30E1 GLMRS – Alternate Warhead (GMLRS-AW). These are not currently fielded by European operators of GMLRS or HIMARS, so would need to be procured. More to the point, these systems would need to be present in theatre with the ammunition available and political permissions to fire into hostile territory as part of the early stages of any clash when the SEAD/DEAD mission would be most critical. They would also need a secure, common and interoperable communications and data exchange architecture to allow real-time targeting information to be passed from assets such as national and Allied F-35s to GMLRS/HIMARS batteries. This multi-domain approach does offer a route towards greater DEAD lethality, but it also imposes additional training, exercising and resource allocation challenges.
+
+For example, in the UK the British Army is currently attempting to reconstitute its warfighting capacity, and long-range precision fires renewal is a key component within the operational testing and resource allocation planning process. The RAF might decide to doctrinally rely on Army GMLRS systems forming a key component of DEAD lethality in future joint operations. However, for that to work, detailed discussions on ammunition stockpiles and warhead/guidance requirements, assumed fire mission capacity allocations, airspace deconfliction, wartime and deterrence deployment sequencing and logistic support assumptions must happen urgently before key Army procurements are fixed. Furthermore, just as with other aspects of air operations, if multi-domain SEAD/DEAD approaches are not properly resourced, regularly exercised in realistic scenarios and trained for as a primary task by all the joint elements involved, they will not work in practice when needed. In terms of weapon cost, the notion of relying on ground-based long-range fires simply transfers cost liability to another service in balance sheet terms (assuming they agree) but does not avoid the overall requirement to spend more on munitions to regenerate a SEAD/DEAD capability at scale.
+
+Whichever weapons are chosen, the cost per weapon is likely to mean that, with the possible exception of the GBU-53/B, stockpiles will need to be purchased and held specifically against the SEAD/DEAD mission. The capabilities that these weapons require mean that they are unlikely to be economical as multipurpose utility weapons for lower-threat target sets and missions. However, the quantities required to give a credible DEAD capability will mean that air forces which buy into this mission set will have to accept a high opportunity cost in terms of other potential purchases forgone. Furthermore, even with such weapons, the SEAD/DEAD mission set in a high-intensity Russia scenario is an extremely complex task that will require joint force planning, enablement and deconfliction, as well as specialist aircrew skills and competencies. In other words, European air forces will have to specialise in order to be good at SEAD/DEAD. For small F-35 operators, with fleets sized only to be able to generate perhaps two four-ship waves per day on a sustained basis, this would likely have to be the primary mission focus for training, exercises and operational deployments. Not every air force in NATO needs to specialise in SEAD/DEAD to unlock the problem set of how to regenerate a viable and credible airpower posture to deter Russian military aggression in the medium term. However, with the US ever more overstretched trying to deter burgeoning Chinese capabilities in the Indo-Pacific, it is not a discretionary requirement for at least some of Europe’s air forces to step up to the task.
+
+If a viable European SEAD/DEAD capability is not regenerated at scale, European NATO states will be unable to establish control of the air in any scenario where the US is either unable or unwilling to commit major resources to doing so itself. This is not simply an issue for deterring Russian forces, but also for maintaining military options against near-peer states such as Iran, or even a state such as Algeria, which fields modern air defence systems at scale. The alternative to regenerating SEAD/DEAD capacity is a requirement to regenerate massed infantry, artillery and armoured forces to beat the Russians at their own game. This would also mandate procuring massed ammunition stocks and recruiting sufficient personnel to run all the enablers needed to deploy and sustain large land forces where needed. Massed land armies such as those fielded by Russia and Ukraine also imply the acceptance of far greater casualties in any war than the current airpower-heavy Western model. Therefore, while regenerating viable SEAD/DEAD capacity at scale is an expensive task, the alternative is far more expensive and more politically problematic.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+Since the early years of the Second World War, the Western way of warfare has relied heavily on the precision, reach and sheer lethality of airpower for its warfighting and deterrence credibility. This has brought a wide range of advantages, not least the ability to retain military overmatch sufficient to deter or defeat most potential and actual adversaries without having to field massed land armies optimised for high-casualty, massed firepower battles of attrition as seen in Ukraine since February 2022. In short, the ability to rapidly establish and exploit air superiority has allowed NATO to be the pre-eminent military alliance in the world since at least the 1980s with comparatively efficient and small standing military forces. However, lacking any serious challenge to its air superiority in discretionary conflicts since 1991, most NATO air forces have allowed their warfighting credibility against peer threats such as Russia and China to atrophy.
+
+The platforms remain, for the most part, highly capable individually. However, the number of bases has been dramatically reduced and, in many cases, the hardening measures at the remaining main operating bases are either inadequate to house the squadrons now stationed there or have been demolished to make way for non-hardened buildings and open hardstands and sun shelters. GBAD capabilities have been retired and/or only replaced in small numbers in many countries. Meanwhile, expensive but resilient networks of dispersal bases, and regular exercises and the maintenance arrangements and equipment required to credibly use them, have been dropped in the name of efficiency savings. It is worth noting that war is an inherently highly inefficient business, and an area where layers of redundancy are essential for credible capability, especially in a peer conflict. These factors mean that the threat posed by Russian long-range missile capabilities is serious, and the survivability of NATO combat air platforms in the air is not matched by their survivability on the ground.
+
+In the air, flying hours are lower than ever in most NATO nations. While modern simulators can compensate for or even improve on live flying training for some advanced threats and tactics, synthetic training does not exercise or test the whole air force and cannot realistically account for real world risks and weather conditions. Furthermore, the capacity is simply not there in most NATO air forces to ‘add’ serious training at scale for warfighting mission sets to existing deployments, operational commitments and exercise schedules. Training and maintaining the aircrew skills, especially tactical leadership skills, as embodied by weapons instructors, is just as vital for credible warfighting capabilities as having the right aircraft and weapons. However, generating and sustaining such talent requires not burning people out so that they leave after one or two front line tours, and giving them sufficient high-quality live and synthetic training hours to develop and maintain the required skills and deep tactical knowledge. Flying enough of the right sort of training hours requires additional operational funding for engineering capacity and spare parts availability for jets. However, in many heavily tasked NATO air forces it also requires both senior air force commanders and political leaders to significantly reduce ongoing discretionary taskings, such as legacy counterterrorism, or diplomatic and industrial influence deployments, to free up force capacity.
+
+Another key issue that needs urgent attention if European NATO air forces are to regenerate warfighting credibility is munitions stocks. It is not simply that the invasion of Ukraine has served as a stark reminder of the scale of munitions expenditure required to stop a determined Russian (or Chinese) military force; it has also shown that many of the existing weapon types developed and purchased for operations in permissive air environments are not relevant in contested airspace. The SEAD/DEAD mission is non-discretionary for achieving air superiority over not only Russian or Chinese forces in a contested area, but also against near-peer or sub-peer states with moderately advanced GBAD capabilities. The dedicated munitions required to allow even advanced aircraft like the F-35 to engage modern mobile SAM systems sustainably, with a high probability of kill, are expensive. To enable non-stealth platforms to either provide supporting fires for F-35 and other penetrating assets from a safer distance or engage themselves, these weapons must have not only the terminal seeker performance to find and strike the target without direct designation, but also significantly greater standoff range. All these requirements can be met, but cost per munition is correspondingly high, and tactics and therefore training to use them effectively must also be developed and regularly practised.
+
+The bottom line is that the way that Western military forces have been sized, equipped and organised to fight as a joint force requires air superiority to be achieved relatively quickly to defeat peer or near-peer opponents. Russia will remain an adversary of the West for the foreseeable future and is likely to continue to rearm and rebuild large-scale conventional forces once the fighting in Ukraine ceases. China has a great deal to gain from helping Russia rearm, in terms of splitting US and European resources and attention to prevent full concentration on the Indo-Pacific, and so is likely to do so once there is some form of ceasefire in Ukraine. The same Chinese threat means that the US will be able to spare fewer and fewer military assets to reinforce Europe in a crisis, especially if such a crisis is timed to coincide with a conflict in the Indo-Pacific. Therefore, European NATO air forces must take steps to urgently regenerate the credible capability to achieve air superiority over an area contested by Russian forces; medium-term deterrence requires it.
+
+Doing this will require reducing the vulnerability of air forces on the ground to long-range precision fires, refocusing aircrew and whole force training on warfighting mission readiness, and acquiring the specialised weapon stocks and skills sets to prosecute a SEAD/DEAD campaign at scale. The cost, and opportunity costs in terms of discretionary capability sets and commitments, will be considerable. But if NATO’s European air forces cannot credibly gain and exploit control of the air in the event of a conflict with their most likely non-discretionary threat actor, then they are not fit for purpose.
+
+---
+
+__Justin Bronk__ is the Senior Research Fellow for Airpower and Technology in the Military Sciences team at RUSI, and the Editor of the RUSI Defence Systems online journal. His particular areas of expertise include the modern combat air environment, Russian and Chinese ground-based air defences and fast jet capabilities, the air war during the Russian invasion of Ukraine, unmanned combat aerial vehicles and novel weapons technology. He has written extensively for RUSI and a variety of external publications, as well as appearing regularly in the international media.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-22-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-13.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-22-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-13.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..a3e71f13
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-22-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-13.md
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第十三日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-02-22 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 區諾軒：新西協議為「會」用權否決財案 其餘4區為「積極」運用
+- 官問是否所有參選者皆同意用否決權 區諾軒：不敢武斷，只是無人公開反對
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，16人否認「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，今（22日）踏入審訊第13天。區諾軒續作供，提及5個地方選區各有協議，當中除新界西表明「會」運用《基本法》權力否決財政預算案，其餘4區均僅稱「積極」運用權力否決預算案，並只有新西和九東兩區將協議文件附在提名表格上。庭上展示參選人簽署的提名表格，列明支持和認同協調會議共識，包括「民主派35+公民投票計劃」及其目標。法官李運騰主動指出，對表格條款第6點「我特此聲明，我會擁護《基本法》和保證效忠香港特別行政區」感興趣，區諾軒解釋民主動力設計該表格時，「希望每一個參與者都能夠奉行到第6點嘅精神。」而在本案中，8名新界西參選人均認罪，九龍東6名參選人中僅施德來一人不認罪。
+
+#### 5區各有協議 僅新界西稱「會」用權否決財案並附在提名表格
+
+控方早前確認會引用「共謀者原則」舉證，並會於辯方開始盤問前，交代在該原則下針對每名被告的證據。代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel 今甫開庭，指若控方於主問完結才說明使用的證據，辯方或沒有足夠時間準備盤問，望能於明早前收到相關文件。法官指現時望先聽取證供。
+
+區諾軒昨供稱，5個地方選區各有一份協議，但當時因憂慮違法及令參選人取消資格，而沒有公開該文件及要求參選人簽署。法官陳仲衡問及是否5區文件均有「積極運用《基本法》權力否決財政預算案」的字眼，區欲進一步解釋，但因有被告如廁而提早休庭。
+
+區諾軒今續作供，表示在2020年6月9日記者會之前，戴耀廷曾在包括他、戴耀廷、趙家賢、鍾錦麟及民主動力職員黎敬輝共5人的 WhatsApp 群組，發出以各地方選區命名的協調機制文件。他當時打開檔案，有個印象是所有文件均包括「積極運用《基本法》權力否決財政預算案」的字眼，但他指「我當時嘅觀察同事實唔係全對嘅」。
+
+區續指，因他沒有去新界西協調會議，直至6月19日新界西候選人遞交初選提名表格時夾附聲明，才知道新界西文件的字眼是「會」運用《基本法》權力否決財政預算案，而其餘4區均是「積極」運用《基本法》權力否決財政預算案。區指，各區初選提名表格內容一致，但只有新界西和九龍東的候選人在交表時亦夾附其地區聲明。
+
+#### 戴耀廷6.3曾擬採通稱五區及超區已達成協議
+
+控方其後展示 WhatsApp 群組訊息，顯示戴耀廷在6月3日曾發出有關6月9日記者會的採訪通知，該採通內容為：
+
+> 「經過三個多月的努力，民主派在九月立法會選舉在五個地區直選選區及區議會（二）的協調，終達成了協議。35+協調機制計劃在七月舉行公民投票的程序，讓支持民主派的選民共同決定由哪些參選人代表民主派參與九月的立法會選舉。負責統籌協調的戴耀廷及區諾軒，協助各區協調的幾位區議會主席、副主席，及負責公民投票執行程序和民調的民主動力召集人趙家賢，會出席記者會講解協調的細節。」
+
+區指，採訪通知由戴耀廷撰寫，當時他認為相關內容可發放予傳媒，但趙家賢後來表示要「執一執」。法官李運騰問，是否代表當時已達成共識？區答：「我相信呢個內容係公允嘅，因為當時候佢（戴耀廷）發出咗一啲檔案啦，而都有呢個記者會嘅內容啦。」法官陳慶偉再問區與戴作為初選組織者，據他們理解，初選參與者是否在6月3日已經達成共識？區再表示「呢個係公允嘅說法」，重申共識是指戴耀廷在群組發出的文件。
+
+控方其後展示紀錄，顯示戴於6月8日曾發出多個檔案，包括：「民主派35+公民投票」、「35+新西final」、「35+區二final」、「35+衛生服務final」、「35+九西final」、「35+九東final」、「35+新東final」及「35+港島final」，確認是達成的協議。
+
+#### 區：戴耀廷發出新西協調文件與提名表格夾附聲明一樣
+
+區諾軒又同意，趙家賢於2020年6月19日，曾將「墨落無悔」發起人鄒家成、張可森及梁晃維，質疑拒簽聲明者可無視共識的聲明轉發在群組。而區當時在群組回應：「我覺得有樣嘢要講清楚：由頭到尾我理解個協議唔係冇咗，而係冇喺記者會公開」，之後再撰〈以正視聽〉一文回應。
+
+區再次確認，該「協議」指各區協調會議達成的協議。法官李運騰問到協議上有甚麼重點，法官陳慶偉表示區諾軒可參考相關文件回答。控方其後展示一份參選人提名表格，顯示由新界西參選人吳敏兒簽署，並附上題為「35+立會過半計劃 民主派新西協調機制協議」的文件。周天行其後逐項讀出文件條款，包括「五大訴求，缺一不可」，及會運用《基本法》權力否決財政預算案等，惟大律師石書銘反對，指控方若想提醒證人，應讓證人閱讀文件而非在庭上逐點讀出。
+
+區諾軒其後解釋，新界西協調文件的內容，與其他地區的協調文件「大致相同」，當中只有3點不同，包括使用「會運用」而非「積極運用」的字眼；投票人數須多於4.8萬人；及爭取的議席數目與其他區不相同。控方一度問及，該協調文件與新界西協調會議達成的共識有沒有分別？區說：「但我冇參加新界西個會議」，林卓廷等被告發笑。控方其後再展示從趙家賢擷取、由戴耀廷於群組發出的新界西協調文件，區確認，該文件與提名表格夾附的聲明條款一樣。
+
+#### 提名表格列明認同戴、區主導協調會議之共識
+
+控方其後展示初選提名表格，其中一項條款為「我確認支持和認同由戴耀廷及區諾軒主導之協調會議共識，包括『民主派35+公民投票計劃』及其目標」。區表示，「協調會議共識」指剛才提及的各區協調機制文件；而「民主派35+公民投票計劃」及其目標，則指協議內提及認同「五大訴求，缺一不可」就可參與協調機制。法官陳仲衡補充，目標還包括在立法會取得過半數，區同意。
+
+參選人報名時亦要提交1萬元保證金，控方其後展示吳敏兒簽署的選舉按金收據，亦提及須支持和認同協調會議共識，包括「民主派35+公民投票計劃」及其目標，亦列明：「選舉按金將於立法會選舉後全數發還；如候選人違反上述共識，將不予發還。」控方問及條款意思，區乾笑了一下，表示：「其實呢個係民主動力嗰份文件嚟嘅，如果照字面所講就係違反呢個共識嘅話，就唔發返比個參加者。」
+
+#### 提名表格列明擁護《基本法》 區：民動望參與者奉行該精神
+
+法官李運騰其後指，他仍在閱讀提名表格，「令我感興趣的是第6點：『我特此聲明，我會擁護《基本法》和保證效忠香港特別行政區』，是誰提出要加上去的？」柯耀林等被告發笑。區解釋：「呢個係民主動力當初設計呢份報名表嘅時候，佢地希望每一個參與者都能夠奉行到第6點嘅精神」，並確認相關條文在所有參選人簽署的提名表格均有出現。
+
+李運騰續問：「有任何跟進嗎，周先生？（“Anything to follow up, Mr. Chow?”）」周猶䂊數秒後再問區：「據你理解為何會加上這點？」大律師沈士文再反對說：「他已經答了同一條問題。」法官陳慶偉續指，該文件屬民主動力，「為何你不留待民主動力成員作供才問？」李運騰其後稱留意到時間差不多，案件押後明早續。
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，16人否認「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，今（22日）踏入審訊第13天。區諾軒續作供，同意35+目標是取得立會大多數，迫使政府回應民主派訴求，當中「有一定程度」的初選參與者講過「攬炒」，區指他們認為「攬炒」是透過否決財政預算案，最後促使特首下台。區又提及，2020年6月發文回應「墨落無悔」聲明發起人時，看不到有人公開反對運用權力否決財政預算案。法官問及，是否即當時所有參與者都同意運用否決權？區表示：「我唔敢咁武斷，只係話冇人公開反對啫」，並指他於7月中已退出初選工作。
+
+#### 區：不少參加者認為否決預算案致特首下台有「攬炒」意思
+
+控方昨就區諾軒〈以正視聽——假如我有資格回應抗爭派立場聲明書發起人〉一文發問，當中區就「墨落無悔」發起人質疑參與者毋須簽署聲明作出澄清，區並在庭上解釋因憂慮違法及令參選人取消資格，而沒有公開該文件及要求參選人簽署。
+
+控方今續引述文章第3點澄清：
+
+> 「直接點說，就算所有人都聯署簽紙，只要有人到時反悔，除了譴責，根本無法阻止。屁股決定腦袋，最具阻嚇力從來在選民，若35+攬炒，否決預算案重要，應該著力宣傳，令社會更多人站在我們一邊，令更多直選、功能界別選民敦促候選人，參與者間繼續夾到出血，效益很少。」
+
+被問到「若35+攬炒，否決預算案重要」的意思，區解釋，當時認為部分參加者「的確係相信攬炒同否決財政預算案係佢哋關心嘅議題」，而他當時認為與其敦促其他候選人，他們不如花時間宣傳理念，令更多人投票給他們。周天行續問他如何理解「攬炒」，區指理解有「一定程度嘅參加者，係有講過呢個概念嘅」，指他們認為透過否決財政預算案促使行政長官下台，是有「攬炒」的意思。
+
+#### 官問是否所有參與者同意運用否決權 區：唔敢咁武斷、7月已退出初選工作
+
+區諾軒文章亦提及「而事實上，就不同黨派的公開回應，不見得有參與者對運用權力否決財政預算案態度保留。那大家反對的是誰？」。區解釋，在6月19日的時間點，「我睇唔到有參與者公開地反對可以運用否決財政預算案嘅權力」，故才在文中問「墨落無悔」發起人究竟反對對象是誰。
+
+法官陳慶偉遂問，據區諾軒理解，是否當時所有參與者都同意運用該否決權？區回應：「我唔敢咁武斷，只係話冇人公開反對啫。」周天行續問，那直至區2021年1月6日被捕，參與者的立場是否一樣？區再答：「我唔敢咁武斷，特別係我7月15號已經係退出咗相關嘅工作啦。」法官陳慶偉再問，那參與者立場直至7月15日是否一樣？區重申：「我唔敢每刻都係睇住咗唔同嘅候選人嘅立場，我只能夠話喺6月19號，我透過一個咁嘅講法嚟回應聲明書嘅發起人。」
+
+周天行其後再問，據區的理解，參與者的立場直至7月15日是否一樣？惟代表黃碧雲和林卓廷的大律師沈士文提出反對，指「問題已經問過，證人已經答過（“The question was put, the answer was given.”）」。周天行再指只是希望作澄清，惟陳慶偉即打斷：「沒有事情要澄清，下一條問題。（“There is nothing to clarify, next question.”）」
+
+#### 區：無聽過人公開表明反對否決預算案、部分民主派預期最壞情況致特首下台
+
+周天行續換個問法，問區有否聽過參與者在公開場合表明不同意否決財政預算案，區指「就我理解冇聽過」。周再問，是否直至他被捕那天也一樣？區再答：「我唔想將個時間拉得咁長。」周在法官問了數條問題後重新再問，那區認為他可以說出直至何時的情況？此時被告欄傳出輕聲的「唓」，區並說，「我諗較為合適係喺我仲參與35+工作嘅時候。」法官陳慶偉遂問，直至區退出初選工作的7月15日，區有否聽到參選人在公開場合表明反對運用否決權，區再答「冇聽過」。
+
+區諾軒在法官李運騰詢問下同意，35+計劃的目標是在立法會取得大多數，並迫使政府回應民主派訴求。李運騰再問，參與者是否期望「最壞情況」是導致行政長官下台？區答：「部分嘅民主派係咁諗。」李追問他是否知道其他人的看法，區說「我宜家腦裡面諗到有幾個，不過佢哋係一啲功能組別嘅參選人」，「佢哋唔係戴耀廷嘅35+（參加者）。」
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
+
+### 列席認罪被告全被安排於延伸庭就坐
+
+審訊不設陪審團，由3名國安法指定法官陳慶偉、李運騰及陳仲衡審理。控方代表為副刑事檢控專員萬德豪及周天行，辯方代表包括資深大律師潘熙、大律師沈士文、張耀良、黃宇逸、關文渭、馬維騉、盧敏儀、石書銘、黃廷光、Trevor Beel 等，本身是大律師的劉偉聰則自辯。
+
+不認罪被告包括獲准保釋的鄭達鴻、楊雪盈、彭卓棋、何啟明、劉偉聰、黃碧雲、施德來、陳志全、柯耀林、李予信10人，及還柙的何桂藍、吳政亨、鄒家成、林卓廷、梁國雄及余慧明6人。
+
+列席認罪被告包括馮達浚、朱凱廸、梁晃維、譚凱邦、岑敖暉、黃之鋒、袁嘉蔚及吳敏兒，全被安排在延伸庭就坐。在延伸庭的被告均專注觀看螢幕顯示的群組訊息，岑敖暉將頭傾前，手托腮觀看；黃之鋒則用手托着額頭。
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-23-bearing-the-brunt.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-23-bearing-the-brunt.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..669ad15a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-23-bearing-the-brunt.md
@@ -0,0 +1,267 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Bearing The Brunt
+author: Gerard DiPippo and Andrea L. Palazzi
+date : 2023-02-23 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/XVv7HJX.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Bearing the Brunt: The Impact of the Sanctions on Russia’s Economy and Lessons for the Use of Sanctions on China"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_This report assesses the effects and effectiveness of the international sanctions and export controls aimed at Russia since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. It also assesses the feasibility and implications of the United States using economic measures to deter China in a crisis over Taiwan._ _Subsequent reports will analyze the economic interdependencies and vulnerabilities of the Chinese and U.S. economies and evaluate how economic measures might be deployed during various Taiwan contingencies._
+
+This report finds that while the economic measures are slowly bleeding the Russian economy, they are unlikely to deliver a knockout blow. Early predictions of their impact were overstated. Russia’s financial sector teetered in the weeks after the invasion but has since stabilized. Russia’s imports dropped in the first few months after the measures but by the end of 2022 had nearly recovered to their prewar levels by shifting away from Europe toward China, Turkey, and a few other economies. Moscow posted only a modest fiscal deficit in 2022 largely because of oil and gas exports. However, Russia’s industrial sector probably has weakened, inflation has worsened, and real wages have fallen.
+
+Going forward, Russia’s ability to continue collecting revenue for oil and gas exports will be a key determinant of Moscow’s ability to avoid draining its sovereign wealth fund or borrowing domestically to fund its war effort. If the economic measures remain in place, Russia’s economic outlook will be bleak, with Russian households looking forward to stagnation at best. Russia is likely to increasingly substitute lower-quality domestic goods for foreign goods and rely on China as its top source of imported goods.
+
+Western governments’ goals for sanctions and export controls have shifted over the past year. Initially, the threat of their use was intended to deter Moscow from attacking Ukraine. That goal failed in large part because Russian president Vladimir Putin believed his war of aggression would quickly succeed. Brief hopes of destabilizing Russia were dashed after Russia’s banking sector and exchange rate recovered. The primary goal is now to degrade Russia’s ability to sustain its war through economic attrition. The measures are doing that to some degree, but they are unlikely to be as decisive as battlefield outcomes.
+
+The use of such measures against Russia has spurred speculation about their potential use against China, particularly in a crisis over Taiwan. Enacting comparable sanctions and export controls on China would be far more difficult and disruptive to the global economy. The biggest differences between the economies of China and Russia in this context are their size, importance to international firms and investors, and degree of integration into global supply chains. That said, the use of such measures is still possible in a crisis where economic logic is superseded by strategic, political, and military priorities.
+
+The economic measures aimed at Russia so far demonstrate some lessons with implications for potential sanctions or export controls against China. These include the following:
+
+- Economic integration and interdependence are not a guarantee against conflict. However, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a sample size of one, and Chinese leaders’ calculus, including regarding Taiwan and their prioritization of economic development, could be quite different.
+
+- If economic sanctions are to be used as a deterrent, the United States and its allies should credibly signal their willingness to impose such measures.
+
+- Economic measures are far more effective when imposed in coordination with allies. Organizing an economic alliance against China would be more difficult than it has been for sanctioning Russia.
+
+- Inflicting maximum economic pain on a target economy requires cutting off its external sources of revenue, which has not occurred with Russia. This might require increasing the economic resiliency of states imposing such measures.
+
+- The effectiveness of measures can wane as work-arounds are discovered, and sustained use of such measures can spur networks to evade them.
+
+- The effectiveness of sanctions is limited by the willingness of leaders in countries imposing them to pay costs themselves.
+
+- Economic deterrence should be considered a supplement to, but not a substitute for, military deterrence.
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+The international sanctions and export controls imposed on Russia in response to its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 offer a unique test case of the power and limits of such measures. The sanctions are the most substantial and rapid aimed at a major economy — previously the 11th largest in the world, with a gross domestic product (GDP) of $1.78 trillion in 2021 — since World War II. The current measures build on those imposed on Russia in 2014. Russia is now the world’s most sanctioned country in terms of the number of measures imposed on it, but the measures are less comprehensive than those the United States has imposed on Iran because Russia remains allowed to export commodities. Still, the sanctions and export controls are hurting Russia’s economy. This study evaluates their effects and effectiveness and draws lessons for future use, including against China.
+
+#### The 2014 Sanctions on Russia
+
+In 2014, the United States, European Union, and other allies responded to Russia’s invasion of Crimea with three types of sanctions and export controls: (1) asset freezes and travel bans aimed at individuals and companies linked to Crimea’s occupation and Russia’s incursion into the Donbas; (2) financial sanctions, including prohibitions on EU and U.S. entities buying or selling new bonds or equity issued by Russia’s largest state-owned banks; and (3) export restrictions on oil-related equipment as well as dual-use and military items.
+
+The 2014 sanctions hit Russia’s energy sector, finances, and military but did not include embargoes on Russian energy products or measures to bar Russian banks from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) network. These actions triggered large capital outflows, substantial depreciation of the ruble, inflation, and contractions in GDP and fiscal revenues. Overall, the estimated loss of potential foreign investments in Russia amounted to nearly $500 billion.
+
+The Kremlin’s “Fortress Russia” strategy arose in response to these sanctions. Its goal was to render Russia a self-reliant economy with a “fortress” balance sheet designed to protect the country from future balance-of-payments shocks and further sanctions. Moscow achieved this goal in four ways.
+
+First, the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (CBR) carried out a substantial de-dollarization of its assets because it believed U.S. assets would be the most at risk of future sanctions. Beginning in 2018, the CBR reallocated its reserves away from U.S. dollar assets, with the euro accounting for 32 percent of CBR reserve assets by mid-2021 and the remainder in gold (22 percent), U.S. dollars (16 percent), renminbi (13 percent), and other currencies (17 percent).
+
+Second, Moscow reinforced its conservative fiscal posture, including by assuming low oil prices. Russia’s public debt — about 75 percent of which is domestic — was fairly stable after 2014 and jumped to $290 billion, or 16 percent of GDP, in 2021 only because of the Covid-19 pandemic. Russia’s public and private sectors reduced foreign currency-denominated external debt for all sectors from $539 billion in early 2014 to $350 billion by the end of 2021.
+
+Third, the CBR built up foreign reserves by intervening to limit ruble appreciation. As a result, Russia’s foreign reserves nearly doubled from 2015 to 2022, from $356 billion to over $630 billion (Figure 1).
+
+Finally, Moscow attempted to spur self-sufficiency in agricultural and industrial goods with subsidies and embargoes on Western food imports. In the industrial sector, self-sufficiency largely failed: Russia’s machine tools and electronics, for example, have remained reliant on foreign inputs.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 1: Russia’s Official Reserve Assets, 2005–2022.__ Source: Calculations based on [“Bank of Russia, Official Reserve Assets,” CEIC](https://www.ceicdata.com/en)._
+
+#### The Current Sanctions and Export Controls on Russia
+
+The Western sanctions in response to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine have required a much greater level of coordination. Since the invasion, Washington, Brussels, and the governments of other major advanced economies have imposed a series of coordinated measures on Moscow, including the following:
+
+- __Financial sanctions__, which banned some Russian banks from the SWIFT network, barred foreign banks from transacting with designated Russian firms and banks, and froze most of the overseas assets held by the CBR. Close to two-thirds of Russia’s banking system has lost access to U.S. or European financial systems.
+
+- __Export controls__ on commodities or technologies deemed relevant for Russia’s defense, aerospace, or maritime sectors, including semiconductors, lasers, and sensors.
+
+- __Import restrictions__, including energy embargoes on Russia’s crude oil and refined petroleum products by the United States, Canada, and Australia soon after the invasion and by the European Union and the United Kingdom in December 2022. The European Union implemented its embargo on refined petroleum products in February 2023.
+
+- __A G7-led cap on the price of seaborne Russian oil__, set at $60 per barrel since December 2022. Third parties must demonstrate compliance with the oil cap to receive Western maritime shipping insurance and services. In February 2023, the G7, the European Union, and Australia implemented price caps on Russian refined petroleum products.
+
+- __Sanctions on individuals and entities involved with the war, including defense sector firms.__ Measures included asset freezes and travel bans on Russian government officials, as well as Russian oligarchs and propagandists. Overall, an estimated $100 billion in private Russian assets has been frozen.
+
+- __Indirect sanctions__, or “self-sanctioning,” by foreign firms exiting the Russian market or suspending operations because of pressures from customers or commercial constraints imposed by the sanctions.
+
+
+### The Economic Impacts on Russia
+
+The sanctions aimed at Russia in response to its February 2022 invasion of Ukraine nearly triggered a crisis at the onset. However, after a few months, Russia’s banking sector and exchange rate had largely recovered. The economic effectiveness of the Western measures has been limited by Moscow’s Fortress Russia preparations; adept policy responses, especially from the CBR; and Russia’s continued ability to export key commodities, particularly oil and natural gas.
+
+At a high level, the economic shock to Russia from Western economic measures was less than many expected in the weeks following Moscow’s invasion. Early forecasts suggested Russia’s real GDP would fall by 10 to 15 percent in 2022. However, Russia’s real GDP contracted only 2.1 percent in 2022, according to preliminary data from Rosstat. For perspective, the contraction in Russia’s economy in 2022 was greater than that caused by the 2014 sanctions but less sharp than the Covid-19 shock in 2020 and even less so than the aftermath of the global financial crisis in 2008 or the sovereign debt crisis of the late 1990s (Figure 2).
+
+It can be difficult to parse the causal impacts from Western measures, voluntary actions from foreign firms, Russian retaliatory actions, or the war more generally. Western measures — especially the export controls and efforts to reduce Russia’s energy revenues — are harming Russia’s economy, as is the general chilling effect of those measures and political pressures on foreign firms to exit the Russian market. Internationally, Russian officials like to blame Western sanctions for negative spillovers to other countries, including higher prices and grain shortages. However, Russia’s actions, disruptions to Black Sea trade, and increased risk premiums are more likely causes, at least after the initial shock from financial sanctions.
+
+The Russian economy has not, and probably will not, sustain anything like a knockout blow, but it is limping along and slowly bleeding. Going forward, the quantity and price of Russia’s energy exports will be a key determinant of fiscal and inflationary pressures felt by Moscow and Russian households.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 2: Russia’s Real GDP after Crises.__ Source: Calculations based on [“Federal State Statistics Service, Gross Domestic Product,” CEIC](https://www.ceicdata.com/en)._
+
+#### Financial Shock and Recovery
+
+During the two to three months following their imposition, Western financial sanctions had a substantial impact on Russia’s exchange rate and banking sector. Coordinated sanctions to freeze the CBR’s foreign exchange reserves were probably the most unexpected and dramatic early economic action after the war began. The sanctions rendered roughly $300 billion of the CBR’s $630 billion assets mostly useless, except for those in Chinese renminbi or gold, constraining the CBR’s ability to intervene in foreign exchange markets. The ruble’s value fell from 75 rubles per U.S. dollar before the February invasion to a low of around 120 rubles per U.S. dollar in mid-March. The CBR imposed strong capital controls and raised interest rates from 9.5 percent to 20 percent to stem outflows and mitigate exchange rate pressures. Meanwhile, worried Russians rushed to withdraw their bank deposits, contributing to financial distress and a severe lack of banking sector liquidity in March 2022.
+
+But the period of acute financial stress passed. By mid-April, the ruble’s exchange rate had recovered to its prewar level, though this is somewhat misleading because the ruble is no longer a fully convertible currency (Figure 3). Banking sector liquidity returned to surplus in April. The CBR began lowering its benchmark interest rate in April and subsequently returned to its prewar rate in June. Most Russians temporarily lost access to their foreign currency deposits, which had been forcefully converted to rubles, but capital controls eased in May to weaken the ruble because it was threatening the competitiveness of Russian exports and ruble-denominated budget revenues.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 3: Exchange Rate of Russian Ruble, January 2021–February 2023.__ Source: [“Bank of Russia, Foreign Exchange Rate: Bank of Russia: US Dollar,” CEIC](https://www.ceicdata.com/en)._
+
+#### Sustained Trade Surplus
+
+Russia’s energy exports only partially mitigated the impact of sanctions and export controls in 2022. Russia’s current account surplus, which includes its trade balance in goods and services plus income, increased after mid-2021 because of higher energy prices. In October 2022, it reached an all-time high of $245 billion on an annualized basis, equal to roughly 10 percent of Russia’s GDP. The CBR’s reported reserve assets, which count frozen foreign accounts, fell from a peak of $643 billion in February to $540 billion in September before recovering to about $600 billion in early February 2023. Russia maintained a substantial trade surplus, allowing the central bank to stabilize the exchange rate and giving the banking sector access to foreign exchange.
+
+Russia’s exports increased more than its imports declined in 2022. The Russian government stopped publishing trade data in early 2022, but it is possible to estimate the value of Russia’s imports and exports by using statistics from other countries. Based on data from 51 other countries, the authors estimate that in 2022, Russia’s exports increased $104 billion year over year while its imports fell $70 billion. An October 2022 study from Bruegel estimates that from January to September 2022 Russia generated $120 billion in extra export revenue because of higher prices, especially for natural gas.
+
+Russia’s imports dropped substantially after the war began but partially recovered during the summer of 2022. Based on mirror trade statistics, Russia’s goods imports likely decreased 50 percent from March to May 2022 compared to the previous three-month period. Russia’s total imports in 2022 fell to $223 billion from $294 billion in 2021 (Figure 4).
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 4: Russia’s Foreign Trade, January 2013–December 2022.__ Source: Calculations based on [“National sources, Imports and Exports: Russia,” CEIC](https://www.ceicdata.com/en)._
+
+Russia’s imports have shifted away from advanced economies in favor of a few emerging market economies, especially China and Turkey. In 2022, EU and U.S. exports to Russia fell fell by 40 percent ($43 billion) and 73 percent ($4.7 billion), respectively, compared to 2021. Meanwhile, exports from China and Turkey to Russia increased by 13 percent ($8.7 billion) and 62 percent ($3.6 billion), respectively, though data from Turkey probably capture transshipments rerouted from other countries. China has overtaken the European Union as Russia’s top source of imports, with Russia’s imports from China increasing as a share of its total imports from 25 percent in 2021 to an estimated 34 percent in 2022 (Figure 5).
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 5: China’s Goods Trade with Russia, January 2019–December 2022.__ Source: Calculations based on [“General Administration of Customs, China: Imports and Exports: Russia,” CEIC](https://www.ceicdata.com/en)._
+
+However, EU exports of machinery and other manufactured goods to Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries were abnormally high at the end of 2022, suggesting transshipment to Russia is occurring. Russia’s semiconductor imports have shifted away from the United States and Germany as top providers toward China and Hong Kong, with Western chips probably reaching Russia through intermediaries.
+
+To reduce exposure to Western sanctions, Russian entities have pivoted to the Chinese renminbi for some international transactions. International renminbi transactions can be processed via China’s Cross-Border Interbank Bank Payment System (CIPS), which primarily uses SWIFT for messaging but also has its own messaging system. CIPS does not report its volumes by country, but overall CIPS transactions increased from RMB 374 billion ($59 billion) per day in the first quarter of 2022 to RMB 421 billion ($59 billion) in the fourth quarter, which might reflect greater renminbi-based China-Russia trade settlement or changes in the renminbi’s exchange rate. Russian companies have been increasingly issuing renminbi-denominated bonds, although their outstanding renminbi debts remain small. Moreover, in September 2022, energy giants Gazprom and China’s National Petroleum Corporation agreed to use rubles and renminbi to pay for Russia’s natural gas to China.
+
+As a result, the renminbi-ruble pair is gaining momentum in Russia. Renminbi-ruble trading on the Moscow exchange totaled RMB 185 billion ($26 billion) in October 2022, more than 80 times larger than in February 2022. In China, however, renminbi-ruble trading volumes in 2022 were down 57 percent compared to in 2021, suggesting that Russian entities are far more interested in holding renminbi than Chinese entities are interested in holding rubles. Overall, the share of the dollar-ruble pair trading volumes on the Russian market declined from 80 percent to 40 percent during the January to October 2022 period.
+
+Capital has flowed out of Russia, although this is difficult to estimate because Russia no longer reports detailed balance-of-payments data. During the first months of the war, fleeing Russians withdrew foreign currency from their banks and deposited in accounts located abroad. Foreign direct investments in Russia decreased substantially, though Russian foreign investments abroad fell equally.
+
+#### Fiscal Impact Mitigated by Energy Exports
+
+The Russian federal government has been able to pay for its spending — including for its armed forces — largely through taxes and fees from oil and natural gas exports. Total revenues and expenditures were RUB 27.8 trillion ($412 billion) and RUB 31.1 trillion ($461 billion), respectively, in 2022. This suggests a fiscal deficit of RUB 3.3 trillion ($49 billion), or about 2.3 percent of GDP, which is modest by international standards.
+
+In 2022, Russia’s budget benefited from higher energy prices, with oil and gas revenues accounting for nearly all of Moscow’s increased revenues. Oil and gas revenues, which typically are about 40 percent of federal revenues, jumped to half of Moscow’s income during the second quarter. For every U.S. dollar of oil and gas exports, Moscow takes more than 50 cents as its cut. In 2022, Moscow earned about $170 billion, or $464 million per day on average, from oil and gas revenues (Figure 6). This understates Moscow’s reliance on oil and gas revenues, however, because such export revenues also influence profit taxes and dividends from state-owned enterprises. Gazprom — the national gas giant — reported net profits of RUB 2.51 trillion ($34 billion) in the first half of 2022, almost three times its profit during the first half of 2021; this reflects Gazprom’s ability to charge non-CIS countries — basically, the European Union — 3.5 times more than it did during the first half of 2021. Moscow also imposed a separate windfall profit tax on Gazprom that padded the budget in late 2022.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 6: Russian Federal Revenues, January 2013–January 2023.__ Source: Calculations based on [“Ministry of Finance, Federal Government Revenue,” CEIC](https://www.ceicdata.com/en)._
+
+After the invasion began, Russia boosted its official defense budget for the year to RUB 3.85 trillion ($57 billion), up from RUB 3.58 trillion ($49 billion) in 2021. Estimating Russia’s actual military expenditures is difficult because Moscow stopped reporting detailed budget data after April 2022, but defense spending has clearly increased dramatically. As of July 2022 — the latest high-level spending data available — national defense and national security spending had reached RUB 2.9 trillion ($40 billion) and RUB 1.3 trillion ($18 billion), respectively, year to date. Together these budget items accounted for 27 percent of total federal expenditures as of that month, with national defense spending increasing 72 percent and national security growing 9 percent year on year in ruble terms. For scale, Gazprom’s net profits in the first half of 2022 were enough to cover all Russia’s reported national defense expenditures. An official document released in September indicated that Russia’s actual defense expenditures would reach RUB 4.68 trillion ($69 billion) in 2022.
+
+Russia has been covering its budget deficit with money from its sovereign wealth fund, the National Wealth Fund. The Finance Ministry said in early January that it had withdrawn RUB 2.41 trillion ($35 billion) to cover the fiscal deficit in December 2022. Total assets in the National Wealth Fund fell from $183 billion at the end of 2021 to $148 billion in December 2022. With assets worth 7.8 percent of Russia’s GDP, the fund offers Moscow a fiscal buffer, but only $87 billion, or 4.6 percent of GDP, is in liquid assets, with about half of that in renminbi-denominated assets. Moscow can also sell its foreign exchange reserves to cover budget deficits.
+
+Moscow could cover its deficits by borrowing domestically. After avoiding net debt issuance for most of 2022, Moscow issued RUB 2.57 trillion ($39 billion) in sovereign bonds — mostly with floating-rate coupons — in the fourth quarter. Russia’s debt levels, however, are quite low, with a public debt as a share of GDP of 16 percent and interest payments of only RUB 1.33 trillion ($19.7 billion), or 4.2 percent of federal expenditures, in 2022. The sanctions prevent the Russian government from borrowing in international markets, but — despite hype about a Russian sovereign bond default — Moscow did not rely on external borrowing even before the war.
+
+#### Disrupted Production, Higher Prices, and Lower Living Standards
+
+Export controls and sanctions, as well as foreign firms’ fears of running afoul of them, are weakening Russia’s economy and industrial capacity. Official Russian data suggest that overall industrial production declined only 1 percent in the months after the war began. However, military-related sectors are propping up overall industrial production, and this conceals the unequal impact across sectors and the degradation of product quality. Sectors most reliant on foreign inputs — especially high-tech components — are those most affected. According to Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) data, Russia’s textiles, machinery, computer and electronics, air transport, pharmaceutical, and transport equipment sectors are the most reliant on foreign inputs and, therefore, the most vulnerable to sanctions and export controls (Figure 7). Alan Estevez, U.S. undersecretary of commerce for industry and security, claimed in June 2022 that global chip exports to Russia were down 90 percent, with 38 countries imposing export controls. Production of motor vehicles, for example, on average fell about 61 percent from January to December 2022 compared to the previous year (Figure 8).
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 7: Foreign Value Added in Russia’s Final Demand by Sector, 2018.__ Source: Calculations based on [“Trade in Value Added (TiVA) 2021 Ed: Origin of Value Added in Final Demand,” OECD.Stat](https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=TIVA_2021_C3)._
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 8: Russian Industrial Production, January 2019–December 2022.__ Source: Calculations based on [“Federal State Statistics Service, Industrial Production Indexes: 2018 Base Year,” CEIC](https://www.ceicdata.com/en)._
+
+Export controls are also likely disrupting Russia’s armaments industry. Moscow claims it is ramping up production of all kinds of weapons and munitions. However, it is opting for a quantity-over-quality strategy, as some high-tech inputs and machinery are hard to obtain, limiting its ability to produce advanced weapons. Instead, the Defense Ministry is upgrading obsolete weapons, such as T-62 tanks. Furthermore, Russia’s armament production rates were inadequate to cover losses in 2022, indicating that Russia needs to dramatically expand its defense industrial base as it struggles to obtain foreign inputs and attract skilled workers. Nonetheless, export controls are imperfect, and some controlled or dual-use high-tech goods are probably reaching Russian factories via China, Turkey, Cyprus, and the United Arab Emirates. Chinese defense firms are reportedly provided dual-use goods to Russia, based on confidential Russian customs data.
+
+Many foreign companies are self-sanctioning by curtailing operations or leaving Russia, even if not required by law. As of January 2023, of more than 1,350 foreign companies in Russia, 12 percent were scaling back operations, 35 percent were suspending operations, and 24 percent had announced they would withdraw entirely. However, a separate study showed that, as of November 2022, only 8.5 percent of EU and G7 companies in Russia had divested from the country. This reflects, in part, the difficulty of divesting equity positions quickly and under such conditions. But the study also notes that some of the exiting foreign firms maintain buy-back provisions with their former local subsidiaries, giving them the option to reenter the market in a few years.
+
+Many Russians have fled in pursuit of better opportunities or to avoid military conscription. Official statistics suggest that about 550,000 Russians emigrated during the first three quarters of 2022, up from 220,000 during the same period in 2021. However, these figures probably understate emigration because many Russians do not want to declare their intentions to leave. Meanwhile, in September 2022, Moscow announced it would conscript 300,000 reservists. These are notable losses for an economy that had a workforce of 75 million in 2021, but the emigrants probably skew toward those with more skills and resources. By some estimates, 100,000 IT professionals fled Russia after the partial mobilization in September 2022. Tourism data suggest that primary destinations are Georgia, CIS countries, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and Finland. Visa requirements limit Russians’ ability to flee to Western countries.
+
+Prices in Russia have jumped, and some foreign goods or brands are no longer available. The official consumer price index suggests that prices increased almost 11 percent in the 10 weeks after the invasion but then stabilized by early May, probably reflecting the restrengthening of the ruble (Figure 9). But inflation statistics do not account for suddenly reduced quality or what is no longer available. For example, Russian-made automobiles no longer have airbags.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 9: Russia’s Consumer Price Index, January 2019–December 2022.__ Source: Calculations based on [“Federal State Statistics Service, Consumer Price Index,” CEIC](https://www.ceicdata.com/en)._
+
+The cumulative costs of the sanctions, export controls, and war are likely adding to the economic distress of many Russian households. The average real disposable income of Russian households tripled from about 2000 to 2014 but has stagnated or declined since then (Figure 10). The war will exacerbate that trend. Russia’s headline unemployment rate — 3.7 percent as of December 2022 — did not increase in 2022, unlike during the previous shocks. But this conceals the impact on Russian households. Many employers have furloughed employees or cut their pay rather than firing them. Russia is a “high-employment, low-wage” economy, where employers often pay a low base wage and offer a substantial but discretionary bonus; this allows them to adjust total compensation in response to shocks. Workers in Russia absorbed the shock in 2022 mostly by losing purchasing power instead of jobs, evident in their falling consumption in real terms. As of December 2022, retail sales volume had fallen by 10.5 percent compared to 2021.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 10: Russian GDP and Household Income, Q1 2013–Q3 2022.__ Source: Calculations based on [“Federal State Statistics Service, Real GDP: Volume Index; Real Disposable Income Index,” CEIC](https://www.ceicdata.cvom/en)._
+
+> #### `HOW RELIABLE ARE RUSSIAN ECONOMIC DATA?`
+
+_`Before the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Russian economic data were among the most reliable and comprehensive of any major emerging market economy. However, since the invasion, Moscow has treated some data as state secrets, making it harder to assess trends in the Russian economy and raising questions about the available data’s reliability. Before 2022, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had categorized Russia’s data as “broadly adequate,” in contrast with, for example, China’s data, which the IMF considers “barely adequate.” In recent years, some economists have raised concerns about the independence of Russia’s Federal Service for State Statistics (Rosstat) after turnover in its leadership and suspicious data revisions. In 2022, Moscow stopped publishing data series on foreign trade, balance of payments, the banking sector, detailed budgetary expenditures, and oil and gas production. The Russian government has classified such data, ostensibly to reduce foreign governments’ ability to target the Russian economy, but some believe the data blackout is intended to hide negative economic news. However, even with the available data, negative trends in the Russian economy remain clearly visible.`_
+
+#### A Dismal Economic Outlook
+
+As the war drags on and Western economic measures persist, Russia’s economic outlook will probably remain stagnant at best. In January, the IMF forecasted that Russia’s GDP would grow only 0.3 percent in 2023, while the Kyiv School of Economics projected a 6.1 percent decline in 2023, with the expectations about Russia’s hydrocarbon exports explaining the difference. On the one hand, economies facing sanctions and export controls learn to adapt. But on the other hand, and in Russia’s case, growing wartime demands and declining energy revenues suggest that Moscow’s fiscal position will worsen and its economic trade-offs will become more acute.
+
+Russia’s oil and gas revenues will likely decline as Europe weans itself off Russian pipelines, as Russian crude oil sells at a discount, and as the European Union’s embargo on refined products takes effect. European imports of Russian gas fell from an average of 2.2 billion cubic meters per week during the first quarter of 2022 to 560 million cubic meters per week during the last quarter of 2022.
+
+The price of Russian crude oil has probably declined, but it is difficult to say by how much. The price of Urals crude oil — the normal benchmark for Russian oil — has fallen from $90 per barrel in June 2022 to $50 per barrel as of February 2023. Part of this reflects lower oil prices globally, but it is also the result of a reportedly widening spread between Urals crude oil and other global benchmarks since late 2022. As of January 2023, this spread was primarily the result of the EU ban on Russian oil shipments, with the G7’s oil price cap of $60 having not yet been tested because Russian crude is selling at prices below the cap. However, energy analysts note that the methodology for calculating the Urals crude price may be compromised, with Russian officials reporting lower prices to skirt the price cap and actual Russian revenues much closer to the Brent crude oil benchmark. Chinese import data also suggest that the discount on Russian crude oil shrank from the third to the fourth quarter of 2022.
+
+Nonetheless, in December 2022, Russia’s energy export earnings fell to an estimated $678 million per day, down from a peak of about $1 billion per day from March to May 2022. A Russian official said in January that the EU ban on Russian refined petroleum products, which took effect on February 5, 2023, will limit Russia’s ability to export such products and result in substituting crude oil in its exports.
+
+Russia’s 2023 federal budget calls for expenditures of RUB 29.1 trillion ($416 billion) and revenues of RUB 26.1 trillion ($373 billion), but it assumes that Russian crude oil will be sold for $70 per barrel. The budget also projects national defense and national security expenditures of RUB 4.97 trillion ($71 billion) and RUB 3.56 trillion ($51 billion), respectively. Together, these items would account for nearly 30 percent of the budget. Planned expenditures on infrastructure, healthcare, education, and research and development are due to be cut, though Moscow probably will continue to prioritize assistance to the poorest households for political reasons. Russia’s finance minister admitted in December 2022 that the planned fiscal deficit of only 2 percent of GDP in 2023 may not be attainable. The budget also assumes Russia’s GDP will decline by 0.8 percent in 2023. Preliminary budget data indicates that Moscow’s fiscal deficit reached RUB 1.76 trillion ($25 billion) in January 2023 because oil and gas revenues dropped to RUB 426 billion ($6 billion), a 54 percent decrease from December 2022, and because of a surge in military spending.
+
+In the longer term, Russia’s economic prospects are bleak. The exodus of foreign firms and skilled Russian workers are risks to Russia’s economic potential. Russia might struggle to maintain oil and gas production at current levels because of controls on needed foreign technologies. Assuming the Western measures remain in place, Russia likely will attempt import substitution of foreign technologies — with which it has a poor track record — or reorient its economy toward Asia, especially China. This latter shift has already begun, but the geographic center of the Russian economy is much closer to Europe. Furthermore, becoming overly reliant on China for manufactured goods and technologies poses its own geopolitical risks to Russia.
+
+
+### The Goals and Effectiveness of the Economic Measures on Russia
+
+Whether the sanctions and export controls are having an effect and whether they are effective are distinct questions. As discussed in the previous chapter, sanctions and export controls are having an effect. But the answer to whether they are effective depends on Western policymakers’ goals. Their primary objectives have evolved from trying to deter Russia from invading Ukraine, to attempting to destabilize Russia’s economy to compel a termination of the war, to degrading Russia’s ability to sustain its war effort, perhaps over the long term.
+
+The first goal, deterrence, failed for at least two reasons. First, Western leaders did not communicate accurately the extent to which they were willing to sanction Russia if Putin invaded. Western allies ended up enacting stronger measures than suggested before the invasion. For example, before Russia’s attack, the White House suggested that the initial sanctions package would not bar Russian banks from SWIFT, and no one publicly discussed sanctions on the CBR. Second, and more significantly, Putin believed Russia would quickly win the war and that the European Union and Japan would not join U.S. sanctions efforts.
+
+Western leaders did not initially signal their intent to impose such measures for several reasons. First, some Western governments — excluding the United States and United Kingdom — did not believe Putin would invade Ukraine. Second, those who believed Putin would attack probably did not expect the strength and effectiveness of Ukrainian resistance, perhaps believing that imposing large costs would be in pursuit of a hopeless goal. Third, they did not anticipate the degree of moral outrage that would emerge, especially in Europe.
+
+However, threats of stronger economic measures from Western leaders still may not have deterred Putin. A month before the full-scale invasion, economic officials reportedly briefed Putin on the potential impacts of sanctions if Russia attacked Ukraine. Officials predicted severe economic effects worse than what ended up happening to the Russian economy, yet Putin still proceeded with his war plans. In January 2023, he boasted that the Russian economy had weathered the sanctions better than Russian economists had expected. But he also believed the war would be brief and that Ukraine would collapse from the Russian onslaught. If that had been the case, it is unlikely that a similar Western economic coalition would have emerged, persisted, and imposed multiple tranches of sanctions. When considering deterrents, Putin weighed his military, economic, and strategic assumptions. Given those, he might have decided differently if military deterrence, either from Ukraine or other countries, had been stronger. But such military deterrence would have been complicated by Putin’s obliviousness to major weaknesses within Russia’s military.
+
+The second goal, destabilization, appeared within reach — at least economically, if not politically — in the weeks following the invasion but faded after Russia’s financial sector recovered. At the time, some observers speculated that financial instability and widespread freezing of oligarchs’ assets might trigger political developments resulting in an end to the invasion. This was probably not a widespread view within Western governments, at least among sanctions experts, but it at least seemed plausible and offered hope at a time when Ukraine’s military position was in doubt. The sanctions, especially on the oligarchs, also had the added benefit of showing to Ukraine and the Western public that governments were taking action and punishing bad actors.
+
+The third goal, degradation, is a work in progress. Western officials have said that the sanctions and export controls are intended to weaken Russia’s ability to sustain its war effort. The measures are doing that to a degree, and additional sanctions — especially on oil and gas exports — could add to this pressure. But they are unlikely to be as decisive as battlefield outcomes, to which they might contribute by reducing the quantity and quality of Russian armaments. This might be reason enough to maintain or, if possible, strengthen the sanctions and export controls, at least for the duration of the war.
+
+#### An Economic Theory of Victory?
+
+Could these economic measures alone bring an end to Russia’s aggression? An economic theory of victory hinges on imposing enough economic suffering on Russians, both elites and the general population, to force an end to the war.
+
+The main mechanism by which pressure could be brought to bear on the Russian population is likely inflation. In theory, if the Russian government’s fiscal revenues — especially from oil and gas — could be reduced and its fiscal savings exhausted, Moscow would have the option of cutting expenditures, raising taxes, or borrowing domestically. Cutting spending is difficult during a war, unless the cuts are concentrated on nonmilitary areas like social payments, education, or healthcare. Raising taxes would increase the transparent costs of the war for Russians if imposed on households or as value-added taxes; if imposed on businesses, employment or wages could suffer. The most expedient option would be to borrow. With Russia’s limited access to foreign capital markets, Moscow would have to borrow from domestic banks or perhaps the CBR, increasing the risk of inflation if done at scale, in order to spend on domestic goods and services. Because of its low debt levels, Moscow surely could borrow, but the flow of new credit and spending matters for inflation.
+
+The economic measures aimed at Russia function like Allied strategic bombing in World War II: they are weakening Russia by attrition and perhaps by lowering morale. But the historical track record of using punishments — economic, bombing, or otherwise — to break a country’s will to fight is poor. Indeed, Putin is trying to break Ukrainians’ will, including by attacking civilian targets, but he has not succeeded.
+
+In Russia’s case, many workers have already experienced a decade of stagnant or declining real wages. One interpretation might be that they have become hardened to such conditions. But another could be that they will eventually respond angrily because of the cumulative costs. Some research suggests that personalist authoritarian regimes are sensitive to revenue losses and sanctions, but dominant single-party or military regimes are more resilient.
+
+Economic factors are among several pressures on Putin’s regime, including battlefield setbacks and losses, conscription, and weakening credibility. However, other factors such as propaganda, repression, and elites’ dependence on the existing system help stabilize the regime. Experts can only speculate which factors, if any, might trigger a power transition in Moscow, though such a transition is at least possible because of a coup, mass protests, or collapse in governance. The only outcome one can predict with confidence is that the war will need to end eventually.
+
+
+### Comparing Russia and China as Economic Targets
+
+The sanctions and export controls on Russia since early 2022 have spurred discussions in capitals and boardrooms about whether and under what circumstances such measures would be aimed at China. In this project, the authors will analyze the probability, practicality, and implications of using such measures against China under various scenarios in subsequent studies. Comparing the Russian and Chinese economies offers insights into how much more difficult and disruptive imposing equivalent measures on China would be.
+
+The biggest differences between the economies and financial sectors of China and Russia are their size, importance to international firms and investors, and degree of integration into global supply chains. In 2021, China’s GDP was $17.7 trillion, 10 times that of Russia. China’s domestic bond market was $21 trillion, 46 times the size of Russia’s. The market capitalization of domestically listed Chinese firms was more than $12.2 trillion, 18 times that of Russian firms. China’s commercial banking sector had $54 trillion in assets, 33 times the assets of Russian banks.
+
+China is far more important as a destination for international investment, and its domestic market and manufacturing ecosystem are critical for many Western firms. At the end of 2021, foreign banks had nearly $1.4 trillion in claims on China, compared to $121 billion in claims on Russia. The stock of foreign direct investment in China was $3.6 trillion, compared to $610 billion in Russia, though balance of payments statistics understate the value of those investments in China. EU firms were far more exposed to the Russian market than U.S. firms before 2022. For the United States, imposing sanctions on Russia was comparatively easy because Russia was a modest market for U.S. multinationals and a small destination for U.S. exports. But for both EU and U.S. firms, China is an enormous market. While China has not proved the booming market for U.S. exports many hoped, accounting for only about 7 percent of U.S. exports for the past decade, it is an important market for local affiliates of U.S. firms in China (Figure 11).
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 11: Local Affiliate Sales in and Exports to China and Russia, 2019.__ Source: Calculations based on [“U.S. Direct Investment Abroad: Activities of U.S. Multinational Enterprises,” U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis](https://www.bea.gov/international/di1usdop); [“Outward FATS, main variables – NACE Rev. 2: Industry, construction and services (except public administration, defense, compulsory social security)” Eurostat Data Browser](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/FATS_OUT2_R2__custom_4702223/default/table?lang=en); [“U.S. Census Bureau, Exports to China and Russia,” CEIC](https://www.ceicdata.com/en); [“Eurostat, Exports to China and Russia,” CEIC](https://www.ceicdata.com/en)._
+
+China and Russia are both current account surplus countries with large exports. The key difference is that whereas Russia exports commodities and imports manufactured goods, China’s trade position is the reverse, with China being the world’s factory and top exporter of manufactured goods. In that regard, China is more important because its market share of global manufactured goods exports is more than twice Russia’s market share of global energy and fuel exports (Figure 12).
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 12: China and Russia: Share of Global Exports, 2000–2021.__ Source: Calculations based on [“World Bank, Exports: Goods,” CEIC](https://www.ceicdata.com/en)._
+
+For multinational firms, pulling out of Russia or finding alternatives to Russian goods is far easier than in the case of China and Chinese goods. Whether a specific good can be sourced from elsewhere or substituted depends on the global market dynamics and nature of that good. As such, there is no simple answer to whether it is easier to sanction a commodity or manufactured goods exporters, although commodities probably are more fungible than manufactured goods in general. But the centrality of China to multinationals for production suggests that many Chinese-made goods cannot be easily replaced. Foreign-funded firms accounted for more than 30 percent of China’s $3.6 trillion in exports in 2022.
+
+Chinese firms rely on some foreign technologies and inputs but much less so than Russian firms. Domestic value added accounted for 79 percent of China’s manufacturing sector in 2018 — the latest data available — compared to only 57 percent of Russia’s manufacturing sector. If Western governments wanted to allow trade in critical goods with China to continue under sanctions, they would need far more carve outs than required for energy and commodities trade with Russia. There might be so many critical inputs from Chinese factories that a sanctions regime might need to exempt more than it covers to avoid causing massive global disruptions.
+
+All of this suggests that foreign governments would be far less willing to apply comparable sanctions or export controls to China. Economic disruptions would be an order of magnitude worse, though this does not mean that such measures are impossible, as economic logic may be a lower priority than strategic, national security, or moral considerations in a crisis. However, the bar would be high, and the United States would probably struggle to organize and sustain the same economic coalition against China. The composition of such a coalition would depend in part on the nature of the crisis, its perceived causes, the state of the global economy, and the quality of Western leadership.
+
+Still, China’s economic heft does not mean it is invulnerable to foreign economic coercion. Beijing is aware that China’s economy has three key external vulnerabilities: foreign technologies, imported commodities such as food and fuel, and reliance on the U.S. dollar for international finance. Beijing is trying to address these vulnerabilities through self-sufficiency efforts, which form the basis of much of the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–25). The economic measures aimed at Russia have reinforced Beijing’s concerns about such vulnerabilities. China also has domestic weaknesses, including government, corporate, and household debts totaling 295 percent of GDP, compared to only 120 percent of GDP in Russia.
+
+Another key distinction is that Russia’s economy has been largely stagnant for a decade while China’s economy continues to grow. Chinese leaders remain committed to economic development, albeit with a greater focus on national security. This could have implications for their relative priorities in a crisis and their sensitivity to economic deterrents.
+
+
+### Lessons for the Potential Use of Sanctions against China
+
+The sanctions and export controls on Russia so far demonstrate at least 10 major lessons with implications for potential sanctions or export controls against China in a potential crisis over Taiwan.
+
+__First, while economic interdependencies did not deter Russia, Putin’s decision to launch a full-scale invasion of Ukraine depended on contingent factors that Western policymakers should not overextrapolate to other cases.__ The Russia-Ukraine war is a sample size of one. Policymakers should not conclude that economic deterrence is irrelevant, including for Chinese leaders. It is troubling that Moscow was willing to risk its main export market and its access to needed imported technologies in pursuit of territorial expansion. However, Chinese leaders and the Chinese Communist Party have a different cost-benefit calculus than Putin and his personalist regime. In the current context, the apparent reluctance of Chinese firms to offer lethal aid to or violate export controls on behalf of Russia suggests they fear secondary sanctions. Beijing is unlikely to believe that any military action against Taiwan would be as easy as Putin believed the invasion of Ukraine would be. It is important that Western leaders credibly communicate to Beijing that unilateral changes to the status quo regarding Taiwan risk catastrophic costs that would exceed any plausible benefits for China.
+
+__Second, if economic sanctions are to be used as a deterrent, the United States and its allies should not undersell their willingness to impose such measures.__ Any threats need to be credible and of sufficient severity to affect Chinese leaders’ calculus. Such warnings should be specific enough to credibly signal that Washington is serious but without giving away details that might allow Beijing to better prepare for their impact. That said, sanctions on individuals likely require more secrecy for impact, as an individual or firm could quickly reposition their assets, whereas broad sanctions on a country’s banking sector or economy cannot be evaded quickly. When or under what circumstances during a crisis the United States should impose such measures is a related and important question, which the authors will explore in future analysis.
+
+__Third, the effectiveness of U.S. sanctions or export controls would be greatly increased if imposed in coordination with U.S. allies.__ For example, without multilateral sanctions against Russia, the CBR would still have access to most of its reserves, with only its overseas U.S. dollar assets frozen. To stop it from using those assets, Washington would have had to threaten — and perhaps use — secondary sanctions against financial institutions in allied countries, a costly diplomatic move. Allied coordination is also essential for export control regimes. The United States could rely on foreign direct product rule provisions to impose export controls extraterritorially on a target economy through allied countries. But such an approach would incentivize replacing U.S. components and intellectual property in the long run as well as potentially angering allied governments. Washington needs to work with like-minded nations to supplement the Wassenaar Arrangement for export controls.
+
+__Fourth, multilateral measures could be more effective economically and as a signaling mechanism if Washington prepares for relevant contingencies with allies well in advance of any crisis.__ This could be difficult in part because it is hard to anticipate how governments, their polities, and their media would respond to an unprecedented crisis, such as a potential Chinese attack on Taiwan. But it is better to discuss such scenarios early, in part to avoid scrambling like the Western allies did after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
+
+__Fifth, the United States and its allies should make early investments in their administrative, intelligence, and enforcement capabilities for sanctions and export controls.__ Managing a more complicated regime — especially one aimed at China — would require more resources. For example, the Bureau of Industry and Security in the U.S. Commerce Department needs more resources to manage the export control measures it is already overseeing. Bureaucracies take time to expand and develop. Whatever the gap in expected needs and existing resources, it should be addressed sooner rather than later.
+
+__Sixth, the war in Ukraine highlights the relative importance of flows of real exports and imports — in part dependent on geography — compared to financial flows in determining outcomes.__ Until recently, economic policy discussions often focused on financial flows and deemphasized supply chains, commodities, and physical access because the latter have been reliable for the past few decades. But money cannot solve everything, especially during wars, pandemics, or other crises. Ultimately, the effectiveness of any sanctions or export control regime is determined by the target economy’s inability to access needed supplies, which is downstream of, but not completely determined by, its ability to access hard currency.
+
+__Seventh, inflicting maximum economic pain on a target country requires cutting off its sources of external financing and trade, and that is not what the current sanctions do to Russia.__ While Russian imports are down, Russia is still largely permitted to export its commodities and goods. Roughly 20 percent of Russian banks by assets are not under sanctions, and some major banks such as Gazprombank and Alfa-Bank are under partial sanctions. Cutting off some Russian banks’ access to international networks and foreign currency settlement hurts those banks. Freezing reserves can be effective, but ultimately what matters for the target economy is flows, not stocks, of trade and finance. As long as trade in most goods is permitted and there are financial carve outs to allow such trade, sanctions can only go so far. Compared to efforts to sanction other countries, the measures aimed at Russia are vast in scope but not necessarily in intensity. The sanctions on Russia are less comprehensive than those aimed at Iran, for example, primarily because Russia is still allowed to export commodities, while Iran is mostly prohibited from exporting energy by unilateral U.S. sanctions, enforced by the threat of secondary sanctions.
+
+__Eighth, the effectiveness of measures can wane as the target and third parties find work-arounds, and their sustained use against major economies can spur networks to evade the measures.__ Financial sanctions can have a sharp but shorter impact, while export controls may be more difficult to ramp up but more impactful over the long run. Many firms or banks will initially overcomply with the measures until their limits are clarified. Sustaining measures over the long term will incentivize work-arounds, especially if the target economy offers a large market or important exports. The U.S. dollar is unlikely to lose its preeminent status as the global currency, at least in the medium term. However, there is a lower threshold and greater risk that sanctioned countries will find ways of settling international transactions outside the reach of the U.S. dollar network and U.S. financial sanctions. For example, Russia is already encouraging international payments in the currencies of “friendly” countries, particularly in renminbi. China and some other countries would remain interested in such networks even if the sanctions on Russia were removed, but keeping the sanctions in place increases the pressure to operationalize such networks.
+
+__Ninth, economic sanctions are ultimately a political decision, and their effectiveness is determined by the willingness of leaders in Washington and other key capitals to pay costs.__ High inflation has contributed to Western leaders’ hesitance to comprehensively sanction Russian energy exports. But even under more benign conditions, the United States probably would be reluctant to disrupt global commodity markets and impose enormous costs on Europe with such an action. Similar measures aimed at China would be even more disruptive.
+
+__Finally, economic deterrence is generally a supplement to, not a substitute for, military deterrence.__ Whatever the criticisms about the concept of “integrated deterrence,” policies, signals, and interests need to be considered holistically. Washington’s perceived willingness to sustain economic costs via sanctions or export controls has implications for its willingness to sustain military costs in a crisis. To put it bluntly, if Chinese leaders do not believe the United States or its allies would be willing to use globally devastating sanctions in a crisis over Taiwan, why would they believe the United States would intervene militarily when a regional conflict could be just as economically disruptive?
+
+---
+
+__Gerard DiPippo__ is a senior fellow with the Economics Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He joined CSIS after 11 years in the U.S. intelligence community (IC). From 2018 to 2021, DiPippo was a deputy national intelligence officer for economic issues at the National Intelligence Council, where he led the IC’s economic analysis of East Asia. He also was a senior economic analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency, focused on East Asia, South Asia, and global economic issues.
+
+__Andrea Leonard Palazzi__ is a research associate with the Economics Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). In this role, he supports research on geoeconomic issues, particularly on monetary policy, digital currencies, and international trade, with a transatlantic focus. He joined CSIS as an intern with the Scholl Chair in International Business. Previously, Palazzi was a graduate research fellow at the South African Reserve Bank in Pretoria, where he worked on monetary policy topics in the economic research department.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-23-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-14.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-23-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-14.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..ad9539ab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-23-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-14.md
@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第十四日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-02-23 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 控方遲交專家報告 辯方反對作供 官指控方解釋不合理惟未造成不公
+- 官指控方不按時序發問 「如有陪審團怎跟得上？」
+- 九東夾附「共同綱領」報名 區諾軒：無權左右地區決定、把關不力
+- 法官問是否知「李伯盧」為35+組織者 區諾軒：唔知道
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪受審。何桂藍的代表大律師於審訊第5日，反對控方傳召兩名警長以「專家證人」身份就Facebook及YouTube作供，因控方太遲提供專家報告予辯方，致她難找辯方專家，最終法庭批准兩警長作供，但不代表接納報告內容。法庭今（23日）就相關決定頒下書面理由，直言控方就延遲送達報告的解釋並不合理，控方應該以嚴格的舉證基礎準備案件。惟法庭認為容許控方呈交報告未會對被告造成不可彌補的損害，亦不會影響審訊的公平性，而且可透過短暫押後或頒下相應的賠償令作為補償。
+
+#### 辯方指報告延遲送達 控方無遵守有關規定
+
+控方申請傳召兩名警長就Facebook及YouTube方面，以「專家證人」身份作供。《國安法》指定法官陳慶偉、李運騰及陳仲衡於判詞指，雖然案件於2022年6月已交付至高院，但辯方卻在開審第一天，才收妥控方所有專家報告。代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel反對指，該些專家報告延遲送達，以及控方沒有遵守相關的法律規定及指示。被告將因控方傳召專家證人而受到不可挽回的損失；另外控方在沒有正當理由的情況下，公然無視專家證據的規定。
+
+#### 控方強調已盡快獲取報告
+
+控方代表、副刑事檢控專員萬德豪承認控方沒有按《實務指示》遵守要求，在交付程序之前，將專家報告送達辯方。但他強調已盡快獲取該些專家報告，亦預期與辯方達成部分協議，可是最後卻未能達成協議，因此控方認為確實需要索取有關報告。但控方認為被告並沒有受任何損害。
+
+#### 辯方質疑控方一早知道會依賴甚麼證據
+
+辯方則指，控方在起訴時已知道會依賴甚麼證據，他們不能坐着等待視乎哪些事項獲得同意或不同意，再決定是否傳召專家證人。控方有義務盡早列出證據，尤其在具有針對性的專家證據上，以容許辯方向其他專家索取意見，以及決定是否傳召他們辯護。在現階段，辯方無法在有限的時間內找到相關領域的其他專家。
+
+#### 法庭認為控方解釋不合理 應以嚴格基礎準備案件
+
+法庭直言，控方就延遲送達報告的解釋並不合理，他們應該一早知道會依賴Facebook及YouTube的片段，控方應該以嚴格的舉證基礎準備案件，而非期望會與辯方達成協議。
+
+#### 法庭指被告夠時間索專家意見 但收報告後3星期卻未嘗試
+
+但另一方面，法庭考慮到現時距離傳召警長尚有一段時間，被告仍然有足夠時間考慮有關報告及索取辯方專家的意見。法庭強調，被告面對的控罪嚴重，為了司法公正，相關專家證據應該呈交予法庭並進行適當的評估。
+
+法庭亦指，辯方指在尋找辯方專家時會遇困難的說法是推測性的，加上辯方收到報告已超過3星期，但他們仍然沒有嘗試徵求辯方專家的意見。
+
+#### 法庭指未會對被告損害 亦不影響審訊公平
+
+法庭最後指，雖然控方未能及時將專家報告送達予辯方，但若繼續容許控方在這方面舉證的話，卻未會對被告造成不可彌補的損害，亦不會影響審訊的公平性。法庭認為，若因報告延遲而對辯方造成不便，可透過短暫押後或頒下相應的賠償令作為補償。
+
+考慮到上述原因，法庭決定批准控方就該4份專家報告舉證，但不代表在現階段接受報告的內容。另外，兩名警長獲批准作供，但其專家資格是否確立，以及其證據所佔的比重，則有待日後處理。
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，16人否認「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，今（23日）踏入審訊第14天。控方續引初選組織者 WhatsApp 群組訊息發問，顯示趙家賢曾稱區諾軒和戴耀廷在協調會議傳閱「白紙黑字」協議予與會者確認，雖沒簽署但屬「互相同意的協議（mutually agreed consents）」，戴耀廷亦指新西和九東兩區參選人均同意簽署協議，並夾附在提名表格。控方其後回溯至6月14日的訊息，遭3名法官質疑不按時序發問，令人難以跟上，法官李運騰質疑控方問題「跳來跳去」，法官陳慶偉亦質疑「如果這是有陪審團的審訊，他們怎能跟得上？」，提醒控方要「記住本案的議題」。
+
+#### 趙家賢曾稱協調會議有「白紙黑字 ciruclate 畀大家確認」
+
+控方今續引初選組織者的「PfD 35＋計劃」WhatsApp 群組訊息發問，顯示趙家賢在6月19日轉發「墨落無悔」發起人的聲明後，曾於群組稱：「屯門張可森依幾條友就擺到明要隊到行啦，仲有大家之前開咗會嘅協議，區軒同埋 benny 係有白紙黑字 ciruclate 畀大家確認，雖然冇最後簽紙，但係呢個都係一個 mututally agreed consents。」區解釋，理解「協議」是指「協調會議上面曾經傳閱嘅協議」。（編按：「ciruclate」及「mututally」分別應為「circulate」及「mutually」。）
+
+法官李運騰問，趙家賢「白紙黑字」指的是什麼，區指「我冇辦法代入佢個角度諗啦」，但「組合返我所憶述嘅協調會過程，我會話係第一次會議嗰個傳閱過程」。區諾軒早前供稱，部分選區首次協調會議曾傳閱「35+計劃」文件，他在法官陳慶偉詢問下表示，該文件在首次會議傳閱，而沒有在會前傳閱，至於會後傳閱的已是總結會議的各區協調機制初稿。
+
+法官陳慶偉遂問，組織者當時是否要求參與者對協調機制初稿提出意見，但最終沒有要求簽署任何文件？區確認。陳再問，所以趙家賢「白紙黑字」指的並非在會議上傳閱的「35+計劃」文件，而是會議後傳閱的協調機制初稿，否則趙不會形容為「mutually agreed consents」？區答：「係有一個咁嘅過程。」
+
+#### 戴耀廷6.19稱新西已決定簽署協議 後夾附於提名表格
+
+控方續指，戴耀廷在趙家賢發訊息後，曾回應：「新西昨晚各參選人已決定了由他們自己簽署一份協議（內容與之前傾妥的一樣），交民主動力。民主動力之後會公布有哪人交回這協議」，及「九東則由秘書處提出一份共同綱領，包括了原先協議的內容，各參選人都同意簽署。」
+
+就新界西訊息，區確認「協議」指新西參選人報名時簽署的「民主派新西協調機制協議」。被問到「內容與之前傾妥的一樣」的意思，區指當時不知道新西「傾妥咗嘅內容」，「不過我哋事後睇到嗰個（新界西協調會議）錄影同開會嘅謄本，應該佢講緊就係新界西第二次協調會議」，而該份協議與參選人報名時夾附的文件一樣。
+
+大律師沈士文一度提出，傳譯主任漏譯了「新界西第二次協調會議」，並指現時控方圍繞新界西文件發問，但不知有何重要，因為所有新界西候選人均認罪。法官李運騰續指，如果控方有其他選區的文件，希望他們能呈上。
+
+#### 九東「秘書處」提共同綱領 施德來夾附於提名表格
+
+就九東訊息，區表示「共同綱領」指當時九龍東候選人在提交提名表格時夾附的聲明，並解釋當時九東成立了一個推動初選的秘書處，但因他沒有去第四及五次會議，不知道秘書處狀況，只能依賴一個6月14日的訊息。被問及秘書處有什麼成員，區指他只知道蔡澤鴻會向組織者報告九東狀況，亦沒有印象有組織者是秘書處成員。
+
+控方其後展示由施德來簽署、夾附在提名表格的九龍東「共同綱領」，區確認正是戴耀廷訊息提及的「共同綱領」。區昨提及，只有新界西和九龍東兩區候選人簽署「共同綱領」並夾附在提名表格，周天行再問組織者有否要求參與者簽署協議文件，區表示：「我們沒有要求他們簽署共同綱領。」周天行欲再追問為何不要求簽署，惟法官陳慶偉即指「Next, next.」，法官李運騰亦指早前已提及相關議題。鄒家成等被告發笑。
+
+#### 控方展示6.19訊息後再展示6.14訊息 官質疑難跟上
+
+在展示3個6月19日的訊息後，控方再展示6月14日的 WhatsApp 訊息，惟法官陳慶偉即問：「周先生，如果這是有陪審團的審訊，他們怎能跟得上？」周天行回應現時仍然在談及抗爭派聲明的議題。惟法官李運騰指控方的問題「跳來跳去」：「5分鐘前我們在談及6月19日的事件，現在又跳去6月14日，我們覺得有點難跟上」；法官陳仲衡亦指，「你作為控方案情的說書人（storyteller），最好當然是你的故事引起我的興趣，但至少應該要容易跟得上。」
+
+周天行與主控萬德豪商量片刻，對要回溯之前的事致歉，但指因區提及沒有去過九東第四和第五次會議，只能依賴一個6月14日的訊息，故就此發問。法官陳慶偉續指，他們是來審理被告面對的控罪，「我們對初選的歷史不感興趣。」周天行一度再發言，惟陳慶偉即打斷指不欲再爭辯，但提醒控方「記住本案的議題（“Bear that in mind, bear what are the issues of this case.”）」。周稱「我正嘗試集中於本案議題」，陳慶偉嘆道：「Thank you.」，有被告發笑，周遂繼續就6月14日的訊息發問。
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，16人否認「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，今（23日）踏入審訊第14天。控方續引初選組織者 WhatsApp 群組訊息發問，區諾軒曾轉述九東參選人稱認為要發布一份由大會認可的公開協議，又指大會若不接納「怕兵變」。區承認，當時認為大會已無權威左右地區決定，故最終容許九東參選人簽署「共同綱領」並夾附在提名表格。區同意當時望避免民主派內鬥，指參選者有不同光譜、對協調機制有不同詮釋，若不斷公開表態會有「收窄模糊」的情況；並以九東參選人、民主黨主席胡志偉為例，指他曾稱民主黨因怕被「揪秤」而不欲簽非官方協議，惟終因組織者的容許而簽下共同綱領，區承認「有把關不力嘅責任」。
+
+此外，控方引述戴耀廷在中聯辦譴責初選或違法後，曾向參選者發訊息稱不提35+目的是否決每個議案和癱瘓政府，區指理解戴「想修正35+嘅講法，規避法律風險」。
+
+#### 蔡澤鴻稱九東欲發布公開協議 望組織者認可否則憂「兵變」
+
+控方今續引初選組織者的「PfD 35＋計劃」WhatsApp 群組訊息發問，一度被法官質疑不按時序發問，令人難以跟上。控方其後引2020年6月14日區諾軒發出的訊息，提及九龍東開會後蔡澤鴻託他向組織者報告5點，區並說出自己的4點建議。
+
+區解釋，發訊息前收到蔡澤鴻電話，指九龍東開會後「就住是否公布一份文件表達異議」，並總結出5點。第一，他們認為「要發布一份公開協議，去說明五大訴求，缺一不可」；第二，他們要求大會認可該份公開嘅協議；第三，蔡特別強調以上理解為民主黨同意，引述民主黨立場：「只要是官方的公開協議，他們願意簽」；第四，關於「積極運用權力否決財政預算案」，蔡指「他們覺得怕DQ的話，可以避重就輕」；第五，區指蔡澤鴻稱「希望大會可以接納，如果唔係，佢怕兵變」，並在電話強調這一點。區解釋第四點時，特別提到「我唔敢講個『他們』係咪代表與會者」。
+
+#### 區：胡志偉曾稱民主黨不希望簽非官方協議
+
+區解釋，相信蔡提及第三點是源於較早前，他曾與時任民主黨主席胡志偉會面，胡當時表示民主黨「唔希望簽一啲非官方嘅協議」，因就處理立法會議案的立場，民主黨「覺得冇理由政府話起學校、起醫院都要否決」，而且「如果不斷有一啲公開嘅協議，恐怕會被人揪秤，有理無理都好」。
+
+至於第四點「避重就輕」的意思，區解釋如之前所述，「當時嘅環境，任何人發表對財政預算案否決嘅公開言論，都會增加無法參選立法會嘅風險」，理解蔡是有此意思。控方再問他們如何避免該風險，區答：「我諗最好就係唔好…唔好表達呢啲講法啦。」此時大律師馬維騉指訊息來自沒有被控的蔡澤鴻，或構成傳聞證供，惟法官不同意，指控方是要問及區諾軒對蔡澤鴻訊息的理解，從而得出他的建議。
+
+#### 區稱認為大會無權威左右地區決定 認「把關不力」
+
+控方續引述區諾軒回應蔡澤鴻的4點建議，提及「地區的共識，我認為大會無權威左右，故順從是唯一選擇。沙盤推演，五區隨時有類近的動作，換言之我方最初的善意（防止DQ），最差局面不但不奏效，而且衍生了爭端，而且最後也白紙黑字化。」
+
+區解釋，因為九東想自行發布一個共同綱領，故當時憂慮其他選區都會有類似行為。他重申，沒有要求參與者簽署文件其中一個目的，是不欲增加參選人被DQ的風險，「所以我當時覺得，只能夠被動地應對情況」，又指「因為佢哋都講到話用『兵變』嚟形容情況嘅嚴重，我當時認為大會已經冇權威去左右佢哋嘅決定，所以我有把關不力嘅責任」。
+
+法官李運騰問及，區起初避免「白紙黑字」，是否想減少參選者被DQ的風險，區同意。李再問35+計劃的哪部分令他認為會導致DQ，區重申當時有輿論稱若有人參選，並「妄顧後果」運用基本法賦予的否決權，就會被視為不尊重《基本法》，故避免「白紙黑字」是「當時處理候選人嘅一種措施」。
+
+#### 區稱初選者光譜不同 若公開不斷表態會收窄模糊情況
+
+控方續引區諾軒第3點建議：
+
+> 「如今應對藍圖該是順勢而行，視乎各區意願順從之，『全國為上，破國次之；全軍為上，破軍次之』，若果不搞到鬥黃，寫了些共識了事，沒了那些關鍵DQ風險，當『執到』，最差不過是原文公開，亦沒法制止。但至少立於不敗之地，欲拆大台者再也找不到借口。」
+
+區重申，當時認為大會已無能力處理地區看法。法官李運騰問及「鬥黃」意思，區指「我會認為不斷逼人表達立場，哪怕佢本身未必真係支持嗰個立場，我會定性為鬥黃」，李再問是否即「人們嘗試顯得盡可能激進（“People try to appear as radical as possible”）」？區同意。
+
+區續解釋，「初選參與者有唔同光譜，呢個大家都理解嘅，本身大家對於個機制有唔同詮釋都係存在。如果公開地不斷去作出表態，就會有收窄咗呢啲模糊嘅情況」，亦是他指「鬥黃」的意思。
+
+#### 區稱無法阻止「官方認證」九東共同綱領 致胡志偉簽署
+
+李運騰續問，他是否嘗試避免民主派內鬥，區同意，並舉例「如果冇6月14號嘅呢個事件（蔡澤鴻向他傳遞訊息），我相信胡志偉係唔會簽署呢份文件嘅」，此時被告欄內的鄒家成邊聽邊點頭。法官陳慶偉表示不太理解，指訊息提及民主黨稱除非有官方協議否則不會簽署，那區指胡志偉簽署文件是什麼意思。區解釋，正如6月14日的訊息所說，九龍東秘書處「要求大會認可呢份協議，而我哋認為冇能力阻止」，最終胡志偉並簽署九龍東的共同綱領。陳慶偉問胡為何會改變主意，區答：「就係因為有呢個官方嘅認證過程。而我當時，係冇辦法阻止。」
+
+陳問區提及「官方認證」，是否意指組織者容許該份共同綱領出現及夾附在提名表格？區同意。陳再問，是否因為組織者的容許，故胡志偉代表民主黨簽署？此時代表民主黨林卓廷和黃碧雲的大律師沈士文反對，指胡並非代表民主黨，而是以個人名義簽署。
+
+區續稱「所以我話我有責任」，並確認胡志偉是以「個人」名義簽署，「唔代表黨」，並在被問及民主黨立場是否不簽任何協議時指，「胡志偉有向我作為當時嘅組織者表達過民主黨嘅立場，但最後佢做唔做，係佢嘅立場。」區確認該份共同綱領只在九東出現，陳慶偉最後問：「所以這並非官方文件？你只是容許參選人在提名表格夾附一份文件。（“So this is not official at all? You simply permit the candidates to attach a document at their wish in their nomination forms.”）」區答：「呢個係公允嘅說法。」
+
+#### 區指尹兆堅稱願簽聲明但不想無限簽民間聲明 望大會轉達
+
+另外，控方指區諾軒曾於6月24日在群組發訊息稱：「有一樣要求我是 facilitate 不到民主黨的，因尹兆堅昨日和我說，若明天記者會，應認同民主黨當初若簽抗爭聲明他們是願意簽，只是最後不想無限簽民間聲明，所以才不簽墨落無悔。」
+
+區諾軒解釋，尹兆堅指民主黨願意簽署聲明，但不想無限簽署民間聲明才不簽「墨落無悔」，並望區在翌日記者會上表達其說法。惟區指，「冇理由個大會去幫一個黨去講說話」，而最後亦「根本冇呢個咁嘅記者會」，故無法順應尹的要求。被問到尹的說法是他本人抑或民主黨的意見，區認為說是尹的意見比較公允。
+
+#### 中聯辦譴責後戴耀廷稱「不說癱瘓政府」 區諾軒理解他想規避法律風險
+
+控方續指，在「新界西訊息發布區」群組中，戴耀廷曾於初選後的7月14日發布訊息稱：「我公開的訊息說35+目的，是運用基本法賦予立法會的權力，包括否決財政預算案，今（編按：「今」應為「令」）特區政府問責。不提否決每一個議案，也不說癱瘓政府。供大家參考。」
+
+控方問及區諾軒，是否知道戴耀廷發此訊息的原因，區回答指：「如果時間正確，當時已有中聯辦、港澳辦譴責初選有機會犯法」，他理解戴耀廷將訊息發布「係想修正35+嘅講法，規避法律風險」。他又指，戴曾在各地區的訊息發布群組發出上述訊息。
+
+#### 區指戴耀廷想修正對否決財政預算案的說法
+
+法官李運騰問到，區諾軒使用「修正」一詞，是否意指其說法與原本的有所不同。區表示，不爭的事實，是戴耀廷在過往數個月曾發布一系列文章 ，表達對否決財政預算案的看法，因此他在7月14日想修正有關說法。李官追問，是否代表就35+計劃目標的立場有改變，區表示：「我只能夠話佢喺呢個時間讓各位參考佢對於35+目的嘅表述。」
+
+其後控方逐一展示新東、港島、超區、衛生服務等的訊息發布群組，區諾軒均確認戴耀廷曾於同日即7月14日，在各群組發布上述同一訊息，其中九龍西群組內，毛孟靜曾回覆「知道了」。
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，16人否認「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，今（23日）踏入審訊第14天。發起「三投三不投」、網名「李伯盧」的吳政亨於本案被控方指為初選組織者之一，控方今問及區諾軒是否認識吳，區指「直到被捕前唔認識」，只透過Facebook知道他。法官李運騰續問區被捕前是否知道「李伯盧」是35+計劃組織者之一，區答「唔知道」，只記得初選早期，戴耀廷曾表示他有與李伯盧或「三投三不投」的組織聯絡。此外，庭上播放2020年7月9日戴耀廷與區諾軒等召開的記招片段，當時時任政制及內地事務局局長曾國衞指初選或違《國安法》，戴會上強調，爭取立法會控制權要求政府問責是《基本法》賦予權力，看不到如何違法。
+
+#### 區諾軒指不知道吳政亨為35+組織者之一
+
+控方今早就初選組織者的Whatsapp訊息提問，主控周天行下午問及，區諾軒是否認識本案第5被告吳政亨或李伯盧，區指「直到被捕前唔認識」。控方再問區，吳政亨有沒有做過任何有關初選的事情，區指「如果你講緊李伯盧，就係舉辦咗一個『三投三不投』嘅計劃」。代表吳政亨的大律師石書銘關注，根據證供區未曾見過吳政亨及與他交談，認為控方應先問區對吳政亨的認識。
+
+控方於是問，以其理解吳還做過什麼，區表示只知道案發期間吳曾透過三投三不投計劃，在網上作宣傳，「希望初選參加者遵守承諾」。法官李運騰問及區，於被捕前他是否知道李伯盧是35+計劃組織者之一，區表示「唔知道」，此時吳政亨與相隔一個位的鄒家成交談。李官追問，區是否只透過Facebook專頁或貼文知道李伯盧，區同意。
+
+#### 區指戴耀廷表示曾與李伯盧聯絡
+
+大律師石書銘續指，雖不爭議部分帖文由吳政亨發出，但若區只從Facebook知道吳，則區其後的證供僅屬「傳聞證供」，不能被法庭接納，法官回應視乎控方問題。控方續問區如何得知李伯盧有舉辦「三投三不投」計劃，以及進行網上宣傳，區稱：「我只記得喺初選嘅較早期階段，戴耀廷曾經向我表示佢有同李伯盧或者三投三不投嘅組織聯絡」，但未有提及有多常聯絡對方。
+
+
+▲ 吳政亨（資料圖片）
+
+其後控方改為問及戴耀廷「真攬炒十步」文章，此時吳政亨再與鄒家成交談，並相視而笑。區續指，當初是在《蘋果日報》看到有關文章。控方再指出區其中一個Facebook帖文最底有戴耀廷的名字，字體為藍色，與超連結的顏色相同。控方追問藍色字體的意思，這時在延伸庭的被告傳來笑聲，區回答是「tag」功能，曾「tag」戴耀廷的專頁，他亦同意曾看過戴的專頁。
+
+#### 控方稱證影片真實性須播6小時片段 官指可予區諾軒閱讀謄本確認
+
+此外，控方早上提及，由於有被告不承認控方片段，或需播放6月9日、7月6日、7月9日及7月15日4個記者會共長6小時的片段，由有出席的區諾軒確認，並強調播片非控方原意。控方午休前再確認會播放6月9日記招片段，法官陳慶偉問：「你想要證明什麼？」，周稱是為了證明影片真實性。法官李運騰續問，若控方能證影片真實，「你呈上這些片段有什麼目的？你想要證明什麼以支持控罪？」，周指是要依賴戴耀廷提及35+計劃的目標，以及DQ風險和參與者達成的共識。
+
+法官問及誰反對片段，代表林卓廷和黃碧雲的大律師沈士文重申是「共謀者原則」的問題，指若控方表明不會以此片段指證其當事人，他就不會再反對；但若控方未能清楚說明援引的證據，他便會要求控方「嚴格舉證（strict proof）」。代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel 亦指，他不爭議影片真實性，但要求控方嚴格舉證。大律師馬維騉則指，若控方會依賴記者會的發言作為援引「共謀者原則」的證據，應播放整條片段；但法官李運騰指，若向證人展示錄音謄本，讓他確認會上內容與其記憶吻合，則毋需看片。
+
+控方下午表示，會盡量透過錄音謄本的方式處理，但仍望播放7月9日的記者會片段，因有部分被告在當天記者會內沒有發言，單憑謄本難以看到他們在場的情況，包括他們在其他被告發言時給予的反應。至於錄音謄本的安排，法官李運騰建議可讓區諾軒在庭上閱讀，但不需要所有人都到庭，包括法官及大律師，以免浪費時間，又指大律師可自行安排代表到庭。
+
+#### 戴耀廷指看不到初選違《國安法》無參選人提分裂國家言論
+
+控方其後播放戴耀廷、區諾軒及趙家賢於2020年7月9日召開記者會的片段，會上介紹初選及籲市民投票。出席者包括戴耀廷、區諾軒、趙家賢、黃之鋒、譚文豪、許智峯、張可森、劉凱文、范國威、楊雪盈、余慧明、朱凱迪、張嘉莉、李永財、劉澤鋒、李芝融、徐子見及安德里。
+
+
+▲ 資料圖片
+
+戴耀廷在記者會上，回應政制及內地事務局局長曾國衞曾提及，民主派初選有可能違法一事，戴指「佢指出有可能違法嗰啲地方呢，我哋都見唔到用一個常理去解讀香港嘅法律呢，係有可能違法嘅」，又強調就私隱保障方面，有《私隱條例》專家已檢視系統。
+
+戴耀廷又指，「我諗大家最關心嘅可能都係有關《國安法》嗰個問題」，但他認為「睇返我哋每一位參選人呢，係冇人提出過一啲係會涉及到分裂國家嘅言論，亦都唔係35+，我哋冇任何涉及到呢啲方面嘅主張嘅，咁所以我見唔到點樣同呢個《國安法》第20條，係有任何違反」。
+
+#### 戴耀廷：爭取立法會控制權屬《基本法》賦予權力
+
+戴耀廷又重申35+目標是爭取立法會控制權，從而行使《基本法》賦予立法會的憲制權力向政府問責，「咁呢個係《基本法》賦予立法會的嘅權力嚟嘅，我見唔到點樣係會符合到《國安法》第22條所講嗰個非法手段」。戴又指，即使真的否決財政預算案，根據《基本法》行政長官擁有職能解散立法會，他反問：「咁點樣會嚴重阻撓咗佢去行使職能呢？」
+
+#### 戴耀廷：初選使用本地資源 與外國無關
+
+戴又提到，《國安法》第29條涉及勾結外國勢力，他強調整個初選均使用本地資源，亦是眾籌所得，與外國完全沒有關係。他亦表示，不論是投票的市民或參選人，均是自主作決定，「見唔到點樣有任何人有能力去操控到呢一個選舉。」
+
+
+▲ 戴耀廷（資料圖片）
+
+#### 趙家賢指表態是合法合憲公民權利 區諾軒稱「無法想像」局長指違法
+
+趙家賢則表示，民主動力獲戴耀廷和區諾軒委託籌辦35+投票，指作為民主動力召集人，統籌選舉實務工作超過12年，對「一個坐喺局長位置都未夠半年嘅人」對初選的「關切」，「覺得好莫名其妙」。他又指，「我相信作為支持民主陣營嘅市民更加會心領神會，喺呢個咁大嘅壓力氣氛底下，我哋更加要堅定我哋嘅意志，係反映市民嘅意見，作出表態，呢個嘅表態係為咗香港係合法、合憲嘅公民權利嚟嘅。」
+
+區諾軒其後發言，表示對於民主派想做「團結協調」的工作，卻被局長指責涉嫌犯法，直言「係無法想像」，又指自己過往多次協調初選，這次當局卻使用嚴重的指控去恐嚇參與初選的香港市民及參選人。區形容責任沉重，最重要原則是不希望有人犯險，並指預緊可能會收緊「限聚令」，籲市民遵從相關衞生措施的安排。
+
+#### 楊雪盈稱《國安法》陰霾下望港人團結投票、參選比以往更大代價
+
+其他出席的被告則手持「支持民主派35+公民投票」及「7月11-12齊投票」的紙牌，並輪流發言。劉澤鋒提及進入議會將「否決政府不義嘅財政預算案」，彭卓棋團隊的李永財指要「對抗極權」，余慧明指是次初選「可能係最後一次嘅民主選舉，希望大家可以珍惜手上面嘅一票，參與一場冇DQ、冇篩選嘅選舉」。
+
+楊雪盈則指「我覺得每一個喺呢度參選嘅人，其實都背負住非常之大嘅責任，亦都係比以往更加大嘅代價去做呢個參選嘅決定」，又指更重要是「香港人有冇辦法喺《國安法》嘅陰霾之下走出嚟投票」，望港人團結「保護番我哋每一個香港人」。范國威指「極權政府無所不用其極咁打壓香港人」，但籲港人勿放棄，「極權政府就係要震壓民意嘅時候亦都懼怕民意。」
+
+
+▲ 資料圖片
+
+#### 區諾軒閱讀謄本期間 其他人可自行選擇是否到庭
+
+控方播放約40分鐘片段後，表示是時候休庭，明早續播放餘下片段。在完庭前，法官陳慶偉再次討論閱讀謄本的安排，指區諾軒閱讀謄本期間，三名法官將不會到庭，並會派書記作代表。他又表示大部分律師應該不會想到庭，若希望到庭的話亦可派代表。至於各被告則可按個人意願選擇是否到庭，此時林卓廷笑着說：「Of course not... never.」
+
+明早將會播放餘下片段，其後給予時間區諾軒閱讀謄本，法官預計下午再開庭。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
+
+### 列席認罪被告全被安排於延伸庭就坐
+
+審訊不設陪審團，由3名國安法指定法官陳慶偉、李運騰及陳仲衡審理。控方代表為副刑事檢控專員萬德豪及周天行，辯方代表包括資深大律師潘熙、大律師沈士文、張耀良、黃宇逸、關文渭、馬維騉、盧敏儀、石書銘、黃廷光、Trevor Beel 等，本身是大律師的劉偉聰則自辯。
+
+不認罪被告包括獲准保釋的鄭達鴻、楊雪盈、彭卓棋、何啟明、劉偉聰、黃碧雲、施德來、陳志全、柯耀林、李予信10人，及還柙的何桂藍、吳政亨、鄒家成、林卓廷、梁國雄及余慧明6人。
+
+列席認罪被告包括馮達浚、朱凱廸、梁晃維、譚凱邦、岑敖暉、黃之鋒、袁嘉蔚及吳敏兒，全被安排在延伸庭就坐。
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-24-the-cost-of-war-to-ukraine.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-24-the-cost-of-war-to-ukraine.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..9ce54a33
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-24-the-cost-of-war-to-ukraine.md
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : The Cost Of War To Ukraine
+author: Janek Lasocki
+date : 2023-02-24 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/uGNMjyY.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_As the first anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion rolls around, much global attention is directed towards the battlefields in eastern Ukraine. But what has been the cost to the rest of the country of the past year of fighting?_
+
+
+
+In January 2022, Western leaders seemed be sending a clear message to the Kremlin. US President Joe Biden said preparations were being made to ‘impose severe economic costs’, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg warned of ‘severe costs’ if there was ‘any further aggression’, and Downing Street said Russia could be hit with ‘swift retributive responses’. But from the moment Russian tanks moved in from three directions early on 24 February 2022, it is Ukraine and the Ukrainians who have paid the heaviest price for Russian aggression.
+
+
+### The Human Cost
+
+Above all, there has been the cost to human life. The UN has confirmed 8,006 civilian deaths, including 487 children: victims of heavy artillery shelling, missiles and air strikes, often on their homes. The UN always caveats that ‘the actual figures are considerably higher’ because there are many places it cannot reach. Among them is Mariupol, a formerly thriving port city. An investigation by Associated Press established that in Mariupol alone, 75,000 are likely to have died as a result of the fighting. As the Russians bulldoze their homes, the majority will never get a decent burial.
+
+The Ukrainian government is reluctant to disclose military casualties but in December it admitted that at least 13,000 soldiers had died, and some estimates suggest as many as 100,000 casualties (dead and injured). Around 3,500 Ukrainian soldiers are currently being held as prisoners of war, with multiple reports of torture and starvation.
+
+Tens of thousands of civilians and soldiers alike have suffered often life-changing injuries. Foreign doctors volunteering in Ukraine have described horrific ‘First World War-type injuries’ that were worse than what they had seen in Iraq. There are many reports of sexual violence, with victims as young as four.
+
+Behind each of these numbers are many human stories. Like 3-month-old Kira, her mother Valeria and grandmother Lyudmila, who were killed when a Russian missile ripped through their apartment block in Odesa. Or 10-year-old Yana, who survived the bombing of Kramatorsk train station but lost her right leg below the knee, her left foot, and her mother. Or Roman Ratushny, a well-known civic activist, who with many others his age volunteered for the army after the invasion, and was killed in combat in Izyum a month before his 25th birthday.
+
+
+### Economic Collapse
+
+The cost to Ukraine’s economy has been devastating, not least due to the extensive damage caused to the country’s infrastructure and its most productive industries.
+
+The Kyiv School of Economics estimates that the value of damage due to the invasion has now reached $137.8 billion (at replacement cost). This includes the complete destruction of 344 bridges, 440 educational facilities, 173 hospitals and hundreds of thousands of homes, while many more buildings have suffered extensive damage.
+
+___`In a country that was the ‘breadbasket of the world’, the World Food Programme now provides food assistance to 3 million people monthly`___
+
+The steel industry, which before the war constituted a third of the value of all Ukrainian exports and was one of the country’s biggest employers, collapsed in 2022. Steel production fell by over 70% last year and will not be able to reach pre-war levels in the near future. One of the biggest steel plants, Azovstal in Mariupol, was totally destroyed. Many others have seen production limited, such as ArcelorMittal’s steel plant in Kryviy Rih. The latter was recently modernised for $5 billion, but is running at only 25% capacity because of chronic energy shortages and logistics problems now that it is no longer able to export by sea. This needs to be seen in context of the fact that half of Donbas, Ukraine’s industrial heartland, was already taken by Russia after 2014.
+
+Agricultural products, Ukraine’s other major export, have also been significantly hit. 26% of cultivatable land has either been lost or damaged, or is contaminated by mines. As a result, the wheat and sunflower harvests in 2022 were down 40% compared to the previous year, and a further drop in production is expected in 2023. In a country that was the ‘breadbasket of the world’ – exporting enough before the war to feed 400 million people around the globe – the World Food Programme now provides food assistance to 3 million people monthly, and approximately 35% of Ukraine’s population is estimated to be suffering from insufficient food consumption.
+
+Overall, an estimated 47% of Ukrainian companies have stopped operating, leading to a sharp fall in tax intake at a time when significantly more needs to be spent on defence. Other consequences include the collapse of the advertising market, without which media outlets are struggling to survive.
+
+Having been on a positive economic trajectory following the COVID-19 pandemic, in 2022 Ukraine suffered a 30% drop in GDP, and it is now dependent on at least $3–4 billion monthly in outside budgetary support to pay for necessary government functions.
+
+
+### Life in a Warzone
+
+For the past eight years, since Russia’s first invasion, life was transformed for anyone living close to the frontline in Donbas in the east. In the past year, however, all of Ukraine has become an active warzone.
+
+The suspension of all air travel has become normal, with any international travel requiring long journeys, mostly through Poland. In most cities, including Kyiv, people still go to work and shops and restaurants are open, but everyone is subject to a curfew from 11pm to 5am. To conserve energy, streetlights are kept off, so it is eerily dark and quiet.
+
+Air raid sirens – now often first heard through a special mobile app – and accompanying sounds of anti-aircraft fire are so frequent that many people have become numb to them and often don’t bother going to their designated underground shelters. But drones and rockets do get through air defences and continue killing civilians in their homes – as they did a month ago in Dnipro, killing 46 people, injuring 80 and leaving 400 homeless when their nine-story apartment building was hit. These attacks also cause blackouts and heating and water shortages due to intentional targeting of critical energy infrastructure, 50% of which has been damaged, occupied or destroyed. Closer to the front, such as in Kherson, people face daily shelling.
+
+___`An estimated 8 million Ukrainian refugees are now outside their country, and a further 5 million are internally displaced`___
+
+Living in this warzone is taking a toll on ordinary Ukrainians. According to the World Health Organisation, roughly 10 million people are potentially at risk of mental disorders such as acute stress, anxiety, depression, substance use and post-traumatic stress disorder. With millions forced from their homes and daily life including schooling disrupted, children are particularly vulnerable – as are soldiers, who suffer sleeplessness, flashbacks and panic attacks. The director of Ukraine’s newly founded and only dedicated military rehabilitation centre for post-traumatic stress says there is a need for 100 such facilities.
+
+Those who now find themselves in territory occupied by Russia are witnessing the attempted eradication of Ukrainian identity, exactly as was done in occupied Donbas and Crimea after 2014. Ukrainian-language signs have been replaced with Russian, street names are reverting to what they were during the Soviet Union (in Mariupol, for example, the Avenue of Peace was renamed to Lenin Avenue), and historical monuments have been taken down, including those to the Holodomor, Stalin’s starvation of Ukrainians in 1932–33.
+
+Most concerningly, Russia has also been operating a large-scale, systematic network of 43 camps and other facilities to ‘re-educate’ Ukrainian children. The Yale School of Public Health’s Humanitarian Research Lab has determined that at least 6,000 children, and likely significantly more, have been put through programmes aiming to make Ukrainian children pro-Russian. Hundreds of others have been taken for adoption by Russian couples.
+
+
+### The Demographic Price
+
+Russia’s invasion precipitated the biggest European refugee crisis since the Second World War. An estimated 8 million Ukrainian refugees are now outside their country, and a further 5 million are internally displaced. In the short term this has caused hardship and uncertainty, particularly for many women and children (men under the age of 60 aren’t allowed to leave without special permission). In the longer term, this exodus is likely to contribute to a further deterioration of Ukraine’s pre-existing demographic crisis.
+
+Since independence in 1991, the population of Ukraine has declined from 51 million to an estimated 43.5 million (including occupied Donbas and Crimea). It has also been ageing: the fertility rate has been low for years, and in 2021 it was only 1.16, one of the lowest in the world (the replacement rate is 2.1). Whether refugees return home will therefore be critical for the country’s long-term economic recovery. Many have gone back already, and others have indicated they will do so as soon as the conflict ends. But the longer it goes on, the deeper the roots that Ukrainians will put down in other countries, finding better-paid jobs and enrolling their children in schools. A survey of Ukrainian refugees in Germany last year found that more than a third (37%) intend to stay in Germany permanently. Similar polling in Poland found that as more of them find jobs, an increasing number of Ukrainians are planning to stay after the end of the war.
+
+Despite nine rounds of EU sanctions, closely coordinated with sanctions imposed by the UK, the US and other allies, in 2022 Russia suffered only a 2–3.5% drop in GDP, much less than some had predicted. In Moscow, many Western brands are off the shelves, but there are no shortages. And 12 months on, there is no indication that Russia intends to stop its aggression or to be held accountable for the inhuman and lasting damage it has inflicted on Ukraine.
+
+---
+
+__Janek Lasocki__ was formerly advocacy coordinator at the European Council on Foreign Relations and currently writes about Eastern Europe and the former USSR.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-24-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-15.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-24-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-15.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..f7960d81
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-24-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-15.md
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第十五日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-02-24 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 柯耀林誤會播片毋須到庭遲到半小時 林卓廷：叫佢請食早餐啦！
+- 官問何謂抗爭派 區諾軒以何桂藍為例指對方有左翼思想
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，16人否認「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，今（24日）踏入審訊第15天。控方今早續播放2020年7月9日，戴耀廷與區諾軒等於初選前召開的記招片段，並讓區諾軒閱讀另外5個記者會的錄音謄本作確認。會上戴耀廷重申初選不違法，黃之鋒及朱凱廸亦籲港人投票，黃稱要「讓北京政權知道，香港仍然有好多人係唔選擇向呢一個共產政權卑躬屈膝」，朱亦指要「畀全世界睇到香港人喺《國安法》之後係唔會向北京嘅野蠻統治屈服」。此外，柯耀林今早因誤會播片時不用到庭而遲到半小時，到達後林卓廷打趣說：「叫佢請食早餐啦！」
+
+#### 鄒家成問「睇咗財政預算案未」柯耀林遲到半小時
+
+控方昨午播放部分戴耀廷、區諾軒和趙家賢於2020年7月9日召開的記者會片段，今早播放餘下片段，其餘時間讓區諾軒閱讀其他記者會謄本確認。
+
+被告今早10時入庭，各被告神情輕鬆，鄒家成向旁聽席問：「睇咗財政預算案未？」，再笑說「支持」，林卓廷亦與黃碧雲交談，早前受傷的吳政亨則已拆除其三角手掛。林卓廷一度向面前的懲教用力眨眼和活動眼球，提及「最近睇緊本書，所有靈長類都冇眼眉，係得人有眼眉，點解呢？」，黃碧雲作回應後，林稱「以前係咁講，後尾發覺唔係」，並解釋眼眉和眼白是表達情感和溝通的工具。
+
+直至10時許，柯耀林尚未到庭，有懲教表示「爭一個」，被告欄有人提到：「今朝打畀佢，仲喺屋企」，有被告發笑，後亦有法庭職員表示：「未齊人，仲有一個未到，所以未開得庭。」林卓廷打趣說：「阿柯要請你哋食飯喎」，其後各還柙被告被帶返囚室，鄒家成一度稱：「我想留喺度喎。」
+
+至10時34分，身穿棒球褸和裇衫、微喘的柯耀林小跑着推開法庭大門，有被告說「柯耀林到啦！」，還柙被告亦即被帶返法庭，林卓廷對保釋被告說：「叫佢請食早餐啦！」鄒家成亦附和：「請食早餐喎！」案件終於10時40分開庭，代表柯耀林的大律師表示柯誤會了今早播片時毋須到庭，已向柯講解法庭的安排。
+
+#### 朱凱廸籲港人勇敢投票：用文明暴露共產黨野蠻
+
+控方其後續播放記者會片段，黃之鋒、朱凱廸等輪流發言。區諾軒不時轉身望向被告欄上方的大屏幕及旁聽席，一時托腮，一時雙手交叉握拳，一時翹起雙手。在會上，黃之鋒形容「初選係《國安法》立法之後第一次公民表態嘅機會」，籲所有港人出來投票，「讓國際社會知道香港人未投降，亦讓北京政權知道，香港仍然有好多人係唔選擇向呢一個共產政權卑躬屈膝。」
+
+
+▲ 黃之鋒（資料圖片）
+
+朱凱廸則提及：「大家都知道凡係共產黨要極力阻止喺香港發生嘅事，我哋就要更加令到佢搞得成功」，又指現時政府與共產黨的立場已經顯明，「初選就係一個非常之關鍵重要嘅一個過程⋯⋯畀全世界睇到香港人喺《國安法》之後係唔會向北京嘅野蠻統治屈服嘅」，籲「香港人勇敢出嚟投票，我哋用文明去暴露共產黨嘅野蠻」。朱凱廸發言前，主控周天行指朱早前未有出現，區確認朱的身份。
+
+
+▲ 朱凱廸（資料圖片）
+
+#### 戴耀廷重申初選不違法 若當局任意解讀「大家都識得判斷香港法治狀況」
+
+戴耀廷重申，否決財政預算案是《基本法》賦予的權力，「呢個應該係一個常識嚟⋯⋯我諗每一個人都會知道立法會行使權力本身就係一個合法嘅行為，我又見唔到有任何嘅非法元素喺裡面。」但他亦指，知道《國安法》並非普通法，用普通法原則解讀雖沒理由違法，但若當局「鍾意任意去解讀呢個《國安法》，連一個公民一齊出嚟投票嘅行動都可以定為非法、甚至為嚴重違法嘅話，咁我諗香港就即係個法治係點樣狀況，大家都識得判斷㗎啦」。
+
+戴耀廷又指，看不到初選會突然出現腰斬，亦會要求票站遵守限聚令要求。趙家賢亦強調，民主動力和香港民研舉辦初選計劃，「係一定要全部係合法嘅，我哋先至會去做，呢個係絕對清楚，我哋會做足所有措施去確保符合返香港現有或者新加嘅法例。」
+
+被問到DQ風險，區諾軒指「相信我哋個個都冇水晶球，因為真係唔知佢開邊路」。他自言不會十分樂觀，「而家基本上係佢哋想做乜就做乜」，但指認為初選合法，沒有問及警方部署，「都希望佢哋唔好去干預一啲合法嘅事。」
+
+
+▲ （資料圖片）
+
+#### 區諾軒留法庭讀謄本 吳政亨與女友交流、何桂藍在電腦打字
+
+播畢片段後，區諾軒確認當中情況與他出席時一致。控方其後讓區諾軒閱讀2020年6月9日、7月6日、7月11至13日5個記者會的錄音謄本，法官陳慶偉着區閱讀謄本確認與他的理解是否一致。陳慶偉續指法官將離席，留下法庭書記在場，至於律師、被告及公眾可以按其意願留下，但特別提醒勿騷擾區閱讀謄本，否則會要求該人立即離開法庭。
+
+3名法官於約11時10分離去，眾被告亦陸續離開。余慧明一度留下與律師溝通，其後亦離去，剩下吳政亨一人被帶到被告欄最盡處的角落，被兩名懲教看守。區諾軒則留在原位獨自翻閱兩個大文件夾的錄音謄本，期間3名懲教人員站在他後面看守，區不時抬頭望向被告欄。
+
+在區諾軒閱讀謄本期間，吳政亨全程與旁聽席的女友以手勢交流。何桂藍於約11時半亦從囚室步回法庭，向旁聽席張望後，便默默在用來摘錄筆記的電腦打字，時而若有所思。旁聽席則尚有十數名人士留下，部分人閉目睡覺。區諾軒於12時53分表示「我睇完啦」，並獲懲教帶離法庭。
+
+案件下午續審。
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，16人否認「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，今（24日）踏入審訊第15天。法官李運騰今問及區諾軒口中「抗爭派」的意思，區形容他們在民主派系中站在「較進步」的位置，指「佢哋都好多元」。區又以不認罪被告為例，指鄒家成、余慧明和何桂藍3人為抗爭派，並形容何桂藍「係一個較為有左翼思想嘅人」，引起何桂藍等多名被告大笑，區一度向被告欄笑着問「準唔準確呀？我好驚我標籤錯人呀」，被法官提醒是問區的理解，不是被告的理解。
+
+此外，主控周天行今展示截圖要求區諾軒認出何桂藍，惟屢被法官質疑區不在場、回應欠證據價值，且控方提問方式不恰當，有如「在律師席上作證」。區已作供10日，控方指主問已大致完結，確認下周一會說明「共謀者原則」下針對各被告的證據，並在法官提問下釐清所有被告於2020年7月1日均已加入串謀。
+
+#### 區問為何僅衞生服務及超區參與初選 官：法庭真的需要知道嗎？
+
+控方下午問及初選投票情況，區諾軒供稱，在7月11至12日的投票日，全港共設200多個票站，每個地方選區約佔50至60個，而除5個地方選區，功能組別只包括超級區議會和衞生服務界。控方問及原因，區解釋曾有其他功能組別想過是否搞初選，但最終只接納衞生服務界參與；至於超區則因過往都由直選產生，故亦在初選計劃內。
+
+周天行續請區再解釋背後原因，但法官陳慶偉兩度問：「法庭真的需要知道嗎？（“Do we really need to know?”）」周起初說是，其後猶豫片刻，指這解釋了初選計劃的部分結構。法官李運騰問這如何幫助控方證明控罪，法官陳仲衡亦指該議題與受審被告無關，亦與法庭無關。周指他只是提供背景，將會問到相關議題。
+
+#### 區：主辦單位整體負責超區、戴耀廷聯絡衞生服務界
+
+周天行其後問及誰負責跟進超區事宜。區解釋，就初選投票安排，組織者一直將超區與其他地方選區一併考慮，而超區協調會是「由我哋主辦單位整體去負責嘅」，包括他、戴耀廷及代表民主動力的趙家賢。他又指，他與戴耀廷均有出席超區協調會議，趙家賢則「應該冇」，至於衞生服務界則一直由戴聯絡相關人士。
+
+#### 官問如何理解「抗爭派」 區稱在民主派系「企喺一個較進步嘅位置」
+
+周天行其後向區展示一段片段，惟法官陳仲衡即指：「作為說故事的人（storyteller），我期望你告訴我們將要展示什麼。」法官李運騰亦指，控方在展示任何證物前，應先確立基礎，先就事件發問以看證人有否相關印象。
+
+周天行續問，區諾軒曾否與何桂藍親身見面（何的律師早前曾表示爭議片中身分），區稱他們曾於7月在香港島一同出席宣傳初選投票的競選活動。周問競選活動與誰有關，區答「好似係有啲抗爭派嘅人選」，鄒家成發笑。
+
+此時法官李運騰表示，區曾數度提及「抗爭派」，但沒有印象解釋過意思，問區「抗爭派」與「傳統民主派」的分別。區表示，「一個較好嘅歸類事件」，是初選投票日後的一個記者會，會上「參加者都係標籤自己係抗爭派」。延伸庭有被告聞言竊笑，梁晃維亦對着袁嘉蔚「戚眉」及露出笑容。控方問區如何理解此標籤，區解釋：「民主派當時嘅派系分類裡面，佢哋（抗爭派）係企得喺一個較進步嘅位置。」
+
+
+▲ 2020年7月15日 抗爭派記者會（資料圖片）
+
+法官李運騰續指，「進步」亦可有不同理解，問區是指「激進（radical）」、「極端（extremist）」抑或其他。區笑着說：「佢哋都好多元嘅」，鄒家成點頭，吳政亨等亦發笑，延伸庭的袁嘉蔚、梁晃維及吳敏兒也發笑。李運騰笑指「那並沒有什麼幫助」，提議區可舉出人名。區續說：「如果我哋以不認罪嘅被告做例子啦……」被告欄即起哄，鄒家成等人說「嘩」。李運騰亦笑說：「如果這能幫助你說明，隨便。（“Well, if it helps illustrate your point, by all means.”）」
+
+#### 區以不認罪被告為例 指鄒家成、余慧明、何桂藍為抗爭派
+
+區諾軒續說：「我嘗試向法官閣下說明，例如鄒家成係本土派啦」，他邊說邊笑着望向鄒家成，並擺動左手示意，多名被告發笑。李運騰問他是否即視「本土派」為「抗爭派」，區指「係其中一種諗法啦」。李再問其他被告的情況，區說：「如果你話何桂藍嘅話，我會覺得佢係一個較為有左翼思想嘅人」，何桂藍聞言面露驚詫，掩嘴大笑，正庭和延伸庭多名被告也發笑。區再補充：「我意思係經濟上面追求社會公平」，此時陳志全等被告也笑起上來。
+
+李運騰指，即區諾軒認為何桂藍可被界定為「抗爭派」？區答「係」，並咧嘴笑着轉身向被告欄問：「準唔準確呀？」，何桂藍笑着反問：「我答唔答得？」，鄒家成等多名被告大笑，區再向法官笑說「我好驚我標籤錯人呀」。陳慶偉向區說，「我們是問你的理解，不是問他們的理解」，其後直接按被告座位逐一讀出名字，要求區確認他們是否「抗爭派」。問到鄒家成、余慧明及何桂藍3人時，區答「係」，至於其餘13人，區均答「唔係」。
+
+#### 官屢質疑控方提問前未確立基礎不恰當：簡直是在律師席上作證
+
+法官李運騰續回到之前關於競選活動的問題，問區指在香港島哪裡出席，區回應「應該係東區或者灣仔區」，陳志全和林卓廷等發笑。區再說：「因為佢哋有位代表係袁嘉蔚，我曾經為佢講說話。」此時延伸庭的梁晃維即望向袁。
+
+周天行再問，區為何認為抗爭派「進步」，區指「主要令我有呢個印象，係喺佢哋喺初選之後舉行記招之後發表嘅言論」，並指該記招於7月15日舉行，但他不在場，今早亦沒有看過相關錄音謄本。周天行欲就該言論再發問，惟代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel 質疑控方提問沒有基礎，法官陳慶偉同意，李運騰亦着控方勿就此再提問。控方續展示區諾軒提及的競選活動片段截圖，區認出他自己和何桂藍。
+
+周天行其後欲再播7月15日片段，惟法官李運騰指控方似乎未說明上述活動的日期。周續問區是否記得該片段顯示什麼活動，區指是幫袁嘉蔚造勢的活動，這時延伸庭的袁手摸下巴思考。周再指區諾軒說過該活動是在7月11日舉行，惟李官指區並沒說過，周遂改為問區是否記得何時舉行，區稱「應該係初選投票日嘅時候」，延伸庭的袁輕輕搖頭。
+
+
+▲ 袁嘉蔚（資料圖片）
+
+周天行其後再向區展示7月15日記者會片段截圖，惟李運騰打斷：「再一次，你向證人展示圖片前並未確立基礎。」周稱因區沒出席該記者會，惟李即問：「那向他展示圖片有什麼意思？」周解釋只是望區辨認被告，區其後並從圖片認出何桂藍。李運騰再質疑，沒有出席記者會的區諾軒，並沒有資格就該場合作供，而控方提問時先指出這是7月15日的記者會，再要求區認出被告身分，「我不認為這是恰當的提問方式，因為你簡直是在律師席上作證。（“I don’t think this is a proper way to ask questions, because you are simply giving evidence from the bar table.”）」
+
+李又指，若最終沒有其他證人能就該記者會的場合作供，那區諾軒的證據價值只會很有限，周天行回應會有其他證據。法官陳慶偉即指控方大可一早說明，周說是，並指會轉為問下一個議題，陳志全、吳政亨、施德來等發笑。
+
+#### 控方稱主問大致上完成 下周一說明「共謀者原則」立場
+
+周天行其後再展示九龍東的 WhatsApp 群組，區確認訊息內容正確，周並指他已大致上完成主問環節，需時翻閱筆記，以考慮有否追問。
+
+控方上周確認會引用「共謀者原則」舉證，並表示會於辯方盤問前說明清楚。法官李運騰續提醒控方，主問將完結，控方須應辯方要求說明就「共謀者原則」的立場，即會依賴其他被告的什麼言論來指證不認罪被告。周天行同意，並在法官追問下指會於下周一說明立場。
+
+#### 辯方要求說明串謀何時開始和被告何時加入 官稱階段尚早
+
+代表林卓廷和黃碧雲的大律師沈士文提出，望控方表明串謀何時開始和每名被告何時加入，指對被告而言很重要。法官陳慶偉續指，刑事串謀並非串謀者的書面協議，人們可以隨時加入或退出。沈表示明白，並希望下周一得知相關資訊，以知道辯方盤問的範圍。陳慶偉着沈向控方提出，指如何鋪排案情由控方決定。
+
+代表鄒家成的大律師陳世傑亦指，被告何時加入串謀與「共謀者原則」相關。陳慶偉同意，但認為現時只是首名控方證人的主問階段，亦尚未進入盤問，不會要求控方現時就根據區諾軒的證供說明每名被告何時加入串謀。
+
+#### 控方確認所有被告於2020.7.1已加入串謀
+
+法官陳仲衡其後提到，控罪日期為2020年7月1日至2021年1月7日，問控方是否指所有被告於7月1日已加入串謀，周天行確認。陳世傑認為並非新資訊，惟法官李運騰認為是新的說法，指被告原本有機會被指在不同時間加入串謀，惟據控方現時澄清，所有被告實於7月1日已成為「共謀者」。
+
+大律師馬維騉問，控方是否即指串謀最早於2020年7月1日出現，李運騰指不一定。馬維騉續問，法庭是否會要求控方說明串謀最早於何時出現，李運騰認為那是證據的問題。
+
+#### 辯方問串謀最早於何時開始 官稱不能早於《國安法》實施日期
+
+陳慶偉重申，刑事串謀非常流動，可能本案起初只是源於一個飯局，有戴耀廷、區諾軒和趙家賢3名發起人，然後在不同時期和階段有不同被告加入和退出，但至2020年7月1日，所有人都成了共謀者。馬維騉再問，是否即控方認為「串謀」於最初便開始，惟李運騰即指，或不應用「串謀（Conspiracy）」一字，因據控方說法，初選計劃在《國安法》實施後才變成違法，而此前只是未必違法的「計劃（Scheme）」。
+
+馬維騉最後再問，法庭會否要求控方說明串謀最早於何時出現，法官重申《國安法》於2020年6月30日才實施，故非法的串謀不能早於該日期出現。陳慶偉並提醒，馬並非代表所有被告，着他集中於其當事人，馬指當然會。
+
+案件下周一續審。
+
+此外，今早遲到的柯耀林，下午由棒球褸和裇衫，換回平時穿着的黑色西裝。
+
+另區諾軒今早完成閱讀5個記者會的錄音謄本，下午向控方確認謄本「都係準確嘅記載」。控方其後要求區認出各記者會出席者，區確認，6月9日「民主派35+公民投票及眾籌行動」記者會，出席者包括他本人、戴耀廷、趙家賢、鍾錦麟；區議會主席楊彧、蔡澤鴻、程張迎、黃偉賢；區議員郭平。7月6日記者會有他本人、戴耀廷、鍾庭耀和一名香港民意研究所職員；7月11日記者會有他本人、戴耀廷、趙家賢；7月12日記者會有他本人、戴耀廷、趙家賢、鍾劍華、陳家洛、鍾庭耀；7月13日有他本人、戴耀廷、趙家賢和鍾劍華。區並確認記者會情況與他記憶中一致。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
+
+#### 列席認罪被告全被安排於延伸庭就坐
+
+審訊不設陪審團，由3名國安法指定法官陳慶偉、李運騰及陳仲衡審理。控方代表為副刑事檢控專員萬德豪及周天行，辯方代表包括資深大律師潘熙、大律師沈士文、張耀良、黃宇逸、關文渭、馬維騉、盧敏儀、石書銘、黃廷光、Trevor Beel 等，本身是大律師的劉偉聰則自辯。
+
+不認罪被告包括獲准保釋的鄭達鴻、楊雪盈、彭卓棋、何啟明、劉偉聰、黃碧雲、施德來、陳志全、柯耀林、李予信10人，及還柙的何桂藍、吳政亨、鄒家成、林卓廷、梁國雄及余慧明6人。
+
+列席認罪被告包括馮達浚、朱凱廸、梁晃維、譚凱邦、岑敖暉、黃之鋒、袁嘉蔚及吳敏兒，全被安排在延伸庭就坐。
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-24-ukraine-war-one-year-on.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-24-ukraine-war-one-year-on.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..85ef626e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-24-ukraine-war-one-year-on.md
@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Ukraine War, One Year On
+author: Sidharth Kaushal and Joe Byrne
+date : 2023-02-24 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/aMyDC4U.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "The War in Ukraine, One Year On"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Russia’s assumption that Ukraine would fall quickly has led to an intense and protracted war._
+
+
+
+_Russia assumed that Ukrainian political opposition would be minimal, and that the ‘decapitation’ of the Ukrainian government would lead to a collapse of resistance._
+
+_This did not go to plan._
+
+In late 2021, satellite imagery documented the massive concentration of Russian forces amassing on the border. Ukraine, for its part, was uncertain whether the build-up was a prelude to an invasion, and there was debate over whether it was an attempt to sow panic in Ukraine or if Russia was preparing for a more limited offensive to take Donbas.
+
+
+
+On 24 February 2022, the Russian army invaded on four axes. From the north, Russian troops invaded via Belarus and on an axis from Sumy to Chernihiv. In the south, the 58th Combined Arms Army pushed out of Crimea. Finally, Russian forces and proxies conducted operations in Donbas to pin down the bulk of Ukraine’s regular units.
+
+
+
+
+### Invasion
+
+
+
+The decision to split a relatively small force on four axes only made sense in the context of an assumed political collapse. Against many predictions, this failed to materialise, and Russian forces failed to take Kyiv. Unprepared for a longer conflict, with many soldiers receiving little to no forewarning or even being provided with adequate maps, the Russians became bogged down.
+
+
+### Donbas Offensive
+
+
+
+Having failed to take Kyiv, Russia shifted its focus to a more limited campaign to seize Donbas and make further gains in the south of Ukraine.
+
+The Russian approach was more deliberate here, and drew on the Russian army’s advantages in both artillery and capabilities such as electronic warfare (EW) complexes. At the peak of the campaign, Russia was firing 32,000 artillery rounds per day in Donbas and had emplaced 10 EW complexes on each 20 km stretch of the front. This combination of fire and information superiority allowed the Russians to inflict heavy attrition on the Ukrainians, and to take cities like Lyman, Popasna and Severodonetsk.
+
+In the south, despite a protracted resistance, Russian forces succeeded in taking Mariupol.
+
+Despite their advantages, Russian forces sustained heavy casualties storming Ukrainian defences in areas of the country that had been steadily fortified after 2014. This was especially true of rebel troops from Luhansk and Donetsk, who were used as expendable cannon fodder.
+
+The arrival of the HIMARS and its 70 km-range M31 rocket, as well as the M270 MLRS system, altered this dynamic by allowing the Ukrainian defenders to target the ammunition depots and railheads on which Russia depended to sustain its rate of fire.
+
+
+### Counteroffensive
+
+
+
+By September 2022, Russia was at the nadir of its power. The force with which it had invaded was largely exhausted, and Russia’s leaders were still reluctant to order mobilisation. As such, Russia was manning a frontline of over 1,000 km with a relatively small force.
+
+Ukraine began a series of shaping operations around Kherson in late 2022, which included striking key bridges like the Antonovsky Bridge. Anticipating an offensive, Russia shifted many of its best remaining units, including units of the Russian Airborne Forces, to Kherson.
+
+Ukraine instead took the offensive in the north, where a brigade-sized Ukrainian force punched through undermanned Russian defences around Kharkiv.
+
+Around Kherson, by contrast, Ukraine’s offensive was slower and more deliberate, and faced stubborn Russian resistance.
+
+
+
+
+### Military State of Play
+
+
+
+Under General Sergey Surovikin, Russia shifted to a defensive posture on the frontline, while conducting a strategic bombing campaign over the winter. Unlike other Russian actions, the withdrawal from Kherson was competently executed. A shift to the defensive and the introduction of mobilised forces to fill gaps on the frontline eased some of Russia’s problems.
+
+This was combined with an air campaign using cruise missiles and Iranian-made UAVs to target critical infrastructure, especially the energy grid. Ukraine faces a conundrum: it can protect its cities, but in doing so it expends air defence interceptors, often against replaceable targets like the Iranian Shahed-136. If interceptor stocks fall too low, the Russian air force can operate much more freely over Ukraine. Western systems such as the German-made Gepard self-propelled anti-air gun have helped alleviate this.
+
+However, the campaign will likely not remain defensive. Russia has mounted localised offensives around Bakhmut, relying on a combination of low-quality troops hired by the Wagner Group from Russia’s prison population, as well as more capable units both from Wagner and elements of the Russian army withdrawn from Kherson.
+
+
+
+The replacement of Surovikin by Valery Gerasimov, Russia’s Chief of the General Staff, as well as the further mobilisation of conscripts, suggest a potential offensive. Though some conscripts were rushed to the frontline to fill gaps, others appear to have been formed into coherent units that have not yet been committed.
+
+The coming months could prove pivotal; a successful Russian offensive or further attrition of Ukraine’s forces could shift the balance. Equally, if a Russian offensive fails, it could lead to a cascading collapse of morale among poorly motivated troops.
+
+
+
+If Russia does stay on the defensive, however, Ukrainian forces equipped with Western armour will have to take the offensive against a more ‘primitive’ but larger and well-entrenched force.
+
+In the medium term, Russia believes that the exhaustion of Western materiel and the erosion of both Ukraine’s manpower and its economic backbone will create the conditions for Russian success. If this window of vulnerability is crossed, the regeneration of Western (in particular, US) defence production and the cumulative effect of Russia’s own economic weaknesses could tilt the balance the other way.
+
+
+### STOCK TAKE
+
+The impact of the war on Ukraine’s population and critical infrastructure has been immense. Millions of people have been displaced, and Russia is constantly targeting energy infrastructure with drones. The economies of both countries have taken a significant hit as a result of the conflict.
+
+#### Internally Displaced Persons
+
+
+
+The toll on Ukraine’s society has been huge. By December 2022, roughly 5,900,000 people were internally displaced within Ukraine.
+
+That number has recently been updated to 7.1 million by some sources.
+
+A total of 12–14 million Ukrainians have been displaced overall since the war began, according to UN figures.
+
+#### Infrastructure
+
+
+
+Russia’s air and missile campaign against Ukraine’s energy grid has focused on transformers and substations. Against large transformers, Russia uses cruise missiles like the 3M-14 Kalibr and ballistic missiles like the 9M723. Smaller substations and facilities housing personnel have been attacked with the Shahed-136.
+
+Currently, Ukraine’s electricity usage is at 75% of its peacetime levels, with rolling blackouts. However, the system is vulnerable to a rapid drop in functionality if multiple transformers go down.
+
+Russia has also targeted the facilities and personnel of the Ukrainian company ZTR, which produces transformers.
+
+Though winter has almost passed, other risks remain – for example, the possibility of a failure of the energy grid cascading into other areas such as military communications, logistics or the management of dams.
+
+Compatibility issues constrain the direct resupply of Ukraine, and personnel may prove even harder to replace than material.
+
+#### Economic Position
+
+
+
+Both Russia and Ukraine have economic vulnerabilities, but these will become apparent at different stages.
+
+Facing a crunch in hard currency due to Western sanctions and price caps, Russia can only sustain its war effort without undergoing crippling inflation by shifting budgetary allocations from civilian expenditure to military spending. Defence spending will now consume 33% of the federal budget. Even with the focus on reallocating resources, Russia has seen a rise in the federal budget from 23 trillion roubles to 29 trillion.
+
+Russia will run a deficit for the first time in decades this year, and individual regional governments are also running deficits driven by mobilisation costs. As cuts to social spending cause a slowdown in consumption and mobilisation draws workers from the civilian economy, this problem will be compounded. Russia can no longer borrow on open financial markets, and is unlikely to be able to do so easily domestically. However, the country’s national wealth fund (which largely relies on revenue from hydrocarbon exports) is likely to sustain this deficit for a time.
+
+Even with price caps, Russia’s oil revenues will exceed 2021 levels, although its revenues from gas exports will be harder to replace. Russia is adapting to the loss of revenue by raising taxes on mineral extraction for hydrocarbon companies as well as other extractive industries, which some expect to offset roughly 75% of lost revenue. Even so, the Russian state will still face a budget deficit, and higher taxes could drive capital flight if avenues for capital to leave Russia remain available.
+
+However, Ukraine faces a more immediately grim economic outlook, having lost 30% of its GDP due to the war (as opposed to the 3% contraction faced by Russia).
+
+In order to win, given its more immediately dire economic circumstances, Ukraine needs either a decisive military victory in short order, or the ability to sustain a war economy over the long term.
+
+Russia can exacerbate Ukraine’s challenges both through air and missile attacks and by resuming its blockade of Odesa on the Black Sea.
+
+Securing the Ukrainian economy for a long fight will require not only economic aid from Ukraine’s partners, but also the ability to secure physical infrastructure and sea lines of communication.
+
+
+### PROJECTION
+
+#### INDUSTRIAL BASE
+
+Russia maintained a large pre-war defence industrial base, employing 2 million people in its defence sector. Though rates of expenditure over the last year have strained its stockpiles of key capabilities, it likely retains the capacity to build munitions such as 152mm and 122mm shells at scale.
+
+An increase in the defence sector’s share of the economic pie and contractions elsewhere in the economy could see the size of the Russian workforce grow.
+
+There are key bottlenecks in Russian defence manufacturing. First, the Russian defence sector is heavily reliant on imports of machine tools. Russia has mitigated the risks involved by increasing imports from China, but it still imported large quantities of machine tools from Germany before the war began.
+
+The workforce in the 600 or so R&D organisations within the Russian defence industrial complex is a second bottleneck. A ‘lost generation’ of STEM-qualified employees in the post-Soviet era and a tendency for promising graduates to seek employment in other areas mean that this workforce is ageing. The flight of individuals from Russia over the last year will exacerbate this. However, this is a long-term problem.
+
+Finally, Russia remains critically reliant on Western components for its more sophisticated platforms. It can offset the effects of sanctions through a variety of means, but at a cost to efficiency.
+
+Nonetheless, in the short to medium term, Russia’s industrial base can generate capacity at scale, especially if the country shifts towards building large volumes of less sophisticated equipment to be manned by a mobilised force.
+
+Ukraine’s Western backers – particularly the US – are regenerating their own production capacity. This will likely take effect by 2025, but there is a risk of a capacity trough until this point.
+
+Ukraine also retains a sizeable domestic defence industrial sector, which remains active despite Russian pressure. Challenges such as access to energy and manpower could be constraints.
+
+#### TIMING
+
+Both Russia and Ukraine will face windows of vulnerability. For Ukraine, this window will be in 2023, when its resources and, in particular, its economy will be heavily stretched. Launching offensives on defended Russian positions – even with Western armour – will prove difficult. However, if the Ukrainians can induce Russia to waste manpower in offensive actions during this period, and if the country’s backers can help sustain its economy, Russia will begin to face its own resource constraints.
+
+Moreover, given time, a more thorough effort to equip Ukrainian forces along Western lines can be sustained. If Ukraine can cross the immediate period of vulnerability it currently faces, its prospects will improve markedly.
+
+#### POLITICAL WILL
+
+In both Ukraine and Russia, political will is likely to remain high. For Ukraine, this war is existential, and polling suggests that 70% of Ukrainians wish to continue fighting. For Russia, failure in Ukraine could lead to regime collapse, which historically has preceded periods of national chaos. As such, both Russia’s leadership and its population are likely to see the costs of war as being outweighed by the costs of defeat.
+
+Public opinion in states backing Ukraine presents a more complex prospect. On the one hand, there has been little shift in support for Ukraine in the US and UK, despite the economic costs of the conflict. On the other hand, two major challenges persist. While publics may not blame the support provided to Ukraine for soaring food and energy prices, they nonetheless tend to blame incumbent leaders for economic hardship. Leaders such as US President Joe Biden face historically low approval ratings. This could, over time, provide an incentive to seek a settlement in the hope that an anticipated economic upturn could strengthen the position of Western leaders.
+
+In Europe, although publics are supportive of Ukraine, large segments of the population in states such as Italy and Germany view peace as more important than the restoration of Ukraine’s internationally recognised boundaries. While there is unlikely to be any significant movement to end support for Ukraine, the risk is that sections of the population and political class may argue for linking continued support with negotiations.
+
+`Russia’s misguided assumption that Ukraine would fall quickly has led to an intense and protracted war.`
+
+`A year after it began, there is still much uncertainty over what the final outcome of this conflict will be.`
+
+---
+
+__Sidharth Kaushal__ is a Research Fellow in Sea Power. His research at RUSI covers the impact of technology on maritime doctrine in the 21st century and the role of sea power in a state’s grand strategy. Sidharth holds a doctorate in International Relations from the London School of Economics, where his research examined the ways in which strategic culture shapes the contours of a nation’s grand strategy.
+
+__Joe Byrne__ is a Research Fellow at RUSI’s Open-Source Intelligence and Analysis Research Group.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-27-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-16.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-27-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-16.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..34b27ff9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-27-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-16.md
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第十六日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-02-27 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 控方就「共謀者原則」交25頁證據列表 公民黨抗爭派記者會等均用以指證所有被告
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，16人否認「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，今（27日）踏入審訊第16天。控方今表示已完成區諾軒的主問，並向辯方呈交「共謀者原則」下針對各被告的25頁證據列表，列出會依賴的文章、帖文及影片等。控方確認，本案協議於2020年2月中已由戴耀廷和區諾軒二人達成，而列表上的所有證據均用以指證所有被告，即使他們當時未加入串謀。
+
+有辯方律師質疑，列表範圍廣闊，包括公民黨和抗爭派記者會片段、社民連網站、甚至個別被告FB帖文，問是否全用以指證所有被告，控方確認。法官李運騰指，控方立場是否合理有待辯論，並預料本案將牽涉兩方面法律爭議，包括「共謀者原則」是否適用於當時尚未變成違法的協議（《國安法》於2020年6月30日才生效）、及當時尚未參與其中的被告。法官陳慶偉批准將案件押後至周三（3月1日）續審，以讓辯方審視文件。
+
+#### 控方完成主問 今交「共謀者原則」證據列表
+
+控方上周五表示主問大致完成，並會於今天交代如何援引「共謀者原則（co-conspirator’s rule）」舉證，即依賴其他被告的什麼言行指證其他被告。主控萬德豪今甫開庭表示，沒有其他問題要問區諾軒，亦已向辯方呈交「共謀者原則」下針對各被告證據的列表。
+
+法官陳慶偉問及，列表上是否只限於區諾軒的證供，抑或是控方依賴的全部證據。萬德豪回應是本案依賴的全部證據，即包括還未向區諾軒展示的證據。法官陳仲衡亦提及，該列表只列出文章、Facebook 帖文、影片及影片謄本等文件證據，問會否包括區諾軒庭上口供，萬指會待區完成作供後再說明。
+
+#### 控方稱協議於2020年2月由戴區二人達成 所有證據均用以指證所有被告
+
+法官陳仲衡指出，列表第一篇文章〈立法會奪半的最後拼圖，原來只需教中小企咁做！〉並未由區諾軒提過，控方同意。法官陳慶偉遂指，該文章於2020年2月15日發布，問控方是否認為協議在當天已達成？萬德豪同意，並指協議是由戴耀廷和區諾軒達成。陳慶偉遂問，除了戴區二人，該文章是否還用來指證任何人？萬德豪回應該文章是用來指證所有共謀者，即使他們當時還未加入串謀。
+
+法官李運騰表示，控方的立場是否成立有待辯論，可留待控方案情完結時聽取雙方的陳詞。陳慶偉再問控方，其立場是否列表上所有證據均用來指證所有被告（“They are against all the defendants?”）？萬德豪指那是正確的，陳續指相信辯方亦需時消化他所澄清的內容。陳慶偉其後欲釐清列表上所有證據均由控方依賴時，一度未能找到適合字眼，萬德豪補充，控方是以所有證據來指證（implicate）所有被告。
+
+#### 辯方稱範圍廣闊需時審視及索指示 官批准押後至周三
+
+代表林卓廷及黃碧雲的大律師沈士文其後表示，控方25頁的列表範圍一如他所預期的非常廣闊，又指雖並非現時作陳詞，但仍望提出觀察，顯然該列表的大部分證據，雖或可證明串謀或協議已存在，但不可能（no way）用以證明部分被告曾參與串謀。他望控方收窄證據範圍，指若範圍如此廣闊，辯方需就每項證據作出爭辯，亦需時處理。
+
+李運騰表示明白辯方關注，但現時並非處理該議題的適當時候。沈士文回應，辯方需時審視及就有關文件索取指示，以及準備對區諾軒的盤問，望押後至周三續審。大律師 Trevor Beel 等均表示同意。
+
+法官陳慶偉認為，給予辯方時間審視該冗長的文件（lengthy documents）是公平的做法，批准押後至周三早上，屆時可先處理承認事實。
+
+#### 官提法律議題 包括達成協議時未違法、被告未加入串謀 原則是否適用
+
+代表鄒家成的大律師陳世傑其後再問，是否稍後才處理共謀者原則是否適用的問題。法官李運騰同意，指援引該原則其中一項要求，是被告作為共謀者的表面證供成立，故須待控方舉證完畢才能決定。法官陳慶偉亦指本案有4名被告任控方證人，現時僅區諾軒完成主問。
+
+陳世傑再欲澄清，是否即文件上所有證據均會用以援引「共謀者原則」，法官同意，陳慶偉並重申據控方立場，該「串謀（conspiracy）」於2月15日已達成。陳世傑一度更正當時並未成為「串謀」，陳慶偉回應他只是廣義地使用該字，稱「串謀」不一定指「刑事串謀（criminal conspiracy）」，亦可指「協議（agreement）」。
+
+法官李運騰其後主動指出，預料本案有一些法律爭議需處理，包括若該協議達成時尚未變成違法，「共謀者原則」是否適用（“... whether the rule can apply to an agreement which is yet to be unlawful at that time.”）；以及若被告當時尚未參與其中，「共謀者原則」又是否適用（“... whether the rule can apply to defendant at that stage yet to be a party.”）。李運騰早前審訊已曾指出，此前的初選「計劃（scheme）」或者並不違法，不過在《國安法》實施後，原本合法的行為也可變成非法，該「計劃」便成了非法的「串謀（conspiracy）」。
+
+#### 辯方問公民黨記者會是否用以指證非公民黨被告 控方：Yes
+
+代表陳志全的大律師馬維騉則舉例，列表中列出公民黨和抗爭派記者會片段、社民連網站截圖，甚至個別被告如鄭達鴻的 Facebook 帖文，惟其當事人不屬公民黨和社民連，望控方澄清是否指上述證據，包括個別被告的發言，都可全用來指證其當事人。法官陳慶偉着馬維騉直接與控方商討，指法庭只處理雙方申請，而非雙方之間的爭拗。馬維騉一度指法庭可當成是他的申請，惟陳慶偉再着他與控方商討，又提醒馬只是代表其當事人一個的利益。
+
+
+▲ 陳志全
+
+主控萬德豪則回覆，「答案非常簡單，只有一個字，Yes」，指該些證據均用來指證所有被告，包括陳志全。法官陳慶偉重申，該立場是否正確有待處理，但那是控方的立場。法官李運騰再問，控方是否即指公民黨的發言是指證所有被告參與串謀的證據，萬德豪確認。
+
+代表何桂藍的大律師 Beel 最後提出，並未承認戴耀廷的相關文章，認為控方需正式地提出（formally produce）該些證據，即交由下載文章的人就此作供，而非交由僅看過文章的區諾軒確認。他在法官詢問下同意，欲爭議就戴耀廷文章的證物鏈。
+
+案件周三（3月1日）續審。散庭時，有旁聽人士喊：「加油！」梁國雄等亦向旁聽席揮手。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
+
+審訊不設陪審團，由3名國安法指定法官陳慶偉、李運騰及陳仲衡審理。控方代表為副刑事檢控專員萬德豪及周天行，辯方代表包括資深大律師潘熙、大律師沈士文、張耀良、黃宇逸、關文渭、馬維騉、盧敏儀、石書銘、黃廷光、Trevor Beel 等，本身是大律師的劉偉聰則自辯。
+
+不認罪被告包括獲准保釋的鄭達鴻、楊雪盈、彭卓棋、何啟明、劉偉聰、黃碧雲、施德來、陳志全、柯耀林、李予信10人，及還柙的何桂藍、吳政亨、鄒家成、林卓廷、梁國雄及余慧明6人。
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-27-ukrainian-innovation-in-war.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-27-ukrainian-innovation-in-war.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..be279ae9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-27-ukrainian-innovation-in-war.md
@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Ukrainian Innovation In War
+author: Seth G. Jones, et al.
+date : 2023-02-27 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/slZEhXL.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Ukrainian Innovation in a War of Attrition"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Russia suffered more combat deaths in Ukraine in the first year of the war than in all of its wars since World War II combined, according to a new CSIS analysis of the force disposition and military operations of Russian and Ukrainian units._ _The average rate of Russian soldiers killed per month is at least 25 times the number killed per month in Chechnya and 35 times the number killed in Afghanistan, which highlight the stark realities of a war of attrition. The Ukrainian military has also performed remarkably well against a much larger and initially better-equipped Russian military, in part due to the innovation of its forces._
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+The Prussian general and military theorist Carl von Clausewitz wrote that war is filled with unpredictability and that “in war more than anywhere else in the world things happen differently to what we had expected.” Just ask Russian political and military leaders in charge of the war in Ukraine today.
+
+One of the most interesting puzzles is how Ukraine — which has a significantly smaller military, weaker military capabilities, a limited defense industrial base, and a smaller economy — was able to blunt a Russian blitzkrieg and then conduct a series of counterattacks against dug-in Russian forces. Before its invasion in February 2022, Russia had nearly five times as many military personnel as Ukraine, a defense budget eleven times larger, an economy almost eight times larger, and significantly better military capabilities. Examples of Russian capabilities included advanced fighter aircraft (such as the Su-34 and Su-35), artillery (such as the 2S7 Pion, BM-21 Grad, and 2S4 Tulpan), main battle tanks (such as the T-72 and T-90), nuclear weapons, and one of the world’s most feared offensive cyber capabilities. Yet Russia’s preponderance of power has failed to deliver it swift victory on the battlefield.
+
+To understand how the war has proceeded and how it may change in the future, this analysis asks three main questions: What is the current state of the war? What factors — particularly Ukrainian military innovation — have contributed to battlefield performance? What are the future prospects for continued Ukrainian innovation and the requirements for additional Western assistance in a war of attrition?
+
+To answer these questions, this analysis adopts a mixed-methods approach. It draws on interviews with individuals involved in the war, including those who have fought on the Ukrainian side and those who have provided technical support to the Ukrainian military. It supplements these interviews with primary and secondary sources, as well as satellite imagery. Finally, it builds an operational-level map of the Ukrainian battlefield to highlight the force disposition and territory that Ukraine has retaken throughout the war. A separate document explains the methodology used to build the battlefield map.
+
+This analysis makes three main arguments. First, the war in Ukraine has become a war of attrition characterized by dug-in forces, trenches, human-wave attacks, artillery barrages, and high casualties on both sides. Russia likely suffered more combat fatalities in Ukraine in the first year of the war than in all of its wars since World War II combined, including the Soviet and Russian wars in Afghanistan and Chechnya. The average rate of Russian regular and irregular soldiers killed per month in Ukraine over the first year of the war was at least 25 times the number killed per month in Russia’s war in Chechnya and at least 35 times the number killed per month in the Soviet Union’s war in Afghanistan.
+
+Second, Ukraine has performed extraordinarily well against an adversary with a significant advantage in material resources. One factor that has likely contributed to Ukraine’s performance is military innovation, exemplified by Ukraine’s utilization of unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) in combined arms operations. Many of Ukraine’s innovations have come from the bottom up, thanks to a military environment that encourages and enables junior officers to seek innovation.
+
+Third, while military innovation will be necessary as the war continues, it will not be sufficient to outweigh the matériel needs of the Ukrainian military, such as air defense systems, long-range artillery, armored vehicles, fighter aircraft, munitions, spare parts, and logistical resources. The West, including the United States, should prepare for a protracted war and long-term support to Ukraine.
+
+The rest of this brief is divided into four sections. First, it provides an update on the war, including through an operational map of the battlefield. Second, it examines the role of military innovation. Third, it assesses Ukrainian military innovation. Fourth, it assesses the future implications of Ukrainian innovation and foreign assistance in a war of attrition.
+
+
+### War of Attrition
+
+The war in Ukraine has become a war of attrition. Ukraine and Russia have constructed trench systems and made heavy use of artillery. Russia has employed human-wave attacks against fixed Ukrainian positions, including frontal assaults that attempt to seize ground by sheer weight of numbers, rather than by superior positioning or effective combined arms employment. Neither side has gained much territory since Ukraine’s successful offensives in late 2022, even as casualty rates have increased. Both militaries have suffered significant damage to their weapons systems. For example, Russia lost approximately 50 percent of its modern T-72B3 and T-72B3M main battle tanks since the war began, along with roughly two-thirds of its T-80BV/U tanks.
+
+The attritional nature of the fighting can also be seen in the overall disposition of Russian and Ukrainian forces, as illustrated in Figure 1. Both sides face one another along a front stretching for 500 to 600 miles. Rather than massing armored formations at decisive points, both sides have distributed infantry across the front lines, with artillery in support. Although the nature of the fighting could still change, most signs point to a prolonged war of attrition in eastern and southern Ukraine, including the Russian military’s failure in February 2023 to achieve a rapid armored breakthrough near the southern town of Vuhledar.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 1: Russian and Ukrainian Force Disposition, February 2023.__ Source: CSIS compilation and analysis of multiple sources._
+
+A war of attrition is one in which the belligerents attempt to wear each other down through piecemeal destruction of matériel and personnel. The essence of an attrition strategy is best described by Clausewitz, who wrote that it is a mistake to believe that there is “a skillful method of disarming and overcoming an enemy without causing great bloodshed.” Instead, Clausewitz contends that “war is an act of violence pushed to its utmost bounds” and that the side “that uses force unsparingly, without reference to the bloodshed involved, must obtain a superiority if his adversary uses less vigor in its application.” In attrition warfare, the belligerents are mainly concerned with overpowering their adversaries in a series of bloody set-piece battles that minimize exposure to enemy fire. These battles are characterized by high casualties, huge expenditures of matériel, and minimal movement of front lines.
+
+In attrition warfare, a successful offensive operation pushes the defender backward along a front line, much like a bulldozer. There is limited expectation of delivering a knockout blow in which a specific action quickly renders the opponent unable to fight. The victorious side is instead the one that can more readily replace the soldiers and equipment — including long-range artillery and armored vehicles — that are lost in huge numbers. Even in cases when it is ultimately successful, attrition warfare carries huge costs. To win a war of attrition requires a willingness to absorb considerable casualties and significant losses of equipment.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 2: Russian and Ukrainian Force Disposition, Bakhmut Area, February 2023.__ Source: CSIS compilation and analysis of multiple sources._
+
+The nature of the war in Ukraine can be most clearly seen in the fighting for Bakhmut, a small city in the Donetsk region of Ukraine. For months, Russian forces have relentlessly shelled the city, fought house to house, and used human-wave attacks to overwhelm Ukrainian defenders. Spearheaded in recent months by the Russian private military company Wagner Group, Russian efforts to take Bakhmut have included recruiting vast numbers of prisoners from around the country to throw at the front lines — in addition to the use of regular Russian soldiers. The Russian military has utilized three waves of fighters in some areas: a first line of contractors and green conscripts, whose casualty rates are often high; a second line of replacements; and a third line of relatively competent Russian forces. Russia is accepting enormous casualties in return for only small amounts of territory. Despite intense fighting throughout the winter, Russia has only captured approximately 400 square miles of Ukrainian territory across the entire eastern front since September 2022. As Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show, there are numerous signs of attrition warfare, including defensive infantry trench systems, anti-tank ditches and berms, and impact craters from artillery.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 3.1: Satellite Imagery of Trench System, Anti-Tank Ditches, and Impact Craters near Bakhmut, Ukraine.___
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 3.2: Satellite Imagery of Trench System and Impact Craters near Bakhmut, Ukraine.___
+
+While the fighting today has devolved into a war of attrition, Russia appears to have initially employed a blitzkrieg strategy intended to win the war quickly. In February 2022, Russia concentrated ground forces at multiple points along Ukraine’s borders and attempted to pierce the front lines, race deep into Ukraine’s rear areas with the aid of air and naval power, and overthrow the government of Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Unlike a war of attrition, a blitzkrieg strategy relies on fast-moving armored and mechanized units to penetrate into the adversary’s weakly defended rear to destroy the informational, logistical, and political infrastructure on which an army depends. Russia likely based its strategy on several faulty assumptions, including that the Ukrainian population would not fight for a Zelenskyy government the Russians accused of being deeply corrupt, the Ukrainian military would be quickly overwhelmed, and the West would not support Ukraine and risk another “forever war” less than a year after the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan.
+
+Prior to the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Russia controlled approximately 7 percent of Ukrainian territory. Within a month of the invasion, Russia controlled nearly 30 percent of Ukrainian territory, including large swaths of eastern Ukraine stretching from the southern Kherson Oblast to the northern Kharkiv Oblast, as well as a sizable chunk of territory reaching from Ukraine’s northern border to outside the capital of Kyiv.
+
+The Russian advance soon stalled, however, and Ukrainian counteroffensives in the spring of 2022 repelled Russian forces from north of Kyiv and retook territory across much of the eastern front line, reducing total Russian territorial control to approximately 20 percent. A second wave of successful Ukrainian counteroffensives liberated more territory on the Kharkiv and Kherson fronts in the late summer and fall of 2022, reducing Russian control to approximately 17 percent, where it remains today. Figure 4 illustrates liberated areas of Ukraine (in blue) between March 2022 and February 2023.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 4: Map of Territorial Control: March 2022–February 2023.__ Source: CSIS compilation and analysis of multiple sources._
+
+The evolution of the war to one of attrition poses significant military and political challenges for Russia, especially since the Russian military is absorbing fatalities and casualties at rates it has not experienced since World War II. Estimating fatality and casualty numbers is notoriously difficult, in part because all sides have incentives to misrepresent such figures and in part because of the difficulties inherent in collecting data during active combat.
+
+According to CSIS estimates, there have been approximately 60,000 to 70,000 Russian combat fatalities in Ukraine between February 2022 and February 2023. These estimates include regular Russian soldiers from the Russian armed forces, Rosgvardiya, Federal Security Service, and Federal Guard Service; fighters from pro-Russian militias, such as the Donetsk People’s Militia and Luhansk People’s Militia; and contractors from such private military companies as the Wagner Group. Overall, Russia has suffered roughly 200,000 to 250,000 total casualties — personnel wounded, killed, and missing — during the first year of the war. These casualty estimates also include regular Russian soldiers, militia fighters, and private contractors from the Wagner Group.
+
+While some types of authoritarian regimes are willing to accept high casualties in interstate conflicts, but Russian casualty numbers are unprecedented for post-World War II Russia. As highlighted in Table 1, the number of Russian soldiers killed in Ukraine during the first year of the war was likely greater than the entire number of Russian soldiers killed in every war Russia has fought since World War II combined. The number of Russian soldiers killed in Ukraine in the first year was roughly two to five times greater than the number of Russian soldiers killed in Chechnya over nearly a decade a half.
+
+The rate of attrition is also much higher in Ukraine than in any Soviet or Russian war since World War II. Russia suffered an average of roughly 5,000 to 5,800 regular and irregular soldiers killed per month in Ukraine over the first year of the war. In comparison, Russia suffered somewhere between 13,000 to 25,000 fatalities in Chechnya over a 15-year period (with a three-year pause), an average rate of between 95 and 185 soldiers killed per month. The Soviet Union also suffered roughly 14,000 to 16,000 combat fatalities in Afghanistan, an average rate of between roughly 130 and 145 soldiers killed per month. Vladimir Putin has thus far been willing to accept large numbers of Russian fatalities and casualties and has suffered limited political repercussions. But it is unclear that he will be able to do so forever.
+
+
+_▲ __Table 1: Russian Forces Killed in Selected Wars Since World War II.__ Source: Authors’ compilation. See endnote 29 for complete list of citations._
+
+Although Russian fatalities in Ukraine pale in comparison to the Soviet death rate in World War II, the political context is extremely different. The Soviet Union suffered between 8 and 11 million military fatalities and another 14 million civilian fatalities following Germany’s invasion in 1941. However, the Soviets were the defenders at the start of the war and were, therefore, fighting a war of survival. Such casualties were a necessary cost of national existence. But Russia is currently the aggressor in Ukraine, where it is engaged in a war of choice against a country that poses no meaningful threat to Russia’s survival.
+
+Although Russia invaded Ukraine from an apparent position of strength, countries with a significant material advantage — a larger population, a larger or more industrialized economy, a larger military, and greater military expenditures — are not guaranteed victory in war. Russia lost to Japan during the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War, despite having more naval ships, guns, and people. Israel repeatedly defeated its Arab foes in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, 1967 Six Day War, and 1973 Yom Kippur War. The limits of material preponderance are true even of wars of attrition. As one study concludes, “the cost of an attrition strategy is always high” and “success is relatively uncertain.” As some analysts have noted, wars of attrition may actually favor the weaker side, including if weaker militaries can find ways to fight more innovatively than their stronger enemies.
+
+
+### Military Innovation
+
+Several factors help explain battlefield performance in conventional wars. They include a combination of the military balance (especially the quantity and quality of troops and weapons on both sides), strategy, tactics, morale, combat motivation (what some have called the “will to fight”), force employment, and political and military leadership. Military outcomes are generally not easy to predict, despite Napoleon’s comment that “God is on the side of the big battalions.”
+
+Military innovation is likely one important factor in determining battlefield success. As used here, military innovation involves a change in the conduct of warfare intended to improve the ability of a military to generate combat power. A change in the conduct of warfare does not necessarily require a change in military doctrine, but it does involve change at the operational level of war. Change could occur throughout the entire military, or it could be a narrower segment, such as a military service.
+
+Yet military innovation is difficult to achieve. Over 400 years ago, Machiavelli wrote: “And it should be considered that nothing is more difficult to handle, more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to manage, than to put oneself at the head of introducing new orders.” Innovation can occur during peacetime when leaders — especially military leaders — respond to changes in the international landscape and create environments that facilitate and encourage junior officers to pursue innovations and new ways of war. But it is impossible to predict the future with certainty, and militaries face incentives to avoid change or hedge between alternate futures rather than commit fully to an innovation that has not been proven in combat.
+
+Wartime allows for testing innovations against a real adversary but comes with its own obstacles. Militaries must balance the incentive to innovate against the daily need to defeat an enemy who is trying to kill their members and destroy their organizations. There is often insufficient time to assess wartime conditions, reformulate strategic conceptions, and build new forces before the outcome of a war is largely determined. Old and new methods can be tested in combat, but time constraints and limited intelligence make it difficult to take advantage of any apparent innovations in time to win the war.
+
+Nevertheless, military innovation does occur during wartime, especially when operational control is decentralized, as was the case with the U.S. Navy submarine force during World War II. Innovation does not necessarily require substantial resources; major innovations have occurred during periods of constrained resources at least as often as during periods in which budgets were large and growing. Key resources for innovation are talented military personnel, time, and information — not money. Junior officers may be particularly important. Several important wartime innovations (such as the tank and microwave radar) and organizational innovations (such as strategic targeting for U.S. bombers) were pursued from the bottom up by junior officers.
+
+
+### Ukrainian Innovation
+
+Military innovation is one factor that likely explains how Ukraine has overcome its disadvantages, though it is clearly not the only factor. The Ukrainian “will to fight,” political and military leadership (including that of President Zelenskyy), strategy, and force employment have all likely mattered, as has military, economic, and diplomatic support from the West. But innovation increases the ability of a weaker military to reverse the gains of a stronger one.
+
+There is also reason to believe that innovation may grow even more important as the war grinds on. Ukraine can win a war of attrition if it can impose greater losses on Russia than it suffers in any given engagement. Although continued Western aid, clever strategy, and sound force employment will contribute to such an outcome, new ways of fighting that improve the efficiency of Ukrainian forces will also be important for winning a long war of attrition.
+
+One example of Ukrainian innovation has been the use of UASs in combined arms warfare — the blending of infantry, direct and indirect fire, aviation, and other joint capabilities to achieve political and military objectives. Ukraine is hardly the first country to use UASs in conventional warfare, but its employment of a wide variety of UASs in a large number of missions and its integration of UASs into more sophisticated targeting complexes have differed significantly from what came before — particularly Azerbaijan’s use of UASs against Armenia in 2020.
+
+Ukraine has operated several types of UASs in combined arms warfare. One has been the Bayraktar TB-2, a medium-altitude, long-endurance UAS, which was extensively used in the early phase of the war. The TB-2 can perform a range of intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and attack missions. Ukraine has operated small A1-SM Furia flying-wing UASs for day and night reconnaissance, hand-launched Leleka-100 and Spectator-M mini-UASs for artillery spotting and aerial reconnaissance, the UA Dynamics-made Punisher UAS for striking military targets, and larger PD-1s and UJ-22s.
+
+Ukrainian forces have also utilized off-the-shelf commercial UASs, such as the DJI Mavic quadcopter. Mavics have been particularly useful for battlefield intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance for frontline forces. In addition, the United States has provided Ukraine with several loitering munitions — UASs intended to locate and destroy a target by detonating against it — such as the tube-launched Switchblade 300 and the long-endurance tactical Phoenix Ghost.
+
+Ukraine has utilized these UASs to conduct several types of missions as part of combined arms warfare, such as target identification for artillery and aircraft, strike, battlefield awareness, and information operations.
+
+- Target Identification: Ukraine has used UASs to identify targets for artillery and aircraft. For example, Ukrainian ground forces have used forward-deployed UASs to detect Russian infantry units. This information is then distributed to command-and-control centers, who then pass it on to Ukrainian units operating 122-mm howitzers and other systems.
+
+- Strike: Ukraine has utilized UASs for strike missions, including against land, air, and maritime targets. Ukrainian Bayraktar TB-2 drones have struck numerous Russian targets, such as howitzers, main battle tanks, supply trucks, towed artillery, maritime vessels, command posts, logistics depots, and Buk, Tor, Strela, and ZU-23 air defense systems.
+
+- Battlefield Awareness: Ukraine has used UASs for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions to monitor Russian activity and facilitate battlefield awareness. The sensors on some Ukrainian UAS platforms can collect signals intelligence, record video, and collect other information for operational use by ground and air forces. These capabilities have also allowed UASs to be useful for battle damage assessment.
+
+- Information Operations: Ukraine has utilized UASs for information operations, such as showing successful strikes and placing them — overtly or covertly — on social media platforms such as Twitter, Telegram, and TikTok.
+
+In addition, Ukrainian forces have utilized software packages that are often developed and deployed by volunteers. The most well-known of these applications is Kropyva, an intelligence mapping and artillery software populated by information from UASs and other sources. Forward-deployed tactical units have downloaded the software and continuously updated it on handheld tablets and computers. Kropyva allows Ukrainian units to plot both enemy and friendly positions. It uses short-wave and digital radio stations compatible with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s security communications standards and is relatively easy to use. Other home-grown software solutions include GIS Arta, ComBat Vision, and the recently deployed Delta situational awareness and battlefield management system.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 5: Kropyva Defense Mapping Software.__ Source: Army SOS._
+
+Ukraine has also leveraged Starlink to integrate some of its systems, another tactical innovation that has allowed Ukraine to overcome Russian jamming. Starlink is a commercially owned satellite internet constellation developed by SpaceX to provide high-speed, low-latency broadband internet using advanced satellites in low earth orbit. Starlink has enabled members of the Ukrainian organization Aerorozvidka, for instance, to carry out intelligence collection and fire support operations against Russian positions. Some Ukrainian UASs rely on Starlink against forward-deployed Russian forces, and Ukrainian forces and civilians use Starlink to communicate using encrypted satellite communications. Overall, Starlink has helped blunt Russia’s attempts to jam signals, block the internet, and undermine Ukrainian command-and-control capabilities. In addition, some Ukrainian troops have strapped Starlink user terminals to drones involved in strike operations, allowing the craft to be steered with the help of the internet connection provided by satellites.
+
+Other Ukrainian military innovations include placing Harpoon anti-ship missiles on flatbed trucks for ground-based, stand-off attack; mounting grenades and other improvised explosive devices on UASs, including Mavics; utilizing “swarming” tactics with multiple UASs; and using 3D printers to build plastic harnesses with light sensors and a mechanical clasp that snap onto UASs and carry grenades. Overall, Ukraine has used its military innovations to help defend against Russian advances, conduct counterattacks in eastern and southern Ukraine, and improve overall battlefield performance.
+
+But obstacles to innovation remain. According to CSIS interviews, the lack of official Ukrainian government support discourages adoption of volunteer-made systems, which prevents the military from scaling their use across the force. Some officers fear the consequences of using a system they lack official permission to use. Others lack the communications hardware required to take advantage of potentially valuable software. The use of commercial quadcopters is also hampered by the makers’ efforts to prevent users from integrating them into military systems, which involve firmware changes between models and increasingly restrictive application programming interfaces. The absence of government funding also means that platform usage is constrained by developers’ ability to raise funds from individual donors. Ukraine has begun taking positive steps to enable the innovation already happening in the country by officially sanctioning the use of the Delta management defense system on the battlefield, but a more comprehensive and systematic approach would be better.
+
+As Ukraine attempts to maintain its innovation advantage, it should avoid apparent innovations that decrease combat power or forestall victory. Innovation is an inherently risky process. Some research suggests that the innovation process goes wrong when a military cannibalizes an old capability to create a new one, ignores the risks associated with a particular innovation, or rushes the vetting process in order to speed deployment. Innovation can also fail if it contributes to a flawed theory of victory. Ignoring the risks of innovation and rushing through the vetting process are real risks — and the current informality of Ukrainian innovation could exacerbate them. Volunteer developers are unlikely to have the necessary capacity to evaluate all the risks because they lack access to classified data and specific analytic expertise held by military or intelligence bodies.
+
+
+### Future Implications
+
+The war in Ukraine is far from over. Ukraine’s achievements on the battlefield have been the result of several factors, including Russian failures and Ukrainian successes. Military innovation has been — and will remain — important. But the Ukrainian military should formalize the current system of domestic innovation and create structures and organizational processes to monitor its successes and failures. To maximize the power of these innovations, Ukraine should give units the permissions necessary to formally adopt the tools they are already using. The military should also consider creating an analysis center to evaluate the impacts of bottom-up innovations on combat performance and other measures of success. With that data and analysis in hand, the Ukrainian military can then make better-informed decisions on which innovations to scale up.
+
+Foreign partners should also consider providing financial support to this infrastructure or the innovators themselves, who currently depend mostly on crowdfunding. Increased funding would empower Ukrainian innovators who are currently constrained by the need to support themselves while donating their time and expertise. Funding would also provide another way for governments to provide “nonlethal” aid to Ukraine if forced to do so by domestic political constraints.
+
+As the war of attrition continues, however, it is unlikely that military innovation will be sufficient to outweigh the matériel needs of the Ukrainian military. The West, including the United States, should prepare for a protracted war and long-term support. Ukraine’s needs have evolved from the initial stage of the war when it needed short-range defensive weapons, such as Javelin anti-tank and Stinger anti-air missiles, which were helpful to conduct defensive operations against advancing Russian forces.
+
+Along with training and intelligence, Ukraine now needs advanced systems to conduct offensive operations in a protracted war, such as air defense systems, long-range artillery, armored vehicles, fighter aircraft, and munitions, along with spare parts and training. These types of munitions, weapons systems, and matériel are essential to assisting Ukrainian forces conduct effective counterattacks against dug-in Russian forces. Figure 6 shows the impact craters from artillery in yet another example of attrition warfare. Even defenders in a war of attrition need to pursue operational offensives to wear down the enemy, reduce pressure on vulnerable areas, and satisfy political audiences at home and abroad to continue support.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 6: Artillery Impact Craters near Pavlivka, Ukraine.___
+
+In addition, wars of attrition are insatiable consumers of munitions, and their heavy use takes a toll on weapons systems and platforms. On some days the Russian military has launched 50,000 artillery shells at Ukrainian military and civilian positions. Supporting Ukraine through a prolonged war of attrition means supplying them with the munitions the Ukrainian military needs. Ukraine has a strong track record of innovating and integrating Western weapons systems into its military operations over the first year of the war. It should be able to effectively integrate new weapons systems into its arsenal.
+
+For example, more Patriot surface-to-air missile systems would be useful. So would MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS), which are surface-to-air missiles that can be fired from a High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), which Ukraine already possesses. ATACMS can be fired three times the distance of standard rockets, allowing Ukrainian ground forces to move farther away from Russia’s deadly long-range artillery. Tanks and infantry fighting vehicles are essential to providing fire support and carrying infantry into battle. Abrams, Challenger 2, and Leopard 2 tanks will be helpful, along with AMX-10 RC armored fighting vehicles. But continuing support for these vehicles — including spare parts, munitions, and trainers — will also be critical. MQ-1C drones would provide helpful intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and strike capabilities to Ukrainian forces.
+
+Finally, Ukraine’s Soviet-era air force needs more, better aircraft to outcompete Russia in a war of attrition. Combat losses in the past five months have cost it over 50 combat aircraft out of an original fleet of approximately 124 combat aircraft. With fewer aircraft available, each plane endures more sorties and wears down faster. Without replenishment from the West, Ukraine could lose the ability to defend its airspace and target Russian ground forces, potentially allowing Russia to resume its blitzkrieg. The U.S. Air Force is divesting more than 200 A-10s, F-15s, and F-16s to make room for sixth-generation fighters, hypersonic weapons, and other systems. Ukraine could use some of these aircraft — along with trainers and spare parts — particularly for close air support missions to aid Ukrainian ground forces.
+
+Ukraine needs munitions, weapons systems, logistics, training, and intelligence at the appropriate scale. Russia still has an advantage over Ukraine in the number of munitions and the quality of some weapons systems — such as long-range artillery, advanced fixed-wing aircraft, and naval capabilities — though Ukrainian military innovation has been impressive. U.S. and other Western military aid to date has been helpful, though sometimes too slow. Moving forward, the U.S. and Western defense industrial bases will be essential for a long, grinding war of attrition.
+
+---
+
+__Seth G. Jones__ is senior vice president, Harold Brown Chair, and director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.
+
+__Riley McCabe__ is a program coordinator and research assistant with the Transnational Threats Project at CSIS.
+
+__Alexander Palmer__ is a research associate with the Transnational Threats Project at CSIS.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-28-euro-sifmanet-paris-report.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-28-euro-sifmanet-paris-report.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b1b48bcd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-28-euro-sifmanet-paris-report.md
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Euro SIFMANet Paris Report
+author: Gonzalo Saiz
+date : 2023-02-28 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/Cac2NM9.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "European Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network: Paris Report"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Participants discussed the process and value of sanctions implementation in France, international challenges and next steps for the EU._
+
+
+
+In January 2023, the Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies at RUSI convened a roundtable in partnership with the Institute for International and Strategic Affairs in Paris. The discussion, held under the Chatham House rule, gathered representatives from government ministries and agencies, the private sector – including banking institutions, law firms and consulting companies – and civil society. The event is part of RUSI’s ongoing study of EU sanctions implementation and wider responses to illicit finance (Euro SIFMANet), funded by the National Endowment for Democracy.
+
+
+### Sanctions Implementation in France
+
+The roundtable opened with a description of the political and operational context within which France is currently implementing sanctions. On the one hand, while the international political discussion is regarded as having achieved consensus on the need to implement sanctions and now focuses on ensuring their effective implementation, in France there remains a debate as to whether sanctions are worth imposing, driven primarily by far-left and far-right political parties, representing only 15% of the French population and yet constituting a very vocal minority. As further testament to the political context of France, participants at the roundtable from the private sector noted that the statement by French President Emmanuel Macron on the need to keep communication channels with Russia open was ill-received abroad but not, to the same extent, among the French population.
+
+Regarding the operational framework for implementing sanctions, a representative from Direction générale (DG) du Trésor (French Ministry of Finance) described the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the ‘negotiating party’ in sanctions, while DG Trésor oversees implementation. Unlike other countries in the SIFMANet project, France has not had to introduce new laws to ensure it is able to effectively implement the restrictive measures on Russia that have been introduced since February 2022, but DG Trésor has reportedly doubled the number of staff dedicated to sanctions, as well as improving its internal departmental cooperation.
+
+Underlying the confidence displayed by officials in France’s ability to implement sanctions on Russia is the belief expressed by the public sector in France’s strong level of knowledge and experience in implementing sanctions, built on prior experience of responding to previous UN and EU sanctions regimes, as well as national sanctions for terrorist financing. This estimation is reflected in the latest Mutual Evaluation Report of France by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in May 2022. The strength of understanding of anti-money-laundering and counterterrorist-financing (AML/CFT) risks in the French financial sector, and its supervisors, is a key pillar on which the implementation of Russia sanctions relies. For example, representatives from DG Trésor highlighted the benefits they believe stem from a robust national AML/CFT system, suggesting that as trade flows largely involve financial institutions, and French banks have strong AML/CFT transaction and client monitoring systems, they are in an ideal position to also monitor for activity in breach of sanctions, and thus ensure the compliance of their clients. The French sanctions implementation system has thus placed banks on the front line of sanctions implementation, relying on their AML compliance capabilities, which require them to report any suspicious transactions to Tracfin, France’s financial intelligence unit.
+
+Yet, the unprecedented range of restrictive measures imposed by the EU on Russia now poses a new challenge for France’s capabilities. As noted above, the level of knowledge and experience of the financial sector is assessed positively, but, with the introduction of sectoral sanctions, the non-financial sector – labelled by the FATF as Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professionals (DNFBPs) – also faces the task of implementing sanctions, often for the first time. Of note in the discussion was the risk described by DG Trésor that companies often do not understand their value/supply chains in detail and thus face difficulties identifying where restrictions need to be implemented, and smaller companies face issues related to overall awareness of sanctions and capacity to absorb the extra work required. Thus, the expertise of DNFBPs is insufficient, with authorities highlighting the real-estate sector in particular. DG Trésor emphasised that it does not expect companies to have a complete understanding of the sanctions regimes from the beginning, and that it provides support to the private sector to ensure that their implementation improves over time.
+
+One area of concern is de-risking, triggered by concerns in the private sector – particularly among banks – that they do not have sufficient information about their customers to ensure compliance with sanctions requirements. This is a longstanding problem connected with sanctions regimes and – like authorities in many other countries – DG Trésor noted that they cannot control the commercial decisions of the private sector and thus de-risking is inevitable, as private sector actors seek to manage the risks they perceive from the raft of sanctions aimed at Russia.
+
+Among the controls exercised by the authorities in France, the French Prudential Supervision and Resolution Authority (ACPR) checks how designation measures are implemented in the banking sector. The ACPR has conducted onsite inspections at banks to check their systems, looking at the use and effectiveness of the private vendor screening systems on which they rely heavily. Representatives from DG Trésor noted that financial institutions can have varying degrees of risk sensitivity and set their systems accordingly. This results in differing outcomes in the effectiveness of banks’ sanctions screening efforts.
+
+Overall, DG Trésor contended that a combination of a strong national AML/CFT framework, rigorous implementation of that framework by financial institutions, and a robust supervisory regime provides confidence that sanctions are being properly implemented in France. Exceptions exist, however. For example, representatives from DG Trésor noted that the agency supervising the real-estate sector has also conducted inspections, with less encouraging results.
+
+In relation to enforcement against sanctions circumvention, customs authorities are legally charged with monitoring circumvention, which is a criminal offence in France under the French Customs Code, and the same authorities are active in the freezing and management of assets other than real estate, such as yachts and artwork. A representative from DG Trésor estimated that assets frozen in France now amount to around €1 billion.
+
+In contrast to the positive picture painted by the public sector, representatives from civil society noted that there is still a lack of data transparency to assess whether sanctions are being well implemented. In this regard, the discussion also addressed the recent ruling by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) limiting public access to beneficial ownership registries, which some participants from both public and private sectors admitted disagreeing with. A remaining weakness of the company registries in France is found in the lack of beneficial ownership information for companies registered before 2017. While companies registered in the last five years had to provide information on this, companies registered before that date have still not submitted it. The problem of multiple registries existing in the country was intended to be solved with the introduction of a new unified registry in January 2023 that would integrate all registries into a unique resource. At the time of the roundtable, this new registry was closed to public access in accordance with the ECJ ruling. However, on 19 January 2023, the day after the roundtable, France reopened its registries to the public until such time as a new framework is implemented that will give access to those with legitimate interest, which will include civil society and journalists.
+
+
+### International Challenges
+
+Despite the overall agreement among participants at the roundtable on France’s capabilities to implement sanctions, concerns were raised by all participants across both sectors about the ongoing implementation challenges at EU and international levels. Consistent with previous SIFMANet country visits, there was a consensus among participants that lack of harmonisation among member states at EU level poses a major challenge to the effective implementation of sanctions. The fact that sanctions are adopted at EU level but implemented by member states leads to a divergence in implementation as a function of political will, national legal frameworks and private sector interpretation. An example shared by a representative from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), not related to Russia, involved a sanctioned bank in Myanmar that owned the majority of shares in a subsidiary. In this case, some member states believed it acceptable to do business with the subsidiary bank, while others did not.
+
+The MFA representative also described the asymmetries between the EU and the US in implementing sanctions. Before February 2022, sanctions were said to be a source of transatlantic tension, but this changed after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, with ensuing close coordination of mission across the Atlantic, although designations and implementation are not fully aligned. Despite this broad alignment of purpose, the failure of the EU to match the vigour with which the US implements sanctions is notable and represents a systemic vulnerability in the Western response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
+
+As sanctions implementation challenges have grown in the EU, the question of a centralised EU sanctions authority has increasingly arisen. Representatives from the MFA pointed to the coordination of implementation and enforcement achieved in the US via the role of the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). They also noted the extent to which US sanctions can have extraterritorial application, as well as the US’s ability to impose secondary sanctions on third countries that engage with sanctioned entities, thus providing a far greater reach and degree of deterrence than EU sanctions.
+
+In line with what has been revealed in the transatlantic dialogue on Iran sanctions, most participants in the roundtable, from both the public and private sectors, expressed concern about the implications of US secondary sanctions, but did acknowledge that the EU could make greater use of its existing tools, for example the size and reach of its economy, and legal provisions that do allow for extraterritorial reach of EU sanctions.
+
+There was less agreement among participants on the utility of creating an EU-level body designed in the style of OFAC, in charge of implementing sanctions in a uniform manner across the EU.
+
+In a description of the wider international context, a participant from the private sector presented a study that found that two-thirds of the world’s population lives in countries that are neutral or positive towards Russia and have not condemned its invasion. Thus, some countries embrace approaches that support the avoidance and evasion of EU and allied country sanctions. Examples include countries seeking opportunities to ‘de-dollarise’, and the emergence of alternatives to the SWIFT payments messaging system, such as the People’s Bank of China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System.
+
+In terms of sanctions evasion, representatives from the MFA noted that Russian circumvention networks operate at a very low level and are often difficult to identify. They agreed that smuggling networks that enable countries like North Korea or Belarus to evade sanctions are not big enough to support the significantly larger size of the Russian economy. However, participants from both the public and private sectors noted that Russia can obtain the knowhow from Iran on how to evade sanctions, particularly related to energy.
+
+
+### Next Steps for the EU
+
+As noted above, roundtable participants were not convinced that establishing an OFAC-style body in the EU would be an appropriate step forward, and judged that such a move might be met with resistance from those who increasingly call for greater sovereignty of member states.
+
+Participants considered that an intermediate step might be the creation of an EU High Representative on Sanctions to facilitate coordination (it is worth noting that the US State Department has long had an Office of Sanctions Coordination headed by an ambassador). In this sense, the appointment of former EU Ambassador to the US David O’Sullivan as International Special Envoy for the Implementation of EU Sanctions was regarded as a positive step at EU level, to improve the dialogue with third countries regarding Russian circumvention of sanctions.
+
+There was also agreement that the EU must make more use of its economic heft to promote compliance in the world. A consensus of views from both the public and private sector described the oil price cap as a successful tool in getting third countries to support measures to restrict the funding of the Russian war machine, as it allows such countries to support the West while at the same time bringing benefit to themselves through their compliance. Participants from both the public and private sector agreed that the EU still has tools to leverage in this regard. For example, Regulation 269/2014 was amended several times in 2022 and now allows the EU to sanction non-EU companies for engaging in business with EU-sanctioned companies and facilitating the circumvention of sanctions; and the EU also has a collection of ‘high-risk’ lists that it can use to indicate heightened financial crime risk (specifically related to money laundering and tax evasion).
+
+However, the roundtable unanimously concluded that the EU must persist in improving the effectiveness of its sanctions regime by defining and clarifying designations and being consistent – that is, ensuring harmonisation of sanctions enforcement across all member states. As a participant remarked, ‘2022 was the year for designing sanctions; 2023 is the year to implement them and close loopholes’.
+
+---
+
+__Gonzalo Saiz__ is a Research Analyst for Project CRAAFT and works at the RUSI offices in Brussels. His research focuses on the crime-terror nexus and its impact on terrorism financing in Europe.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-28-on-shifting-ground.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-28-on-shifting-ground.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..e5febaef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-28-on-shifting-ground.md
@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : On Shifting Ground
+author: Simon Rynn
+date : 2023-02-28 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/GWKxaSs.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "On Shifting Ground: An Appraisal of UK Engagement in Ethiopia"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_This paper asks what factors have helped or hindered the UK in pursuing a ‘Global Britain’ agenda in Ethiopia. The paper also tests common assertions around the effects of Brexit, reductions in the UK aid budget, and the merger of two government departments, the Department for International Development (DFID) and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)._
+
+
+
+Since 2016, successive British governments have sought to emphasise that a post-Brexit UK would be outward-looking, collaborative and influential. A series of speeches and policy statements have emphasised the pursuit of prosperity and an intention to capitalise on previous investments in overseas aid, trade, defence and diplomacy. In March 2021, the UK government published its Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy. The document reiterated these themes and referenced East Africa for increased UK engagement.
+
+Against this backdrop, a RUSI research team has set out to examine how the UK has deployed its development, defence and diplomacy toolkit in four countries in East Africa in support of this agenda. The project, entitled ‘Furthering Global Britain? Reviewing the Foreign Policy Effect of UK Engagement in East Africa’, asks what factors have helped or hindered the UK in pursuing a ‘Global Britain’ agenda in Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan. The research also tests some common assertions around the effects of Brexit, reductions in the UK aid budget, and the merger of two government departments, the Department for International Development (DFID) and the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) into the Foreign & Commonwealth Development Office (FCDO).
+
+This paper sets out the research findings on the UK’s relevant engagements in Ethiopia, focusing on 2015 to the present. It finds that the UK has made some limited progress on aspects of its foreign policy agenda in the country. Examples can be found of UK action contributing towards positive outcomes, including through forging partnerships; combining defence, diplomacy and development aid; and pursuing trade and prosperity agendas.
+
+The analysis suggests, however, that the UK has indeed been constrained by a number of internal factors: smaller and unpredictable budgets; the unplanned merger of the FCO and DFID; the absence of a detailed strategy for Ethiopia; and weaknesses with leadership. And while the UK is still regarded as a capable and relevant actor, with skilled personnel and a measure of influence in certain areas, the overall picture is one of diminished status. Aid cuts are a factor. Losing the DFID brand has also been a net negative. Leaving the EU has not presented insurmountable practical difficulties, but it is seen by many as diminishing UK influence.
+
+The overriding limiting factor for UK action in Ethiopia in recent years has, however, been a worsening operating context since a change in Ethiopia’s leadership in 2018. Initial hopes for reform and greater openness have been dashed by a series of political decisions, and the devastating war in Tigray. A severe drought across the Horn of Africa has accentuated these difficulties. Widespread insecurity, hunger and violence have resulted. Decades of socioeconomic progress, achieved in part through close partnership with the UK, have been reversed. These events have upended Ethiopia’s relationship with the outside world, and the country’s trajectory is uncertain.
+
+Despite tensions and challenges, the UK has successfully maintained relationships with a range of actors through its work in Ethiopia. It has also adapted to events and made positive contributions, even with reduced resources. The UK’s future strategy and approach should reflect lessons learned on the nature of the Ethiopian state, the sources and limitations of influence, and the UK’s particular contribution.
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+In the wake of the June 2016 Brexit vote, successive UK prime ministers Theresa May and Boris Johnson repeatedly made reference to ‘Global Britain’. The phrase attracted widespread commentary, much of it quizzical or critical. It was, however, an attempt to signal – albeit in boosterish language – a sense that the UK would remain an outward-looking country.
+
+In March 2021, the UK government published a policy paper, Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, commonly known as ‘The Integrated Review’. The document recognised a more competitive global context than in earlier years but reiterated the now familiar ‘Global Britain’ themes. It signalled a wish for the UK to play a proactive role in global affairs, work in partnership with others, and better integrate foreign policy, defence, trade and international development efforts. Africa was referenced in terms of forging partnerships and pursuing shared goals such as prosperity, democracy and security. The policy paper also referenced overseas aid, while leaning strongly towards promoting trade, economic resilience and the alignment of international development with wider foreign policy. Eastern Africa was highlighted as a region for increased UK engagement. Specific references were made to Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan, and in the case of Ethiopia to working in partnership ‘to further our shared prosperity goals, our democratic values and our security interests’ and to investing in ‘regional stability, moving towards closer defence cooperation with ... Ethiopia if the situation there allows’.
+
+Against this backdrop, a RUSI research team has set out to examine how the UK has deployed its development, defence and diplomacy toolkit in Eastern Africa in support of its Global Britain agenda, looking at how it has sought to bring about positive change in the countries in which it is working while also securing secondary, largely geopolitical, benefits in the national interest at a time of domestic and international change.
+
+Through a two-year research project, the team has sought to test some of the assertions that have been made around Brexit; the reduction in the UK aid budget from 0.7% of Gross National Income (GNI) to 0.5%; the increases in the defence budget; and the creation of the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) from the merger of the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Department for International Development (DFID) announced in June 2020. The project, entitled ‘Furthering Global Britain? Reviewing the Foreign Policy Effect of UK Engagement in East Africa’, asks whether these structural changes have helped or hindered the progress of recent UK governments’ Global Britain policy agendas in the region, while seeking to identify factors that may have contributed to or limited the UK’s ability to project influence. It aims to answer the following research questions:
+
+- How effective has the UK been in making a positive difference in relation to Global Britain objectives in the region in recent years, particularly via development aid, diplomacy and defence engagement?
+
+- What impact have recent structural and policy changes such as Brexit, aid cuts and the creation of the FCDO had on Global Britain outcomes?
+
+- How does the UK’s approach and impact differ from those of others?
+
+- How do UK aid priorities for Eastern Africa align with those of the region’s governments, and what are those governments’ expectations of and recommendations for the UK?
+
+The research methodology consisted of a review of selected policy literature and semi-structured interviews. Interviews were used to identify factors that recurrently enabled or constrained UK actions, particularly with reference to positive outcomes to which the UK was thought to have contributed. Data on UK aid, defence and diplomatic engagement in the four focal countries covering the period 2015–2022 is used as a reference point to identify UK policy objectives and trends over time. The intention is to provide an overview of the realities of UK engagement in each country over a six-year period and to identify the factors that were most salient in driving outcomes.
+
+This paper offers the project’s findings on the UK’s engagement in Ethiopia. It is based on a review of key secondary sources and 58 interviews with government officials, staff from multilateral organisations, and predominantly Ethiopian interviewees from academia, civil society, media and business (see Annex).
+
+Chapter I provides background on Ethiopia–UK relations and summarises the UK’s major policy interests and its main investments in international development, diplomatic and defence engagement in the country in recent years. From within this broad portfolio of work, Chapter II highlights several examples of UK action that have contributed to positive outcomes in Ethiopia. Chapter III identifies key factors that have constrained or enabled UK action in this period. The paper concludes with commentary and analysis of these factors in relation to the project’s research questions.
+
+The paper should be read in conjunction with upcoming companion papers on the UK in Kenya, Sudan and Somalia, and an earlier publication that sets out the project methodology in depth and offers more detail on UK investments in the region. A synthesis paper that combines findings from the four focus countries will follow.
+
+
+### Background
+
+Ethiopia is the most populous country in Eastern Africa, with approximately 120 million citizens alongside significant numbers of refugees. Diplomatic relations with the UK were formally established in 1841. In 1868, a 13,000-strong British force invaded what was then Abyssinia to free British nationals who had been held hostage by Emperor Tewodros II as a tactic to secure military aid from Queen Victoria. From 1935 to 1936 Ethiopia fought and lost the second Italo–Ethiopian war. Its reformist emperor Haile Selassie went into exile in the UK. A British imperial force invaded again in 1940, ousting the Italian army and restoring the emperor to power in 1942. He remained in power for the next 32 years, eventually being overthrown by a military junta (the Derg) in 1974 following a bitter civil war.
+
+From 1991 to 2018 Ethiopia was governed via a system of ‘ethnofederalism’. This gave autonomy to major nationalities within a polity dominated by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the leading actor within the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), the coalition that had ousted the previous regime in 1991.
+
+Overseeing a poor and diverse population, deferring democratisation, and committed to a state-led economy, the EPRDF sought legitimacy via economic growth. Under one-time president and later prime minister Meles Zenawi, the country achieved enviable rates of growth. In the mid-2000s it became the fastest-growing economy worldwide, registering an annual growth rate of over 10% between 2004 and 2009, and it acted as a cheerleader for international development in global forums. Approximately one-third of the country’s national budget of $9 billion came via foreign, mostly Western, aid. Seeing Ethiopia as a quintessential ‘developmental state’, the UK became a staunch partner to the EPRDF. The UK–Ethiopia relationship was built initially in the 1990s, on UK prime minister Tony Blair’s rapport with Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. Via the now-defunct DFID, the UK aligned strongly with the EPRDF’s development agenda, providing direct budget support and funding initiatives linked to government service delivery. Ethiopia at times became the largest single recipient of UK bilateral aid globally, much of it channelled via the government in support of service delivery. This left the UK open to criticism when the Ethiopian government fell short on human rights. Western donors at times tried but largely failed to use ‘conditionalities’ to push democratisation and human rights agendas. The brief move by Western donors to pause and then restart budget support in response to state brutality linked to national elections in 2005 is one example of this.
+
+Over time, the EPRDF came to play a notable role in the formation of the African Union (AU), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, negotiations on international development and climate change, and more. Ethiopia made a substantial investment in peacekeeping. From the 2000s onwards, Ethiopian troops were major contributors to the AU in Somalia (AMISOM), the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), and the UN–AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). The Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) received training and income, while the Ethiopian government shaped politics and security in the region.
+
+Meles continued Ethiopia’s long tradition of diplomatic balancing, managing cordial relationships with Western and non-Western powers from the US and the UK to Russia and China. He positioned the EPRDF as a US ally in the War on Terror, again projecting influence (including an invasion of Somalia in 2006), but also combating perceived security threats and opponents at home. Ethiopia also aligned with US policy on sanctions on Eritrea and the role of the International Criminal Court in Sudan.
+
+The UK supported and cooperated with Ethiopia on all of the above. In the mid-2000s, DFID championed ambitious security sector reforms in Ethiopia. These did not proceed, but for six years ENDF officers up to the Chief of Staff attended exchange visits and training courses on security sector management in the UK. UK–Ethiopia security cooperation later attracted the attention of legal activists and human rights campaigners, who questioned the wisdom and appropriateness of support and training for institutions with poor human rights records.
+
+Despite a troubling record on democratisation and human rights that included repression of political opposition, censorship and cancellation of elections, the EPRDF remained dominant until 2018. Internal population movement, uneven growth and demands for greater freedoms eventually fractured the alliance. By 2018, Ethiopia faced rising insecurity, popular protests and simmering conflicts in states including Afar, Somali Regional State and Oromia. In March, Abiy Ahmed, leader of the Oromo People’s Democratic Organization, was elected EPRDF chair. One month later, he was appointed prime minister. In December 2019, erstwhile members of the EPRDF created a new ‘Prosperity Party’ (PP) coalition, which incorporated new parties into the ruling coalition, but omitted ethnically based parties, including the now-disaffected TPLF. The stated PP/Abiy policy agenda included increased political freedoms, economic liberalisation and privatisation of state-owned enterprises. The poverty reduction and rural development agendas of previous EPRDF governments were jettisoned. Abroad, and by some at home, Abiy was welcomed as fresh and dynamic. However, notwithstanding the high-profile release of political prisoners, he and his allies began sidelining opponents and creating space for promised privatisation and economic liberalisation. Loosening the grip of former EPRDF members, including the TPLF, was key. While taking steps to centralise governance and unlock sections of the economy controlled by TPLF affiliates, Abiy also apparently agreed with Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki and Somalia’s President Mohamed Abdullahi ‘Farmajo’ to act militarily against the TPLF. Meanwhile, internal rivalries and repression mounted, notably in 2020 towards Oromo opposition groups. In 2021, delayed national elections allowed Abiy to win popular endorsement for the PP agenda. The PP secured a resounding victory. Yet significant parts of the country were unable or unwilling to participate due to boycotts and insecurity. Allegations of manipulation were widespread.
+
+Tigray was one regional state to boycott the national election. The TPLF had been returned to power there via a state-level election on 9 September 2020. Although declared successful by the Tigray election commission, the federal government, which at that point had postponed elections citing the Covid-19 pandemic, considered the process to be illegal. Tensions between the TPLF and federal government erupted into violence in November 2020. What was originally a political fight quickly grew into an internationalised civil war overlaid with harsh rhetoric, including mutual accusations of terrorism and genocide. Ethiopia’s national army, the ENDF, was backed by Eritrea and Somalia, as well as by sub-national special forces and ethnic militias, in a series of battles against the Tigray Defense Forces (TDF). Several hundred thousand have likely perished. Human rights organisations have documented atrocities and war crimes on all sides. The Ethiopian federal government faces the most damning criticism for using collective punishment against Tigray by stopping all government services, communications and media coverage and blocking humanitarian aid deliveries. Harassment and detention of not only Tigrayans but also other political opponents, journalists and critics has been marked. Many thousands have been displaced or have faced starvation due to crippling inflation and a severe economic contraction.
+
+The above events have changed Ethiopia’s relationship to the outside world. Security in the region has been reconfigured as Abiy brought in Somali and Eritrean forces to fight the TPLF. The UAE, Turkey, Iran and possibly China are thought to have provided military assistance to the federal government. Reports of atrocities, amplified by diaspora and social media, have drawn public condemnation from governments such as the US, the Republic of Ireland, the Netherlands and the EU. Many aid donors consequently stopped (the EU, the World Bank) or reoriented programmes away from central government channels, and a US preferential trade agreement was cancelled. While expressing concern and condemning atrocities, the UK approach has overall been more circumspect.
+
+Violence in Tigray has ebbed and flowed since breaking out in November 2020. A humanitarian ceasefire announced by the federal government in June 2021 was not fully honoured. Hostilities broke out again in August 2022, again involving Eritrean forces. In November 2022 a cessation of hostilities agreement was brokered by the AU, with US and Kenyan support. Implementing this agreement will be hugely challenging – a resumption of violence is a plausible scenario. At the time of writing, Ethiopia’s trajectory remains highly uncertain, not only due to the Tigray war but also because of the current political polarisation, unresolved grievances and conflicts in many parts of the country.
+
+#### UK Policy Priorities and Engagements
+
+This section offers a summary of the UK’s engagements from 2015 to 2022 in the areas of development, diplomacy and defence in pursuit of its policy objectives outlined above.
+
+- __Development and Humanitarian Engagement__
+
+For most of the past 20 years, Ethiopia has been the leading recipient of UK bilateral aid globally. Expenditure averaged around £300 million per annum between 2016 and 2020. This made the UK the second-largest donor after the US (see Figure 1), contributing around 11% of Ethiopia’s recorded aid income, as reported via the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (OECD–DAC). Approximately 60% of the UK’s bilateral aid budget has typically been channelled via central government programmes, the bulk allocated to multi-donor, multi-year funds that supported delivery of basic services. The UK also made significant Official Development Assistance (ODA) investments in other sectors such as drought response, water and sanitation, and refugee and migrant support. Smaller programmes have focused on human rights, peace and stability, and economic development. Examples include £6.5 million for the textiles industry, with subsidies to business parks to support their recovery from the Covid-19 pandemic, and to fund TradeMark East Africa’s programme to reduce barriers to trade across the region.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 1: Top Six OECD–DAC Donors to Ethiopia, 2012–21.__ Source: OECD–DAC, [‘Creditor Reporting System’](https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=crs1)._
+
+After decades of high aid allocations, from 2019 a sequence of events meant that the UK bilateral aid budget for Ethiopia began to shrink. Changing ministerial priorities brought a slight reduction in the budget from 2019 (£299 million) to 2020 (£254 million). The Covid-19 pandemic triggered further cuts, as economic forecasts took a downturn, followed by a reduction in the aid budget from 0.7% to 0.5% of GNI in November 2020. By 2021, UK bilateral spending had roughly halved compared to 2019. Despite briefly allocating more than the UK in budgetary terms in 2020, Germany returned to typical spending levels by 2021, as did other leading donors. The exception was the US, which markedly increased spending, mainly on humanitarian relief. The remaining UK bilateral aid allocation to Ethiopia of £120 million in 2021 was £134 million lower than the allocation in 2020. This was the largest cut – in absolute, though not proportional, terms – of any country’s budget worldwide.
+
+Reductions were accompanied by reallocations to different sectors following a series of natural disasters, shifting ministerial priorities, Covid-19 and the Tigray war. To give a sense of the changing priorities: in 2020, the UK allocated £254 million of bilateral ODA to Ethiopia. Humanitarian aid (£103 million) accounted for 40% of this budget, as compared to 15% in 2013. Health accounted for £55 million, other social infrastructure and services £29 million, and government and civil society £14 million. Expenditure on economic development and defence engagement (mostly non-ODA-funded) was cut to a minimum.
+
+- __Diplomatic Engagement__
+
+As well as supporting international development work, the UK’s diplomatic interest in Ethiopia has historically focused on issues ranging from trade promotion to migration, counterterrorism cooperation and the Ethiopian involvement in peacekeeping. Considerable energy has also been absorbed on consular cases involving dual nationals. Diplomatic relations were tested in early to mid-2021, as Western criticism of the Ethiopian government’s blockade of Tigray and reported human rights abuses led to recriminations. As explored below, the UK has taken a lower profile approach to the Tigray war than more prominent critics, such as the EU, the Republic of Ireland and the US, which quickly paused aid packages and publicly condemned Ethiopian government actions. The UK has attempted to position itself as constructively critical, while continuing to route its aid via government. Throughout the course of the Tigray war the UK has sought diplomatic engagement with the Ethiopian federal government at the highest level, lobbying for improved humanitarian access, ceasefires and talks. It has not invested high levels of political capital, however. For example, senior ministerial visits have been infrequent: in December 2022, recently appointed foreign secretary James Cleverly visited Ethiopia almost two years after his predecessor-but-one, Dominic Raab, who visited in January 2021.
+
+- __Defence and Security Engagement__
+
+The UK government has maintained a relationship with the Ethiopian Ministry of National Defence for over two decades and has a permanent defence attaché in the country. Defence-related expenditure is below £1 million per annum, mostly drawn from regional defence and Conflict Stability and Security Fund budgets with competing priorities, among them AMISOM. Prior to the partial withdrawal of ENDF troops from AMISOM in 2021, Ethiopia’s support to the mission was the UK’s principal focus. Many AMISOM troops have received training from the UK.
+
+UK ambition on defence in Ethiopia has declined over time. From contemplating costly support to security sector reforms in the mid-2000s, the UK moved from running courses for senior government officials on security sector management to halting most cooperation outside peacekeeping training during the difficult transition years since 2018. Since that date, UK defence engagement has mainly focused on education and training in non-combat areas linked to the Ethiopian Peace Support Training Centre. Cooperation on counterterrorism has all but stopped.
+
+
+### Overview of Selected Outcomes
+
+This chapter highlights a number of outcomes to which UK action has contributed in Ethiopia, whether through international development cooperation, defence engagement or diplomacy. The examples below are drawn from interview data, with interviewees identifying cases from within the wider UK portfolio of work in the country, as outlined in Chapter I. The cases – which interviewees viewed as broad examples of success – identify and analyse key factors that have enabled or constrained the UK’s attempts to further its stated Global Britain agenda of cultivating partnerships and linking development, defence, diplomacy and trade.
+
+#### Telecoms Sector Liberalisation
+
+When the PP came to power in December 2019, following the EPRDF’s dissolution, major sectors of the Ethiopian economy were dominated by state monopolies and closed to foreign competition. In 2018, DFID and Department of International Trade (DIT) teams opened discussions with the government about liberalisation and privatisation. With the UK offering a £100-million grant for economic reform, the PP government committed to opening up the banking and telecoms sectors. The UK then provided technical support by funding a high-level adviser to help government develop policy options. A ‘Homegrown Economic Reform Programme’ followed, which included plans to restructure agriculture, manufacturing, mining, tourism, and information and communications technology, and open each to external competition. The World Bank and the IMF subsequently announced US$3 billion in loans to support planned reforms.
+
+The UK embassy decided to focus on the telecoms sector, perhaps as a model for others. This had a growing domestic market and solid infrastructure, thanks to the state-owned provider Ethiotel. Regional and international competitors were theoretically available to drive down prices. The FCDO funded an Ethiopian adviser, formerly of the IMF, to support the federal government on strategy. The World Bank then agreed to allocate grants and loans via a multi-donor trust fund. This was for technical assistance for telecoms liberalisation, which the UK also part-funded through an economic assistance programme, the Ethiopia Investment Advisory Facility. Former DFID development staff worked closely with former FCO political staff, the ambassador and the DIT delegation that was also housed at the embassy, who provided diplomatic and lobbying support and legal advice and outreach to UK companies.
+
+In May 2020, the Ethiopian government announced that two new telecoms provider licences would be put out to tender, establishing competition for Ethiotel. Shortly afterwards, Ethiotel halved its tariffs and built new towers across the country. The UK then funded the World Bank to develop another options paper to move the liberalisation process forward. Initial interest was shown by companies including Vodafone/Safaricom, MTN, Orange and Etisalat (UAE-owned). But tendering took place amidst news of the Tigray war. Only two bids were received, at lower values than anticipated. A bid from MTN worth approximately US$600 million was rejected by Ethiopia. In June 2021, the winning ‘Global Partnership for Ethiopia’ consortium was awarded a licence. Its bid, with a direct equity investment quoted at US$220 million, consisted of a mix of public and private investors: the UK’s Vodafone, with backing from the UK’s Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) Group, Kenya’s Safaricom, South Africa’s Vodacom Group, the US’s Development Finance Corporation, and Japan’s Sumitomo Corporation.
+
+Viewed in terms of the UK’s own agendas on prosperity and integrated approaches, the bidding process was a success. Embassy staff note that the winning consortium likely benefited from longstanding DFID support to Ethiopia’s industrial park development in the decade before, underscoring the value of long-term relationship building. Development, trade and diplomatic engagement had been used in a joined-up way. The winning bid was also seen as distinctive due to the involvement of the CDC Group, which directly addressed the UK’s prosperity agenda. And – at least on paper – the bid included commitments on women’s empowerment, new technologies, access to education, the investment of more than US$8 billion, impacting over 1 million jobs.
+
+The new Safaricom Ethiopia network went live in Addis Ababa in October 2022. Western hopes that Abiy’s government would liberalise other sectors have not, however, materialised. The federal government’s attention has for now shifted to maintaining foreign currency flows and stabilising the country’s wrecked economy. An early return to the liberalisation policy agenda, including moves to introduce more competition in the telecoms sector, looks unlikely. Critics, meanwhile, have noted the lack of a societal consensus on the PP’s rapid privatisation and liberalisation agenda, and expressed doubts about the intentions of a government which has no shame in using policy agendas to isolate opponents. For supporters of the EPRDF government’s economic model, there is also suspicion that introducing foreign competition will lead to expatriation of profits.
+
+#### Support to Basic Services
+
+UK development assistance to Ethiopia has a long history of providing budgetary and technical support via government institutions. Ongoing examples are: the Sustaining and Accelerating Primary Health Care in Ethiopia programme, worth approximately £288 million, delivered with the Ethiopian Ministry of Health; and a Rural Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) programme, costing £106 million.
+
+OECD–DAC donors have taken different positions on working through the federal government of Ethiopia since the outbreak of the Tigray war in November 2020. The EU ceased budget support to the government two months later. While continuing people-focused ‘human development’ projects, the World Bank followed. Despite reduced budgets and a reorientation towards humanitarian relief, in areas such as health, education, water and sanitation, the UK continued to provide financial aid and technical assistance to government departments. It also continued to play a strong technical role in donor–government coordination meetings. The UK stood with a minority of OECD–DAC donors including Germany, Italy and Nordic countries in maintaining support to the federal government’s programmes. It initially argued that prolonged aid withdrawals would further weaken government systems and put additional stress on a crisis-affected population.
+
+The net effect of aid cuts and stoppages is difficult to ascertain in the midst of a war, drought and economic contraction, but access to and quality of health and education in Ethiopia are believed to have declined as a result. By continuing to work with the Ethiopian government, however, the UK attracted criticism for ‘soft-pedalling’ on human rights and accountability. Questions can be also raised about the effectiveness of only one leading OECD–DAC donor using a reduced aid budget to maintain the social systems of a state with little professed interest in social services and a war to fight. The federal government did not move to replace donor funding when aid cuts were announced, prioritising above all its security agenda. Moreover, national budgeting trends since 2018 show the Ethiopian government drastically deprioritising basic services, in line with the PP leadership’s interest in the private sector and infrastructure development.
+
+In addition to arguments about the rights and wrongs of maintaining government systems, UK officials defended their approach as a way of avoiding alienating their Ethiopian counterparts, and as a means of maintaining dialogue and influence at a technical and political level with the federal government, bilateral and multilateral donors, international financial institutions (IFIs), and indeed Tigray’s leadership. In early 2022, the UK sought to use its IFI board membership, alongside its bilateral donor relations, to lobby the World Bank to restart ‘pro-poor’ programming – on condition that the federal government showed some progress on providing humanitarian access and service delivery in Tigray, increased state expenditure on service delivery elsewhere, and worked towards a cessation of hostilities. Although the political and development sections of the embassy collaborated on this, there was no significant progress for months to come. A World Bank programme worth US$300 million was nevertheless approved at board level in April 2022, part-allocated for victims of sexual violence but also for reconstruction and water, sanitation and education support via the Ministry of Finance. Critics, including the local EU delegation, were fearful that this prematurely rewarded sluggish government moves to conclude the war. However, by July 2022, the European Commission had approved €81.5 million, mostly for health and education in conflict-affected areas, to be channelled through NGOs, the UN and member-state development agencies. Its much larger (around €1 billion) multi-year development budget remains on hold due to outstanding concerns, including around human rights monitoring.
+
+Although the exact sequence of events allows for different interpretations, the Tigray war erupted again in August 2022. As a result, the very limited humanitarian access that had been provided to Tigray stopped. Tigray’s services remained entirely cut off until December 2022, while countrywide service delivery has been degraded across the board. With a new phase of the Tigray conflict in full swing, the UK hardened its position, now arguing against any new World Bank spending until a cessation of hostilities was agreed. It also reportedly lobbied against an IMF mission to Ethiopia that could potentially have unlocked a valuable foreign currency loan. The question of whether to adopt a ‘politics first’ or a ‘development first’ approach, and under what conditions development aid should restart, continues to be debated, both within and between bilateral and multilateral donors.
+
+This example illustrates the dilemmas and limitations of delivering aid amidst conflict, and in a ‘non-developmental’ state. It points to the value of aligning political and technical approaches, the importance of maintaining multiple relationships, the need for flexibility, and the potential reputational costs of pursuing a minority position.
+
+#### Political Negotiations in Somali Regional State
+
+For more than two decades, an armed movement, the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), has fought for self-determination for Somalis in the Somali Regional State (SRS) of Ethiopia. In 2012, the Kenyan government began to mediate peace talks between the Ethiopian government and the ONLF. The initiative followed many months of quiet background diplomacy with the involvement of UK-based NGO Conciliation Resources (CR), which advised the parties.
+
+CR provided negotiation trainings and advice for six years, helping to develop a ‘roadmap’ for peace. In October 2018 a peace deal, the Asmara agreement, drafted with inputs from CR, was signed in Eritrea by the ONLF and the Ethiopian federal government. It put an end to hostilities and opened the door to the ONLF leadership to transition into a political party and take part in formal politics. CR has since accompanied the actors, providing advice and organising learning visits and technical support to the Ethiopian Federal Reconciliation Commission formed in 2018. CR also assisted in the establishment of the Somali Regional Reconciliation Commission, which is now operational. CR’s work has also included supporting civil society groups with the capacity to represent victims of human rights abuses to articulate their needs within the peace process, and the inclusion of marginalised groups.
+
+This work was initially funded by the UK and Swiss governments from 2012 to 2014, and later by the Swedish government. Despite strong interest from the UK embassy, funding was episodic, coming from different instruments over time with stops and starts. This frustrated organisational planning. Nevertheless, the involvement of a British-funded NGO gave the UK a conduit to promote a more inclusive process. Marginalised, including rural, populations have been able to participate in the regional political process, and it has been suggested that the initiative contributed to the later formation of a women’s caucus in the Somali regional parliament.
+
+Some have argued that the Somali region peace initiative contributed to wider peace and stability in the region. The Somali region did see reduced violence in the wake of the Asmara agreement, and both an FCDO project completion report and an independent review assess the CR project as having made a positive contribution to stability. But key provisions of the Asmara agreement are still to be implemented, and although SRS is relatively stable compared to Oromia or Tigray, regional elections in 2021 saw a boycott by opposition parties. The Asmara agreement did not prevent a longstanding border dispute with the neighbouring Afar region from flaring up. Combined with a regional drought, this has seen significant displacement and killings. To the extent that the region has seen some progress on stability, wider political changes likely acted as enablers: a rapprochement between the Eritrean and Ethiopian federal governments; Addis’s removal of a repressive regional governor, Abdi Iley, in 2018; and a change in the ONLF’s leadership. At the same time, CR proved adroit in capitalising on these dynamics, with UK backing.
+
+An indirect benefit to the UK government has been improved political access in the region. In parallel, the UK was also focusing its attention on sub-national (Somali-dominated) political entities across Ethiopia’s international borders – from Somaliland to northern Kenya and Somalia’s federal member states. Cross-border collaboration and the movement of goods and people across Ethiopia’s international border into northern Kenya and Somaliland has also improved. CR’s work and the UK’s political and financial support will only have contributed to, rather than delivered, such outcomes. The context in the Somali region and neighbouring territories remains daunting. The engagement could still have enduring effects, however. For the UK, it illustrates that combining long-term, low-key investments with political savvy and a trusted partner can bring results under the right conditions.
+
+#### Peacekeeping Training
+
+As noted above, the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) has long maintained a relationship with the Ethiopian Ministry of National Defence. From 2010 to 2020, exchange visits and security sector management courses were run for senior military and political figures, including a defence minister. These are thought by the UK to have been highly regarded in Ethiopian government circles, and to have given the UK leverage.
+
+Around 2018, MoD support moved to focus on strengthening the Ethiopian International Peace Support Training Institute. Established in 2011, the centre was conceived as centre of excellence for training and deployment of military and civilian peacekeepers to AU and UN missions. Ethiopian military graduates receive training on a range of non-combat skills relevant for deployment in peace support operations. Donors include Japan, Germany, the US and the UK, each of whom has invested around £1.5 million. While Germany funded a research facility, accommodation and a canteen, Japan and the UK funded the construction of classrooms and delivered training in non-combat subjects such as combating sexual and gender-based violence, strategic planning, humanitarian law and countering IEDs. UK funding supports around 90 students per annum. Post-training evaluations are positive overall, although students often ask for more practical or combat-oriented training. The UK estimates that around 75% of Peace Support Training Institute graduates go on to serve in peace support operations. Missions such AMISOM have relied heavily on Ethiopian contributions, arguably helping to contain Al-Shabaab in southwest Somalia.
+
+Just as development work is sometimes claimed to aid wider foreign policy objectives, UK defence-related projects (peacekeeping training and beyond) are thought by the MoD to have offered the UK access to and influence with political decision-makers. Earlier security sector management training courses helped to open discussions about improving governance and accountability within the security sector, previously a DFID responsibility. But although the UK and Ethiopian defence ministries are still in routine contact, the Tigray war, weaker government-to-government relations and lower UK budgets make this agenda unrealistic for the medium term.
+
+#### Crisis Response – The Tigray Conflict
+
+After a slow start, the UK mounted diplomatic, humanitarian and consular responses to the November 2020 outbreak of conflict in Tigray. As part of the diplomatic response, then foreign secretary Dominic Raab met Abiy in Addis Ababa on 22 January 2021, urging an end to violence and humanitarian access and action on human rights. In May 2021, the UK Special Envoy for Famine Prevention and Humanitarian Affairs and the FCDO Director General for Africa visited Tigray, before calling for a humanitarian ceasefire. Efforts were also made to bring pressure to bear at the UN in New York and to reach out to the head of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, a UK national.
+
+At this point, the UK’s humanitarian contributions were significant. For example, data from the UN’s Ethiopia Humanitarian Fund Annual Report for 2021 shows UK contributions at US$18.3 million. At embassy level, humanitarian advisers mobilised funds from crisis reserves and sought reallocations from development budgets. The UN Ethiopia Humanitarian Fund places the UK as the second-most generous humanitarian donor in 2021, after Germany, which spent US$24.7 million, and ahead of the US, which spent US$12 million. A series of UK funding announcements were made through 2021 and early 2022. In October 2021, £29 million was announced for those affected by the conflict. On top of an existing allocation of £76 million in humanitarian support, in January 2022, £5 million in new funding was announced for a drought in the south, £5 million for health and education services for people affected by conflict, and £4.5 million for peacebuilding and human rights. The embassy meanwhile sought to maintain relations with the federal government at working and senior political levels, lobbying repeatedly for humanitarian access and respect for international humanitarian law, possibly even hoping for a mediation role for the UK.
+
+The Tigray blockade policy and reports of battlefield atrocities drew UK ministers into public criticism of the federal government in 2021. UK officials nevertheless counselled that ‘megaphone diplomacy’ was unlikely to work. The UK sought to build a ‘critical friend’ profile for itself in-country instead. Attempts to maintain a nuanced UK position may have had benefits in private but in public, the Ethiopian government responded negatively to all critics, fostering a blanket social media campaign that denounced ‘anti-Ethiopian’ ‘imperialists’. Some observers, including many Tigray activists, meanwhile suspected the UK of soft-pedalling on human rights, due to, variously, double standards, racism or commercial interests.
+
+Considering the diplomatic aspects of the crisis, UK–Ethiopia relations were tested in November 2021 when Tigrayan forces advanced south from Tigray towards Addis Ababa. The UK government drew down diplomatic staff and called on UK nationals to leave. Other countries followed. The rapid process of withdrawing some 50 out of 70 diplomats from the embassy angered federal government officials and loyalists, many of whom saw the move as affirming a Tigrayan position, or pro-Tigrayan claims of impending victory. The withdrawals may have been a sensible proactive measure but proved unnecessary when US diplomatic pressure and ENDF drone attacks forced a TDF retreat. UK staff began to return five to six weeks later.
+
+The UK has since sought to maintain its ‘critical friend’ approach in Ethiopia, using working-level channels while seeking influence up to prime ministerial level. Lobbying for improved humanitarian access, a ceasefire and possible talks continued, bilaterally and with allies, throughout 2022. The scale of humanitarian need continued to grow, however. A humanitarian ceasefire first agreed in March 2022 was not adhered to. Conflict then restarted in August. At the time of writing it is debatable whether the UK approach or the more public and strident positions adopted by others have shifted federal government behaviour. Much is not yet in the public domain. It is too early to know whether the November 2022 agreement brokered by the AU in Pretoria and Nairobi will shift the dynamics between Tigray and Addis. The UK remains officially supportive of AU mediation efforts. Although it did not play a role in the Pretoria peace negotiations of October 2022, it may be hopeful of playing a more direct role in future, building on the ‘critical friend’ approach.
+
+
+### Enablers and Constraints
+
+Chapter II highlighted positive examples of the UK’s development, diplomacy and defence engagements in Ethiopia. Drawing on these examples and on supplementary interviews, this chapter identifies the key factors that appear to have constrained or enabled the UK’s actions in pursuing the Global Britain agenda in recent years.
+
+#### Operating Context
+
+As discussed, the operating context in Ethiopia has worsened markedly since 2018. A country once seen as a strong partner for international development, a fledgling trading partner, and a regional stabiliser, is now a major stability risk due to political intransigence and miscalculation. This is a highly challenging context in which to execute UK policy objectives. Longer-term agendas that have featured prominently in UK policy, such as trade and development, now have an uncertain future. Ethiopia’s stuttering political transition means a loss of direction and vision. It has also reversed hard-won socioeconomic development gains, causing widespread insecurity, inflation, starvation and death, conditions that will pose challenges for decades. The worsening context needs to be factored in when assessing the UK’s progress on its Global Britain agenda.
+
+#### Resources
+
+The UK built a strong reputation for itself in Ethiopia over the last two decades, driven in large part by substantial allocations of ODA that helped to fuel impressive reductions in poverty. Given the centrality of aid to the UK–Ethiopia relationship, a more than 50% budget cut has posed real challenges. Reductions in UK aid budgets have registered strongly with UK partners, and at working level with government. Informed Ethiopians feel the UK is losing influence as a result. Reduced budgets have, however, spurred some innovative thinking, with attempts to involve such organisations as HM Revenue and Customs, Ofcom and the City of London in telecoms work, and to ‘crowd-in’ World Bank funding for basic services and ‘social safety net’ programmes as a way of substituting for a reduced bilateral development budget.
+
+The November 2020 announcement of the reduction in the UK aid budget to 0.5% GNI ushered in a period of ongoing uncertainty. Due to constantly shifting priorities, budgets and ministerial turnover, budgeting horizons have shrunk to one year at best. By mid-March 2022, the 2022–23 bilateral aid budget total for Ethiopia still had not been agreed. This negatively impacts the ability to plan, deliver and maintain good relations.
+
+More positively, as budget cuts fall on programmes, not operations, staffing levels in Ethiopia were broadly maintained by the FCDO and MoD in the period 2015–21. The number of development (formerly DFID) advisory posts has somewhat reduced. The DIT, meanwhile, has increased its presence, appointing a director to head the office in Addis Ababa and recruiting additional staff to pursue a more joined-up approach to trade and development, in line with the Global Britain agenda. Research suggests that FCDO staff are perceived by counterparts in civil society, government and bilateral and multilateral agencies as bringing valuable technical skills.
+
+#### Strategy
+
+In the EPRDF years, socioeconomic development, closely followed by stability and counterterrorism, was uppermost among the UK’s objectives in Ethiopia. These objectives were felt to be consistent with other goals, and it was assumed that stability and poverty reduction would over time contribute to democratisation and improved governance. Post- 2016, UK governments leaned further towards pursuing trade and mutual prosperity, as set out in the 2021 Integrated Review. The arrival of the 2018 Abiy government was seen as a great opportunity. Critics have accused the UK of adopting a naïve ‘blank cheque’ approach to the Abiy transition, and in the years 2019–21, the UK approach was found wanting. Many now see the UK – and indeed other Western countries – as lacking clear objectives or a viable strategy for Ethiopia. Certainly, the UK, despite macro-level strategies such as the Integrated Review and the FCDO’s unpublished strategy for Africa, has not had a detailed strategy to guide decision-making across all sectors of its engagement in Ethiopia.
+
+#### Structure
+
+Recent years have seen incremental progress on joining up the UK’s development and diplomatic efforts in Ethiopia. This is partly due to the changing country context, which for a short time appeared encouraging for foreign trade and investment. But the shift towards more integrated working across different arms of the UK government in Ethiopia was initiated by the UK government’s overall post-Brexit foreign policy, later accentuated by the merger of the FCO and DFID.
+
+The FCO–DFID merger process has not been much noticed outside UK government circles. For more than two decades, DFID built an enviable reputation for the UK in Ethiopia, with its technical leadership and generous funding, and among those Ethiopians who follow international development debates, most expect the UK’s reputation to suffer as a result of DFID’s closure. Internally, although other events – for example, the Covid-19 pandemic and aid cuts – have been in play, the merger process is seen as time consuming and difficult. Business processes have had to be revised repeatedly. Working practices are now settling down, and the concept of integrated working is becoming more normalised, regardless of formal working arrangements. Examples of this cited by interviewees include international development staff becoming better at spotting trade opportunities, and humanitarian advisers better at factoring in the political context around famine and access questions in Tigray. At the same time, interviewees note that political staff have worked more closely with development colleagues to lobby the Ethiopian government, and to lobby IFIs to link future lending to conflict de-escalation, humanitarian access and respect for humanitarian law. Transitioning formerly separate staff into fully integrated teams, particularly with a significantly larger (former) DFID presence, is, nevertheless, taking time.
+
+#### Leadership
+
+Political instability in the UK, with high rates of ministerial turnover and public questioning of politicians’ integrity, has left many Ethiopians doubtful about UK leadership. UK ministerial attention to Ethiopia is meanwhile seen as having declined from previous years, with no senior ministers visiting between January 2021 and December 2022. This has been noticed by Ethiopians, with comparisons made with France, Canada and the US, each of which is seen as having attempted to address the Tigray war at a presidential and prime ministerial level with more consistency than the UK, via ongoing calls, visits and statements. Periodic clampdowns on African migration, work permit restrictions and reports of worsening living conditions in the West are also negatively influencing attitudes towards the UK and the West. Some Ethiopian interviewees felt, however, that Western legitimacy problems dated back as far as the 2003 Gulf War.
+
+#### Relationships
+
+The UK has maintained a range of productive relationships in Ethiopia and with regional and international partners. This includes European and Euro-Atlantic countries, from Canada to the US, Japan, and many others with whom the UK has cooperated successfully on trade, defence, development and humanitarian agendas. It also includes multilateral agencies and IFIs in relation to which the UK is both a donor and a partner.
+
+The end of DFID, however, along with Brexit and budget cuts, has led many to assume that British influence is in decline. It is common to hear that the UK must have lost ‘traction’ by leaving the EU. The UK has significantly reduced influence over EU aid allocations, and UK officials no longer attend routine EU cooperation meetings, such as those of the EU Heads of Mission. This has necessitated developing workarounds, meeting in other forums and communicating informally. Interviewees reflected that at times, officials have had to work harder to maintain relationships with the Ethiopian government. Other interviewees felt that moving outside EU decision-making circles has made the UK freer in its bilateral dealings with Ethiopia and freed up time previously spent on intra-EU negotiations and administration.
+
+The UK established a good reputation for itself in Ethiopia on the basis of DFID’s leading financial and technical role in international development. Evidence of Western donor influence over successive Ethiopian governments’ handling of sensitive issues around governance, human rights and democratisation is, however, hard to find. Nevertheless, Ethiopian observers have tended to see the UK as technically competent on international development questions, but less principled than countries such as the Republic of Ireland, Denmark or Sweden on matters of human rights and democracy.
+
+Given the close alignment of the two countries’ governments prior to 2020, the Tigray conflict has upended the UK–Ethiopia relationship. With the Abiy government’s lack of interest in poverty reduction, the development-oriented foundations of the UK–Ethiopia relationship have been shaken. A falling aid budget only accentuated this problem. Meanwhile, muted UK criticisms of Ethiopian federal government strategy have left relations intact but strained. There has been no public acknowledgement of the UK’s attempt to distinguish somewhat its own approach from more strident (for example, EU, Irish and US) positions on the conflict. Views may be different behind closed doors, as the apparently productive meetings between the new UK foreign secretary and Abiy in December 2022 suggest. At the same time, some have drawn conclusions from the fact that a leaked Ethiopian foreign ministry re-engagement strategy towards Western actors did not distinguish the UK as having its own position on the war.
+
+Ethiopian perceptions of external actors have been strongly influenced by the question of their position on the Tigray war. Those sympathetic to the opposition often see external actors, including the UK, as negligent for not holding the federal government and Eritrea to account. The reasons offered vary from callous disregard to an interest in commercial deals with Ethiopian companies and the federal government. A contrast is often drawn between strenuous Western support for, and investment in, Ukraine, and limited efforts to assist Tigray. Conversely, those more supportive of the federal government’s Tigray strategy tend to condemn foreign criticism as imperialist or as embodying double standards.
+
+Either way, the fast pace of the Tigray war seems to have wrongfooted the West at points. The US, the EU and the UK have all arguably struggled to adjust their approach to events and have changed tack more than once. For example, while the US proved a useful co-sponsor of the recent Pretoria peace talks, initial public condemnation from the US State Department in the early stages of the Tigray war was bitterly received by the federal government and not forgotten. The hand of non-Western powers has probably been strengthened in comparison. Given recent tensions, Ethiopia arguably sees Russia, Turkey (a supplier of drone technology to the ENDF), and China (supportive of non-interference via the UN) as its staunchest allies. This could change. As the history of Western and Soviet relations with Ethiopia in the 1970s and 1980s shows, Ethiopia can pivot quickly in favour of perceived interests. And the UK’s less strident positioning might yet bear fruit, with access maintained and relationships forged, as in the recent apparently productive discussions between the UK foreign secretary and the Ethiopian prime minister.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+The analysis in this paper suggests that the UK has been able to make limited progress on aspects of its ‘Global Britain’ agenda. Examples can be found of the UK combining defence, diplomacy and development, pursuing trade and prosperity agendas and – in a more mixed fashion – forging partnerships.
+
+The UK has been constrained by a number of factors: smaller and unpredictable budgets; an unplanned institutional merger; the absence of a focused in-country strategy; and weak leadership. At the same time, the FCO–DFID merger and ODA budget cuts spurred fresh thinking about leveraging different relationships and funding sources. But benefits around joined-up working have, at least in the short term, probably been eclipsed by losing the well-known DFID brand. Leaving the EU has not been a major constraint. It is, however, seen as reducing UK influence by Ethiopian observers, even if offering new freedoms. While the UK is still regarded as a capable and relevant actor, with skilled personnel and a measure of influence in certain areas, the overall picture is one of a relative decline in status.
+
+The key issue, however, has been the changed operating context since 2018. Early promise has yielded to widespread insecurity, hunger and violence in Ethiopia, reversing decades of socioeconomic progress. The PP leadership has pursued zero-sum politics and turned away from poverty reduction and the ‘developmental state’ rhetoric of its predecessor. Ethiopia may be facing its most difficult challenges in recent history. Any shared vision for the future has gone, and the situation could worsen before it improves. It is no longer possible for external actors to ‘align with’ the Ethiopian government, deploying aid as a foundation for wider socioeconomic development and stability. This change, coupled with wartime conditions, also limits the immediate relevance of UK defence engagement. On the other hand, it is perhaps too early to judge the utility of the UK’s ‘critical friend’ diplomatic stance.
+
+Provided it is prepared to make fresh choices, despite its declining influence, the UK may be able to build on its current position. If the November 2022 cessation of hostilities holds, it will provide a basis for confidence building between Tigray and Addis Ababa. It will not, however, resolve the deeper issues, which require careful stewardship of multiple peacemaking, dialogue, reconciliation and accountability processes. The UK could, in theory, work with others in support of such efforts, providing technical leadership on a number of critical peacemaking and reconstruction questions in which it has expertise, from ceasefire monitoring to stabilisation, peacebuilding, governance, security sector reform and transitional justice. Learning from the past, however, a principled and coherent stance should be sought on these policy agendas among as broad a range of international actors as possible. While recognising the limited influence that external critics and donors, including the UK, have had on Ethiopian governments’ decision-making, questions of rights, accountability, self-determination and democracy should inform clear benchmarks for working closely with or through government.
+
+
+### Annex: List of Interviewees
+
+
+
+
+
+---
+
+__Simon Rynn__ is Senior Research Fellow for Africa at the International Security Studies department at RUSI. His experience covers conflict prevention and peacebuilding, stabilisation, security and justice, de-mining, humanitarian, governance and small arms control. His main research focus is on the security of East Africa and the Horn, particularly the security sector, external engagement with stabilisation and peace support operations, as well as economic security and the relationship between security and international development.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-03-01-europes-defense-dilemma.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-03-01-europes-defense-dilemma.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..933f13ac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-03-01-europes-defense-dilemma.md
@@ -0,0 +1,355 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Europe’s Defense Dilemma
+author: Sean Monaghan
+date : 2023-03-01 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/SeAozay.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Solving Europe’s Defense Dilemma: Overcoming the Challenges to European Defense Cooperation"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine has led to a transformational moment for European defense. However, Europe has a dilemma: it is spending more on defense but cooperating less — all despite three decades of political initiatives designed to improve European defense cooperation._
+
+
+
+As this brief explains, there is no single reason for this failure: it is a result of a deep-seated collective action problem entrenched across the political, economic, and military fields of the European defense landscape.
+
+This brief identifies three main insights for NATO, EU, and European policymakers to help solve Europe’s defense dilemma:
+
+- Understanding the challenge as a collective action problem reveals three principles that can help unlock European defense cooperation: small groups, normalization, and mechanisms to incentivize cooperation (and discourage fragmentation).
+
+- Previous experience reveals internal and external factors that influence the prospects for cooperation.
+
+- Many different types of defense cooperation may be used to provide European leaders with a range of options to boost cooperation.
+
+
+### The Sorry State of European Defense Cooperation
+
+> #### `European Defence Agency (EDA), November 15, 2022`
+
+_`“In terms of defence spending, the positive trend seems to be accelerating, in line with announcements from the majority of pMS [participating member states]. It remains to be seen whether pMS will follow a coordinated approach which would ensure greater efficiency and interoperability of armed forces, and avoid further fragmentation.”`_
+
+Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine has led to a transformational moment for European defense. Together, European nations have committed to nothing less than a pan-continent Zeitenwende, providing unprecedented military assistance to Ukraine, drastically hiking defense spending, and reversing long-standing defense policies. But the real test for European leaders is yet to come: Can they deliver lasting change in Europe’s ability to defend itself?
+
+One important element of transforming European defense — and the focus of this paper — is the level of multinational cooperation in Europe. Increasing European defense cooperation promises political, economic, and military benefits for the nations involved. As EU high representative Josep Borrell explains: “We could avoid competing for the same products, competing for the same things with a limited industrial capability. We may have greater bargaining power; we could ensure the interoperability of the armies.”
+
+Yet the benefits of European defense cooperation have proven elusive. Cooperation remains the exception, not the rule. The excerpt above from the European Union’s latest annual report on European defense spending captures the current European defense dilemma: Europe is spending more on defense but cooperating less. Or, as one headline bluntly summarized, “Record EU defence spending masks failure to collaborate.”
+
+According to EU data, both the total amount of cooperative spending and the number of cooperative initiatives have decreased significantly over the last decade. As of 2020, cooperative equipment spending fell to 11 percent of total defense spending, far short of the European Union’s target of 35 percent and the lowest figure since EDA records began in 2005. The same trend applies to cooperative research and development (R&D) spending, which was 6 percent of overall R&D investment in 2020, far below the EDA’s 20 percent target and another record low. Figure 1 shows these trends.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 1: Defense Investment and Collaborative Spending in European Defense.___
+
+The EDA summarizes the situation in plain language: “Despite the increase in total defence expenditure, defence investments and defence equipment procurement, spending for collaborative projects does not seem to be a priority for the majority of MS [member states].”
+
+European defense cooperation is in a sorry state. Worse still, it is not for want of trying: several transformational efforts have failed to improve European defense cooperation since the end of the Cold War.
+
+The initial transformation of European defense forces after 1989 — through NATO and, from 1993, the European Union — fell short in Bosnia and Kosovo, where Europe relied heavily on the U.S. military. This led to further transformation efforts over the next decade, both through NATO and based on a new, dedicated European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Several flagship NATO and EU initiatives focused on developing capabilities through cooperation and collaboration.
+
+However, operations over Libya in 2011 again revealed European shortfalls and continued reliance on the United States for strategic capabilities. Combined with the fallout from the 2008 global financial crisis, this led to another transformation attempt through two flagship cooperation initiatives: EU Pooling and Sharing, established at a 2010 EU Council meeting on defense, and NATO’s Smart Defence, launched at the 2012 Chicago summit.
+
+When Russia seized Crimea in 2014, European nations realized they needed to refocus on collective defense, committing to drastically increase spending at NATO’s 2014 Wales summit. This imperative — combined with the United Kingdom’s departure from the European Union — provided an opportunity to roll out several new initiatives to transform EU defense cooperation, including the European Defence Fund (EDF) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) projects.
+
+The impact of three decades of political impetus and flagship initiatives on European defense cooperation is difficult to judge. While there have been several successful examples of defense cooperation — for example, in strategic lift and air-to-air refueling, a critical Libya shortfall — and long lists of NATO and EU projects, there are too many examples where European cooperation did not emerge where it could have, such as in the naval sector.
+
+Ultimately, the EDA’s figures tell the story: cooperation within the European Union has markedly declined over the last decade, and the prospects are not good. This dilemma could not come at a worse time for Europe. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine requires stepping up defense on several counts: to continue supporting Ukraine, to bolster its own defenses to deter Russia from wider aggression, and to make up for the inevitable reduction in U.S. forward presence as American forces are required to deter an increasingly capable and belligerent China in the Indo-Pacific.
+
+Yet while European defense spending has skyrocketed, most of it has gone toward urgent, off-the-shelf U.S. equipment, from ammunition to air defense. Continuing with this policy will not address the fragmented and piecemeal nature of Europe’s defense industrial base and defense forces. As one analyst puts it, Europe is “missing its moment” to embed cooperation and fix its fragmentation problem.
+
+In summary, Europe has a dilemma: it is spending more on defense but cooperating less. The track record of European defense cooperation invites two questions:
+
+1. Why is European defense cooperation so difficult?
+
+2. How can it be made easier?
+
+This report addresses these questions in two parts. It first shows that challenges to European defense cooperation are rooted in a deep-seated collective action problem with political, economic, and military dimensions. It then uses insights from collective action theory to identify several principles for solving Europe’s defense cooperation problem.
+
+
+### The Collective Action Problem in European Defense Cooperation
+
+> #### `Tomas Valasek, 2011`
+
+_`“There is a great contrast between the co-operative way in which European countries fight wars, and the insular manner in which most prepare for them. . . . Yet in peacetime EU militaries revert to their national ways. . . . This is a very wasteful way to build armed forces.”`_
+
+The basic challenge to European defense cooperation is known in economic and political theory as the collective action problem. This problem arises in groups where actors would be better off cooperating but are discouraged from doing so by individual incentives that work against joint action. The tragedy of the collective action problem is that all parties are worse off than they would have been had they been able to overcome the barriers to cooperation. These challenges to European defense cooperation have three dimensions: political, economic, and military (Figure 2).
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 2: The Collective Action Problem in European Defense Cooperation.__ Source: Author’s analysis._
+
+#### Political Challenges
+
+Political factors are often judged the most important for success in defense cooperation. There are three basic political challenges to European defense cooperation: the strategic cacophony problem, the strategic fit problem, and the specialization dilemma.
+
+__The Strategic Cacophony Problem__
+
+The most significant challenge to defense cooperation is posed by sovereign imperatives that work against cooperation. In the European context, Hugo Meijer and Stephen G. Brooks have referred to this as the “strategic cacophony” problem, which they define as “profound, continent-wide divergences across all the domains of national defense policies, most notably threat perceptions.” Their analysis suggests this problem is so deeply embedded that overcoming it “would require a long-term, sustained and coordinated effort.” The practical results are described in the EDA’s 2022 CARD report: “Member States implement their [defense] plans to a large extent nationally. . . . Key drivers remain primarily nationally defined requirements.”
+
+For EU member states, political factors are a double-edged sword as they work in both directions: cacophony and integration. The political imperative to make the EU project succeed provides a powerful incentive to cooperate with fellow travelers. At the same time, national sovereignty works in the opposite direction and may prevent a natural ceiling to ever closer cooperation, though both effects vary in potency between member states.
+
+A different dynamic is present in NATO, which has focused more pragmatically on coordination and interoperability over the years rather than on cooperation and integration as an end in itself. By one assessment, NATO is “the only institutional framework that has fostered some degree of coordination in Europe (at the strategic, doctrinal, and capability levels) and partly contained Europe’s strategic cacophony.”
+
+__The Strategic Fit Problem__
+
+The political factors that influence multinational defense cooperation include shared goals, strategic culture, geography, and history. These boil down to the same problem: strategic fit. As one study on defense cooperation puts this:
+
+_`In a [business] environment, a lack of “strategic fit” may lead to the reluctance of one company to procure demand objects with its competitors. . . . In the context of [cooperative] purchasing in defence, the requirement for a “fit” is more complex.`_
+
+These factors may include political and ethical issues about the use of force in certain situations or trust and reliance on other nations. Furthermore, “as trust and ethical alignment is not static, this results in a dynamic development of cooperation in defence.”
+
+In practice, this makes defense cooperation politically demanding and doubly difficult: not only must the stars align for two or more nations to decide that defense cooperation is viable to begin with, but they must work to maintain their strategic fit in the face of resistance and changing circumstances.
+
+__The Specialization Dilemma__
+
+Specialization — focusing on one product or domain to enhance efficiency — is the bedrock of economic theory and practice. Yet this principle is less prevalent in defense and security, which as a public good is less amenable to market principles.
+
+The strategic cacophony problem also limits the extent to which nations can give up capabilities (or rely on others to specialize for them), which creates the specialization dilemma: national capitals know specialization would bring benefits, but they cannot follow through. Worse still, nations often end up limiting or removing some aspect of their forces by default rather than design due to national political or industrial issues.
+
+#### Economic Challenges
+
+All things being equal, defense cooperation should give European nations more bang for their euro. However, two main challenges have prevented the economic benefits of cooperation from being realized in practice: the fragmented nature of European defense and a defense spending bias toward short-term gains.
+
+__Fragmentation__
+
+The first part of the problem is fragmentation. When it comes to European defense, all things are not equal. The European defense landscape and market are heterogenous and economically inefficient due to strategic cacophony, which fragments demand and supply by favoring national defense forces and defense industries. Where cooperation emerges, fragmentation also contributes to inefficient work share, duplication of facilities, and multinational management structures that add friction and cost.
+
+The result of fragmentation is incoherence and capability gaps. Europe’s military forces are not designed to fit together neatly like a jigsaw puzzle. A 2017 assessment showed EU militaries have 178 different types of weapon systems — 148 more than the United States, despite having half the budget. Several assessments have also revealed Europe’s high-end capability gaps in deterrence and defense.
+
+Efforts to date have seen little progress or promise to overcome fragmentation:
+
+> No improved coherence of the EU defence landscape has yet been observed. . . . It remains to be seen whether pMS will follow a coordinated approach which would ensure greater efficiency and interoperability of armed forces, and avoid further fragmentation.
+
+__Short-Termism__
+
+Over the last decade, according to EDA figures, spending has gone up while cooperation has gone down. This indicates European nations favor spending on national or off-the-shelf equipment from non-EU countries over cooperation — especially equipment made in the United States.
+
+While this approach has short-term merit in addressing the immediate threat cost efficiently, it also exacerbates the fragmentation problem. As the EDA summarizes:
+
+> There is overall a strong prioritisation of off-the-shelf equipment procurement in most MS which could be further reinforced by the current security context. If off-the-shelf procurements are conducted in an uncoordinated manner, this could negatively impact the coherence of the EU defence landscape and curtail European cooperation in the future.
+
+#### Military Challenges
+
+The challenges of defense cooperation in the military and defense acquisition context are threefold: defense planning, joint procurement, and multinational operations.
+
+__Defense Planning Alignment__
+
+One implication of the strategic cacophony problem is that national military requirements and defense procurement cycles are rarely aligned, which makes cooperative solutions even more difficult. The sheer variety in the size, scale, and capabilities of national defense forces across Europe compounds the already invidious problem of multinational defense planning.
+
+Defense planning alignment is the key to unlocking the deepest forms of cooperation. The most significant multinational capability development projects — from the A400M transporter to the Eurofighter Typhoon — have occurred when several nations have prioritized the same requirements at the same time.
+
+__Joint Procurement__
+
+The increasing complexity of modern defense capabilities makes procurement in the national context highly challenging. However, CSIS’s Greg Sanders and Andrew Hunter note, “While single-nation acquisition programs are hard, international joint acquisition is harder.”
+
+There are three main challenges to joint procurement. The first is the added complexity of managing international actors, which requires multinational organizations and structures that introduce cost and friction. The second is divergent national preferences regarding requirements, work share, and incentives for joint procurements, which are difficult to align. The third is the specificity dilemma. This arises because it is easier for nations to cooperate on low-specificity items that many of them could use (such as clothing, medical supplies, or small arms) rather than bespoke, high-specificity objects and systems (such as missiles, ships, and aircraft). Yet the gains from cooperation on high-specificity items far outweigh those in the low-specificity realm.
+
+__Multinational Operations__
+
+Modern military operations are also becoming increasingly complex and challenging as they integrate new technologies and doctrine, such as multidomain operations. These challenges are multiplied in the context of multinational operations for two main reasons.
+
+The first is command and control (C2) of multinational operations, which incur setup and running costs that can be prohibitive, as shown by the European Union’s experience with battle groups and operational headquarters. In practice, multinational units also suffer from frictions related to language, strategic culture, sovereignty, and interoperability.
+
+The second challenge to multinational military operations is the growing complexity of modern warfare. The natural conservatism of military organizations poses a serious challenge for European military cooperation in particular, given the disparities in technology and capability among them and with key allies (e.g., the United States).
+
+
+### Overcoming the Challenges to European Defense Cooperation
+
+> #### `Letter signed by 10 European defense experts, November 7, 2022`
+
+_`“If Europeans really . . . want to become a credible player in the international security arena, they must do and spend more together. And they must do it now.”`_
+
+The previous section showed that the challenges to European defense cooperation are rooted in a deep-seated collective action problem with political, economic, and military dimensions. This section considers how to overcome those challenges and solve — or at least improve — Europe’s defense cooperation problem.
+
+It proceeds in three parts. First, it identifies three principles for overcoming the cooperation challenges above. These principles are based on the theory of resolving collective action problems. Second, it identifies key factors for improving the prospects of cooperation. These factors are drawn from the literature on multinational cooperation. Third, it identifies several different types of cooperation — all of which can be used to expand the options for European defense.
+
+
+### Key Principles
+
+#### Principle 1: Use the power of small groups
+
+Using the power of small groups may be the best way to enhance European defense cooperation and mitigate the political challenges in European defense. Collective action problems are less prevalent in small groups where free riders cannot hide, members are more inclined to trust each other, identification and enforcement are easier, and group identity or solidarity may be stronger.
+
+The promise of small groups in European defense is not new, with several examples in NATO and the European Union (e.g., the Framework Nations Concept and PESCO). Several studies in recent years have highlighted the untapped potential of “country clusters,” “islands of cooperation,” “core groups,” and “differentiated cooperation” in European defense. Moreover, bilateral relationships and small groups are already widespread, as “the essence of defense cooperation in Europe is a web of hundreds of bilateral and minilateral collaborations.”
+
+However, the full power and potential of small groups to transform European defense cooperation has not been realized. Existing small groups either emerge ad hoc or are not designed with defense cooperation in mind. Instead, small groups should become an organizing principle of European defense, taking advantage of the subregional dynamics that already exist across Europe. Small groups also have the potential to specialize and exploit division-of-labor benefits within them.
+
+To go further, previous studies have identified areas where new or existing small groups could address capability gaps or adopt a regional focus. As small groups can form across a range of cooperation types (see figure 3), existing groups such as the European Air Transport Command (EATC) or the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) could also build on the strategic fit they have established to expand cooperation into other areas (e.g., codevelopment or procurement).
+
+#### Principle 2: Normalize cooperation
+
+Another way to overcome collective action problems is to normalize desired behavior among groups. Developing group norms, social solidarity, group identity, and reciprocity also encourages cooperation.
+
+Treating cooperation as the default setting, rather than the exception, would mitigate many of the political, economic, and military obstacles to cooperation by aligning incentives and introducing a common strategic culture of cooperation. Cooperation can be normalized in European defense in three main ways: political prioritization, championing success, and leadership.
+
+__Make Cooperation a Political Priority__
+
+First, European capitals and institutions should take every chance to make cooperation a political priority. The EU Versailles declaration in March and the raft of initiatives that followed are a good example, linking the need to embed cooperation in European defense with the continent’s response to war in Europe. As EDA chief executive Jiří Šedivý stated, “At EU level we must now work to shift the balance and make cooperation the norm.”
+
+However, even with the winds of crisis in their sails, there is still a danger that “the EU’s new defense bureaucracy’s proposals remain just that.” Brussels and EU capitals must maintain a laser-like focus on enhanced cooperation as the means to address the worsening security environment — and an end in itself.
+
+In contrast to the EU Strategic Compass and Versailles declaration, neither the June Madrid summit declaration nor the new NATO Strategic Concept mentions the need to enhance cooperation among members. This also stands in contrast to NATO’s first strategic concept in 1949, in which cooperation between allies was a central theme.
+
+With the July Vilnius summit on the horizon — and a historic seventy-fifth anniversary summit in Washington in 2024 — NATO has an opportunity to make cooperation its center of gravity once again by making it a clear political priority. One model for this is the 2014 Wales summit, at which allies agreed to the Defence Investment Pledge to spend at least 2 percent of their GDP on defense by 2024. A new cooperation pledge may provide the same political impetus and accountability that contributed to increased spending levels.
+
+NATO allies should put as much emphasis on the need for European defense cooperation as they have on European defense spending. This shift could be significant for the United States given its diplomatic clout and its traditional wariness of European defense industrial cooperation.
+
+__Champion Success, Name and Shame Failure__
+
+Another strategy for normalizing cooperation in European defense is championing success stories while naming and shaming failure. With 18 projects and new members joining regularly, this approach to NATO’s High Visibility Projects (HVPs) has seen some success. However, there is a difference between new projects and those that have delivered results: the latter should be the focus of any high-visibility campaigns. The success stories of European defense cooperation are not widely known, and in some cases the data do not exist.
+
+Publicly reporting on defense spending data can also change norms by encouraging good behavior and calling out bad. This makes nations more accountable to each other and their citizens. Both NATO and the European Union already do so annually, but their approach is limited in three ways.
+
+First, the EDA’s figures are anonymized in its annual defense data report, which undermines their utility to both champion success and name and shame failure. Considering the attributed data can be accessed elsewhere on the EDA’s website and that NATO already attributes much of the same data annually, this anachronism should be corrected to unlock the benefits of sharing performance data and enhance transparency.
+
+Second, both the European Union and NATO should report accurately on cooperative spending. EU figures are misleading because only half of the member states report their data. NATO should adopt the same practice as the EDA and report on cooperative spending while maintaining attribution.
+
+Third, both NATO and the European Union should be more creative when reporting on levels of cooperation: spending data are far from the only measure and may be misleading. Other indicators would complement spending data and give a fuller picture, such as national cooperation policies, cooperative treaties, participation in multinational formations, equipment standardization levels, and NATO standardization agreement compliance.
+
+__Encourage Cooperation through Leadership__
+
+Leadership is important in overcoming collective action problems. All groups have leaders who are willing to bear the costs for reasons of status, history, strategic culture, and so on. Leaders can encourage cooperation in two main ways: through demonstrative leadership or by removing the burdens of cooperation for others.
+
+Demonstrative leadership requires nations to assume group leadership roles or lead by example. Exemplar behavior could be expanded or replicated. Examples of nations that have prioritized and implemented cooperation include the Franco-German brigade, German-Netherlands tank battalion, Belgian-Netherlands naval cooperation, Benelux joint air policing, UK-France Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF), and UK “international by design” policy.
+
+In contrast to the European Union’s PESCO projects, NATO’s 18 HVPs do not have appointed leaders, only participants. NATO should appoint lead nations to realize the collective action benefits of leaders. Leadership effects can also be exploited within international institutions. For example, NATO and the European Union could appoint senior officials charged with increasing cooperation levels, while a European Centre of Excellence for cooperation could share best practices among nations.
+
+Leadership can also remove the burden of cooperation from others to encourage cooperation or mitigate perceived risks, such as Baltic air policing or support to Ukraine. Provision of security assurances can also encourage nations to cooperate, while larger nations can help cover short-term gaps for smaller nations while cooperative solutions come to fruition. This form of leadership also helps solve the specialization dilemma and could unlock the division of labor potential in European defense.
+
+#### Principle 3: Incentivize cooperation (or discourage fragmentation)
+
+A third principle for overcoming the cooperation problem in European defense is to incentivize good behavior using carrots or deter bad behavior using sticks. These can be implemented by a central authority or by social mechanisms such as rules and norms. Carrots and sticks should be designed for two purposes: to consolidate either the fragmented supply or demand of European defense cooperation.
+
+__Consolidate Demand__
+
+Josep Borrell explains the need to consolidate demand: “We need a reliable production capacity. But a reliable production capacity in the field of defence requires also a reliable demand.” The main way to consolidate fragmented demand is through collective approaches to setting strategy and military requirements, such as through NATO and the European Union. However, current cooperation levels suggest the existing approaches to demand consolidation are not meeting their potential.
+
+These could be improved in two ways: setting multinational targets and using small groups to catalyze cooperation. First, defense planning capability targets are currently set on a default national basis by NATO and the European Union. This misses the opportunity to bake in consolidated demand from the outset and should be reversed: capability targets should be multinational by default and national by exception. For NATO, these changes could be instigated at the forthcoming Vilnius summit in July.
+
+Second, small groups may present an untapped resource for consolidating demand on a geographical or functional basis (see above). To take advantage of this potential, small groups should be made a focal point for cooperation, both within NATO and the European Union and through their own forums.
+
+Other avenues for demand consolidation include finding ways to incentivize the following:
+
+- the long-term benefits of defense cooperation
+
+- national specialization in specific capabilities or industrial expertise
+
+- pooling and sharing to realize economies of scale
+
+- improvements in interoperability and standardization
+
+__Consolidate Supply__
+
+There are three main ways to consolidate supply on the European defense market. The simplest is to reduce the institutional friction involved in cooperation to make multinational solutions more viable through dedicated structures for joint procurement or multinational formations. The most demanding way to consolidate supply is to create a single market for defense equipment — an approach that is unlikely to become politically viable any time soon.
+
+A third way to consolidate the fragmented supply in European defense is to design structural incentives and regulation to reduce market inefficiency. Both the European Union and NATO have unique tools to generate such incentives.
+
+As a political and economic union with financial and regulatory levers at its disposal, the European Union is uniquely positioned to incentivize cooperative supply in Europe. Given the “limited or even non-existent impact” of previous regulation intended to discourage national sourcing, the European Union in recent years has turned to economic incentives, including the EDF and other new and prospective initiatives.
+
+However, given the state of European defense cooperation, the only question is whether these new incentives will be enough to overcome the powerful political incentives that work against cooperation. Several expert assessments suggest not. A cursory look at the numbers supports their case. But how much is enough? According to think tank experts Max Bergmann and Benjamin Haddad, as much as €100 billion in EU borrowing is needed to overcome the severe obstacles to cooperation. This figure is around the same level as that already provided in emergency assistance for Ukraine.
+
+NATO has two types of economic incentives to encourage cooperation among allies: joint funding and common funding. Joint funding enables groups of allies to set up frameworks or agencies that NATO has political oversight over and runs on their behalf. A recent example designed to incentivize R&D cooperation is the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA), which is complemented by a €1 billion innovation fund. As with the European Union’s incentive schemes, the amount of funding is modest. Now that the model is established, NATO leaders should increase innovation funding at the Vilnius summit. The DIANA model could also be applied elsewhere, such as by incentivizing participation in HVPs, through a joint cooperation fund. The fund could also be designed with a bias toward initiatives that address European gaps with European solutions and could become a focal point for NATO-EU cooperation.
+
+The second economic tool NATO has for incentivizing cooperation is common funding, through which allies pool resources to provide alliance-wide goods. Several in-service and capability development projects already prove the effectiveness of common funding to enable and encourage cooperation. However, there is only one commonly funded HVP: the Multinational Multirole Tanker Transport project. This commonly funded, “cooperative by design” approach should become the default option for addressing common capability gaps identified by the NATO defense planning process. This would require a much larger common funding budget and extensive negotiation given the disparate views on the matter. Nevertheless, it could be put on the table at Vilnius. In the meantime, allies could review which HVPs are candidates for common funding.
+
+
+### Success Factors
+
+The previous section applied principles for solving collective action problems to help overcome the challenges of European defense cooperation. This section surveys lessons from the literature on past examples of cooperation to identify key factors for success. It is worth noting the issue of what makes European defense cooperation initiatives more or less likely to succeed has not been widely studied.
+
+These success factors may be divided into two types: endogenous (internally caused) and exogenous (externally caused). Both are summarized in Figure 3.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 3: Endogenous and exogenous factors in European defense cooperation.__ Source: Author’s analysis._
+
+
+### Endogenous Factors
+
+The following endogenous factors are divided into four core factors and three enabling factors. The core factors for successful defense cooperation are as follows:
+
+- __Trust and solidarity.__ Trust and solidarity are “the basis for success” but must be developed over time. The sovereignty barrier to cooperation is not insurmountable but does not give way easily. Practical measures can help generate both, such as the delegation of authority arrangements in the EATC, the legal basis of the UK-France CJEF, and the JEF’s common policy directive and opt-in model. Building trust and confidence is easier with fewer nations participating, though the number of participants is related to the type of cooperation.
+
+- __Shared strategic culture and like-mindedness.__ Strategic culture, geography, and linguistic and cultural proximity have also been shown to play a part in emerging clusters of cooperation — for example, within PESCO. Like-mindedness (shared conceptions, policies, and priorities) has played a role in several initiatives, including the JEF. However, this factor is “important, not crucial” because nations who do not share strategic cultures can still cooperate effectively together. In fact, cooperative initiatives — particularly joint military formations — often develop a shared mindset, or esprit de corps, of their own.
+
+- __Clear goals and serious intent.__ According to one study, “All case studies confirm the importance of this factor.” A CSIS study shows that successful projects can satisfy a range of goals, whether political, operational, or economic — as long as they are agreed to early on. If it is true “governments that take defence seriously . . . will be more inclined to co-operate than others,” those nations most committed to investing in their defense will be the best candidates for cooperative projects — and vice versa.
+
+- __Military-strategic symmetry.__ Having forces of similar size and quality is important for cooperation but is “not a golden rule.” This factor is related to establishing trust, being like-minded, and agreeing on shared goals. One important aspect of symmetry is defense planning alignment, which goes hand in hand with the deepest forms of cooperation. Regardless of symmetry, standardization and interoperability act as “multipliers for cooperation” through aligning concepts, doctrine, and equipment standards.
+
+The following factors indirectly enable cooperation rather than secure success:
+
+- __A level playing field for defense industry.__ Defense industry protectionism undermines the prospects for cooperation because it reduces the chances of joint procurements or cross-border collaboration and erodes trust. Another challenge is the mixed role of the U.S. industry in European defense.
+
+- __The role of institutions.__ International institutions and regimes — whether formal (e.g., NATO or the European Union) or informal (e.g., minilateral groups) — are designed to overcome many of the barriers to cooperation. Institutions also enable the collective action benefits of large groups, such as increased resources or coalitions of the willing. However, bottom-up cooperative initiatives can be just as viable as top-down initiatives driven by institutions — both are needed.
+
+- __Cost savings.__ Economic factors are often critical to the political argument for justifying cooperation in the first place. This argument is generally one of cost savings and efficiency. For example, the European Sky Shield air defense initiative purports to offer “a flexible and scalable way for nations to strengthen their deterrence and defence in an efficient and cost-effective way.”
+
+
+### Exogenous Factors
+
+Endogenous factors are an important limitation and enabler for the prospects of European defense cooperation. However, external factors often trump internal ones. History shows the power of exogenous forces and shocks in shaping the environment and the policies that result.
+
+This point is made in the context of European defense in a RAND report on European strategic autonomy, which concludes that “EU-led initiatives in pursuit of European strategic autonomy in defence are important, but its shape will also be determined by external influences.” This effect can be seen in European defense spending levels, which rose significantly after Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea and in the context of an isolationist president in the United States.
+
+Example exogenous factors that may influence the prospects for European defense cooperation over the next decade include the following:
+
+- the global economic outlook
+
+- the war in Ukraine
+
+- levels of regional and global aggression and conflict
+
+- the policies of revisionist actors, such as Russia and China
+
+- the policy of key allies such as the United States (toward Europe and regarding European defense in particular), the United Kingdom, and Turkey (regarding EU defense)
+
+- the credibility and policies of NATO
+
+- unknown future shocks and surprises
+
+
+### Types of Defense Cooperation
+
+There are many different types of defense cooperation. This final section outlines a typology for understanding the landscape of defense cooperation.
+
+The wide variety of cooperation types gives European defense leaders a range of options to boost cooperation. Knowing this fact may help overcome the challenges of European defense cooperation as leaders may tailor initiatives to the specific situation and constraints of the participants.
+
+The typology is based on four characteristics of cooperation, shown in Figure 4:
+
+1. __Form:__ Form refers to the structure of cooperation, from loose association to tight integration. Forms depend on the degree of participant interdependence.
+
+2. __Function:__ Function refers to the purpose of cooperation, from establishing joint military units to the joint procurement of capability.
+
+3. __Venue:__ Cooperation occurs through formal multilateral institutions (such as NATO and the European Union), small groups (minilateral), or bilateral relationships.
+
+4. __Benefit:__ Cooperation has political, economic, and military benefits. The benefits of defense cooperation depend on its nature and may provide various benefits. For example, multinational military units may provide more military or political than economic benefit, while joint procurements may yield more economic benefit.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 4: The Four Characteristics of Defense Cooperation.__ Source: Author’s analysis based on multiple sources._
+
+
+### Conclusion: Now or Never
+
+Europe has a defense dilemma: it is spending more on defense but cooperating less. This is despite three decades of flagship political initiatives designed to improve European defense cooperation. There is no single reason for this failure. It is a result of a deep-seated collective action problem entrenched throughout the political, economic, and military dimensions of the European defense landscape.
+
+Equally, there is no silver bullet. Even the radical change in the threat environment since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine may be counterproductive if new defense spending is not directed toward European cooperation.
+
+Ultimately, the solution is simple: European capitals must prioritize cooperation over other objectives, though this is easier said than done. However, understanding the nature of the problem can inform the solutions in three ways.
+
+__First, conceptualizing European defense cooperation challenge as a collective action problem reveals three principles that European leaders and institutions can apply to overcome the challenges:__
+
+- Use the power of small groups
+
+- Take steps to normalize cooperation
+
+- Design mechanisms to incentivize cooperation and discourage fragmentation
+
+__Second, previous experience reveals internal and external factors that influence the prospects for cooperation.__ Endogenous factors include trust, like-mindedness, clear goals, and symmetry, alongside other enabling factors. Exogenous factors include external threats, the policies of key allies, and the unexpected shocks that so often shape international politics.
+
+__Finally, there are many different types of defense cooperation.__ Knowing this may help overcome the challenges of European defense cooperation, as initiatives can be tailored to the specific situation and constraints of the participants to provide European leaders with a range of options to boost cooperation.
+
+Europe has solved collective action problems before. The success of the European Union in embedding cooperation across a wide swath of European life, from its origins in the coal and steel community to recent advances in digital services laws, demonstrates the power of shared identity to overcome the constraints of national polices and borders. The same goes for NATO, an organization founded on the power of cooperation for the common good.
+
+Europe can solve its defense cooperation dilemma, but it needs to think big and act fast. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has provided a wake-up call for European leaders and the imperative they need to transform European defense. They cannot miss their moment: it is now or never.
+
+---
+
+__Sean Monaghan__ is a visiting fellow in the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, where he focuses on NATO, European security, and defense. His career as a civil servant in the UK Ministry of Defence has focused on international defense policy, including NATO, the European Union, and the United States.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-03-01-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-17.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-03-01-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-17.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..446618d2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-03-01-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-17.md
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第十七日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-03-01 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 李予信打泰拳受傷留院 押後續審 官提醒勿參與危險運動
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（1日）踏入審訊第17天。其中李予信因打泰拳，疑腦震盪留院，法官認為不能在被告缺席下繼續審訊，終決定押後，案件或於明午或周五早上再續。此外，代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel 表示控方昨天新呈800頁文件，包括3份有關證物鏈的證人供詞，其中一份為負責獲取新界西影片的證人陳鑫（音譯）。控方擬就其中一人申請匿名令，惟官着控方待李予信出庭再處理。法官陳仲衡一度提醒獲准保釋的被告，不要參與任何危險的運動，法官陳慶偉指「試想想這裡一天需要多少法律開支」，法官李運騰亦補充，不僅是律師，外面也有警察駐守，「我們說的是每天數百萬元」，相關做法似乎並不負責任。
+
+#### 撤口罩令首天 大部分被告無戴口罩
+
+今天是政府撤銷口罩令第一天，還柙的被告在開庭前陸續被帶往被告欄，除了梁國雄外，其餘還柙被告均沒有戴口罩，而看管他們的懲教人員卻有戴口罩。在延伸庭的8名列席認罪被告馮達浚、朱凱廸、梁晃維、譚凱邦、岑敖暉、黃之鋒、袁嘉蔚及吳敏兒，亦全沒有戴口罩，開庭前互相談笑。
+
+至於獲保釋的劉偉聰、楊雪盈、鄭達鴻、彭卓棋和陳志全庭上沒有戴口罩，黃碧雲、何啟明、施德來、柯耀林則有戴口罩。3名主審法官及大部份律師均沒有戴口罩。
+
+
+▲ 楊雪盈
+
+
+▲ 黃碧雲
+
+
+▲ 陳志全
+
+
+▲ 劉偉聰
+
+#### 李予信因泰拳受傷留院 官稱不能在被告缺席下繼續審訊
+
+甫開庭，代表李予信的大律師關文渭指，李在上周日（26日）玩泰拳期間受傷，疑受腦震盪，他如期出席周一（27日）的聆訊，但其間感到非常不適，亦有嘔吐，最終在昨日（28日）送往屯門醫院急症室治療，醫生囑他留院觀察，但李望法庭繼續審訊。
+
+法官李運騰一度形容，李予信在保釋期間參與「本來就危險」的運動，關文渭回應「所有運動都可以是危險」，法官陳慶偉則舉例不包括桌球和扔飛鏢，關文渭重申僅是意外。陳慶偉問及有否醫療證明，關引述醫院指要出院才能簽發，亦不肯定李現時情況或何時能上庭。
+
+法官李運騰認為，在沒有醫療證明下，不能單憑辯方的說法確定李予信情況，亦認為不能在被告缺席下繼續審訊。控方代表、副刑事檢控專員萬德豪表示會採取行動去確認辯方的資料是否正確，又指今日原訂在庭上讀出控辯雙方承認事實，而李予信早已同意了相關事實，理解辯方獲指示在李缺席的情況下繼續審訊。
+
+法官李運騰重申，不認為在被告缺席下繼續審訊是合適做法，認為應押後。關文渭指，會嘗試要求主診醫生簽發醫療證明，並理解李予信已轉至觀察病房。法官陳慶偉決定，今天不會繼續聆訊，並着各方今午通知法庭李予信的狀況，以決定明午是否如常開庭，並暫定星期五早上續審。
+
+#### 何桂藍大狀稱昨收3份新證人供詞 控方欲為其中一人申匿名令
+
+代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel 其後指，昨天收到控方800頁新文件，包括已核證的英文譯本，以及5項新材料，其中有3份新的證人供詞，均與證物鏈相關，包括負責獲取新界西相關影片的證人陳鑫（音譯）、TVB助理新聞製作總經理葉炳棠和另一負責搜證的警員。Beel 指，3人供詞均於案件開審後，分別於2月21日、23日及13日才錄取，表示幾乎從未聽聞這樣的情況，又強調該些供詞應一早準備好（“All these statements should be taken long time before.”）。
+
+法官李運騰續指，他亦尚未有機會閱讀該些供詞，並表示他與 Beel 有同樣不滿（“I share your dissatisfaction.”），亦認為有關證物鏈的證據，理應在很早以前便處理好（“... should be obtained long long time ago.”），但認為 Beel 現時仍有時間考慮。
+
+散庭前，控方代表萬德豪欲替剛才 Beel 所提及的其中一名證人申請匿名令，惟遭法官陳慶偉打斷，指待李予信出庭才處理。據了解，另外兩項新材料涉何桂藍 Facebook 內容及抗爭派記者會片段謄本。
+
+#### 官提醒被告勿參與危險運動：試想想這裡一天需要多少法律開支
+
+此外，法官陳仲衡特意提醒獲准保釋的被告們，不要參與任何危險的運動（“Please don’t engage in any dangerous sports.”）。法官李運騰補充，本案牽涉很多律師和人士，似乎亦不是負責任的做法（“... doesn’t seem very responsible either, given the number of counsels and people involved in this case.”）。法官陳慶偉亦指，「試想想這裡一天需要多少法律開支（“Think about the legal expenses for one day here.”）」，李運騰再補充，不僅是律師，外面也有警察駐守，「我們說的是每天數百萬元。」（“Not only about number of counsels, but number of police officers deployed outside, we are talking about millions of dollars everyday.”）
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
+
+### 列席認罪被告全被安排於延伸庭就坐
+
+審訊不設陪審團，由3名國安法指定法官陳慶偉、李運騰及陳仲衡審理。控方代表為副刑事檢控專員萬德豪及周天行，辯方代表包括資深大律師潘熙、大律師沈士文、張耀良、黃宇逸、關文渭、馬維騉、盧敏儀、石書銘、黃廷光、Trevor Beel 等，本身是大律師的劉偉聰則自辯。
+
+不認罪被告包括獲准保釋的鄭達鴻、楊雪盈、彭卓棋、何啟明、劉偉聰、黃碧雲、施德來、陳志全、柯耀林、李予信10人，及還柙的何桂藍、吳政亨、鄒家成、林卓廷、梁國雄及余慧明6人。
+
+列席認罪被告包括馮達浚、朱凱廸、梁晃維、譚凱邦、岑敖暉、黃之鋒、袁嘉蔚及吳敏兒，全被安排在延伸庭就坐。
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-03-01-ukraines-upstream-capability.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-03-01-ukraines-upstream-capability.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c8b5ddd7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-03-01-ukraines-upstream-capability.md
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Ukraine’s Upstream Capability
+author: William George and Patrick Hinton
+date : 2023-03-01 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/QhuYBre.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_As territory, towns and cities captured at great cost are liberated, there are numerous reasons why Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is experiencing ongoing struggles. These span the levels of conflict and range from strategic miscalculation and a centralised command structure inherently unable to adapt and react to poorly conceived and executed operational plans to tactical errors._ _All have contributed to the prolongation of what Vladimir Putin had seemingly planned as a short ‘special military operation’ into the first mass mobilisation of the Russian population since World War II and continued escalation. From the Western perspective there have been lessons to draw from the conflict and the Ukrainian armed forces’ robust defence of their sovereign soil._
+
+The tenacity of Ukraine’s troops has been buoyed by an influx of modern weaponry from NATO and the West since the Russian invasion began in February 2022. But preceding these important imports was a coherent package of support to the Ukrainian defence and security sector from the UK and its allies, which began in 2014 and – at the time of writing – appears to represent a successful case of upstream capacity building and investment that contrasts sharply with the chaotic collapse of Western support in Afghanistan. Does such an approach provide a model for future defence engagement activity or is there a danger of drawing premature conclusions from an ongoing war? And do we risk being too selfcongratulatory by linking our support with the successes of those unified in their fight for the survival of Ukraine as a nation state?
+
+Perhaps the first question to consider though is why the British Army should occupy itself with such endeavours? The answer to which should be relatively fresh in Western military minds – capacity building aims to avoid the messy outcomes often associated with peacekeeping and stabilisation operations. As Nilsson and Zetterlund write: “Fragile countries are to be strengthened so that they can shoulder their own problems, thereby reducing the need for international assistance”. The paradigm of capacity building is not without issue. It is poorly defined and can range from a short, simple training course in a specific skill through to a multi-departmental effort orchestrated over months or years with significant resource. It can span a broad spectrum of activities – from short-term training teams through to institutional reform. The selection of the capacity to be built is important. Indeed, “building the ‘wrong’ capacity or strengthening the ‘wrong’ actors might make a conflict even worse”. Capacity building is similar to security force assistance, although is generally considered to have a wider remit where force footprints are small and often focused on basic tactical training.
+
+
+### POST-CRIMEA COMMITMENT
+
+The expansion of the UK’s commitment to the development of Ukraine’s defence and security sector began in earnest after the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014. There were two significant strands to this: Operation Orbital – the provision of training and support to the Ukrainian armed forces (primarily in the land domain) and assistance, afforded to the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine and wider government, in implementing security sector reforms. In summary, the blend of tactical training and equipping the Ukrainian armed forces was paired with the longerterm institutional changes required at the operational and strategic levels. These efforts complemented both the NATO-led assistance to the country as an enhanced NATO partner nation and unilateral engagement. Ukraine has been part of the US National Guard State Partnership programme since 1993. This offers, among other training opportunities, low level non-commissioned officer leadership training. The surge of the UK efforts since 2014 came during a period of increased focus on what the Chief of the General Staff at the time outlined as defence engagement, one pillar of which was the development of regional capacity to enable security concerns to be dealt with by their respective regional governments. This built on concepts first articulated in the Strategic Defence and Security Review in 2010, which viewed Defence playing a key role in early, upstream capacity building to preventthe causes of conflict.
+
+___`“Operation Orbital deployed in 2015 with a focus on training, mentoring and advising local military personnel and with the intent to improve the capacity and capability of the Ukrainian armed forces on a sustainable basis.”`___
+
+Following a similar model to previous training missions (including in Afghanistan), Operation Orbital deployed in 2015 with a focus on training, mentoring and advising local military personnel and with the intent to improve the capacity and capability of the Ukrainian armed forces on a sustainable basis. By February of last year, more than 22,000 Ukrainian troops had received British training. A subsequent focus on planning, operations and low-level leadership assisted in the development of a cadre of well trained, tactically astute officers and soldiers capable of planning coherent military activity at the tactical level supported by and set within an operational framework. This was in tandem with NATO and other unilateral support to Ukraine, with multi-national training teams regular visitors to the country.
+
+
+
+Concurrently, pre-dating the recommendations of the Integrated Review, Operation Orbital was enhanced by UK support to theUkrainian Ministry of Defence and other government departments to drive security sector reform and improve areas such as procurement that had previously been open to corruption. The increased workload in Ukraine was supported by a reinforced defence section, employed within the embassy in Kyiv, further improving and exploiting efforts from the Ministry of Defence, Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office and partners across government. This encapsulated the all-encompassing, whole of government approach to national security later detailed in the 2021 Integrated Review. It is partly this exploitation of existing synergies of the work completed by partners across government that have made the capacity building in Ukraine a comparative success and potentially a useful model for further upstream projects.
+
+
+### WHAT LESSONS CAN WE LEARN?
+
+The models currently in use for engagement activity (such as the Methods of Effect model) place the emphasis on what activity we will undertake in a given country and how we measure its effectiveness. There is less attention paid to the underlying suitability of a country or understanding if the model used is the correct one for the circumstances prevalent in that country. The war in Ukraine has been one of national survival with the majority of society united in its determination to expel the Russian invaders, a unifying factor that has undoubtedly played a significant part in the defence of their homeland. The fight has been in many ways a conventional, metal-on-metal battle rather than a counter-insurgency conflict (as some commentators considered it would develop into). The government and military have acted in tandem with a united and obvious intent, and Ukraine has welcomed efforts to develop its capacity and supported them internally. In previous upstream capacity building efforts this has not always been the case, with the Clausewitzian trinity of the political, the military and the public bodies divided and disconnected.
+
+___`“The government and military have acted in tandem with a united and obvious intent, and Ukraine has welcomed efforts to develop its capacity and supported them internally. In previous upstream capacity building efforts this has not always been the case.”`___
+
+Logistics have also been relatively straightforward. For the UK and many other European nations, it has been comparatively simple to move massed materiel across the Continent – although this supply chain is now being severely tested as the battle continues. The unity of the Ukrainian response and the country’s relative proximity should not, however, detract from what has been a coherent, layered and connected example of defence overseas engagement working to develop capacity and capability.
+
+
+
+Of course, if the aim of upstream capacity building is delivering sustainable peace and stability, then it could be argued that the evolution of the Crimea crisis into a wider, conventional war suggests that international endeavours in Ukraine have been in vain. To do so would be harsh, given the Kremlin’s true intent towards Ukraine has gained significant clarity since 2014 and the limited options open to dissuade Putin from his current course, and should not deter the UK from continued investment in capacity building across the globe. Equally, the fruits of the multi-layered capacity building labour are clear. The enduring presence from 2014 to prior to the Russian invasion of last year has assisted in Ukraine’s defence. The basic measure of effectiveness with a desired end state of a capable and resilient Ukrainian Armed Forces and security sector has been achieved. It is Russia’s ongoing struggle against this capable, determined resistance that will have a deterrent effect. This effect demonstrates part of the utility of capacity building and other activities that fall under the defence engagement concept.
+
+
+
+___`“The vision is to enable the Ukrainians to export parts of the programme and deliver them domestically. This is a key point for capacity building. It should not be entirely transactional from the donor to the partner nations.”`___
+
+The conflict also raises questions about the effectiveness of the UK’s and NATO’s deterrence posture. Russia was not deterred by economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure or the limited presence in Ukraine of UK, NATO and Western allies in a training capacity. Indeed, the presence of Western force elements could have played into Moscow’s narrative of NATO encroachment and confrontation with Russia. This narrative has been amplified during the conflict with the Kremlin pushing its perception of a battle between Russia and the West both internally and increasingly across the global south. Although the deterrence measures taken prior to the conflict failed on several fronts this should not lead to an abandonment of the concept. What does deter aggression is a capable opposing force able to inflict damage and sustain a defence. In Ukraine, this form of capable deterrence has been further enhanced by the rapid influx of advanced, Western weaponry that has been used to inflict punishment on the attacker. A lesson and deterrent, perhaps, for future aggressors. In a hark back to the proxy wars of the Cold Warera, Ukraine is now awash with a spectrum of capabilities from Western allies.
+
+The UK’s cross-governmental approach and close liaison with international partners such as NATO has partly realised the vision of the Integrated Review for a coherent approach to upstream capacity building to promote stability. It is this, working alongside a united, legitimate political body with popular support, that provides a potential template for future capacity building efforts and highlights the benefits of UK investment after the debacle of withdrawal from Afghanistan. Our continued training engagement through Operation Interflex – the successor to Operation Orbital outlined below – assists in what must be a capability interoperability and integration-atspeed issue for the Ukrainian armed forces.
+
+
+### OP INTERFLEX
+
+British forces left Ukraine only days before the Russian invasion. The following months saw partner nations begin to send equipment to Ukraine and devise other packages of support along several lines of effort. In June 2022, whilst on a visit to Kyiv, then-UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson announced a major programme to train Ukrainian soldiers. This announcement developed into Operation Interflex – an endeavour that has seen Ukrainian troops trained by the British Army and partners in the United Kingdom, with a stated aim of training 10,000 soldiers every 120 days. The threeweek package covers basic infantry skills such as marksmanship, medical training and cybersecurity and partner nations such as Australia and New Zealand, as well as representatives from members of the Joint Expeditionary Forces, including Estonia and Denmark, have lent expertise to the effort.
+
+An event hosted by the Royal United Services Institute and attended by representatives from Land Operations Command and 5th Battalion, The Rifles in November provided a number of insights on Interflex. After the initial rotations, the course was increased from three to five weeks as a result of the feedback loop received from units returning to Ukraine. The syllabus would be familiar to anyone who has undergone initial military training, although it is possible to see the influence of the specific conflict being prepared for. The course includes teaching on the law of armed conflict, trench warfare, marksmanship, section defence and urban training.
+
+As well as the five-week basic combat course, a second five-week junior leadership course aimed at junior non-commissioned officers and sergeants has been taking place. This concentration added command and leadership training as well as the military decision-making process. Soldiers are given instruction on how to coach marksmanship, complete commanders’ checks, are drilled in simulated mounted tactics and receive counterunmanned aircraft systems training. The vision is to enable the Ukrainians to export parts of the programme and deliver them domestically. This is a key point for capacity building. It should not be entirely transactional from the donor to the partner nations.
+
+Measuring the effect of such efforts can be difficult. Indeed, Western forces have been involved in other capacity building enterprises which have not been successful. Both Iraq and Afghanistan offer examples of vast investment in time and resource where the trained forces have not stood up to scrutiny. Both forces quickly capitulated in the face of Islamic State and the Taliban respectively, leaving Western forces embarrassed. Recent analysis has looked to determine the reasons for this issue. As Robinson argues, the gap between the imported army concepts and recipient culture was vast. The leading power brokers in both states did not want to create the liberal moderate state of Western peace builders’ imagination, and therefore the military transformation was out of step with that of the civilian sector. Ukraine, on the other hand, is more closely aligned with European sensibilities, both geographically and culturally. Indeed, anecdotal evidence from soldiers who have returned to the front after receiving British training is positive. In one example, a subsection of a Ukrainian unit that repulsed a Russian assault was asked by their commander about the source of their tactical knowledge. “This is what we were taught to do in UK training,” came the response. Another front-line Ukrainian commander whose unit took part in the Battle of Kherson stated that “we are delighted with the high level of preparedness of soldiers we are receiving from the United Kingdom who have been trained by Op Interflex”. Of course, it is unlikely that the Ukrainians would publicly admit that the training was not having the desired effect so some of the praise may also have some value in encouraging partners to keep up support. However, capacity building has its limits. There was never a chance that Orbital would put Ukraine on a peer level with Russia and as such, NATO support has been, and – without a finish line in sight – will continue to be necessary going forward. This speaks to the importance of drawing a clear end point to efforts, rather than becoming stuck as permanent trainers to a population for extended periods.
+
+
+### OTHER BEST PRACTICE
+
+The conflict in Ukraine has offered other examples of successful capacity building which might provide a model to build upon. Professional military education is one such area, and one that often does not receive the same level of coverage as combat training. The Defence Education Enhancement Programme is a joint US-NATO endeavour to professionalise the officer and noncommissioned officer corps of partner nations, and first came into being in 2007. It aims to establish “effective, self-sustaining defence institutions” and the Ukrainian chapter became the largest in the world in 2013. These efforts to “help the Ukrainian military transform from a rigid centralised Russianstyle operational decision-making process to one where junior and mid-level leaders are expected to take initiative on the battlefield” have been credited with enabling Ukraine’s forces to operate with an agility and dynamism absent from their adversaries.
+
+
+
+Sustainment is another area which has received attention during the conflict. US European Command and the Institute for Security Governance, part of the US Defence Security Cooperation University, began a programme in 2016 to help Ukraine establish effective sustainment planning protocols. US support to Ukraine was such that it overwhelmed the Ukrainian ability to incorporate repair and sustainment into its own organic capability. As a result, the US had to cover this burden, which in turn sapped resource from providing new equipment and support. Among the success stories is the pilot effort to improve domestic sustainment of the high mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicle (or Humvee as it is more commonly nown). Initiatives included servicing centres, developing maintenance manuals and creating a mobile repair unit. Since the invasion in 2022, this issue has become exacerbated with a plethora of weaponry and equipment flooding into Ukraine. Indeed, byone analysis, the Ukrainian armed forces are operating 14 different artillery systems, “each with distinct maintenance and ammunition requirements, creating a tangle of logistics challenges”. This reinforces the importance of having institutions which have the capacity to absorb such increases in burden.
+
+
+
+These two examples are useful to stress the importance of institutional capacity building over simply running training courses. Attempting the former is rife with vulnerabilities and each scenario will require a bespoke approach which takes heed of culture, history, and the complexities of organisational change programmes. It is also important to consider civilian elements of capacity building, as it is not purely a military sport. The Polish Medical Mission – a non-governmental organisation – provided bespoke deliveries of medical equipment to 50 hospitals from June to December 2022. Crucially, the logistic chains required to support deliveries to hard-to-reach areas in a conflict zone are now developed and remain established so they can be used going forward. Israel, which has received some criticism for not supporting Ukraine with military equipment, provides another example. A civilian-run field hospital was deployed to Ukraine for six weeks in the spring of 2022. The facility provided battlefield care but also prioritised wider local capacity building, delivering training in a variety of techniques to circa 800 Ukrainian medical personnel. The capacity to treat wounded people and return them to the fight is vital and is an area of expertise in which the British Army is highly skilled and experienced.
+
+
+### CONCLUSION
+
+Upstream capacity building offers a means by which the British Army can contribute to peace and security, advance the vision of Global Britain and make use of its deep and well-developed experience throughout the defence lines of development – from doctrine development, sustainment and combat training to professional education and medical knowledge. The ongoing example of Ukraine shows the utility of long-term commitment to a force to provide vital capacity with which to counter aggression. It has also shown how resource intensive successful capacity building can be, and there is no end in sight to the support currently being given. This may become unpalatable to decision makers as time goes on.
+
+The example of Ukraine also provides a useful distinction from the seemingly failed attempts to build armies in Iraq and Afghanistan. Rebuilding military forces and attempting to forge a functioning state with imported idealshas been proven to be a losing mission. Conversely, Ukraine’s cultural similarities and relative stability appear to have afforded the atmosphere necessary for successful capacity building. It is difficult to conclusively prove the correlation/causation link between capacity building activities and the effectiveness of a country’s armed forces but there is clear evidence of an enhancement of Ukraine’s military prowess. Whether attributable in part to multinational efforts or not, there is plenty of progress to be seen when you compare the events of 2014, when a much smaller Russian force was able to achieve its objectives largely unchallenged, to today’s well-orchestrated defence and counter-offensive operations.
+
+---
+
+__William George__ is the Chief of the General Staff’s Visiting Fellow at Chatham House, and holds an MA in International Relations. His primary area of research is Russian information warfare.
+
+__Patrick Hinton__ is the Chief of the General Staff’s Visiting Fellow in the Military Sciences Research Group at RUSI. Patrick has an MA in International Relations from the University of Staffordshire and an MBA from the University of Warwick.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-03-01-us-dutch-japanese-semicon.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-03-01-us-dutch-japanese-semicon.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c039113d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-03-01-us-dutch-japanese-semicon.md
@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : U.S.-Dutch-Japanese Semicon.
+author: Gregory C. Allen and Emily Benson
+date : 2023-03-01 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/dEsk6Of.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Clues to the U.S.-Dutch-Japanese Semiconductor Export Controls Deal Are Hiding in Plain Sight"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_On October 7, 2022, the Biden administration upended more than two decades of U.S. trade policy toward China when it issued sweeping new regulations on U.S. exports to China of advanced artificial intelligence (AI) and semiconductor technology. These export controls were designed after consultation with key U.S. allies, but the U.S. originally implemented them unilaterally._
+
+
+
+This was a major diplomatic gamble.
+
+In the face of rapidly advancing Chinese AI and semiconductor capabilities, the United States wanted to move fast, so it was willing to take the risk of moving first alone. The United States has the strongest overall position in the global semiconductor industry, and it was by itself strong enough to reshape the Chinese semiconductor industry in the short term. Over the medium to long term, however, this move could have backfired disastrously if other countries, particularly Japan and the Netherlands, moved to fill the gaps in the Chinese market that the partial U.S. exit left.
+
+But that is not going to happen. In late January 2023, the Biden administration’s gamble paid off when the United States secured a deal with both the Netherlands and Japan to join in the new semiconductor export controls. Some officials suggested to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) that the result of the dialogues is better characterized as an “understanding” rather than a formal deal, as some details have yet to be worked out. Regardless, the United States has secured the top three international partners needed to ensure the policy’s success. Taiwan had already made a public announcement that it would support enforcement of the October 7 regulation’s application of the U.S. Foreign Direct Product (FDP) rule.
+
+However, the exact contours of the deal with the Netherlands and Japan are not yet publicly known. China has aggressively used trade restrictions in the past as a coercive and punitive tool of foreign policy, and all parties to the deal remain tight-lipped, likely in the hopes that this will diminish China’s appetite for retaliation. No doubt the White House would love to have had a big photo-op signing ceremony to show how its gamble on allied diplomacy paid off, but the Biden administration has remained remarkably leak-proof on the topic. The lack of leaks is happening for the same reason the administration was able to pull the deal off: they take allies’ concerns — including a desire for secrecy — seriously.
+
+Thus, journalists and semiconductor companies have struggled in vain over the past few weeks to gain clarity on the elements of the deal. The full details are unlikely to be known until the Dutch and Japanese governments publish their updated export controls regulations, which will take months. In the case of Dutch export controls, some types of policy changes might never be published at all, such as changing the policy for reviewing certain types of export license applications from “case by case” to “presumption of denial.”
+
+In the meantime, however, there are plenty of clues to the deal’s contents from a careful analysis of three elements: (1) the role that Dutch and Japanese companies play in the global semiconductor value chain, (2) the revealed policy preferences of the Biden administration based on the content of the October 7 regulations, and (3) the nature of the underlying legal authorities that constitute the Dutch export controls system. This paper addresses each in turn.
+
+
+### The Role of Dutch and Japanese Companies in the Global Semiconductor Value Chain
+
+The semiconductor value chain includes three major segments: chip design, fabrication (i.e., chip wafer manufacturing), and assembly and testing. See Figure 1 for a simplified depiction.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 1: Simplified Depiction of the Semiconductor Value Chain.__ Source: Authors’ own creation._
+
+The United States has the strongest overall position in the global semiconductor industry, but that is as a leader of a deeply interwoven multinational value chain in which other countries also play critical roles and possess technological capabilities that are extremely difficult to replace. The October 7 export controls restricted U.S. sales across multiple segments of the value chain, but the lynchpin of the entire policy is the fact that U.S. semiconductor manufacturing equipment is an essential part of nearly every single Chinese chip factory. There are multiple categories of equipment — such as deposition, etching, and process control — in which U.S. companies are either exclusive or dominant suppliers, and China’s domestic semiconductor equipment industry is tiny and generally far behind that of the United States. The regulations identified 11 specific types of advanced semiconductor equipment (equipment that is only used for producing advanced chips) where there is no foreign substitute for U.S. technology. Some of these equipment types are among the most complicated and precise machines used anywhere in the global economy. Each represents an extremely tall technology mountain that China must climb to reach its goal of a self-sufficient semiconductor industry.
+
+The United States moved first for two reasons: First, to move fast. Chinese chip companies were purchasing equipment as quickly as they could in anticipation of future export controls. Second, the United States wanted to prove that it was not going to ask allies to bear any costs that it was unwilling to bear itself. The long-term success of the policy required multilateral cooperation, most urgently from the Netherlands and Japan.
+
+The Biden administration correctly assessed that the United States was, by itself, strong enough to reshape the Chinese semiconductor industry in the short term. However, Dutch and Japanese companies possess advanced technological capabilities in highly related disciplines. Whereas it would have likely taken China, by itself, decades to replace the equipment that the United States is no longer willing to sell, assistance from the Netherlands or Japan could have had China back up and running in as little as a year or two.
+
+The global semiconductor manufacturing equipment industry has seen ever-increasing market consolidation as the cost and complexity of remaining competitive at the state of the art has soared. For the equipment categories in which the United States is dominant, Dutch and Japanese companies have increasingly found head-to-head competition with U.S. firms unattractive. It would have taken Dutch and Japanese companies billions or tens of billions of dollars in research and development (R&D) costs to produce products that might capture only meager and highly unprofitable market share. However, the October 7 export controls could have changed that calculus. With U.S. companies prohibited from competing in the large and growing Chinese market, Dutch and Japanese companies might have found monopoly access to China attractive enough to justify the equipment R&D expense for new product lines to replace U.S. ones. Once successfully established in China, Dutch and Japanese companies might have been in a position to more effectively compete with and displace U.S. firms in these market niches around the world.
+
+___`Whereas it would have likely taken China, by itself, decades to replace the equipment that the United States is no longer willing to sell, assistance from the Netherlands or Japan could have had China back up and running in as little as a year or two.`___
+
+This is the policy disaster that the United States had to avoid at all costs: cutting off a key revenue source for U.S. companies, creating stronger international competitors to U.S. tech leadership, and having almost nothing to show for it in terms of affecting China’s military technology trajectory.
+
+But that is not the only thing that the United States wanted from the Netherlands and Japan in negotiations. Dutch and Japanese companies dominate additional categories of semiconductor manufacturing equipment that U.S. companies do not. In particular, they dominate the production of lithography equipment, the most advanced types of which rival the James Webb Space Telescope or Large Hadron Collider in terms of technological precision and complexity. In January 2021, the think tank Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) published a report on the global semiconductor value chain that argued:
+
+> The Netherlands, Japan, and a small number of other countries are the dominant producers of lithography equipment, critical for the production of chips and photomasks. China cannot produce any advanced lithography equipment. Most importantly, the Netherlands and Japan are exclusive providers of advanced photolithography equipment — especially extreme ultraviolet (EUV) scanners and secondarily argon fluoride (ArF) immersion scanners — necessary for mass-production of advanced chips, representing China’s top chokepoint.
+
+In other words, the United States maintains control of strong chokepoints for blocking China’s access to the future of AI and semiconductor technology, but the Dutch and Japanese chokepoints are even stronger.
+
+Combined, these facts suggest two primary goals that the United States sought in its deal with the Netherlands and Japan: (1) an agreement to prohibit Dutch and Japanese companies from backfilling the categories of semiconductor manufacturing equipment that the United States is no longer selling to China, and (2) an agreement to prohibit the Dutch and Japanese from exporting their advanced lithography equipment to China.
+
+Dutch companies are the world leaders in lithography steppers and scanners, which produce and refract the light that passes through a photomask (a transparent plate that contains the desired circuit pattern) to transfer that pattern to the silicon wafer. Japanese companies are the other major producers of steppers and scanners. In 2019, the two countries combined enjoyed more than 99 percent worldwide market share. Japan is also dominant in resist processing tools and electron beam lithography tools, which are critical for producing photomasks. Beyond lithography, there are other categories of semiconductor manufacturing equipment where Dutch and Japanese companies are also dominant — Japan in silicon wafer crystal machining equipment, for example — and Japan also excels in the production of the ultra-precise materials and ultra-pure chemicals that are used for semiconductor manufacturing.
+
+At least some of these other semiconductor technology categories were likely included in the deal. However, lithography equipment — including steppers and scanners, electron-beam tools, and resist processing tools — is the most important foreign technology dependence in the Chinese semiconductor industry, and sources with knowledge of the deal have confirmed to CSIS that restricting exports of advanced lithography equipment to China was included in the deal. As was an agreement to prevent backfilling of U.S. equipment.
+
+But knowing that these are the categories of items to control does not answer how they will be controlled. For that, a closer look is needed at how the October 7 policy is designed and what that suggests about the desired U.S. approach.
+
+
+### The Revealed Policy Preferences of the Biden Administration in the October 7 Regulations
+
+The publication of the October 7 regulations included a supplementary information section that detailed the rationale and justification for the regulations. In general, however, these justifications are geared toward explaining how the government’s actions are consistent with the legal authorities that it possesses. In particular, the justifications go into great detail to explain the connection between exports of semiconductor technology to China and China’s nuclear weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and advanced missile programs. This is important because many export controls authorities for both the United States and other countries apply only in cases of counter-WMD efforts, which the paper will return to again later.
+
+However, the October 7 document deserves further discussion beyond the explicit justification. The U.S. government’s actions themselves are an important clue to what the United States desires and how it assesses the likely interplay of certain policy mechanisms and market forces. The U.S. approach reveals a great deal about what U.S. policymakers want and, therefore, presumably what they would have asked for from the Dutch and Japanese governments.
+
+In the context of semiconductor equipment manufacturing, the Biden administration used multiple tools from its export controls policy toolbox. It also created other policy tools, such as new types of FDP rules, by drawing upon legal authorities and flexibilities granted to the U.S. Department of Commerce by the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 and earlier legislation. A previous CSIS paper, “Choking Off China’s Access to the Future of AI” goes into significantly greater detail on the various elements of the policy. This paper will focus only on the elements related to chip wafer fabrication and semiconductor manufacturing equipment since these are the two that matter most in the context of the U.S. agreement with the Netherlands and Japan.
+
+In short, the October 7 regulations are designed to restrict China’s ability to manufacture semiconductors above certain technology performance thresholds, which in the semiconductor industry are commonly referred to as a “technology node.” These performance thresholds are segmented by the three major categories of chips, all aligned at the same technology node. They are:
+
+- logic chips: FinFET or superior, which corresponds to 16 nanometers (nm) or lower technology nodes;
+
+- short-term memory (DRAM): 18 nm or lower; and
+
+- long-term memory (NAND): 128 layers or higher.
+
+The October 7 regulations created a new Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) on the Commerce Control List, ECCN 3B090, which details 11 different types of semiconductor manufacturing equipment that are exclusively relevant to producing chips at this technology node or better. This paper refers to these categories of equipment as “advanced node equipment.” Then, there is a much longer list of equipment that is potentially useful for producing chips equal to or better than the previously mentioned performance thresholds but that are also often used to produce older chips. This paper refers to these categories of equipment as “node-agnostic equipment.”
+
+The October 7 regulations require an export license for selling advanced node equipment to any end-users in China, but the policy also states that license applications will be reviewed differently depending on the location of the end-user company headquarters (e.g., China).
+
+The U.S. Department of Commerce will review license applications for U.S. exports of advanced node equipment to companies that are headquartered in China (Chinese companies) with a “presumption of denial,” which is de facto a ban. However, license applications for sales of advanced equipment to company facilities that are operating in China but are owned by non-Chinese companies headquartered in a country on the Commerce Export Administration Regulations (EAR) A:5 or A:6 list will be reviewed on a “case-by-case basis,” depending upon “factors including technology level, customers and compliance plans.”
+
+Thus, Chinese-owned companies are prohibited from buying advanced equipment, but companies headquartered in more trusted countries (the A:5 and A:6 lists) will likely still be able to buy advanced equipment for their production facilities in China. Shortly after October 7, the U.S. Department of Commerce granted one-year authorizations to Taiwanese and South Korean companies to allow them to continue purchasing U.S. advanced node and node-agnostic equipment for their advanced semiconductor manufacturing facilities in China. During a speech at CSIS on February 23, Undersecretary of Commerce Alan Estevez stated that “We’re working with those companies on the way forward there. So, what it’ll likely be is a cap on the levels that they can grow to in China . . . If you’re at whatever layer of NAND we’ll stop it somewhere at that range. It will depend on what the Chinese are doing too, but we are in deep dialogue with the companies around that.”
+
+Exports of node-agnostic semiconductor manufacturing equipment to China are restricted only under end-use control. Even after October 7, there is no export license requirement for node-agnostic equipment sales to facilities in China unless that facility is producing chips equal to or better than the previously mentioned performance thresholds, which is the relevant end-use. In such cases, all equipment sales, whether advanced node or node-agnostic, are subject to a presumption of denial. For example, SMIC, the most advanced Chinese logic chip manufacturer, has some facilities that, in 2022, achieved mass production of 14 nm logic chips. SMIC also has many other facilities that produce at older technology nodes, such as 28 nm and 55 nm. The SMIC 14 nm facilities face a presumption of denial on purchases of both advanced node equipment and node-agnostic equipment. SMIC’s 28 nm facilities will be allowed to purchase the node-agnostic equipment, as well as legacy node equipment, but not the advanced equipment.
+
+The same export restrictions that apply to the sale of equipment also apply to the provision of equipment components as well as expertise and advice. If the United States does not want China to be able to buy advanced semiconductor equipment, it only makes sense that they would also not want China to be able to buy all the constituent components that could be assembled into such equipment. Nor would they want to allow U.S. consulting companies and experts to teach China how to build such equipment.
+
+As stated above, the approach that the United States has taken reveals a great deal about what U.S. policymakers want and what they think is required to succeed. The U.S. policy is designed to halt Chinese-owned production of advanced chips but also to provide more flexibility in decisions related to foreign-owned production of advanced chips in China. The United States also wants to continue allowing China to produce less advanced chips but only to Chinese companies that clearly give up on the goal of producing advanced chips.
+
+It is a safe assumption, therefore, that the United States asked the Netherlands and Japan to adopt rules that pursue the same goals but also reflect the different technological niches that each country occupies in the semiconductor value chain. This leads naturally to the question of what types of lithography equipment are sufficiently advanced to allow for producing chips at the performance levels covered by the October 7 thresholds. The five different types of lithography technology relevant to the question, in order of most advanced to least advanced, are:
+
+- extreme ultraviolet (EUV);
+
+- argon fluoride immersion (ArF immersion) deep ultraviolet (DUV);
+
+- argon fluoride dry (ArF dry) DUV;
+
+- krypton fluoride (KrF) DUV; and
+
+- I-line.
+
+The Dutch government already stopped granting EUV scanner export licenses to China in 2019, so expanding the deal to include Japan and other types of EUV lithography equipment besides scanners was the easiest area on which to reach agreement in the deal.
+
+I-line lithography, which was already in widespread use by the mid-1980s, is positively ancient by semiconductor industry standards and is, therefore, unlikely to be included in the deal. Again, the U.S. controls seek to (1) restrict sales of advanced node semiconductor manufacturing equipment to all Chinese-owned semiconductor production facilities in China and to (2) restrict sales of both advanced node and node-agnostic manufacturing equipment to Chinese semiconductor production facilities that intend to produce advanced chips (those above the aforementioned performance thresholds). I-line lithography equipment is neither advanced nor useful for producing advanced chips, and thus it is irrelevant to both U.S. goals. There is little reason to restrict its export to China.
+
+That leaves the three types of DUV lithography — ArF immersion, ArF dry, and KrF — as the possible places to draw the line. In commercial usage, KrF dates back to the late 1980s, ArF dry dates to the late 1990s, and ArF immersion dates to the mid-2000s. However, new and improved versions of all three types of DUV lithography machines continue to attract commercial customers due to their lower costs and reduced operational complexity. They are especially attractive to fab operators in China, where massive government subsidies allow Chinese companies to focus more on growing market share in legacy chip production than achieving unsubsidized commercial profitability.
+
+The most advanced Chinese lithography company, Shanghai Micro Electronics Equipment group (SMEE), currently markets systems using ArF dry and KrF technology. This is important because the risk of foreign substitution is a key criterion for export controls decisions. However, SMEE’s most advanced ArF dry lithography machines are in the prototype stage and have not yet achieved the affordability, reliability, and performance required to be marketed commercially. On every metric that matters, they are dramatically inferior to Dutch and Japanese alternatives. Moreover, SMEE DUV scanners are more than a decade and a half behind the state of the art in the Netherlands and Japan in terms of the types of chips that they can produce. Of note, in December 2022, the U.S. Department of Commerce added SMEE to the Entity List “for acquiring and attempting to acquire U.S.-origin items in support of China’s military modernization.” This action is consistent with the overall approach of the October 7 regulations and was likely a helpful step for securing Dutch and Japanese buy-in. SMEE will struggle more than it already has with reduced access to foreign lithography technology components — such as light sources, mirrors, and laser amplifiers — and expertise.
+
+In its 2021 final report, the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI) included a recommendation that directly pertains to both the logic behind the October 7 policy and the resulting negotiations with the Netherlands and Japan. It is worth quoting at length:
+
+> [The United States Government should] work with the governments of the Netherlands and Japan to align the export licensing processes of all three countries regarding high-end SME [semiconductor manufacturing equipment], particularly EUV and ArF Immersion lithography equipment, toward a policy of presumptive denial of licenses for exports of such equipment to China. This would slow China’s efforts to domestically produce 7nm or 5nm chips at scale and constrain China’s semiconductor production capability of chips at any node at or below 16nm — which the Commission assesses to be most useful for advanced AI applications — by limiting the capability of Chinese firms to repair or replace existing equipment.
+
+The October 7 policy targeted the 16 nm technology node (FinFET), and the NSCAI concluded that the right lithography technologies to apply export controls to prevent China from producing 16 nm or better chips were EUV and ArF immersion. EUV and ArF immersion are also the lithography technologies that the aforementioned CSET report identified in 2021 as “China’s top chokepoint.” Combined, this strongly suggests that the agreement between the United States, the Netherlands, and Japan drew the performance threshold line to restrict sales of EUV and ArF immersion lithography equipment, related components, and possibly expertise to China. An examination of Dutch export controls law provides even further evidence for this conclusion.
+
+
+### The Legal Authorities underlying the Dutch Export Control System
+
+As mentioned previously, the U.S. Congress had already passed multiple laws updating the process for making export controls and giving additional legal flexibilities and authorities to the executive branch to issue new export controls regulations. Naturally, a deal with the Netherlands and Japan would be much more difficult to achieve if it required their governments to pass new laws to implement the agreement. While ASML, the leading Dutch lithography company, has stated that it believes that the Dutch parliament will have to pass new laws to implement the agreement, the Dutch and Japanese governments have not indicated that new laws are required. Thus, a careful examination of the existing legal authorities available for export controls, in particular for the Netherlands, provides significant relevant information for inferring the content of the agreement.
+
+___`Combined, this strongly suggests that the agreement between the United States, the Netherlands, and Japan drew the performance threshold line to restrict sales of EUV and ArF immersion lithography equipment, related components, and possibly expertise to China.`___
+
+In an interview with CSIS, Sebastiaan Bennink of BenninkAmar Advocaten, a Dutch law firm that specializes in economic sanctions, export controls, and trade law, explained that there are three potential sources of legal authority for the Dutch government to regulate the export of dual-use goods and services (i.e., commercial items with both civilian and military applications):
+
+1. the Wassenaar Arrangement;
+
+2. European Union dual-use export controls regulations; and
+
+3. Dutch legislation passed by parliament.
+
+__The Wassenaar Arrangement:__ Created after the end of the Cold War, the Wassenaar Arrangement is the most important multilateral export controls framework. It establishes the process for updating the List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions. Each of the member states agrees to apply an export controls licensing process to all of the listed technologies and also to exchange information regarding the export of such items. The United States, Japan, and the Netherlands are all participating states.
+
+Critically, the Wassenaar Arrangement’s founding documents state that “The decision to transfer or deny transfer of any item will be the sole responsibility of each Participating State.” As a party to the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Netherlands already has a system of export licenses in place for all items on the List, and the Dutch government has both the responsibility and the authority to make decisions about whether license applications will be reviewed with a “presumption of denial.”
+
+Lithography scanner and stepper equipment are included on the Wassenaar list when the equipment has “a. A light source wavelength shorter than 193 nm; or b. Capable of producing a pattern with a ‘Minimum Resolvable Feature size’ (MRF) of 45 nm or less.” Both ArF dry and ArF immersion use a 193-nm light source (i.e., equal to but not shorter than 193 nm), so that criterion would only allow restrictions of EUV lithography tools. The MRF criterion achieves the same result. Dylan Patel of SemiAnalysis has argued that ArF immersion, ArF dry, and even some types of KrF lithography machines are capable of producing patterns with an MRF size of less than 45 nm, but only by using multiple patterning techniques. This might be true in theory, but in practice, it would be extremely difficult to exclusively use legacy equipment to produce advanced chips with competitive quantity, quality, and price to be commercially relevant. Regardless, the equation that the Wassenaar list requires governments to use when calculating MRF does not take into account the effects of multiple patterning.
+
+Thus, the Dutch government’s authority under the Wassenaar Arrangement gives it the flexibility only to restrict the exports of EUV lithography equipment, which it was already controlling prior to the October 7 rules. Updating Wassenaar rules requires consensus among all member countries. Russia, a Wassenaar member that has been extensively targeted with technology export controls following its invasion of Ukraine, has made clear that it will veto any proposed reforms to the existing Wassenaar list. The recent deal between the Netherlands and the United States must, therefore, have gone beyond Wassenaar and beyond EUV.
+
+__European Union Dual-Use Export Controls Regulations:__ The Netherlands has aligned its laws and regulations on export controls with those of the European Union. However, the European Union not only requires an export license but can also specify that certain types of exports are prohibited. In practice, such EU export controls regulations must be imposed by the European Council and can only be instantiated with the unanimous consent of all EU member countries, which is difficult to achieve. The EU response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was one of the rare instances in which new export controls were imposed on a unanimous basis.
+
+For the most part, the lists of EU export-controlled goods and services conform to those of the Wassenaar Arrangement, and this is indeed the case for lithography equipment. However, Article 4 of the European Union’s export controls regulations (EC No 2021/821) grants individual member states the independent authority to require a license for items other than those on the EU lists in certain cases. One of those is cases in which:
+
+> [. . .] the items in question are or may be intended, in their entirety or in part, for use in connection with the development, production, handling, operation, maintenance, storage, detection, identification or dissemination of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or the development, production, maintenance or storage of missiles capable of delivering such weapons.
+
+The October 7 regulation justifications included significant analysis of the connection between exports of advanced computer chips and other semiconductor technologies and the military supercomputers that China uses to develop nuclear weapons and advanced nuclear missile delivery systems, such as hypersonics. This is undoubtedly true and does not require the capabilities of the U.S. intelligence community to prove; journalists at the Wall Street Journal independently reviewed Chinese government procurement documents and reached the same conclusion. Moreover, when the U.S. government builds advanced supercomputers, it freely acknowledges that simulating nuclear explosions and hypersonics modeling are among their most important tasks.
+
+Thus, the United States was not misleading or exaggerating when it said that the technologies being export controlled were directly related to China’s supercomputers as part of China’s nuclear weapons and missile programs. Loudly and repeatedly emphasizing this point, however, served an additional purpose: reminding the Dutch government that they were within their rights to invoke Article 4.
+
+If Article 4 criteria apply, it means the Dutch prime minister and the Dutch cabinet (specifically the ministers of foreign affairs and foreign trade) can implement new export controls license requirements and a policy of “presumption of denial” for certain types of goods without requesting a vote by either the European Council or the Dutch parliament. Given the relatively thin majority of the current ruling Dutch political coalition, this is a significant convenience.
+
+This is not to say that the Dutch will not ultimately seek to Europeanize the controls. Mathieu Duchâtel of the Institut Montaigne has argued persuasively that the Dutch should and will do so, both to reduce the risk of Chinese retaliation and to build cohesion between the European members of the Dutch semiconductor equipment supply chain. Regarding the latter point, there is some cause for optimism. Partly as a result of the tremendous U.S. response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and U.S. efforts to align technology policy with the European Union, Dutch and wider European confidence in the United States is growing alongside increased wariness of China. In a February 2023 op-ed, Dutch prime minister Mark Rutte wrote, “I cannot see how this will be China’s century. The 21st century will be the century of democracy and thus the century of America.” Similarly, during a recent speech at CSIS, EU commissioner Thierry Breton gave a speech in which he said: “We cannot allow China to access the most advanced technologies, be they in semiconductors, quantum, cloud, edge, AI, connectivity, and so on. I see a very strong alignment on this agenda between the EU and the U.S., even if we may sometimes differ on the methods, which is normal.”
+
+Some German think tank scholars, including Tobias Hehrke and Julian Ringhof of the European Council on Foreign Relations, have argued that the European Union must update its strategic approach to export controls in the wake of the October 7 policy. Even Germany’s government, which has historically been cautious about strengthening restrictions on technology trade with China, recently blocked the acquisition of a Chinese takeover of a German semiconductor fab. Future geopolitical developments could accelerate the U.S., EU, and Japanese semiconductor export controls alignment. In mid-February, U.S. secretary of state Antony Blinken warned that China was considering providing “lethal support” to Russia’s military. Given the speed and strength of the European Union’s export controls reaction to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, such a move by China would no doubt cause a dramatic reassessment of the European relationship with China, including on technology export controls.
+
+The desire to ultimately bring Europe into the new semiconductor export controls framework is a reason in favor of drawing the line at ArF immersion lithography technology, rather than ArF dry or KrF. Given that the vast majority of Chinese domestic semiconductor production facilities are producing chips at older technology process nodes, restricting ArF immersion is primarily about choking off China’s access to future technological progress in AI and semiconductors, redirecting Chinese semiconductor production capacity growth toward older technology nodes, and redirecting advanced production capacity growth to countries outside of China. In that regard, the United States, Japan, Europe, South Korea, and Taiwan have all signaled a desire to significantly increase government support of semiconductor production investments. If the policy and diplomatic stars align, this could even mean that U.S. and allied semiconductor equipment producers need not face an overall reduction in sales from the October 7 regulations and their foreign equivalents — merely a geographic customer realignment. This favorable outcome would require more than a few strokes of luck, but the possibility exists. Regardless, there is a strong reason for the major allied powers in semiconductors to align their investment strategies to avoid duplication and unprofitable overcapacity in key segments. Aligning export controls is basically a pre-requisite to aligning investments, and that increases the chance that the major semiconductor powers will do so.
+
+
+### Summary and Conclusion
+
+In sum, the U.S. deal with Japan and the Netherlands included assurances that Japan and the Netherlands will not allow their semiconductor manufacturing equipment companies to sell to China the categories of equipment that the United States is now prohibiting. The agreement also included assurances that the Dutch and Japanese governments will prohibit the sale of lithography equipment — steppers and scanners, electron-beam tools, and resist processing tools — most likely at advanced performance levels consistent with EUV and argon fluoride immersion technology. The agreement also likely covered the export of related technology components that are used in the production of such lithography equipment and may have even restricted consulting services for transferring knowledge related to such machines, though this is more speculative. Finally, the agreement may have also prohibited the sale of a much broader set of semiconductor manufacturing equipment, as well as materials and chemicals, in cases where these represent genuine market chokepoints. In all cases, such restrictions in the Netherlands and Japan will likely follow the U.S. approach of treating export license applications differently depending on whether the chip production facilities in China are Chinese-owned or foreign-owned, as well as the degree of technological advancement at the production facility.
+
+Even though many details remain unclear at this stage and will likely require continued diplomatic engagement to iron out, the semiconductor export controls agreement between the United States, Japan, and the Netherlands is a major diplomatic achievement for all three countries. Furthermore, if the countries can implement and enforce an agreement, that achievement alone would advance the formation of a new plurilateral export controls regime on semiconductors. This, in turn, begs questions about the long-term suitability of the Wassenaar Arrangement for housing these types of sensitive dual-use diplomatic agreements.
+
+___`Even though many details remain unclear at this stage and will likely require continued diplomatic engagement to iron out, the semiconductor export controls agreement between the United States, Japan, and the Netherlands is a major diplomatic achievement for all three countries.`___
+
+The work is not done, however. Germany is a leader in the production of key components that make up semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and South Korea is both a leader in chip manufacturing and a small but sophisticated producer of manufacturing equipment. Both Germany and South Korea need to join the new export controls agreement in order to prevent the fracturing of the U.S.-led global semiconductor value chain. If possible, it would be best if the entire European Union were to join. None of this will be easy or quick, but the trilateral deal has bought years of time and demonstrated to others that the United States will work to protect the interests of those that join it in promoting international peace and security.
+
+---
+
+__Gregory C. Allen__ is the director of the Artificial Intelligence (AI) Governance Project and a senior fellow in the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Prior to joining CSIS, he was the director of strategy and policy at the Department of Defense (DOD) Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, where he oversaw development and implementation of the DOD’s AI Strategy, drove policy and human capital reforms to accelerate the DOD’s adoption of AI, developed mechanisms for AI governance and ethics, and led frequent diplomatic engagements with governments and militaries in Europe and the Indo-Pacific regions, including China.
+
+__Emily Benson__ is a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where she focuses on trade, investment, and technology issues primarily in the transatlantic context. Prior to joining CSIS, she managed transatlantic legislative relations at a European foundation, focusing on trade relations and emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-03-02-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-18.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-03-02-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-18.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..e2c17d3e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-03-02-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-18.md
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第十八日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-03-02 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 庭上披露：警方據國安法取得提交物料令 要求蘋果、立場和獨媒交出資料
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（2日）於西九龍裁判法院（暫代高院）續審。李予信早前打泰拳而受傷留院，缺席昨日審訊，他今日如期出庭應訊，庭上所見精神不俗，不過法官警告若果類似情況再度發生，他便不會繼續獲准保釋。本案共有4個版本的控辯雙方同意事實，控方讀出其中一份由13名被告所同意的事實，當中披露警方根據《國安法第四十三條實施細則》附表7第3條，於2020年12月24日獲高院簽發提交物料令，要求《獨立媒體》、《立場新聞》、《蘋果日報》向警方提供或交出與案相關物料。
+
+#### 李予信昨出院 今日如期到庭
+
+李予信因打泰拳而受傷留院，缺席昨日審訊，案件押後至今日續審。他今日如期到庭應訊，庭上所見精神不俗。
+
+甫開庭，代表李予信的大律師關文渭通知法庭，李昨日於早上10時05分獲批准出院。法官李運騰聞言指出：「即是昨日當你在庭上作出申請時，你的當事人已經出了院？」關大律師強調他其時並不知悉相關資料。李官指，如果關大律師是在知悉當事人已出院的情況下作出申請，那他便是藐視法庭。
+
+關大律師就其當事人所引致的打擾向法庭道歉。惟李官指李予信浪費了百萬元的公帑，並警告若果類似情況再度發生，他便不會繼續獲准保釋。關大律師指李現已知道他不應再參與危險運動。李予信與事務律師溝通後，關大律師補充指雖然李於10時05分獲批出院，但直至10時15分才獲醫院通知。
+
+
+▲ 李予信
+
+#### 同意事實現4版本 控方開始讀出
+
+控方代表之一、署理助理刑事檢控專員羅天瑋接著讀出控辯雙方同意事實，由於不同被告所同意的內容不同，因此共有4份不同版本。
+
+首份版本獲13名被告同意。除黃碧雲、何桂藍和林卓廷之外，其餘13名被告皆承認以下事實：
+
+民主派初選（又名「民主派 35＋公民投票（初選）」）於2020年7月11至12日在香港舉行。2020年立法會換屆選舉原訂於2020年9月6日舉行，但特區政府於7月31日宣布鑑於新冠肺炎疫情，行政會議決定延遲選舉。
+
+當時立法會換屆選舉擬選出70名議員，其中35席來自地區直選，另外35席來自功能組別。而初選涉及5個直選地區，包括香港島、九龍西、九龍東、新界西和新界東；以及2個功能組別，包括區議會（第二）功能界別和衞生服務界。本案第6至第47被告均參與其中及為初選參選人。
+
+#### 戴耀廷區諾軒公開帖文和電腦物料列證物
+
+警方將 Facebook 專頁「Tai Yiu Ting 戴耀廷」所發布的帖文、該專頁所轉載的不同媒體內容，以及戴耀廷 YouTube 頻道所發布的影片保存及列為證物。
+
+至於區諾軒，警方把他所撰寫的文章及 Facebook 專頁帖文保存及列為證物。區諾軒於2021年1月6日被捕時，偵緝警員11027檢取了一部屬於他的電腦，從中取得相關物料，同樣被列為證物。
+
+#### 吳政亨發起「三投三不投」 住所搜獲蘋果頭版廣告交易收據
+
+吳政亨（又名李伯盧）發起「三投三不投」運動。吳被捕時，警方於其住所檢取了一份2020年7月3日的《蘋果日報》頭版廣告，以及一份交易收據，顯示吳轉帳13萬5千元給蘋果日報有限公司。
+
+「三投三不投」運動在不同時期採用不同名字，在2020年3月19日至5月24日期間名為「立會要初選 『三不投聯署』」，在同年5月25日至9月19日期間名為「『三投三不投』 立會初選聯署」，並在同年9月20日起名為「街頭議會」。
+
+「『三投三不投』 立會初選聯署」設有網站，網站截圖及英文鑑證本分別被列為證物。約於2020年3月19日，「三投三不投」設立Facebook專頁，至同年9月，該專頁改名為「街頭議會」，截至11月27日，逾6千人讚好該專頁。
+
+約於2020年4月，吳政亨成立 YouTube 頻道，由該頻道發布的影片、相關謄本和英文鑑證本皆列為證物。
+
+此外，吳政亨以 Facebook 帳戶「李伯盧」在其專頁發布帖文，相關文章亦刊載於《獨立媒體》及《立場新聞》。部份文章的草稿儲存於其手提電腦，亦被警方檢取作為證物。
+
+#### 趙家賢、鍾錦麟和關尚義為民主動力銀行戶口簽署人
+
+就舉辦初選及協助舉辦初選的單位，其中「民主動力」於香港成立，由2002年直至2021年1月7日期間均為註冊社團。2018年11月10日至2020年12月6日期間，民主動力的執行委員會成員包括：召集人趙家賢、副召集人鍾錦麟、司庫關尚義、委員譚文豪和尹兆堅。趙家賢作為民主動力召集人的卡片被列為證物之一。另外，民主動力的 Facebook 專頁截圖及帖文被列為證物。
+
+民主動力的恒生銀行戶口於2002年8月16日開設，自2017年8月15日至2021年1月7日，趙家賢、鍾錦麟和關尚義為戶口的簽署人。恒生銀行就該戶口的誓章及其英文鑑證本被列為證物。
+
+#### 警方獲簽發國安法下提交物料令 要求蘋果、立場和獨媒提供資料
+
+警方根據《國安法第四十三條實施細則》附表7第3條，於2020年12月24日獲高院簽發提交物料令，要求香港獨立媒體網絡有限公司（《獨立媒體》所屬公司）、Best Pencil (Hong Kong) Limited（《立場新聞》所屬公司）、蘋果日報有限公司和壹傳動有限公司，向警方提供或交出相關物料，皆列為本案證物。
+
+#### 警方從趙家賢手機取得 WhatsApp 對話及相關材料
+
+有關來自趙家賢的證據，趙於2021年1月6日被捕後，警方執行搜查令，在趙的住所和太古城區議員辦事處檢取有關民主動力的文件。警方另把趙家賢 Facebook 專頁的帖文列為證物。
+
+偵緝警員8143從趙家賢檢取了兩部手提電話，並從中取得相關材料。另外，警方亦取得趙的 WhatsApp 對話，以及相關人士所使用的電話號碼。
+
+至於鍾錦麟，警方將其 Facebook 專頁帖文及 YouTube 頻道影片、相關謄本和英文鑑證本一同列為證物。
+
+#### 香港民研由鍾庭耀全資擁有
+
+另一協助舉辦初選的單位為香港民意研究所有限公司，它於2019年2月19日根據《公司條例》第622條以有限公司名義成立，直至2021年1月7日，公司由鍾庭耀全資擁有，他同時擔任公司董事和公司秘書。2020年期間，鍾劍華擔任公司的副行政總裁。在初選中，民研負責收集投票數據，並把初選結果刊於其網站。
+
+#### 各參選人須繳1萬元保證金
+
+有關初選的錄影片段包括記者會等，被警方保存及列於證物表。
+
+初選參選人須於2020年6月13至20日提名期間，向民主動力遞交提名表。每名參選人亦必須交出1萬元選舉按金，以劃線支票或本票支付，以及須得到100名屬於該選區的選民簽署提名。同年6月19至22日，第6至47被告提交了初選提名表格，並分別獲編配一個參選人號碼，民主動力向各人發出按金收據。當政府宣布立法會換屆選舉延期後，民主動力向各人發還選舉按金，並發出相關收據。
+
+第6至47被告均簽署了一份「民主派 35＋公民投票（初選）：捐贈及收支安排備忘錄」。而民主動力所收取有關初選的資金，則來自眾籌。
+
+針對被告的各自行為，各初選參選人提名表、發布「墨落無悔」的 Facebook 帖文，以及有關初選的 Facebook 帖文、文章和影片，分別被警方保存和列為證物。
+
+#### 初選論壇於壹傳媒大樓錄影 蘋果、立場、城寨協助製作
+
+2020年6月5日至7月4日，一系列初選論壇舉行，包括香港島、九龍西、九龍東、新界西、新界東及區議會（第二）功能界別。上述論壇於將軍澳工業邨駿盈街8號壹傳媒大樓內錄影，《蘋果日報》、《立場新聞》、網台D100和《城寨》協助製作及傳播。民主動力於同年8月簽發支票，向《蘋果日報》支付30萬元製作費用。
+
+初選論壇最終在網上廣播，相關影片和截圖被警方保存，可分辨出各被告身份。除了尹兆堅和余慧明外，所有被告均有出席初選論壇。
+
+根據香港民意研究所統計，是次初選共錄得59萬電子票及2萬實體票，初選結果刊登於其網站上。
+
+#### 14名被告抗爭派記者會
+
+14名被告出席抗爭派立法會參選人記者會，並於同日發表〈抗爭派立法 會參選人立場聲明〉，聯署的被告有袁嘉蔚、梁晃維、馮達浚、黃之鋒、李嘉達、朱凱廸、張可森、黃子悅、伍健偉、何桂藍、劉頴匡、鄒家成、岑敖暉、王百羽和余慧明，其中伍健偉沒有出席記者會。
+
+#### 33被告遞立會選舉提名表 9人被DQ
+
+共有33名被告向選舉事務處提交立法會換屆選舉提名表格，其中9名被告的提名被裁定無效（DQ）。其餘9名被告並沒有報名參選。
+
+警方透過選舉事務處取得被告的選舉提名表格、競選單張、選舉捐贈收據、相關證明和選舉主任發出的DQ理由書等。
+
+#### 大部份被告為前任或現任立法會議員或區議員
+
+在案發相關時段，戴耀廷為香港大學法律系副教授（直至2020年7月28日），區諾軒為前立法會議員及前區議員，梁國雄為前立法會議員。其他被告亦為前任或現任立法會議員或區議員，其中吳政亨、何桂藍、鄒家成和余慧明則不是上述任何身份。
+
+2021年1月6至7日，警方拘捕本案47名被告，並在被告住所或辦事處檢取相關物料，另在部份被告的電子器材取得相關物料和截圖。
+
+被告同意所有證物保存完好以及沒有受不當干擾，並對證物鏈沒有爭議。
+
+由2020年7月1日至2021年1月7日，吳政亨、鄭達鴻、楊雪盈、彭卓棋、何啟明、劉偉聰、施德來、陳志全、鄒家成、柯耀林、李予信和余慧明，均在香港沒有案底。
+
+控方已完成宣讀第一個版本的同意事實，案件明日續審，屆時將讀出餘下3個版本。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
+
+審訊不設陪審團，由3名國安法指定法官陳慶偉、李運騰及陳仲衡審理。控方代表為副刑事檢控專員萬德豪及周天行，辯方代表包括大律師沈士文、張耀良、黃宇逸、關文渭、馬維騉、盧敏儀、石書銘、黃廷光、Trevor Beel 等，本身是大律師的劉偉聰則會自辯。
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-03-03-importance-of-legacy-chips.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-03-03-importance-of-legacy-chips.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b3e010b9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-03-03-importance-of-legacy-chips.md
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Importance Of Legacy Chips
+author: Sujai Shivakumar, et al.
+date : 2023-03-03 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/d82psYA.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_The chip shortage in late 2020 drew widespread attention to the fact that the most advanced semiconductors are no longer manufactured in the United States, and that this represents a strategic vulnerability._ _Interestingly, this chip shortage was overwhelmingly a function of inadequate availability of so-called legacy chips, which U.S.-based firms continue to make but not in sufficient quantities to meet the needs of domestic manufacturers. The shortfall adversely affected not only traditional industries like automobiles but also other devices that incorporate a complement of semiconductor technologies — including microprocessors, advanced microcontrollers, analog and mixed-signal products, and power semiconductors — and drive displays, decode audio, operate engines, and perform other key functions. The absence of these components created significant disruptions in the U.S. economy, prompting a deeper look at the strategic significance of so-called legacy chips._
+
+
+### What Are “Legacy” Chips?
+
+“Legacy” or “mainstream” semiconductor-based integrated circuits (ICs) are made using established — but still evolving — manufacturing processes, typically with larger transistors etched on each chip. The CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 defines legacy devices as those produced with 28-nanometer (nm) technology or larger, and it tasks the Department of Commerce with formulating a precise definition for other types of chips. That determination is still pending. The official definition of “cutting-edge” chips has also yet to be formulated but can be assumed to apply to process nodes at or below 5 nm. The highly advanced 10 nm and 7 nm chips are in a definitional gray area, at least until the Department of Commerce categorizes them. Even then, this is a static distinction in a technology that is still following a trajectory predicted by Moore’s Law: what is considered “legacy” today was cutting-edge not long ago, and what is cutting-edge today is destined to become tomorrow’s legacy chip.
+
+Legacy chips are ubiquitous. While cutting-edge chips or microprocessors have widespread applications in critical technologies, legacy chips are involved in the production of most automobiles, aircraft, home appliances, broadband, consumer electronics, factory automation systems, military systems, and medical devices. These devices have a central role in the U.S. manufacturing economy, meaning disruptions in the availability of legacy chips negatively impact U.S. manufacturing and downstream economic activities.
+
+Despite the name, legacy chips are not stale technology. The connotations associated with terms like “mature,” “older,” and “legacy” are misleading because these categories of chips are constantly being refined for new requirements and applications. Innovations in these chips, for example, include the use of silicon carbide semiconductors, which are expected to have an important role in decarbonizing the economy. Legacy chips are destined to remain highly relevant to emerging industries and technologies far into the future.
+
+___`These devices have a central role in the U.S. manufacturing economy, meaning disruptions in the availability of legacy chips negatively impact U.S. manufacturing and downstream economic activities.`___
+
+Therefore, identifying legacy chips as separate from leading-edge chips in terms of transistor size may limit our understanding of their strategic and economic importance. The term “legacy” is itself a holdover from an era when military applications were a driving force in chip innovation. Reflecting this mindset, recent export controls aimed at limiting China’s potential to manufacture advanced chips — leaving China to innovate in mainstream chips — mask a major vulnerability.
+
+If the United States is to protect its economy from the impact of Chinese industrial policy, U.S. strategic thinkers can no longer categorize chips as “advanced” or “less advanced” purely in terms of the size of their components. Instead, policymakers must think more carefully about the importance of specialized legacy chips and policies supporting their production and continued innovation.
+
+
+### Impact of the 2022 Legacy Chip Shortage
+
+Today’s widespread awareness of legacy chips was spurred by a shortage of chips during the Covid-19 pandemic. Despite operating at historic output at that time, the domestic production base was not able to keep pace with domestic demand. In early 2022, the U.S. Department of Commerce released the results of a survey addressing the chip shortage and found that firms faced their most acute shortages not in cutting-edge chips but in legacy chips at the 40 nm node or larger. Most current U.S. chip production — and most global production — consists of these higher-node devices. By the beginning of 2022, according to Department of Commerce survey, U.S. chip plants were operating at 90 percent capacity or higher, “incredibly high for a production process that requires regular maintenance and very high amounts of energy.” Despite the demand, chipmakers were simply incapable of increasing output over the short term.
+
+A 2021 Biden administration review of the U.S. semiconductor supply chain found that “the United States relies on sources concentrated in Taiwan, South Korea, and China to meet demand for various non-leading-edge memory and logic chips that are used widely in myriad consumer and industrial applications.” In 2022, the Department of Commerce concluded — based on a survey of over 150 U.S. companies that produce and consume semiconductors — that a chip shortage was “threatening American factory production and helping to fuel inflation.” Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo said on January 25, 2022, that “it’s alarming, really, the situation we’re in as a country, and how urgently we need to move to increase our domestic capacity.”
+
+Considering semiconductors take many months to manufacture — with typical automotive microcontrollers taking six to nine months — current supplies reflect 2022 boosts in production volume, and the market now faces an oversupply for certain kinds of chips. However, the auto industry still faces a shortage of semiconductors.
+
+
+### Supplying the U.S. Automotive Industry
+
+The experience of the U.S. automotive industry in recent months provides important lessons regarding the importance of legacy chips for car and truck production and related economic activity. The U.S. automobile industry relies almost entirely on legacy chips, which account for 95 percent of its total semiconductor consumption. This is because chips used in the automobile industry must achieve “automotive-grade” function: the chip’s ability to endure punishing environments characterized by extreme temperatures, moisture, dust, chemicals, vibration, and electronic interference. This requires far more robust and near “zero-defect” performance than chips found in advanced consumer electronics.
+
+Accordingly, the auto industry has suffered the most from the recent legacy chip shortage. Starting in 2020, shortages and long wait times for automotive-grade legacy semiconductors crippled U.S. auto production. Despite claims that the chip supply problem was due to pandemic disruptions to global supply chains, surging global demand for chips during the pandemic and “just-in-time” optimized automotive supply chains were more to blame. U.S. automakers, expecting a sharp pandemic-induced decline in demand, had canceled their existing contracts for chips. To their surprise, the pandemic brought about an unprecedented swell in the demand for consumer electronics and work-from-home devices, leading to a global shortage for the chips that drive them. As a result, between the beginning of 2021 and mid-2022, North American auto producers were unable to access additional devices and were obliged to cut 4.3 million vehicles out of their production schedules. Prices of available semiconductors also rose substantially, aggravating inflation. The price per unit of common varieties of microcontrollers, for example, quintupled from the fall of 2020 to the fall of 2021.
+
+While this is not always appreciated, today’s automobile industry incorporates semiconductors into the most basic functions of a vehicle. The average number of chips per vehicle doubled between 2017 and 2021 to about 1,700, and this number will only continue to increase as cars and trucks incorporate new safety features and automated driving capabilities. According to one estimate, the total value of the global automotive semiconductor market will grow from $38.7 billion in 2020 to $116.6 billion by 2030, or a compound annual growth rate of 11.7 percent. However, keeping aside cyclical supply issues, the output of semiconductors for automotive applications is simply not keeping pace. Legacy chip production capacity is only expanding at roughly 2 percent annually. For comparison, production capacity for the semiconductor industry as a whole increased by 10 percent per year on average from 2010 to 2020.
+
+
+### Underinvestment and Lost Capacity
+
+For the auto sector, this underinvestment has been particularly acute with respect to analog devices, which process information along gradients rather than just according to on and off signals. STMicroelectronics NV, one of the world’s largest makers of analog chips, forecasts that its backlog of automotive orders will “continue to exceed existing and anticipated manufacturing capacity through 2023.”
+
+More generally, the U.S. chip industry is losing the capability to produce some types of legacy devices altogether. This is not a reflection of technical hurdles but rather of the fact that older fabs are closing down and not being replaced given the associated difficulties. According to a report by the Congressional Research Service, many legacy chips are produced in fabs that are only able to process 200-milimeter (mm) wafers, not the current-generation 300 mm wafers made in newer fabs. To complicate matters, the report mentions that “equipment to make 200 mm chips is no longer readily available.” As a result, firms are hesitant to make new investments in fabs making “old” chips, which can only achieve the required profit margins if produced on depreciated equipment.
+
+This diminution in capacity means that there is no “silver bullet” solution to the chip shortage in the auto sector, not least because the needs of the industry are growing rapidly. Going forward, virtually all the forecasted growth in automotive chip demand will be with respect to devices needed for electrification, autonomous driving, and connectivity — and over two-thirds of the chips required for these applications will consist of legacy nodes through 2030.
+
+
+### The Impact of the Shortage
+
+Supply constraints have disrupted U.S. automakers’ operations as well as affected many other U.S. manufacturing sectors. Medical device producers, for example, suffered from the shortage of mature chips needed to power their machines. The limited availability of chips forced “companies into the spot market to buy electronic components . . . making it difficult for patients to get some critical devices.”
+
+The shortage of mature chips also affected makers of electronic consumer products. In 2021, Apple was forced to curtail its production plans for iPhones and other devices because of shortages. With respect to the iPhone 13 Pro Max, a highly complex device incorporating over 2,000 components, the shortfall did not occur with respect to the most advanced chips. Instead, shortages in peripheral components costing just a few cents — such as power management chips made by Texas Instruments, transceivers from Nexperia, and connectivity devices from Broadcom — held up production. Importantly, “such chips are not unique to the iPhone, to smartphones, or even to consumer electronics, but are used across computers, data centers, home appliances, and connected cars.”
+
+
+### Lagging Investments in Legacy Chips
+
+A major source of chip shortages is simply a lack of investment. For several years, investment in the capacity to manufacture legacy chips has lagged far behind demand. The explanation is straightforward: returns are much lower on investments in the production of legacy chips. At present, only about one-sixth of all semiconductor investment is directed toward legacy chip manufacturing. Despite these risks, several major semiconductor device makers are now pursuing investment strategies aimed at producing higher-node chips, including Infineon, Analog Devices, Texas Instruments, and NXP Semiconductors.
+
+A tension exists between public investments in manufacturing capability for the most advanced chips and the need for additional capacity for more mature devices, forcing policymakers to reconcile conflicting demands for the allocation of public resources. The dilemma has been most evident in the European Union, which has committed €43 billion for advanced chip research and production. In March 2022, Intel announced plans to invest €30 billion, with substantial public support, to build a fab in Magdeburg, Germany, using the most advanced chip manufacturing technology. European manufacturing executives have been critical of these investments in fab construction. They argue that devices made at the 5, 3, and 2 nm process nodes contemplated for the Intel project are best suited for “high-volume, highest performance uses such as smartphones and servers.” According to the executives, these chips “would not match the needs of European industry,” which requires legacy chips for applications in sectors such as automobiles, machinery, and process industries (e.g., chemical or pharmaceutical). One European executive commented that “the narrative that everything will converge to less than five nanometers is a false statement. The main innovation for the auto industry is happening on mature nodes. They need to be very energy-efficient and safe.”
+
+France and Germany have reportedly secured a compromise agreement that will allow older chips to qualify for state aid, as long as they bring an “innovative element” to manufacturing or the final product, which would make Intel’s legacy chip fabs eligible for EU subsidies.
+
+The same tensions were evident in the United States during the 2021–2022 policy debates over legislation that ultimately became the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022. The act became law in August 2022, committing $52 billion in federal funds to promoting investments and research in the domestic semiconductor industry. A coalition of senators secured a cut-out of $2 billion in incentives explicitly meant to subsidize the production of legacy chips. The Biden administration also later clarified that the Department of Commerce would allocate approximately $10 billion of CHIPS funding to expand “new manufacturing capacity for mature and current-generation chips, new and specialty technologies, and for semiconductor industry suppliers.” Such incentives are necessary to incentivize private investment in lower-margin fabs producing higher-node chips, but whether the public funds allocated will prove sufficient to meet the growing need is an open question.
+
+In Japan, virtually all current demand for semiconductors is for the higher-node chips needed by the auto and consumer electronics industries. In 2021, Taiwan’s TSMC and Japan’s Sony Group announced they would invest $7 billion to build a chip plant in Japan to address the need for older-generation chips. The plant is expected to become operational in 2024. Auto parts maker Denso and Sony will take minority stakes. TSMC is reportedly considering building a second fab in Japan to support the transition of the auto industry to electric and autonomous vehicles, which will require access to increasing numbers of cutting-edge chips. Japan is also reportedly working with the United States to establish a fab capable of producing 2 nm devices beginning in fiscal year 2025. Current partners include IBM and Rapidus, a Japanese consortium that includes Sony, NEC, Toyota, Softbank, Kioxia, and MUFG Bank.
+
+
+### The China Risk
+
+Apart from low margins, another major risk factor facing U.S. companies considering legacy chip investments is China. The Chinese government recently announced a $143 billion investment in its chip industry. The Chinese semiconductor industry is expected to have spent $12.3 billion and $15.3 billion on capital expenditure in 2021 and 2022 respectively, accounting for 15 percent of the global total. China is projected to nearly double its installed wafer capacity over the next 10 years to reach approximately 19 percent of worldwide installed chip capacity — assuming it can acquire the necessary manufacturing equipment. Analysis from the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) notes that “Chinese EDA firms now have increasingly robust offerings for legacy chips, and domestic Chinese equipment firms are on track to provide strong capabilities for mature node (40/28 nm) production over the next few years.”
+
+Given the Western embargo on advanced chip technologies to China, most of the new investments will likely be in the production of older (28 nm and above) devices. An unintended consequence of U.S. export controls on advanced chip technology to China may be a wave of state-backed investment leading to overproduction and, potentially, Chinese dominance of global legacy chip production.
+
+U.S. experts have already highlighted the risk of this potential Chinese dominance. Former deputy national security adviser Matt Pottinger observed that a Chinese buildup of legacy chip-making capacity would “give Beijing coercive leverage over every country and industry — military or civilian — that depend on 28-nanometer chips, and that’s a big, big chunk of the chip universe.” Dan Hutcheson, another semiconductor expert, observed that “the Chinese could just flood the market with these technologies. Normal companies can’t compete, because they can’t make money at these levels.” Of course, state-owned and state-financed companies benefiting from new equipment do not have to make a profit. They can and likely will focus on market share, cutting foreign companies’ revenues and the resources they need to invest. This will leave authorities in market economies with little choice but to block exports of “dumped” chips or see the industry suffer the fate of the photovoltaic industry, with a loss of sales, revenue, jobs, and innovation.
+
+___`An unintended consequence of U.S. export controls on advanced chip technology to China may be a wave of state-backed investment leading to overproduction and, potentially, Chinese dominance of global legacy chip production.`___
+
+Looking ahead, the importance of legacy chips for the operation of the modern economy will only continue to grow. Maintaining a robust and resilient supply base able to make the investments and to produce and improve constantly higher node chips is essential for the nation’s competitiveness and economic security. Moreover, innovation in the higher-node chips is expected to serve as the foundation for a variety of emerging technologies, including those necessary to bring us to a greener, healthier planet. More advanced, higher-node chips will be needed to produce green energy technologies, a domain that neither Europe nor the United States can afford to surrender.
+
+---
+
+__Sujai Shivakumar__ is director and senior fellow of the Renewing American Innovation (RAI) Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
+
+__Charles Wessner__ is a senior adviser (non-resident) with the CSIS Renewing American Innovation Project.
+
+__Thomas Howell__ is an international trade attorney specializing in the semiconductor industry and a consultant with the CSIS Renewing American Innovation Project.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-03-03-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-19.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-03-03-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-19.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..e8a7119e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-03-03-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-19.md
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第十九日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-03-03 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 區諾軒開始接受辯方盤問 指2020年3月曾舉行「沈旭暉35+交流會」
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今踏入審訊第19天。區諾軒下午開始接受盤問，庭上披露其錄影會面紀錄，區曾提及不同光譜的民主派對如何落實五大訴求有不同看法，未必想特首下台或癱瘓政府；又指2020年2月與公民黨會面，當時有功能組別議員的公民黨對否決財政預算案表達擔心，認為會對該些議員構成很大壓力。惟被問及公民黨2020年是否一直抱有同樣看法，區則稱「唔能夠咁武斷」，只能講及該次會議的意見。區在盤問下又承認，2021年7月至8月共錄取了7次錄影會面，並曾獲警方開啟其手機「行事曆」以整理供詞。他亦首次透露2020年3月曾舉行「沈旭暉35+交流會」。
+
+#### 區諾軒21年7月錄首份口供 稱民主派對實踐五大訴求手段有不同看法
+
+上周已完成主問的區諾軒，今午開始接受辯方盤問，由代表鄭達鴻和梁國雄的資深大律師潘熙開始。潘熙先指出，區諾軒於2021年7月至8月曾錄取共7次錄影會面，分別在7月27日錄取第一次、8月3日錄取第二及三次、8月6日錄取第四、五及六次、8月12日錄取第六次，區同意。
+
+潘熙其後引區諾軒首次錄影會面謄本，談及於2020年2月會見公民黨梁家傑的情況。區提及，後來就如何落實五大訴求引發「好重點嘅爭議」，因當時戴耀廷的說法很細緻和具體，但對很多「民主派」的人物來說，「佢哋嘅諗法只不過係讓到更加多民主派代表進入議會」，可能不斷「講五大訴求嘅說話」，但不一定服膺於「特首下台」或「癱瘓政府」的想法。區表示，實踐的手段根據不同政治光譜會有不同想法，但當時一直都未有釐清。
+
+區諾軒在盤問下，同意當時提及的「民主派」是包括公民黨及社民連，並同意早前曾供稱民主派有傳統泛民、激進泛民和本土派等不同光譜。
+
+#### 區諾軒稱公民黨有功能組別議員 對否決預算案提出擔心
+
+潘熙續就2020年2月區諾軒和戴耀廷與公民黨執委會見面盤問，區承認當時「分唔到邊個係當時嘅執委」，但他提到出席的梁家傑、譚文豪、余若薇、陳淑莊和賴仁彪5人都是「有影響力嘅人物」，並在法官陳慶偉詢問下，指被告鄭達鴻當時「不在場」。
+
+
+▲ 鄭達鴻
+
+區諾軒同意，當時會上除了陳淑莊指公民黨望推林瑞華參選功能組別飲食界，亦有提及郭榮鏗是法律界議員。潘熙再引述區諾軒錄影會面謄本，提及當時公民黨有「提出過一啲擔心」：「如果你話係人人都要走去否決呢個財政預算案嘅⋯⋯咁你咪搞到佢哋（功能組別議員）好大壓力囉。」區解釋，功能組別議員「好難會背棄業界去否決財政預算案」，如政府大幅撥款增聘教師，教育界立法會議員亦「好難話去否定呢樣嘢」，故公民黨有此擔心。區亦形容，該說法當時在民主黨、公民黨和社民連，「都不時聽到。」
+
+#### 區同意否決預算案困難視乎政見 20年3月曾舉行「沈旭暉35+交流會」
+
+潘熙續問，當時公民黨擔心的事情，其他政黨是否都有同樣看法，舉例社民連曾指預算案若包括全民退休保障，社民連會投贊成。區表示，岑子杰和代表梁國雄的陳寶瑩在協調會議上都表達過相關看法。潘熙續指，事實上否決財政預算案的困難亦同樣適用於地區直選和功能組別，視乎相關人士政見，區同意。潘再問該種擔心是否至2020年5月尾至6月初仍存在，區指若根據協調會議的情況，他會說至5月中仍存在。
+
+潘熙其後引區諾軒第五份錄影會面謄本，提及6月初一個交流會，林瑞華亦有出席，會上林指他雖屬公民黨，但亦積極考慮參選飲食界，有表達過同樣的「關心」和「憂慮」。區同意，該「關心」是他上述所說，不能很輕易地同意否決財政預算案。區並主動補充，雖稱該交流會於6月發生，「但係睇返我嘅行事曆，發生呢件事原來係2020年3月」，在「沈旭暉 35+ 交流會」。
+
+#### 官問公民黨是否整個2020年抱持同樣擔心 區：唔能夠咁武斷
+
+潘熙續問，以區理解，能否說整個2020年，公民黨對於無差別否決財政預算案都不能有整體立場，此時主控周天行起身，質疑證人不能回答此問題。法官陳慶偉亦指該問題並不是很好，並直接問區，以他理解，公民黨是否在2020年一直抱有同樣的看法，區回應：「唔能夠咁武斷。」潘熙續指，那區稱公民黨的「擔心」，最遲於何時仍持續，能否說直至2020年7月仍持續？區回應：「我只能夠講係該次會議佢哋嘅意見，就難以推論佢後邊嘅諗法有冇轉變。」
+
+#### 區稱曾獲警方展示手機「行事曆」
+
+法官李運騰其後問及，區諾軒提到的沈旭暉會議，是先或後於3月25日的公民黨記者會舉行，區答：「我冇行事曆喺手，但係就我憶述，應該未過該次3月25號嘅記者招待會」，即沈的會議早於公民黨記者會。法官陳仲衡問及該「行事曆」，區解釋「喺整理我嘅供詞嘅時候，我曾經獲警方開啟返我嘅手機，睇得返案發時每一日我做啲乜」，並確認要答李運騰的問題，需要重看其手機。案件下周一續審。
+
+#### 黃碧雲林卓廷僅同意與自己相關的事實
+
+此外，控方昨日讀出其中13名被告的同意事實，今早分別讀出黃碧雲、何桂藍和林卓廷的同意事實，3份內容均較13人的一份為少，而黃碧雲和林卓廷的內容又比何桂藍一份為少。
+
+其中由大律師沈士文代表的黃碧雲和林卓廷，僅同意與他們本人相關的事實，包括他們分別於6月20日及19日向民主動力提交提名表格、於6月25日及28日參與初選論壇、及向選舉事務處提交選舉單張和參與初選。二人又同意其個人發布的帖文、文章和片段，被捕後家中及電子器材被檢取的證物，及案發時個人的背景，包括黃碧雲案發時為立法會議員，任期於2020年12月1日結束，而林卓廷兼任立法會議員及區議員，立會任期於同日結束。
+
+至於其他所有被告發布的帖文、影片及行為，如戴耀廷、區諾軒和吳政亨的文章，吳政亨發起「三投三不投」的過程，趙家賢被搜得的 WhatsApp 對話，其他被告報名參與初選及獲發按金收據，抗爭派記者會及相關立場聲明，報名參選、被DQ和沒有報名參選立法會的被告名單，及其他被告的背景、拘捕和搜獲的物料等，均沒有在二人同意事實提及。其他組織如民主動力和香港民意研究所的資料，以及參與舉辦初選論壇的媒體等，二人亦沒有同意。不過二人有同意警方於2020年12月，向《獨立媒體》、《立場新聞》、《蘋果日報》發出提交物料令。
+
+另外，同意事實提及黃碧雲於「2020年7月1日至2021年1月7日」，在香港沒有案底，法官陳仲衡一度關注該寫法，是指被告該段時間沒有案底，抑或直至當時沒有案底，控方回應是後者，遂將所有被告承認事實的寫法改為「直至2021年1月7日」沒有案底。
+
+#### 何桂藍同意事實不包括戴耀廷文章、抗爭派記者會
+
+至於何桂藍，同意事實與13被告大致相同，包括吳政亨發起「三投三不投」、民主動力和香港民研的資料等，惟不包括所有戴耀廷的文章、Facebook 帖文和 YouTube 片段；各被告發布「墨落無悔」的帖文及其他競選帖文和影片；7月15日抗爭派記者會的出席名單及其後發布的〈抗爭派立法會參選人立場聲明〉；及警方向媒體發出的提交物料令。代表何的大律師 Trevor Beel 在首兩周審訊曾表示，戴耀廷不會出庭作供，質疑其文章僅屬「傳聞證供」，控方須證明涉案文章由戴所寫；又指無證據何曾出席抗爭派記者會及在會上發言。
+
+#### 何桂藍同意事實不包括被捕後搜得的物料
+
+就初選論壇，何桂藍只同意2020年6月5日至7月4日曾舉行初選論壇，但沒有同意舉辦論壇的媒體及論壇出席者。何的同意事實亦提及所有其他被告被捕後被搜得的證物，唯獨不包括從她本人搜得的物料，她亦不同意證物鏈。Beel 表示，任何從何桂藍搜得的物品都不會同意，會要求傳召警員舉證，又指不明白為何「T裇」也相關，惟李運騰指，附表沒提「T裇」，只是與競選有關的物品。Beel 又提到，並不同意任何被告報名立法會選舉後被裁定無效，但控方並無回應其修訂。
+
+#### 何桂藍修改至直至2021年12月無案底、12人改為至2023年3月無案底
+
+此外，何桂藍的同意事實，原列明「直至2021年1月7日」何沒有案底，惟辯方提出望改為「直至2021年12月12日」。法官李運騰問及，法庭是否要考慮何桂藍擁有良好品格，又問在同意事實加入該段落有何用意，主控萬德豪指若被告在本案發生後再犯案，或不能視為具良好品格。法官陳仲衡提及，被告於案發期間犯案會影響法庭對其犯罪傾向的評估，但於案發後、開審前犯案，又會否影響對其犯罪傾向的評估？萬德豪指，此情況被告亦會被視為有案底。李運騰續指不希望知道詳情，法庭亦只會考慮同意事實上的資訊。
+
+控方休庭後再提出修訂，將昨日13名被告同意事實有關案底的描述，由「2020年7月1日至2021年1月7日」沒有案底，改為「直至2023年3月3日」，鄭達鴻、楊雪盈、彭卓棋、何啟明、劉偉聰、施德來、陳志全、柯耀林、李予信、吳政亨、鄒家成及余慧明12人均沒有案底，不包括梁國雄。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
+
+審訊不設陪審團，由3名國安法指定法官陳慶偉、李運騰及陳仲衡審理。控方代表為副刑事檢控專員萬德豪及周天行，辯方代表包括資深大律師潘熙、大律師沈士文、張耀良、黃宇逸、關文渭、馬維騉、盧敏儀、石書銘、黃廷光、Trevor Beel 等，本身是大律師的劉偉聰則自辯。
+
+不認罪被告包括獲准保釋的鄭達鴻、楊雪盈、彭卓棋、何啟明、劉偉聰、黃碧雲、施德來、陳志全、柯耀林、李予信10人，及還柙的何桂藍、吳政亨、鄒家成、林卓廷、梁國雄及余慧明6人。
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-03-06-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-20.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-03-06-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-20.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c29c5aaa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-03-06-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-20.md
@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第二十日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-03-06 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 區諾軒獄中曾去信鄭達鴻 指公民黨「搶疆」開記者會連累鄭及李予信
+- 區諾軒稱中聯辦譴責後盡全力解散初選 望退出後情節為同案覓從輕發落基礎
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（6日）踏入審訊第20天。區諾軒今繼續接受盤問，庭上首次披露他今年1月在獄中向鄭達鴻撰寫的私人信件，區形容鄭達鴻被公民黨「連累」，又指若非公民黨忽然「搶疆」開記者會（會上楊岳橋承諾若政府不回應五大訴求，會否決所有議案及財政預算案致特首下台），他和李予信的處境會截然不同。
+
+區諾軒又確認，港島區僅在首次會議談及否決預算案，而協調機制初稿文件稱「會積極」運用權力否決僅是戴耀廷看法，用以「迎合」不同意見，「叫唔上係一個共識」；又同意即使初選條款字眼為「會」運用權力否決預算案，也不代表參選人會「無差別」否決，指「狄志遠最近都話佢否決財政預算案」，有被告發笑。法官又問及，當時有沒有參選人認為不應綑綁對否決預算案的立場，區表示：「總有人冇表態，疑點利益應該歸於被告」，多名被告大笑。
+
+
+▲ 鄭達鴻
+
+#### 區諾軒主動補充沈旭暉35+交流會 指沈與戴「概念好唔同」 只望立會過半
+
+區諾軒上周五下午開始，接受代表鄭達鴻及梁國雄的資深大律師潘熙盤問，區提及公民黨因有人參選功能組別，對否決財政預算案表達擔心。區諾軒今坐下後即舉起右手，主動向法官提出，想就早前供詞做一點修正和補充。修正方面，區諾軒早前曾稱港島區於2020年6月舉行第4次會議，當時戴耀廷着與會者由一人投4票轉為投1票。區今更正港島於6月並無會議，「4票轉1票」的決定是在5月17日的會議作出。
+
+至於補充，區上周五曾提及沈旭暉於2020年3月舉行35+交流會，他今指望在辯方盤問前，「完整地講返一次沈旭暉35+交流會個發展。」區指，在2020年，「35+」說法不止戴耀廷有講，沈旭暉亦曾在報章提及，「但個概念係好唔同， 沈旭暉只係期望民主派立會過半。」區指，沈約於3月招聚了一班有興趣參選功能組別的人士作意見交流，該些人後來定期有交流意見，區本人亦有參與其中，包括工程界黃偉信、批發及零售界張秀賢、飲食界林瑞華，及進出口界的本案被告林景楠，但區補充林在6月19日「突然轉為想選新界東」。
+
+#### 區指功能組別參選人指支持35+ 但不支持綑綁對預算案立場
+
+區指，除林景楠外，其餘各人在7月初陸續召開記者會或表明有意參選，並曾向他表示：「佢哋都支持35+，但係佢哋唔支持就住財政預算案嘅立場有一個捆綁」，並記得黃偉信曾公開講過反對無差別否決財政預算案。
+
+在法官李運騰詢問下，區諾軒指沈只是舉行過首次交流會，之後並無出席功能界別的定期會面，但區本人則有參與其中。他並確認，此為早前在法庭供稱，對否決預算案「有唔同意見」的功能組別參選人士，但不包括衞生服務界，戴耀廷亦只曾就地區直選和超級區議會舉辦協調會議。
+
+#### 區指林瑞華表達對否決預算案有兩難 但不肯定幾大程度代表黨
+
+法官陳慶偉一度問區是否完成補充，區指「想做埋個結尾」，有被告發笑。區並補充除黃偉信外，至於其他參選功能組別人士有否公開表達反對否決預算案，「因為我還柙兩年，就掌握唔到相關資料。」法官李運騰指他們更關注2020年的情況，區續指是望回答上周潘熙有關公民黨否決預算案立場的問題，並指儘管公民黨於3月25日舉行記者會，但林瑞華想法「一路都係有顧及業界利益」，並曾向他表達過「對於否決預算案有兩難」，惟區指，林的說法「幾大程度代表個黨」需要更多論據支持，柯耀林和彭卓棋等人發笑。
+
+#### 辯方向區諾軒確認錄影謄本內容 遭官打斷指毋需發問
+
+資深大律師潘熙其後引述錄影會面謄本，區曾指新界東第二次會議前，社民連黃浩銘曾致電他，指不要胡亂答應就否決預算案達成共識，謄本寫區理解似乎已有人醞釀向大會「逼供」。潘熙欲澄清區的意思是否「逼宮」，惟法官陳慶偉打斷指「OK, move on」，法官陳仲衡亦指意思很明顯，毋需提問，陳慶偉着他要問適合（sensible）的問題。
+
+潘熙其後又引區諾軒有關九龍西協調會議的錄影會面謄本，指岑子杰曾表示「講抗爭，大家點會唔諗起社民連，不過社民連都係一個濟弱扶傾嘅政黨」，又指不能承諾必定否決財政預算案，因若政府有民生項目如全民退保，「社民連係要贊成。」潘熙向區確認供詞是否正確，惟陳慶偉打斷指已聽取過相關證供，看不到謄本與庭上供詞有任何分別，又指潘熙是資深大律師。陳仲衡亦指「move on」是要「move forward」，不是要兜圈。
+
+#### 港島協調機制初稿稱「會積極」用權否決預算案 區確認非與會者共識
+
+潘熙其後就港島區3月26日首次協調會議發問，指當時戴耀廷雖提及「積極」運用權力否決預算案，但會上是否沒有就此達成共識，法官陳慶偉即指司馬文表達反對。潘熙同意，但指他想知道會議最終是否無達成任何共識，因區諾軒似乎沒有清楚表達。法官陳慶偉指「這是完全清楚的」，陳仲衡亦指他一直理解會上無共識。陳慶偉並向潘熙指，「重複與說服是兩個概念。（“Repetition and persuasion are two different concepts.”）」
+
+潘熙其後再引區諾軒錄影會面謄本，提及九龍西第二次會議後，他與戴耀廷和趙家賢曾就否決財政預算案的立場討論，區曾指民主黨和社民連表達關注，認為戴「冇理由唔理唔同人嘅睇法而去表達一個咁激進立場」，戴耀廷回覆用「積極」一字，能讓參與者有「唔去否決嘅空間」。潘熙續向區諾軒展示「35+立會過半計劃 民主派港島協調機制（初稿）」的文件，提及「會積極」運用權力否決財政預算案字眼，區確認戴是於首次協調會議後直接傳予他，及向他指有傳予其他參與者，但「那時沒有（港島區 WhatsApp 群）組」，「我唔知佢有冇妥為發畀其他人。」
+
+潘熙續問，該份文件是否並非代表會上的共識，法官李運騰指該文件涵蓋很多內容，認為潘應想就第二段提問，可直接發問，法官陳慶偉亦提醒「一個籠統的問題只是會換來一個籠統的答案（“A general question attracts a general answer.”）」。潘續改問，文件第二段是否並非會上共識。該段提及參與協調者「認同若民主派能取得立法會一半以上的議席，會積極運用立法會的權力，包括否決財政預算案，迫使特首回應五大訴求，特赦抗爭者、令相關人士為警暴問責、及重啟政改以達雙普選。」
+
+#### 區諾軒稱港島僅首次會議觸及否決預算案 「叫唔上係一個共識」
+
+區確認不是與會人士的共識，「因為會議入面有異議」。法官李運騰續指，有趣的是文件名為港島協調機制初稿，但事實上會上並無共識，問區是否知道為何戴耀廷加入該段。區回應，「我會話呢個係戴耀廷嘅共識，就唔係參與者嘅共識」，彭卓棋、陳志全等被告發笑。李運騰指他不明白，因「共識」意指最少兩個人的共識，如何能說是戴耀廷自己有共識。區遂指，因會議過程，「我相信我都講得比較清楚，就係佢（戴耀廷）見到有異議，就用呢個字眼去統攝唔同人嘅觀點。」林卓廷疑惑反問：「統攝？」鄒家成、彭卓棋等發笑。法官陳仲衡提議用「accommodate」翻譯。
+
+潘熙續問，是否即戴耀廷希望其他人同意但卻沒有共識，區同意。潘續問，在第二及第三次協調會議後，與會者就否決預算案是否最終沒有達成共識，區回應：「第一次會議有討論，但之後冇再觸及，所以叫唔上係一個共識。」
+
+#### 區諾軒稱戴耀廷用「會積極」字眼「統攝」不同人觀點 後改用「迎合」
+
+其後庭上再提到「accommodate」，傳譯主任一度猶豫如何翻譯，區指可用「統攝」，並說「我忽然諗唔到一啲更簡單嘅字，對唔住」。法官李運騰一度提議用「summarize and capture」，法官陳慶偉則問：「Which 統、which 攝？」林卓廷等被告大笑，區指是「統治個統，收攝個攝、攝影個攝」，再致歉指「諗唔到更易嘅字」。陳慶偉續指，很少聽過此字，認為統指「統一」、攝指「震懾」，或有威嚇控制的意思，又說：「You see, I want to 『統攝』 my staff.」區笑指「我都被威脅」。區其後指，認為以「迎合（accommodate）」來表達其想法較恰當。潘熙一度提議用「包容」，惟陳慶偉再打斷：「No, thank you, next.」
+
+下午休庭後，法官陳仲衡指在午飯時搜尋「統攝」意思，發現有「to exercise control over」或「to govern」的意思，區重申認為「迎合（accommodate）」是較切合的說法，並確認他今早證供應指「迎合」，而非「統攝」。
+
+#### 區諾軒曾受訪指候選人對35+有兩種不同想像
+
+潘熙其後展示區諾軒2020年4月的 Facebook 帖文，轉載《蘋果日報》的訪問〈【立法會選舉】民主派或五區齊初選定出線權 區諾軒：以「35+」否定中共極權路線〉，提及：
+
+> 「區稱，按其觀察，不同派系代表都期望未來能於選舉組合出基本綱領，但具體做法仍未有共識，指公眾或候選人都對『35+』有兩種不同想像。」⋯⋯「其一是透過議會過半提高民主派的議價能力及政治力量，爭取五大訴求，『至於點樣爭取係冇人傾落去嘅，亦都好難去傾，因為牽涉到到時個政治局勢係點』。另一種是不惜攬炒，否決《財政預算案》等向北京施壓，『寧願你（北京）做得最赤祼，咁你唔好再令香港存有任何幻想』。」
+
+#### 區諾軒稱簽署「墨落無悔」減低參選人「模糊性」、「走盞」空間
+
+潘熙問，以區理解，是否傳統泛民抱有第一種想像，區同意。法官陳慶偉問是否包括公民黨，區則稱公民黨3月25日召開記者會，「我好難將佢哋歸類落去呢個類入面。」庭上早前播放片段，時任公民黨黨魁楊岳橋曾在記者會承諾若政府不回應五大訴求，公民黨將否決所有議案及財政預算，令行政長官解散立法會重選及辭職。
+
+
+▲ 資料圖片：楊岳橋（右）
+
+潘熙續問，以區理解，能否說該兩種想法於整個初選過程也持續？區則指兩種立場的角力到6月有變化，「特別係墨落無悔嘅簽署出台啦」，但同意聲明出台後該角力仍然存在。法官陳慶偉問及「墨落無悔」聲明有何意義，區重申民主派有不同光譜的人，「如果有一啲聯署要人表態，會減低個模糊性。」法官李運騰問「模糊性」是否指「彈性」、有空間「走盞」，區同意。
+
+#### 區認有候選人提及「必定」否決財案 惟不肯定誰說
+
+潘熙其後展示新界西協調機制文件，區諾軒早前供稱只有該區用「會」運用權力否決預算案而非「會積極」，認為「會」的意思較為確定。潘熙問2020年3月至6月是否有不同人提議不同字眼，區指看不到其他人在4月至5月時「係咁關注個字眼問題」，指首次出現是新界東5月5日的第二次會議，圍繞使用「會」抑或「會積極」，而「會積極」一字較早出現。
+
+潘熙續問，是否有其他候選人曾指「必定會否決財政預算案」，區指要視乎當時不同人的公開言論，「我好難話邊個真係咁講，以免不公」，傳繹主任一度問「咩話？」，區說「唔……唔好講」，有被告發笑。區其後在法官陳慶偉詢問下，確認當時有被告曾提出相關說法，但他不確實記得是誰說。法官問及是在什麼場合提到，區指在後來的選舉論壇或競選活動，「的確有部分人有呢個咁嘅主張。」
+
+#### 官問有沒有人認為不應綑綁否決財案立場 區：總有人冇表態，疑點利益應該歸於被告
+
+區在盤問下同意，除了「必定會」、「會」及「會積極」否決預算案，尚有第四種主張，即認為不應綑綁參選人對否決預算案的立場。法官李運騰續問，至6月尾7月初的選舉論壇，還有沒有參選人抱持第四種立場，區答：「總有人冇表態嘅，疑點利益應該歸於被告」，多名被告大笑。法官陳慶偉再問，有沒有人曾明確表示該立場，區指是早前提及的功能組別參選人，但其餘人有否說過則「冇掌握」。
+
+潘熙續問，即使只使用「會」而非「會積極」字眼，也不代表必定「無差別」否決預算案？區指「我即時都諗到有三個可能」。潘熙一度指不需知道所有可能性，惟法官陳仲衡提醒屆時控方覆問問及時，辯方便沒機會澄清。
+
+#### 區同意「會」用權否決預算案不代表會「無差別」否決
+
+潘熙續容許區解釋，區指該三個可能分別為「我淨係話我會否決財預算案」、「我會否決財政預算案係為咗爭取五大訴求」及「我乜都唔理，總之我點都係否決財政預算案㗎啦」。法官李運騰問及第一和第三的分別，區解釋就第一點，只是說會否決預算案「可以有好多原因 ，重點係你為咗乜」，又指「狄志遠最近都話佢否決財政預算案」，有被告笑說「嘩」。區諾軒最終再同意潘熙指，即使沒有「積極」一字而只用「會」，也不代表當選者必須「無差別」否決預算案，「所以我會話係為乜（否決）。」
+
+#### 辯方展示區諾軒予鄭達鴻信件 指公民黨記招「連累」鄭及李予信
+
+潘熙其後引述區諾軒今年1月尾寫給鄭達鴻的4頁信件，指控方於2月11日將信件納為「未被使用材料（unused materials）」。庭上展示信件其中一段：
+
+> 「港島的狀況幸好較其他區好，但始終主要關鍵，是個人的行為、言論。Michael 多言論上硬傷；Clarisse 較好，我猜，你的關口是黨的活動行為連累吧。作為外人，我是不太明白 CP 的人想什麼。佢地三個 PG + 落口供，他們該有和你交流，你也明白此中邏輯吧？（還是根本各顧各的…）問題是，他們說的內容的程度是不足的，大概不去到實質過程、實據，是不行的（看看我）。（註：需陳述主要犯案事實，為司法提供客觀證據…）這裡便牽涉做人道德問題：己所不欲，勿施於人，盡可能也不該傷害到人。可其實你縱觀各資料之多，令我不時想，究竟有同冇人講，係咪已不太有分別…」
+
+潘熙問，以區理解，是否即鄭達鴻的行為不如其黨激進，惟法官陳慶偉指潘熙是要求區諾軒就鄭的思想作供，着他問下一條問題。
+
+潘熙續問，區指鄭被黨行為「連累」是什麼意思，區指若公民黨曾舉辦一些活動，如3月25日記者會，而鄭達鴻又有參加，「咁的確係一個連累嘅意思嚟」。法官陳仲衡提醒，區諾軒如何理解該記者會與法庭如何理解無關，法官陳慶偉亦着他問另一條問題。
+
+潘熙續引信件最後一頁的一段：
+
+> 「不知有否和你說過，區某踏入政壇，伊始自 2007 年 CP 實習計劃，不是 DP… 我決定選 DC 時無揀 CP 去左 DP，多少係不太 buy 好民粹主導的路線，不是說 DP 便好，它有它問題，只是聯想到我們的苦難 —— 若 CP 不是 2020 年 3 月不知想什麼忽然『搶疆』開 press con，汝等處境必截然不同，那不是搶民粹又為何？有必要嗎？這也不是你和信可左右，結果誤了你們。當然，我人生裏連累人的也不少，正如 Margaret 說，民主運動總是牽牽絆絆。展望將來，需要的理論基礎更高，也不是沒想過，這兩年，區某讀了很多中國自由派的書藉，我認為將來倘尚有人有志，該學學錢理群、張千帆、章詒和怎樣在內地生存、知進退。只是，區某氣數已盡，此事一過，能否仍立於天地之間，尚未可知，君亦宜珍重、保重。」
+
+區同意，「這也不是你和信可左右」中的「信」指李予信。
+
+#### 被問鄭達鴻有否參與決定召公民黨記者會 區：我係一個外人，唔知道人哋黨嘅運作
+
+潘熙續問就3月25日記者會，區諾軒是否認為鄭達鴻和李予信相較其他公民黨立法會議員譚文豪、郭家麟及楊岳橋，較沒有話語權。法官李運騰指，那是要求證人猜測，反問如何協助其當事人？法官陳慶偉並指若他是潘熙，會問區，舉行記者會是否主要是公民黨黨魁或立法會議員的主意。區答「我係一個外人，我唔知道人哋黨嘅運作」，但「喺得立法會開，就即係立法會議員開啦」。潘熙其後就下一議題發問，惟螢幕仍展示信件，區稱：「不如閂咗封信先啦，如果唔用……私人信件啊」，有被告發笑。
+
+潘熙其後問，區諾軒早前作供曾提及「鬥黃」，會否認為公民黨3月25日記者會亦可歸類為「鬥黃」。主控萬德豪指證人無法回答此問題，法官陳慶偉亦指潘熙可以叫其當事人作供，潘指會認真考慮。潘熙再問，以區理解，鄭達鴻是否被迫參與「鬥黃」，再遭法官阻止，李運騰指若辯方無證據顯示證人對此有個人認知，辯方只是問及其意見。潘熙一度改問據區理解，鄭達鴻是否會無差別否決財政預算案，惟陳慶偉再稱「no, next」。李運騰亦指，若潘熙認為證人知道相關事實，便可直接提出，否則其問題會引來異議，陳仲衡亦指潘的問題「突然（out of the blue）」。潘熙一度欲解釋，惟陳慶偉連說四個「next」，潘遂就其他議題發問。
+
+案件下午續審。
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（6日）踏入審訊第20天。區諾軒今繼續接受盤問，提及《國安法》前及剛生效後，均相信作為憲法專家的戴耀廷指初選不違法，惟政府7月9日指初選或違法後，他開始「響起問號」，並在初選結束、中聯辦於7月14日譴責初選違法後，不單決定退出初選，「而且盡我全力去解散整個初選」，並向時任政制及內地事務局政治助理吳璟儁徵詢補救措施。區在庭上補充，是在看過《國安法》33條自動放棄犯罪可減輕處罰的條文作此決定。
+
+區最終於7月15日宣布退出初選工作，趙家賢亦於翌日退出，戴耀廷之後亦宣布休息。區在臨散庭主動提及，他們數人退出後各區有剩餘工作無任何牽頭人能處理，並指希望上述情節，「能夠為整體嘅同案搵到好嘅求情同從輕發落嘅基礎」，有被告面露愕然和發笑。
+
+#### 區諾軒稱參與者《國安法》可能改變否決財案立場 惟認個人無認知
+
+區諾軒繼續接受辯方盤問。代表鄭達鴻和梁國雄的資深大律師潘熙午休前問到，《國安法》落實後，以區理解，初選參與者就否決預算案有否改變立場，區答「可能有，要睇個根據係邊」。控方指是問及意見，法官李運騰遂改問區是否認知有參與者改變立場，區答「有呢個可能，但我的確冇清楚嘅資訊」，他個人亦沒有認知。
+
+法官陳慶偉再指，若他是潘熙，會向區指出他曾供稱，有候選人在《國安法》後問戴耀廷否決預算案會否違法，可理解為有人對此表達擔心，區同意。陳再補充，但這會否影響他們否決的立場則是另一回事，區亦同意。潘熙再問，至《國安法》公布前，區個人是否不清楚公民黨就否決預算案的立場，區指他「冇進一步資訊」。
+
+#### 區指曾相信否決預算案合法：當時確實係冇為意有問題
+
+潘熙下午續就區認知初選是否違《國安法》盤問，其中戴耀廷曾多次發文指初選不違法，潘展示區諾軒錄影會面謄本，提到「始終戴耀廷係一個香港大學嘅法律教授喇，咁佢有佢嘅專業喇，我諗相信好多人都信任佢嘅專業嘅」，區確認知道戴於2020年已在港大教授近30年、曾任法律系副院長，故當戴耀廷談及對《基本法》理解，「當時我哋都信佢係專業。」
+
+潘熙其後展示戴耀廷於2020年5月12日《明報》文章〈「支持否決」不能成為DQ理由－－再論立會否決財政預算案的憲制設計〉，提及「基本法的條文並沒有規定立法會否決財政預算案只能單純因為財政預算案的內容」，區同意戴嘗試解釋為何認為否決預算案是合法，而他當時沒有質疑戴的看法，因為相信戴是憲法專家。
+
+區同意，當時認為否決預算案令政府回應五大訴求是合法的，並指「我當時確實係冇為意有問題」。至於其他參與者是否都有同樣想法，他指「我冇辦法進入其他人嘅心境」，但不少民主派同事過往多年均否決財政預算案，亦未見有問題。
+
+潘熙其後引述2019年5月18日立法會有關《逃犯條例》修訂的會議紀錄，當時區諾軒曾發言指如非必要也「不想以否決預算案作為迫使政府撤回《逃犯條例》修訂建議的手段」，但指「這可以是其中一種做法」，區確認。
+
+#### 提名表格有擁護《基本法》條款 區：相信亦盡力確保參選人擁護
+
+潘熙其後問及初選提名表格，區確認於2020年6月設計。潘引表格條款「我特此聲明，我會擁護《基本法》和保證效忠香港特別行政區」，並引區諾軒錄影會面謄本談及，「其中有一樣呢，係希望保護返啲參選者喇」，又指希望參與者聲明擁護《基本法》與效忠特區，是「製作呢個表格嘅時候，有拎過出嚟討論嘅」。
+
+潘熙問區在2020年6月設計表格時，是否相信參加初選不會違反相關條款。區回應，「我當時相信，亦都盡過力確保大家都係擁護《基本法》同效忠香港特別行政區。」區亦同意當時仍認為運用《基本法》權力否決預算案是合法，至於其他人的想法，他無法代入，但相信不少人分享同樣看法。
+
+#### 戴耀廷《國安法》後稱初選不違法會繼續 區提底線指官方機構指違法就要考慮停止
+
+潘熙續就《國安法》落實後的情況發問，展示區諾軒書面供詞，提及他「一直很憂慮初選有沒有違法」，和留意政府或官方有否指出初選違法，並向戴反映相關問題，指犯法與否不是他「說了便算」；又指很多候選人曾問戴初選有否違《國安法》，但戴「一直說看不出有違法之處」。區在盤問下同意，戴耀廷在《國安法》落實後指否決預算案不違法，並重申：「法律上佢的確係有佢嘅專業意見，我冇辦法挑戰佢。」
+
+潘熙其後展示戴耀廷7月1日與趙家賢的 WhatsApp 對話，提及「這是我（戴）給個別團隊的訊息」，指《國安法》後有人擔心會否違法，但戴認為否決預算案是《基本法》賦予立法會的憲制權力，不可能是《國安法》第22條顛覆國家政權下的「非法手段」，特首解散立會亦不構成嚴重干擾和阻撓政權機關依法履行職能；而初選資金全為本地所得，應不會違《國安法》第29條勾結外國勢力。
+
+戴總結「35+的目標要否決財政預算案，應沒有觸犯國安法 」，並在最後指「我的看法是初選會繼續。對我的想法，你有甚麼意見，敬請告知」，區確認收到該訊息。被問及有何回應，區指「佢給出咗一個法律嘅理解，我給出我嘅政治判斷」，向戴指「合唔合法就唔係佢講咗算嘅」，並提出一條底線，「如果有官方機構話初選係犯法呢，我哋就要考慮停止初選活動啦。」法官李運騰問及，該討論有否在 WhatsApp 記錄，區指沒有，僅他與戴耀廷在該訊息發布後進行對話。
+
+#### 曾國衛7.9指初選或違法 區指信戴法律觀點惟政治上開始響問號
+
+潘熙再引戴耀廷7月7日《蘋果日報》文章〈民主派 35+ 初選會否觸犯國安法〉，及7月9日時任政制及內地事務局局長曾國衞指初選或違《國安法》後，戴耀廷的 Facebook 回應，均強調否決預算案是《基本法》賦權，不會違《國安法》。法官陳仲衡留意到後者無提令特首下台，區同意。
+
+潘熙再引述7月9日初選記者會，區曾指「冇諗過」民主派做團結協調的工作亦會被指違法，又指搞初選多年，「卻喺今次要用一啲咁嚴重嘅指控去恐嚇參與嘅香港市民」，指會「盡我哋最大嘅努力去處理今次情況」，戴耀廷會上亦再次指初選不違法。潘熙問，區當時是否仍信初選不違法，區再重申：「法律上我信任咗戴耀廷當時既觀點，政治上，我開始響起問號，呢個係基於我嘅政治判斷。」
+
+#### 區指仍辦初選因對法律未有正確認識、沒足夠時間冷靜思考
+
+區續解釋，當時「一啲親建制嘅輿論，作出咗一定程度嘅指控」，而若官方機構都開始指控，他認為「政治上是一個警號」。法官陳仲衡問，既然政府初選前已指初選或違法，為何當時仍繼續舉行，區解釋「我當時的確對法律未有正確認識，舉例說非法手段係乜嘢」，而且「初選當時已經如箭在弦」，7月9日舉行記者會、翌日警方已到香港民研搜證、11及12日已是初選，「我的確冇足夠嘅時間冷靜思考。」
+
+#### 區諾軒稱不少人問戴耀廷初選是否違法 但無仔細問否決財案是否違法
+
+區同意，截止初選投票日，記者和參加者不時問戴耀廷初選是否違法，但各人問題都「泛泛而談」，「未必去到否決財政預算案咁詳細，只係問犯唔犯法」，亦不記得誰發問。他又提到，戴耀廷對是否違法的回應包括《國安法》第29條勾結外國勢力，「咁所以當時趙家賢係用過好多努力去睇嗰啲資金有冇問題。」
+
+潘熙一度問，直至2020年7月，是否不同人在《國安法》下有不同關注，惟控方指問題籠統，法官李運騰亦指不同人必然對事情有不同看法。潘熙改指出，至7月11日，香港民研鍾庭耀曾關注初選是否違《國安法》，區同意，亦同意戴回應參選人提問指初選不違法，但理解沒有參選人詳細問及「否決財政預算案」會否違法。
+
+#### 區於中聯辦譴責初選違法後決定退出 指曾約見吳璟儁問補救措施
+
+潘熙其後引中聯辦7月14日發表的〈嚴厲譴責反對派策動非法初選 破壞立法會選舉公平 決不允許外部勢力操控香港政治事務〉，指初選違法，問區是否在該聲明發出後決定退出初選。
+
+區回應：「我唔單止係退出，而且盡我全力去解散整個初選」，指他在聲明發出後已決定將整個組織初選的機構停止工作。區指，他第一步嘗試約見時任政制及內地事務局政治助理吳璟儁，徵詢任何補救措施，並主動建議若組織者一起退出是否可行做法，而據其憶述，吳回應「只能夠盡量做」。區指，他其後往戴耀廷港大辦公室指應要退出和解散初選，戴當時指「要啲時間諗一諗」。區並將決定告知趙家賢，趙指只要區退出，他當日亦會退出，結果區於7月15日退出初選後，趙於7月16日亦宣布退出，戴耀廷之後亦宣布休息。
+
+#### 區指決定退出因《國安法》指自動放棄犯罪可減輕處罰
+
+區解釋，當時在 Facebook 發文宣布退出35+工作，並記得是早上9時，在西九龍法院審理8.18流水式集會案前。法官李運騰一度問，當日亦有抗爭派發表聲明，問哪者為先，區指是其帖文先發出。
+
+區續指有一點想說清楚，指他「當時睇咗國安法第33條(1)」，而作出此決定。根據《國安法》第33條(1)，「在犯罪過程中，自動放棄犯罪或者自動有效地防止犯罪結果發生的」，能使「對有關犯罪行為人、犯罪嫌疑人、被告人可以從輕、減輕處罰；犯罪較輕的，可以免除處罰」。
+
+#### 區稱希望所述情節能為整體同案「搵到好嘅求情同從輕發落嘅基礎」
+
+潘熙續問，以區理解，當時中聯辦是否沒有清楚解釋初選為何違法，區指「佢哋係表達過佢哋嘅觀點」，而他當時已覺得，「無論如何都要停止個工作」。潘熙亦問及「親建制輿論」是否無解釋為何初選違法，區再指他們有很多觀點，「但你唔知邊個觀點先係權威。」
+
+法官陳仲衡問，但區曾任立法會議員，是否不需戴耀廷意見，都知道可根據《基本法》權力否決預算案，區同意，但指始終戴耀廷是港大法律系教授，曾參與《基本法》起草委員會諮詢，「我作為後輩，佢係有權威。」
+
+潘熙再展示戴耀廷7月14日 Facebook 帖文，對中聯辦稱初選是「典型的涉嫌犯法」，嚴正指出完全不合常理，區指在網上看過相關文章，但沒有在當天見戴耀廷時談及。區其後主動指出，「我淨係想就住退出嗰度做一句補充啫」，指他們幾個主要人士退出後，「喺香港島、九龍西同埋新界東其實仲有一啲剩餘嘅工作，結果係冇任何牽頭嘅人可以處理得到，可以查閱得到 WhatsApp 紀錄入面嘅對話」。他並指：「我希望上述嘅情節，能夠為整體嘅同案搵到好嘅求情同從輕發落嘅基礎」，鄒家成一臉愕然，其後發笑，鄭達鴻、何桂藍等人也有發笑。
+
+案件周三（8日）下午續。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
+
+審訊不設陪審團，由3名國安法指定法官陳慶偉、李運騰及陳仲衡審理。控方代表為副刑事檢控專員萬德豪及周天行，辯方代表包括資深大律師潘熙、大律師沈士文、張耀良、黃宇逸、關文渭、馬維騉、盧敏儀、石書銘、黃廷光、Trevor Beel 等，本身是大律師的劉偉聰則自辯。
+
+不認罪被告包括獲准保釋的鄭達鴻、楊雪盈、彭卓棋、何啟明、劉偉聰、黃碧雲、施德來、陳志全、柯耀林、李予信10人，及還柙的何桂藍、吳政亨、鄒家成、林卓廷、梁國雄及余慧明6人。
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-03-08-euro-sifmanet-warsaw-report.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-03-08-euro-sifmanet-warsaw-report.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..951c38f5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-03-08-euro-sifmanet-warsaw-report.md
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Euro SIFMANet Warsaw Report
+author: Gonzalo Saiz
+date : 2023-03-08 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/S59wW7m.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "European Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network: Warsaw Report"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Participants discussed the process and value of sanctions implementation in Poland, international challenges and next steps._
+
+
+
+In late January 2023, RUSI’s Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies (CFCS) hosted a roundtable in partnership with the Polish Institute of International Affairs in Warsaw. The discussion, held under the Chatham House rule, gathered representatives from government ministries and agencies, the private sector – including banking institutions, law firms and consulting companies – and civil society. The event was part of RUSI’s ongoing study of EU sanctions implementation and wider responses to illicit finance (Euro SIFMANet) funded by the National Endowment for Democracy.
+
+
+### The Polish Legal Framework
+
+The roundtable opened with a candid statement from representatives of Poland’s public sector, who noted that before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, pressure to implement EU sanctions was low, as they had little or no connection with either the strategic goals of Polish foreign policy, or with individuals/entities and their assets in Poland. In view of the limited scope of those sanctions, this included the sanctions imposed on Russia in 2014. This lack of focus was also reflected by private sector participants, with one representative of the legal sector noting that sanctions had not featured in their work on transaction due diligence, despite the presence of a range of EU sanctions regimes.
+
+However, sanctions on Russia since February 2022 have brought to the fore the need to increase Poland’s capabilities to facilitate their implementation. Participants from the public sector stated that Poland has now cut off all reliance on Russia for its energy supply and severed most links to Russian businesses, a process termed by one participant as the ’de-russification’ of the Polish economy. With only 2.8% of Polish exports heading to Russia, Poland already had relatively limited connections with the Russian economy (for example, the country does twice as much trade with the Czech Republic as it does with Russia). In the view of roundtable participants, this limited economic connection with Russia is partly related to the countersanctions Russia has applied to Poland, for example on agricultural products. Still, following Poland’s commitment to effectively implement sanctions to weaken Russia’s capacity to fund and resource its military capabilities, the country has introduced new legislation relating to sanctions. This legal strengthening is underpinned by firm social support for countering Russian aggression against Ukraine, which incentivises both the public and private sectors to apply an unambiguous approach to sanctions implementation.
+
+More specifically, representatives from the Polish public sector emphasised that Poland complies not only with UN and EU sanctions, but also with UK and US sanctions, as many transactions are conducted in those countries’ currencies.
+
+On top of the EU’s sanctions regulations and designations, in 2022 Poland introduced additional legislation offering ‘specific solutions in counteracting the promotion of aggression against Ukraine and serving to protect national security’. A representative from the National Revenue Administration (NRA) provided a detailed description of the country’s new legislative framework, in which the Ministry of Finance is charged with implementing sanctions, and can impose administrative penalties for non-compliance. Within this ministry, the NRA has the most resources to take charge of these issues and is tasked with the supervision of sanctions implementation. However, multiple other agencies have relevant competencies in the national sanctions framework. Customs authorities monitor the transit of goods, and local customs offices can conduct audits and impose administrative penalties. And while the Financial Supervisory Authority audits the financial sector, the Ministry of Economic Development and Technology issues licences for trade on armaments and dual-use goods.
+
+Among the novelties introduced by the new legislation was the creation of a national sanctions list. The national list is managed by the Ministry of the Interior and aims to include names of persons and entities beyond those listed by the EU. In order to identify potential additions to the domestic list, Polish authorities look into entities that are not on the EU list but are identified as having Russian or Belarusian shareholders or board members. To this end, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) shares the list with Polish embassies abroad to get further information from the countries they are based in. There are currently 38 individuals and 39 entities on Poland’s national sanctions list. The representative from the NRA at the roundtable noted that some of the listed entities are companies with known links to high-profile Russian individuals established in Poland through the Netherlands, Singapore and Switzerland. The same authority explained that listing has reportedly had a meaningful impact on these companies, with some closing overnight as a result, leading to bankruptcy proceedings. In a testament to Poland’s efforts, representatives from the public sector estimated that assets amounting to €1 billion have been frozen in the country.
+
+As described by the NRA representative, the new sanctions Acts also imposed a national embargo on coal from Russia and Belarus, and introduced administrative penalties for non-compliance, which can amount to 20 million zlotys (around €4.2 million) and prison sentences of three to 15 years. Furthermore, Poland has also introduced new tools such as temporary compulsory administration, which was created to manage the frozen assets of entities subject to sanctions. This legal tool can be used to provide support to the workplaces of sanctioned entities, in order to enable business operations that serve a public utility to keep running, or to protect national economic interests.
+
+Participants from the public sector were keen to emphasise that Poland is an active contributor of sanctions proposals to the EU and stated that Poland is widely regarded among member states as a good source of sanctions ideas that, they argued, would result in the design of new packages of EU restrictive measures, if not immediately, then certainly at a later date. They believe that the delay in integrating Poland’s ideas into packages at the EU level impacts the effectiveness of those packages.
+
+In sum, a government representative described Poland as a ‘good runner’ in implementing sanctions, but emphasised that the implementation of sanctions is a ‘relay race’, in which Poland needs the member states that have closer economic links with Russia to pick up the baton of commitment to effectively implement sanctions.
+
+
+### Challenges to Implementation
+
+National authorities estimate the level of non-compliance among Polish businesses to be very low. In fact, representatives from the public sector added that the country’s main problem is over-compliance beyond what is legally mandated, especially from financial institutions.
+
+To assess the level of compliance, representatives from Poland’s financial intelligence unit (FIU) explained that the unit conducts audits and onsite inspections of obliged entities in both financial and non-financial sectors. The majority of investigations are related to customs fraud and the creation of fake customs codes. Under the new sanctions mandate, sanctions inspections have become an add-on to general anti-money-laundering inspections, and authorities have completed two inspections, with three more currently underway. Inspected institutions are most commonly banks, payment service providers, logistics companies and art dealers.
+
+A representative from the FIU explained that currently around seven to nine entities are suspected of having breached sanctions but noted that most of them are not Polish. A representative of another public authority added that some of these identified entities are Dutch companies transferring goods to a sanctioned Russian entity, and that their organisation is now investigating whether this was done intentionally. In this case, the source of information was the customs authorities, who have access to information related to the transfer of goods and were supported by the contribution of financial intelligence from Georgia regarding capital transfers to Russia.
+
+However, despite Poland’s efforts, participants from the public sector acknowledged that the country faces challenges in the implementation of sanctions. In particular, there are struggles with multi-layered corporate structures, and authorities described a recent example in which they identified a company that had been established in Poland by a Russian oligarch as a subsidiary of a company based in the British Virgin Islands. Representatives from both public and private sectors voiced their intention to be proactive in these operations, but reported that they sometimes face difficulties identifying these complex cases. Participants from the public sector explained that they try to reach out to the intelligence community to obtain relevant information, but its confidential nature means that this information cannot be shared with businesses. For this reason, the introduction of national sanctions lists has proved helpful as a means of alerting the private sector to individuals and entities of concern and enabling the freezing of their assets.
+
+Another challenge highlighted by the public sector was the confiscation of frozen assets. Representatives of public authorities explained that legal barriers continue to hinder confiscation, for example, the need to identify a connection to a criminal offence. They added that they often receive questions about the low number of assets frozen in Poland, but they explained that this matches the fact that there are very few Polish entities listed in EU sanctions lists, and trade between Poland and Russia is limited. The introduction of a domestic list aims to facilitate improvements in this regard.
+
+Yet, despite the confidence of the country’s public authorities in their work, representatives from the private sector voiced concerns over a lack of clarity in the sanctions rules themselves and noted that there were issues related to interpretation of these measures. Participants noted that freezing accounts is simple, but freezing tangible property presents added difficulties. Similarly, it was considered unclear as to what the approach should be in the case of a company where only a small portion of the shares is held by a sanctioned oligarch. These doubts were described by representatives from the banking sector as a major source of uncertainty for businesses, which fear not only the financial penalties associated with facilitating sanctions evasion, but also the reputational implications, the latter being described by a representative from a law firm as the primary driver of sanctions implementation in the private sector. The same participant also observed that sanctions had brought an unexpected bonus in some cases, as they could be used to trigger ‘force majeure’ on contracts that their clients wanted to terminate with Russian clients.
+
+A representative from the MFA explained that the ministry had received around 2,000 requests from the private sector for support on interpretation of sanctions regulations, and noted that they had replied to most of them, with the most common questions (and accompanying answers) published on the Ministry of Finance’s website. In contrast, the private sector expressed disappointment at the lack of outreach from the public sector and explained that, while information might be public, authorities should nevertheless approach businesses to raise awareness, provide guidance and support their implementation efforts.
+
+Representatives across all sectors also shared concerns related to the evasion risks posed by transactions with regional neighbours of Russia such as Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and China. Representatives of Polish public authorities added that they are unable to collect information from entities abroad without the support of the authorities in the relevant jurisdiction, who can of course refuse to cooperate.
+
+Representatives from the MFA described foreign direct investment (FDI) as a powerful tool to circumvent sanctions, through mechanisms such as the ‘citizen by investment’ schemes (also known as ‘golden passports’). Participants from both public and private sectors also discussed the use of active financial measures, whereby a rival can make strategic use of investments or donations into another state’s economy to gain influence in that society with the underlying intention of undermining its stability. These concerns make the screening of FDI an essential task, and yet participants complained that there is no unified procedure on FDI at EU level. Instead, FDI screening is at the discretion of individual member states, whose current approach, according to the Polish MFA, is to primarily look into investments in specific sectors, such as security or national infrastructure. However, these sectors are not the only ones that can present opportunities for bad actors to gain influence over another country, with participants from both public and private sectors expressing unease about foreign actors financing the targeting of civil society, donating to cultural and educational institutions, or funding extremist political campaigns.
+
+Representatives of national authorities explained that they are currently awaiting a judgment from the European Court of Justice regarding Malta’s ‘golden passport’ scheme, also noting that loopholes in the Austrian scheme remain and have not yet been investigated. The EU is taking small steps to regulate investment schemes, through non-binding guidelines rather than via direct regulation. In fact, a representative from the MFA stated that efforts made to improve FDI screening and increase information-sharing come predominantly from the private sector. In this regard, the MFA representative recognised that Poland needs to improve its tools and analytical models to make sure no business under its jurisdiction has connections to a listed entity either in the country or abroad.
+
+
+### Roundtable Recommendations
+
+Participants from the public sector expressed a belief that the most significant restrictive measures issued by the EU have been already adopted and there is little need for new sanctions; however, implementation is key and thus the main proposal from this sector is to focus on closing loopholes.
+
+The decision by the EU to de-SWIFT Russian banks was an impactful measure. However, not all Russian banks were banned from SWIFT, which undercuts effectiveness and – as noted in previous SIFMANet roundtables – leaves open a loophole for abuse. A proposal put forth by the Polish MFA during the roundtable was to de-SWIFT all remaining Russian banks. However, representatives from all sectors predicted possible pushback in some cases, noting the reluctance of countries such as Germany or Italy to take measures against Gazprombank.
+
+Representatives from the private sector also agreed on the need to target professional enablers, such as lawyers and accountants, within member states. These actors are supposed to be gatekeepers of the EU’s financial system but, without adequate regulation, they often serve to facilitate active financial measures from rival states and advance the interests of hostile actors in undermining the security and stability of the EU.
+
+Participants from both public and private sectors also voiced concerns over the lack of available measures for taking steps against third countries for hosting Russian assets and/or facilitating evasion. The same participants did note the latest steps taken by the EU towards allowing for the sanctioning of third-country entities, in the most recent revision of Regulation 269. However, representatives from the public sector added that they expect challenges in achieving consensus among all 27 member states over imposing these sanctions, given a historical aversion to extra-territoriality.
+
+Seeking to provide new creative proposals, participants from the private sector discussed leveraging the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) to further restrict Russian business. CBAM is a mechanism, expected to be operational from October 2023, through which non-EU businesses must fulfil the climate standards applicable to EU member states in order to import goods into the Union. However, several participants from the public and private sectors doubted the viability of using this tool for the implementation of sanctions, given that its mandate is entirely for environmental purposes.
+
+The discussion also addressed the possibility of instrumentalising the debt that third countries, such as Serbia or Bosnia, have with the EU or the IMF as a means of applying pressure to encourage their compliance with sanctions. However, participants discussed the likelihood that this step would meet countermeasures from affected countries. For example, Turkey could leverage its migrant deal with the EU in retaliation.
+
+Most importantly, attendees agreed that it is crucial to keep political attention and pressure sustained over time to make sanctions effective. To succeed, public sector participants highlighted the need to improve the communication and publicity around sanctions, in particular the impact they are having in restricting the Russian economy, to encourage both citizens and private businesses to commit the necessary resources to ensure sanctions are implemented effectively.
+
+---
+
+__Gonzalo Saiz__ is a Research Analyst for Project CRAAFT and works at the RUSI offices in Brussels. His research focuses on the crime-terror nexus and its impact on terrorism financing in Europe.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-03-08-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-21.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-03-08-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-21.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..2ed83891
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-03-08-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-21.md
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第廿一日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-03-08 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 區諾軒指私人信件被公開「對我都有一定嘅傷害」盼可免則免
+- 區諾軒指戴耀廷稱「攬住中共跳出懸崖」瘋狂：挑動國家情緒係過份咗
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（8日）踏入審訊第21天，區諾軒繼續接受盤問。辯方周一展示區諾軒1月尾寫予鄭達鴻的私人信件，形容鄭被公民黨「連累」等，區今甫開庭便舉手示意，指信件「其實對我都有一定嘅傷害，我更加唔想第三者造成傷害」，望之後提問如非必要，「可免則免」。法官陳仲衡指辯方如認為信件有助其當事人，可就此盤問，除非問題與案無關法庭才會介入，區諾軒表示「我會從容面對」，被告欄傳出笑聲。區諾軒在盤問下並確認，並不肯定鄭達鴻曾否同意在當選後「無差別」否決預算案，又指曾於2020年5月與沈旭暉及林瑞華等功能組別參選人作「非正式交流」。
+
+#### 區諾軒指展示私人信件造成一定傷害 望之後提問「可免則免」
+
+代表鄭達鴻和梁國雄的資深大律師潘熙周一盤問時，展示區諾軒今年1月尾寫予鄭達鴻的私人信件，形容鄭達鴻被公民黨「連累」，又指若非公民黨忽然「搶疆」開記者會，他和李予信的處境會截然不同。
+
+區諾軒今甫坐下便舉起右手，表示：「我有個建議，上一庭展示過私人信件呢，其實對我都有一定嘅傷害，我更加唔想第三者造成傷害，希望接下來嘅提問如果引用唔係必要嘅，可免則免。」何桂藍面露愕然。
+
+法官陳仲衡表示，區諾軒要明白辯方如認為信件有助其當事人，可就信件內容盤問，除非問題與案無關，法庭才會介入。區諾軒向法官點頭：「我會從容面對」，林卓廷等發笑。法官李運騰表示，文件可僅展示予證人及法庭，但不一定需向公眾展示，辯方往後可與控方商討。潘熙則向區諾軒表示，其信件是由控方在「未被使用材料」披露，故他有責任就此向區提問，但他不會再就信件發問，會就另一範疇發問，區表示「明白」。
+
+#### 區確認7月11日前認為否決預算案合法、不肯定鄭達鴻曾否同意無差別否決財案
+
+潘熙早前展示多篇戴耀廷《國安法》前後談及初選不違法的帖文、文章及訊息，今再展示戴耀廷5月5日於《明報》撰寫的文章〈立會否決財政預算案的憲制設計〉，區同意戴認為否決財政預算案致特首下台是符合《基本法》。至於5月12日〈「支持否決」不能成為DQ理由——再論立會否決財政預算案的憲制設計〉一文，戴提及全國政協委員張志剛對他指正，他須指出其觀點謬誤，區同意此為建制派認為初選有問題的其中一個觀點。
+
+潘熙再問及，《國安法》實施後、區諾軒於7月15日退出初選工作前，是否至少有部分候選人關注否決財政預算案會否違法。區表示候選人是擔心會否觸犯《國安法》，「但未去到討論否決財政預算案本身係咪犯法咁仔細」，但戴曾嘗試向候選人解釋否決預算案是「沒有違法」。
+
+法官李運騰續問，區有否聽過候選人表達對戴耀廷回應的質疑，區指「觀察唔到」，因通常是候選人找戴耀廷的「一對一對話」。區在法官詢問下同意，他並無參與其中，李運騰遂着他只談及自己認知的內容。
+
+潘熙再引戴耀廷7月1日發予趙家賢和區諾軒等人的訊息，提及「因此，35+的目標要否決財政預算案，應沒有觸犯國安法」。區確認，由當天到7月9日初選記者會和7月11日初選投票日會見記者，戴耀廷都仍然相信否決財政預算案是合法。而他本人亦相信戴耀廷指否決預算案是合法的看法，他也看不到其他候選人對此表達異議。
+
+潘熙再問及，區諾軒個人是否不知道鄭達鴻曾否同意當選後「無差別」否決財政預算案，區答：「我唔肯定。」
+
+
+▲ 鄭達鴻
+
+#### 區稱5月曾與沈旭暉及功能組別人士非正式交流 林瑞華5至7月曾表達否決的兩難
+
+區諾軒在盤問下同意，當時有留意功能組別人士有否參選，並從參選記者招待會及選舉事務處網頁等，得知公民黨林瑞華最終有報名參選立法會。潘熙其後就區諾軒的手機行事曆盤問，區指「我反而唔介意」在庭上展示行事曆。就早前供稱的「沈旭暉35+交流會」，區表示於2020年3月下午2、3時在新蒲崗一個圓桌會議（roundtable）的辦事處舉行，並在翻查行事曆後確定於3月20日早上10時，於新蒲崗勤達中心一單位舉行。
+
+
+▲ 沈旭暉
+
+潘熙其後展示行事曆，顯示3月20日的紀錄無沈旭暉名字，但同年5月6日則有題為「simon shen」的紀錄。區解釋交流會於3月舉行，而5月6日是與沈旭暉和其他功能組別參選人在林瑞華創辦的餐廳晚膳，作「非正式交流」，林瑞華亦有出席。
+
+潘熙問，林當日是否仍有表達對否決預算案的關注，區指該些功能組別人士「絕少提及」有關是否否決預算案的問題，而就他對林瑞華於5月至7月的「總括印象」，林的確向他提及過否決預算案的「兩難」，因他要照顧飲食界選民。
+
+法官李運騰問5月6日會面上曾否討論該議題，區答「肯定唔係主題」，但他不確定林瑞華當天有否向他表達此意見。他印象中當日出席的候選人亦無參與初選。區在盤問下再確認，在該次會面後，由2020年5月到7月，林瑞華曾向他表示否決預算案的兩難。
+
+
+▲ 林瑞華
+
+案件下午續審。
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（8日）踏入審訊第21天。區諾軒繼續接受盤問，其書面供詞提及他初選後曾公開鮮明反對戴耀廷言論，認為初選應與戴文章分開審視。區今提及他辦初選的「初心」，是不應捆綁參選人就否決預算案的立場，但「好可惜」戴耀廷在初選發展過程發文鼓勵參加者運用否決權，令初選有「質性上」的變化，《國安法》後初選的犯法風險亦越來越高。區又形容，戴耀廷〈真攬炒十步〉一文想法太瘋狂，尤其最後一步「要攬住中共跳出懸崖」：「我哋係生活喺一國兩制下嘅香港，你發表一篇文章挑動咗國家嘅情緒，我認為係過份咗啦」，有被告發笑。
+
+此外，區確認他主要負責地方選區及超區的工作，沒有「沾手」衞生服務界，而該界別無召開協調會議，亦無就否決預算案字眼作討論，他對余慧明參選目標等無直接認知。
+
+
+▲ 余慧明
+
+#### 區諾軒指只曾見過余慧明一次 對當選後會有何行為無直接認知
+
+代表第八被告鄭達鴻和第四十一被告梁國雄的資深大律師潘熙下午完成盤問，代表第十被告楊雪盈的大律師張耀良原打算接着發問，惟法官要求先由代表第五被告吳政亨和第四十七被告余慧明的大律師石書銘開始。
+
+石書銘指就吳政亨沒有問題要問，並為余慧明作盤問。區諾軒在盤問下同意，只在2020年7月初銅鑼灣教協舉辦的初選記者會上，見過余慧明一次，當時余是會上其中一名發言者，區幫忙計算其發言時間，「我冇同佢有特別嘅對話。」
+
+石書銘其後問到，區諾軒是否不知道余慧明參與初選的目的，區表示只知道包括余慧明的幾個衞生服務界參選人，約於5月曾接觸戴耀廷，稱有興趣舉辦初選，戴與香港民意研究所交流後，接納衞生服務界作為初選參選的界別之一。但區同時指，因為不是他負責，故沒有「沾手」衞生服務界的初選，對於余一旦當選後會有何行為亦沒有直接認知。
+
+#### 區指衞生服務界無協調會議、對戴耀廷與參選人溝通不知情
+
+區同意，他是衞生服務界一個用以發放訊息的 WhatsApp 群組成員之一，並指該群組只是討論初選後勤工作。庭上展示群組資訊，顯示成員包括候選人余慧明、劉凱文、袁偉傑及李國麟，而戴耀廷、民主動力趙家賢、鍾錦麟及職員黎敬輝亦在群組內。
+
+區同意以其記憶和理解，群組內沒有討論過參選人一旦當選後會作甚麼行為，衞生服務界亦沒有舉辦過協調會議。區亦指，戴耀廷沒有與衞生服務界候選人開會討論，「以我理解，佢係個別聯絡唔同候選人。」區強調自己在群組中「幾乎不發一言」，對戴與候選人討論的內容亦不知情，只知道戴向組織者匯報的資訊。
+
+#### 區稱與沈旭暉聯絡者與戴耀廷「太唔同」 不應視為謀劃一部分
+
+石書銘其後問及區，他作為初選組織者，是否集中於地方選區及超級區議會，而功能組別只是次要，區表示：「我的確主要負責地方選區及超級區議會嘅組織工作，但唔代表我唔關心功能組別嘅事」，並補充：「但我見到嘅功能組別民主派候選人，同戴耀廷接觸嘅太唔同啦，我接觸嘅主要係同沈旭暉聯絡嘅嗰班人，在本案而言，甚至唔應該視為謀劃嘅一部分」，吳政亨等隨即發笑。
+
+法官李運騰即指，「其他人士有否參與串謀，是由法庭去決定，不是你」，指區只需告訴法庭他所知道的事（“Whether or not there were other persons involved in this conspiracy, is a matter for the court to decide, not you. You just tell us what you know.”），旁聽席和被告欄再傳出笑聲。區在法官陳仲衡詢問下再確認，與沈旭暉聯絡的人沒有參與初選。
+
+李運騰再問到，地區直選就否決財政預算案的爭議，如使用「會」或「會積極」字眼，有否在衞生服務界出現，區指「的確係冇一個會議觸及過相關嘅討論」；而戴耀廷亦沒有向他提及曾出現有關討論。區並在李運騰詢問下確認，與沈旭暉聯絡、有意參選功能組別的人士，並沒有人來自衞生服務界。
+
+#### 區確認指余慧明是「抗爭派」因她出席抗爭派記者會
+
+另外，區諾軒早前曾指余慧明屬「抗爭派」，石書銘問是否因為余曾出席抗爭派記者會，區同意。石再問到，區是否不清楚余參與初選之目的，惟遭法官陳慶偉打斷，指他早前已問相關問題。法官李運騰則指，如石書銘認為其當事人並非抗爭派一員，可向區諾軒指出其案情，石書銘一度回頭望向余慧明，其後沒有再就此發問。
+
+
+▲ （資料圖片）
+
+#### 區指曾表明反對戴耀廷文章 指辦初選初心是不應該捆綁否決財案
+
+石書銘其後引述區諾軒2022年9月14日的供詞，提及接受港台邀請到節目「千禧年代」，與梁美芬任嘉賓，並指「我於節目上很鮮明地反對戴耀廷文章的言論，公開聲明初選活動與戴耀廷的文章應該分開審視」。在盤問下，區表示他是於退出初選翌日出席該節目。法官陳慶偉追問區所指的是戴耀廷哪篇文章，區指是戴於4月尾發表的「攬炒十步曲，這是香港人的宿命」（應為〈真攬炒十步 這是香港宿命〉）。
+
+區續解釋反對的原因：「我舉辦初選嘅初心，係唔應該捆綁否決預算案嘅立場，但係好可惜，喺初選嘅發展過程，戴耀廷發表過唔少嘅文章，鼓勵唔同參加者運用否決權。」他續指：「去到6、7月嘅時候，開始有唔同嘅輿論聲音指初選犯法，特別係6月30日《港區國安法》立法，初選嘅犯法風險越嚟越高」，這亦是他在節目中指戴耀廷文章應與初選分開的原因。區並重申：「事實係，初選當時嘅法律風險，的確係好高。」
+
+#### 區指戴攬炒十步想法太瘋狂 令初選有「質性上變化」
+
+法官李運騰續指，區諾軒與戴耀廷在2020年3月就協調會議討論，其後開始舉行不同選區的協調會議，差不多每個會議的文件都會用到「會運用」或「會積極運用」權力否決財政預算案的字眼，故區諾軒並非在4月尾才知道使用否決權是35+計劃的其中一個元素，區同意，指「我知情嘅」。
+
+李遂問：「既然你不同意戴耀廷，有沒有向他表達？」區諾軒指沒有特別向戴表達，是因為協調會議的確存在不同意見，「我曾經相信，呢個係參選者自己嘅選擇」，但當戴4月陸續刊出幾篇關於攬炒的文章後，「我開始覺得佢嘅睇法，令到初選有質性上面嘅變化。」區指這亦是為何他在戴發表文章後，會向他指其文章「想法太瘋狂」。
+
+#### 戴稱「要攬住中共跳出懸崖」區指活於一國兩制香港卻挑動國家情緒
+
+法官陳慶偉指，戴耀廷其實提出了十步，並問區「你認為戴耀廷提及的十步之中，去到哪一步你覺得瘋狂？是第7至10步？還是全部？」，林卓廷、鄒家成等被告發笑。區表示：「我記得佢篇文章有提及一句說話，話要攬住中共跳出懸崖」，陳慶偉指那是第十步，區並解釋：「我哋係生活喺一國兩制下嘅香港，你發表一篇文章挑動咗國家嘅情緒，我認為係過份咗啦」，鄭達鴻、何桂藍等發笑。區最後同意陳慶偉指，是戴耀廷整篇文章給予他的觀感，令他感覺戴是瘋狂。
+
+#### 控方於盤問後始知區諾軒行事曆 認遲交予辯方
+
+代表第八被告鄭達鴻和第四十一被告梁國雄的資深大律師潘熙，於午休後表示完成盤問，其後大律師張耀良站起身準備盤問，指他代表第十被告楊雪盈。法官陳慶偉問：「那第五被告（吳政亨）呢？」代表吳的大律師石書銘表示，吳的名字排在公訴書（indictment）的最後（吳曾進行初級偵訊，是最後一名交付高院的不認罪被告，初選案分成認罪和不認罪兩案後，吳被排為本案最後一名被告，獲發編號A18（accused）），惟陳慶偉指「第五被告仍是第五被告（“D5 is still D5.”）」。石書銘其後向走到被告欄前方的吳政亨索取指示後，表示就吳而言，沒有問題要問區諾軒。
+
+至於石書銘同時代表的余慧明（第四十七被告），石指因不久前才收到控方有關區諾軒行事曆的未被使用材料，望能保留就余的提問，惟法官陳慶偉着他先問其他問題，主控萬德豪亦表示今天審訊前已向石的律師提供該些材料。法官李運騰則指，所有未被使用材料應在開審前已完成審視，對相關申請於數天前才作出感到驚訝。萬德豪解釋，控方於區接受盤問時才意識到該行事曆的存在，故這麼遲才呈交。
+
+#### 張耀良原打算接着盤問 惟法官要求由石書銘開始
+
+法官李運騰續指，石書銘或可就行事曆以外的事情發問。石重申，吳政亨和余慧明排在公訴書的最後，加上由資深大律師潘熙開始發問（鄭達鴻為第八被告，公訴書排首位），故以為他是最後一個發問。
+
+惟陳慶偉指，肯定石有其他議題要發問；李運騰亦指石應頗清楚他的案情和要問的問題，又指區諾軒已在證人台至少3星期，「你是說你沒有問題要問他嗎？」石指就吳政亨沒有問題，但法官指不是問吳政亨。法官陳仲衡亦指，石同時代表吳政亨和余慧明，理應知道他是「第二個」盤問。（不過根據公訴書，鄭達鴻是本案首名被告，其次是楊雪盈，余慧明和吳政亨排在最後；而若按原來的被告號碼，吳政亨則是首名被告，其次方為鄭達鴻。）
+
+石重申他因公訴書和律師席座位均排在最後而被混淆（confusion），陳慶偉指那絕對不相關。石欲再解釋，惟陳慶偉厲聲指「現在開始你的盤問（“Start your cross examination now.”）」，石再稱望索取指示，惟陳慶偉舉起手中間尺，指着石說：「不，現在開始！（No, now!）」
+
+案件明午續。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
+
+### 16人不認罪受審
+
+審訊不設陪審團，由3名國安法指定法官陳慶偉、李運騰及陳仲衡審理。控方代表為副刑事檢控專員萬德豪及周天行，辯方代表包括資深大律師潘熙、大律師沈士文、張耀良、黃宇逸、關文渭、馬維騉、盧敏儀、石書銘、黃廷光、Trevor Beel 等，本身是大律師的劉偉聰則自辯。
+
+不認罪被告包括獲准保釋的鄭達鴻、楊雪盈、彭卓棋、何啟明、劉偉聰、黃碧雲、施德來、陳志全、柯耀林、李予信10人，及還柙的何桂藍、吳政亨、鄒家成、林卓廷、梁國雄及余慧明6人。
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-03-09-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-22.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-03-09-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-22.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..166f40f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-03-09-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-22.md
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第廿二日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-03-09 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 辯方就區諾軒背景及民主運動提問 官多番打斷質疑無關、稱對政治運動歷史無興趣
+- 辯方問政府若讓步抗爭派是否不一定否決財案 區：我唔係適當嘅角色評論
+- 官關注審訊進度、料審至聖誕 鄒家成、林卓廷等4人擬作供
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（9日）踏入審訊第22天。辯方今就區諾軒的學術和從政背景及初選背景發問，區同意「35+」是以往民主派追求政改的延續。惟法官多番打斷提問，質疑問題與案無關，又指對香港政治運動歷史沒有興趣，籲勿將審訊當作政治平台提倡政治主張，辯方回應本案無可避免觸及政治。區又同意，五大訴求除了撤回修例和成立獨立調查委員會等5項，亦有人提出官員為警暴問責和時任特首林鄭月娥下台，解釋五大訴求概念「含糊」，各人有不同說法，組織者亦「冇清楚傾過」定義。法官陳仲衡問是否不去定義就能取悅所有人，李運騰亦問是否即如聖誕樹，想掛什麼上去都可以？引來被告大笑。
+
+#### 辯方就區諾軒背景及立會選舉發問 官稱對政治運動歷史無興趣
+
+代表吳政亨和余慧明的大律師石書銘今繼續盤問區諾軒。區在盤問下，確認他過去10年在香港民主運動有較投入的角色，他2009年、即22歲時加入民主黨，2014年前亦曾參與「左翼21」活動，形容該組織是一班有志於社會公平分配的年青人，開讀書會、關心時事和政府政策。他確認，他於中文大學修讀政治與行政學系學士和碩士，專攻比較政治和公共政策，並於東京大學修讀公共政策博士，研究亞洲全民退休保障，他亦曾於香港城市大學專上學院任客席講師。法官陳慶偉一度質疑問題不相關，惟石書銘指望就引發35+的民主運動背景發問。
+
+至於政治參與，區確認於2011年當選南區區議員，2012和2016年參選立法會議員，並在香港民主運動活躍，曾於2017年任民間人權陣線召集人，並曾兩度參選民主黨主席，並於2018年補選當選立法會議員，但任期只有1年9個月，其後被終審法院取消資格。
+
+區同意，根據其學術背景及政治參與，他對香港追求政治改革的歷程非常熟悉亦有親身參與，而「35+」計劃建立一套民主派協調機制，亦是香港漫長政改歷史的其中一章。區同意，初選協調機制是因應比例代表制的制度建立，而民主派每屆都是「多票、少議席」。石書銘續問，對泛民主派來說，要求普選是否有《基本法》的基礎，惟法官李運騰質疑，區能否代其他人回答，法官陳慶偉亦提醒石只是代表吳政亨和余慧明。
+
+石書銘表示明白，惟欲就初選的脈絡發問。陳慶偉指，「我們對香港的政治運動歷史沒有興趣，我們只對本案控罪有興趣。（“We are not interested in the political history movement in Hong Kong, we are only interested in the charge.”）」石指控罪只能在政治的背景下理解，陳慶偉指他明白，「我們不需要你教」，李運騰亦指石書銘的問題在主問已觸及，可直接問其他問題。石書銘指尚有許多細節未觸及，望能提供一個完整的圖畫，惟陳慶偉再着石直接發問，又指法庭不需區諾軒就香港的政治改革講課（“We don't need a lecture from him on political reform in Hong Kong.”）。
+
+#### 區諾軒同意35+是政改延續 官再打斷發問指不應倡政治主張
+
+石書銘續問，35+是否以往民主派追求政治改革的延續，區同意。石再問，直至2019年，民主派陣營是否已對政改進程感到挫敗，法官李運騰再打斷，指區只能代表自己說話，法官陳慶偉亦着石「不要利用法律程序作為政治平台（“Do not use this proceeding as a political platform.”）」。石遂改問區曾否與其他團體討論，惟陳慶偉再指問題太空泛。石書銘重申，本案核心無可避免觸及政治議題（“The crux of the matter in this case inevitably touches on political issues.”），他不是要以此作為政治平台。陳慶偉表示明白，但指其盤問有限度，重申不應以此為平台提倡任何政治主張，並駁回其問題。
+
+石書銘指他並非提倡任何政治主張，並改問為何區諾軒及戴耀廷等組織者推動35+。惟陳慶偉再指區已在主問答過該問題，即望為民主派建立協調機制。石再問有否其他原因，惟陳慶偉打斷着他問下一條問題。李運騰指石如想提出其他原因可以指出，石回應想問開放式問題，惟陳慶偉不准他繼續發問。
+
+#### 區諾軒同意五大訴求概念「含糊」 組織者「冇清楚傾過」定義
+
+區諾軒其後在盤問下，同意35+的性質是要爭取立會過半，向政府問責並要求政府回應公眾訴求，而以上兩項都是當時社會所缺乏的。他亦認為，當時初選組織者和參與者都有過相關看法，並主動提及他2020年4月30日在《蘋果日報》的訪問，指當時有兩種聲音，一邊是支持攬炒和否決財政預算案；另一邊是要爭取立法會過半，以增加談判空間。
+
+就區在訪問提到藉35+爭「五大訴求」，石書銘指五大訴求是否即「撤回《逃犯條例》修訂」、「成立獨立調查委員會」、「撤回暴動定性」、「特赦被捕者」及「爭取雙普選」，區同意，並指尚有另外兩點，包括「相關政府官員為警暴負責」，及「林鄭月娥下台」。
+
+法官李運騰問，是否即除了五大訴求，還有另外的訴求，區指這是當時他聽到的訴求，並同意法官陳慶偉指，五大訴求的概念「的確係含糊嘅」，「因為呢啲訴求有時有，有時冇。」李運騰指他不太明白，問五大訴求其實是否有多於五個訴求？此時施德來點頭，陳志全亦發笑。區否認，指當時社會輿論的確不斷講五大訴求，「至於係邊五個，唔同人有唔同講法」，林卓廷亦邊笑邊點頭。
+
+法官陳仲衡指，「五大訴求」是35+目標，初選組織者曾否定義五大訴求，區指「的確冇清楚傾過，但係喺嗰七樣嘢裡面」，並同意李運騰指，「五大訴求」是像「口號」一樣。陳仲衡續問，是否若不具體定義何謂「五大訴求」，便可取悅所有想要「五大訴求」的人，區確認「當時嘅公眾討論的確係咁嘅情況」。李運騰又形容，是否即如聖誕樹，想掛什麼上去都可以？此時被告大笑，區並稱「都離唔開呢七條樹枝」。
+
+區諾軒其後在石書銘盤問下，同意林鄭月娥下台與爭取雙普選兩訴求有較多「可取代性」；而要求政府官員為警暴負責亦與要求獨立調查委員會查警暴相似，兩者實是「五大訴求」的另一種演繹方式。石書銘其後欲再問，35+計劃如何落實區提及的目標，惟再被陳慶偉要求問下一條問題。
+
+#### 官稱對辯方盤問感困惑 提醒應與案相關
+
+小休後，法官陳仲衡表示對石書銘的盤問感到困惑（puzzled），法官李運騰指，看不到辯方問題與控罪或余慧明角色的相關性，又指若石書銘不作解釋，難以容許他繼續發問。石書銘指控罪與被告取得立會過半的「非法手段」相關，惟李運騰強調，控方案情不僅談及取得立會過半，而是指被告串謀目標是「無差別」否決預算案。石書銘指，故希望理解初選組織者的看法和如何理解否決預算案，惟李運騰提醒，他只是代表吳政亨和余慧明，而吳並沒有盤問，着他只集中在自己的當事人。
+
+李運騰又指，若石書銘認為35+計劃不違法，則應向證人指出，又指石是在兜圈，並非處理35+的合法性問題，望他能善用法庭時間。法官陳慶偉其後問，石在結案陳詞希望有什麼陳述，石回應望指出整個「攬炒」的概念並非控方所指的「非法手段」及可「顛覆國家政權」。李運騰質疑證人是否可回答相關問題，陳慶偉亦多次問石期望證人回答什麼，石指望區回答就舉辦初選的想法，以說出初選的脈絡（context），惟陳慶偉指該說法太過空泛（hollow）。石解釋，望證人就初選的合法性作供，法官重申問題必須相關和集中。
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（9日）踏入審訊第22天。區諾軒續接受盤問，表示認為《基本法》精神是政府和立法會「互諒互讓」，他亦曾期望立會透過談判與政府解決反修例風波；並將「攬炒」一派歸結為「不斷透過施壓要求政府妥協」，意指「你唔合作，我都唔合作囉」。辯方問及，抗爭派曾否表示若政府回應五大訴求，便不會否決預算案，區表示無相關資訊，又指除非與被告有私交，否則「我唔係一個適當嘅角色去評論人（立場）」。辯方再問激進陣營是否以否決權作籌碼，區指政治人物通常都會實行所說的事，「不過當然都有啲政治人物話，『我講吓咋喎』」，法官和被告發笑。
+
+#### 區指《基本法》精神是政府與立會「互諒互讓」 曾期望透過談判解決反修例風波
+
+代表吳政亨和余慧明的大律師石書銘今繼續盤問區諾軒。石書銘就戴耀廷2019年12月的〈立會奪半，走向真普選重要一步〉一文發問，提及「立會奪半若能成功，最重要的不是能直接改變香港制度的本質，而是令立法會轉變為一個守護香港核心價值的重要堡壘」，問區諾軒作為初選組織者，當時是否抱持同樣看法，區指「我的確認同過呢篇文章，所以先開始同戴耀廷合作」。石問區為何認同，惟法官陳慶偉指與案無關，石解釋與本案串謀的目標相關，惟遭陳打斷並着他問下一條問題。
+
+石書銘其後引文中提及，「立法會最強大的力量是財政權 ⋯⋯ 因此，民主派在立法會奪半，應可運用立法會的財政權，迫使特區政權在運用公共資源上考慮公民的真正需要。」區同意戴耀廷於2020年1月的飯局提及該觀點。石其後就立法會議員向政府議案提出修訂的權力發問，惟再遭法官陳慶偉多番打斷指不相關。區其後確認，議員提出私人條例草案需要政府同意，議員亦不能對財政預算案提出修訂。
+
+區諾軒曾受訪指，當時對35+有兩種想像，分別是支持攬炒和否決財政預算案，及爭取立會過半以增加談判空間。石書銘續問，立會過半是否讓議員可增加與政府談判的空間，讓政府回應民生議題？區解釋，《基本法》第49至52條詳細談及關於立法會與政府處理財政預算案的機制，他一直對條文的解讀，是「當中嘅精神，其實就係政府同立法會大家，互相互諒互讓」，並在出現分歧時透過談判處理。區並舉例他任立法會議員時，曾就預算案與施政報告等與特首或財政司司長會面，形容「一個良好嘅政治制度，應該要做到呢一點」。
+
+區續指，若沿着該談判空間的思路發展下去，「我的確曾經期望過，新選出嚟嘅立法會，會同政府一齊透過談判解決反修例風波。」惟區亦指出，「攬炒論嗰一派係另一種睇法，我會歸結為不斷透過施壓，要求政府妥協。」他並指，該兩種看法，在多年民主運動亦有出現。
+
+#### 辯方問向政府施壓是否仍有討論空間 區舉人力社民連例子稱視乎情況
+
+石書銘續指，無論談判或施壓其實都是一體兩面，法官陳慶偉着他留待陳詞再述，又指「我知道你不喜歡這個答案」，惟石回應他其實喜歡該答案。石續問，區提及有陣營不斷施壓要求政府妥協，但是否仍有討論空間？區舉例，以往人民力量和社民連均被歸類為較激進的政團，並在政府是否派錢的議題上以拉布爭取訴求，對施政構成影響，惟其後政府決定直接派錢予市民後，他們亦決定停止拉布，「所以一切都係要睇情況而定。」
+
+法官陳仲衡問及，直至初選論壇，是否仍然有該兩個陣營存在，區指「相信總有候選人係可以歸類喺兩個陣營裡面嘅」，但認為仍要視乎他們當時言行，才會有較公允評價。石書銘續問，那對較激進陣營來說，若政府回應五大訴求，是否便不必然否決預算案。控方質疑問題屬揣測、區無法回答，法官陳仲衡亦指論壇上沒有相關言論，其問題充滿假設性，陳慶偉亦重申「籠統的問題只會換來籠統的答案」，亦沒有證案價值。
+
+#### 區諾軒指認為並非適當角色評論被告立場
+
+陳慶偉續指，區諾軒其實已回答了石的問題，即視乎各人言行。區同意，並指「呢幾日因為⋯⋯我相信嚟緊都會有唔少嘅辯方律師，會問我佢哋嘅當事人究竟係咪持守某個立場，我越諗越覺得，我唔係一個適當嘅角色去評論人，除非我同佢有私交，而可以提供到佢嘅諗法畀法庭」，何桂藍一度露齒笑。
+
+石書銘再問，以區觀察，是否同意有激進陣營的參與者以否決權作為籌碼，區答：「政治人物通常都係講乜嘢就實行啲乜嘢，不過當然都有啲政治人物話，『我講吓咋喎』，所以呢個問題真係好難答」，法官陳慶偉隨即發笑，多名被告包括鄭達鴻、林卓廷、余慧明和鄒家成等也忍俊不禁。
+
+#### 辯方問有否抗爭派稱若回應五大訴求就不否決財案 區稱無相關資訊
+
+石書銘再問，區曾否聽過激進陣營表示若政府回應五大訴求，他們或不會否決預算案，區指「始終係未發生嘅事」，又指「若果有人真係咁講，我哋就要相信囉」。法官陳仲衡補充，據庭上播放的片段，曾否有任何抗爭派人士表達過相關看法，區指看不到相關片段，「好難話呢個可能出嚟」，又指「我嘅難處的確係，當事人冇特別咁講，佢又冇同我私交」。
+
+法官李運騰問及，那區在不公開的協調會議曾否聽過抗爭派人士有相關說法，區則重申，雖然戴耀廷有提及「會積極運用」等字眼，但3至4月的氛圍尚未去到討論是否否決預算案，並指「的確冇人係喺嗰個時候特登講話如果政府做啲乜，我就唔用（否決權）啦。」李運騰再問，那在其他任何場合，區有否聽過任何抗爭派人士提過相關說法，區再稱「我真係冇相關嘅資訊」。
+
+#### 區諾軒稱「攬炒」意思為「你唔合作，我都唔合作囉」
+
+石書銘其後就「攬炒」發問，區同意「攬炒」意思為雙方互不讓步，導致雙方有損失。石其後引述2020年《立場》的戴耀廷訪問〈【選舉近了】面對 35+ 憧憬與「囚徒困境」 民主派有可能協調嗎？〉，提及2016年立法會選舉民主派名單數目創新高，卻導致「攬炒」局面：「前車可鑑，有沒可能避免因『囚徒困境』引致的『攬炒』結局？戴耀廷的構思，是辦一個『有公民參與的協調機制』⋯⋯」石指「攬炒」一詞亦用來形容2016年選舉。
+
+法官陳仲衡指，上文「攬炒」涉及對象是民主派之間，問區〈真攬炒十步〉一文所涉對象為誰，區指是政府與民主派之間。陳續指「攬炒」的意思要視乎脈絡，區同意。
+
+石續問，「攬炒」是否視乎雙方的互動，一方作出行為，另一方再回應。區解釋，「囚徒困境」中雙方合作能得益，「如果大家都唔合作，就係一種攬炒」，理解「攬炒」意思為「你唔合作，我都唔合作囉」。區並認為，35+中部分民主派若高舉「攬炒」，會解讀其動機是指「你唔合作，我都唔合作囉」。
+
+石書銘一度再問，若指戴耀廷4月文章提及「攬炒」，是指若政府不回應五大訴求，泛民才拒絕合作，該說法是否公道，法官陳慶偉指他應問戴耀廷。
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（9日）踏入審訊第22天。區諾軒繼續接受盤問，法官李運騰臨散庭前表示，對本案進度非常關注，指他於9月底需處理另一宗案件，惟本案自開審後24天，仍在處理首名控方證人的盤問。大部分辯方律師均認為，原定的90天足夠完成雙方案情，自辯的劉偉聰亦指感到樂觀，指他自被捕後每天也樂觀地生活，其中鄒家成、施德來、黃碧雲和林卓廷擬作供。法官陳慶偉指，若計及相關法律爭議、求情和裁決等，料審訊或需延至聖誕節。翻查資料，黎智英及《蘋果日報》3間公司涉勾結外國勢力案定於9月底開審。
+
+#### 法官關注審訊進度 指同意事實除首5段外均需舉證
+
+區諾軒今繼續接受盤問，臨散庭前，法官就案件進度與雙方商討。法官李運騰表示，對案件進度感到非常關注，指現時已是審訊第20多天，惟仍在處理首名控方證人，並只是第二名辯方律師進行盤問。他並指，他9月底有另一宗案件要處理，今早亦推遲了一宗原定8月開審的謀殺案，並向律師索取未來兩年日程，因他不認為本案能於8月初完成（“I see no prospect of this case finishing in early August.”）。翻查資料，壹傳媒創辦人黎智英與《蘋果日報》3間公司被控「串謀勾結外國勢力」等罪，原定今年9月25日開審，李運騰為該案主審法官之一，本案主控周天行亦為該案主控。
+
+李運騰要求控方估計審訊需時多久，周天行指，現時尚餘3名被告證人，至於其餘為程序而需要傳召的證人（formal witness），則視乎雙方同意的事實。控辯雙方早前讀出4份同意事實，當中黃碧雲、林卓廷和何桂藍同意的部分較少。李運騰指陳仲衡製作了比較列表，除了頭5段，幾乎其餘的段落均需控方舉證。法官陳慶偉指尚有逾100名證人，被告席傳來「吓」，控方確認名單上有100名證人，但希望其他證人證供能「相對上」較短。
+
+法官陳仲衡指，「相對」是一個相對的概念，李運騰亦笑指，一百年「相對上」較一千年為短，控方說法對法庭無甚幫助，問控方有否較實際的估計。陳慶偉指控方不可能有「實際的估計」，只能有「大概的估計（guesstimate）」，又問能否於聖誕前完成審訊，被告發笑。李運騰並指，法庭的底線是不希望押後續審（part heard），周天行回應，認為審訊能於8月前完成。李運騰其後指辯方或有更好的估算，並逐一問辯方的看法。
+
+#### 施德來、黃碧雲、林卓廷及鄒家成或作供
+
+大部分辯方律師認為90日足夠雙方案情。代表吳政亨和余慧明的大律師石書銘指，就區諾軒的盤問只餘下5至10分鐘，盤問其他證人需2至3天，亦不預計會傳召辯方證人。代表彭卓棋的大律師盧敏儀指，盤問區諾軒會於1小時完成；代表何啟明的大律師阮偉明亦指，就區諾軒的盤問會很簡短，亦不會傳召辯方證人。
+
+代表施德來的大律師黃廷光指，認為90日審期足夠，而施德來或會作供及傳召一名辯方證人，預計需時3日；代表黃碧雲和林卓廷的大律師沈士文則指，區諾軒的證供是3名被告證人中最長，其餘的會較短，認為90日足夠，而黃林二人或會作供，料需時3日。代表鄒家成的大律師陳世傑則指，鄒或會作供，但無法估計控方案情需時多久，因現時還在接收新的材料。代表柯耀林的大律師葉海琅指，或會傳召一至兩名證人。
+
+代表陳志全的大律師馬維騉，及代表鄭達鴻和梁國雄的大律師黃宇逸，均認為90日足夠，黃宇逸並指盤問區諾軒只用了1.5天，預計其他證人會更短。自辯的劉偉聰則表示，「我感到樂觀，這也是我被捕後度過每天的方法（“I am optimistic, that’s how I live everyday since my arrest.”）」，認為90日足夠處理整宗案件。
+
+#### 官指計算裁決求情等 案件或於聖誕才能完成
+
+不過亦有辯方認為90日不足夠。代表楊雪盈的大律師張耀良認為控方過於樂觀，料在90日審期外尚需多20至30日，而他需時少於1小時盤問區諾軒。代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel 指，會就「共謀者原則」作爭議，亦可能作中段陳詞，認為在90日審期外或需多10日進行法律爭議。代表李予信的大律師關文渭則指，預計會審至9月。
+
+法官李運騰最後苦笑指，雙方似乎只認為90日只足夠完成雙方案情，惟他與主控周天行均須處理9月的案件，若屆時本案審訊未完，將會面對重大困難，又指不是希望責怪任何人，但望雙方均做好準備。法官陳慶偉則指，要處理所有證據、法律爭議、結案陳詞、求情及裁決等，案件或需延至聖誕才能完成。
+
+案件明天續審。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
+
+### 16人不認罪受審
+
+審訊不設陪審團，由3名國安法指定法官陳慶偉、李運騰及陳仲衡審理。控方代表為副刑事檢控專員萬德豪及周天行，辯方代表包括資深大律師潘熙、大律師沈士文、張耀良、黃宇逸、關文渭、馬維騉、盧敏儀、石書銘、黃廷光、Trevor Beel 等，本身是大律師的劉偉聰則自辯。
+
+不認罪被告包括獲准保釋的鄭達鴻、楊雪盈、彭卓棋、何啟明、劉偉聰、黃碧雲、施德來、陳志全、柯耀林、李予信10人，及還柙的何桂藍、吳政亨、鄒家成、林卓廷、梁國雄及余慧明6人。
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-03-10-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-23.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-03-10-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-23.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..a684f3cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-03-10-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-23.md
@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第廿三日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-03-10 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 區諾軒稱楊雪盈落敗後仍參選有違35+共識、港島會議及文件無提及〈真攬炒十步〉
+- 區諾軒：否決財案為戴耀廷「單向」介紹 從不視吳政亨為組織者
+- 區諾軒稱辦初選「初心」與戴耀廷不同、民主黨「墨落無悔」後維持不無差別否決預算案立場
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（10日）踏入審訊第23天。區諾軒今接受代表港島區參選人楊雪盈和彭卓棋的大狀盤問，區諾軒同意楊雪盈政治議程主要提倡文化及動保政策，而楊雪盈並非任何港島候選人指定的替補人選，卻在初選落敗後報名參選立法會，是有違「35+」共識。區諾軒又同意，港島協調會議、初選提名表格及「35+」文件均無提及戴耀廷〈真攬炒十步〉一文，而否決預算案亦從來不是港島會議的重要議題，亦無聽過彭卓棋稱當選後會無差別否決預算案。
+
+辯方一度欲問，能否說戴耀廷是將有意參與初選者「帶上船」，再試圖將否決預算案的說法「強加」在他們身上，惟法官指區諾軒無法回答該問題，辯方終無繼續就此發問。
+
+#### 區諾軒同意楊雪盈政治議程倡文化及動保政策
+
+代表吳政亨和余慧明的大律師石書銘表示完成盤問，續由代表楊雪盈的大律師張耀良進行盤問。區諾軒同意，於2015年首次認識楊雪盈，當時楊有意參選灣仔區議會，向他諮詢競選的意見，楊成功當選後亦不時向他諮詢擔任區議員的意見。張耀良問，故區對楊的政治議程和任區議員的志向有一定認識，區稱「我係知道嘅」。
+
+
+▲ 楊雪盈
+
+區同意，楊雪盈是獨立候選人，沒有任何攻治聯繫，於2019年區選再次當選。張耀良續指，楊的政治議程與其他候選人略為不同，她在論壇自我介紹為有藝術教育背景，並在公眾服務特別提倡有關藝術和設計的議題，區同意，形容楊「好關注文化政策」。
+
+區確認，楊是非政府組織「香港文化監察」的主席，在任時曾推動不少文化政策，形容她很關注香港陶瓷業和泥窯的地方保育。他亦同意，楊曾於2018年成功爭取政府撥款10億，將低用量或少用的政府大樓改作文化用途；亦有倡議動物保護，爭取用政府無使用的土地拯救動物。張耀良問，上述是否其政治議程的主要政策，區指「可以咁講」，並解釋自2015年起有與楊恆常見面作直接溝通，故對相關事實的認知是由楊告知。
+
+#### 區同意楊雪盈初選落敗後仍參選立會 有違35+共識
+
+張耀良續就35+計劃發問，區諾軒早前供稱楊雪盈曾派代表出席一次協調會議，楊本人曾出席兩次。張續問，據區的記憶，楊雪盈會上是否不曾對戴耀廷有關否決預算案和五大訴求的看法表達意見？區指「佢冇表達」，亦「冇乜點表達」其他意見，但曾於第二和第三次會議對替補機制表達較強烈意見，當時羅冠聰提倡以「靈童制」，即候選人指定的方式替補被DQ者，但楊雪盈和徐子見不同意，認為應用「排名制」，即第二高票數的人作替補。
+
+區確認，楊雪盈最終於初選落敗，但在2020年7月報名參選立法會。張耀良一度問及楊是否有違「主流」做法，惟法官陳慶偉和李運騰均指沒有所謂「主流」。區其後確認，港島區在第二、三次會議投票取得共識，決定採用「靈童制」，但未決定派出名單數量，而其他選區均預設「靈童制」。法官李運騰遂問，楊雪盈最終報名參選立法會，是否即有違35+共識？區答「係，因為根據靈童制，要係勝出者指定一位替補人選，你先至得到35+支持」。
+
+#### 法官追問替補人選 區稱有預備惟無沒透露是誰 但楊雪盈不是
+
+區在法官陳仲衡詢問下，表示袁嘉蔚和梁晃維均是被DQ的初選勝出者，他一度不肯定鄭達鴻有否被DQ，問「鄭達鴻係咪都因為公民黨嘅緣故 DQ ⋯？」鄭發笑。翻查資料，鄭當時亦被DQ。
+
+
+▲ 鄭達鴻
+
+法官李運騰再問，楊雪盈是否不曾被任何初選勝出者指定為替補人選？區確認。法官陳仲衡續問，港島候選人有否指定候補人選，區則答：「根據 WhatsApp 紀錄，佢哋各自表示預備咗，但佢哋最後都冇講係邊個。」
+
+庭上早前提及，初選參加者報名時須交一萬元按金，若違初選共識便會沒收。法官陳慶偉續問，楊的一萬元按金有否被充公？區答：「呢個唔係我管理範圍，唔好意思，可以問返民主動力嘅代表」，陳志全等發笑。陳仲衡最後問，區諾軒是否知道，楊是不是港島候選人的替補？區肯定答：「不是。」
+
+#### 區稱彭卓棋與戴耀廷因初選首次會面 不肯定戴曾否發訊息
+
+代表彭卓棋的大律師盧敏儀其後開始盤問。區諾軒確認，2020年3月26日舉行的首次港島區協調會議，是港島區首次及唯一一次提及運用《基本法》權力否決財政預算案，亦確認港島區候選人只有一個於2020年6月29日成立的 WhatsApp 群組。區並確認彭卓棋曾出席港島全部3個協調會議，亦是該群組成員。
+
+法官陳慶偉提及，區曾提到此前有群組發放訊息。區解釋，是戴耀廷利用 WhatsApp 的廣播功能個別通知候選人，而非互相交流的群組，並在法官李運騰提問下確認，除了九龍東一區於3月已成立「35+九東立選座談會」群組，其他地方選區的 WhatsApp 群組均在6月才相繼成立，此前均由戴耀廷個別發放訊息。
+
+區諾軒確認，他與戴耀廷3月在李永財議員辦事處與彭卓棋團隊會面，是戴與彭的第一次見面，而除非二人私下有會面，否則他們其後的見面只是在協調會議中。盧敏儀問及，在區在場的情況下，戴和彭是否沒有交換電話，區稱「我冇辦法講到咁仔細」，盧再問，故區是否不知道戴曾否向彭發訊息，區指只能從大方向說，戴耀廷慣常於每次協調會議向各參與者交換電話號碼，並向他們發放訊息，只是他不能精準說出戴曾否找某些人。
+
+
+▲ 彭卓棋
+
+#### 區諾軒確認初選提名表格、35+文件及協調會議均無提〈真攬炒十步〉
+
+盧敏儀續提及，區曾於宣布退出初選工作翌日，在港台節目指戴耀廷於〈真攬炒十步〉一文的觀點應與初選分開審視，並問事實上，是否在任何提名表格、35+計劃文件和港島區協調會議均沒有提及過該篇文章，區同意。
+
+盧續問，那能否說〈真攬炒十步〉一文，與初選其實是「分開（separate）」的？主控周天行站起身，指「分開」一詞太籠統，法官李運騰亦澄清，辯方問題是否指「攬炒十步」並非初選一部分（not part of the 35+ project）。法官陳仲衡指，該文章所涵蓋的範圍似乎比35+更廣泛，問題應為「35+」是否文章的一部分。法官陳慶偉着辯方重新考慮問題，李運騰補充否則會適得其反（backfire）。
+
+盧敏儀指對答案感到滿意，即35+計劃任何文件和港島區協調會議都沒有提及〈真攬炒十步〉一文，區其後再次確認，「文件同香港島嘅協調會都冇（提及戴的觀點）。」
+
+#### 辯方問戴耀廷是否強加否決預算案想法在參與者 官指證人不能回答
+
+盧敏儀其後再問，能否說戴耀廷是將有意參與初選的人帶上船（took people interested in primary on board），再試圖將否決預算案的說法強加（impose）於上了船的人身上。法官陳慶偉指，其問題太長和費解，亦不認為區諾軒能回答，「他怎能知道戴耀廷是否將看法強加於其他人身上？」
+
+盧遂改問，戴是否先接觸有興趣參選的人，而港島區協調會議的討論焦點在於初選機制，如參選人被「DQ」後的替補機制、選票數量，否決財政預算案從來不是重要議題。區確認，重申否決預算案只是於首次會議由戴耀廷提及。
+
+#### 區稱無聽過彭卓棋提會無差別否決預算案
+
+區續確認，彭卓棋是獨立候選人，無政治聯繫，而案發時他與彭互相認識，彭亦從無向他提及一旦當選，會無差別否決預算案。盧敏儀再問，有否聽過彭向其他人提及該看法，區再指「所有被告問我都係咁講架啦，由返當事人公開嘅言行去決定，我只係有資格去評論我同佢嘅交流」，並確認他在場下，沒聽過彭向其他人表示會無差別否決預算案。
+
+案件下午續審，至現時為止，鄭達鴻、梁國雄、吳政亨、余慧明、楊雪盈及彭卓棋6人已完成盤問。
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（10日）踏入審訊第23天。區諾軒續接受九龍西何啟明及劉偉聰盤問，區同意在九西首次協調會議，否決預算案的議題僅由戴耀廷「單向」介紹，而在第二次會議除張崑陽和岑子杰外，其他人沒有就此表態，最終各區亦沒有就否決財案達成共識，承認會議上有「分歧」。區又形容，何啟明所屬的民協為溫和的傳統民主派，亦「從來沒有看李伯盧（吳政亨）為（初選）組織者的一部分」，吳聞言微笑。至於自辯的劉偉聰，指出他並無如區所言出席第二次會議，區指不排除記憶有錯，但已盡力記憶。
+
+#### 區同意首次九西協調會議 否決預算案議題不獲關注
+
+代表何啟明的大律師阮偉明進行盤問，指出何啟明首次出現在本案中，是在2020年3月24日九龍西首次協調會議，當時會議主要討論協調機制，包括誰可參選、預計勝出議席等，戴耀廷曾提及否決財政預算案，但該議題沒有得到任何關注，會後亦沒有達成任何共識，區同意。
+
+
+▲ 何啟明
+
+阮續指，第二次協調會議於4月29日舉行，是在戴耀廷發表〈真攬炒十步〉一文的翌日，惟焦點仍在協調機制，區同意。阮再指，當時張崑陽曾提及戴的文章，戴並因此作出回應，但此外其他人士對該議題不感興趣，區同意，並補充岑子杰曾提出質疑，但「除此之外就冇其他嘅嘢啦」，之後亦沒有第三次協調會議。
+
+#### 初稿提否決預算案僅戴耀廷「單向」介紹 除岑子杰張崑陽外無人表態
+
+區諾軒同意，戴耀廷首次會議準備的「35+計劃」文件，提及初選機制，但沒有觸及否決預算案。而在首次會議後，戴曾向與會者發出「35+立會過半計劃 民主派九西協調機制（初稿）」文件，該文件加入會運用權力否決預算案的條文，但區不知道戴是否實際上有發給所有人。
+
+辯方指根據該初稿，似乎否決預算案的議題曾在首次會議提及，但問區，事實上是否不曾有任何相關討論？區指「我只能夠話戴耀廷介紹嘅時候有講過」。阮再指，事實上相關議題只是「單向」地由戴耀廷介紹，而非與會者之間有「討論」，區稱：「既然冇其他人回應，咁其實都係一種單向性。」
+
+法官李運騰續問，初稿在與會者間傳閱後，有沒有人就否決預算案提出反對。區指「就我憶述，就冇其他人對呢個文件有特別嘅討論」，亦「冇特別有人提出反對」。李運騰續指，一般開會議程均會通過前一次會議的紀錄，惟區指，九西第二次會議並無相關程序，並再重提該次會議「最鮮明」反對否決預算案是岑子杰，他指社民連支持全民退休保障，此外「我冇記得其他人講其他嘢」。
+
+區早前亦稱，張崑陽在會上表示支持財政預算案，辯方續問，能否說會上沒有人同意張崑陽的說法，亦沒有人反對岑的說法？區再謂：「我諗只能夠話大家都冇表態囉。」他確認，當天會議何啟明、劉偉聰、馮達浚、黃碧雲與毛孟靜助理都有出席。
+
+#### 區確認協調會議共識不包括否決預算案、6.9才達成協議
+
+就協調會議的共識，區重申各區會議最終達成4項共識，包括同意舉行初選、目標議席、替補機制及會舉辦初選論壇，其中九龍西目標贏4席，但打算投票後再決定出選名單數量。辯方續指，上述4項共識並不包括否決預算案，區指「的確喺會議之間係有分歧」。
+
+區諾軒早前供稱，戴耀廷於6月9日初選記者會前，曾在組織者群組發出各區協調機制文件，內有「會積極運用／會運用」權力否決預算案的字眼。辯方再問該些文件是否理應代表由戴耀廷達成的共識，但明顯地參與者就否決預算案一點沒有達成共識，區表示，只能說戴發出該些檔案後「呢啲檔案被視為共識」。阮偉明續指，6月9日初選記者會談及初選機制細節，能否說當天才就35+達成協議？區答：「可以咁講。」
+
+#### 區諾軒指從無視「李伯盧」為初選組織者一部分
+
+阮偉明其後就不同概念着區澄清。就「攬炒」，區同意民主派的光譜廣闊，故不同人對「攬炒」有不同理解。就「墨落無悔」聲明，區指與任何協調會議的討論結果「完全無關」，只是因應戴耀廷於6月9日記者會表示參與者毋須簽署共同綱領，所衍生的結果。
+
+至於戴耀廷撰文提及立會過半是「大殺傷力憲制武器」，區指戴案發期間持續使用該字眼形容其主張，惟區本人從未講過相關字眼。區續稱，根據《基本法》第49至52條，立法會的確「有一套好完整嘅機制」處理立會與特首之間的關係，包括否決財政預算案後解散立法會及特首須辭職，而戴於文章亦清楚解釋該權力，並「說成是武器」。李運騰追問區「武器」的意思，是攻擊性（attacking）或防禦性（defending），區指應採納文章就此方面的解釋。
+
+辯方其後欲就「三投三不投」運動作盤問，李運騰指區與該運動無關，惟辯方指區是初選組織者。李續問，區有否以任何形式參與「三投三不投」，區表示沒有，而且「我從來沒有看李伯盧（吳政亨網名）為組織者的一部分」，吳政亨聞言微笑，握緊右拳往下輕輕一振。法官再問，是否即不視吳政亨為「35+」組織者，區再答「正確」，吳政亨望向鄒家成笑及戚眉。
+
+
+▲ 吳政亨
+
+#### 區諾軒形容民協不止是傳統民主派 更站在較溫和位置
+
+辯方又問，區諾軒作為初選組織者，是否盡力確保初選合法，區諾軒指「我的確盡過最大嘅努力」，並就辯方提出的《個人資料（私隱）條例》、《選舉條例》、社交距離有關法例及《基本法》，「我都記得我有唔同嘅措施，嘗試努力地避免唔同嘅法律風險」，惟組織初選時尚未訂立《國安法》。
+
+最後，區確認與何啟明認識，但二人並不相熟，並知悉何為民協成員。被問及是否將民協歸類為傳統民主派，區形容「佢哋不單係傳統嘅民主派，更加係企喺較為溫和嘅一部分」，並憶述他與民協「最緊密的合作」就是關注領展議題，強調公屋資產私有化是民生問題。
+
+#### 劉偉聰會議曾指初選性質「不民主」、指沒如區稱出席第二次協調會議
+
+其後輪到自辯的大律師劉偉聰，法官陳慶偉問他希望最先或最後進行盤問（「“Do you wish to go first or go last?”」），劉回應指「我希望現在開始盤問（“I wish to go now.”）」，引起眾人發笑。
+
+
+▲ 大律師 劉偉聰
+
+區諾軒在盤問下，確認案發時他與劉只知道對方的名字，而劉有出席首次九龍西協調會議，亦記得劉曾在會上關注初選因局限某些人參選，故性質有「不民主」之處。劉續指，區曾稱他有參與第二次會議，惟事實上他並無參與當天會議。區指「我只會話我係憑住我嘅記憶去作供」，法官李運騰問區是否同意劉的說法，抑或他亦不肯定，區指「我的確冇更加多嘅證據話佢係有出席，如果我真係錯嘅，我好歡迎大家否定」，多名被告發笑。李運騰再問區是否可能記錯，區指不排除這個可能，「但我已經盡全力去記憶整件事嘅經過。」
+
+#### 劉偉聰指直至控方提供方收到協調機制初稿 區稱相關檔案是戴耀廷視為「共識」
+
+就區諾軒稱，戴耀廷在會後將九西協調機制初稿發送給與會者，劉偉聰問有沒有可能戴沒有發送予所有人。區指只知道戴會後發給與會人士，但無參與整個過程，無法知道是否每人都「妥為傳達」，並在法官陳仲衡提問下，指他無收到任何與會者投訴指無收到文件。劉偉聰續指，其實直至控方向他提供，他一直無收到該份文件。李運騰問區能否確認劉收到該份文件？區重申只知道戴當時有將文件發送，惟不肯定是否有送達予劉。
+
+劉偉聰續問及，區指6月9日記者會前戴耀廷向組織者傳送的協調機制檔案「被視為共識」，問是誰視之為共識？區說是「戴耀廷當時視之為共識」，林卓廷等發笑。區並同意，到了第二次會議，組織者及與會者並無就此作進一步討論。
+
+#### 劉偉聰指「35+」和「35+公民投票」為兩個概念
+
+劉偉聰其後指，區諾軒在證供多次提及「35+」和「35+公民投票」，兩者其實是不同的概念，前者指立會過半的政治願景，後者指2020年7月11及12日的投票，區同意「的確可以有兩個概念」。區亦同意，初選可被視為泛民主派內的比賽，爭取出線在正式選舉參選。
+
+劉盤問結束後，向區表示：「祝你在將來的聆訊順利。（“I wish you the best in your future proceedings.”）」
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（10日）踏入審訊第23天。區諾軒接受代表民主黨黃碧雲和林卓廷的大狀盤問，同意與戴耀廷就初選目標有分歧，他的「初心」只是協調民主派爭取立會過半，惟戴耀廷則較着重運用否決權，亦承認組織者對如何爭五大訴求「傾唔到一個有效嘅策略」。被問是否同意將否決權與「35+」綑綁，區承認「終歸冇反對」，指當時未立《國安法》，「我的確冇為意到當時候呢一啲嘅主張，係會觸犯法例。」區又同意，民主黨在「墨落無悔」發布後，仍維持不會無差別否決預算案的立場，他亦不知道林卓廷和黃碧雲有否收到相關協調機制文件。
+
+
+▲ 黃碧雲
+
+#### 區辦初選初心協調民主派爭立會過半、組織者無有效策略爭五大訴求
+
+代表黃碧雲和林卓廷的大律師沈士文下午盤問區諾軒。沈先指出，區諾軒曾在盤問期間提及「初心」一詞，並指追問35+計劃的真正目標非常重要，因為這解釋了許多人在2020年3月至7月的反應及行為。
+
+沈其後指出，有關「35+計劃」的真正目標，有一條重要的分界線，就是該計劃僅關乎泛民在立會選舉作協調，以免浪費選票，而非關注立會過半後會做什麼，區回應「呢個係我初心」。法官陳仲衡指出，「35+」亦要求參與者認同「五大訴求」，區形容是「環境使然」，因當時正值反修例運動，五大訴求是民主派爭取的訴求，但他同意辯方指，要求認同五大訴求事實上也只是像口號或願景一樣，沒有如何達成的實質計劃。
+
+沈續指，本案謀劃根本的難處，在於一方面望有越多民主派參與越好，但同時參與者光譜非常廣闊，要落實達成五大訴求的計劃幾乎不可能，區同意。沈續指，因此組織者辦「35+」，純粹集中於透過協調取得立會過半。區同意此為初選「最基本的目標」，至於取得過半後如何爭取五大訴求，組織者「的確傾唔到一個有效嘅策略去應對呢個問題」。
+
+#### 區稱與戴耀廷立場差異 區望爭民主派最大勝算、戴着重運用憲制權力
+
+沈士文問及，組織者無法達成共識，是在計劃開始前，抑或在整個35+過程發生？區諾軒指在謀劃開始前，即使是最初的飯局，「哪怕戴耀廷嗰陣已經有講佢對於否決預算案嘅睇法」，但其他與會者亦只關心如何增加民主派最大勝算；而之後接觸不同持分者，因當時有許多新晉政治人物、不知道他們想法，故協調會議上「唔同人都有唔同嘅睇法」。
+
+沈續指，因此在35+計劃開始前，組織者對立會過半後如何爭取五大訴求並沒有達成共識？區回應：「起碼我同戴耀廷好清楚睇到我哋係有立場上嘅差異」，並指「我哋嘅共識就係去搞初選」。
+
+法官李運騰追問該差異的意思，區解釋對戴耀廷來說，「一開始佢就好着重關於憲制上面點樣去運用權力」，包括否決預算案，並在文章鮮明表達；但區在整件事行進期間，「我嘅行為係說明得好清楚，我係要去做協調，我係要去爭取民主派最大勝算。」
+
+#### 區指否決預算案爭議於4月尾出現 惟同意有參與者無表態
+
+區諾軒同意，在籌辦初選早期，約3月至4月中，大部分參與者對否決預算案和如何落實五大訴求均不感興趣。雖然九東首次協調會議於3月2日舉行，但當時作為試點，「傾得掂初選機制，已經係難能可貴」，否決權議題「當時只係佢（戴耀廷）一個人喺度講」。直至4月尾至5月，部分協調會議出現「風向轉變」，包括4月29日第二次九西會議、及5月5日第二次新東會議，會上才就是否否決預算案作爭拗。但區同意，上述兩次會議均沒有達成共識。
+
+沈士文續問，即使風向改變，當時是否仍有人對該議題無興趣？區同意「的確有相當人士冇興趣參與當中討論」。法官一度提及，「冇興趣」可指同意但無發聲、不同意但無發聲、或完全不感興趣，區同意，並指各參與者是「冇講嘢」。
+
+#### 區確認最初35+文件無提否決預算案、「冇違反我初心」
+
+沈士文其後展示「35+計劃」的文件，指「35+」的「初心」化成該文件。主控周天行一度指，區說的「初心」是指他個人的初心，並非「35+」的初心，法官李運騰表示他們理解，法官陳慶偉亦指，區辦初選的「初心」，狹義來說只是爭取民主派立會過半，與戴耀廷的「初心」不同。
+
+區確認，該份文件曾向所有與會者傳閱，而他與戴耀廷發出前，均知悉及認同該內容，「佢（戴）製作呢份文件，而我都完全同意。」沈續指，文件標題「有選民參與的民主派立法會選舉協調機制」，已清晰反映「35+」目標，並問文件內容是否「反映你（區諾軒）的初心，而不是戴耀廷的初心」？區答「我能夠講冇違反我初心」。
+
+區同意，戴在區的初心以外，還想利用立會過半來否決預算案，不過該主張沒有在「35+計劃」文件出現。沈遂問，參加者會否因此理解初選目標只是爭取立會過半？區指視乎他們接收的訊息，「你話係早期嘅訊息，又或者係呢份（「35+計劃」）文件嘅訊息，固然仍在我初心之中」，林卓廷和吳政亨等發笑。
+
+#### 區認無鮮明反對戴耀廷主張：未立《國安法》，的確冇為意會觸犯法例
+
+沈續問，區諾軒是否一直都反對戴耀廷在「35+」的政治議程，區指「我冇認同佢理念」，但後來戴耀廷在很多記者會「不斷講關於否決權嘅講法，我亦都冇喺嗰啲時候作出鮮明嘅反對」。陳慶偉續問，那能否說區同意將否決權與35+計劃綑綁？區指「我終歸冇反對到呢樣嘢，因為當時候的確未立《國安法》，我的確冇為意到當時候呢一啲嘅主張，係會觸犯法例」，又指他亦「誤解咗」，因以他對《基本法》的理解，否決權是行使憲制上的權利。
+
+#### 區：戴耀廷「積極」用權說法迎合不同意見、予不遵行的空間
+
+沈士文其後展示區諾軒錄影會面謄本，提及某次協調會議後，他曾向戴耀廷及趙家賢反映兩個政黨的意見，並指他們作為初選主事者，「冇理由唔理唔同人嘅睇法而去表達一個咁激進立場」，戴回應認為「積極運用《基本法》權力否決預算案」能給予政治團體或參與者「唔去遵行」、「唔去否決嘅空間」。
+
+區諾軒在盤問下表示，與二人會面是在5月5日的第二次新東協調會議後進行，當時民主黨、社民連、街工都有表示不同意否決預算案，會議前社民連黃浩銘亦曾着他勿答應會否決預算案。區說，「既然人哋託付我，我就要將呢個意見講畀戴耀廷聽」，並略帶激動指：「因為喺呢件事之前，佢（戴耀廷）已經不斷喺報章出文啦，甚至令我感覺到脫離咗一啲參與者嘅睇法啊。」
+
+區在錄影會面又解釋，戴主張「積極」一字是作為「大家討論嘅平衡點」，說法同時包含「可以不遵行否決財政預算案呢個承諾」。區確認，重申戴耀廷提「積極運用權力」的意思，是「你可以用，你可以唔用，但若果政府唔聽呢個意見，我就會行使呢個憲制權力」。
+
+區同意，戴是以此迎合兩派陣營意見，包括望運用否決權的一方，及望保留彈性、視乎預算案內容才決定是否否決的一方，並同意戴是試圖告訴人們有空間可不運用否決權。沈士文其後指，戴耀廷沒有提及「積極」字眼是任何會議的共識，區同意「的確冇任何選區達成呢個共識」。
+
+#### 區諾軒稱戴耀廷用否決權論述屬「演進」
+
+法官李運騰其後就戴耀廷對否決權想法的時序發問。區同意，戴於2019年12月的文章首次提及立會過半後行使否決權，但並非很確切的說法；其後3月26日，與初選記者會同日舉行的港島區首次會議，戴提倡運用否決權但遭司馬文反對；戴其後不斷提倡在文件加入「會積極運用」權力否決預算案字眼，並鑒於其他區亦加了相關字眼，在不遲於5月4日第三次九東會議，將相關字眼加入九東文件。
+
+李運騰續問，按此時序，會否同意運用否決權是戴耀廷持續（consistent）的主張，區指不會用 consistent 來形容，而是會用「evolvement（演進）」形容，指戴在2019年12月的文章僅提出運用憲制權力的可能性，至於談及特首下台的相關步驟，是在3月31日〈立會過半是大殺傷力憲制武器〉一文才出現。不過區同意，直至他錄影會面上提及的5月5日會面，戴耀廷仍然解釋採用「積極運用權力」是作為「大家討論嘅平衡點」。
+
+#### 胡志偉曾稱憂政黨利用初選綑綁民主黨 惟「墨落無悔」後仍維持立場
+
+區諾軒曾提及，「墨落無悔」聲明發布後情況有變。沈士文就此發問，區確認「墨落無悔」發布後，黃之鋒曾主動詢問他民主黨對聲明的回應，坐在延伸庭的黃聞言與譚凱邦及馮達浚交談。區並確認，當時回覆黃3點，包括他並無與任何民主黨成員確認；預計民主黨不會同意聲明；及民主黨已表明不會無差別否決財政預算案。
+
+區補充，他在與黃之鋒會面前，曾與民主黨主席胡志偉會面，重申胡當時憂慮將有更多非官方聲明出現，擔心其他政黨或團體會利用初選將民主黨綑綁、令該黨受制肘；又指該黨過往立場，是對政府議案開設新的人事職位大多有保留，因為「易請難送」，但若政府要「起醫院、起學校」，無理由要否決預算案。但區同意，即使「墨落無悔」發布後民主黨被游說，但該黨依然維持上述立場。
+
+#### 辯方引區論文指民主黨為傳統民主派 區稱不知道黃、林曾否收協調文件
+
+沈士文其後提到，區諾軒曾就傳統及激進民主派的差別進行研究，該論文在今年發表，名為〈Cooperate but divided at heart: Analysis of an opposition elite survey during autocratization〉。區確認文章中，黃碧雲被歸類為傳統民主派，民主黨亦被歸類為傳統民主政黨，並指出傳統民主派比激進民主派「較親中（pro-mainland）」，民主化手法亦「較溫和（moderate）」。
+
+區亦確認，黃碧雲及林卓廷2020年時為立法會議員，而二人分別從未出席九龍西及新界東的任何一次協調會議，均為其代表出席。沈士文問區是否知道戴耀廷有否將協調機制文件送達二人，區表示不知道新界東的情況，至於九龍西，戴耀廷曾告知他在首次會議後有將文件發放給與會者，惟他不知道戴實際上有否發放。
+
+案件押至下周二（14日）下午續審，沈士文表示預計當天能完成盤問。至現時為止，鄭達鴻、梁國雄、吳政亨、余慧明、楊雪盈、彭卓棋、何啟明、劉偉聰8人已完成盤問區諾軒。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
+
+### 16人不認罪受審
+
+審訊不設陪審團，由3名國安法指定法官陳慶偉、李運騰及陳仲衡審理。控方代表為副刑事檢控專員萬德豪及周天行，辯方代表包括資深大律師潘熙、大律師沈士文、張耀良、黃宇逸、關文渭、馬維騉、盧敏儀、石書銘、黃廷光、Trevor Beel 等，本身是大律師的劉偉聰則自辯。
+
+不認罪被告包括獲准保釋的鄭達鴻、楊雪盈、彭卓棋、何啟明、劉偉聰、黃碧雲、施德來、陳志全、柯耀林、李予信10人，及還柙的何桂藍、吳政亨、鄒家成、林卓廷、梁國雄及余慧明6人。
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-03-13-chinas-three-roads-to-taiwan.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-03-13-chinas-three-roads-to-taiwan.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..ac797740
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-03-13-chinas-three-roads-to-taiwan.md
@@ -0,0 +1,281 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : China’s Three Roads To Taiwan
+author: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan
+date : 2023-03-13 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/ORvBPrs.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- China seeks to fully control Taiwan through three distinct but interrelated campaigns: persuasion, coercion, and compellence.
+
+- American policy’s focus on compellence marginalizes strategies that counter China’s persuasion and coercion campaigns.
+
+- China is more likely to achieve its goals through persuasion and coercion or a form of compellence, such as a blockade of the island, short of an amphibious invasion.
+
+- The US must urgently rethink its defense of Taiwan so that it blocks all three roads to Chinese victory.
+
+
+
+### Executive Summary
+
+US policy to defend Taiwan from Chinese aggression is overly focused on the risk that China will attempt an amphibious invasion of Taiwan. The US is not paying sufficient heed to Chinese efforts to regain control of Taiwan through persuasion and coercion, and US strategies to block a Chinese invasion may actually undermine efforts to block the persuasion and coercion roads to Chinese success. Xi Jinping likely prefers to accomplish his aims by means short of war. Those roads offer Xi the prospect of success at much lower risk and cost than fighting a war. The US must develop strategies to defeat these campaigns while deterring an invasion.
+
+Beijing faces a difficult set of choices between military considerations and geopolitical dilemmas that US discussions of a putative Chinese invasion often fail to consider adequately. A militarily optimal Chinese invasion strategy would require that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) strike American bases in Japan, a US treaty ally, and Guam, US territory, early in a conflict. Such attacks would bring the US fully into the war and expand the conflict to include Japan and other East Asian states. American strategists may worry that the US would not commit fully even after Guam was attacked or that the Japanese would try to remain neutral, but neither scenario is likely.
+
+Xi has no reason to be confident in outcomes that would be optimal for China. Such attacks, after all, would be even more radical moves than Vladimir Putin’s have been in Europe. American strategists cannot take for granted that the US and its allies will behave optimally, but Xi cannot dismiss the possibility that they would. He will thus face an unpleasant choice once he decides to invade — accept the risk of expanding the war greatly or leave fully operational the bases from which a possibly devastating US military response might come. These considerations, among others, make strategies of persuasion, coercion, and military isolation short of invasion far more attractive to Xi.
+
+China’s persuasion and coercion campaigns target the will of Taiwan, the United States, and America’s allies to support and defend the island. Ongoing Chinese demonstrations of military capability accompanied by “lawfare” — the weaponization of legal arguments for political purposes — and information operations aim to convince the American people, US allies, and the Taiwanese people that the Taiwan issue is a domestic Chinese matter that other countries should leave to Beijing to “resolve.” They also try to demonstrate that Taiwan is not defensible and that any use of force to resist Chinese aggression would result in a catastrophe for Taiwan and any intervening force. China’s persuasion campaign works to rewrite history and convince other nations of things that are not true in order to erode resistance to its aggression against Taiwan. China’s coercion campaign is a form of “violent bargaining” meant to use means short of large-scale war to force other nations to comply with its demands and defer to its interests.
+
+China also aims by persuasion and coercion to set the conditions for a campaign of compellence: the use of force through blockade or invasion. That is why it is vital Washington not allow Beijing to isolate Taipei, push America into a standoff defensive posture that pulls the bulk of its military forces outside the Chinese anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) zones within which US forces are most at risk, and undermine US efforts to build a coalition. A blockade accompanied by other means of isolating Taiwan is an attractive option for China. Beijing could force ships en route to Taiwan to stop for inspections, disrupting the supply of resources to the island. The Chinese Communist Party could then attempt to use the PLA to convince the American people and US allies that a US response to break the blockade would be escalatory. Chinese persuasion and coercion campaigns are meant to induce precisely such responses should Beijing escalate to the overt use of force on a limited basis.
+
+The US must urgently reorient its approach to defending Taiwan against all three of China’s roads to controlling the island. Deterring and ability to defeat an invasion are necessary but insufficient conditions for success in maintaining the status quo: a de facto independent Taiwan. US approaches to those challenges must reinforce rather than undermine US and coalition efforts to defeat China’s persuasion and coercion campaigns. US strategy for defending Taiwan must defeat each of China’s interrelated campaigns separately and all of them together. Policymakers must explain and defeat Chinese information operations aimed at the American and global publics so that they understand and can resist China’s persuasion campaign. The US must demonstrate its commitment to the defense of Taiwan to its own public, Taiwan and potential coalition partners, and Xi himself. America must defend the rules-based international order specifically as it applies to Taiwan against the incremental escalations of Beijing’s coercion.
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+China has been moving along three roads to fully integrating Taiwan into the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and extinguishing Taiwan’s autonomy: persuasion, coercion, and compellence. American policy has focused increasingly on preventing China from seizing Taiwan by force — blocking the compellence road. But China can still secure its goals through persuasion and coercion.
+
+Chinese General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Xi Jinping likely prefers those roads to the much riskier path of overt military attack on the island. Blocking the Chinese roads through persuasion and coercion is not a marginal task, nor is it inherent in the effort to deter or defeat a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The current US approach to blocking the compellence road may in fact increase the likelihood that Xi will reach his objectives by these other two paths. The US must urgently rethink its approach to the problem of defending Taiwan’s autonomy so that it blocks all three roads to PRC victory rather than focusing on only one — at the expense or even to the detriment of defending Taiwan against ongoing persuasion and coercion campaigns.
+
+#### Persuasion
+
+One can easily overstate the Chinese preference for “winning without fighting” or ascribe to Chinese military thought an intellectual patent on an idea that other societies and cultures value and share. Frequent and facile references to Sun Tzu’s aphorism that “those who render others’ armies helpless without fighting are the best of all” contribute to this danger.
+
+The fact that repetition of this aphorism has made it seem trite, however, does not strip it of its force in Chinese thought. The concept of buzhan ersheng (不战而胜) — to “subdue the enemy without fighting” — has been a cornerstone of Chinese strategic thinking for centuries. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has pursued a massive military reform and modernization program since 1993 in preparation for modern, great-power warfare, even as Beijing has intensified a coercion campaign that uses real and threatened power to achieve its aims. But China has not abandoned the psychological strategies that helped the CCP successfully topple the Republic of China (ROC) during the Chinese civil war and take over mainland China.
+
+The aim of so shaping an adversary’s understanding of the world that it voluntarily chooses one’s own preferred course of action is a highly evolved part of Chinese strategic thought and practice. The idea of causing the enemy to perceive its own benefit in choosing the path most favorable to oneself is heavily discussed in Sun Tzu, encapsulated in the observation that “what causes opponents to come of their own accord is the prospect of gain.” Mao Zedong translated that aphorism into an accessible analogy, describing
+
+> three ways to make a cat eat a hot pepper: stuff it down the cat’s throat, disguise the pepper by wrapping it in cheese, or grind the pepper up and spread it on the cat’s back. In the latter case, the cat will lick itself, thinking it is doing something for itself when it is actually doing what you want. This is the essence of strategy.
+
+Soviet theorists expanded on this idea in considerable and meticulous detail under the rubric of “reflexive control.” Soviet writer Vladimir Lefebvre described reflexive control in the following manner:
+
+> In making his decision the adversary uses information about the area of conflict, about his own troops and ours, about their ability to fight, etc. We can influence his channels of information and send messages, which shift the flow of information in a way favorable for us. The adversary uses the most contemporary method of optimization and finds the optimal decision. However, it will not be a true optimum, but a decision predetermined by us.
+
+Reflexive control is at the heart of Russian information operations and hybrid war theories. The CCP has long studied and learned from Russian thought and experiences.
+
+Mao’s theory of how to prevail in war was based on what he called the “three magic weapons.” The CCP, or politics, is in the lead. It wields armed force together with “the united front” to “storm and shatter the enemy’s positions.” Armed force is calibrated to support the ongoing work of political struggle to defeat an enemy.
+
+The PLA has always had robust political warfare units alongside its conventional units. Its General Political Department (GPD) was devoted to undermining enemy morale and building international support. The GPD helped build the United Front with the Kuomintang (KMT) against the Japanese while subverting the KMT military to further its aims in the Chinese civil war. The GPD was reorganized in 2015 into the Central Military Commission’s Political Work Department. Its responsibilities are to conduct the “three warfares”: public opinion warfare, legal warfare, and psychological warfare. This department, along with the new Strategic Support Force, where the PLA’s cyber, space, electronic warfare, and information warfare units reside, is responsible for conducting political warfare in peace and war, including the ongoing coercive campaign against Taiwan.
+
+Beijing’s theory of victory rests on the destruction of Taiwan’s morale: If Taiwan believes that the US will not or cannot help undermine China’s escalating threats, it will have to accede to Beijing’s demands. Taiwan is a small, isolated island with little acceptance as an independent state. It is sui generis in international relations. Absent US support, it is not difficult to imagine morale on the island collapsing.
+
+China’s persuasion campaign is thus aimed at not only Taiwan but also the US and its key allies and partners. Beijing continues to use all the tools at its disposal to drive general acceptance of the reality it desires to instantiate — that Taiwan is part of China, not an independent country, and that all other states agree with that premise. Its goal in doing so is to achieve preemptive recognition of its objectives and thereby collapse Taipei’s will to resist by demonstrating that Taiwan is fully isolated and alone.
+
+This objective is the primary motivation behind the CCP’s constant efforts to rewrite history and current events in what often appears to be a ham-fisted way. The CCP has thus continually portrayed itself as the victim and the US and Taiwan as the aggressors in the cross-Strait dispute, despite enormous concessions and diplomatic generosity by Washington and Taipei. This argument resonates in parts of the nonaligned world and among potential US partners who would rather stay neutral in a conflict over Taiwan and more broadly in the US-China global competition.
+
+Even as the CCP engages in highly destabilizing shows of force, it accuses the US and Taiwan of violating an “agreement” that was never made, in which the US supposedly recognized Beijing’s right to control Taiwan’s affairs. A brief excursion into the actual history of PRC-ROC relations — and America’s relations with both — is necessary to understand the scope and scale of Beijing’s revisionism as part of its persuasion campaign to isolate Taiwan.
+
+The ROC, not the PRC, was China’s sovereign government after the fall of the Qing dynasty. Though the ROC never controlled all the lands it claimed, it had all the trappings and juridical elements of a state for most of the period in which it ruled mainland China. The ROC conducted all official diplomatic business for China before the CCP’s victory in 1949. The ROC was part of the grand alliance in World War II and a charter member of the United Nations Security Council. Consistent with the prominent role it was to have after the war, the ROC, not the CCP, accepted the surrender of the Japanese on Taiwan. The CCP only came to power after its violent rebellion against the duly constituted ROC government run by the KMT.
+
+The CCP prevailed on the mainland, but the ROC survived and retreated to Taiwan. The CCP governed, had sovereignty, and was the legitimate ruler only over the mainland of China, while the KMT had sovereignty and legitimate rule over the island of Taiwan and the offshore Matsu, Pescadores, and Quemoy islands.
+
+The CCP consistently denies and attempts to persuade others to deny the historical and geopolitical reality that there have been two Chinas since 1949: an ROC on Taiwan and a PRC on the mainland. The US recognized the ROC (including its claims to rule all of China) from 1949 to 1979 and the PRC (which also claims to rule all of China) from 1979 onward.
+
+The shift in US recognition did not change the reality of the two Chinas. The US made a policy choice to accommodate the PRC, a decision that had no bearing on the continued reality that the ROC legitimately governed Taiwan. Though the US made an enormous concession to its erstwhile enemy by switching its official recognition from the ROC to the PRC and abrogating its treaty with the island, the ROC still ruled Taiwan and had sovereignty over its people. The shift in US recognition was not accompanied by a formal agreement that the CCP was the legitimate ruler of Taiwan and that the ROC was therefore illegitimate. Beijing demanded such an agreement, but it only received an “acknowledgement” from Washington of the CCP’s position that Taiwan was a sovereign part of China.
+
+Even when the US broke formal ties with Taipei — but still refused to recognize the CCP’s formal claims — the US Congress protested and enacted with bipartisan support the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which provides the legal basis for strong if unofficial relations with Taiwan today. The US thus never officially recognized China’s claim of sovereignty over Taiwan. Washington’s robust political, commercial, cultural, and educational ties with Taiwan are required by law. The PRC knows this yet insists that the US can somehow stop supporting Taiwan. Further, the US has a legal requirement to help Taiwan resist coercion. The TRA was passed in 1979, yet China continued with the process of diplomatic normalization. It thus implicitly acknowledged that US unofficial relations with Taiwan are part of what Washington calls “our one China policy.”
+
+The CCP not only denies this reality but also portrays itself as an aggrieved party, despite the concessions the US has made to its demands. The US shifted its recognition from the ROC to the PRC at a time when China was especially weak: ravaged by Mao’s Cultural Revolution, threatened by the Soviets with nuclear war, and readying for war with a Vietnam that was becoming hegemonic and hostile. It has still not acknowledged this tremendous US concession, but rather continues trying to force more change.
+
+To understand Beijing’s persuasion campaign, it is useful to understand what the US did not agree to in its “One China” policy and what Congress insisted on through the TRA and associated actions. First, the US does not take a position on Taiwan’s sovereignty. It insists that the dispute over sovereignty between Taipei and Beijing is to be worked out peacefully, without preconditions. That is why the TRA’s language requiring the US to resist Chinese coercion of Taiwan is so crucial: Washington has always maintained that Taiwan should not have to negotiate with a gun pointed at its head. That the US does not take a position on sovereignty does not negate Taiwan’s sovereignty; under international law, Taiwan is a sovereign entity. The US is making a reversible policy concession to the PRC in not officially recognizing the ROC, and it certainly never agreed to the “One China” principle (as opposed to America’s “One China” policy), which Beijing tries to persuade countries to accept. The supposed “principle” is that Taiwan has always been part of the PRC. The principle is a lie — Taiwan has never been part of the People’s Republic of China. It has been part of past Chinese empires (as well as Dutch, Portuguese, and Japanese empires), but it has never been part of the political entity that is the PRC.
+
+Second, the US never agreed to cut off unofficial ties with Taiwan or limit the seniority of officials who conduct the operations of this unofficial relationship. Indeed, the presidents of Taiwan and the US can meet if they so choose. Such meetings cannot have the trappings of official state meetings because treating the Taiwanese leader as the president of Taiwan would violate America’s definition of its “One China” policy — not because it would violate international law or any promise to Beijing. Yet the PRC protests meetings between lower levels of the US government and Taiwanese officials, increasingly through demonstrations of force.
+
+Third, while the US stated in a 1982 diplomatic communiqué that it would cap arms sales to Taiwan, it made abundantly clear that this cap was contingent on China’s commitment to peace as manifested in China’s military posture. But China’s military posture has grown more menacing. Given Washington’s historic position that it will calibrate its Taiwan policy based on the threat China poses to Taiwan, the US has no formal obligation to limit its military relationship with Taiwan. It has limited this relationship as a concession to China. But it can exercise with and train the ROC armed forces, and it can sell any military equipment it deems necessary to keep the peace across the strait.
+
+Fourth, the US never agreed to limit Taiwan’s international political and economic identity. Washington can push for Taiwan’s participation in any international organization for which statehood is not a requirement. China has in the past acquiesced to Taiwan’s participation as a separate legal entity in the World Trade Organization. China, not the US, has changed policy. Beijing is trying to persuade the US and its allies that the “One China” principle governs cross-Strait relations, that Taiwan is part of the PRC, and that the US is abrogating promises to China to this effect.
+
+The US must undermine this persuasion campaign and provide its allies with the political cover to develop the kind of relations with Taiwan that they want, free from Chinese intimidation. There is simply nothing provocative about this policy. The US promised not to unilaterally confer diplomatic recognition on the ROC, and it is abiding by that promise. On the other hand, the PRC is not abiding by its promise of peacefully resolving its differences with Taiwan.
+
+#### Coercion
+
+The CCP has not been content to rely on persuasion to secure final control of Taiwan, of course. It has long accompanied its persuasion campaign with an expanding coercion effort. This effort fits with Thomas Schelling’s definition of coercion as a kind of “violent communications about intentions and commitment.” Schelling’s insight was that the power to hurt gives states tremendous bargaining power. Expounding on his work, scholar Tami Davis Biddle evokes one of the most memorable scenes in modern cinematic history to explain how coercion works: In The Godfather, Don Corleone tells his consigliere that he will make a noncompliant movie producer an “offer he cannot refuse” to get him to do something he otherwise would not do. Following a famous scene involving a decapitated horse’s head, the producer subsequently hired the don’s friend for an important role in an upcoming movie.
+
+The movie producer felt he had to comply or face more harm. This cinematic example helps illustrate the PRC’s coercion tactics toward the US and Taiwan. No serious analyst doubts that Beijing is willing and able to inflict harm against Taiwan and the US if they do not comply with its demands. The act of being coerced is thus a psychological process. The coercer must manipulate the mind of the coerced. As Schelling says, the power to hurt is a bargaining power. The willingness to use it is diplomacy — “vicious diplomacy, but diplomacy.” This strategy is an exploitation of fear. Arguably, a state’s leverage over another is at its greatest when its adversary believes it has not yet used all its power, that any display of force is a restrained one.
+
+__The PLA’s Theory of Coercion.__ The PLA has been interested in US theories of coercion since the first Gulf War. Coercive strategies fit well with a CCP strategic culture that emphasizes the ability to manipulate an adversary’s psyche through stratagems. According to Mark Stokes, in the late 1990s the PLA began to theorize that US aerospace coercion was related to China’s own concepts of stratagem, which it calls moulüe (谋略). Military force could be used to attack “an opponent’s cognitive processes.” Military strategies of this kind require specific calculations of where pressure or manipulation can be applied to achieve political objectives. The PLA theorizing about coercive tactics closely resembled Mao’s writing about the so-called magic weapons of warfare. Force and political manipulation were tightly sewn into strategies that manipulate the enemy and make them concede before all-out warfare is needed.
+
+PLA theorists wrote about the coercion of Taiwan in the context of achieving limited political objectives, short of what could be achieved through an invasion and occupation of the island. Force would be modulated based on the objective and level of resistance to it. Deterring de jure independence requires a certain level of force; forcing agreement with different forms of unification requires more force.
+
+These PLA writings coincided with the onset of the PLA modernization program in 1993. By the beginning of the 21st century, the PLA was deploying a lethal, precision-guided missile force positioned across the Taiwan Strait, enabled by a modernizing comprehensive command, control, communications, and computers and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (known as C4ISR) program. Indeed, the PLA aerospace force was the leading edge of the modernization program. At the same time, the PLA was developing anti-access and area-denial (A2AD) capabilities that raised the costs of US intervention on Taiwan’s behalf. The political message to Taiwan was clear: The PLA could inflict great harm on the island, and the US would not want to risk making a costly defense of it.
+
+As the PLA acquired new capabilities, it developed new options to deter Taipei’s moves to formalize its de facto independent status, co-opt Washington to contain such perceived moves by Taiwan, and set conditions for intensification of the use of force across the strait. PLA authors stressed that the threat or actual application of force is necessary to ensure its goals regarding Taiwan, and Washington understood the consequences of crossing Beijing’s ever-changing political thresholds.
+
+The PLA continues to debate the efficacy of demonstrations of power to affect political dynamics. The 2020 version of the Science of Military Strategy describes weishe (威慑), often translated as “deterrence,” as
+
+> a method of military conflict to achieve a political goal based on military strength . . . and determination to use strength [that] makes the other side face unworthy or even unbearable consequences.
+
+The intended political outcome of this method of military conflict is to make the adversary “give in, compromise, or surrender,” ideally without having to engage in large-scale fighting.
+
+The PLA may use military conflict at a low level to achieve a political goal. The Science of Military Strategy identifies “warning military strikes” as part of strategies to both forestall adversary actions and coerce compliance. Indeed, limited uses of military strikes against precise and specific targets can showcase the ability and determination to achieve military and political objectives and may obviate the need for larger military campaigns and operations. The PLA does not see itself as moving through distinct phases of war, from “shaping” and “influence” operations to “kinetic” use of force operations. Rather, it intertwines shaping and influence operations with kinetic operations.
+
+All militaries are instruments of politics, but in the PRC the relationship has historically been more direct. The PLA is the party’s armed wing, not China’s professional military. The PLA’s foundational purpose is to help the party win political struggles and develop new political realities. In turn, the CCP’s main purpose is to expand its power over territory and peoples. The party’s history as an insurgency engaged in “people’s war” informs its current conduct as it expands its writ over Hong Kong, Tibet, and Xinjiang.
+
+In Taiwan’s case, the CCP seeks to expand its political power over new territory and 24 million additional people that is has never ruled. This is difficult to do and would require much more force than any of the other populations and territories it now controls. The PLA is thus a crucial tool, and intensifying applications of actual — rather than “only” demonstrations of — force may be necessary.
+
+The coercive campaign offers the PRC distinct advantages over a campaign to invade and occupy Taiwan. It also provides Beijing flexibility to continually redefine what it considers the bounds of acceptable political behavior by Taipei and Washington. First, unlike a campaign of brute force annihilation, Beijing can redefine success if it needs to. Second, Beijing’s negotiating leverage keeps increasing as the PLA grows stronger.
+
+___`The coercive campaign offers the PRC distinct advantages over a campaign to invade and occupy Taiwan.`___
+
+The CCP’s coercion campaign has expanded even as Taipei has made concessions. The ROC abandoned its claim to be the sole legitimate ruler of all of China in 1991. In effect, Taiwan declared peace, abandoning its stated policy of unification through force, and aligned its polity with geopolitical realities. The overwhelming majority of Taiwanese residents did not come to Taiwan during the KMT retreat, and they had no say and little interest in perpetuating the Chinese civil war. They disagree with Washington’s “One China” policy and never had a say in its foundational 1972 statement that “all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but One China.” Yet they have accepted it.
+
+A substantial group of voters now supports Taiwan’s newer Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), an erstwhile opposition party that rose to power as part of the independence movement in Taiwan. But the once-oppressed DPP voters made an enormous concession by accepting that they were citizens of the ROC, not of a new state called Taiwan. The ROC is a preexisting political entity whose existence the CCP recognizes in practice even while denying its right to rule over anything. Any declaration of the existence of a new Republic of Taiwan would seem to Beijing a declaration of independence and therefore an escalation rather than a concession. But the US does not support such a political escalation and thus this option is all but impossible. Rather, the US supports the political status quo, which means that the ROC rules Taiwan and the PRC rules mainland China.
+
+Taipei also suspended martial law in 1987, which had been put in place to fight Communist subversion and infiltration. It made political changes to better reflect the reality that its government only has sovereignty over the people and territory of Taiwan, though it did not formally amend its constitution to relinquish its claims to mainland China, which ironically would have angered the PRC. The ROC thus set the conditions for a diplomatic breakthrough across the strait. Officials from each side of the strait met to work out practical matters of cooperation, from the governance of postal services to consular services. The two sides implicitly agreed to compromise on a political formulation, now referred to as the 1992 Consensus. They agreed to disagree on the meaning of “One China.”
+
+The ROC’s unilateral abandonment of the threat of force and the forfeiture of claims of jurisdiction over the mainland should have been the basis for a lasting peace. But Beijing’s response to Taipei’s cessation of a state of hostilities was an escalation of its coercion campaign. Before Taiwan’s first democratic election in June 1995, Taiwan’s president, Lee Teng-hui, made a high-profile visit to his alma mater, Cornell University. The PRC then conducted a series of missile tests in the waters surrounding Taiwan and other military maneuvers in response to what CCP leaders called Lee’s attempts to “split the motherland.” The US and Taiwan had never formally agreed to limit the visits of Taiwan presidents, and the US does not agree that there is a “motherland” that Taiwan is trying to “split.” There has never been a single political CCP-run entity that included Taiwan. This was a provocative escalation by Beijing.
+
+The PRC initiated another set of missile tests in the run-up to Taiwan’s first presidential election in 1996 in an attempt to frighten Taiwan’s electorate into voting against Lee and compel the US to rein in what they called Taiwan’s pro-independence forces. In 1999, Lee suggested the two sides negotiate on a “special state-to-state basis” in an effort to break Taipei and Beijing out of a diplomatic stalemate, just seven years after its partial breakthrough. The response from Beijing was a stepped-up rhetorical assault with escalating military maneuvers. Beijing focused on Lee’s use of the term “state-to-state,” despite Lee’s use of the modifier “special” to connote something less than official country-to-country relations. His creative formulation was meant to co-opt independence-minded Taiwanese while providing Beijing with a face-saving way to conduct relations with Taiwan.
+
+Taiwan’s efforts to normalize relations based on a reasonable diplomatic formula that recognized CCP rule over the mainland while avoiding declaring Taiwanese independence were seen in Beijing as dangerous “splittism” (the term the CCP uses for political separatism). Beijing pocketed Taiwanese concessions as it had previous American concessions, but it failed to make any concessions of its own. Moreover, the PRC treated these concessions as provocations justifying further demands and coercion.
+
+This response was delivered by the Chinese General Secretary Jiang Zemin at the height of the US effort to integrate China into the global economy and establish warm commercial relations with Beijing. It occurred as the US dramatically downsized its military following the end of the Cold War. There was certainly cause for Beijing to worry about the military balance with the US after America’s thumping of Saddam Hussein’s military in 1991 — and the prodemocratic rhetoric of both the George H. W. Bush and Clinton administrations. But US actions indicated that the threat to the PRC was receding rather than growing. The Chinese coercion campaign thus began during a time of peace and prosperity for Beijing, when it enjoyed friendly relations with the West.
+
+Countries and companies had rushed into China to explore commercial opportunities while the PRC embraced foreign expertise and know-how. The Soviet Union had collapsed, removing a long-standing threat to Beijing’s north. Beijing’s ideological problem remained, however: Democracy in Taiwan undermines the CCP’s core tenet that democracy is unsuitable for the Chinese cultural context. The existence of a legitimate constitutional government actually ruling Taiwan, moreover, discredited the CCP’s claim to speak for all Chinese people.
+
+Having received US and Taiwanese concessions as if they were acts of escalation, the CCP learned during this period of peace and Western outreach and engagement that threats of force could push the US to pressure Taipei. The US sent ships to the Taiwan Strait in response to Chinese missile tests in 1995 and 1996, to be sure. But the PRC convinced then-President Clinton to publicly affirm China’s position on Taiwan, rather than Taipei’s or Washington’s, while speaking on Chinese soil in Shanghai. Beijing demanded that President Clinton repeat the so-called three nos: that the US would not support (1) Taiwan independence, (2) “Two Chinas” or “One China One Taiwan,” or (3) Taiwan’s efforts to participate in international organizations in which statehood is a requirement.
+
+The events of 1995–97 also exposed the PRC’s relative military impotence at that time, as the PLA had no military answer to the arrival of US warships in the strait. But Beijing accomplished the political outcome it sought, despite its military weakness, through an apparent escalation that was not backed by actual capability. It made a political demand of Washington based on a military bluff, and Washington complied.
+
+A DPP government under Chen Shui-bian was elected in 2000, partially in reaction to China’s military intimidation. As the CCP’s pressure grew on the Chen government, Taipei pushed for greater recognition of Taiwan’s independence. Yet Beijing convinced President George W. Bush to publicly rebuke Taiwan’s president in the company of PRC Premier Wen Jiabao, humiliating Chen in the process.
+
+When Xi became general secretary of the CCP in 2012, his initial approach to Taiwan was relatively moderate. Taiwan was governed by a KMT leader, Ma Ying-jeou, who sought more conciliation with Beijing. Xi and Ma met in Singapore in 2015, the first meeting between the leaders of Taiwan and China and a notable Chinese diplomatic olive branch to Taiwan. Moreover, Xi did not protest when Ma took the public position that the two sides had “agreed to disagree” about the meaning of “One China,” another apparent PRC concession. The formula of “One China, different interpretations” was apparently back on the table. This formulation was in essence the same as Lee’s “special state-to-state relations” comment in 1999, as the leaders of the government of Taiwan and China met as coequals.
+
+This history is not merely of academic interest. To counter CCP revisionism, US policymakers need to understand it. And, as a matter of policy, the US should insist that Beijing does not get to choose which elected leaders of the ROC it deals with. To date, the US has not called on the PRC to return to the negotiating table with the current Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen based on this precedent.
+
+Xi’s relatively conciliatory approach to Taiwan did not survive Ma’s presidency, however. When Tsai succeeded Ma in 2016, Xi reverted to the previous CCP posture of threats and demands. During his meeting with Ma, Xi said that “as long as the 1992 Consensus and its core values are acknowledged, we stand ready to have contact.” Tsai did not explicitly accept the language of the 1992 Consensus, charting a different course from an agreement made by her political opponent’s party. This is, of course, the prerogative of any new government. China’s Taiwan Affairs Office criticized her and demanded that she recognize the PRC’s “One China” principle. Tsai nevertheless went as far toward conciliation as Taiwan’s new politics would allow. By 2016, the electorate in Taiwan had little connection to mainland China. The grandchildren of the old KMT were voters who had grown up in a democratic Taiwan. Ties with China were akin to those of Canadians with the US: a shared culture, history, and language but little else, despite the CCP’s insistence otherwise.
+
+While Beijing was warning Washington about Tsai’s “separatist” and independence proclivities, Tsai conceded in her May 2016 inauguration speech that “the new government will conduct cross-Strait affairs in accordance with the Republic of China Constitution, the Act Governing Relations between the People of Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, and other relevant legislation.”
+
+This statement was another major concession by a Taiwanese leader. That Tsai represented the native Taiwanese DPP yet accepted that the ROC and Taiwan were the same entity was a difficult internal political maneuver. Crucially, she embraced the reality that the PRC governs the mainland and the ROC on Taiwan does not; she thereby opened the door to diplomatic solutions similar to those of her predecessors. But for Tsai, the meaning of “One China” was to be negotiated, not simply conceded to the PRC. Washington encouraged Tsai’s concession, but it never insisted that the CCP make any similar compromise or live up to Xi’s implicit acceptance of the “different interpretations.”
+
+Xi has years of experience dealing with Taiwan as a former party secretary of Fujian province, directly across the strait from Taiwan. He is versed in Taiwanese politics and knows that Tsai went as far as she could go on the issue of “One China.” Yet he chose to escalate the coercion campaign, blaming Tsai for recalcitrance. The US and its allies should have made a more concerted effort, beginning then to call on Xi to return to the negotiating table and not escalate his disagreements with Taiwan’s new government through force and diplomatic pressure.
+
+Soon after Tsai was elected, Beijing pressured Panama and São Tomé and Príncipe to shift diplomatic relations from the ROC to the PRC. Beijing shut Taiwan out of international organizations, such as the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International Criminal Police Organization, among others. During Tsai’s presidency, the CCP has pressured companies ranging from United Airlines to Snickers to call Taiwan a province of China or face economic penalty.
+
+Beijing also accelerated its campaign of military coercion following Tsai’s accession. The PLA increased the frequency of bomber circumnavigations of Taiwan in late 2016 and made such circumnavigations an enduring reality for the Tsai administration. By late 2017, PLA bombers and support aircraft circumnavigated the island. Beijing modified a civil aviation route near the centerline of the Taiwan Strait in January 2018 to allow commercial airlines to fly over open ocean in the strait, severely taxing Taiwan’s air defense system and air traffic controls. Since February 2018, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) intensified a pattern of flights through the Miyako Strait, off the east coast of Taiwan in the Philippine Sea, and the Bashi Channel. These flights demonstrate the PLAAF’s ability to “break” the first island chain and establish air dominance over key lifelines for Taiwan and its geographical connection to the outside world.
+
+In March 2019, two PLAAF fighters crossed into Taiwan’s side of the median line — an unofficial boundary between Taiwan and the PRC not challenged by the Chinese military since 1999. The military maneuvers were accompanied by statements from China’s Taiwan Affairs Office and the PLA’s Eastern Theater Command about their necessity to guard against “separatists,” as if the PLA were conducting legitimate counterterror operations. In September 2020 a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman stated, “There is no so-called median line in the Strait.”
+
+This line had been another means of keeping peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. The CCP’s violation and rejection of it was an incremental move to claim the waters and air around Taiwan as its own. The PRC continued this coercive campaign by increasing air incursions into the Taiwanese Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). Taiwan recorded 969 incursions by Chinese warplanes into its ADIZ in 2021 — more than double the roughly 380 carried out in 2020. In 2022, total Chinese air incursions into the ADIZ were 1,115. The PLA continually issues threatening messages in native Taiwanese dialects and allows military commentators to describe the ability of their jets to decapitate the Taiwanese leadership.
+
+These PLA operations are part of Chinese cognitive warfare, what Taiwan calls “cognitive domain warfare” or renzhi yu zuozhan (认知域作战). A Taiwan defense analyst has captured the purpose of this aerospace campaign: “PLA exercises first create an environment of fear, and then the responsibility of causing tension is blamed on ‘Taiwan’s ambitious politicians.’” The CCP aims to influence Taiwanese and American politics through the tension it creates. In manipulating the information space through demonstrations of force, its goal is to get important audiences in Taipei, Washington, and allied capitals to believe more pliant Taiwanese leaders could make this threat go away.
+
+The CCP has thus put the Taiwanese under the constant threat of ever-escalating violence and political pressure. One purpose of these shows of force across the strait is to coerce the US to change its policy, curtail its relations with Taiwan, come closer to the CCP’s definition of what “One China” means, and force Taipei to come with it on that journey of concessions. The second purpose is to wear down Taiwan’s resistance, undermine DPP rule, and persuade the Taiwanese of their own accord to elect and follow leaders who will concede to China’s demands.
+
+The PRC can fully secure its objectives vis-à-vis Taiwan if it achieves either aim. Taiwan cannot continue to resist growing PRC pressure without the active support of Washington and its allies in and beyond the region. If Beijing can reduce or break that support, Taiwan will have no option but to give the PRC what it desires. The CCP can succeed even more fully if it can actually break the will of Taiwanese supporters of policies of autonomy and resistance and elevate compliant Taiwanese politicians to power.
+
+US policy risks making a grave error by seeing China’s expanding military operations around Taiwan only through the prism of preparations for an invasion. Those operations may be part of such preparations and may help with them in various ways, but they are also strategic undertakings in their own right and are directly aimed at accomplishing Beijing’s goals. Developing strategies to deter or defeat a Chinese invasion of Taiwan may be ineffective or even counterproductive in preventing the PRC from subjugating Taiwan through a combination of these coercion efforts and the continuing persuasion efforts that accompany them, as we consider below.
+
+A strategy to protect Taiwan’s autonomy and freedom from Chinese control requires blocking the persuasion and coercion roads to PRC domination of the island and deterring or defeating the compellence road. A US counter-persuasion and -coercion strategy should be focused, tightly sequenced and phased, and deliberate. Chinese political and economic moves to undermine Taiwan’s isolation should be coordinated with demonstrations of US and allied force that can ensure open strategic lines of communication and resupply around Taiwan. The increasingly myopic focus on the supposedly imminent Chinese invasion threat can seriously hinder or prevent entirely the development and implementation of such a strategy. This outcome may be in part what China seeks.
+
+#### Compellence
+
+The PRC has unquestionably been developing the capability to compel Taiwanese capitulation by force if coercion and persuasion fail, but Xi’s determination to move to compellence and the imminence of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan both require more rigorous interrogation than either is currently receiving. It would be more strategically apposite for the US to approach concerns about an impending Chinese invasion in the context of ongoing Chinese persuasion and coercion approaches. An invasion or other compellent strategies are possible, but such scenarios would be escalations of current campaigns carrying significant risks and downsides for Beijing.
+
+The narrow focus on the threat of Chinese invasion, moreover, marginalizes an alternative compellence strategy that would flow far more naturally from China’s persuasion and coercion efforts — a strategy of isolation. The US would do well, therefore, to take a step back from the increasingly frantic discussion of ways and means to deter or stop a cross-Strait invasion and instead reconsider the PRC strategic context from which any such decision and operation would emerge.
+
+China did not begin its military modernization with the express purpose of invading Taiwan. As we have stated, the PLA modernization campaign started in the early 1990s, when the PRC observed America’s military modernization demonstrated in the deserts of Iraq and Kuwait. The Gulf War shocked the world’s major militaries by demonstrating that a highly trained, professional, all-volunteer force equipped with precision strike and stealth capabilities could humiliate the world’s fourth largest army rapidly and with extremely low casualties.
+
+Russian military theorists were seized by this phenomenon and pushed for the modernization and professionalization of the Russian military in the following decades. Many other countries began abandoning long-held conscription practices and turning to professional volunteer militaries equipped with more advanced technology. The Chinese did the same and for the same reasons.
+
+___`US policy risks making a grave error by seeing China’s expanding military operations around Taiwan only through the prism of preparations for an invasion.`___
+
+Defense analysts have grown increasingly concerned that the PLA has a set goal of 2027 to invade Taiwan, based on comments by outgoing commander of US Indo-Pacific Command Adm. Phil Davidson (ret.). But the primary importance of 2027 is that it is the 100-year anniversary of the PLA’s founding and is thus likely a deadline for it to reach new modernization milestones. The PLA can likely already conduct an invasion if ordered, albeit with high risk; as the modernization process continues, and in every year that passes, the PLA will have more capability to do so.
+
+The PLA’s modernization effort is general-purpose, rather than narrowly optimized for a cross-Strait invasion. It began at a time when the PRC was pocketing US and Taiwanese concessions and increasing its demands; it continued through periods of apparent Taiwanese and American conciliation of Beijing and through periods of easing of tensions between Beijing and Taipei. Xi may have accelerated the expected date of completion of this decades-long general military buildup, shifting it into a specific preparation for a particular invasion scenario, but there is no direct and publicly available evidence of this assessment. US policymakers would do well to question the notion that this program’s date of completion represents some kind of specified invasion date.
+
+The modernization program naturally enhances the PRC’s military abilities to invade Taiwan even against US resistance, but it also enhances the PLA’s abilities to pursue another form of compellence — isolation.
+
+__Isolation.__ A strategy of isolating Taiwan by air and sea flows naturally from China’s ongoing persuasion and coercion efforts. Those efforts explicitly aim to get the last few states that diplomatically recognize Taiwan to shift their recognition to Beijing. They aim to cajole states and businesses to accept and promulgate the Chinese version of the Beijing-Taipei relationship, rather than Taiwan’s — a form of informational isolation. That aim includes efforts to prevent other heads and senior leaders of foreign states from visiting Taipei or receiving Taiwanese officials in their capitals.
+
+It is thus in part also a strategy of diplomatic isolation. And Beijing constantly presses other countries to refrain from providing Taiwan with military equipment — a form of military-cooperation isolation. One set of aims of the current coercion and persuasion efforts is thus to use means short of the actual use of force to cut Taipei’s connections to the outside world, other than those that might run through Beijing.
+
+The natural next escalation in these efforts is not invasion, but rather adding the overt use of force to complete the isolation. Beijing could declare a quarantine or blockade of Taiwan on some pretext and deploy its maritime power and airpower to enforce such a policy. The blockade need not be total from the start. The PRC could begin by deploying ships covered by aircraft around the island to inspect all vessels entering and leaving Taiwan’s ports for some claimed contraband — advanced weapons systems, perhaps. Beijing could similarly insist on inspecting aircraft, although attempting to enforce such a demand without actually shooting down civilian aircraft would be challenging. How many civilian aircraft, on the other hand, would continue operating through skies full of PLAAF aircraft threatening to down them?
+
+If such initial efforts failed to bring Taipei to a position satisfactory to Beijing, the PRC could escalate further to an actual blockade. Taiwan is unalterably dependent on external resources to survive, so it is almost impossible to imagine that a protracted blockade could fail to secure Taipei’s surrender on almost any terms Beijing might dictate. Moreover, given its unique lack of official status in international affairs, it may be especially vulnerable to demonstrations that it can be isolated. It would be difficult to muster the kind of defiance that Britain did under attack from Nazi Germany: Taiwan lacks Britain’s long history and strategic traditions, general cohesion, and unbreakable morale.
+
+This form of compellence not only is the most natural and obvious progression from the current PRC campaigns but also seems to present a far more attractive balance of risk and reward to Beijing. It does not in principle require the PLA to engage in combat. If Taiwan’s supporters make clear they will not challenge such a blockade, then Taiwan might surrender without fighting. If either Taiwan or its supporters decide to challenge it, moreover, they run the risk of appearing to have fired the first shot, provided the PRC has arranged matters such that running the blockade requires shooting at ships or aircraft blocking routes to ports or airfields.
+
+If the PRC has not managed such an arrangement, then the PLA might need to shoot first, but it might begin by hitting a civilian plane or ship. Such an action would obviously incur outrage and opprobrium, on the one hand, but it would also place Taiwan and its partners in the position of having to decide how to respond. That position would likely be uncomfortable, as competing pressures to respond to the Chinese action and support Taiwan would be offset by fears that the pro-Taiwan coalition would be initiating a war. To see this dynamic at work, we have only to look at the extensive Western discourse about the fears of prompting Russian escalation by providing defensive systems to Ukraine following Moscow’s unprovoked and illegal invasion. The West’s early wavering about supporting Ukraine against a blatantly illegal and unjust invasion requires considerably more attention than it has received, since it offers Beijing encouragement as it considers escalation toward Taiwan.
+
+This isolation strategy has some downsides for Beijing, to be sure. It would be an obvious escalation to the use of force and could trigger the US and regional states to mobilize for war, thereby depriving the PRC of the element of surprise it might otherwise hope to achieve at some level in a no-notice invasion scenario. If the US and its partners responded to the isolation rapidly and in force, Beijing could find it has made the prospects of a successful invasion much worse by bringing its adversaries’ advanced military capabilities into the vicinity of Taiwan without interdicting them.
+
+The PRC would thus need to be prepared to choose either of the two most plausible actions in response to the deployment of considerable US and allied firepower toward Taiwan: de-escalate and await another moment or escalate to regional war. If the strength and determination of the US and partner response seemed to Beijing too high to challenge, then the PRC could back away, accept a temporary defeat, and develop alternative approaches for another try later on. Beijing could prepare in advance to mitigate the unpleasantness of having to climb down by defining a lesser political objective that it could be reasonably sure to accomplish — or plausibly claim to have accomplished — before it had to back away.
+
+The PRC could alternatively ensure that its initial preparations for the isolation campaign include preparations to escalate to major conflict if a US-led coalition challenged it seriously. This approach might not be easily distinguishable from preparations for a full-scale invasion in that it would likely include putting in place all the capabilities needed to exclude US-led forces from the vicinity of Taiwan and drive off or destroy any already near the island. It might include the preparation of an invasion force, depending on whether Beijing believed it could achieve its aims by the escalatory application of the isolation approach. The PLA would face a potentially much worse military position at the start of such an escalation than it could hope to face in a surprise invasion scenario, but Beijing might also calculate that the threat of invasion could reduce the willingness of the US-led coalition to push matters to full-scale war.
+
+Time-space relationships could also be central to any PRC isolation approach. The PRC appears to believe it is developing a strong network of collaborators and fellow travelers in Taiwan and that its own political warfare elements on the island may be able to paralyze initial Taiwanese responses and quickly sap the island’s will to resist. An isolation strategy would almost certainly begin with the successful isolation of the island by air and sea; any response to break blockades or quarantines would likely take days or weeks to negotiate and then bring into effect.
+
+The initial shock of isolation could engender strong psychological effects, especially if China manages to cut Taiwan’s internet connectivity and other means of communicating with the outside world. Beijing might calculate that its efforts and agents could bring Taiwan to surrender before the US is able to break through Taiwan’s isolation. The PRC leadership is moderately likely to be wrong in such a calculation; overestimating one’s ability to break the will of an adversary is one of the most common mistakes in coercion and compellence strategies. But miscalculation would change the outcome, not the decision to make the attempt.
+
+If Beijing pursued an isolation strategy, it would undermine the prospects of an immediate escalation to full-scale attack. But this approach is still attractive as it offers the possibility of achieving Beijing’s aims without having to engage in a complicated amphibious invasion. An isolation strategy poses a potentially higher risk that the PRC might have to back down in an embarrassing fashion, but it offsets that risk by offering a climbdown before major hostilities break out and therefore before China suffers significant combat losses. It also flows most naturally from the long-standing persuasion and coercion campaigns China has been pursuing.
+
+__Invasion.__ Xi might nevertheless decide not to bother with isolation efforts, instead driving straight toward his final objective via invasion. The Chinese idealized version of this strategy would of course be attractive to Beijing: A brief period of increased tension covers the execution of well-planned and rehearsed PLA mobilization for an invasion. A short air-missile campaign shatters Taiwan’s defense and government structures while Chinese political warfare agents on the island become active, wrecking any hope of coherent Taiwanese preparations for defense. The massive Chinese fleet sweeps quickly across the strait and begins disembarking troops and vehicles onto Taiwanese beaches almost before Taipei knows what’s happening, and Chinese troops raise the PRC flag over government buildings in Taipei while policymakers in Washington and Tokyo debate what to do. Xi makes a speech from the Presidential Office in Taipei, and “splittism” is forever defeated.
+
+It is unlikely that even Xi seriously entertains this fantasy. The statements and actions of American and Japanese leaders and officials offer no reason for Xi to be confident that the US and Japan (or Australia) would stand idly by and watch this spectacle. On the contrary, from the PRC’s perspective, President Joe Biden has been setting informational and military conditions to prepare to defend Taiwan against an invasion.
+
+Xi has clearly also been observing the disastrous Russian invasion of Ukraine that highlighted additional factors of concern. The Russians thought they had thoroughly penetrated Ukrainian society and government with their own agents and fellow travelers and built a campaign on the assumption that Ukrainians would not fight. They were wrong on all counts. The Russians also wildly overestimated their own military capabilities and competence and underestimated the inevitable effects of battlefield friction. The PLA is almost certainly more competent and able to handle friction than the Potemkin army with which Russia invaded, but friction is real in any war and the more so in complex large-scale amphibious invasions.
+
+Chinese military leaders and Xi himself must therefore take seriously the possibilities that Taiwan will fight and that the political warfare efforts on the island will be only partially successful, that the US and its allies will respond with force rapidly and determinedly, that the PLA will not perform optimally, and, even if nothing else does, that the friction inherent in war will lead to setbacks and losses. None of these observations are groundbreaking. They serve only to say that Xi must recognize the high risks associated with invading Taiwan — unless he is a thoroughgoing fool, which he does not in any way appear to be.
+
+It is clear enough that an island of 24 million people cannot hope to defeat the massed forces of a country of 1.4 billion. The best that Taiwan on its own could hope would be to inflict painful losses on an invading Chinese force. Properly equipped and determined to fight, Taiwan might be able to do so. We shall set aside further consideration of this aspect of the scenario, however, to focus on those that are more dangerous to Beijing.
+
+Debate roils the US national security establishment about America’s capacity to stop a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Some argue that the PLA’s ballistic, cruise, and now hypersonic missiles render America’s aircraft carriers hopelessly vulnerable and that China’s air and missile arsenal and A2AD systems force the US to rely on bases far from Taiwan and on long-range standoff missiles alone, ultimately dooming any chance the US might have to stop the attack.
+
+Much hinges in these scenarios on when and whether Beijing would attack US bases at Guam and Okinawa, at least, and on assumptions about America’s ability to use bases in South Korea and the Japanese home islands. If the US retains the ability to use Guam and Okinawa, so the reasoning often goes, then it might be able to challenge the PLA’s ability to cross the strait or at least to impose losses that Beijing would find unbearable.
+
+These discussions are important for considerations of invasion scenarios. One struggles to recall a successful amphibious invasion in the era of combat aircraft conducted without at least localized air supremacy. Amphibious ships are large, vulnerable targets whose sinking entails the deaths of hundreds or thousands of soldiers and the loss of large amounts of vehicles and supplies. Few if any militaries have been willing to risk sailing them to shore in the face of enemy aircraft or an enemy’s ability to concentrate volumes of high-payload munitions on them.
+
+China cannot deprive the US of all ability to strike a PLA landing force. Long-range stealth bombers can refuel out of the A2AD bubble and fire missiles, some of which will almost surely hit and destroy their targets. US attack submarines and other platforms can fire volleys of cruise missiles that PLA air defenses will not completely shoot down. If China invades and the US is determined to defend Taiwan, the PLA will take losses.
+
+The scale and consequences of those losses depend heavily, however, on whether the US can use its carriers and regional bases. The more of those assets the American military can use, the more severe the damage it can impose on the invasion force, possibly up to and including its destruction. That is one of the reasons many discussions of a Chinese invasion scenario assume that the PLA would attack US bases on Guam and Okinawa, at least, and possibly on the Japanese home islands. They often assume that South Korea would not allow the US to use its bases on the Korean Peninsula in a war that, in principle, interests Seoul very little.
+
+Chinese military technocrats would likely prefer to begin the attack in this fashion and deprive the US of as much regional capacity as possible. The geostrategic advisability of doing so, however, rests on political rather than military considerations. Would the US absorb an attack on Guam and not thereafter regard itself as at war with China? Would Tokyo regard attacks on US bases on Japanese territory as bilateral US-China affairs that do not constitute acts of war against Japan? Would the US, having lost immediate use of its other regional bases, not activate the US–Republic of Korea mutual defense treaty (which, unlike the US treaty with Japan, actually is mutual and obliges Seoul to come to the aid of the US if the US is attacked in the region)? Would Seoul refuse that activation, thereby risking the loss of its most important ally?
+
+As both Russia and the allies have learned, no prewar assumption holds after a war begins. Ukraine’s fighting will is beyond what analysts imagined before the conflict, the US and NATO are equipping Ukraine far beyond what was thought possible, Washington has reinforced NATO forces on the eastern flank, and there are now two new NATO members under consideration. Turning back to Asia, it is hard to imagine South Korea wanting to remain neutral once Australia, Japan, and the US (and possibly some other NATO countries) are in the fight; in a scenario in which US ships, territory, and allies are struck, the US will likely pay whatever price its allies Thailand and the Philippines demand for the use of their airspace and bases in their territory. The issue of South Korean sympathy for Taiwan (or lack thereof) is a red herring. Seoul will have to make decisions in the context of the viability of its long-term reliance on the US and America’s allies — and the possible impact of refusing US requests for help on that reliance.
+
+Surely Xi and his lieutenants have considered the geopolitical consequences of trying to succeed operationally. If not, the China problem may be bigger than most analysts realize. In that case, either Xi is as isolated and delusional as Putin was before invading Ukraine, and therefore is undeterrable, or his grand strategic objectives have changed. From building up comprehensive national power and making incremental gains to undermine US alliances and reshape the world order, Xi would have transformed his grand strategy into one of forcefully obtaining hegemony in Asia. If Xi’s objectives have changed in such a fashion, then the US should not be preparing to counter only an invasion of Taiwan but rather a series of Chinese campaigns for hegemony. The assumption of this report is that China’s strategy toward Taiwan is part of a unification campaign, a close cousin of the successful Hong Kong, Tibet, and Xinjiang campaigns, and that any other gains Xi thinks he can secure from successful unification are secondary and opportunistic.
+
+One might restate these considerations more straightforwardly. A PRC invasion plan that relies on attacking Guam and US positions in Japan early in the conflict would immediately bring China into open war with the US, Japan, and possibly South Korea. US policy analysts might broodingly fear that the US and its regional allies would allow even such attacks to glance off them from a geopolitical standpoint and work to treat the war as a “Taiwan crisis” with no larger ramifications. We needn’t get into that argument ourselves to observe that Xi would, again, be a complete fool to be confident of such a response.
+
+Serious political and military leaders in Beijing must thus consider that a decision to invade Taiwan immediately confronts them with a second extremely thorny decision: Either Xi accepts the much greater risks to the success of the military operation if China does not attack US bases at once, or he must accept the real possibility that the limited invasion of Taiwan could rapidly become a full-scale regional or even global war with the US and its allies.
+
+___`An invasion would be an extraordinarily risky undertaking to any Chinese leader not besotted with his own power and deluded by stupid or dishonest generals and political advisers.`___
+
+We do not by any means intend to suggest that Xi might not decide that either risk is acceptable; he might. We certainly do not mean to say that strong and prompt US responses or US and American-allied escalations are certain or would be successful. Those arguing that, as things stand today, China could invade Taiwan and the US couldn’t stop the invasion might be right. Calls for increasing America’s military capabilities to defeat such a Chinese attack at acceptable costs to the US and its allies are surely cogent and should be heeded.
+
+But even this cursory examination of some of the invasion-scenario implications suggests that it would be an extraordinarily risky undertaking to any Chinese leader not besotted with his own power and deluded by stupid or dishonest generals and political advisers. Most leaders would prefer less risky approaches that offer the promise of securing the same outcome at lower cost.
+
+US policy therefore cannot accept as a given that Xi is simply preparing to invade and that, when the PLA is ready, he will. We must instead reopen the aperture to see other plausible roads Xi could take to seizing Taiwan and develop strategies to block all of them rather than focusing on only one.
+
+#### Implications
+
+This discussion would be of merely academic interest if preparations to defeat the cross-Strait invasion also included blocking the persuasion, coercion, and isolation-compellence roads. Unfortunately, though, the approaches generally advocated to stop the invasion actively undermine efforts to block Xi’s other roads.
+
+If the invasion scenario is the only one the US and its allies plan to block, the temptation will grow to pull back from the Chinese A2AD bubble, abandon reliance on Guam and Okinawa, and focus on increasing America’s long-range strike capabilities. Maximizing perceived operational effectiveness would override geopolitical necessity. Such a move would potentiate the PRC’s persuasion, coercion, and isolation efforts. It could be the case that these efforts actually enhance America’s ability to defend Taiwan and therefore increase the likelihood the US would come to Taiwan’s defense, although we question both assumptions. But would it seem that way to the Taiwanese?
+
+The actual optics of that strategy involve withdrawing visible US presence from the near vicinity of Taiwan, after all. The more imminent war becomes, under this approach, the faster US carrier battle groups steam away from the island, the more US strike aircraft fly north and west from Okinawa and Guam, and the more American military bases throughout the region move into defensive rather than offensive postures. The Taiwanese would be remarkable people indeed to observe those phenomena, see the growing concentration of Chinese military assets around their island, and conclude that they should be ready to fight to the death, confident that America will be with them.
+
+Openly accepting the premise that US carriers cannot survive Chinese attacks also means openly stating that moving carriers toward Taiwan, Japan, or through the strait is always an American bluff and should not be seen as a serious demonstration of Washington’s willingness or ability to fight. The utility of such freedom of navigation operations could be questioned in any event, but accepting the widely held premises about the poor US prospects for defeating a cross-Strait invasion today makes them worse than meaningless.
+
+These discussions all tend to undermine the likely effectiveness of any strategies the US and its partners might develop to try to block the persuasion and coercion roads to the conquest of Taiwan, but they don’t preclude the construction and implementation of such strategies. Even advocates of the standoff approach to defending Taiwan against invasion, after all, generally agree that the US should develop such counterstrategies even if they also generally dismiss the significance of Chinese persuasion and coercion campaigns through their confidence that invasion is inevitable and even imminent.
+
+The most serious problem with focusing narrowly on preventing the cross-Strait invasion from standoff ranges is that it almost invites Xi to try the isolation strategy. Breaking blockades requires presence. The US certainly could use long-range precision weapons to sink Chinese ships blocking or interfering with merchant vessels trying to move into and out of Taiwan’s ports — until those Chinese ships move too close to those merchant vessels to permit their safe destruction. And driving PLAAF aircraft out of Taiwan’s skies is not likely a task that can be undertaken from far-over-the-horizon bases except by destroying all the PLAAF bases on the mainland from which such operations are conducted.
+
+Even assuming that that is a feasible military undertaking, it nevertheless would move the US rapidly toward the tremendously escalatory step of conducting a large-scale air attack on the Chinese homeland. Any approach to breaking the blockade with standoff munitions, finally, requires the US to use an immediate lethal approach to respond to a Chinese effort conducted, possibly, with less-than-lethal force. It could put the responsibility for escalating to a shooting war on the US, even though China created the crisis.
+
+The main problem with approaches seeking to break a blockade from standoff distances is not that doing so is impossible but rather that promising to do so is insufficiently credible. It is almost impossible to imagine a scenario in which the Chinese begin to interfere with Taiwan’s communications and trade with the rest of the world, whereafter the US instantly responds by sinking Chinese ships. Beijing’s isolation strategy would almost inevitably have some time to work before a serious US response along these lines even started — let alone before it succeeded, if it could. Xi might miscalculate the odds of securing Taiwan’s concession in that interval, as we have observed above, but the relatively low risks he would run compared with those entailed in a full-scale invasion make it more plausible that he would accept the risk of miscalculation here.
+
+There is a solution to the conundrum these challenges pose to the US: Design a counterinvasion strategy that includes a counter-isolation strategy. The far-over-the-horizon counterinvasion strategy is a problem only if it precludes or excludes counterisolation efforts. The US should and, indeed, must have far-over-the-horizon capabilities in any scenario. But it must also develop ways to operate within China’s A2AD zone, including within the range of China’s hypersonic missiles. It must be able to meet a Chinese blockade effort centered on nonlethal force with a nonlethal counter-isolation effort of its own. It must avoid the optics of withdrawing its military power from the theater as the threat of Chinese attack grows and instead, ideally, create the object of credible military power flowing toward Taiwan.
+
+We recognize that these demands are easy to make and hard to meet. We have no specific suggestions to offer about how to do so technically or tactically. Our purpose in this report, rather, is to say that actually keeping Taiwan free is even harder than it seems to many. We cannot reduce the problem to one specific scenario, and we actually must focus on solving extraordinarily hard military problems to enable strategies that can defeat not only the most dangerous courses of action Beijing might pursue but also the most likely.
+
+---
+
+__Dan Blumenthal__ is director of Asian studies at AEI and author of The China Nightmare: The Grand Ambitions of a Decaying State (AEI Press, 2020). Before joining AEI, Mr. Blumenthal served as senior director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia at the US Department of Defense.
+
+__Frederick W. Kagan__ is a resident scholar and the director of the Critical Threats Project at AEI. He was previously an associate professor of military history at West Point. He holds a PhD in Russian and Soviet military history from Yale University.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-03-14-revive-arsenal-of-democracy.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-03-14-revive-arsenal-of-democracy.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..af226338
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-03-14-revive-arsenal-of-democracy.md
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Revive Arsenal Of Democracy
+author: Cynthia Cook
+date : 2023-03-14 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/mhTNtTV.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Reviving the Arsenal of Democracy: Steps for Surging Defense Industrial Capacity"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Russia’s war in Ukraine has reinforced the necessity of maintaining a deep inventory of weapons. Any future operational plans assuming that a war will be short-lived may run against a capable and determined adversary willing to wage a prolonged conflict._ _That is what has happened in Ukraine, where Russia’s plan for a quick decapitation strike and absorption of further territory was thwarted by the fierce resistance of the Ukrainian people with the support of allies and partners, led by the United States. It is now a war of attrition. The protracted nature of the war has prompted questions and reflection on the readiness of the U.S. defense industrial base, though the current conflict is not yet an exercise in industrial mobilization. To date, the robust support that the United States has provided to Ukraine has primarily come out of stockpiles, drawing the United States down to levels that have triggered concerns as to whether there are sufficient residual inventories for training and to execute war plans in the case of a conflict in which the United States is directly involved. It is no longer a question of whether the U.S. industrial base is prepared to rapidly surge production in the case of a direct conflict with a capable adversary — it is clear that it is not, and that is because the necessary investments have not yet been made to make it so._
+
+In World War II, the United States served as the “Arsenal of Democracy” — a term President Franklin D. Roosevelt used to refer to the key industrial role U.S. industry played in the Allied war effort — but it took more than five years for the industrial base to fully gear up for the war effort.[1] If the United States were to be directly engaged in conflict, the time it could take to surge production represents a serious vulnerability. Why is surging production so complicated, and why would it take so long?
+
+Even before this conflict, concerns about the shallow depth of U.S. precision weapon inventories, the preferred weapons of defense planning scenarios, loomed in the Pentagon and Congress. This vulnerability is just now being elevated by policymakers. Language in the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) authorizes an increase in the acquisition of new munitions, for example, including with multiyear buying authorities. Reaching the programmed number may take years to finish at current production rates , so discussions are increasingly about the need to surge production levels as a solution, and the U.S. Army is taking steps to support this. However, years of underinvestment mean that the industrial base may not be sufficient to both refill and increase stocks while meeting demands from allies in the timeframe that can have a warfighting impact at the speed of relevance. Furthermore, the commercial defense industrial base itself faces an incentive structure that motivates a least-cost production model at the expense of capacity and delivery speed, which means that manufacturing slack has been eliminated to the extent possible. While this incentive structure is designed to ensure that the Department of Defense (DOD) can invest in as broad a range of capabilities as possible and to carefully allocate taxpayer funds, it has reduced the ability of the defense industrial base to surge.
+
+Without a formal requirement with clear targets for higher sustained volumes — and with issued contracts — defense contractors have not risked investing in the production capacity that is now needed. This issue is pervasive across the defense manufacturing ecosystem, not just for munitions. Refilling inventories in a reasonable timeframe or preparing for surge more generally may require contractors to invest in additional capacity to allow for production to increase. It is thus worthwhile to review the steps required to boost production rates so that policymakers have an understanding of what it takes to surge and, more specifically, what types of investments are required.
+
+The first question that must be addressed when considering surge production for any capability is whether existing factories and facilities have the necessary capacity to expand in-house production. Generally, an increase in production using existing facilities and workforce would be the most cost-effective approach, so assessing capacity is a key first step. The fixed costs of production (e.g., facilities and machine tools) may be useable for up to three shifts. If the factory is not at full capacity and has space for additional production requirements, more workers can be hired or additional shifts can be added. Recruiting and retaining workers is more challenging when unemployment rates are low and workforce participation rates are already high. In early February 2023, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate is 3.4 percent. One major defense contractor reported offering $10,000 bonuses to existing workers for identifying new skilled mechanics who join the organization, and paying long-distance relocation costs for the new skilled touch labor employees.
+
+If the factory is running three shifts at full capacity, there is the potential to increase production by using industrial engineers to look for new ways of doing the work, to speed up assembly, or to otherwise find efficiencies. The search for production efficiencies is not a new one, so one challenge is that the increasing automation and adoption of production approaches such as lean manufacturing may have already taken all significant slack and unnecessary expenses out of the system, an approach driven both by advances in industrial engineering and by government contract incentive structures that focus on reducing costs. There may still be room for improvement, particularly if the factory is able to use robots where increased automation is possible. Changing production approaches might require additional training for the workforce, along with coordinating with a union if there is a represented workforce.
+
+Increasing capacity within an existing facility will require an increase in other inputs besides labor. Deliveries of raw materials, parts, subassemblies, and whatever components go into the goods being produced will need to increase to support the new production rate. Increasing production at final assembly sites requires an increase in the full range of inputs. If supply chains are constrained, increasing production may be difficult or even impossible. For some subcontractors, their defense production may represent a small portion of their total output, and increasing the percentage of their output sent to defense contractors may not make economic sense if it harms their relations with other, more profitable customers. Aerospace is the largest market for titanium, but the metal has multiple consumer uses, including in automobiles — and there is a single U.S. producer of titanium sponge and titanium castings. Castings and forgings have been identified as a risk item by all services of the U.S. military. Semiconductors are used across the entire spectrum of manufacturing and have lead times of up to six months. Requirements for U.S.-sourced subcomponents, down to the material level, complicate production growth; contractors cannot just turn to the open market to look for new suppliers without a rigorous qualification process. Government regulations for defense contracting require U.S.-sourced subcomponents, generally down to the material level. Some munitions materials have such adverse environmental impact that they are not available in the United States, causing dependence on foreign sources and critical points of failure. Thus, investments in increasing the supply of manufacturing inputs are fundamental to a successful manufacturing surge.
+
+In the case of munitions production, the DOD retains some manufacturing capacity in-house, such as artillery shells and chemicals that go into making explosives and propellants. In these government-owned, contractor-operated (GOCO) facilities, the commercial entity that manages the GOCO may have limits on investments in facilities and tooling that may not exist in contractor-owned and contractor-operated (COCOs) sites. The operating contracts for GOCO plants have a relatively short durations (5 to 10 years), which limits companies’ assurance that they can recoup and profit from investments, if they are allowed to make them.
+
+If additional factory space necessitating capital expenditures is required, there may be a corporate review process for approval before decisions are made. If the plan is approved, the new facility may either be built at the same site or at a different location. Building the facilities at the same site offers certain economies of scale, especially in terms of management. For example, plant management can take responsibility for the additional production space, the same human resources staff can oversee the process of recruiting, hiring, and training new employees, and new workers can get trained by existing production employees. Likewise, the quality assurance staff can oversee the quality processes for the new production lines. While additional personnel may be required in each of these functions to support the capacity increase, the institutions themselves are in place. For the facility itself, issues with the local community or federal regulatory agencies regarding permits, environmental impact assessments, and other technical challenges may have already been addressed. The local community may have longer-term relationships with, and thus greater trust, in plant management.
+
+However, there are also downsides to collocating additional production space. If factories have already expanded their radius of recruitment because of the low local unemployment, additional workers may be difficult to find. Building in a new location also has the benefit of reducing the risk of having a single point of failure. For example, climate-related emergencies such as tornadoes and hurricanes have the potential to wreak significant damage, although factories may be hardened against all but the most unusual events. Human-caused disruptions such as terrorism or adversary attacks represent other risks. In one historical example of hardening against such disruptions in the 1950s, a second production for the California-built F-86 Sabre was developed in Columbus, Ohio.
+
+If the decision is made to build in a “greenfield” site, the first step is to identify the location. Some states and localities may offer subsidies to attract new business, such as direct investments, tax rebates, and investments in roads. Some may have labor laws that are more advantageous to employers. It takes time for a company to collect and analyze this information. Some types of production also have very specific constraints, which may shape location decisions. Shipbuilding needs to occur on the coast, and appropriate land can be very scarce and subject to additional environmental constraints relating to littoral environments. The construction of nuclear-powered ships and submarines brings additional complications, which will contribute to the difficulty of any increase in submarine production to support AUKUS. Another example of such an issue is choosing the site location for factories working with energetic explosive material, as these will need to be located at a distance from population centers.
+
+The new facility will also need to be designed, and there might be a time lag if a competition for the architect is held. Plants should be designed with industrial engineering considerations in mind, so space limitations should not constrain the manufacturing approach. Plans can be started in advance of the location decision, but there may need to be some changes based on the specific site. A variety of building permits will need to be obtained before building can commence, and there may be additional necessary permits depending on the production processes, such as those involving paint with volatile organic compounds (VOCs). Getting permits can be time-consuming and require support from counsel to work through the procedure and deal with any rejections. After the building is constructed, additional inspections by government regulators will likely be required before work can start.
+
+Before building commences, a competition may be held for different construction companies to ensure best value and lowest costs. Once a contractor is chosen, some work may start immediately, but there may be items necessary for building construction with long lead times due to supply chain challenges. Building a facility to support construction may have specific requirements that take additional time and expertise, such as extremely level floors or advanced air filtration, along with the usual requirements, including electricity, plumbing, internet connectivity, landscaping, and fire alarms. New roads, a rail link, a runway, or other local transportation infrastructure may be necessary to facilitate the delivery of inputs into the plant and finished items to the customers.
+
+As complicated as the above process is, the time to develop and build additional infrastructure may not be the biggest schedule constraint. For complex production processes, advanced machine tools can take years between order and delivery and may need to be sourced from overseas. This includes machines such as multi-axis metal cutting machines, lasers, and autoclaves. Particularly large machines and hard tooling can require additional support in the building foundation as well as overhead cranes to move heavy parts. Production planning and ordering machine tools does not need to wait until the building is complete.
+
+A new site will require new plant management and whatever other on-site support functions are needed to run the factory. Manufacturing touch labor in defense production may require extensive training and specific certifications on skills such as welding, where it can take years to move from apprentice to mastery. In addition to the time necessary to recruit and hire new workers, on a greenfield location where most or all workers are new, it will take time to bring them up to speed and train them to work together as a team. Along with touch labor, other production elements such as industrial engineering, test, and quality control may need to be identified and staffed. Some individuals may be willing to move from other sites either temporarily or permanently to help start up the new location. The U.S. government will also need to staff on-site regulatory functions such as the Defense Contract Management Agency and Defense Contract Audit Agency. This is not something that the defense contractors themselves can control or accelerate.
+
+The same supply chain challenges associated with increasing production capacity within an existing plant also pertain to a new facility. Suppliers will also need to surge, and in turn, their subcontractors will need to surge. Even if the necessary excess manufacturing capacity is present, components or key materials may have limited sources and those sources may be shared by multiple product lines that might be surging at once. This is not something that prime contractors can control, although long-term relationships with suppliers, including training on best practices to develop flexible responses for changing demand, can help. That will not address the question of deconflicting requirements if multiple systems rely on the same subcontractor, especially where there is a single U.S. source. Which system takes priority will be a question that needs to be resolved. Furthermore, there are difficulties in bringing new suppliers into the defense industrial base ecosystem, including concerns about losing intellectual property rights and challenges due to the stringent government regulatory environment, such as cybersecurity requirements laid out in the cybersecurity maturity model certification guidelines.
+
+For the supply chain, one strategy could include certain kinds of stockpiling of supplies — for example, maintaining inventories of materials like steel, that could be used in times of surge. This approach should focus on inputs that do not face the risk of obsolescence. In spite of long lead times for items like semiconductors, stockpiling is not a solution for those because of the rapid technology refresh in that sector, and stockpiles will risk being outdated and useless. For those, the government might encourage creating incentives for industry to develop preferred customer status with suppliers so that they can trigger priority access in the event of need. It should be noted that stockpiling or maintaining inventories of final products also comes with costs in both potential obsolescence as well as warehousing costs and regular maintenance.
+
+Building capacity for any type of defense manufacturing — not just munitions — is complicated by the lack of a clear market signal. For consumer goods, companies can make predictions about the long-term viability of a product and estimate the return on investment of building additional capacity before making decisions. Defense production is different. The DOD is generally the only U.S. buyer for defense goods, and government policies often reduce or eliminate the contractor’s ability to sell in the commercial market — that is, to foreign militaries. If a contractor invests its capital to increase capacity, and a surge in DOD requirements never materializes or results in signed contracts, the contractors would not be able to recoup their investments in that now excess capacity, and an increase in cost structure may impact their ability to successfully compete for future contracts. Multiyear contracts can provide additional fidelity to future demand, but the DOD needs congressional approval before issuing multiyear contracts, and Congress imposes limits on their use, although the 2023 NDAA authorized them for certain munitions purchases.
+
+Thus, the hardest questions when planning for surge are who is going to pay for it, and how. The question of funding any necessary increases in capacity will need to be answered before capacity can be increased. A long-term commitment on the part of Congress and the services will be necessary for defense contractors to make these investments. In addition, the government will need to ensure that future contracts support the maintenance of excess capacity — of slack — rather than continually drive to low-cost solutions. The clear challenge here, as ever, is competing priorities. Investing in increasing the surge capacity for existing systems may reduce the government’s budget for modernization investments that will produce capabilities needed in the future fight. Finally, since most of the companies in the defense industrial base also produce for the commercial industrial base, they may not want to tie up capital by maintaining slack capacity if the incentives are insufficient.
+
+Note that a strategy of working with allies can alleviate some of the strain on the domestic defense industry. “Ally-shoring” or “friend-shoring” — one approach that has been identified to take advantage of any existing capacity in the industrial bases of close allies — may be able to accelerate the potential for surge. Of course, this relies on whether there is slack capacity overseas, which would need to be assessed. Depending on how production is allocated, this can free up U.S. facilities for more advanced weaponry where export controls and intellectual property concerns could push production to stay in the United States while allocating existing capabilities to overseas suppliers. The key negotiating points to address will be deciding what is produced where, which country or which companies pay for necessary amendments to infrastructure, and how technology transfer considerations are handled.
+
+The next war that the United States faces may not be one where it enjoys a distinct capability advantage, as in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Allied Freedom. For a long war against a more capable adversary, the United States may need to more directly draw on its industrial base, with production going directly from the factory to the front. After a year of supporting Ukraine primarily out of existing stockpiles, there are signs that political leadership recognizes the need to awaken the “Arsenal of Democracy” in continued support of Ukraine and to refill the “empty bins.” Engaging the United States’ larger manufacturing sector for a longer-term production increase will be a more significant effort. Developing an implementation approach to do so — an operational or “OPlan” for mobilization — is something that planners should work on now. The challenges of supporting Ukraine should show us that we are certainly not thinking about this too early, and hopefully not too late. If there is a future conflict, the nation will have to go to war with the industrial base that it has at the time. The World War II model of engaging the industrial base in five years may not be sufficient for a conflict with a highly capable adversary with a strong industrial base, a strategy of onshoring all the components of production, and near-monopoly power over critical subcomponents, including critical materials used in defense production across the world.
+
+---
+
+__Cynthia Cook__ is director of the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group and a senior fellow in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Her research interests include defense acquisition policy and organization, the defense-industrial base, new technology development, and weapon systems production and sustainment. Dr. Cook is a member of the editorial board for the Defense Acquisition Research Journal and is an adjunct professor at the Pardee RAND Graduate School. From 1997 to 2021, Dr. Cook worked as a senior management scientist at RAND, where she oversaw, led, and worked on a wide range of studies for components across the U.S. Department of Defense, along with the Australian Department of Defense and the UK Ministry of Defense.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-03-14-unanswered-questions-on-kim.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-03-14-unanswered-questions-on-kim.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..d6b74c39
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-03-14-unanswered-questions-on-kim.md
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Unanswered Questions On Kim
+author: Victor Cha and Katrin F. Katz
+date : 2023-03-14 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/BaijL84.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Unanswered Questions about North Korean Leadership"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+___`The stability and continuity of the North Korean leadership is the biggest “known unknown” when it comes to assessing the future of North Korea.`___
+
+
+
+### Kim Jong-un’s Political Control of the North Korean Regime
+
+Kim Jong-un has consolidated power and appears more confident than ever. More than a decade ago, this outcome would have been largely unexpected, given that Kim Jong-un was relatively young (around 30 years old) and had only three years to prepare for leadership when his father, Kim Jong-il, suddenly died in December 2011. By comparison, Kim Jong-il was in his early 50s and had been in a grooming process for over 20 years when he took charge of the country when his father, Kim Il-sung, died in July 1994. Despite assessments that power consolidation would be challenging for this young, untested leader, Kim Jong-un attained six important titles that gave him firm control of the party, the state, and the military within the first six months of his rule — a period when he would have been the most vulnerable to attempted coups or other challenges to his leadership. In this regard, the recent surfacing of Kim’s daughter, Kim Ju-ae, could signal the start of a leadership grooming process of greater duration than what Ju-ae’s father enjoyed (elaborated below).
+
+Since taking power over a decade ago, Kim Jong-un has used a number of tactics to further cement his hold on power.
+
+- Kim has relied on his nuclear and missile arsenal as an instrument of control. This has given him the capacity to both generate support and demonstrate confidence internally while signaling to foreign leaders that they will face significant risks if they challenge him.
+
+- Kim has conducted brutal periodic purges of the leadership, including the executions of his uncle, Jang Song-thaek, in 2013 and his minister of defense, Hyon Yong-chol, in 2015; the assassination of his brother, Kim Jong-nam, in 2017; the replacement of all of North Korea’s top military generals; and the reported purge (and possible execution) of former foreign minister Ri Yong-ho in recent months. These actions have been used to remove the confidants of his father and any others Kim has perceived as a threat and replace them with Kim loyalists.
+
+- Kim has “retired out” elder statesmen and arranged marital alliances for individuals in his close circle to orchestrate a generational shift within the regime. For instance, the son of Choe Ryong-hae, who currently serves as chairman on the Standing Committee of the Supreme People’s Assembly and first vice president of the State Affairs Commission, is reportedly married to Kim Jong-un’s sister, Kim Yo-jong.
+
+- To increase his popularity among the citizenry, Kim Jong-un has drawn on nostalgia among the public for his grandfather, Kim Il-sung. The grand-elder Kim had a grandiose and charismatic personality and ruled during a time when North Korea was not plagued by famine (as it was during Kim Jong-il’s rule) and had strong relations with its Cold War patrons, China and the Soviet Union. Kim Jong-un has made efforts to dress like his grandfather, and there have even been rumors that he underwent plastic surgery to look more like him.
+
+- Kim Jong-un has tightened state control on information inflow into the country to enhance socialist ideological grip over its people and drive the country into further isolation. In December 2020, for instance, North Korea passed the “Law on the Elimination of Reactionary Thought and Culture” to clamp down on foreign influence. Anyone caught consuming or possessing foreign materials or cultural goods such as movies and dramas will be heavily punished. The law also banned foreign speech, hairstyle, and clothes, which Kim called a “dangerous poison.”
+
+Despite Kim Jong-un’s successful efforts at power consolidation, the situation remains unpredictable and opaque, and it is likely that Kim’s confidence masks inner insecurity. His brutal form of rule comes with the heavy baggage of knowing that he needs to “clean house” periodically to ensure that officials around him are not only loyal but will fear consequences if they are ever tempted to challenge his leadership. Economically, Kim faces the dilemma that all dictators face: regime survival and prosperity necessitates a degree of economic opening, but the process of opening could precipitate the regime’s collapse. Furthermore, Kim’s moments of peak popularity with the public (to the degree they can be measured) have coincided with periods when the economy was improving and growing. The combined effects of the Covid-19-induced lockdown starting in January 2020, international sanctions, and severe weather in recent years have created the worst economic contraction since the period of the great famine of the 1990s. Collectively, these conditions make it likely that elites and the general public resent or even despise Kim, though they cannot express this outwardly. As a result, even as Kim displays a facade of boldness, he probably worries deep down about the security of his rule.
+
+___`Kim faces the dilemma that all dictators face: regime survival and prosperity necessitates a degree of economic opening, but the process of opening could precipitate the regime’s collapse.`___
+
+Given this situation, it is important to identify and look for future indicators that Kim Jong-un’s hold on power could be waning. These might include
+
+- elite defections;
+
+- erratic purges (shifting from Kim’s usual vacillations of promoting and demoting officials to something more dramatic and irregular);
+
+- enhanced information and ideological control;
+
+- increased defections or refugee outflows;
+
+- generational tensions; and
+
+- public protest.
+
+The last of these remains unlikely due to the regime’s extreme level of social control. However, given recent unpredicted popular protests in China against Covid-19 lockdown measures, social protest should remain on the list of possible developments that could weaken Kim’s control over the regime.
+
+
+### The Known Unknown: Kim Jong-un’s Health
+
+Probably the biggest unknown concerning North Korean leadership is Kim Jong-un’s health, a variable that could take the form of death or incapacitation and that directly affects the trajectory of the other two variables: control and succession.
+
+Kim Jong-un has a number of health issues, including obesity, chain smoking, high blood pressure, gout, and a family history of diabetes and heart disease. When Kim met South Korean president Moon Jae-in at the Mount Paektu summit in 2018, he reportedly struggled to walk to and from the buses, perspiring profusely and breathing heavily. Kim lost some weight at one point, but more recently he seems to have gained it back (though it is important to keep in mind that, culturally, this might be viewed a sign of vitality in North Korea rather than a risk factor for an early death).
+
+Despite his numerous medical conditions, it is difficult to speculate about when or how Kim may die or become incapacitated. The regime is opaque by design, and North Korea is one of the hardest intelligence targets in the world. The Central Intelligence Agency did not know about the passing of Kim Jong-un’s father, Kim Jong-il, until North Korea’s public announcement two days later. Periodically, Kim Jong-un “disappears” — as he did for a number of weeks in May 2020 — prompting much speculation about his condition. But even with the high level of attention these moments attract, top North Korea watchers rarely, if ever, have clear insights into the actual situation. Among experts, the perpetual answer to questions about Kim’s health is: “we do not know.” He is currently almost 39 years old (from experts’ best understanding), and his father and grandfather lived to the ages of 70 and 82, respectively. Considering that his father and grandfather had many of the same medical conditions as Kim Jong-un, he could be around for decades to come. Or, as one expert in the workshop noted, Kim “could just be one little sugar wafer away from [his] demise.”
+
+The most important factor in determining the impact of Kim’s health on regime stability will be the timing of his death or incapacitation, specifically whether it occurs in his old age following a lengthy period of leadership transition or takes place unexpectedly and suddenly with no clearly identified successor. The latter situation would be the most precarious in terms of creating the potential for a failed succession process and regime instability. That said, while succession crisis scenarios must be kept in mind, one expert noted that the most probable outcome if Kim Jong-un were to die today would be a relatively smooth transition of power, perhaps to Kim Jong-un’s sister (discussed in further detail below). As in the past, the system is likely to perpetuate.
+
+
+### Plans for Leadership Succession
+
+The North Korean constitution does not enumerate a succession process; it is not institutionalized in the state. Yet there was a clear process to the two past successions prior to and following Kim Il-sung’s sudden death in 1994 and Kim Jong-il’s sudden death in 2011.
+
+There is currently no clear successor to Kim Jong-un. However, a number of developments in recent years have brought succession questions to the forefront, including the public debuts of Kim Jong-un’s wife, Ri Sol-ju, his sister, Kim Yo-jong, and his 10-year-old daughter, Kim Ju-ae.
+
+___`The North Korean constitution does not enumerate a succession process; it is not institutionalized in the state. Yet there was a clear process to the two past successions prior to and following Kim Il-sung’s sudden death in 1994 and Kim Jong-il’s sudden death in 2011.`___
+
+The panel experts agreed that Kim Jong-un’s sister, Kim Yo-jong, would be the most likely transitional leader if her brother were to die or be incapacitated in the near term. Kim Yo-jong has had significant power within the system for a number of years. While her debut on the world stage occurred around 2018, she had been running the powerful Propaganda and Agitation Department since at least 2015. By 2020, Kim Yo-jong assumed an even more significant role at the Department of Organization and Guidelines, where she oversaw important daily decisions on personnel matters such as who would be monitored, demoted, promoted, punished, or banished. She was also authorized to run South Korea policy and U.S. policy. By 2021, Kim Yo-jong reportedly returned again to her prior position in the Propaganda and Agitation Department. She seems to be ambitious, in contrast to her older brother, Kim Jong-chul, who lacks interest in politics and was passed over long ago as a possible heir. Optics also indicate that Kim Yo-jong is powerful and trusted by Kim Jong-un. In the heavily choreographed events surrounding the leader, she is the only individual who moves freely, guiding others on where to stand and making spontaneous moves such as fetching an ashtray for her brother. These menial acts counterintuitively suggest a degree of power for Yo-jong that no one else has.
+
+The transfer of power to Kim Yo-jong would mark the first horizontal transition of power, as well as the first female leader of North Korea. The past two successions have been vertical, passed from one generation to the next. While these would both be significant firsts, there are currently no other members of the family within this dynastic system who seem as capable or interested in leading as Kim Yo-jong.
+
+The other figure who has received significant succession-related attention in recent months is Kim Jong-un’s daughter, Kim Ju-ae. She first appeared in public by Kim Jong-un’s side in November last year at the inspection and launch of a Hwasong-17 missile. Kim Jong-un reportedly has three children, one son and two daughters. Kim Ju-ae, the second child and first daughter, is estimated to be 10 years old. She was the child who Dennis Rodman famously held when he visited North Korea in 2013.
+
+Kim Ju-ae’s now-frequent public appearances are highly unusual, given the Kim family traditions of extreme privacy. Basic information about the children of North Korean leaders had been guarded as a close secret in prior generations. The first photo of Kim Jong-un and his siblings was not released until April 2009, and Kim’s name was not announced until 2010, one year before he took power.
+
+The unveiling of Kim Ju-ae at this particular time, and at her particular age, has generated a great deal of speculation about Kim Jong-un’s possible intentions. Some have said that Kim’s introduction of his daughter provides a means to humanize him or to make him appear fatherly and responsible as a custodian of the country’s nuclear weapons. Others have suggested that Kim Ju-ae’s debut serves as a signal, both internally and externally, that North Korea’s status as a nuclear state and the Kim family’s hold on power are secure and will be passed on to future generations. The parading of Kim Ju-ae could also be a useful distraction from further advances in North Korea’s weapons programs. A more extreme yet still plausible explanation is a power struggle between Ri Sol-Ju and Kim Yo-jung. As Kim Yo-jung’s political power within the regime began to grow, Ro Sol-ju may have wanted to keep her in check and make it clear that her children are in the succession line. All of these explanations, or some combination of them, seem plausible.
+
+___`Kim Ju-ae’s debut serves as a signal, both internally and externally, that North Korea’s status as a nuclear state and the Kim family’s hold on power are secure and will be passed on to future generations.`___
+
+It is possible that Kim Ju-ae’s recent public outings mark the early stages of a succession process, though there are reasons to be skeptical of this explanation, particularly given her young age. As one expert noted, “Ju-ae would need a phone book to . . . reach up and touch the nuclear button. She’s probably not first in line right now.” Furthermore, Ju-ae’s term of endearment, the “most beloved,” does not necessarily imply that she is considered the most qualified leader. If Ju-ae’s public debut was an aspect of grooming, there would likely be more deification of her, such as showcasing her abilities to lecture scientists on fissile material or get multiple holes in one on the golf course.
+
+However, it remains possible that Kim Ju-ae could be her father’s designated successor. The number of appearances with her father have proliferated since the beginning of 2023. Even though she has an older brother, who would be the most expected choice, given the vertical, male lineage of North Korean leaders that has prevailed thus far, his father might not deem that he is up for the job.
+
+There is also the possibility that Ju-ae’s older brother is the actual successor. Under this scenario, the older brother is being protected from public scrutiny, perhaps attending a boarding school in Switzerland as his father did, while Ju-ae serves as a useful distraction.
+
+One panelist noted the possibility that the intelligence on Kim’s children has been faulty, and Ju-ae has no older brother — after all, he has never been seen in public, so there is no firm evidence that he exists.
+
+There are two possible explanations for the patterns surrounding the women in Kim’s life. Kim could genuinely be a North Korean version of a “liberated man” seeking to empower women. But the opposite could also be true, that Kim’s elevation of a number of women reflects his insecurity. According to this line of reasoning, in a patriarchal society such as North Korea, women are less threatening to Kim than men. He can therefore use women to show that he has a support system around him and that there is a generation ahead of him. At the same time, his female cadre sends the message that he’s “still the man,” both literally and figuratively.
+
+Similar to the situation with Kim Jong-un’s health, there is no way to know for sure why Kim has chosen to raise the profile of his daughter at this time, or women within the regime more generally. Given these levels of uncertainty, all possibilities should be considered, even the ones that seem unlikely.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+Most conversations concerning North Korea in recent months have focused on its nuclear and missile programs. This is understandable, given the unprecedented 95 cruise and ballistic missile tests North Korea conducted in 2022, alongside preparations for a seventh nuclear test. The regime started 2023 with a battery of ballistic missile tests in February as well. But an examination of who is controlling the country’s nuclear weapons and missile systems is equally important.
+
+While the current situation is deeply concerning, it is worth considering whether Kim Jong-un’s sudden demise would bring better unknowns. Is this something to hope for or something to fear? Perhaps the answer is both.
+
+There are two specific pieces of advice for policymakers grappling with how to manage leadership uncertainty in North Korea. On the one hand, it is important to focus on the current leader, the one “in front of the curtain now,” for “that’s the one we have to deal with.” At the same time, in considering the future of North Korea, it is important to keep a number of scenarios in mind, including the less likely “wild-card” ones. Balancing these two imperatives will help to ensure that policymakers are prepared to deal with whichever leadership scenarios the future may bring — from an extended period of Kim Jong-un’s rule to an abrupt succession and regime instability.
+
+Assumptions about leadership are baked into all policy decisions on North Korea. They should be made explicit and periodically revisited when considering various policy options. Exercises such as this CSIS workshop — mapping out a range of possibilities concerning three pivotal “known unknown” leadership variables — help to serve that purpose.
+
+---
+
+__Victor Cha__ is senior vice president and Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. He was appointed in 2021 by Biden administration to serve on the Defense Policy Board in an advisory role to the secretary of defense. He formerly served on the National Security Council from 2004 to 2007, where he was responsible primarily for Japan, the Korean peninsula, Australia/New Zealand, and Pacific Island nation affairs.
+
+__Katrin Fraser Katz__ is an adjunct fellow (non-resident) with the CSIS Korea Chair. She is a former director for Japan, Korea, and oceanic affairs on the staff of the National Security Council, where she served from 2007 to 2008. Previously, she was a special assistant to the assistant secretary for international organization affairs at the U.S. Department of State and an analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency.
diff --git a/_config.yml b/_config.yml
index e5a18c10..1fd51eed 100644
--- a/_config.yml
+++ b/_config.yml
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
title: The Republic of Agora
-description: UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.25 © MMXXIII
+description: UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.26 © MMXXIII
baseurl: "/pen0" # the subpath of your site, e.g. /blog
url: "https://agorahub.github.io" # the hostname & protocol, e.g. http://example.com
google_analytics: 'UA-166928354-2' # agorahub-pen0
diff --git a/_data/archives.yml b/_data/archives.yml
index aa76730e..5aedc19f 100644
--- a/_data/archives.yml
+++ b/_data/archives.yml
@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
+- name: VOL.25
+ repo: https://gitlab.com/agora0/pen/0x19
+ site: https://agora0.gitlab.io/pen/0x19
- name: VOL.24
repo: https://gitlab.com/agora0/pen/0x18
site: https://agora0.gitlab.io/pen/0x18
diff --git a/c1.html b/c1.html
index 209926a5..20ad3bb4 100644
--- a/c1.html
+++ b/c1.html
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
paginate:
collection: columns
per_page: 25
+ limit: 100
reversed: true
permalink: /page:num/
permalink: /c1/
diff --git a/c2.html b/c2.html
index 79b41c59..2c50a04e 100644
--- a/c2.html
+++ b/c2.html
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
paginate:
collection: hkers
per_page: 25
+ limit: 100
reversed: true
permalink: /page:num/
permalink: /c2/